Roving Bandits of Modern Fisheries

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    Swedish FAO Committee

    Publication series 5

    ISSN: 1652-9316

    Roving Bandits

    in Modern Fisheries

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    Production: Ministry o Agriculture, February 2009

    Swedish FAO Committee

    Printed by: Edita Vstra Aros, Vsters

    Article no: Jo 09.002

    Additional copies can be ordered rom the Ministry o Agriculture via

    www.regeringen.se/jordbruk or by telephone at: +46 (0)8-405 27 50

    Table o Content

    Preace 3

    1. Background 4

    2. The illegal shery 9

    3. How does the phenomenon o

    Roving Bandits work? 18

    4. What are the eects? 24

    5. Which initiatives have been taken

    to handle the problem o Roving Bandits? 28

    Conclusions 30

    Abbreviations and glossary 31

    Literature cited 32

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    Preace

    This is the th edition o the Swedish FAO Committees publication series.The purpose is to spark an interest in issues related to global cooperation,particularly the work being conducted at FAO (Food and Agriculture Orga-nization), the United Nations organization or agriculture, orestry, sheriesand ood production. The last discussion paper discussed conficting inte-rests related to the trade advantages o developing countries and whethersome countries benet at the expense o others. As the FAO Committee hasdecided to continue the paper series along a similar topic, this edition willocus on problems related to the growing global market or sheries productsand the threat which the illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) sherypresents to viable sh stocks around the world.

    The declining stocks o the last decades and the growing demand or shhave led governments around the world to introduce tougher regulations.This has caused shing feets to seek new shing grounds, the coasts oArica being one such place. The weak institutions, and thus weak sheriesgovernance, o many o these coastal states oten lead to a situation whereillegal shing undermines the conditions or local sheries and ood security,thereby threatening the livelihoods o poor coastal populations.

    The discussion paper highlights the alarmingly ast loss o marine biologi-cal resources and illustrates the need or political action.

    The term Roving Bandits is explained. These Roving Bandits illustrate thediculties acing sheries governance bodies. Questions are raised regardinghow the phenomenon o Roving Bandits operates and who can be regardedas a Roving Bandit. Which actors contribute to the phenomenon and whatare the possible eects? Which initiatives have been instigated to combat theproblems?

    In this discussion paper Beatrice Crona, Stockholm Resilience Center,and Henrik sterblom, Stockholm Resilience Center and the Baltic Nest

    Institute, discuss the growing illegal, unreported and unregulated shery andthe implications o this or attaining sustainable sheries. The developmento the paper was commissioned by the Swedish FAO Committee. BeatriceCrona and Henrik sterblom are responsible or its content. The purpose othis paper is to spark a debate which can lead to urther discussions on thesubject. It is my hope that it will give the reader a deepened understandingo the complex conditions surrounding the worlds sheries and stimulate aruitul debate.

    Happy reading!

    Rol ErikssonChair o the Swedish FAO Committee

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    1. Background

    1.1. Not enough sh in the sea

    During the last decade our understanding o the problems surroundingsheries worldwide has increased. A large number o scientic studies haveshown a very clear and signicant decline in important sh stocks around theworld, oten as a result o excessive shing pressure. The previously stableincrease o catches since the 1950s (as a result o improved technology amongother things) has abated. Catches have remained virtually unchanged duringthe last twenty years (Figure 1). Nonetheless, the demand or sh has notdiminished. Fish consumption has increased signicantly since the 1970s,largely as a result o the strong increase in China (Table 1). Between the years1970 and 2007 the average consumption o sh per capita rose rom 11.5 kg tonearly 17.0 kg.

    Per capita

    consumption (kg)

    1970 1980 1990 2007

    The World 11,5 12,8 14,8 16,9

    The Worldexcluding China

    13,5 14,3 13,5 14

    China 5 26

    Table 1. Trends in the consumption o sh between 1970 and 2007

    (WHO 2008)

    The Indian

    Ocean

    The Atlantic

    Ocean The Pacific

    Ocean

    The Pacific

    Ocean

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    Region Per capita consumption (kg)

    Asia (excl. China) 14,3

    China 26

    Europe 19,9

    North and Central America 18,6

    South America 8,7

    Arica 8

    Table 2. Current regional dierences in sh consumption (FAO 2008)

    90

    85

    80

    75

    70

    65

    60

    55

    50

    45

    40

    0

    1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

    Globalcatch

    (t

    x

    106)

    Year

    El Nio event

    El Nio events

    Figure 1. Trends in the global marine shery

    Data on total catches (open circles) comes rom FAO and show a continuous

    increase during the 1990s. I adjustment is made or over-reporting by China,

    the graph shows a somewhat dierent pattern (lled circles). The Peruvian anch-

    oveta constitutes a signicant portion o the total catch, while the sh resource

    is simultaneously aected by El Nio. I catches o anchoveta are excluded rom

    the analysis (i.e. total catches minus the anchoveta) a clearly decreasing trend is

    discerned during the entire period o the 1990s (lled triangles). The gure is

    rom Pauly et al (2005;7), and reprinted with the kind permission o The Royal

    Society Publishing.

    Fish consumption has also increased in other parts o Asia, Europe andNorth- and Central America. The consumption is stable but considerablylower in South America and in Arica (see Table 2). The situation can beseen as particularly worrisome in Arica, in part because sh consumptionis lowest in this areas, but also because a signicant increase in population is

    expected in this region and is likely to cause large problems related to healthand ood security.

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    In response to the growing demand or sh large investments have beenmade in shing feets in virtually all industrialized nations, and many shstocks have been subject to increased shing pressure. This has lead many im-portant stocks o ood sh in the Northern hemisphere to become classiedas ully exploited (i.e. there is no room or urther increase in sh extraction),or over exploited. Alaska pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) is ully exploited(or in some cases stocks have already collapsed, as in the Eastern Bering Sea),as is blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) in the North Atlantic. Moststocks o Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) are over exploited and in some caseshave even collapsed (FAO 2007).

    In recent decades the increasing global demand has been met by a sub-stantial increase in the development o aquaculture (primarily in China).Thus today we are approaching a level where almost hal o all the shconsumed by humans is derived rom aquaculture. The demand is expectedto continue to increase in the next decades as an eect o increasing worldpopulation and rising levels o welare. Aquaculture is, however, not decou-pled rom wild sh stocks and hence marine systems. In predatory sh arms(e.g. salmon) large amounts o sh meal (produced rom wild caught marinesh) is used as odder. Without signicant development and improvement ovegetarian alternative odder an increase in the production o predatory shwill thereore result in an increased pressure on wild sh stocks o e.g. sprat(Sprattus sprattus), sand eels (Ammodytidae) and capelin (Mallotus villosus),species which constitute an essential ood source or wild predatory sh butalso or marine birds and mammals (sterblom et al 2008).

    1.2 Too many boats at sea

    More boats at sea no longer mean larger catches being landed. The biologicalcapacity o our seas to produce sh seems to have been reached, and in severalinstances it has been exceeded. One o the undamental problems acingtodays sheries governance is the excessive amount o vessels or, as it is otenreerred to, over capacity o the shing feet. Prot maximizing companies

    naturally invest part o their prot in the business. This applies to the indus-trial shery as well, and it has led to a development towards more ecientvessels and gear. Quite oten state subsidies are also provided as a mean toimprove shing capacity and saety on board the vessels. The result is anincreased capacity o the shing feet to catch sh while there are ecologicalconstraints on how much sh ecosystems can produce.

    A large part o the regulated shery is managed through a quota system,where a certain xed amount o sh can be caught each year. When the quotahas been lled shing is stopped. This means that the vessels with the great-

    est capacity have the biggest potential o catching a relatively larger portiono the total quota. The worlds total shing capacity is currently signicantlylarger than what is needed to catch the existing marine resources, even i it is

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    Figure 2. Major trade fows o sh and sheries products.

    For intercontinental fows, only those worth over 500 million USD per year are shown. The

    gure is based on data rom FAO (2007) and it is adapted rom a version published in Stop

    Illegal Fishing (2008), produced by Suzannah Walmsley, Marine Resources Assessment

    Group Ltd (England).

    very dicult to make precise estimates o the scale o the over-capacity.Realization o this over-capacity has led to the initiation o a number o

    measures rom governments around the world. In some cases nancing is be-ing provided or the decommissioning o vessels, and to a growing extent eco-nomic incentives are being used to reduce over-capacity. One such incentiveis to limit and speciy how much o the annual quota is allocated to a specicvessel. These quotas can oten be sold between vessel owners which can leadto an improved adaptation o the shery to the size o the existing resource.What happens to decommissioned vessels is not entirely clear however. Insome instances boats can be traded between nations or move to sherieswhich are less regulated, in other parts o the world.

    1.3 Fish o the world

    The international trade with sh and sheries products is continuouslyincreasing. The liberalization o the market or sheries products is by someconsidered to be a contributing actor. The reason or this is that liberaliza-tion means, among other things, a decrease or elimination o trade taris orproducts traded between nations, and in theory this promotes a more e-cient production and utilization o resources. The theory partly agrees withreality at least within the manuacturing sector but since there is very limitedroom or increased production o sh, it is not as successul in predicting

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    sustainable production o sheries. However, it is very likely that the trade insh and sheries products would have increased regardless o the liberaliza-tion initiatives, and current trends point to a continued increase. During thelast thirty years the value o export sheries has increased rom close to 10 to86 billion USD. During the last ew years the increase has stabilized around9% per year. Developing countries are important actors on the export marketand contribute with approximately 50% o the total export value. For manyo these countries the export o sheries products has increased so much thatit today constitutes a larger portion than the combined total o other agricul-tural products. Fish is thereore a very important source o income or manydeveloping nations while at the same time it also constitutes an essentialsource o protein or their populations.

    Japan, the EU and USA account or around 70% o the import (Pauly et al2005). At the same time international trade fows are becoming increasinglycomplex and in recent years parts o the production has shited to Asia, theormer East European nations and North Arica, primarily as a result o largedierences in production costs. Today China is the worlds leading producerand exporter o sh products, and in 2006 it accounted or 10% o the globalsh exports in terms o monetary value (Lem 2007). A large portion o thisis re-exports, i.e. sh which has been imported, rened and then exportedagain. China is currently the main exporter o white sh (Atlantic cod andAlaska pollock) to the EU (Glitnir 2007), o which a large portion is caughtin Arctic waters (WWF 2008).

    Globalization, in the orm o increasing interdependencies betweenmarkets within the sheries sector around the world, is occurring primarilythrough trade in sh and sheries products, as well as through oreign directinvestment in catch and processing. The evolution o increasingly globaldistribution channels and multinational corporations has urther stimulatedthis development. China is only on example o how complicated the tradefows o sh can be. An attempt to illustrate this complex phenomenon isshown in Figure 2. This complexity impedes the monitoring and control o

    the production chain rom raw material to the consumer.

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    2. The illegal shery

    2.1 Is everyone ollowing the rules?

    It has long been known that there are signicant diculties in governing andmanaging sheries in a sustainable manner. In many countries the over capa-city discussed above creates a dicult problem as it results in a high politicalpressure to maintain a shery which is larger than the stocks can sustain. Theproessional sherman who has invested large sums in more ecient vesselsis naturally dependent on the quota being high enough or the business tobe protable. Industrial sheries are oten important in regions where otheralternatives sources o livelihoods are scarce which means that demandsrom lobbyist groups oten infuence politics in the direction o quotas whichsurpass those advised by science. It is not uncommon that direct and short-term economic and social needs receive priority during political deliberation,at the expense o a more long-term, biological sustainable (and thereby alsosocially and economically sustainable) shery. In the EU this problem hasbeen apparent or quite some time (Sissenwine & Symes 2007). Another issuewhich has received increasing attention in recent years is the act that illegalshing undermines the conditions or sustainable sheries. Since sheriesgovernance is oten conducted at the international level it is not uncommonthat social norms dier between, as well as within, nations. The opportuni-ties or cheating can oten also be quite good. Fishing is commonly conduc-ted ar o shore where there is signicant diculties monitoring catches.The risk o being caught red-handed with catches that surpass the allocatedquota is very slim. Within the EU there is a well developed organization orsheries governance and management, including unctions or the controlo vessels at sea and in port. In spite o this the European Court o Auditorsrecently (2007) concluded that set quotas are consistently being surpassedand that insucient measures are being taken to deal with and punish the

    perpetrators. The phenomenon is not unique or the EU.There are considerable diculties associated with estimating the illegalcatches, but in spite o this a number o recent reports have attempted todo just this. Naturally they can not present exact gures but they give usan idea o the magnitude o the problem at hand, regional dierences andtrends over time. Some estimates suggest that illegal shing operationscorrespond to a value o the catches landed ranging between 4 to 9 billionUSD, o which one billion stems rom Arican waters south o the Sahara.This urthermore corresponds to a quarter o the total income rom export

    o sheries products rom these countries (HSTF 2006, EJF 2005). A fightinventory o the Guinean coast reported 60% o the 2,313 vessels observed inthe area to be there illegally. Similar surveys outside the coast o Sierra Leone

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    and Ghana estimated that 25% o the vessels present in the territorial waterso both countries were there illegally (EJF 2005).

    An analysis o illegal shing in sixty countries estimated that between1045% o all sh landed has been caught illegally between 1980 and 20031.There are considerable dierences between regions. The illegal shingoperations were highest in the central and eastern parts o the Atlantic, thatis outside o the West Arican coast. This region has also seen a signicant

    Illegal shing could be dened in dierent ways. In English the term Illegal, Un-

    reported and Unregulated (IUU) shery is oten used. This publication has decided

    to ollow FAO:s denition which can be summarized as ollows:

    Illegal shing reers to activities:

    conducted by national or oreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction o a

    State, without the permission o that State, or in contravention o its laws andregulations.

    conducted by vessels fying the fag o States that are parties to a relevant re-

    gional sheries management organization (RFMO) but operate in contravention

    o i) the conservation and management measures adopted by that organization

    and by which the States are bound; ii) relevant provisions o the applicable

    international law; or iii) in violation o national laws or international obliga-

    tions, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional

    sheries management organization.

    Unreported shing reers to shing activities:

    which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant natio-

    nal authority, in contravention o national laws and regulations.

    which are undertaken in the area o competence o a relevant regional she-

    ries management organization and which have not been reported or have been

    misreported, in contravention o the reporting procedures o that organization.

    Unregulated shing reers to shing activities:

    conducted in the area o application o a relevant regional sheries manage-

    ment organization (RFMO) but are i) conducted by vessels without nationality;

    ii) by those fying the fag o a State not party to that organization; or iii) by

    a shing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the con-servation and management measures o that organization.

    conducted in areas, or or sh stocks, where no applicable conservation or ma-

    nagement measures are in place and where such shing activities are conduc-

    ted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities or the conservation o

    living marine resources under international law.

    Source: FAO 2001, Articles 3.1 3.3.

    1

    Data used or this analysis includes inormation rom surveillance programs, existing literature andinterviews with experts. The ocus o the study were those species that made up the most importantcatches in each respective region (in total 46% o the global catches).

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    increase in illegal shing in recent years. The study estimates the value o theillegal catches to somewhere between 10 to 23 billion USD, correspondingto a volume between 11 and 26 million metric tons (MRAG and UBC 2008).Thus illegal shing is highly signicant in many regions o the world.

    However, illegal shing is only part o the problem. In several regions sh-ing is also poorly regulated. Catches in the unregulated shery, most otenconducted ar o shore outside o the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (200nautical miles outside the coast), are included in the estimates above. Thebox on previous page describes the dierent types o shing which is com-monly classied as illegal, and Figure 3 illustrates how this works in relationto national and international waters.

    2.2. Roving Bandits what are they?

    The term Roving Bandits was rst described by the economist Mancur Ol-

    son (2000). He contrasted the term with what he called Stationary Bandits.In his book Olson discussed the economic implications o dierent types ogovernance regimes, with particular ocus on anarchy, tyranny and demo-cracy. Among other things, he articulated the theory that under anarchis-tic conditions (that is a situation without any clear governance structure),Roving Bandits have no incentives to conserve or manage a resource. On thecontrary they are more likely to try to amass as much wealth and resourcesas possible and then move on to another place. So the plundering continues.This diers rom the stationary bandits who, on account o their stationary

    nature, have much stronger incentives to manage their resources sustainableor the long term.Mancur Olson discussed these types o bandits in relation to governance

    National waters

    200 nautical miles

    Operating in

    closed area

    Unlicensed

    border hopping

    Licensed but

    mis-reporting

    Unregulated

    fishing

    Unlicensed

    Vessel from flag state

    not party to RFMO

    Non-complying vesselfrom flag state party to

    RFMO

    Unlicensed

    organization

    (RFMO)

    Contin

    ental

    sh

    elf

    Area of regional

    closed area

    Figure 3. Illustration o the various types o IUU shing.

    Within an exclusive economic zone

    (EEZ) there may be unlicensed

    shing (poaching), under- or non-reporting, or unauthorized shing

    by area, seasonal, gear, quota or

    species. Outside the EEZ there may

    be non-compliance with an RFMO,

    or there may be unregulated shing

    outside the area o an RFMO. Note

    that included in IUU are also un-

    regulated shing conducted outside

    o the management area o an RFMO

    (see box on previous page). Adaptedrom MRAG (2005).

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    regimes but interesting parallels can be made in relation to modern day sh-eries resources and governance. The absence o clear governance structuresin many regions, with well unctioning control and sanctioning mechanisms,can be likened to the anarchy which Olson describes2. The role o the RovingBandits is played by mobile actors who can exploit sheries resources quicklyand eciently. When the resource collapses, or when it is no longer prot-able, they can move and nd new areas and stocks to exploit. This sequentialexploitation, as it is oten called, is one o the key characteristics o theRoving Bandits o the modern shery (See section 3).

    2.3. Who can be seen as a Roving Bandit?

    The global scope o illegal shing underscores the act that it is conductedby a multitude o dierent actors. So then, which types o actors can be seenas Roving Bandits in a sheries context? For the sake o simplicity we chooseto divide them into two groups: 1) technically well equipped distant watervessels, and 2) trade operators. Both categories have the capacity to behave asRoving Bandits as a result o weak or non-existent governing institutions andtrade restrictions.

    The ability o individual shing vessels or feets to conduct a highlyprotable illegal shery is highly dependent on technical inrastructure, incombination with faws in existing governance. Several indicators suggest thesituation is most severe outside the coast o West Arica. This is partly as aresult o the very limited capacity o these states to monitor their territorialwaters. A number o environmental organizations have led the way in map-ping the existence o illegal shing vessels in the region. Investigations rom,or example, the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF 2005, 2007) indicatethat the majority o vessels have their origin (and/or ownership) in Europe orAsia. Particular attention has been directed at Spanish, Japanese, Korean, andTaiwanese vessels.

    EU is considered to be an important driver behind the current develop-ment o illegal shing activities in the region, partly because EU shing

    vessels are operating in the area. There are also indications that some ille-gal activities are coordinated by Spanish companies located on the CanaryIslands. Las Palmas is one example o an important port used or transerand urther shipment o catches rom Arica to Europe, as well as a centrallocation or maintenance o IUU vessels. In many cases onward transport oillegally caught sh to Europe occurs without any inormation about how orwhere it was caught. Consequently, it is very dicult to discern which shhas been legally or illegally caught along the West Arican coast, and subse-quently consumed by Europeans.

    2 Berkes et al (2006) discuss how the problem surrounding the so called Roving Bandits can beapplied to a sheries context.

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    The situation looks a little dierent i we look at the trade operators, butsimilarly to the distant water feets they are characterized by high mobility.At the global level there are a number o multinational companies which buyup and distribute large amounts o sh, both or grocery store chains and ordierent processing purposes. However, much o the trade occurs throughsmaller actors who operate at several dierent levels in the commodity chain.The trade in sea cucumbers in parts o Eastern Arica is an illustrative exam-ple. Small-scale shermen are linked to local buyers with access to larger col-lection and storage acilities. These buyers, in turn, are linked to buyers at ahigher level in the hierarchy. These can be based within the country but alsopurchase on behal o external traders to satisy the international market. Seacucumbers (belonging to the genus Holothuria), is a group o animals whichby tradition have not been consumed to any greater extent in East Arica.In Asia, however, they are used or dierent types o traditional medicines.The Asian demand or sea cucumbers have caused local and regional stocksin parts o South East Asia to decrease and the market is increasingly satis-ed by imports rom other parts o the world. The South Arican stocks oabalone (Haliotis midae) are similarly aected by trade, as over 95% o exportsare destined or Asia. Actors trading in abalone and sea cucumber trade thusbehave as Roving Bandits. They move between continents in search o newareas with viable stocks. Sea urchins, live ree sh, and large pelagic sh liketuna are similar examples where mobile actors behave like Roving Bandits.

    2.4. Roving Bandits throughout history

    Historically there have been many examples o behavior which simulates Ro-ving Bandits3. European ur traders who came to North America during the1700s are one example. In 1768 the last sea cow was killed by European hun-ters in Alaska but the hunt or new ur resources continued. During the 1800sthe sea otter was hunted to extinction. The same course o events played outin Caliornia where sea otter populations were decimated already at the starto the 19th century. Similar stories can be told about the sea turtles in Aus-

    tralia and North America, as well as or cod stocks o the North AmericanEast coast. Almost all the cases described can be said to have one commondenominator; stocks which had previously been protected due to their inac-cessibility, or as a result o technical constraints, could suddenly be exploitedwith the help o improved technology in combination with access to a largemarket. Times and technology have changed but these two actors remainimportant contributions to the problem o the Roving Bandits o modern daysheries. Globalization is another circumstance which contributes to, and insome cases reinorces, the eects o these actors.

    3 Jackson et al (2001) describe in depth how historical overshing has aected the earths marineecosystems throughout time.

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    2.5. Which actors contribute to the phenomenon o the Roving Bandits

    o the modern day shery?

    We have established that Roving Bandits are represented by highly mobileactors who can move to new stocks once the resource base they are currentlyexploiting has declined. One can, or the sake o simplicity, divide the pre-conditions that make roving banditry possible into two types; 1) institutio-nal and 2) technological. The institutional preconditions are the political,economic and social climate which is created by sheries politics, economicincentives and social norms. The technical preconditions are an importantprerequisite which allows the Roving Bandits o the modern shery to ope-rate eciently.

    2.5.1. Technological preconditions

    Modern, high-tech shing vessels have a great capacity to sh ar out at seaduring prolonged periods o time. They can move over large areas relativelyquickly and they have high-tech equipment onboard (including reezing aci-lities) which acilitates o-loading, ueling and changing o crew members atsea. The use o trans-shipment vessels which can collect sh rom a numbero dierent vessels and transport the catch rom the shing area to port,decreases the operational costs signicantly. Illegal shing can be very wellorganized and consist o extensive coordination among illegal feets, jointownership o vessels in shell-companies which conceals those responsible, aswell as well developed illegal distribution chains. In this orm o organizedcrime those involved put great deliberate eort into obscuring the produc-tion chain. Naturally, this presents a great challenge or governing institu-tions. Some orms o illegal shing is even directly related to well knownorganized crime operations. There are clear indications that the illegal sheryin the Barents Sea is partly coordinated by the Russian maa and in a simi-lar way the Chinese Triads are involved in the trade with the South Aricanabalone (see above). Transport o illegally caught sh has at times even beenassociated with smuggling o weapons, narcotics and humans.

    Modern communication technology and equipment create good precondi-tions or localizing sh aggregations as well as avoiding controlling govern-ments. A vessel shing or cod in the North Sea or the Baltic Sea duringone part o the year can sh outside the Arican coast a ew months later.Regulation o sheries in one part o the world can thereore lead to a shitin illegal shing eort to another region where regulations are less strict orwhere control less extensive. One sign that this is in act occurring can bedrawn rom the import restrictions put in place or Patagonian toothsh(Dissostichus eleginoides) which was instituted in the Indian Ocean (FAO areas

    51 and 57). This led to a marked reduction in the illegal shing in this region at the same time illegal shing increased in the Atlantic. It is possible thatthe illegal shing in the two areas described is conducted by the same ves-

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    sels. Improved technology, and thereby also better communication, has thuscontributed to shrinking the world.

    2.5.2. Institutional preconditions

    Subsidies

    Subsidies or the modernization o existing, or construction o new, shingvessels have been an important driver behind the development o the overcapacity we are currently witnessing, and which is spilling over to regionssuering rom illegal shing. Thanks to subsidies shing can be conductedon stocks which would otherwise not be protable. Subsidies thereby consti-tute a orm o overarching economic incentive or the development o illegalshing.

    Economic incentives

    The diculty associated with monitoring shing at sea is another importantdriver behind the growth o illegal shing. I the value o the catches issimultaneously high, and the penalties (in the unlikely event o being caught)are low, the incentives or partaking in illegal shing increases. A review othe probability o being caught in a number o dierent sheries in relationto existing penalties shows with great clarity that there are strong incentivesto sh illegally. According to the analysis the size o the penalties would haveto increase 24 times or the expected cost to be comparable to with the ex-pected prot (Sumaila et al 2006). Fish with signicant economic value (e.g.tuna or Patagonian toothsh, se box) urther increase the incentives to shillegally. Cooperation between illegal actors can urther increase the protmargin or the illegal operator. By having a joint organization or mainte-nance (uel) and trans-shipment o catches at sea (see trans-shipment vesselsdescribed above), the risks o being caught are reduced. In addition, organizedfeets who engage in illegal shing can oten aord to loose a vessel i onewas to get caught by a control operation (Gallic and Cox 2006, OECD 2005).

    Governance regimes and institutions

    In a report by the English organization MRAG (Marine Resources Assess-ment Group (MRAG): 2005) it was shown that a strong relationship existsbetween the governance o a nation and its vulnerability to illegal shing.Good governance was associated with good systems or combating illegalshing activities, through surveillance and control, political will and coope-ration across national borders. Thus, the lack o strong institutions at local,national and international levels is an important contributing actor to the

    phenomena o Roving Bandits.Regional sheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) are intergovern-mental sheries organizations and agreements which have the mandate to

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    establish measures to protect and manage sh stocks in international waters.RFMOs play a critical role in the sheries governance as they constitute thebulk o the international structure in place to achieve cooperation betweenshing nations. Cooperation between states is essential or eective manage-ment and governance o international stocks. RFMOs have (in principle) themandate to manage all commercially important stocks within their respec-tive areas. However, eective governance is oten only achieved or a minori-ty o species such as ore example tuna like species, salmon and halibut. Manyo the remaining species being shed within RFMO areas are, or all practicalpurposes, not encompassed by any management plans and regulations, par-ticularly many o the deep-sea species described below. Several o the RFMOshave thereore in many respects ailed in their task to prevent over shingand negative eects on the ecosystems. One line o critique is targeted at theact that RFMOs primarily ocus on management o the sh stocks withoutmuch consideration or the ecosystems to which they belong, such as thesea foors which are being exposed to trawling. For example, in the NorthAtlantic the North Atlantic (NAFO) and North East Atlantic (NEAFC) sh-eries organizations have ailed in the regulation o bottom trawls or over 40years, with dire consequences or the ecosystems associated with the sea bed.However, since 2004 important measures have been taken to improve thesituation. In the Mediterranean Sea restrictions have also been introduced onbottom trawling but only in waters deeper than 1000 meters.

    Flags of convenience and tax havens

    Poor control o vessel fag states is another contributing actor to the problemo illegal shing. A large number o vessels sail under so called fag o conve-nience. This means that they are registered in a country with less stringentcontrol, oten as a result o not having ratied agreements central or sheriesgovernance or not being party to relevant RFMOs. Vessels which sail undertheir fag thereore do not have to pay or shing licenses, vessel monitoringsystems, or abide by the regulations stipulated by the RFMOs. Most com-

    monly, nations who allow fags o convenience have so called open registries,which means that they make money by letting oreign vessels pay to sailunder their fag. Flag o convenience is relatively easy to acquire via the inter-net or only a ew hundred dollars. To re-fag is thus both simple and cheapand allows Roving Bandits to change fag several times in a season, whichmakes surveillance and control dicult. The existence o tax havens urthercontributes to the problem as vessel owners can protect their identity by usingbanks in these countries and thereby avoid having to pay nes. The costs orthe illegal shery can also be kept at a minimum since many vessels are being

    operated with e.g. Indonesian, Chinese or Philippino crews, which involvesgreatly reduced salary costs. Lack o surveillance also makes the risk o being

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    caught and the cost o penalties or not maintaining appropriate working andsaety conditions on board relatively low.

    Ports of convenience

    Despite the occurrence o trans-shipment vessels all shing vessels musteventually enter a port. Regulating which vessels are allowed to dock is seenas an eective way o controlling illegal shing. In spite o this many countri-es ail in their capacity to uphold eective port controls.

    Finally, underestimation o the social costs incurred by illegal shing shouldalso be seen as a contributing actor. This can, however, not be seen as an insti-tutional actor. It relates more to the ethical values among the actors operatingwithin sheries world wide. The morale in the shing industry can be one suchimportant aspect. For example, in the Baltic Sea Swedish shers have or a longtime been accusing shers rom Poland and the Baltic countries o conductingextensive illegal shing. At the same time Polish shers accuse Swedish vesselso similar illegal activities. A report rom the EU commission shows that therewas some substance to the accusations against the Polish cod shery, whileSwedish were also ound to have signicant amounts o illegal cod onboard atinspections. According to the analysis made by the commission Polish werealmost 50% higher, and Swedish catches more than 20%, when inspected (EUCommission 2007). The commissions estimates o Swedish catches were,however, seen by Swedish controlling authorities to be unduly high. Regardlesso the absolute gures in this particular case this example emphasizes the actthat suspicions o cheating among nations with regard to sheries quotas canundermine the will to adhere to rules and regulations set by joint agreements.

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    3. How does the phenomenono Roving Bandits work?

    The availability o signicantly improved technology has contributed to thesuccess o Roving Bandits. Faster ships, reezing possibilities onboard, bettercommunication (e.g. satellite radio), and technical aids to nd stocks (GPSand high-tech sh nders/echo sounders) have all made it easier and aster toexploit the resource. Improved communication and generally increased tradeas a result o e.g. Internet auctions and other web based interactions acilitatequick contacts between the exploiter, buyer and market. Together this allowspreviously isolated areas and sheries resources to be reached and exploited.Restrictions, both in terms o depth and geography, have thereby disappearedin todays globalized shery.

    3.1. Masking o dwindling resources through sequential exploitation

    Why is it that we in Northern Europe, despite having decimated several oour own ood sh stocks in the Northern hemisphere, have not really seenany noticeable lack o sh in out markets and grocery stores? The answer isthat dwindling sheries resources at our own latitudes have been graduallycompensated through geographical expansion and shiting o shing feetsto other parts o the world, or by directing shing eorts at deeper watersthereby exploiting species which were not previously targeted or ood con-sumption. This is called sequential exploitation and it can occur both geo-graphically and by depth (see also box about sea urchins).

    3.1.1. Sequential exploitation through geographical expansion

    The expansion o shing eort geographically has occurred both rom theNorth to the South, but also rom a local to a global scale. The European

    third party sheries agreements increased dramatically during the period1960-1990, but have since decreased, partly as a result o critique beingleveled at them (Sumaila et al 2006). The critique is primarily directed atthe act that the agreements have been made with incomplete (or incorrect)inormation about the status o the sh stocks, but also the act that re-quent breaking o rules have occurred, as well as unair agreements (avoringEuropeans) and corruption related to the agreement negotiations. In recenttimes the agreements have nonetheless developed in a positive direction andthe European Ministerial Council has emphasized that the level o the ees

    which EU vessel owners shall pay to conduct shing activities shall be air,balanced and non-discriminatory.The expansion rom local to global scales has, like the expansion in the

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    Sea urchins and Roving Bandits

    Ecosystems which are altered as a result o strong shing pressure oten stimulate the

    emergence o new sheries, which then target species urther down the oodweb. In

    Maine, on the North East coast o the United States, the sea urchin (Strongylocen-

    trotus droebachiensis) expanded dramatically in response to the decimation o one o

    its main predators, the cod, which was shed to virtual extinction in the 1980s. The

    interest in the stocks o sea urchins increased, with ocus on exports or the sushi

    market. The demand on the Japanese market was big and in 1987 an organized but

    unregulated shery or urchins began along the Maine coast. The sheries governance

    o Maine was taken by surprise. They were not prepared or the virtual explosion in

    the expansion o the shery. No management plans existed or sea urchins and no

    regulations were in place to limit extraction, and in a short time the urchin stocks were

    almost completely depleted.

    But the commercial shery or sea urchins and the sequential exploitation had

    started already in the mid 1990s with Japan as the main market, ater its own stocks

    o urchins had been decimated. The Japanese shery continued but could not satisy

    the growing demand. Initially the shery expanded into neighboring regions, but in the

    1970s the shery and the trade had spread to all continents around the Pacic Ocean,

    with the exception o Australia. However, Australia was represented in the next wave o

    expansion which occurred in the 1980s and which also spread all the way to the North

    Eastern coast o the United States (Figure 4a).

    The sequential expansion o the shery masked the act that local stocks were col-

    lapsing. The global catch peaked in 1990 (Figure 4b) at the time as the last wave o

    expansion to previously unexploited areas occurred. It then proceeded to drastically

    decline when the limit was reached and no more areas could be expanded to. The ex-

    ample o the expanding sea urchin shery well illustrates the problem associated with

    Roving Bandits.Source: Berkes et al (2006)

    Figure 4. Figure A shows the geographically sequential exploitation o sea urchins overtime. Figure B shows the total catch o sea urchins over time. Each region is codedaccording to color in chronological, ascending order: Japan; Korea; Washington andOregon; Baja, Mexico; Caliornia; Chile; NE Pacic (Alaska and British Columbia);Russia; NW Atlantic (Maine, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick). Global catches peaked inthe 1990s at the same time as the last wave o expansion to previously unexploitedareas occurred. It then proceeded to drastically decline when the limit was reached

    and no more areas could be expanded to. Both gures are rom Berkes et al (2006).The gures are produced by David Bellwood at James Cook University, Australia, andthe data or gure B are rom Andrew et al (2002).

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    Important species

    Tuna The illegal catch o tuna in the Western Indian Ocean has been estimatedto 10% o the total catches. The illegal catches in the Western Pacic Ocean are

    also believed to be extensive, even though data are partially lacking. Greenpeace

    has estimated the value o the illegal catches o tuna (and tuna like species) in the

    Pacic Ocean to be in the range o 134-400 million USD per year.

    Sharks A study o the shark n market in Hong Kong estimated that the total

    catches o sharks amount to somewhere between 3 to 5 times the numbers which

    are actually reported. The illegal catches are thought to have a value o 292476

    million USD yearly, estimated solely rom the value o the ns. Many tuna sheries

    catch large numbers o sharks as bycatch which is a wide spread problem.

    Cod Illegal cod sheries are extensive in or example the Barents Sea and the

    Baltic Sea. The value o the illegal catches o cod in the Barents Sea has been

    estimated at 258429 million USD yearly and the bulk o the catch is thought to

    be caught by Russian vessels. Measures to increase the port control have, however,

    contributed to a reduction o illegal catches.

    Patagonian toothsh An extensive illegal shery or Patagonian toothsh around

    the Antarctic reached its peak during 1997, when estimated illegal catchesamounted to a value o around 160 million USD. Since then illegal catches have

    declined to a yearly value o approximately 40 million USD.

    Abalone The illegal shery or abalone is primarily driven by Asian demand and

    consumption and the illegal operations surrounding this species have been do-

    minated by criminal syndicates. The illegal trade in abalone in South Arica has

    an estimated value o 70140 million USD, which has contributed to the closing

    o the commercial shery. A CITES listing was introduced or abalone in 2007 to

    control the illegal trade.

    Based on information from MRAG (2005) and MRAG & UBC (2008)

    North-South direction, largely occurred to satisy a market despite the actthat local stocks are no longer economically viable as a result o overshing.A clear example o this is the shery and the industry associated with seaurchins, which is described in greater detail in the box. Already in the 1960sthe sea urchin shery started expanding in the region closest to the mainmarket, Japan (Figure 4a). In the 70s the shery spread to the west coasts oNorth and South America, and by the end o the 1980s the urchin sheryhad spread all the way to Australia, North Eastern United States and Canada.Less than ten years later one can, without overstating acts, conclude thatthe sea urchin shery is a global phenomenon, as it is now also conducted in

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    European waters. Even though the consumption o sea urchins (particularlytheir roe) today also occurs in Europe and the USA, oten as a substitute orthe nowadays collapsed stocks o sturgeon, most o the catches are exportedto Japan.

    Another example o geographical sequential exploitation can be ound inSouth East Asia and concerns the shery and trade in live ree sh or humanconsumption. The largest market or this type o live ree sh is located inHong Kong. Much like the pattern described or sea urchins, the live reesh shery has expanded rom a local to a much broader regional scale whichincludes large parts o the tropical areas where coral rees occur (Figure 5).There has been a gradual decline in the shery or the ree sh species target-ed or the live trade in most o the nations involved (Scales et al 2006). Thishas led to a phenomenon which Helen Scales and her colleagues call shingdown the price list4. The analysis thus shows that the overshing o specieshas occurred in relation to their price on the market.

    3.2.2. Sequential exploitation by depth

    Even beore to the 1950s the large industrial sheries in coastal areas o theNorth Sea and the North East Atlantic had begun to show signs o sequentialover exploitation. Ater the 2nd World War the search or marine resourceswas expanded by increasing the depth o shing eorts. However, deep-sea

    4 This can be compared to the term shing down the oodweb, which was coined by Daniel Pauly ina widely cited article in Science in 1998. Pauly describes how the worlds sheries have successively

    eliminated the large, long-lived, predatory sh species ( so called higher trophic levels) which hasresulted in a situation where an increased portion o global sh catches o todays sheries consistso herbivorous or planktivore sh which represent lower throphic levels in the marine oodweb.

    Figure 5. Import o live ree sh species to Hong Kong over time

    Each species is

    color coded accor-

    ding to decreasing

    price (red = high

    market value, blue

    = medium market

    value, green =

    currently low mar-

    ket value). Figure

    rom Scales et al

    (2006).

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    shing5 did not become a well established practice until the period between196070, and coincided with the decline in sh catches rom shallow waters(Figure 6). The opportunities or an increased deep-sea shery appeared asa result o the development o technology in the orm o larger and moreecient vessels. This development was sped up in part by state subsidies,issued as an attempt to mitigate the eects o dwindling sheries resourcesin shallower waters. Today approximately 40% o the worlds trawl areas liein areas outside the continental shelves (McAllister et al 1999) and accordingto FAO data on the status o the worlds sheries the global catch o oceanicspecies was estimated to amount to almost 8.5 million tons in 2000. This thencorresponded to almost 10% o the total sh catches in the world (FAO 2002).Although no exact estimates exist, a large portion o the so called deep-seasheries are thought to lie in international waters and consequently, in manycases, there are no regulations in place or how much sh can be caught (Cox2005). Alternatively, the deep-sea stocks targeted all under the mandate oRegional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs).

    The exploitation o deep-sea sh stocks can be very lucrative as a result oinitially big catches. The orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) serves as anillustrative example. The shery or this species started in the 1970s but tooko in the 80s when spawning aggregations were located around the deep-seamounds o the coast o New Zeeland. Within approximately a decade thestocks had plummeted to a level below 20% o their original size and werevery close to complete collapse. The species met the same ate in the North

    Figure 6. Mean depth o global sh catches (in latitude) rom 1950 to

    2000, based on data rom Watson et al (2004)

    Note the trend towards

    increasingly deep waters

    being targeted, particularly

    in the Southern hemisphere.

    The gure is rom Pauly et al

    (2005;9), and reprinted with

    the kind permission o The

    Royal Society Publishing.

    5 Deep-sea shing as a term is primarily dened as shing which occurs at a depth greater than400500 meters. Hence it is not a biologically dened term. For more inormation see e.g. ICES 2003Report o the Working Group on Biology and Assessment o Deep-Sea Fisheries Resources, AdvisoryCommittee on Fishery Management.

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    Atlantic (Roberts 2002), and similar examples can be seen or species such asthe blue ling (Molva dipterygia) in the North Atlantic. Most deep-sea speciesgrow and reproduce at very low speed. Many do not reach maturity until aconsiderable age. These actors make them particularly vulnerable to highshing pressure. It is thereore questionable whether the stocks o manydeep-sea species can be seen as renewable resources. Given the high costsassociated with deep-sea shing (specialized equipment, large vessels andlong transports) it is hard to see how this industry can be economically viablewithout actors adopting the strategy o sequential exploitation o stocks, i.e. aroving bandit behavior.

    The Arctic in ocus

    The sea ice in the Arctic is melting. Debates continue as to exactly how ast and

    how ar into the uture we can expect completely ice ree summers, but the trend

    is now clear; within a not so distant uture Arctic waters will lie open or exploita-

    tion, at least during the summer months. What will then happen to the rich natural

    resources which previously lay protected rom exploitation under the pack ice?

    Arctic waters are known or their high productivity o phyto- and zoo plankton

    which benet both sh and marine mammals. The Barents Sea contains one o the

    worlds last large cod stocks, but also important stocks o Alaska pollock (Theragra

    chalcogramma). An intensive shery already exists within those areas which belong

    to the EEZ o the countries surrounding the Arctic. In total Arctic waters currently

    contribute to 20-30% o the global catch o whitesh.

    Illegal shing has been, and to some degree still is, a problem in the Arctic, but it

    has reportedly decreased since 2005. However, the positive trend could be broken

    as the stocks o whitesh in other areas collapse and new areas o Arctic waters

    open up or expansion o the shery. Ownership over the waters that in all likeli-

    hood will become ice ree is highly contested. Eight countries USA, Russia,

    Norway, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland all make claims on

    Arctic areas, while China is also beginning to show an interest. According to theUnited Nations Convention on the Law o the Sea (UNCLOS), states can claim the

    right to the waters (and the biological and geological resources) up to 200 nautical

    miles o their coast. However, as o yet the US has not ratied the law and its im-

    plementation has been delayed by various disputes between involved nations over

    the location o boundaries.

    As a result it is not dicult to imagine a scenario where the development o joint

    institutions and agreements or the governance o the Arctic resources can not

    keep level pace with melting o the pack ice. This could create a golden opportu-

    nity or Roving Bandits and is a big and important challenge or the governments

    in the surrounding states.

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    4. What are the eects?

    The illegal shery has ecological, economic and social consequences. As theecological balance is disrupted through excessive exploitation o certainspecies, the preconditions or biological sustainability diminish. Since a largeportion o the sh caught is not reported it becomes gradually more dicultor scientists to make sensible estimates o the size o stocks. The scienticadvice thereby looses its relevance and credibility, which urther impedes asustainable use o the sheries resource. The economic and social eects aresignicant, in part because nations loose tax income, but also employmentopportunities in the long term.

    4.1. Ecological, economic and social consequences

    The expansion o the shery or sea urchins to, or example, the North Eastcoast o the USA was acilitated by the act that stocks o sea urchins hadvirtually exploded in size as an eect o the decimation o their main pre-dator, the cod. The mechanization o the cod shery ater the 1920s starteda dramatic decline o the cod stocks, rom the coast o Maine all the way toGeorges Bank. Smaller sized species o less commercial value replaced thecod in the ecosystem but these species were not interested in sea urchins as asource o ood. The lack o predators caused the stocks o primarily urchins,crabs and lobster to grow. The eect was an enormous grazing pressure assea urchins are marine grazers, and as the stocks grew the exerted grazingpressure on the kelp orests became so intensive that much o the kelp orestpreviously extensive along the Maine coast disappeared6. The Baltic Sea isanother interesting example. A decrease o the valuable cod contributed toa dramatic increase in the stocks o its main ood item, the sprat. Today, thesprat constitutes the main catch in the region.

    The sequential exploitation and decimation o species which play a key

    role in the fow o energy and biomass through the marine oodweb presentsthe most serious threat and ecological risk7. The elimination o the cod hashad dramatic and persistent eects on the ecosystems in both the Baltic Seaand in North America. But the shing or more pelagic species such as tuna,which is more dicult to monitor and regulate, also aects the oodweb inthe open ocean. For example, a strong correlation has been noted between

    6 Kelp is a type o large brown algae, a so called macroalgae, which can grow large and create under-water orests.

    7 Key species are species which have a disproportionately large eect on the surrounding ecosystemin relation to the abundance o the population. The species in question thus play a key role in theunctioning o the ecosystem.

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    8 Outside the South Western coast o Arica a signicant increase in the abundance o jellysh hasbeen observed while a simultaneous decrease in sh biomass has been noted. In 2006 jellyshrepresented a larger portion o the marine biomass (12.2 million tones) than sh (3.6 million tons).Similar jellysh blooms have been observed in other parts o the world have as well. Whether these

    are caused by shing is unclear at the present moment, as climate variations also seem to be a con-tributing actor to the abundance and distribution o jellysh. It is, however, likely that shing playsa role since declining sh stocks mean less competition or ood or the jellysh (Lynam et al 2006).

    the decrease in sh and a simultaneous increase in jelly plankton, i.e. dier-ent types o jellysh8.

    In addition, the ocus o the shery on large, long-lived and predatory shspecies on many o the worlds coral rees has led to cascading eects. Asthese larger predatory species have disappeared rom the oodweb exploita-tion has gradually been shited to the larger, grazing sh species instead.These large grazers are also those which have the most proound grazing e-ect in the ecosystem (due to their size and intensity o eeding) and therebyll an important role to insure that the coral rees are not overgrown by algae.An increased shing pressure on this group o sh species have in many casesled to a situation where algae have been able to establish on coral rees, espe-cially ater a storm or some other big disturbance when the coral structurehas been damaged and is most vulnerable. Corals grow slower than algae andare thereore commonly out competed by these plants that grow quickly andovershadow the corals which need sunlight to survive.

    The eects o the deep-sea shery described earlier are likely to be simi-larly negative, but since the deep seas are still largely unexplored scientistsknow less about the complex relationships in these oodwebs and how theyare linked to other, more shallow water stocks. One thing worth mentioningin relation to this is the signicant eect o bottom trawling on both shallowas well as deeper sea beds. The trawl doors, the large metal plates which keepthe trawl open as it is dragged over the sea bed, leave large ploughed urrowswhich cause damage to bottom dwelling organisms. These deep-sea bot-tom dwelling animals are, much like the deep-sea sh, slow growing and arethereore very vulnerable to bottom trawling. Furthermore, they are oten animportant source o ood or sh and thereore have long-term eects on thesh stocks as well.

    Bycatch is another big and important eect o shing with consequencesor many species not necessarily targeted by the shery. For deep-sea shingthis is particularly pronounced as most o the species caught as bycatch arenot marketable because their fesh is watery and thereore can not be used

    either or human consumption or sh meal production.The economic consequences are notable, partly because overshed stockscannot generate the same returns as sustainable managed sheries, but alsobecause illegal actors aect the protability and economic incentives o lawabiding actors. The social eects can be very negative, particularly in Arica

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    and other developing nations. In many Arican nations the populationdepends on the ocean or protein and as a source o income. The workingconditions and salaries on illegal shing vessels are also oten ar below whatwould be considered acceptable by serious and legitimate actors. It is notuncommon that illegal shing vessels trawl in close vicinity to the coast inareas reserved or small-scale, coastal sheries. There are a number o reportsdocumenting incidents where shing gear or human lives have been lost as aresult o these circumstances (e.g. JALA 2008).

    4.2. New markets or old resources or vice versa?

    Ecosystems which have been altered as a result o strong shing pressure o-ten appear to have stimulated new sheries (Jackson et al 2001). The marketcan be satised through sequential exploitation o new sheries resources,which in turn has led to a masking o the act that many sheries aroundthe world are declining. The increasing demand or sheries products on theglobal market has made altered ecosystems, where previously unexploitedspecies have increased dramatically in abundance, primary targets or RovingBandits in search o new stocks to exploit, and have thus helped in maskingthe sequential collapse o local resources. As a result o overshing, which a-ects the species composition o ecosystems, new industries are thus createdaround new species which in many cases have not been used in the hostcountry but which are valuable and sought ater on established markets inother parts o the world. Old markets can thereore be said to be linked up tonew resources. Or is it in act the reverse where old existing resources, i.e.species which have always existed but traditionally have not been used, arending new markets on opposite sides o the globe? Regardless o how onechooses to look at it is clear that one o the biggest reasons that these newlydeveloped sheries become perect targets or Roving Bandits is the lack olocal institutions to regulate exploitation. Because these new species havenot been previously shed to any great extent in the particular host nation,at least not or international export, there are oten no, or insucient, insti-

    tutions in place to regulate extraction.

    Unforeseen effects in the future?

    The link between strong shing pressure (in many cases created by illegalshing activities) and changes in the conguration o ecosystems withnew sheries as a consequence is very important to note. It illustrates thenegative spiral which is created in the interplay between overshing andinsucient institutions, as well as how this aects the resilience o the entirecoupled social and ecological system. Resilience, in this case, is reerred to as

    the ability o the ecosystem, as well as the social system dependent upon it, torespond to disturbance without collapsing. When we sh down the oodweb(see ootnote 4) we gradually remove species which play an important role

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    in regulating, among other things, grazing species at lower trophic levels. Ithese grazing species are also subsequently removed it is unclear what willhappen. We do, however, see that the new sheries which arise serve to maskwhat is happening. We are thus turning a blind eye to the act that or longperiods o time we have been altering the species composition and unctiono ecosystems and thereby likely also undermined the resilience o many oour seas. The simple act is that no one knows exactly what the consequenceswill be.

    A recent report rom UNEP (Nelleman et al 2008) states that there is arisk that combined eects o climate change, overshing, and pollution willcause a collapse o commercial sh stocks within only a ew decades. Climatechange has already been shown to reinorce the negative eects o oversh-ing by increasing sea surace temperatures which kill corals, threaten thespawning areas o tuna, and cause a shit in ocean currents and through thisaects the distribution o plankton which are the oundation o marine oodchains. The report deems the most threatened areas to be those which alsocorrespond to approximately hal o the worlds sh catches today.

    An important point to make in this context is that much i the discus-sion relating to the problems o illegal shing ocuses on improvement othe governance o stocks which are already known (even though some maynot be currently exploited). But what happens when new stocks emerge as aresult o overshing on other species? How then can institutions and rulesbe devised quickly enough so that these new sheries are not also decimatedby Roving Bandits? This is a big and important challenge or sheries govern-ance, at both the local and global level.

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    5. Which measures have beentaken to handle the problem o

    Roving Bandits?

    To conront the illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) shery internationalcooperation and common rules are needed. There are several ongoing interna-tional initiatives which aim to tackle IUU shing. In most cases FAO plays acentral role (see also Box below). As an extension o the FAO code o conductor responsible shing, an action plan against the illegal shery was acceptedin 2001 (International Plan o Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUUFishing). FAO also conducts a program9, which is partly supported with Swedishunding, to help developing nations improve their port control. At the last COFI(Committee on Fisheries 2007)10 FAO was appointed the task o developing aproposal or binding rules and guidelines or port state control, to be presentedat the next meting (COFI 2009). Furthermore, within FAO work is currentlyundertaken to create a global ship registry or shing vessels in order to improve

    Important international instruments or sheries governance

    The United Nations Convention on the Law o the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention

    was adopted in 1982 and entered into orce in 2004. It is binding and has been

    ratied by 152 nations. It constitutes an important legal oundation or sheries

    governance. The convention demands that port states, based on scientic data,

    manage and protect the sh stocks within their EEZ or long-term sustainability (a

    capacity which the majority o developing nations have diculties meeting). To the

    extent which a surplus exists, which is not utilized by the nations own shery, the

    nation must allow other states the right to sh in their EEZ.

    The FAO Compliance Agreement (Compliance Agreement to Promote Compliance

    with Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas). This is a binding

    agreement rom 1993 which entered into orce in 2003 and has been ratied by

    29 states. The agreement obliges fag states to make sure that shing vessels sai-

    ling under their fag comply with international governance regulations while shing

    in international waters.

    9 FAO Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing10 The Committee on Fisheries (COFI) convene every second year and is the meeting orum o the

    worlds sheries governance bodies.

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    11 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1005/2008 o 29 September 2008 establishing a Communitysystem to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated shing.

    control and monitoring and thereby acilitate the struggle to reduce illegal sh-ing activities. In 2008 EU adopted stricter criteria or sh landed in, or importedto, the EU market11. These criteria stipulate that importers or shers must beable to provide documentation that traces the origins o the sh which entersthe EU, and which proves that the sh has been caught legally in compliancewith current governance regulations.

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    Conclusions

    The sheries politics in Europe, like in many other regions, have signicantdiculties in meeting the goals set or economic, social and ecological sus-tainability. These problems are exhibited through declining sh stocks anddeteriorating protability in the sheries industry. The demand or sheriesproducts continues to be high and is expected to increase even more in theyears to come. Commodity chains or sheries products are becoming increa-singly more complex and today sh is truly a global commodity. This alsoapplies to some o the actors involved in catching it. Modern shing vesselshave the capacity to move over long distances and to stay at sea or weeks onend. A development towards a more global market and global actors createsconditions or a highly adaptable sheries industry, especially i it choo-ses not to abide by existing rules and regulations. Around the world thoseinvolved in sheries governance have become more attentive to the extensiveillegal shery which is conducted in many regions, particularly where thepossibilities to monitor and survey are limited and where the institutionalcapacity is insuciently developed.

    This discussion paper has described Roving Bandits, a term we use to il-luminate the phenomenon o global actors who currently operate around theworld, at sea and on the global market or sh and sh products. These Rov-ing Bandits illustrate the diculty which aces agencies involved in sher-ies governance, even in parts o the world which have traditionally had welldeveloped institutions. Naturally the problem is likely to be even more severein other parts o the world. The paper highlights the alarmingly rapid loss obiological marine resources and illustrates the need or political action.

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    Abbreviations and glossary

    FAO The Food and Agriculture Organization o the United Nations

    OECD Organization o Economic Cooperation and Development.A collaborative organization between industrialized countrieswith head quarters in Paris.

    WWF World Wildlie Fund

    UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law o the Sea

    UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

    CITES The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Specieso Wild Fauna and Flora

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    This th edition o the Swedish FAO Committees publication series highlights

    the diculties that sheries policy in Europe and in many other regions have in

    meeting the goals set or economic, social and ecological sustainability. The de-mand or sheries products remains high and is expected to increase even more

    in the years ahead. This is refected in declining sh stocks and deteriorating

    protability in the sheries industry, which has resulted in shing feets seeking

    new shing grounds, including along the coasts o Arica. Fisheries management

    in these countries is oten weak, which leads to predatory shing, and this can

    undermine the conditions or local sheries and ood supply. In turn, the survival

    o poor coastal communities is threatened.

    This publication describes the phenomenon o global actors who currently operate

    on the oceans o the world and in the world market or sh, and who pose a threat

    to global marine resources.

    Questions are raised regarding how the phenomenon o the Roving Bandits in

    modern sheries operate, who can be regarded as a Roving Bandit, which actors

    contribute to the phenomenon and what initiatives have been taken to deal with

    the problems.

    The eects o the growing global market or sheries products and the threat

    posed by illegal shing demonstrate the need or orceul political action.

    Swedish FAO Committeec/o Ministry o AgricultureSE 103 33 Stockholm Sweden

    www.regeringen.se/fao

    The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is the UNs specialised agency

    or agriculture, orestry and sheries. The FAO was ounded in 1945 with the

    purpose o, among other things, contributing to ood security and reedom

    rom hunger, as well as an improved global economy.

    The Swedish FAO Committee was established in 1950, the same year in which

    Sweden became a member o the FAO. The task o the Committee is to as-

    sist the Swedish government in eorts to ood security or all people, taking

    into consideration global trends and the maintenance o biological diversity in

    the areas o agriculture, sheries and orestry. The Committee comprises 14members in addition to the Chairman, Rol Eriksson, State Secretary at the

    Swedish Ministry o Agriculture. The Swedish government's overarching work

    on matters involving the FAO as an organisation is handled through the FAO

    group within the Ministry o Agriculture.