G.R. No. L-6207 August 4, 1911SIMON MALAHACAN, administrator of the goods, chattels and credits of GUILLERMA MARTINEZ, deceased,plaintiff-appellee,vs.JOSEFA IGNACIO, MACARIO IGNACIO, PAULA IGNACIO and AGUEDA BUAG,defendants-appellants.M.P. Leuterio for appellants.No appearance for appellee.MORELAND,J.:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas, the Hon. J.S. Powell presiding, awarding the possession of the lands described in the complaint to the plaintiff, with costs.The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the said deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before the commencement of this action.Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. In the case of Ilustre, administrator of the estate of the deceasedCalzado vs. Alaras Frondosa(17 Phil. Rep., 321), this court said:Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed on the merits, without special findings as to costs.Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-21725November 29, 1968AURELIO ARCILLAS,petitioner,vs.HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO ARCILLAS and VICENTE ARCILLAS,respondents.Antonio J. Calvento for petitioner.T. de los Santos for respondents.MAKALINTAL,J.:Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate petitions having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part of the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City of Zamboanga.In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of their respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276 executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new certificate of title. But before any other material pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed the November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this later petition, insofar as pertinent to this case, read:3. That the deceased left an estate consisting of real property in Zamboanga City with a probable value of not less than SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency;4. That as far as petitioners know, the deceased left no debts remaining unpaid;In the meantime, on November 23, 1962 herein petitioner filed his opposition to the November 12 petition on the ground that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 the subject matter thereof was included in the estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration had actually been filed and was awaiting resolution, that petition (the one dated November 12) should be held in abeyance until after Special Proceeding No. 632 was closed and terminated. Recognizing then the merit of petitioner's ground, respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 temporarily holding in abeyance resolution of the November 12 petition until the termination of the intestate proceedings.Meanwhile, in his answer to the November 16 petition (Sp. Proc. No. 632) Geronimo Arcillas, this time joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration to herein petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was improper. However petitioner, in his reply on January 18, 1963, insisted that there were still other properties of the estate of the deceased besides Lot No. 276; he likewise took issue with respondents' view that administration proceedings could be dispensed with asserting, firstly, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial partition and, secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of their participation in the estate.On March 8, 1963 respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the issuance of letters of administration and at the same time gave due course to the November 12 petition. Reasoned the court: "... to obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which would only deplete the funds of the estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property involved herein, and following the doctrines established by the Honorable Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which is in consonance with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court is of the opinion that the herein petition (should) be denied and (holds that) the cadastral motion of the oppositor Geronimo Arcillas covering the same property is the most expedient and proper action."Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary injunction. On December 2, 1963, upon filing by petitioner of the required bond, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the "cadastral motion" dated November 12, 1962.The issues to be determined are whether respondent Judge acted properly (1) in dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age and (2) in maintaining that the "cadastral motion" brought under the provision of section 112 of the Land Registration Act was the more proper proceeding under the circumstances.Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the partiesmay, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary. In other words, respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age.We cannot entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in the past, we had occasion to explain inRodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273:... section I does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the wordmay. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the wordshallas was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the wordmayits used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in administration proceedings rather than in any other action.Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the "cadastral" motion, supposedly brought under the authority of section 112 of Act 496, cannot be sustained. While this section authorizes, among others, a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate have terminated and ceased," and apparently the November 12 petition comes within its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs (see Puguid v. Reyes, L-21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein). In the instant case the obvious lack of unanimity among the parties in interest, manifestly demonstrated by petitioners' express objection to the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244, sufficiently removes the November 12 petition from the scope of section 112 of Act 496. Besides, the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are summary in nature and hence inadequate for the litigation of issues which properly pertain to the case where the incident belongs.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the appealed orders and directing respondent Judge or whoever is presiding the court below to reinstate Special Proceedings No. 632; the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the "cadastral" motion dated November 12, 1962 is hereby made permanent. Costs against respondents, except respondent Judge.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC,respondents.Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.GANCAYCO, J.:Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.1In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent2alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order.3Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987.4Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased.5The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any.6The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.7Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.8An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74.9Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action.10It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.11Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings .12Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.In one case,13We said:Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration.14In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.15We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature,16the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134329 January 19, 2000VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA,respondents.DE LEON, JR.,J.:The victory1of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court2in an ejectment suit3filed against them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal4by the Regional Trial Court5on appeal. They elevated their cause6to respondent Court of Appeals7which, however, promulgated a Decision8on May 20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.The following facts are undisputed:One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higina was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses.On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation9transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It made the following findings:After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic] successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-described residential property . . . as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the name of his heirs . . ..The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-described property long before the sale of said property on November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-described property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-described property to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners became the undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . their possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful.10From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:. . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or estoppel.It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the community property, the question then involved is no longer one for partition but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.x x x x x x x x x. . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft of any right in donating the very property in question.11The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as follows:WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the option of acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and until the termination of the present case;4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit.12Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court.On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said petition. It explained:Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possessionde factoor physical or material possession and notde jure. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession . . . .Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such partition.1wphi1.ntNotably,petitioners in their petition admittedamong the antecedent facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally owned by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot,i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share . . . . Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada, and her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary division of the estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the respective portions assigned to them . . ..The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest nor right to transfer. . . . This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years . . . . Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by petitioners.13Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.Hence this petition raising the following issues:I.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.II.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.III.WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH.14There is no merit to the instant petition.First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid.15The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims.16The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved.17Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid.18The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein.19The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves.20And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.21The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.22Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.23When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid.24No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family.25Their admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject property is concerned.Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.26Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 44827and Article 54628of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith,i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.29Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled,i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized.30More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6871 January 15, 1912JOSE McMICKING, administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose,plaintiff-appellant,vs.BENITO SY CONBIENG, administrator of the estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco,defendant-appellee.Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher for appellant.D. R. Williams for appellee.MORELAND,J.:On or about the 5th of February, 1902, one Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippine Islands, died at Amoy, in the empire of China, leaving an estate consisting of personal property partly in Hongkong and partly in the Philippine Islands. On the 16th of April, 1902, one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased, by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties and qualified as such in the sum of P60,000. After the execution of this bond the said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose, amounting in all to $58,820.29 Hongkong currency. On the 22d of April, 1904, the Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila, testate. The fact of his death was brought to the attention of the Court of First Instance of said city on the 2nd of November, 1904, by an application made by one of the legatees of said Margarita Jose, deceased, for an order directing said administrator to furnish a new bond. Pursuant to this application the court, on the 10th of November, 1904, made an order directing the said Palanca to furnish a bond in the sum of P60,000 to take the place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, and Dy Cunyao were sureties. The bond thus required was duly filed on the 22nd of November, 1904, the sureties thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. On the 11th of May, 1904, one Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator with the will annexed of said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, and on July 7 following Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator in the sum of P30,000. Said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco left him surviving as his heirs at law and devises and legatees one daughter, to whom he devised two-thirds of his estate, and three sons in China, to whom he devised the remaining one-third. On the 27th of July, 1904, said Doroteo Velasco, as such administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of he estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate. This agreement of partition was drawn and executed under sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes and to attain the ends therein mentioned. On the 28th of July, 1904, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, upon the request of the administrator with the will annexed and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, entered an order in said agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, and after all the liabilities under which said estate lay had been fully paid and satisfied, the said Doroteo Velasco, as said administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, all of the property of said decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands of said administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time forward said administrator has not had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and has not had any participation in the management thereof. At the time the agreement for participation was made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the property of the estate pursuant thereto, no committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, and no notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to present their claims against the said estate in the manner prescribed by law.On the 30th of March, 1908, by virtue of an order made by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, upon application of all parties interested, the said Engracio Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased, and the plaintiff herein, Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. The said Palanca was removed from office by reason of the fact that he failed and refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased, which has come to his possession as such administrator, and failed and refused, on order of the court, to deliver said property and funds or any portion thereof to the court or to the said Jose McMicking, his successor. Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands. At the time of his removal he was indebted to the estate in the sum of P41,960.15, no part of which has ever been received by the estate or by its representative.On the 30th of June, 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against the estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administration with the will annexed of Margarita Jose, deceased, which claim was allowed by said commission and later approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by the commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased.On the 3rd of November, 1905, Pio de la Barretto, who, it will be remembered, was one of the sureties on the undertaking of Doroteo Velasco, as administrator with the will annexed of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, died in the city of Manila, leaving an estate consisting of real and personal property located in the city. Said deceased left a will which was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 3rd day of February, 1906, and letters of administration with the will annexed were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng, the defendant in this case. On the 4th of June, 1909, upon the application of the plaintiff in this case, a committee was appointed by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented against his estate. Thereafter and within the time prescribed by law the plaintiff herein presented to said committee a claim for the sum of P30,000 "based upon the fact that the claim for the larger amount had been allowed in favor of the estate of said Margarita Jose Sempco, deceased;" and based upon the further fact "that the Court of First Instance had ordered the said Doroteo Velasco, as administrator of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, to pay the said claim if there were funds sufficient to make such payment, but that it has not been paid by the said Doroteo Velasco, or any part thereof," The claim so presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof. The plaintiff herein within the time allowed by law appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila from the order of the committee disallowing said claim.It is disputed in the case that all of the claims against the estate of Mariano Ocampo were fully paid and satisfied at the time of the partition of said estate, with the exception of the alleged claim arising by virtue of his having been a surety of the default Palanca. It nowhere appears in the evidence or the record exactly when this claim arose it may be inferred from the time of presentation in 1909, and we have no means of determining whether the defalcation represented by the said claim occurred before or after the substitution of sureties herefore referred to.Upon these facts it was contended by counsel for plaintiff that the judgment should be rendered in his favor for the sum of P30,000, with costs, while counsel of defendant contended that upon said facts judgment should be rendered in favor of defendant, dismissing the complaint, with costs. The court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. This appeal is from that judgment.We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stands sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as follows:SEC. 596.Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.SEC. 597.In such case distributees liable for debts. But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made.These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent without proceedings in court. The provisions which they contain are extremely important. The wisdom which underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and imperative reason and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons effective. It is a principle of universal acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave birth to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which destroyed the feudal despotism and created the democracy of private owners.These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction so that the intent of the framers may be fully carried out. They should not be straitened or narrowed but should rather be given that wideness and fullness of application without which they cannot produce their most beneficial effects.Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of administration of these Islands, they are the first provisions to which our attention is directed in seeking a legal method for the division and distribution of the property of deceased persons. They are thus made prominent. And justly so. The purpose which underlies them, as we have already intimated, is to put into one's hands the property which belongs to him not only at the earliest possible moment but also with the least possible expense. By permitting the partition and division without proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially all expense and waste are saved. This is as it should be. The State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution of the property of a decedent is no cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished quickly and at very small expense; and a system which consumes any considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure. It being undoubted that the removal of property from the possession of its owner and its deposit in the hands of another for administration is a suspension of some of its most important rights of property and is attended with an expense sometimes entirely useless and unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided whenever and wherever possible.In the case at the bar we are of the opinion that, under the broad and liberal policy which we must adopt in the interpretation and application of the provisions referred to, the decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, in the form, in the manner and for the purposes expressed, falls within the provisions of said sections and may be termed, therefore, and we hold it to be, a partition of the property of a decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact of the prior appointment of an administrator and the filing of an inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as the right of the owners to partition is concerned. The only requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that "there are no debts . . . or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When the condition is fulfilled the partition can take place, no matter what stage the administration may have reached. By this it is, of course, not meant that the partition after the appointment of an administrator will interfere with the rights acquired by third person dealing with said administrator within the limits of his authority and prior to the partition; nor that the administrator can be deprived of the property of which he is legally in possession without proper proceedings and the consent of the court.As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an administrators' bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of the principal precedes that of the surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then his surety incurred none. The question that naturally suggests itself is, then, In what was Velasco at fault or in what did he fail? When the persons interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreed voluntarily upon a partition and division of the property of said estate and the actual partition followed, the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator. The parties to the partition stood invoking their rights under section 596 and 597. Velasco was helpless. He was powerless to prevent the parties from taking the property to which they were entitled under the agreement, it being conceded that they were actually entitled thereto in law. Those sections were applicable to the situation and there was nothing that Velasco could do to prevent the estate from being divided according to their provisions. In giving his consent to the partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the court thereto he did no wrong. He simply aided in carrying out the provisions of the sections referred to. It is a universal principle that one who follows a law commits no fault, incurs no failure and wounds no rights. If one obeys the law he is free not only in person but in property. Observance of the law discharges obligations; it does not create them; and an obligation once discharged cannot be re-acted by the act of others in which the person as to whom it was discharged takes no part. The proceedings under sections referred to were, after the partition was actually made and the property duly turned over the administrator under the proper proceedings, a complete settlement of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, as it then stood, so far as the administrator was concerned. Nothing further needed to be done. Every duty which Velasco owed up to the time of the partition had been met. All debts presented or known had been paid. The court had given it approbation to the delivery of the property by the administrator to the partitioning parties. Every obligation which lay upon him had been removed. Nor could there arise against him any obligation in the future in relation to the same property. The instant that the partition occurred, in the form and manner stated, he stood stripped of all responsibility to the estate, to its creditors, to the heirs and to the court. He stood divested o every official duty and obligation, as fully as before his appointment as completely as if he had not been appointed at all. In law, therefore, he was no longer administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased. He was in effect, discharged. As to him the estate had been wiped out as a legal entity. It had ceased to exist. And, while at any time within two years after the partition the property, or a portion thereof, then in the possession of the partitioning persons could have been placed in administration upon the happening of certain events, it would not have been the same estate that had been represented by Velasco, nor would Velasco have been the administrator of the estate by virtue of his appointment in the old. It would have been necessary for the court, upon the proper application setting forth the conditions prescribed by the sections, to appoint another administrator for the purposes specified therein. It might have been Velasco, if he would have accepted the appointment, or it might have been another. The point isthat it would have been necessary to appoint a new administratorjust as if one had not been named before. The new administrator would have had new duties, some of which would have been quite different from those of the administrator appointed originally. He would have had different sureties, who would have found themselves to different obligations.That on the partition under said section the estate was, in this case, completely wiped out and the administrator as completely discharged cannot be doubted for the following reasons:1. The whole estate was, by virtue of these sections, taken from the administrator and turned over to the partitioning persons. No security was required or given for its safekeeping or return.2. The persons to whom the estate was thus turned over became absolute owners of the same, subject to be devastated, wholly or only partly, on the happening of certain events and the taking of certain proceedings thereon. But even such divestiture could not have been avoided by the payment by the parties, or any of them, of the debt which was the moving cause thereof.From these premises it is the merest conclusion to say that the decedent's estate was merged in their partitioning parties; and this no matter whether the partition occurred before or after the appointment of an administrator. When one has been named to perform certain acts in relation to a given thing, and before said acts have been begun, or, having been begun, are completed, the appointing power has placed the thing upon which those acts were to operate wholly beyond the possession, jurisdiction and control of the one so appointed, there is a complete revocation of such appointment, so far as all subsequent acts are concerned. An administrator cannot be held to any accountability for property over which he has absolutely no power or jurisdiction and in which he has not the slightest legal interest. The thing on which he was appointed to operate having been withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by the very power (the law) which appointed him, there is a complete revocation of the appointment.Moreover, the sureties of an administrator so appointed can not be held liable for property which by force of law has been taken from the principal and its ownership and control turned over to others. Their obligation is that their principal shall obey the law in the handling and distribution of the estate. Their obligation is discharged when the estate is legally turned over to those entitled thereto. The law requires the principal to turn it over to those who bring themselves within the provisions of section 596. Having turned over the whole estate under the compelling power of the law, his obligation ceased. The responsibility of the sureties ceased at the same time. Without their consent another obligation could not be imposed upon them in relation to the same principal, and the same property, or apart thereof, especially after the lapse of two years. Their undertaking was that their principal should discharge one obligation, not two.It requires no argument to demonstrate that the duties and obligations imposed upon an administrator appointed under section 597 might and probably would be different in many respects from those of an administrator appointed in the first instance; and that, therefore, the obligation of his sureties would not be the same as that of the sureties of the administrator appointed originally. The administration contemplated by section 597 is a new administration and one entirely apart from any other administration theretofore had. This section requires the appointment of a new administrator, with a new undertaking. The administration under the section is distinct and separate from any administration which may have been in progress at the time of the partition and division under section 596. This is clear for the following reasons:After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the following requisites:1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement and distribution of estate."2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of an administrator.If those requisites are lacking, there can be no administration. When one fails the right too such administration does not arise and any person intersted in the estate may oppose any effort to administer under such circumstances. These requisites combined are that and that alone which give to the administrator when appointed the right to recover the assets from the persons who received them on the a partition. Indeed, if these requisites are lackingno administrator can lawfully be appointed, and, if improperly appointed, he fails of legal power to maintain an action to recover the assets in the hands of those among whom they have partitioned; in other words, he is powerless to administer. If these requisites fail, then the real estate in the hands either of the persons among whom it has been partitioned or of their assignees is free from the lien created by section 597 and any attempt to enforce such lien can be successfully opposed by any person interested in such property. The appointment of an administrator without the concurrence of these requisites is without warrant of law and the appointee is powerless to perform any act of administration. The statute must be strictly complied with in every essential before it operates. Every essential requirements must be fulfilled before it will be permitted that a partition which has the clear sanction of the law and which is strictly in accord with the public policy of the estate shall be set aside and destroyed with all the evil consequences thereby entailed.It is necessary deduction from the provisions of the sections mentioned that the appointment of an administrator ought not to be permitted, even when the requisites above mentioned occur, unless the heirs or the persons among whom the property was partitioned have been given an opportunity to be heard on that application. It would be extremely unusual to proceed to the appointment of an administrator under section 597, by virtue of a debt which had been discovered after the partition and division, without giving the heirs an opportunity to avoid such administration by the payment of the debt, it being kept in view that the object of the law in originally giving the right to pay the debts and having partition without proceedings in court was to avoid that every administration. Such a proceeding would be unusual and irrational. Such a course would be in direct opposition to the purposes which animated the provisions authorizing the original partition.(1) In the case at bar no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed.(2) No creditor made his application.The requirements of section 597 not having been met, there could be no administration under section. Therefore, the appointment of commissioners for the hearing of the claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo presented by the plaintiff in this case was an appointment without warrant or authority of law. It was appointment in respect to an estatethat did not existand in relation to an administrationthat had never been inaugurated. Under section 597 the commencement of the administration is the application of the creditor and the appointment of the administrator pursuant to such application. Without such appointment there is no administration. As we have before stated, when the property was partitioned a described heretofore, the estate, as such, ceased to exist and the administration thereof by Doroteo Velasco was wiped out. There was no administrator to carry on the administration. By operation of the law the estate had been passed on the heirs who had become the absolute owners of it. They were subject to the orders of the old administrator and they held rights inferior to no one. To be sure, as we have already stated, those rights might be modified to a certain extent by the happening of subsequent events; but until those events transpired their rights were absolute. Those conditions never having been met, a fact admitted by both parties in the case at bar, there was absolutely no estate at all, much less one in the process of administration, at the time the commissioners were appointed to her the claim for P30,000 presented against the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, by the plaintiff herein. Add to this the fact that there was no administrator of said estate in extense at the time, and we have before us the absurdity of the appointment of the commissioners to report on a claim against an estate which did not exist and under the direction of an administrator that had never been appointed.The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against the estate and none against the so-called administrator.It must be remembered that it is only debts discovered within the prescribed period that can be made the reason for an administration of the estate subsequent to its partition. The necessary result is t hat a debt not discovered within that period cannot be made the reason for an administration of the estate. The debt in the case at bar having first discovered more than four years after the partition of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, an administrator, even though appointed under section 57, would not no authority in law, over the objection of one interested, to pay the debt in question or to maintain an action or other proceeding for the recovery of property for that purpose. This section creates a statute of limitations which deprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an administration of the estate. The administration of the estate after the partition under the law has been accomplished depends upon the discovery of the debt "at any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate." The law does not operate unless that discovery is made within the time prescribed.We have not overlooked the contention that at the time this partition took place there was a contingent claim against the estate partitioned, namely, the claim which would arise on the contingency that the administrator for whom Mariano Ocampo was surety might default or otherwise fail to perform his duties thus rendering Mariano Ocampo liable on his bond; and that contingent claim, being one expressly recognized by sections 746 to 749 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a claim entirely proper to present, no partition of this estate under section 596 and 597 was legally possible until such claim was provided for by the petitioning parties. This contention goes upon the assumption that a partition under the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure so often referred to is void unlesseverydebt is paid or provided for by the petitioning parties, and may therefore be entirely disregarded by the creditor holding a claim either unpaid or provided for. We do not believe that this assumption is warranted. In the first place, we must remember that the partition proceedings in question are proceedingsout of court. Consequently there is no prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the publication of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administrationin courtare not required in partitionout of court. The law is silent as to how the claims are to be ascertained, presented and determined. We must assume, therefore, that the method of ascertaining them and determining their validity was left to the good sense and sound judgment of the persons concerned. Usually no difficulty will be experienced in solving the problem presented by this conclusion. It is obvious that creditors always know who owes them and that debtors generally know whom they owe. It is equally obvious that, generally speaking, a creditor is one of the first to learn of the death of the debtor, and that heirs of the latter are the first to begin to calculate how much of his property they are to receive. This cannot be known until the debts are determined. The heirs know they cannot escape payment of the debts. A surreptitious division behind the backs of the creditors would not avail as the latter have two years thereafter in which to throw at least a portion of the estate into administration and thereby nullify the attempt to overreach them. Even the transfer by the partitioning persons of the property received on the partition to third persons would not profit them, inasmuch as the consideration received on such transfer would, if necessary, be subject to seizure to pay the debt presented and the real estate would go into the hands of the vendees charged with the lien of said debt.The method of ascertaining claims against the defendant's estate not being prescribed, it is apparent that no objection to a partition can be urged by a creditor whose claim has not been paid, due to the faulty method adopted by the partitioning parties to ascertain claims, or, even, the absence of any effort at all to ascertain them.In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made by sections 596 and 597 for the payment of a claim discovered by them or presentedafter the partition. That is one of the main provisions. It is a necessary deduction, therefore, that it was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not all of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partitiondirectly; that is, by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. While a partition manifestly fraudulent in inception and result might possibly be attacked directly by an action to set aside, a question which we do not discuss or decide, the manner of attacking the partition prescribed by the law is the one, generally speaking, preferably to be followed; and that is to throw into administration so much of the estate as is necessary to pay the outstanding claim. The method, thoughindirect, accomplishes a better result than adirectattack. The latter, by destroying the validity of the partition, would throw the whole situation into confusion and uncertainty, something always to be avoided. The former does not produce that result. Where there is no fraud, and possibly where there is, a direct attack on the partition is impossible under the provisions under discussion. A claim discovered and presented within the two years serves not to destroy, primarily, the partition. It does not even permit the whole estate to be thrown into administration. Only such portion as is necessary to pay the discovered debt can be administered. This is apparent when it is observed that on such administration the administrator is authorized to recoveronly the amount of property necessary to pay the debt presented, leaving the partitioning parties in undisturbed possession of the remainder. Moreover, the partitioning parties may still pay the debt and preserve undisturbed the partition in all it parts and thus assure and maintain the rights of the parties thereunder. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.But, as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such appointment and administration,the claim must be presented within two yearsfrom the date of the partition and distribution.Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity, either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so far as thevalidityof the partition is concerned.We have also seen that the fact that there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place is of no importance so far as thevalidityof the partition is concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which we have already adverted and left undecided.We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an administration of the estateunless such claim is discovered and presented within two years.The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The sections under discussion make no distinction between claims.The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five years after the petition before the alleged creditor made any attempt whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death of Ocampo very soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities that Ocampo's estate might be called upon to respond for the failure of Palanca to perform his duty as administrator. It was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of Ocampo to be partitioned and distributed without protest and without the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very probable that the property of the estate was being consumed, incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it had been distributed.The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special finding as to costs.Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ.,concur.Carson and Trent, JJ.,concur as to the dispositive part.

G.R. No. L-47475 May 6, 1942DONATO LAJOM,plaintiff-appellant,vs.JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO VIOLA,defendants-appellees.Simeon P. Mangaliman for appellant.Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.BOCOBO,J.:This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, sustaining the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint and dismissing the case. On March 17, 1939, the plaintiff-appellant, Donato Lajom, filed a complaint, which amended on May 16, 1939, praying, among other things, that he be declared a natural child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and therefore a co-heir of the defendand-appellees, Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola, and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of said Dr. Maximo Viola; and that after collation, payment of debts and accounting of fruits, a new partition be ordered, adjudicating one-seventh of the estate to the plaintiff and two-sevenths to each of the defendants. Among the allegations of the complaint are the following:x x x x x x x x x2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledged by his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola, begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom and born in 1882 when both, Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and could have contracted marriage;x x x x x x x x x4. That from early childhood until before the year 1889, and even thereafter, the plaintiff had been living with his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola, and had been enjoying the status of a son, not only within the family circle but also publicly, on account of the acts of his said father;x x x x x x x x x6. That a testate proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, covering the estate left by the said Dr. Maximo Viola, registered as civil case No. 4741 of said Court; and this special proceedings was already closed on March 17, 1937, as can be seen in a copy of the order of said Court, hereto attached, marked as Annex D, and is being made an integral part hereof;7. That the plaintiff did not intervene during the pendency of the special proceeding above mentioned, as he expected that his brothers, the herein defendants, would disclose and tell the truth to the Court that they have a natural brother whom they knew to be living, and whose address was well known to them; a brother who should also participate in the estate of their deceased father; and besides, the herein defendants promised to the herein plaintiff that they would give him his lawful share in the estate of their father;8. That the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed the truth from the Court that they have a natural brother who should also participate in the estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question;9. That the herein defendants partitioned among themselves the estate in question, as can be seen in their "Convenio de Patricion y Adjudicacion," dated October 25, 1935, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked as Annex E, and is made an intergral part hereof, and since then up to the present time, each of the herein defendants has been occupying, possessing and enjoying his corresponding share, in accordance with the said "Convenio de Particion y Adjudicacion"; while the properties alleged to be paraphernal properties of the late Juana Roura in said "Convenio de Particion y Adjudicacion" are not paraphernal but conjugal properties of the late spouses, Dr. Maximo Viola and Doa Juana Roura, acquired during their martial life;x x x x x x x x x18. That the plaintiff had demanded of the defendants that they give to him his lawful participation of the estate in question, as well as of the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with their promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the herein defendants have failed to give to the herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in questions, nor of the products or fruits therefrom; and the said defendants continue to fail to give to him his legal portion of the said estate and the fruits or products therefrom, of which the plaintiff is entitled to one-seventh (1/7) while each of the three defendants is entitled to two-sevenths (2/7) of the same.By an order dated July 31, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the case. The Court held that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because its allegation called for the exercise of the probate jurisdiction of the court and consequently did not constitute a cause of action in an ordinary civil case like the present. It was further held that the court had no jurisdiction because there was no allegation that the late Dr. Maximo Viola was, at the time of his death, a resident of Nueva Ecija; on the contrary, the complaint showed that the will of the deceased had already been probated in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and that court having first taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija could no longer assume jurisdiction over the same case.The two grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the complaint will now be discussed.First, as to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff and one of the defendants, Jose P. Viola, are residents of Nueva Ecija; and from the complaint it appears that 16 of the parcels of land belonging to the estate are situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, while 3 lots are in the Province of Isabela, 1 in the City of Baguio, 6 in Manila, and the rest (46 parcels) are found in the Province of Bulacan. Paragraphs 7, 8, and 18 of the complaint allege a violation of contract, a breach of trust, and therefore the case may be instituted in the Province of Nueva Ecija. Paragraph 7 alleges "the herein defendants promised to the herein plaintiff that they would give him his lawful share in the estate of their father." Paragraph 8 states that "the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed from the Court the truth that they have a natural brother who should participate in the estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question." And paragraph 18 asserts that "the plaintiff herein had demanded of the defendants that they give to him his lawful participation of the estate question, as of the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with their promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the herein defendants have failed to give the herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in question." These allegations clearly denounce a breach of trust which, if proved at the trial, the courts could not for a moment countenance. Regardless of any legal title to the plaintiff's share, declared by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in favor of the defendants in the testate proceedings, high considerations of equity vehemently demand that the defendants shall not take advantage of such legal title, obtained by them through a betrayal of confidence placed in th