Rule 3 sec.9 - 4 (Rules of Court Jurisprudence Digest)
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Transcript of Rule 3 sec.9 - 4 (Rules of Court Jurisprudence Digest)
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Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be
pleaded.
Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is
asserted a necessary party is not joined, the
pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shallstate why he is omitted. Should the court find the
reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party
if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his
inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be
deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not
prevent the court from proceeding in the action,
and the judgment rendered therein shall be
without prejudice to the rights of such necessary
party.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
CARANDANG VS. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
Spouses Carandang and the decedent
Quirino de Guzman were stockholders and
corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting
System (MBS). The Carandangs have equities at 54
% while Quirino has 46%. When the capital stock
of MBS was increased on November 26, 1983, the
Carandangs subscribed P345,000 from it, P293,250
from the said amount was loaned by Quirino to
the Carandangs. In the subsequent increase in
MBS capital stock on March 3, 1989, the
Carandangs subscribed again to the increase in the
amount of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of the
mentioned amount was again loaned by
Quirino. When Quirino sent a demand letter to
the Carandangs for the payment of the loan, the
Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a
pre-incorporation agreement was executed
between Arcadio Carandang and Quirino, whereby
Quirino promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions of the Arcadio without cost, in
consideration for Arcadios technical expertise,hisnewly purchased equipment, and his skill in
repairing and upgrading radio/communication
equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness on
the part of the Carandangs. Thereafter, Quirino
filed a complaint seeking to recover the P336,375
total amount of the loan together with damages.
The RTC ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered theCarandangs to pay the loan plus interest,
attorneys fees, and costs of suit. The Carandangs
appealed the trial courts decision to the CA, but
the CA affirmed the same. The subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the Carandangs were
also denied. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the four checks
used to pay their stock subscriptions were issuedin the name of Milagros de Guzman, the
decedents wife. Thus, Milagros should be
considered as an indispensable party in the
complaint. Being such, the failure to join Milagros
as a party in the case should cause the dismissal of
the action by reason of a jurisprudence stating
that: (i)f a suit is not brought in the name of or
against the real party in interest, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have
dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of
action, considering that Milagros de Guzman,
allegedly an indispensable party, was not included
as a party-plaintiff.
HELD:No. Although the spouses Carandang were
correct in invoking the aforementioned doctrine,
the ground set forth entails an examination of
whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation,and notwhether all persons interested in such
outcome are actually pleaded. The first query
seeks to answer the question of whether Milagros
is a real party in interest, while the latter query is
asking if she is an indispensable party. Since the
issue of this case calls for the definition of an
indispensable party, invoking the abovementioned
doctrine is irrelevant to the case because the
doctrine talks about a real party in interest and
not an indispensable party. Although it is
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important to take note that an indispensable party
is also a real party in interest.
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife
shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by
law.
Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable,
necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary.
The third case occurs if, for example, a husband
files an action to recover a property which he
claims to be part of his exclusive property. The
wife may have no legal interest in such property,
but the rules nevertheless require that she be
joined as a party.
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married
before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage
settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains govern their property relations.
All property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
the contrary is proved.Credits are personal
properties, acquired during the time the loan orother credit transaction was executed. Therefore,
credits loaned during the time of the marriage are
presumed to be conjugal property.
Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are
assumed to be conjugal properties of Quirino and
Milagros. There being no evidence to the contrary,
such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de
Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership
property, is certainly a real party in interest.
Now, with regard to the discussion on the effect of
non-inclusion of parties in the complaint filed: in
indispensable parties, when an indispensable party
is not before the court, the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actuations of the court
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.
For necessary parties, the non-inclusion of a
necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgmentrendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party. Non-compliance
with the order for the inclusion of a necessary
party would not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint. Lastly, for pro-forma parties, the
general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be
followed: such non-joinder is not a ground fordismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to
recover a sum of money, we held that the failure
to join the spouse in that case was not a
jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse
does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal
requirement which may be cured by amendment.
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma
parties are also indispensable or necessary parties,
the rules concerning indispensable or necessary
parties, as the case may be, should be applied.
Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma
party not joined in the complaint is an
indispensable party.
Under Art. 147 of the Civil Code which was
superceded by Art. 108 of the Family Code, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on the contract of partnership. Thus, Milagros is a
co-owner of the subject personal property in this
case the credit incurred by spouses Carandang.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and
Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an
action for the recovery thereof.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-
owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring
an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of
co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the
co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit
for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable
party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly
loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such,
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she need not have been impleaded in said suit,
and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her
not being a party thereto
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.
If the consent of any party who should be joined as
plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a
defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated
in the complaint.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
EMATA v. IAC
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION; THIRDPARTY
COMPLAINT, FILING THEREOF RESTS WITH THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT.-For purposes
of Section 14 of Rule 6, above quoted, the court
may authorize the filing of the proper third-party
complaint to implead the other parties not
included in the original complaint, in keeping with
the injunction that all pleadings shall be liberally
construed so as to do substantial justice.
ID.;ID.;ID.; CONSTRUED.A third-party complaint
is a claim that a defending party may, with leave
of court, file against a person not a party to the
action, called the third-party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief in respect of his opponents claim.
ID.; ID.; PARTIES; UNAVAILING CO-PLAINTIFF MAY
BE MADE DEFENDANT; PARTY MUST BE A REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST; CASE AT BAR.Petitioner
cannot rely on the provisions of Section 10, Rule 3which envisages a party who should be joined as a
plaintiff but who does not assent to such joinder.
Obviously and necessarily, such unwilling party
must be real party in interest. In the case at bar,
Filinvests position and the evidence thereon was
that it was not a real party in interest, as it was no
longer entitled to the avails of the suit by reason of
the anterior assignment it made in favor of private
respondent. Hence, at the very least, its capacity
was in issue and it would be a case of procedural
petitio principia for the trial court to have
categorized it as an unwilling co-plaintiff, with the
procedural consequences thereof, although such
operative issue was still unresolved.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OPTION LIES WITH THE
PLAINTIFF.The option lies with the plaintiff on
whether or not to join an additional party in hiscomplaint. The original plaintiff cannot be
compelled, on the mere representations of the
defendant, to implead anyone, especially if it does
not appear that such joinder is proper or is
necessary for the complete and expeditious
adjudication of the case.
ID.;ID.; ID.;ADDITION OR DROPPING OF PARTY
ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE
COURT.Nor can the general rule in Section 11,
Rule 3, on the power to order the addition ordropping of a party at any stage of action, be of
solace to the petitioner. This is a power addressed
to the sound discretion of the court to be exercised
on such term as are just, and by this is meant that
it must be just to all the other parties.
ID.; COURT; CLOTHED WITH AMPLE AUTHORITY
TO RULE ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS BEFORE
THEM. Petitioner should be reminded that the
courts, as the arbiters of the rights of the parties,
stand in a better position and are clothed withample authority to rule on the procedural
measures that are proper in cases before them. If a
party believes that the order of the court is not in
accordance with law, he is not without other
alternative remedial avenues. If, on the other
hand, the order does not suffer from any legal
infirmities, the same is binding on the parties and
to this they must submit with grace. We cannot but
be displeased with petitioners unseemly
motivation and stance when he adopted an
attitude of inaction and uncompletely ignored the
order of the trial court requiring the filing of a
third-party complaint, especially in view of the
factual finding that it was he who manifested on
April 26, 1982.
FACTS:
Petitioner purchased a car on installments from
Violago Motor Sales Corporation (Violago) with a
down payment of P14, 982.00. Petitioner likewise
executed in favor of the seller a promissory note
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and a chattel mortgage over the car as security for
the payment of the note.
The total amount that the petitioner was supposed
to pay was P72, 186.00, with P57, 204.00 as the
balance after deducting the down payment. Thetotal amount payable was P22, 246.00 more than
the list cash price of P49, 940.00 for said vehicle.
After the execution of said documents, Violago
endorsed the promissory note and assigned the
chattel mortgage to Filinvest upon payment by the
latter of P34, 958.00, the unpaid balance of the list
cash price of the car.
Three years later, Filinvest assigned to private
respondent Service Specialists, Inc. the remaining
installment balance due on and corresponding to
the period from February 25, 1981 to August 25,
1981.
Alleging non-payment of five (5) consecutive
installments from February 25 to June 25, 1981,
private respondent initiated the case in the trial
court for a writ of replivin to effect the seizure of
the car or, alternatively, for the payment by
petitioner of the sum of P 1,332.40, with interest
thereon of the 14% per annum from July 10, 1981
until fully paid and, additionally, for attorneys fees
and costs of suit.
Petitioners allegation:
the promissory note does not express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, the same
having been procured through fraud deceit,
trickery and misrepresentation, that the chattel
mortgage was intended to secure the payment of
P34,958.00 which was the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of the Toyota car;
that he was made to sign the note and the
mortgage in blank that he has paid, and even
overpaid, Filivest by P9, 388.22 that the
promissory note by inflating its value and charging
more than the prescribed rates in violation of the
Financing Company Act violates the Usury Law that
the note and the mortgage are null and void; and
that the demand set forth in the complaint has
been long extinguished.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Implead Filinvest
Credit Corporation on the theory that for all
legal purposes the corporation sought to be
impleaded is the real party in interest because it
retained interest over the balance of the
petitioners account in spite of its assignment toprivate respondent.
The court held in abeyance the pre-trial hearing of
the case since upon motion of Atty. Emata, said
petitioner was given a period of 15 days to file the
third-party complaint against the third party
defendant (Filinvest). Petitioner, however, did not
file any third-party complaint, hence the trial court
set the case for pre-trial on May 3, 1983, it being
understood that petitioner was no longer
interested in impleading the herein privaterespondent as a third-party defendant therein.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to cancel the
scheduled pre-trial and the trial court reset the
same. Another motion for postponement of the
scheduled pre-trial filed by petitioner was denied
by the lower court, which consequently issued an
order declaring petitioner as in default for failure
to appear at the pre-trial.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor ofplaintiff.
Petitioner raises both procedural and substantive
issues. Initially, he complains that the trial court
erred in requiring him to file a third-party
complaint against Filinvestn instead of impleading
the latter either as party plaintiff or defendant. He
insists that Filinvvest is the real party in interest in
the present case and it should be impleaded under
Rule 3 of the ROC.
Sec. 10.Unwilling co-plaintiff. -If the consent of
any party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot
be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the
reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. -
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by
order of the court on motion of any party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just. Any claim against a partymay be severed and proceeded with separately
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which he complements with a provision in Rule 6,
to wit:
Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. When the presence
of parties other than those to the original action is
required for the granting of complete relief in thedetermination of a counterclaim or cross-claim,
the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants if jurisdiction over them can be
obtained.
According to petitioner, based on the above
quoted provisions, the court, may authorize the
filing of the proper third-party complaint to
implead the other parties not included in the
original complaint, in keeping with the injunction
that all pleadings shall be liberally construed so asto do substantial justice.
ISSUES:WON the petitioners allegations correct
RULING:No. The SC rejects petitioners complaint
that the order of the court a quo requiring the
filing of a third-party complaint is improper. A
third- party complaint is "a claim that a defending
party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third-
party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,subrogation or any other relief in respect of his
opponent's claim."Obviously, a third-party
complaint against Filinvest, had petitioner filed the
same, would be a claim
in respect
of the plaintiffs
claim since the former arises from the same
transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based,
that is, the promissory note which was eventually
assigned to private respondent.Although the
petitioner did not admit in his answer that any
amount is due from the corporation sought to be
impleaded, that is not indicative of nor does itsupport his thesis of the alleged impropriety of a
third-party complaint. Apparently, petitioner failed
to take into consideration that the remedy is also
applicable where the defendant seeks "any other
relief in respect of his opponent's claim," a
remedial grant of power broad enough to include
the relief he seeks in the case at bar.
Petitioner cannot rely on the provisions of Section
10, Rule 3 which envisages a party who should be
joined as a plaintiff but who does not assent to
such joinder. Obviously and necessarily, such
unwilling party must be a real party in interest. In
the case at bar, Filinvest's position and the
evidence thereon was that it was not a real party
in interest, as it was no longer entitled to the avails
of the suit by reason of the anterior assignment it
made in favor of private respondent. Hence, at thevery least, its capacity was in issue and it would be
a case of proceduralpetitio principii
for the trial
court to have categorized it as an unwilling co-
plaintiff, with the procedural consequences
thereof, although such operative issue was still
unresolved. Furthermore, the option lies with the
plaintiff on whether or not to join an additional
party in his complaint. The original plaintiff cannot
be compelled, on the mere representations of the
defendant, to implead anyone, especially if it does
not appear that such joinder is proper or is
necessary for the complete and expeditious
adjudication of the case.
Nor can the general rule in Section 11, Rule 3, on
the power to order the addition or dropping of a
party at any stage of action, be of solace to the
petitioner. This is a power addressed to the sound
discretion of the court to be exercised on such
terms as are just, and by this is meant that it must
be just to all the other parties.
Obviously, given the
facts of this case, the trial court wisely exercised its
discretion in refusing to give in to the unjustified
importunings of petitioner.
Petitioner should be reminded that the courts, as
the arbiters of the rights of the parties, stand in a
better position and are clothed with ample
authority to rule on the procedural measures that
are proper in cases before them. If a party believes
that the order of the court is not in accordance
with law, he is not without other alternativeremedial avenues. If, on the other hand, the order
does not suffer from any legal infirmities, the same
is binding on the parties and to this they must
submit with grace. We cannot but be displeased
with petitioner's unseemly motivation and stance
when he "adopted an attitude of inaction and
completely ignored" the order of the trial court
requiring the filing of a third-party complaint,
especially in view of the factual finding that it was
he who manifested on April 26, 1982 that he
would file said third party complaint .
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-petition is Denied; the assailed decision on the CA
is affirmed
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
BOSTON EQUITY vs. CA G.R. No. 173946
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint
for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment against the
spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein
respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998
but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged,
among others, that her husband and co-
defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already
dead. The death certificate of Manuel states "13
July 1995" as the date of death. As a result,
petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to
require respondent to disclose the heirs of
Manuel. In compliance with the verbal order of the
court during the 11 October 1999 hearing of the
case, respondent submitted the required names
and addresses of the heirs. Petitioner then filed aMotion for Substitution, dated 18 January 2000,
praying that Manuel be substituted by his children
as party-defendants. It appears that this motion
was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9
October 2000.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for
herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement
of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for
herein respondent was given a period of fifteen
days within which to file a demurrer toevidence. However, on 7 October 2004,
respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) that
the complaint failed to implead an indispensable
party or a real party in interest; hence, the case
must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action; (2) that the trial court did not acquirejurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(3) that the trial court erred in ordering the
substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs;
and (4) that the court must also dismiss the case
against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November
2004, denied the motion to dismiss for having
been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 ofthe 1997 Rules of Court which states that: "Within
the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion
to dismiss may be made." Respondents motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise
denied on the ground that "defendants attack on
the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by
estoppel by laches" since respondent failed to
raise the issue despite several chances to do so.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA and was granted on the ground that:
The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant Manuel Toledo (dead).
The court a quos denial of respondents motion
to dismiss was based on its finding that
respondents attack on the jurisdiction of the court
was already barred by laches as respondent failed
to raise the said ground in its amended answer and
during the pre-trial, despite her activeparticipation in the proceedings.
However, it is well-settled that issue on jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even
for the first time on appeal. By timely raising the
issue on jurisdiction in her motion to dismiss
respondent is not estopped from raising the
question on jurisdiction.
Moreover, when issue on jurisdiction was raised
by respondent, the court a quo had not yetdecided the case, hence, there is no basis for the
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court a quo to invoke estoppel to justify its denial
of the motion for reconsideration;
It should be stressed that when the complaint was
filed, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already
dead. The complaint should have impleaded theestate of Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only
the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel S.
Toledo is an indispensable party, which stands to
be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the
case.
Respondents motion to dismiss the complaint
should have been granted by public respondent
judge as the same was in order. Considering that
the obligation of Manuel S. Toledo is solidary with
another debtor, the claim should be filed againstthe estate of Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with
the provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not Manuel Toledo is an
indispensable party.
2.
Whether or not the inclusion of Manuel
Toledo as party-defendant is a misjoinder
of a party warranting the dismissal of the
case.
HELD:
1. No, Manuel Toledo is not an
indispensable party.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensableparties. Parties-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter of a
case that a final adjudication cannot be made in
his or her absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest. He or she is a party who has not only
an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but "an interest of such nature that afinal decree cannot be made without affecting that
interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between theparties already before the court which is effective,
complete or equitable." Further, an indispensable
party is one who must be included in an action
before it may properly proceed.
On the other hand, a "person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from
the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a
decree which does complete justice betweenthem. Also, a person is not an indispensable party
if his presence would merely permit complete
relief between him or her and those already
parties to the action, or if he or she has no interest
in the subject matter of the action." It is not a
sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party simply because his or her
presence will avoid multiple litigations.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the
case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is
not an indispensable party to the collection case,
for the simple reason that the obligation of
Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is
solidary.
The provisions and stipulations of the contract
were then followed by the respective signatures of
respondent as "MAKER" and her husband as "CO-
MAKER." Thus, pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil
Code, petitioner may collect the entire amount of
the obligation from respondent only. The
aforementioned provision states: "The creditor
may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The
demand made against one of them shall not be an
obstacle to those which may subsequently be
directed against the others, so long as the debt has
not been fully collected."
In other words, the collection case can proceed
and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by
respondent only, even without impleading the
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estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of
Manuel is not an indispensable party to
petitioners complaint for sum of money.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil
Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Saidprovision gives the creditor the right to "proceed
against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously." The choice is
undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce
collection. In case of the death of one of the
solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so
chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary
debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the
estate of the deceased debtors.
2.
No, the inclusion of Manuel Toledo as
party-defendant is not a misjoinder of a
party warranting dismissal of the case.
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states
that "neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties
is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately."
Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted
provision of law, a misjoined party must have the
capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the
claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued
in a separate case. In this case, therefore, the
inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be
considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action
would have proceeded against him had he been
alive at the time the collection case was filed bypetitioner. This being the case, the remedy
provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain
here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant
cannot simply be dropped from the case.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
LEONIS NAVIGATION vs. VILLAMETER
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
Private respondent Catalino U. Villamater
(Villamater) was hired as Chief Engineer for the
ship MV Nord Monaco, owned by petitioner World
Marine Panama, S.A., through the services of
petitioner Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. (Leonis), as
the latters local manning agent. Consequent tothis employment, Villamater, on June 4, 2002,
executed an employment contract,[4]
incorporating
the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-
Going Vessels as prescribed by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Prior to his deployment, Villamater underwent the
required Pre-Employment Medical Examination
(PEME). He passed the PEME and was declared
Fit to Work.[5]Thereafter, Villamater wasdeployed on June 26, 2002.
Sometime in October 2002, around four (4)
months after his deployment, Villamater suffered
intestinal bleeding and was given a blood
transfusion. Thereafter, he again felt weak, lost
considerable weight, and suffered intermittent
intestinal pain. He consulted a physician
in Hamburg, Germany, who advised hospital
confinement. Villamater was diagnosed with
Obstructive Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid, with
multiple liver metastases, possibly local peritoneal
carcinosis and infiltration of the bladder, possibly
lung metastasis, and anemia; Candida Esophagitis;
and Chronic Gastritis. He was advised to undergo
chemotherapy and continuous supportive
treatment, such as pain-killers and blood
transfusion.[6]
Villamater was later repatriated, under medical
escort, as soon as he was deemed fit to travel. As
soon as he arrived in the Philippines, Villamater
was referred to company-designated
physicians. The diagnosis and the recommended
treatment abroad were confirmed. He was
advised to undergo six (6) cycles of
chemotherapy. However, Dr. Kelly Siy Salvador,
one of the company-designated physicians, opined
that Villamaters condition appears to be not
work-related, but suggested a disability grading of
1.[7]
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In the course of his chemotherapy, when no
noticeable improvement occurred, Villamater filed
a complaint[8]
before the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
payment of permanent and total disability benefits
in the amount of US$80,000.00, reimbursement ofmedical and hospitalization expenses in the
amount of P11,393.65, moral damages in the sum
of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, as well as attorneys
fees.
After the submission of the required position
papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision[9]
dated July 28, 2003 in favor of
Villamater, holding that his illness was
compensable, but denying his claim for moral andexemplary damages.
On February 4, 2004, the NLRC issued its
resolution,[11]
dismissing the respective appeals of
both parties and affirming in totothe decision of
the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
of the February 4, 2004 resolution, but the NLRC
denied the same in its resolution dated June 15,
2004.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA. After the filing of the required
memoranda, the CA rendered its assailed May 3,
2007 Decision, dismissing the petition. The
appellate court, likewise, denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration in its July 23, 2007
Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that non-joinder of indispensable parties
warrant the outright dismissal of the Petition for
Review on Certiorari?
HELD:
The answer is in the Negative.
Villamaters widow stands as an indispensable
party to this case.
Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court,
neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a
ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties isground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately.
The proper remedy is to implead the indispensable
party at any stage of the action. The court,
either motu proprioor upon the motion of a party,
may order the inclusion of the indispensable partyor give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his
complaint in order to include indispensable
parties. If the plaintiff ordered to include
the indispensable party refuses to comply with the
order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified
failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to
amend is the action dismissed.[30]
By reason of Villamaters entitlement to total andpermanent disability benefits, he (or in this case
his widow Sonia) is also entitled to the award of
attorneys fees, not under Article 2208(2) of the
Civil Code, *w+hen the defendants act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest, but under Article 2208(8) of the same
Code, involving actions for indemnity under
workmens compensation and employers liability
laws.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, G.R. No. 201816
April 8, 2013
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Facts:
The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina
(spouses Mesina), during their lifetime, bought
from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian
(spouses Fian) two parcels of land on installment.
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Both of these spouses eventually died. Upon the
death of the spouses Fian and Mesinas, the heir of
the formerwhose names do not appear on the
records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land
and taking possession of themrefused to
acknowledge the payments for the lots and deniedthat their late parents sold the property to the
spouses Mesina.
This prompted Norman S. Mesina as attorney-in-
fact of his siblings, filed an action for quieting of
title and damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte against the Heirs
of Fian. Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint, arguing that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the case should be
dismissed for gross violation of
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The
RTC granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint. Motion for reconsideration was also
denied.
Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed the
lower courts decision and denied the motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the petitioner brought the
case to Supreme Court.
Issue:
The (CA) court erred in affirming the order and the
resolution of RTC dismissing the case on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of
action.
Ruling:
Petition is meritorious and SC reversed CAs
decision.
The dismissal of the case for failure to state a
cause of action is improper. This is not a case
where there is a failure of the complaint to state
cause of action, rather this is properly a non-
joinder of indispensable party (that is, the
indispensable parties who were not included in the
complaint being the other heirs of Fian).
What the trial court should have done is to direct
petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs
of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a
reasonable time from notice with a warning that
his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the
complaint.
By a simple reading of the 3 elements of a failure
to state a cause of action, it can be readily seen
that the inclusion of Theresas co-heirs does not
fall under any of the above elements. The infirmity
is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action
but a non-joinder of an indispensable party.
A complaint states a cause of action if it
avers the existence of the 3 essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the
defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said right.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed April 29, 2011 Decision and
April 12, 2012 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01366, and the November 22, 2005 Order and
February 29,2006 Resolution of the RTC, Branch 14
in Baybay, Leyte, dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 8-05-08-20, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXSec. 12. Class suit.
When the subject matter of the controversy is one
of common or general interest to many persons so
numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties, a number of them which the court finds to
be sufficiently numerous and representative as to
fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue
or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in
interest shall have the right to intervene to protect
his individual interest.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Juana Complex v. Fil-Estate Land,
G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Facts:
Juana Complex I Homeowners
Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual
residents of Juana Complex I and other
neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as
JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for damages,
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in its own behalf and as a class suit representing
the regular commuters and motorists of Juana
Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were
deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-
Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum
Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing &
Development Corporation (La Paz), and WarbirdSecurity Agency and their respective officers.
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al.
were regular commuters and motorists who
constantly travelled towards the direction of
Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and
exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX)by
passing through right-of-way public road known as
La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road
for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998,
Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined
La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. wouldnot be able to pass through the said road; that La
Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it
passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again;
that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal
Government and the Office of the Municipal
Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to
make it passable and safe to motorists and
pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating
La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice,
inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious
hours to them, to the commuters and motorists
because traffic was re-routed to narrow streetsthat caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard;
and that its permanent closure would not only
prejudice their right to free and unhampered use
of the property but would also cause great damage
and irreparable injury.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the
immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)or a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI)to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from
stopping and intimidating them in their use of La
Paz Road. On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issuedordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a period of twenty
(20) days, to stop preventing, coercing,
intimidating or harassing the commuters and
motorists from using the La Paz Road.
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings
to determine the propriety of the issuance of a
WPI. On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action and that it was
improperly filed as a class suit. On March 5, 1999,
JCHA, et al. filed their comment on the motion to
dismiss to which respondents filed a reply. Fil-
Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order
dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus Order
dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action and that
it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard
to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred
that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a
clear and unmistakable right to the use of La PazRoad; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a
torrens registered private road and there was
neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted
over it.
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated
a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their
complaint that they had been using La Paz Road
for more than ten (10) years and that their right
was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated
the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the
complaint was properly filed as a class suit as itwas shown that the case was of common interest
and that the individuals sought to be represented
were so numerous that it was impractical to
include all of them as parties. The CA, however,
annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove
their clear and present right over La Paz Road. The
CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for
a full-blown trial on the merits.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the complaint states a cause of
action;(2) whether the complaint has been properly filed
as a class suit;
(2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Ruling:
1. The question of whether the complaint states a
cause of action is determined by its averments
regarding the acts committed by the
defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate or essential facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. Tobe taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts
and circumstances or other matters aliundeare
not considered.
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting a cause of action
is whether or not admitting the facts alleged,
the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
In the present case, the Court finds the
allegations in the complaint sufficient to
establish a cause of action. First,JCHA, et al.s
averments in the complaint show a
demandable right over La Paz Road. These are:
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(1) their right to use the road on the basis of
their allegation that they had been using the
road for more than 10 years; and (2) an
easement of a right of way has been
constituted over the said roads. There is no
other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in
the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenientand safe route towards SLEX Halang that the
commuters and motorists may use. Second,
there is an alleged violation of such right
committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they
excavated the road and prevented the
commuters and motorists from using the
same. Third,JCHA, et al. consequently suffered
injury and that a valid judgment could have
been rendered in accordance with the relief
sought therein.
2. The necessary elements for the maintenance ofa class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons; 2) the parties
affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3)
the parties bringing the class suit are
sufficiently numerous or representative of the
class and can fully protect the interests of all
concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that
benefits all commuters and motorists who
use La Paz Road.
3. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites
for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2)
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. For the writ to issue, the
right sought to be protected must be a present
right, a legal right which must be shown to be clear
and positive. This means that the personsapplying for the writ must show that they
have an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in their complaint.
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to
establish aprima facie proof of violation of their
right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to
the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have
no clear legal right therein.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,
vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE
AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA
y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO PLANTERS
ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO,ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, JR.,
PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE
GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA,
JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL
GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this
special action for certiorari, prohibition with
preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated
December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the
then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for libel filed by private respondents
(Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated
March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion for
Reconsideration.
On March 5, 1981, private respondents,
incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500
members and several individual sugar planters,
filed Civil case in their own behalf and/or as a class
suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the
province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner
and non-resident reporters Fred Bruning and Barry
Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and
other defendants committed libel against them by
publication of the article An Island of Fear in theFebruary 23, 1981 of petitioners weekly issue.
The article supposedly portrayed the island
province of Negros Occidental as a place
dominated by big landowners or sugarcane
planters who not only exploited the impoverished
and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but
also brutalized and killed them with imprunity.
Complainants denied what is written in the article
because it would expose them to public ridicule
and humiliation. They prayed for damages of P1M
as actual and compensatory damages, and such
amounts for moral, exemplary and correctivedamages as the court may determine, plus
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expenses of litigation, attorneys fees and costs of
suit.
On Nov. 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss and pointed out that the article is not
libelous and consequently the failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. However, the
court denied the motion to dismiss as well as
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court
seeking the annulment of the trial courts order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for
the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. But the court affirmed the
decision of the Trial Court and also petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether or not the private respondents'
complaint failed to state a cause of
action; and
2. Whether or not the case at bar is a class
suit in representation of all the 8,500sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental.
Held:
1. Yes, private respondents complaint failed
to state a cause of action.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16
SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order
to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable (People vs.
Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962),although it is not necessary that he be
named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case,
this Court declared that" ... defamatory
matter which does not reveal the Identity
of the person upon whom the imputation
is cast, affords no ground of action unless
it be shown that the readers of the libel
could have Identified the personality of
the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs.
Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil.
760).
This principle has been recognized to be
of vital importance, especially where a
group or class of persons, as in the case at
bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is
evident that the larger the collectivity, the
more difficult it is for the individual
member to prove that the defamatoryremarks apply to him.
In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen
,32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:
Defamatory remarks directed at a class or
group of persons in general language
only, are not actionable by individuals
composing the class or group unless the
statements are sweeping; and it is very
probable that even then no action would
lie where the body is composed of so
large a number of persons that common
sense would tell those to whom the
publication was made that there was
room for persons connected with the
body to pursue an upright and law abiding
course and that it would be unreasonable
and absurd to condemn all because of the
actions of a part.
It is evident from the above ruling that where the
defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply
to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the
class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he
can bring the action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class
suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees
and argues that the absence of any actionable
basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filingof a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar
planters.
2. No, the case at bar is not a class suit.
It is not a case where one or more may
sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58
SCRA 559) or where the representation of
class interest affected by the judgment or
decree is indispensable to make each
member of the class an actual party
(Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We
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have here a case where each of the
plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not
have a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which
refers to plaintiff Sola and which was
claimed to be libelous never singled out
plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news
report merely stated that the victim had
been arrested by members of a special
police unit brought into the area by Pablo
Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence,
the report, referring as it does to an
official act performed by an elective
public official, is within the realm of
privilege and protected by the
constitutional guarantees of free speechand press.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
MATHAY VS CONSOLIDATED BANK
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
The complaint in this case, filed on December 24,1963 as a class suit, under Section 12, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court, contained six causes of action.
first cause action was that plaintiffs-appellants
alleged that they were, on or before March 28,
1962, stockholders in the Consolidated Mines, Inc.
(CMI), a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws; that the stockholders of the
CMI, including the plaintiffs-appellants, passed, at
a regular stockholders' meeting, a Resolution
providing:
(a)
that the CMI be organized with an authorizedcapital of P20,000,000.00;
(b) that the organization be undertaken by a Board
of Organizers composed of the President and
Members of the Board of Directors of the CMI;
(c) that all stockholders of the CMI, who were
legally qualified to become stockholders, would be
entitled to subscribe to the capital stock of the
proposed Bank "at par value to the same extent
and in the same amount as said stockholders'
respective share holdings in the CMI," as shown inits stock books on a date to be fixed by the Board
of Directors [which date was subsequently fixed as
January 15, 1963], provided that the right to
subscribe should be exercised within thirty days
from the date so fixed, and "that if such right to
subscription be not so exercised then the
stockholders concerned shall be deemed to have
thereby waived and released ipso factotheir rightto such subscription in favor of the Interim Board
of Organizers of the Defendant Bank or their
assignees;" and
(d) that the Board of Directors of the CMI be
authorized to declare a "special dividend" in an
amount it would fix, which the subscribing
stockholders might authorize to be paid directly to
the treasurer of the proposed Bank in payment of
the subscriptions; On February 7, 1964
defendants-appellees, , filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that (a) plaintiffs-appellants had nolegal standing or capacity to institute the alleged
class suit; (b) that the complaint did not state a
sufficient and valid cause of action.
Second cause of action that on or about August 28,
1963, defendants-appellees "falsely certified to the
calling of a special stockholders' meeting allegedly
pursuant to due notice and call of Defendant
Bank" although plaintiffs-appellants and other CMI
stockholders were not notified thereof, and
amended the Articles of Incorporation increasing
the number of Directors from 6 to 7, and had theillegally created Position of Director filled up by
defendant-appellee Alfonso Juan Olondriz, who
was not competent or qualified to hold such
position.
On March 21, 1964, the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, holding, among other things,
that the class suit could not be maintained
because of the absence of a showing in the
complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were
sufficiently numerous and representative, and that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action.Appellants, plaintiffs interposed this appeal to this
court.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the instant action could be maintained
as a class suit.
2. Whether the complaint stated a cause of action.
RULING:
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1. The necessary elementsfor the maintenance of
a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject
matter of the controversy be one of common or
general interest to many persons, and (2) that
such persons be so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all to the court. The
statute also requires, as a prerequisite to a classsuit, (3) thatthe subject-matter of the
controversy be of common or general interest to
numerous persons.
In the instant case. The interest that appellants,
plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI
stockholders had in the subject matter of this suit
the portion of stocks offering of the Bank left
unsubscribed by CMI stockholders who failed to
exercise their right to subscribe on or before
January 15, 1963 was several, not common or
generalin the sense required by the statute. Eachone of the appellants and the CMI stockholders
had determinable interest;each one had a right, if
any, only to his respective portion of the stocks.
No one of them had any right to, or any interest in,
the stock to which another was entitled.
2. A cause of action is an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its
essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence
of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative
legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or
omission of the defendant in violation ofplaintiff's right with consequential injury or
damage to the plaintiff for which he may
maintain an action for the recovery of damages
or other appropriate relief. On the other hand,
Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides
that the complaint must state the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Hence,
where the complaint states ultimate facts that
constitute the three essential elements of a cause
of action, the complaint states a cause of
action;28
otherwise, the complaint must succumb
to a motion to dismiss on that ground.
The alleged specific facts did not evenshow that
appellants were entitled to subscribe to the
capital stock of the proposed Bank, for said right
depended on a condition precedent, which was,
that they were qualified under the law to become
stockholders of the Bank, and there was no direct
averment in the complaint of the facts that
qualified them to become stockholders of the
Bank. The allegation of the fact that they
subscribed to the stock did not, by necessary
implication, show that they were possessed of the
necessary qualifications to become stockholders of
the proposed Bank.
Even if it be assumed arguendo that defendants-
appellees had the duty to have the waived stocks
subscribed to by the CMI stockholders, this duty
was not owed to all the CMI stockholders, but only
to such CMI stockholders as were qualified to
become stockholders of the proposed Bank.
In the second cause of action that the calling of a
special meeting was "falsely certified", that the
seventh position of Director was "illegally created"
and that defendant Alfonso Juan Olondriz was "not
competent or qualified" to be a director are mere
conclusions of law, the same not being necessarily
inferable from the ultimate facts stated in the first
and second causes of action. It has been held in
this connection that:
An averment that ... an act was 'unlawful' or
'wrongful' is a mere legal conclusion or opinion of
the pleader. The same is true of allegations that an
instrument was 'illegally' certified or ... that an act
was arbitrarily done ..."
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action
depended on the first cause of action, which, as
has been shown, did not state ultimate facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It stands
to reason,therefore, that said causes of action
would also be fatally defective.
The instant appeal is dismissed.
Sec. 12. Class suit When the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons, and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the benefit of -ill. But in such case the court
shall make sure that the parties actually before itare sufficiently numerous and representative so
that all interests concerned are fully protected.
Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene
in protection of his individual interest.
Three types of class suits: 1. True 2. Hybrid 3.
Spurious.
These three had only one feature in common, that
is, in each the persons constituting the class must
be so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all before the court.
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spurious class action (Rule 23 (a) (3) which
involves a right sought to be enforced, which is
several, and there is a common question of law or
fact affecting the several rights and a common
relief is sought.
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VICTORIANO BORLASAS, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. VICENTE POLISTICO, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.1925 Jan 282nd
DivisionG.R. No. 22909
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Facts:
This action was instituted in the Court ofFirst Instance of Laguna on July 25, 1917, by
Victoriano Borlasa and others against Vicente
Polistico and others, chiefly for the purpose of
securing the dissolution of a voluntary association
named Turnuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel
the defendants to account for and surrender the
money and property of the association in order
that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets
applied according to law. The trial judge having
sustained a demurrer for defect of parties and the
plaintiffs electing not to amend, the cause was
dismissed, and from this order an appeal wastaken by the plaintiffs to this court.
In an amended answer the defendants
raised the question of lack of parties and set out a
list of some hundreds of persons whom they
alleged should be brought in as parties defendant
on the ground, among others, that they were in
default in the payment of their dues to the
association.
On November 28, 1922, the court made
an order requiring the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint within a stated period so as to include
all of the members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co.
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiffs
excepted to this order, but acquiesced to the
extent of amending their complaint by adding as
additional parties plaintiff some hundreds of
persons, residents of Lilio, said to be members of
the association and desirous of being joined as
plaintiffs.
The defendants demurred to the
amended complaint on the ground that it showed
on its face a lack of necessary parties and this
demurrer was sustained, with the ultimate result
of the dismissal of the action, as stated in the first
paragraph of this opinion.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial judge erred in
sustaining the demurrer to the amended
complaint which resulted to the dismissal of the
action.
Held:
Yes. The trial judge is incorrect in
sustaining the demurrer to the amended
complaint.
This trial judge appears to have supposed
that all the members of the Turnuhan Polistico &
Co. should be brought in either plaintiffs or
defendants. This notion is entirely mistaken.
The situation involved is precisely the one
contemplated in section 118 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, where one or more may sue for the
benefit of all. It is evident from the showing madein the complaint, and from the proceedings in the
court below, that it would be impossible to make
all of the persons in interest parties to the case
and to require all of the members of the
association to be joined as parties would be
tantamount to a denial of justice.
The general rule with reference to the making of
parties in a civil action requires, of course, the
joinder of all necessary parties wherever possible,
and the joinder of all indispensable parties underany and all conditions, the presence of those
latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of
judicial power. The class suit contemplates an
exceptional situation where there are numerous
persons all in the same plight and all together
constituting a constituency whose presence in the
litigation is absolutely indispensable to the
administration of justice. Here the strict
application of the rule as to indispensable parties
would require that each and every individual in
the class is sufficiently represented to enable the
court to deal properly and justly with thatinterest and with all other interests involved in
the suit. In the class suit, then, representation of
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a class interest which will be affected by the
judgment is indispensable; but it is not
indispensable to make each member of the class
an actual party.
A common illustration in American procedure of
the situation justifying a class suit is thatpresented by the creditors' bill, which is filed by
one party interested in the estate of an insolvent,
to secure the distribution of the assets
distributable among all the creditors. In such
cases the common practice is for one creditor to
sue as plaintiff in behalf of himself and other
creditors. (Johnson vs. Waters, 111 U.S. S., 640;
28 Law. ed., 547.) Another illustration is found in
the case of Smith vs. Swormstedt (16 How., 288;
14 Law. ed., 942), where a limited number of
individuals interested in a trust for the benefit of
superannuated preachers were permitted tomaintain an action in their own names and as
representatives of all other persons in the same
right.
The addition of some hundreds of persons to the
number of the plaintiffs, made in the amendment
to the complaint of December 13, 1922, was
unnecessary, and as the presence of so many
parties is bound to prove embarrassing to the
litigation from death or removal, it is suggested
that upon the return of this record to the lower
court for further proceedings, the plaintiff shallagain amended their complaint by dismissing as
to unnecessary parties plaintiffs, but retaining a
sufficient number of responsible persons to
secure liability for costs and fairly to represent all
the members of the association.
There is another feature of the complaint which
makes a slight amendment desirable, which is,
that the complaint should be made to show on its
face that the action is intended to be litigated as
a class suit. We accordingly recommend that the
plaintiffs further amend by adding after thenames of the parties plaintiffs the words, "in their
own behalf and in behalf of other members of
Turnuhan Polistico & Co."
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Ibanez vs. Roman Catholic Church
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The case stemmed from a controversy between
the Roman CatholicChurch on one side and the
Independent Filipino Church on the other. That it is
the purpose of the plaintiffs, ifthey secure
possession of the image, to place it in the chapel of
the Independent Church.
There are no other allegations in the complaint as
to the right of the plaintiffs to represent theinhabitants of Ternate, nor is there any proof
whatever in the case upon this point. The claim of
the plaintiffs is that the persons who were at the
time of the presentation of the complaint the
inhabitants of Ternate were the owners in
common of the image considered as a piece of
personal property. There is no evidence to show
that the present plaintiffs, or any one of the
present inhabitants of Ternate, were the heirs or
in any way related to any of the two hundred
Mardicaswho came to the Philippines nearly twohundred and fifty years ago. The claim of the
plaintiffs is apparently not rested upon the
proposition that they are entitled to relief because
they are such heirs, but because they live in the
pueblo. Their view seems to be that the heirs of
the Mardicasliving in other pueblos have no
interest in the image.
Passing the question as to whether the Roman
Catholic Church is not the owner of the image, the
question may be asked, whether under thesecircumstances it can be said that any one has a
proprietary right in this image who is not a Roman
Catholic? If among the Mardicaswho first came
here there had been on who did not profess that
religion, would he have any participation therein?
Are the Chinese who now live in Ternate part
owners of the image? These are questions which
we do not feel called upon to decide, for the case
must be resolved upon the point made by the
defendant at the very commencement of the
action, to wit, that the thirteen persons named as
plaintiffs have no right to maintain it.
The plaintiffs rely upon article 118 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which is as follows:
When the subject-matter of the controversy is one
of common or general interest to many persons,
and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of
all. But in such case any party in interest shall have
a right to intervene in protection of his individual
interests, and the court shall make sure that the
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parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous
and representative so that all interests concerned
are fully protected.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the plaintiffs can validly represent
the others so that it could amount to a class suit.
Held:
No, the plaintiffs in the case at bar can not validly
represent the others.
It is a well entrenched rule that there is no class
suit if interest of those who filed the action
conflicts with those sought to be represented.
The court is quite emphatic upon citing the case of
In Macon and Birmingham Railroad vs. Gibson,
where it said:
It is true that as only two of the citizens
have become parties, it is rather a small
representation of thewhole community;
but considering the publicity of the case
and of the interest involved in it, and the
factthat the suit is located in Upson
County and will be tried (if tried at all) at
the county town, which is thetown whosecitizens are interested, there can be no
cause to apprehend that the two plaintiffs
on theface of the petition will be
disposed, or if so disposed, allowed to
misrepresent the community in
whosebehalf they have brought this suit.
No doubt it is somewhat discretionary
with a court of equity as tohow many
representatives of a class will, or ought to
be, regarded as a fair representation of
the wholeclass in the given instance.
What number of the inhabitants of the town
(2,460 according to the census) are members of
the RomanCatholic Church and what part are
members of the Independent Filipino Church does
not appear. But it is veryapparent that many of the
inhabitants are opposed to the transfer of the
image from the Roman CatholicChurch. Under the
circumstances, the thirteen plaintiffs do not fairly
represent all of the inhabitants of thetown. Their
interest and the interests of some of the others
are diametrically opposed. For this reason
thisaction can not be maintained.itc-alf
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and
the defendants are acquitted of the complaint,
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Lianas Supermarket vs National Labor Relations
Commission
GR No. 111014 . May 31, 1996.
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FACTSOF THE CASE: Lianas Supermarket, herein
petitioner, employed as sales ladies, cooks
packers, cashiers, electricians, warehousemen,
etc., members of private respondent National
Labor Union. However, in the course of their
employment they were allegedly underpaid and
required to work more than 8 hours a day without
OT pay and deprived of legal holiday pay and
monthly emergency allowance. The employees
aired their grievances to Peter Sy, the
supermarkets Gen. Manager and Rosa Sy,
Consultant, but were only scolded and threatened
with outright dismissal. Consequently, they formed
a labor union and affiliated it with respondent
National Labor Union.
Petitioner entered into a 3-year contract with
Warner Laputt, owner of BAVSPIA Intl Services, to
supply the former with laborers.
Subsequently, Rosa Sy met with the employees
and urged them to quit their membership with the
union and required them to accomplish
information sheets and/or application forms with
BAVSPIA otherwise they be terminated. When
they refused, many were dismissed without any
charges and others were given memo onconcocted offenses and violations.
Respondent Union on behalf of its members filed a
complaint against petitioner and BAVSPIA and
Warner Laputt before the Labor Arbiter fir
underpayment of wages, nonpayment of OT pay,
monthly emergency allowance, legal holiday pay,
SIL and 13th
month pay.
The complaint was amended since respondent
manifested through its authorized rep. that it wasintended as a class suit.
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ISSUE:WON this case falls under the term class
suit.
SUPREME COURT DECISION: NO. This is a
representative suit as distinguished from class
suit.
Sec. 12 Class Suit. --- When the
subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or
general interest to many
persons, and the parties are so
numerous that is impracticable
to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or
defend for the benefit of all. But
in such case the court shall makesure that the parties actually
before it are sufficiently
numerous and representative so
that all interests concerned are
fully protected. Any party in
interest shall have a right to
intervene in protection of his
individual interests.
SC has cited In re: Request of the Heirs of the
Passengers of Dona Paz to Set Aside the OrderDated Jan 4, 1988, the Court had occasion to
explain class suit; ---
What is contemplated, as will be noted, is that
(a)
The subject matter in controversy is of
common or general interest to many
persons, and
(b)
Those persons are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court.
What makes the situation a proper case for a class
suit is the circumstance that there is only one right
or cause of action pertaining to or belonging in
common to many persons, not separately or
severally to distinct individuals. The object of the
suit is to obtain relief for or against numerous
persons as a group or as an integral entity, and not
as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or
liabilities are separate from and independent of
those of others. The other factor that serves to
distinguish the rule on class suits is the
numerousness of parties involved.
The rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is
needful inter aliathat the parties to so numerous
that it would be impracticable to bring them allbefore the court.
In the present case, there are multiple rights or
causes of action pertaining separately to several,
distinct employees who are members of
respondent Union. Therefore, the applicable rule is
that provided in Sec. 3, Rule #, of the ROC on
representative parties ---
Sec. 3. Representative Parties.
A trustee of an express trust, a
guardian, executor or
administrator, or a party
authorized by statute, may sue
or be sued without joining the
party for whose benefit the
action is presented or defended;
but the court may, at any stage
of the proceedings, order such
beneficiary to be made party.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Sec. 13. Alternative defendants.
Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of
several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join
any or all of them as defendants in the alternative,
although a right to relief against one may be
inconsistent with a right of relief against the other.
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Insurance Company vs. US Lines
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Sec. 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant.
Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is
unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner,
heir, devisee, or by such other designation as the
case may require; when his identity