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G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO , petitioners,vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO,ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR.,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution1of the Court of Appeals 2affirming

the Orders3

of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution4

which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts5are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and

his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo,Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1wphi1.nt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business

under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 Gen eral Tinio Street, ArtySubdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina,

Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition6with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7of the judicial settlement of the estate of their latefather, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for

three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon theheirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government,"

and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside

herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to filetheir opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8on July 23, 1993 seeking;

(1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to

set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial co urt did not acquire jurisdiction overthe persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, saidaffirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo forhearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial

court in its Order10dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction

over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward

compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6

1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the

questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the

failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling ofthe petition but that the same have failed.

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Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point outthat it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial orextra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefitand advantage xxx.

X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to thedamage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.

X X X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses

and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as andattorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a

motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the

petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members ofthe same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments15and the character of the relief sought16in the

complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement andDistribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition

contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo

on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within

he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626

also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in

the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein(private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased

TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and

the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all inaccordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,0 00.00 plushonorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, asoppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is

actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary

damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16,Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late

Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court,

has limited and special jurisdiction20and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary

civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by

the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrownout of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

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Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a

deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for

the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberal ly construed in order to promote their

object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term

"proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the

invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manaloinasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have

been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or

persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the

enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the

enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.24Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the

intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of thesame family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is nec essary that every effort

should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between clo se

relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant

was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PR OC. No. 92-63626 is a special

proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.26the petitioners therein (privaterespondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so

that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and specialjurisdiction of the probate court.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDAFUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA,J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relatingto the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the dece dent to any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion ofwhich declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed

of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No.

186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosarioin a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo,

Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among

themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 shareof the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Sixchildren.1wphi1.nt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they

subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a

portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by

TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90

square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife

Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six

children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's

death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano

executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in

the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimeshave been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law,

she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, inadvance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's

property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a c omplete nullity. There

being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation ofproperty between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance ofPatricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action

for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for thesettlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

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"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule onthe validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's

decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no m erit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or th e prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for

a special civil action.

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's righ

in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The

term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special

proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon anapplication or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules

and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this

sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted

without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct andindependent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the

estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantlyrequires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise

of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the de ceased to any heir may be

heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings;and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the personraising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the"court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue

of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with

damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not

properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, hereinpetitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for

the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property

owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From

the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceedingbecause it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13andMendoza vs. Teh14that whether a particular

matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdictionis not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authorityof the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

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Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide

a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement,or the parties consent to theassumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is c ompetent to decide the question ofownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh,we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not

necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 17(emphasissupplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necess ary that certain steps be taken

first.18The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the

deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of thecompulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of

procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-

entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forumto ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is herebyAFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 168799 June 27, 2008

EUHILDA C. TABUADA, petitioner,vs.

HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, ERLINDA CALALIMAN-LEDESMA and YOLANDACALALIMAN-TAGRIZA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA,J.:

In this petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the March 2, 2005 Order1of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20, 2005 Resolution2of the trial court denying the motion for thereconsideration of the challenged order.

The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the parties in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 (the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate

estate of the late Jose and Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their desire to amicably settle the case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial courtissued the following Order3on December 6, 2004:

In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable settlement,

finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pe nding incidents for hearing as the parties and their counsel haveassured this Court that they are going to submit a "Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement" on or before 25 December 2004.

Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul Retiro are notified in open court.

Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.

SO ORDERED.4

The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3,5Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of the parties' failure to

submit the amicable settlement and to comply with the afore-quoted December 6, 2004 Order. The trial court, in the challenged order of even date, likewisedenied all the motions filed by the parties.6

Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately moved for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among

others, that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no payment of the debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already

prepared all the necessary papers for the amicable settlement.7Despite the said pleas for reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to

terminate the proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution,8it affirmed its earlier order. Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule45.9

The petition is granted.

While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural

sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case.10Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court

on account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement.

Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings11(which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not

entirely within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is thesole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein.12

The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propiodismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any orderof the

court,13cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the December 6, 2004

Order14readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the

parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would be dismissed.15Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order

requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties

cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. An orderrequiring

submission of an amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the lawand rules.

Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive

aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or

intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorariis GRANTED. The March 2, 2005 Order and the May 20, 2005 Resolution of theRegional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 areREVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDEDto the court of origin for furtherproceedings.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION,Petitioners,vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 andADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA,J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto

(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto

involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner

Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitionersLopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters o f administration in her favor,

pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition

acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, "net of liabilities."3On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing

private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4In January 2001, private

respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5In the List of

Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before

the Bacolod City courts.6Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137

and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory andappraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9praying that they be furnished with copies of allprocesses and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners

to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion

praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate.10Petitioners also filed

other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing theinventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the

contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a

petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestateproceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate

court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in factcontingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the

estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various

other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all

processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14Second, they prayed that

the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon

submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the

same.15Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon

submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,

preservation and disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals

on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the

success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the

custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case

law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent andexpectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The

settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2,

Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to

special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whosecredit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

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Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had

sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have

no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the rightto intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying

capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any

person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving

of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the

estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows anindividual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or

of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowanceof the Administrators account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it

may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person

interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or

provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent

under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator

immediately after the issuance of such notice.19However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in

connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the

notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the

administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, wassuccessfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21was already pending review before this Court at the t ime of Benedictos death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In

the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the jud gment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what

extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts

therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same

trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint

to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil

case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil

case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to

close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close

the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the

property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court

is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have

a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume

general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be brandedas having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action

for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general

jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal

property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced

against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its

termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a

corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should

be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory ifwe are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we canpartake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to

the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests

are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24

Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special

Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities to protect their

respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned

that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that thejudgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every

aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we

deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate

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court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modalityunder the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings

filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of thedevelopments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate

remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate

concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings.

We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then

anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit theclaim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate,

much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy andorderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core

concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by

the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge

had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be

available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records inthe intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper dispositionof the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting appears

legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement

of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the

service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed

of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court

order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the

decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties"

will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and

place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or

administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application

for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, e ven the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pendingcases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified andcomplete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the

appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual

account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interestedin the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and per sonal estate of the deceased within

three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from

receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but

a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these

duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those withcontingent claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with

Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a

contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assetsto answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their

prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are

entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules onSpecial Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1which is

particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been offset by theevidence of record.

The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. Thereason therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:

Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action oppositors may want to take later on because

until now the personality of the oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot

pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be

dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in

the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as hisalleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your client; you are

leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to

cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction ofthe Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)

Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to

establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction eitherthe foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.

To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellan ts could not be permitted tointroduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contestedthe jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, bycross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' coun sel announced that he would take

part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein,

said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants'

counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection,

unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then,

too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they

maintain that these proceedings should bedismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction ofthe court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid

improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the

Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and gi ven thereto

the proper effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or

improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of

appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition

for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16,

1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On

December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein),

moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953.

This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court

first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all ot her courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the

decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently

refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the

authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the samewould then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several

provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not

only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts but, also,

because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be

contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same,

the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs.Tan, L-

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7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should bedismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of F irst Instance of Rizal had no

authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, havesustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

Francisco Carreon for petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN,J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs ofthe settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of

administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, diedintestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable

Court." At the same time, she movedex partefor her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix

was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there hasbeen no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be

preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed

that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia fi led on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as

special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 th at her appointment was obtained

through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown

herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna,

was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in theBayanihan,a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This

supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected

as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B.

Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is

the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G.

Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia

for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at thebeginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues ofjurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the

hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed

the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal

and real properties making up the state of the deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B.

Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been

acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entit led to inherit from the deceasedAmado G. Garcia.

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On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia

G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceasedAmado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in thehands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her

authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of

action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving

the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of

Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing