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Transcript of RSIS Policy Paper Bibhu (1)
7/27/2019 RSIS Policy Paper Bibhu (1)
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rsis-policy-paper-bibhu-1 1/10
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism:
Force, Development or Both?
Bibhu Prasad RoutrayMay 2012
7/27/2019 RSIS Policy Paper Bibhu (1)
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India’s Response to
Maoist Extremism:
Force, Development or Both?
Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray was a Visiting Fellow with the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU) from October 2010 to March 2011 and from September 2011 to March
2012. Prior to that he served as Deputy Director at the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India, NewDelhi, India. He can be contacted at [email protected]
Bibhu Prasad RoutrayMay 2012
7/27/2019 RSIS Policy Paper Bibhu (1)
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Contents
03 Executive Summary
04 The Problem
05 State Responses: Military and Developmental
06 Government Approaches: A Critique
07 Policy Recommendations
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Executive Summary
India is currently grappling with an eective response to
let-wing extremism. Even though in the last two years,extremist violence as well as areas under extremist
inuence has somewhat diminished, the problem remains
serious. While India’s military approach has ailed to make
much headway owing to a range o weaknesses among the
orces, the development approach too has been critiqued
or being too romanticised and unreal or implementation.
There is an obvious need or a policy rethink and clarity o
approach i the challenge is to be met. It is essential that
the policy to deal with the problem needs to consider the
ollowing recommendations.
• Thecountryhastoarriveataconsensusonthekindof
approach it wishes to pursue against the extremists.
• Apermanentinstitutionalmechanismintheformofa
coordination centre can be established to thrash out
emerging dierences between the Centre and the
States.
• Augmentingthecapacitiesofthepoliceastheprimary
orce against Maoist violence will be key to neutralizing
the frepower o the extremists.
• While development is a useful tool against Maoist
extremism, it is imperative that a semblance o orderprecede injection o resources into the extremist-
aected areas.
• Developmentmustoperateintandemwiththesecurity
orces. Resumption o administrative activity should
immediately ollow the clearing o an area by the
orces.
• Itisessentialthattheofcialapproachbebasedon
an eective policy o communication that not just
brandishes the extremists as essentially bad, but is
also honest about its own honourable intentions.
• Holding elections for institutions of local self-
government in the aected areas ollowed by the
strengthening o these institutions with additional
fnancial and decision-making powers is a necessity.
• Success of security force operations need to be
based on the concept o just war that strives to do the
maximum to avoid collateral damage.
• Government needs to stay away from propagandistclaims about winning the war in quick time.
03
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
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The Problem
For the past several years, the let-wing extremism problem
has emerged as a major internal security challenge or
India, described on several occasions as the “biggest
internal security challenge” by the Prime Minister o the
country. The extremists proessing a pro-tribal outlook
and with an avowed objective o overthrowing the present
system o government through an armed revolution have
been able to pose a serious governance and development
challenge. Armed violence by these extremists,
predominantly belonging to the Communist Party o India-
Maoist (CPI-Maoist)1 peaked in 2009 when intelligence
sources inormed that they were active in almost 230
districts o the country, amounting to more than one third
o India’s geographical area. Such areas witnessed large
scale violence targeting the state and what the Maoists
describe as ‘state sympathizers’.
1 The Communist Party o India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is the result o a 2004 merger between two let-wing extremist organizations- the Maoist CommunistCentreofIndia(MCCI),whichwasactiveinCentralIndiaandthePeople’sWarGroup(PWG),whichwasmostlyactiveinsouthernIndianstates.TheCPI-
Maoist continue to remain the most dominant and violent outft among the various Let Wing Extremist groups, accounting or more than 90 percent o totalLet Wing Extremist incidents and 95 percent o resultant killings. Annual Report 2011-12,MinistryofHomeAffairs,GovernmentofIndia,p.29.
2 State-wise extent of Naxal violence during 2007 to 2011 (from January to December),MinistryofHomeAffairs,GovernmentofIndia,pp.1-2.
3 See “Maoist violence down, says Chidambaram”, 14 June 2011, http://www.inewsone.com/2011/06/14/maoist-violence-down-says-chidambaram/56593.
Accessedon10April2012.
(Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal)
(Remains of a vehicle following a Maoist landmine explosion in
Maharashtra, 2012)
Maoist Violence in IndiaYear Incidents Fatalities
(Civilians
& Security
Forces)
Maoists
Killed
Maoists
Arrested
Maoists
Surrendered
2007 1565 696 141 1456 390
2008 1591 721 199 1743 400
2009 2258 908 219 1981 150
2010 2213 1005 172 2916 266
2011 1755 606 99 1972 393
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India.
Areasunderextremistcontrol havesomewhatshrunkin
the past couple o years. While as many as 18 states (o
a total o 28) were said to have been witnessing Maoist
activities in 2009, since 2010 government sources havebeen reporting extremist violence only rom eight. In 2011,
government reported 606 atalities in 1755 incidents o
Maoist violence which was signifcantly lower than 1005
deaths in 2213 incidents in 2011.2 While this represented a
major improvement in the state o extremism, the problem
continues to remain serious. There has been a spike in the
number o training camps organised by the Maoists or
their cadres as well as in the number o ‘people’s courts’ in
which the extremists punish the ‘enemies o the movement’
– indicating that the decrease in violence is only the result
o a tactical and temporary retreat by the Maoists and
is not necessarily due to the augmentation o capacitiesamong the security orces. Moreover, intelligence sources
have indicated Maoist attempts to spread to new states
in southern, central and northeast India. The government
has termed the current level o violence ‘unacceptable’3.
Patterns of Maoist Attacks
Targets 2008 2009 2010
Economic Targets 05 17 24
Railway 27 46 54
Telephone Exchange/ Tower
46 67 45
Power Plant 1 2 3
Mining 6 3 9
Transmission Pole 24 7 2
Panchayat Bhawan 7 23 31
School Building 25 71 39
Forest Rod, Culverts etc 41 126 158
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India.
04
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
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State Responses: Military and Developmental
In 2008, an Expert Committee o the Planning Commission,
India’s nodal ofcial development planning body, in
its report recognized the Maoist movement’s political
nature.4 The report, an exhaustive anthology o the roots
o tribal discontent and violence underlined the need or
a development-centric approach to the Maoist problem.
It made a series o recommendations with regard to
implementation o protective legislation, land acquisition,
rehabilitation and settlement and livelihood security.
However,theneedtoobliteratethemilitarycapacitiesofthe
extremists who accounted or the lives o 721 civilians and
security orces in 1591 incidents in 2008 and 908 civilians
and security orces in 2258 incidents in the subsequent
year,pushedtheMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA)topursueaforce-centricpolicyagainsttheCPI-Maoist.Althoughthe
government described its policy as being based on the
twin pillars o development and security orce operations,
the need to undermine the frepower o the extremists as a
pre-condition beore starting development initiatives was
an unwritten principle.
The belie that major armed operations can break the
back o the extremists was derived rom success stories
in Mizoram in India’s northeast and also Punjab, which
had once been seriously aected by Sikh militancy. Even
intheMaoist-affectedsouthernstateofAndhraPradesh,intelligence-backed tactical operations by the anti-Maoist
commando police force, Greyhounds, was thought to
have played a decisive role behind the victory o the state
over the extremists.
4 Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas, Report o an expert
groupto PlanningCommission,April 2008,http://planningcommission.
gov.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf.Accessedon10April2012.
This thinking resulted in Operation Green Hunt, a
coordinated multi-theatre military oensive against the
extremiststhatbeganinearly2010.Around70battalions
ofCentralArmedPoliceForces(CAPFs)weredeployed
bytheMHAtoassistthestatepolicepersonneloperations
against the extremists. New battalions were raised
and existing battalions underwent extensive counter-
insurgency training. The ministry also sanctioned the
raising o ten battalions o specialised counter-Maoist
force called the Combat Battalion for Resolute Action
(COBRA). However, lack of adequate planning and
coordination between the various agencies involved in the
operation and inadequate intelligence backup resulted in
a series o serious reversals or the security orces. Two
big ambushes in the state o Chhattisgarh claimed thelives o nearly 100 security orce personnel, pushing them
intoadefensivestateofoperation.Areorientationinthe
approach was called or.
Althoughthemilitaryoperationshavenotbeenabandoned
and individual states continue to undertake area clearing
operations, such exercises appear to orm parts o a new
‘clear, hold and develop’ strategy that uses development
as a tool to win back the support o the tribal population,
who overwhelmingly appear to sympathize with the
extremists. Since early 2011 there is a renewed ocus
on carrying out development initiatives in areas clearedo Maoist presence. Several agship projects o the
government to improve connectivity o tribal areas with the
administrative centres, to provide employment to the tribal
youth and to ensure health and educational acilities have
been launched. To ensure that proper implementation o
these developmental projects and monitor their progress,
anewschemetitled‘PrimeMinster’sRuralDevelopment
Fellows Scheme’ has also been unveiled. Under the
scheme, 156 young proessionals have been trained
and are being stationed in 78 worst-aected districts or
two years to assist the district administration. Resources
too have started owing into the coers o the district
administration with an emphasis on time bound utilization
and implementation.
Since the extremists are known to have targeted
inrastructure projects in the past or have prevented
contractors rom executing the projects, security orces
are now assigned to protect the planned development
ventures in order to ensure their timely completion and
saety. To ensure that the security orces are not targeted,
as they protect the development projects, the government
is also planning to build landmine-proo Roller-Compacted
Concrete (RCC) roads in aected states. Further, the
government has also cleared a proposal to raise a combatunit under the para-military Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF) or construction o roads in Maoist-aected areas.
(Security Forces carrying out anti-Maoist Operations in
Chhattsigarh, 2010)
05
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
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Government Approaches: A Critique
Two types o problems continue to aict the counter-Maoist eorts – frst, the lack o coordination between
the ederal government and the states; and second, theinherent problems within the states impacting on theircapacity to tackle the challenge.
Even when the Centre embarked on the now abandonedOperationGreenHunt,differentstatespursueddivergentpolicies against the extremists, oscillating between peacetalks, development and security measures. The lacko a common approach was taken advantage o by theextremists who used the territories o the states sot on
security orce operations to regroup. Even the centralorces who aided the state police orces were ound tobe operating without direction and able leadership. Themilitary approach did achieve some notable successesby neutralizing some senior extremist leaders. But in theabsence o a coherent nation-wide approach, a completevictory over Maoist extremism remained a ar-etcheddream.In2009,thethenHomeSecretaryhadpredictedthat “within 30 days o the security orces moving in anddominating the area, we should be able to restore civiladministration.”5 The goal was never met.
Similarly, the lack o unanimity among the Centre andthe states has the potential o becoming a bane or the
development-centric approach o the government aswell. InOctober 2011, the Rural DevelopmentMinisterJairam Ramesh, whose ministry oversees most o thedevelopment programmes in the Maoist-aected areas,pointed to this specifc problem. “We need to rise abovepartisan political considerations and set aside old Centre-vs-State arguments and work concertedly to restorepeople’s aith in the administration...only then will the tideo Naxalism be stemmed”, he is reported to have said.6 This, however, is easier said than done. Media reports inJanuary 2012 indicated that the development projectsinitiated in the eastern state o Jharkhand have run intoa rough patch owing to the unenthusiastic responserom the state government. The state orest department
has been extremely slow in providing clearances or thesetting up o security orce camps in the protected orestareas.Accordingtotheplan,theseforcesaretoprovidesecurity to the development projects.
Similarly, the relative weakness o the state police orcesand the complete absence o intelligence networksto assist the security orce operations have impactedon the eectiveness o the security orce operationsagainst the extremists. Since 1969-70, the MHA hasbeen implementing a Scheme or Modernisation o StatePolice Forces.7However,implementationofthescheme,according to which the Centre provides money to the statesto build capacity among their police orces, has been
slow, barring a ew states. States continue to demonstratean overwhelming tendency to all back on the fghtingability o the central orces rather than going through thetedious process o capacity building among their ownpoliceforces.Auditingbythecentralgovernmentonmanyoccasions has revealed serious gaps in implementation othe modernisation programmes.
I the military approach is seen to have achieved minimalresults, development initiatives in the extremist aectedareas too have received setbacks. Firstly, without anyunctional system o governance worth its name in vastareas under extremist inuence, it has been almostimpossible to execute the developmental projects.
Secondly, wherever the government has managed to setup a unctional project implementing mechanism, real orthreatened extremist attacks targeting the executing agencyhave slowed down the project execution considerably.This has widened the trust defcit among the intendedbenefciaries and the government. Thirdly, a perennialabsence o coordination between the security orces andthe civilian administration has meant that areas continueto remain without ofcial developmental intervention, evenater these are cleared o Maoist presence by the orces.Assoonastheforcesretreat,Maoistsrecapturethearea,nulliying the achievement.
5 AlokeTikku,“Anti-Naxaloffensivetobegininelevenplaces”,Hindustan Times,10October2009,http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/ Anti-Naxal-offensive-to-begin-in-eleven-places/Article1-463353.aspx.Accessedon10April2012.
6 “Central and state govts responsible or Naxalism: Jairam Ramesh”, Daily News & Analysis, 11 October 2011, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_
central-and-state-govts-responsible-for-naxalism-jairam-ramesh_1597691(Accessedon25January2012).
7 Scheme for Modernization of State Police Forces,MinistryofHomeAffairs,GovernmentofIndia,http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/MPF.pdf.Accessedon10April2012.
India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram
Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh has been one of the
main advocates of the development approach
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Policy Recommendations
Wide-ranging suggestions or an optimal response
have been made by analysts, activists and experts.
Organisations which the government considers to be
pro-Maoist categorize the ofcial approaches to deal with
Maoist extremism as a war unleashed by the Indian state
on the hapless tribals. They allege that the government
is merely interested in the natural resources lying buried
in the tribal inhabited lands and is trying to cleanse the
area o tribal presence on behal o the Multi-National
Corporations (MNCs), with whom it has signed several
Memorandums o Understanding (MoUs). Even the
ofcial development initiatives have been termed as a
‘sot counter insurgency’ method by these activists. They
prescribe that the government leave the tribal population
alone.
Apartfromthe factthatstoppingminingandexploration
o natural resources is an unviable proposition or India’s
growing economy, such suggestions gloss over the act
that the CPI-Maoist has an avowed objective o replacing
the current structure o governance with a people’s
government. Even though, in real terms, this objective
appears grossly unrealistic, the CPI-Maoist’s capacity to
pose a major hurdle or ofcial developmental activity in
remote areas remains a reality.
Another group ofexperts opines that dialoguewith theMaoists and development o the tribal areas, rather than
a military solution, is the way out o the current mess. This
approach too is untenable, given the act that Maoists
have either resisted attempts at negotiation or have used
the peace process to recoup. Similarly, suggestions have
also been made to use land reorms and to bringing about
changes in the laws that secure the rights o the tribal
population over orests. Land reorms have remained
a contentious issue in many states invoking divergent
policies rom the governments. While many states have not
bothered to take any steps towards land reorms, in some
likeAndhraPradesh,wheretheneedforlandreformshas
been accepted, entrenched stake holders have slowed
down the process considerably. The Central government
has initiated several schemes and passed legislations
aimed at empowering the tribals. But the growing
criminalisation in the Maoist ranks has severely limited the
impact o such measures on the level o extremism.
On the other hand, a separate groups o experts avouring
a security orce-led response underline the need to
strengthen the state police orces as an eective model o
counter-insurgency rather than depending on the central
forces.However,giventhepoorstateofpoliceforcesin
the aected states, this approach appears to be highly
ambitious and may take years to implement.
Thereore, an eective approach to deal with the Maoist
problem may contain the ollowing.
(i) Consensual approach: The country has to arrive at a
consensus on the kind o approach it wishes to pursue
against the extremists. Whether it is purely military,
developmental or a judicious mix o both has to be decidedby national-level brain storming. The MHA will have to
be at the oreront o building such a consensus. Merely
supporting the state governments by providing unds and
orces is inadequate.
(ii) Institutional arrangements for centre-state cooperation:
Since problems in ormulating a counter-Maoist policy as
well as in dealing with the issue on a day-to-day basis
are sourced to the lack o centre-state cooperation,
a permanent institutional mechanism in the orm o a
coordination centre can be established to thrash out
emergingdifferences.AcoordinationcentredoescurrentlyexistwithintheMHA,butrequirestheactiveparticipation
o state representatives to ensure smoother coordination.
(iii) Police hold the key: Augmenting the capacities of
the police, who are conversant with local conditions, as
the primary orce against Maoist violence will be key to
neutralizing the frepower o the extremists. To optimize
this, close and timely monitoring o the expenditure o the
unds made available by the Centre is required.
(iv) Development follows military success: While
development is a useul tool against Maoist extremism, it is
imperative that a semblance o order precede injection o
resourcesintotheextremist-affectedareas.Asexemplied
by India’s experience in other conict theatres like the
northeast, without some level o security, conict-ridden
areas resemble bottom-less pits. Without local capacities
to absorb the available resources and an accompanying
mechanism or accountability, unds simply disappear
into the coers o the extremists, politicians, bureaucrats
and the contractors. Here again, careful monitoring is
essential.
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(v) Coordination between the administration and
security forces: Asexplainedearlier, developmentmust
operate in tandem with the security orces. Resumption
o administrative activity should immediately ollow the
clearing o an area by the orces. In this context, the
creation o a dedicated team o administrators, with some
level o independent decision making authority, requires
special attention.
(vi) Strategic communication: Maoists have exploited
tribal disenchantment against government apathy lasting
over decades. It is essential that the ofcial approach be
based on an eective policy o communication that not
just brandishes the extremists as essentially bad, but is
also honest about its own honourable intentions.
(vii) Development of local political leadership: It is not
the security orces, state or central, but local political
leadership which will act as a primary resistance orce
against a cleared area relapsing into extremism. Every
step must be taken or the resumption o political activity
intheaffectedareas.Holdingelectionsforinstitutionsof
local sel-government could be the frst step in this regard,
ollowed by the strengthening o these institutions with
additional fnancial and decision-making powers. This
would ameliorate the reality o alienation among the aected
population, thereby making them genuine stakeholders in
maintaining peace and promoting development.
(viii) Need for a just war: Just like other conict theatres,
the Maoist conict theatre too has reported its own share
o human rights violations and excesses committed by the
security orces on non-combatants. While some o these
allegations have been ound to be alse, some are real.
There is an urgent need to base the success o security
orce operations on the concept o just war that strives to
do the maximum to avoid collateral damage that leads tourther alienation o the aected people.
(ix) Cut the hype: Without doubt, the anti-Maoist operations
willbeaprolongedaffair.Augmentingstatecapacitywill
need sustained eort and time. Thereore it is essential or
the government to stay away rom propagandist claims
about winning the war in quick time.
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