Rule 103 Complete Cases 1-5

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Rule 103 Case No. 1 Republic vs Marcos G.R. 31065. February 15, 1990 Ponente: Griño-Aquino.: J Facts: Private respondent Pang Cha Quen, a citizen of Nationalist China, is the mother of May Sia alias Manman Huang. She registered her child under the name of Mary Pang, i.e. bearing the maternal surname, because the child’s biological father allegedly abandoned them. A few years later, she married Alfredo de la Cruz, a filipino citizen. Pang Cha Quen later on filed a petition for change of name for her daughter on the grounds that her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father and, to afford the child a feeling of security. Moreover, she alleges that Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to the petition, and even signified his conformity at the foot of the pleading. Respondent Judge Pio R. Marcos granted the petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and issued an order authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. The Government, through the Solicitor General, filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law. Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case (2) Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor. (3) Whether or not Pang Cha Quen is the property party to file the petition. Ruling: Issue No. (1 ) Whether or not the respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus: IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.) The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz." Issue No. 2 Whether or not respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980); (4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or (5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965). As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading". Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of their paternity. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the State has an interest in the name borne by each individual for purposes of identification and the same should not be changed for trivial reasons like the instant case (Ty vs. Republic L-18669, November 29, 1965). A change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L-8035, November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L- 22040, November 29, 1965) and because the petition to change the name of the minor May Sia is not supported by weighty reasons, the trial court erred in granting it. Issue No. 3 Whether or not Pang Cha Quen is the property party to file the petition. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide: SECTION 1. Venue . — A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. SEC. 2. Contents of petition .- A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

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Transcript of Rule 103 Complete Cases 1-5

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Rule 103Case No. 1Republic vs MarcosG.R. 31065. February 15, 1990Ponente: Griño-Aquino.: JFacts: Private respondent Pang Cha Quen, a citizen of Nationalist China, is the mother of May Sia alias Manman Huang. She registered her child under the name of Mary Pang, i.e. bearing the maternal surname, because the child’s biological father allegedly abandoned them. A few years later, she married Alfredo de la Cruz, a filipino citizen.

Pang Cha Quen later on filed a petition for change of name for her daughter on the grounds that her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father and, to afford the child a feeling of security. Moreover, she alleges that Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to the petition, and even signified his conformity at the foot of the pleading.

Respondent Judge Pio R. Marcos granted the petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and issued an order authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. The Government, through the Solicitor General, filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law.Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case (2) Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor. (3) Whether or not Pang Cha Quen is the property party to file the petition.

Ruling: Issue No. (1 ) Whether or not the respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the caseIn the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus:IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."Issue No. 2 Whether or not respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor.The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:

(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;

(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);

(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or

(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).

As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading".

Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963).

In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the State has an interest in the name borne by each individual for purposes of identification and the same should not be changed for trivial reasons like the instant case (Ty vs. Republic L-18669, November 29, 1965). A change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L-8035, November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L- 22040, November 29, 1965) and because the petition to change the name of the minor May Sia is not supported by weighty reasons, the trial court erred in granting it.

Issue No. 3 Whether or not Pang Cha Quen is the property party to file the petition.Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide:SECTION 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.SEC. 2. Contents of petition.- A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;(c) The name asked forClearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chose

Rule 103Case No. 2Republic vs WongG.R. No. 97906. May 21, 1992PONENTE: REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: Maximo Wong petitioned for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. which was his name prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.Maximo Alcala, Jr. (2 ½ years old) was adopted by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong (naturalized Filipino citizens) with the consent of their parents.Maximo Wong (22 years old) then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.

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It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality;that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life;and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.RTC Ruling: Ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE (having complied with the necessary requisites)OSG appealed the decisionCA Ruling: AFFIRMED RTC decision in fullOSG’s Contentions:Maximo's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name.For Maximo to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and his adoptive mother who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name.The reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adoptive child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maximo Wong may change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.

HELD: YESChange of name is a privilege, given the proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason.SC: We are guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor.

SC: We find unacceptable the assertion of the SolGen that Maximo's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his present surname is unsubstantiated.Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings.

CA Ruling is AFFIRMED in toto.

Rule 103Case No. 3Yasin vs Judge, Shari’a Judicial DistrictG.R. No. 94986Ponenete: Bidin, J.:

FACTS: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court issued an order which ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name.

HELD: NO

The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation. The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.

Rule 103 Case No. 4 Ponente : ReyesONG PENG OAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Facts: -Ong Peng Oan filed an application with the CFI of Manila to change his name to Vicente Chan Bon Lay, by which he allegedly is and has been better known in social and business circles, since 1946. However, his application was declined for the following reasons:-In a certificate issued by Justice of the Peace Geronimo J. Garcia of Navotas, Rizal, it appears that the herein petitioner, with the name of Ong Pin Can, was convicted for a violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code. And in a decision of Judge Conrado Barrios, this same petitioner, with the name of Ong Peng Oan alias Vicente Chan was fined P20 for a violation of section 2698.

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- The certificate issued by the Justice of the Peace above referred to, shows that the petitioner has not been using the name Vicente Chan Bon Lay, as he claims, because the name appearing therein is Ong Pin Can, and in the decision of Judge Barrios it appears that his name is Ong Pen Oan alias Vicente Chan, which belies his pretension that he has been using the name Vicente Chan Bon Lay ever since his arrival in the Philippines, because, if it were true, the inescapable conclusion would that he changes his name to Ong Pin Can or Ong Pen Oan whenever it suits his convenience.Issue: Whether or not Ong Peng Oan shall be allowed to change his name to Vicente Chan Bon Lay.Held: No. Ong Peng Oan shall not be allowed to change his name. A person with a criminal record will have evident interest in the use of a name other than his own, in an attempt to obliterate an unsavory record; hence, the mere fact that the applicant has been using a different name and has become known by it does not per se alone constitute "proper and reasonable cause", or justification, to legally authorize a change of name. There being no showing that petitioner will be prejudice by the continued use of his true name, for in fact he has been using it all along together with the other names he has assumed on different occasions, we fail to see any error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the petition. Where prior convictions exist, it is the court's duty to consider carefully the consequences of the change of name, and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. It must not be forgotten that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.

Rule 103 Case No. 5 Ponente : MendozaREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLYN MERCADERAFacts: - Merlyn Mercadera represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048.- The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048.- Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC)- The RTC granted Mercadera's petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. -The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. The OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. - But the CA was not persuaded, the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order.Issue: Whether or not the filling of name correction under Rule 108 instead of Rule 103 was proper.Held: Yes. The filling of name correction under Rule 108 was proper. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. I