ALLFORJESUSCRIMPROCRULE111CASUPANAN VS LAROYA CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002Topic:CriminalProcedure:Rule 111, Rules of CourtFACTS:As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by RobertoCapituloand driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed acriminal caseagainst Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting indamage to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and Capitulo filed acivil caseagainst Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separatecivil actionwhich can proceed independently of the criminal case.Casupanan and Capitulo then filed apetitionfor certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that theorder ofdismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.Casupanan and Capitulos contention: that ifthe accusedin a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting fromthe crimeof reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrievedparty ina civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.Laroyas contention:that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.ISSUE/HELD:WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. AFFIRMATIVERATIO DICIDENDI:The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states that it is with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's order dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.- See more at: http://studentsofsocrates.blogspot.com/2011/01/casupanan-vs-laroya-case-digest-gr-no.html#sthash.y7pRTi0U.dpuf

Hambon vs CA

G.R. No. 122150March 17, 2003

FACTS:

Herein respondent filed a complaint for damages against respondent for the injuries and expenses he sustained when the latters truck bumped him that night of December 9, 1985.

However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed previously against the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioners lack of interest.

Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.

Trial Court rendered decision in favor of petitioner,

Court of Appeals reversed the decision, on the grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case. Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the dismissal of the civil case.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

HELD:

1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.... In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.chan robles virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto

Dreamwork Construction VS. Janiola

G.R. No. 184861June 30, 2009

FACTS:This case involves a violation of Batas Pambansa bilang 22, whereby the petitioners filed ciriminal information against the Private respondent.

Subsequently, herein respondent filed a complaint against Dreamwork Construction for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The check which was subject of the criminal case were used as a consideration for the construction agreement.

Respondent filed a motion to suspend the hearing on the grounds of Prejudicial Question.Petitioner opposed the suspension by alleging that:(1)there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

MTC granted the motion; Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.

HELD:

Petition must be granted.

SEC. 5.Elements of prejudicial question.The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

In the instant case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution. We find for petitioner.

People vsBayotas Leave a commentG.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994FACTSIn Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.ISSUEWhether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liabilityHELDThe ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the courts pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.xxxFrom this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBISGR No. 138509July 31, 2000FACTS:On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. Dulce Javier. With said marriage not yet annulled, nullified nor terminated, he contracted a second marriage with herein petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with certain Julia Hernandez, thereafter.Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC granted the motion, while petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.HELD:Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent cannot be permitted to use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the civil case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisiteusually the marriage licenseand thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held inLandicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA 731(1968): Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, [as] only competent courts have such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case. The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

People vs Aragon

February 28, 1957G.R. No. L-10016

FACTS:

Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu while he is still married to Maria Gorrea. Yet again, the accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon contracted another a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol.

This was put into possibility because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When Maria Gorrea died, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, Aragon brought Faicol to Cebu from Iloilo, where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however, suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.

He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to Maria Faicol but affirmed his marriage to Maglasang.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

ISSUE:Whethe or not accused is guilty of bigamy?

HELD:

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costsde oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

JOSE v SUAREZFACTS:Sps Suarez (Respondents) had availed ofpetitioner Carolina Joses offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2% which the latter increased to 5% and respondents were forced to accept due to their financial distress. They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day fixing claiming that the same were contrary to morals and done under vitiated consent.Thereafter, the petitioners filed cases of violation ofBP 22 against respondents where the latter filed motions to suspend hearings based on the existence of a prejudicial question.Respondents claimed that ifthe 5% interest rates are nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks which are objects ofBP 22 cases are not only fully paid but in fact overpaid.ISSUE:W/N a prejudicial questions exist such that the outcome ofthe validity ofthe interest is determinative ofthe guilt or innocence ofthe respondents in the criminal case?RULING:No. Prejudicial questions have two elements:a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;b) The resolution ofsuch issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.The validity or invalidity ofthe interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of the respondents in the criminal case.The cause or reason for issuance ofa check is immaterial in determining criminalCulpability under BP 22. The law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check, which is malum prohibitum, and not the purpose it was issued for.

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