(Routledge Hindu Studies Series) Sucharita Adluri-Textual Authority in Classical Indian Thought_...

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Textual Authority in ClassicalIndian Thought

Theistic Veda-nta originated with Ra-ma-nuja (1077–1157), who was one ofthe foremost theologians of Visis.t.a-dvaita Veda-nta and also an initiate of theSrı-vais.n. ava sectarian tradition in South India. As devotees of the God Vis.n.uand his consort Srı-, the Srı-vais.n. avas established themselves through variousprocesses of legitimation as a powerful sectarian tradition. One of the pro-cesses by which the authority of the Srı-vais.n. avas was consolidated wasRa-ma-nuja’s synthesis of popular Hindu devotionalism with the philosophy ofVeda-nta.

This book demonstrates that by incorporating a text often thought to be ofsecondary importance—the Vis.n.u Pura-n. a (first to fourth century CE)—intohis reading of the Upanis.ads, which were the standard of orthodoxy forVeda-nta philosophy, Ra-ma-nuja was able to interpret Veda-nta within thetheistic context of Srı-vais.n. avism. Ra-ma-nuja was the first Brahmin thinker toincorporate devotional pura-n.as into Veda-nta philosophy and his synthetic theol-ogy called Visis.t.a-dvaita (unity-of-the-differenced) wielded tremendous influenceover the expansion of Vis.n.u devotionalism in South India. In this book, theexploration of the exegetical function of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a in arguments salient toRa-ma-nuja’s Veda-nta facilitates our understanding of the processes of textualaccommodation and reformulation that allow the incorporation of divergentdoctrinal claims.

Expanding on and reassessing current views on Ra-ma-nuja’s theology, thebook contributes new insights to broader issues in religious studies such ascanon expansion, commentarial interpretation, tradition-building, and thecomparative study of scripture. It will be of interest to students and scholarsof Indian philosophy and Religious Studies.

Sucharita Adluri is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy andComparative Religion at Cleveland State University. Her research interestsinclude the History of Religions of South India, Sanskrit Commentary andIntellectual History.


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Textual Authority in ClassicalIndian ThoughtRa-ma-nuja and the Vis.n.u Pura-n. a

Sucharita Adluri

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Contents

List of tables ixAcknowledgements xAbbreviations xi

1 Introduction 1Ra-ma-nuja’s exegetical method 2Vis.n.u Pura-n. a 5VP 1.1 7VP 1.2 8VP 1.3 8VP 1.22 9VP 2.7 9VP 2.12 9VP 2.14 10VP 6.4 and VP 6.5 10VP 6.7 10Outline of chapters 10Editorial notes 12

2 The individual self, cosmology, and the divine bodyin the Veda-rthasam. graha 14The individual self 15Sruti on the individual self 15Vis.n.u Pura-n.a on the individual self 18Vis.n.u Pura-n.a on the embodied self 21Brahman’s originative causality 25Brahman as the material cause as a whole (avises.an. aka-ran.a) 26Sruti support 26Bhagavadgı-ta- support 28Vis.n.u Pura-n.a support 30Causality as an aspect of the essential nature of Brahman

(brahmsvaru-pavises.a) 31


The divine body of Brahman 39Structure of Ra-ma-nuja’s argument 40The first description of Brahman’s divine from 41Sruti support 43Smr.ti support 46The second description of Brahman’s divine form 50Conclusion 54

3 Brahman, the individual self, and ignorance in the Srı-bha-s.ya 64The nature of Brahman 67Sruti support 69Bhagavadgı-ta- support 72Vis.n.u Pura-n.a support 74The nature of the individual self 81The essential nature of the individual self 81Plurality of individual selves 85The liberated self is distinct from Brahman 89Defining ignorance 93Sruti support 93VP (2.12.36–46) support 96Conclusion 102

4 Sa-m. khya-Yoga, Kr.s.n.a, and the foremost devotee inthe Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya 113Defining Sa-m. khya and Yoga 114Being (sat) and Non-being (asat) 114Realization of Brahman (samyagdarsana) and realization

of the individual self (a-tmadarsana) 120Kr.s.n.a’s nature 123The two natures (prakr.ti) of Kr.s.n.a 124The field (ks.etra) and the field-knower (ks.etrajña) 128Bondage and liberation 134Kr.s.n.a’s ma-ya- 135The foremost devotee (jña-nin) 137Conclusion 140

Bibliography 150Index 155

viii Contents


Table

3.1 Scriptural Use in the Major Objection and Major Conclusionof Srı-bha-s.ya 66


Acknowledgements

This book is based on ideas developed in my doctoral dissertation at theUniversity of Pennsylvania, and I owe a deep gratitude to my advisors, FrankClooney (Harvard University), E. Ann Matter, and Ludo Rocher. In theinitial stages, I worked extensively with Ludo and Frank and I thank them forall their helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Ann for her unflagging supportand encouragement.

My initial research in India was supported by the Fulbright Program andI would also like to thank Cleveland State University for additional funding.I am grateful to the late Dr. M. Narasimhachary (University of Madras),K.S. Varadachary of Mysore, and Dr. S. Padmanabhan (University of Madras)for working with me on the commentaries of Ra-ma-nuja. My thanks also, tothe folks at Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Chennai for all their help.

Friends and family have cheered me on during this work – Sunita Adluri,Ashish Agrawal, Signe Cohen, Leah Comeau, Benjamin Fleming, AmrutaInamdar, Mrs. Vasantha Parthasarthy, Annette Reed, Valerie Stoker, Mrs.Vishalam Ramanathan, and Kate Zubko—and I am grateful for their support.My thanks, also to Gavin Flood, Dorothea Schaefter, Jillian Morrison, andRebecca Lawrence at Routledege. Last but not least, I would like to thank mycolleagues in the Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion atCleveland State University for all their encouragement and support.


Abbreviations

Adhya-tma Upanis.ad Adhy UpAitareya Upanis.ad Ait UpBrahma Su-tras Br Su-

Bhagavadgı-ta- BhGBha-gavatapura-n. a BhPBr.hada-ran.yaka Upanis.ad Br. UpBr.hada-ran.yaka Upanis.ad(Ma-dhyandina recension) Br. Up Ma-dhCha-ndogya Upanis.ad Ch UpKat.ha Upanis.ad Kat.h UpKena Upanis.ad Kena UpMaha-bha-rata MBhMaha-na-ra-yan.a Upanis.ad Maha- Na-r UpMaitrı- Upanis.ad Maitrı- UpMa-n.d.u-kya Upanis.ad Ma-n. d. UpMun.d.aka Upanis.ad Mun.d. UpRa-ma-nuja’s Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya RBhGBhR. g Veda RVSan. kara’s Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya SBhGBhSan. kara’s Brahmasu-trabha-s.ya SBrSuBhSrı-bha-s.ya SBhSrutapraka-sika- SPStotraratna SRSuba-la Upanis.ad Sub UpSveta-svatara Upanis.ad Svet UpTaittirı-ya A

-ran.yaka Taitt A

-r

Taittirı-ya Sam. hita- Taitt Sam. hita-

Taittirı-ya Upanis.ad Taitt UpTa-tparyacandrika- TCTa-tparyadı-pika- TDVeda-rthasam. graha VSVis.n.u Pura-n. a VPVis.n.udharmottara Pura-n. a Vis.n.u Dharm


1 Introduction

Ra-ma-nuja (1077–1157), one of the foremost proponents of systematic theis-tic Veda-nta1 was not only a Veda-nta philosopher but also an initiate of theSrı-vais.n. ava sectarian tradition in Tamilnadu.2 As devotees of the God Vis.n.uand his consort Srı-, the Srı-vais.n. avas established themselves through variousprocesses of legitimation as a powerful sectarian tradition in South India. Oneof the ways by which the authority of the Srı-vais.n. avas was consolidated wasRa-ma-nuja’s synthesis of popular Hindu devotionalism with the philosophy ofVeda-nta.3 This theology, that came to be known as Visis.t.a-dvaita (unity-of-the-differenced), wielded tremendous influence over the expansion of Vis.n.udevotionalism in South India and beyond. By incorporating more popularreligious texts such as the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a (VP) into his reading of the Veda-ntatexts, which were the standard of orthodoxy for Veda-nta philosophy, Ra-ma-nujalegitimized identification of the absolute principle, Brahman, in the upanis.ads,with the supreme deity Vis.n.u. While he was certainly not the first Brahminthinker to be influenced by the devotional pura-n.as, he was the first to incorporatesuch traditions into Veda-nta philosophy.

Broadly speaking this study investigates Ra-ma-nuja’s use of the VP toaccommodate, within Veda-nta, the doctrinal claims of the Srı-vais.n. ava sec-tarian tradition. Though it has been noted by many scholars that he is one ofthe first Veda-nta commentators to identify the supreme reality of the upanis.ads,Brahman, with the deity Vis.n.u, there are not many sources that investigate howRa-ma-nuja manages this. I suggest that the use of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a as a validmeans of knowledge (sabdaprama-n.a) of Brahman is one such strategy.

In Veda-nta philosophy, the application of the authority of scripture as avalid means of knowledge in the domain of extra-sensory matters is acommon convention. Known as verbal testimony (sabdaprama-n.a), scripturesare the basis of authentication of specific ontological frameworks and areimportant in constructing the legitimacy of various systems of thought. Inthis scheme, philosophical and theological concepts are substantiated withevidence first from sruti and then from smr.ti.4 In the Veda-nta system it isprimarily the upanis.ads, the later portions of the Vedic texts, and to a certainextent the earlier sections of the Veda that qualify as sruti. Though smr.ti wasacknowledged as of secondary importance, its use in Veda-nta philosophy was


negligible, except for the Bhagavadgı-ta-.5 As a smr.ti text, the importance ofthe VP in Ra-ma-nuja’s writings is considerable and unique.

Lott (1980: 47) notes that “Ra-ma-nuja’s polemic takes two forms: somearguments are aimed at the logical structure of the absolute position, whileothers are based more on theological affirmation or scriptural interpretation.”Though, these two aspects cannot be entirely divorced, this study will only beconcerned with the latter in that it only takes into account arguments relevantto scripture as a valid means of knowledge. As such it is not solely devoted tothe Veda-nta of Ra-ma-nuja, but does address philosophical contexts in whichscriptural citations, specifically those of the VP are embedded. This bookevaluates Veda-nta as both a philosophical and a commentarial enterprise, butdoes not attempt a comprehensive treatment of Ra-ma-nuja’s vast exegeticalproject (Clooney 1992: 47–68). I only examine distinct sections utilizing theuse of the VP to demarcate the limits of my exegetical analysis.

Each of the core chapters (2–4) on Ra-ma-nuja’s three key writings evaluatesthe role of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a as valid means of knowledge (sabdaprama-n.a). Inso doing, I draw out structures in the pura-n.a conducive to Ra-ma-nuja’s argument,underscore its function in interpretive maneuvers that counter rival doctrinessuch as Advaita, and evaluate some of these strategies. The Vis.n.u Pura-n.acannot be said to espouse Visis.t.a-dvaita Veda-nta systematically. Ra-ma-nuja,however, taking citations from diverse sections of this pura-n. a arranges themthematically and in a coherent fashion and in so doing incorporates the Vis.n.uPura-n.a into his sectarian theological vision.

In evaluating the various exegetical uses of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a in Ra-ma-nuja’sVeda-nta this study also contributes to the understanding of inter-textuality inthe Indian context. For the purposes of this study, I define inter-textuality asan awareness of other texts, whether this is explicitly mentioned or is alludedto (Rocher 1994; Olivelle 2004). This notion of inter-textuality is built into theVeda-nta commentarial tradition in the form of sabdaprama-n.a (scripture as avalid means of knowledge), which allows for the interplay of various inter-pretations and contexts. An examination of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a’s use as scrip-tural evidence in Veda-nta commentaries reveals the fluidity of this pura-n. a asa text that exists at the nexus of inter-textual exegesis, in some ways similar totexts such as the Bhagavadgı-ta-.

Ra-ma-nuja’s exegetical method

In his commentaries, Ra-ma-nuja does not explicitly describe his method ofexegesis as far as the use of scripture as a valid means of knowledge is con-cerned. Though it is generally noted that Ra-ma-nuja accords equal importanceto sruti and authoritative smr.ti, how this “equality” manifests in his exegesisof Veda-nta is not a primary concern of most scholarly works on Visis.t.a-dvaita(van Buitenen 1956: 48ff; Lipner 1986; Bartley 2002). On the topic of theauthority and function of smr.ti, Ra-ma-nuja has much to say. I have addressedthis issue elsewhere and only discuss it briefly here (Adluri 2006).

2 Introduction


Ra-ma-nuja does use the traditional exegetical principles of corroboration(upabr.m. han.a), harmonization of scripture (samanvaya), and so on, to validatehis use of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a. He claims that he follows the Pu-rvamı-ma-m. sa-

understanding of corroboration as augmentation that is not contrary to theVeda. That is, smr.ti that does not contradict the Veda is deemed author-itative. The primary function of smr.ti then is to augment the Veda as stated inhis commentary on BhG 16.24:

[t]herefore sa-stra alone is your authority to determine what is to be doneand what is not to be done, that is, what is acceptable and what isnot acceptable. The Vedas augmented (upabr.m. hita) by the dharmasa-s-tras, itiha-sas, and pura-n. as, teach only the highest reality called Pur-us.ottama, His pleasing form, and the actions that are the means toattain Him.6

The term upabr.m. hita used to denote smr.ti’s function is a derivative of theverbal root br.h, meaning to “expand”, “grow”, “increase”, “raise” and so on;together with the prefix “upa” it denotes “the act of making strong, invigor-ating, promoting, nourishing” and so on. According to Ra-ma-nuja, only byknowing both the Veda and smr.ti is one to perform one’s duties, which arenot Vedic sacrifices but acts of devotion to Vis.n.u. This inseparability of srutifrom smr.ti7 and the latter’s amplificatory function is also discussed in the Srı-

bha-s.ya 2.1.1. In commenting on Brahma Su-tra 1.1.1, Ra-ma-nuja exploresfurther, the corroborative function of smr.ti.

The Veda should be amplified by the itiha-sas and pura-n.as.The Veda fears that he of little learning will do me wrong.

(MBh 1.1.264)

This is what is taught by scripture ‘the act of amplifying’, is the meaning ofepics (itiha-sa) and pura-n. a. To amplify means to gain a clear perception of themeaning of Vedic passages known to oneself, by means of the statements ofthose who know the entire Veda and its meaning and those who have directlyperceived the essential nature of the Veda and its meaning, by means of thegreat power of their yoga. Indeed, amplification of Veda ought to be done, becausewithout it one cannot reach a settled conclusion, since the knowledge of allthe branches (of the Veda) is not comprehensible from listening to a smallportion.8

The pura-n.as and itiha-sas are correctives to the misuse of the Veda. Butwhat corroboration can mean is open to interpretation. Scholarship’s unani-mous declaration of the function of smr.ti as strictly corroborative in Ra-ma-nuja’scommentaries is not entirely helpful. In the context of justifying the useof smr.ti texts, it has been noted that “Ra-ma-nuja’s citations of the VPare illustrative and corroborative. His justification of these citations showsclearly that he was anxious not to introduce any evidence that would

Introduction 3


be unacceptable to his fellow Veda-ntins” (van Buitenen 1956: 35). ThatRa-ma-nuja occasionally utilizes smr.ti such as the BhG to interpret sruti hasbeen noted, but this has not led to closer examinations of the use of scriptureas a valid means of knowledge (Lott 1976: 28). Another explanation forRa-ma-nuja’s use of smr.ti is that he took his scripture literally, unlike otherVeda-ntins (Lott 1976: 28; Lipner 1986: 83). While all these claims are valid,they do not offer enough insight into the exegetical practices that exemplifycorroboration.

Corroboration by smr.ti of an argument already established by sruti meantthat, exegetically speaking, the sruti passages would be cited followed bysmr.ti. However, this is not always Ra-ma-nuja’s method, as we see in the fol-lowing chapters. Some of the patterns of usage of the VP he employs are thefollowing. First, there is the more traditional usage of citing sruti and then theVP. Second, the VP sometimes is used to interpret sruti. Third, a valid smr.ti isused to validate another smr.ti whose authority may be in question. Fourth,only smr.ti (VP) is used as valid means of proof. Each of these categories isrepresented in the discussion of Ra-ma-nuja’s commentaries in the subsequentchapters.

Though in a traditional sense, Ra-ma-nuja maintains the canonical statusof the Vedic texts, he also expands their boundaries without, however,admitting to such a change (Smith 1982: 48–49). He constructs a Veda-ntacanon of religiously meaningful texts that includes not only the canonicalVedas, but also a pura-n. a, the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a, in order to maximize legitimationfor his philosophy without altering the Veda-nta canon in the process. As aVeda-nta exegete, Ra-ma-nuja actively participated in the making and remakingof the world in which these texts were embedded and recovers the “true”meaning of the upanis.ads relevant for 12th century South India, by manip-ulating the scriptural categories of sruti and smr.ti (Inden, Ali and Waters2000). The rest of this chapter considers the sources for this study, followed byan introduction to the provenance and content of the VP and concludes withan outline of chapters.

The primary sources for this study are Ra-ma-nuja’s expositions on the threefoundational texts of Veda-nta, the upanis.ads, the Brahmasu-tras (Br Su-), andthe Bhagavadgı-ta- (BhG) called the Veda-rthasam. graha (VS), the Srı-bha-s.ya(SBh), and the Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya (RBhGBh) respectively.9 I also utilizecommentaries on the VS and SBh titled the Ta-tparyadı-pika- (TD) and theSrutapraka-sika- (SP) by Sudarsanasu-ri (thirteenth century CE), as well asthe Ta-tparyacandrika- (TC), the commentary on RBhGBh by Veda-nta Desika(fourteenth century CE). In addition to these Srı-vais.n. ava sources, I also con-sider the Advaita commentaries of San. kara (seventh century CE), the Brah-masu-trabha-s.ya (SBrSuBh) and Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya (SBhGBh) on the BrahmaSu-tras (Br Su-) and the Bhagavadgı-ta- (BhG) respectively. I juxtapose theserival interpretations with those of Ra-ma-nuja to clarify the importance ofthe VP in his interpretation of Veda-nta texts and this is especially evident inthe RBhGBh.

4 Introduction


Vis.n.u Pura-n.a

As one of the most important pura-n. as, the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a comes closest to thepañcalaks.an.a characteristic that is thought to be the hallmark of pura-n. ic lit-erature (Rocher 1986: 29). Wilson’s theory that the VP contains the fivecomponents characteristic of the pura-n. a genre—details regarding cosmogony,dissolution and the recreation of the universe, genealogical lists of gods andpatriarchs, different periods of Manu, and dynastic history—is said to be oneof the reasons he chose to translate this particular pura-n.a (Rocher 1986: 26, 29).Although the significance of this theory of pañcalaks.an.a as regards the studyof pura-n. as is debated, it is still considered one of the defining characteristicsof pura-n. ic literature (Rocher 1986: 24–30).The provenance of the VP is between the first and the fourth century CE

and it is considered a Pa-ñcara-tra10 document by some scholars (Farquhar1920: 145; Rocher 1986: 248; Pathak 1997: 20). Its geographic area of com-position is not known, however, a theory as to its origins in Andhra has beenadvanced (Vaidya 1921–26: 1. 352). The VP is one of the shorter pura-n. ascomprising six books with 22, 16, 18, 24, 38, and 8 chapters respectively. Allof Ra-ma-nuja’s citations from the VP are to be found in the critical edition ofthis pura-n. a (Pathak 1997).11

Several commentaries on the VP are extant as printed editions or manuscripts:Vis.n.ucitta’s Vya-khya-/Vis.n.ucittı-ya (twelfth century CE), Srı-dhara’s A

-tmapraka-sa/

Svapraka-sa (1276 CE), Ganga-dhara’s San.keta (1383 CE), Ratnagarbha’s Vais.n.a-va-ku-tacandrika- (1811 CE) and others such as the commentaries of Nr.hari, andKuma-ra Yogin’s Vis.n.u Vallabha- (Pathak 1997: 16; Rocher 1986: 249). Wilson,in his translation of the VP notes that Srı-dhara at the beginning of his com-mentary mentions a commentator by the name of Chitsukhayoni, who, however,is not readily identifiable (Wilson 2003: LXXII). Both the commentaries ofSrı-dhara and Ratnagarbha are written from an Advaita perspective; the workof Vis.n.ucitta is the only Visis.ta-dvaita commentary to date in Sanskrit.Presented as a dialogue between the sage Para-sara and his disciple Maitreya,

the VP’s main endeavor is the elucidation of the true nature of the universe.According to the VP, the universe arises out of Vis.n.u, is entirely dependent onHim, and is reabsorbed into Him during dissolution.12 In addition to identi-fying Vis.n.u with the entire universe, the VP also identifies Him with theBrahman of the upanis.ads (VP 1.2.12–13). In comparison to the Maha-bha-rata,which also makes an identification between Brahman and Vis.n.u, the VP isunique in that this identity is “not simply one strand of theology, but adeliberate and consistent redactional emphasis” throughout the entire pura-n. a(Matchett 2001: 69).

The VP, then, alternates between the transcendent and immanent aspects ofVis.n.u. In this sense, it is similar to the upanis.ad theology of Brahman.However, even as it declares the transcendence and the immanence of Vis.n.uwith the world, the VP also uses proto-Sa-m. khyan13 language to describe theevolution of creation from Vis.n.u. Ra-ma-nuja finds such cosmological detail

Introduction 5


useful in clarifying his soul–body (sarı-rasarı-ribha-va) paradigm. It is this typeof detail that he finds lacking in the upanis.ads.

Scholarship on the VP is limited to the examination of the concept ofincarnation (avata-ra) in comparison to other Vais.n. ava texts such as Bha-ga-vatapura-n.a (BhP) and the Harivam. sa, or to the study of the divinity of Kr.s.n. a,which on the whole is relegated to Book V of the VP (Sheth 1985; Matchett2001). The devotion (bhakti) embodied in the VP narratives such as thePrahla-da story and its counterpart in the BhP, have been explored. Accordingto Hacker, the VP on the whole exemplifies an intellectual devotion in con-trast to the emotional Kr.s.n. a devotion of the Bha-gavatapura-n.a; the latterbeing identified as the first pura-n. a in Sanskrit to epitomize emotionalism(Hacker 1959; Hirst 1993: 117–46). Hardy, too, notes that though the sourceof its emotionalism is the Tamil Vais.n. ava tradition of the A

-lva-rs, the VP

served as a literary model for the BhP (Hardy 2001). Some research exploresthe linguistic dimensions of the VP through specific concepts such as cosmogonyor the nature of time (Penner 1965; Salomon 1986; Wessler 1995). However,there has been no scholarly work on the VP as it relates to Ra-ma-nuja.14

The VP was an important text for Ya-muna (eleventh century CE), Ra-ma-nuja’spredecessor who in his hymn, the Stotra Ratna (SR) praises the VP as a gemamong pura-n. as:

Salutations to Para-sara, who is the best among sages, who composed thegem among pura-n. as wishing to show correctly the sentient, insentiententities, and I

-svara, along with their true nature,the enjoyment of entities

in the world, their liberation and the means to attain this freedom.15

(SR 4)

In light of this high praise, it is not surprising that Ra-ma-nuja utilizes thispura-n. a in his commentaries to construct the “right” relationship betweenindividual selves (cit), matter (acit), and Brahman (Venkatachari 1994: 203–6).The importance of the VP is also evident in the later Srı-vais.n. ava tradition asit serves as the model for the first commentary on Pil.l.a-n’s (twelfth century CE)commentary on the Tiruva-ymoli of Namma-lva-r (tenth century CE) called theA-r.a-yirappat.i (Six Thousand Pat.is) and is numerically modeled on the VP. A

pat.i is a metrical unit consisting of 32 syllables. The A-r.a-yirappat.i is 32 x 6000

syllables, the same length as the VP (Carman and Narayanan 1989: 10). It ishighly probable that the reason for such emulation of the VP is due toRa-ma-nuja’s high regard for this pura-n. a, which is reflected in its use in hiscommentaries.

Another characteristic of the VP useful for Ra-ma-nuja’s purposes is thatcertain sections of this pura-n.a clearly articulate the distinction between Brahman/Vis.n.u, individual selves (Jı-va/a-tman), and matter (prakr.ti/pradha-na). The VP’sdeclaration of the different forms of Vis.n.u, such as the principle of conscious-ness (purus.a), manifest and unmanifest universe (pradha-na/prakr.ti), and timeexpressed in Sa-m. khyan terms is the kind of differentiation that Ra-ma-nuja

6 Introduction


utilizes to affirm his theology of the unity-of-the-differenced (Visis.ta-dvaita).Again, these details are difficult to find in the upanis.ads that Ra-ma-nuja cites in hiscommentaries: it is the VP that provides Ra-ma-nuja pertinent information whilemaintaining a connection to the upanis.ad theology of Brahman.

It has been noted that the reason for Ra-ma-nuja’s use of this pura-n. a may bethat “[i]n comparison with the [s]mr.tis that were generally accepted asauthoritative, the epics among which the Bhagavadgı-ta- has a privileged posi-tion, and Manu, the sma-rta authority of the [p]ura-n. as was not so widely andcompletely recognized before Ra-ma-nuja’s age” (van Buitenen 1956: 34).Ra-ma-nuja found in the VP not only a description of Brahman/Vis.n.u thatcoincides with his own sectarian views, but he also utilizes the cosmologicaldetails not found in the upanis.ads that bring coherence to his interpretationof Veda-nta. Indeed, it is this last reason that is the most compelling.

Ra-ma-nuja was the first Veda-ntin to quote profusely from a pura-n.a. San.kara

utilizes the VP as well, but not as frequently as Ra-ma-nuja.16 San.kara’s Brah-masu-trabha-s.ya utilizes Ma-rkan.d. eya Pura-n.a and other puranas in eightinstances (Deussen 1990: 34). Three passages from the VP are used in San.kara’scommentary on Br Su- 1.3.28 and 1.3.30; however, these passages are also saidto be found in the MBh (Raghavan 1975: 294–95). It has been noted that inSan. kara’s commentaries, especially the BhG, the perceptible theistic back-ground is of the Vais.n. ava religion rather than the Saiva tradition (Hacker1965: 147–54; Hirst 1993).17 In the SBh, Ra-ma-nuja has the Advaitin quotethe VP in several instances to support the prima facie (pu-rvapaks.a) view; hethen goes to great lengths to refute the Advaita interpretation. One reasonmight be that this pura-n. a was esteemed in Advaita circles, but it is also pos-sible that the objector’s (pu-rvapaks.in) utilization of the VP rhetorically neces-sitates Ra-ma-nuja’s own use later in his conclusion (siddha-nta). That theAdvaitins were interested in the VP is known by the existence of the twocommentaries of Srı-dhara and Ratnagarbha. Even as late as the twentiethcentury Advaita scholars such as Ra-ma Ra-ya (1875–1914) in his San.kar-a-san.karabha-s.yavimars.a, establish the Advaitic nature of the VP (Datta 1978:193–94). It is probable that the VP enjoyed a special status not only amongthe budding Srı-vais.n. ava sect, but also among other groups, such as thesma-rta Brahmins of medieval South India who were mostly Advaitins.

The rest of this section addresses the content of the VP. Since severalsynopses of the chapters of the various books (am. sa) of the VP are available, Iwill examine in detail only those chapters that are important for Ra-ma-nuja asreflected by their use in his commentaries (Rocher 1986; Pathak 1997;Matchett 2001; Wilson 2003). As a result of this focus, certain sections andinterpretations relevant to other concepts in this pura-n. a will not be addressed.

VP 1.1

In the first chapter of Book I, the sage Maitreya, well-versed in the Vedicsciences and dharma, questions his teacher, the sage Para-sara on the nature of

Introduction 7


the universe. Para- sara first explains the boon that has been bestowed uponhim that enables him to compose this pura-n. a. As a result of the clemencyPara- sara shows the demons (ra-ksasa) in not avenging the death of his fatherat their hands, Pulastya the progenitor of demons grants Para- sara twoboons—that he would be well-versed in all scripture (sa-stra) and that hewould compose a summary of all the pura-n. as (i.e., the VP).

What is important for Ra-ma-nuja here is Maitreya’s query (1.1.4–5) into theworkings of the universe; specifically Maitreya’s questions as to the state ofthis world in the past and in the future, the substantial nature of the universe,and its source at the time of creation and dissolution. More importantly,Para- sara’s detailed answer to these questions (1.1.31)—that the world evolvesfrom Vis.n.u, that it exists in him, and that it dissolves into him, and theidentity of the world with Vis.n.u—is one of the most important passages forRa-ma-nuja. Though the VP distinguishes the world as distinct from Brahman,it also argues for an identity between the two that is similar to the upanis.addescriptions of Brahman. However, on the topic of matter, individual selves,and karma as powers (sakti) of Vis.n.u, (VP 1.2) the pura-n. a is unique andoffers Ra-ma-nuja adequate detail to support his soul–body paradigm.

VP 1.2

This chapter begins with a lengthy glorification of Vis.n.u, and describes thechain of transmission of the VP. The god Brahma- imparts the VP to Daks.a18

and other sages before it is transmitted to the king Purukutsa, reigning on thebanks of the river Narmada. He then imparts it to Sarasvata who in turnrepeats it to Para-sara. Following this is the description of Brahman as Va-sudevaand his different forms (ru-pa) and powers (sakti), such as individual selves(purus.a), matter (pradha-na/prakr.ti) both manifest and unmanifest, and time(ka-la). Through the playful action (lı-la-) of Vis.n.u, these forms are the cause ofcreation. Ra-ma-nuja turns to this conception of the world as a form or powerof Vis.n.u in arguing a much closer and positive connection between Brahmanand the world. The association between individual selves and matter leads tothe various evolutes, which ultimately form the cosmic egg, the abode of thegod Brahma-. Vis.n.u, as the inner self of both Rudra and Brahma-, participatesin this creation. The transcendence of Vis.n.u is underscored by the discussionof the three dispositions (bha-vana) inherent in all creatures but the SupremeBeing. The cosmological details of this chapter are very important forRa-ma-nuja, since they allow him to introduce information he feels is lackingin the sruti passages.

VP 1.3

The major portion of this chapter concerns the different divisions of time. Thefirst section is the most important for Ra-ma-nuja. Interrupting Para- sara, whohad just explained elemental creation (1.2), Maitreya asks how it is that

8 Introduction


creative agency is attributed to Brahman who is pure, eternal, and infinite. InPara- sara’s response Ra-ma-nuja finds much detail to support his theology.Para- sara explains that this aspect of Brahman, as the creator who remainsunsullied by the process, is something that is peculiar to Him alone, just asheat is a unique quality of fire. Ra-ma-nuja takes these passages as illustra-tive of his soul–body perspective and depends on them significantly in hiscommentaries.

VP 1.22

Though VP 1.22 is the last chapter of Book I, it continues to address thequestions posed by Maitreya in VP 1.3, in regard to the nature of Brahman’srelation to the world. Begun in the previous chapters, the conclusion of thecreation of different beings such as demons (ra-ks.asa), gods (daitya), anti-gods(da-nava), and so on, forms this chapter’s primary topic. Para-sara furtherdeclares the universality of Vis.n.u with all these beings. He utilizes conceptssuch as: 1) the world as Vis.n.u’s lordly manifestation (vibhu-ti); 2) the world asa portion or part (am. sa) of Vis.n.u; 3) the world as the body (vapu) of Brahman;4) the world as the essential nature (svaru-pa) of Vis.n.u; and 5) the individualselves and matter as powers (sakti) of Vis.n.u. Additionally, two forms of Vis.n.uare described—one that is perishable and is identified as the world of matter,and the other which is imperishable and inherent in all beings as the individualself. Using the above-mentioned terminology to deliberate on creation, Para--sara affirms the world as interwoven with Brahman, even as it is distinct fromHim. He concludes this chapter with a description of the ornaments andweapons of Vis.n.u which are identified with different aspects of creation.

VP 2.7

Having heard the geographic descriptions of the various regions on earth,Maitreya questions Para- sara about the celestial worlds. The majority of thechapter enumerates the planets, constellations, and their relation to eachother. It also includes a listing of the material evolutes and their relation toVis.n.u. What is important for Ra-ma-nuja in this chapter is the description ofmatter and individual selves as dependent on Brahman and as encompassedby Him, even as He brings about their association and disassociation.

VP 2.12

The function of celestial bodies such as the sun begun in 2.11 extends into2.12 and ends with an exploration of the world’s relation to Brahman. In theSBh, both the Advaitin and Ra-ma-nuja utilize about ten passages from thischapter to establish their respective views. While for San.kara these passageselucidate ultimate reality from an Advaita point of view, for Ra-ma-nuja thepura-n. a affirms the metaphysical reality of the individual self as distinct from

Introduction 9


Brahman. The passages on the whole seem to support the Advaita view, butRa-ma-nuja spends a considerable amount of time reinterpreting these passagesaccording to his theology as we see in Chapter 3 of this study.

VP 2.14

The narrative of Bharata is covered in 2.13 and 2.14. Even though a devoutworshipper of Va-sudeva, he fails to attain liberation because of excessiveattachment to a fawn. After successive births on earth, he finally reaches hisgoal. The highest truth of life, namely, the highest reality is defined as eternal,immutable, imperishable, and essentially different from the rest of the createdworld. Whereas the Advaitin interprets this highest reality as Brahman whichis pure knowledge, without attributes (nirgun.a), Ra-ma-nuja interprets this asthe individual self in its essential nature. I discuss Ra-ma-nuja’s use of passagesfrom this section in Chapters 3 and 4.

VP 6.4 and VP 6.5

These two chapters detail the dissolution of the universe and the absorptionof creation into Vis.n.u. The description of the resolution of matter and spiritinto Brahman is important for Ra-ma-nuja. His refutation of Advaita doctrinethat posits the world as unreal compared to Brahman relies on these chapters.In 6.5, the exegesis of the word bhagavan is connected to the causal nature ofVis.n.u and He is proclaimed as the self of all, residing in all beings. For thisreason, all beings are said to dwell in Him. Much of the information fromthese chapters Ra-ma-nuja utilizes to establish his theology.

VP 6.7

Para- sara’s teaching in 6.5 is said to have been first taught by Kesidhvaja tohis brother Kha-ndikhya, also known as Janaka. For Ra-ma-nuja this chapter offerssupport on the reality of the individual self and on the divine form (divyaru-pa) ofVis.n.u. The description of Vis.n.u’s divine form as the auspicious object of medi-tation (subha-sraya) includes a head-to-toe description of the deity adornedwith ornaments. Though this chapter contains the passage (6.7.53) quoted bythe Advaitin in SBh 1.1.1 to support his view that Brahman is attribute-less andpure knowledge, Ra-ma-nuja once again reinterprets it to refer to the individualsoul, in its essential nature. Ra-ma-nuja relies on this very important section ofthe pura-n. a in both the VS and the SBh, which I evaluate in Chapters 2 and 3.

Outline of chapters

Chapter 2 of this book evaluates the exegetical role of the VP in the VS.Ra-ma-nuja turns to this pura-n. a to support some salient doctrines of his theol-ogy, such as the metaphysical reality of the individual self, Brahman’s

10 Introduction


originative causality, and Brahman’s divine form. As valid means of knowl-edge of Brahman (sabdaprama-n.a), the VP is indispensable in the details itprovides on the essential nature of individual selves and their embodied con-dition while bound in the cycle of birth-and-rebirth (sam. sa-ra). This pura-n. a isalso a source text for the nature of ignorance (avidya-), which Ra-ma-nujadefines as karma and its effects on the individual self. In these discussions, theVP is the only scripture utilized for support, and the importance of thispura-n.a is also borne out by the commentator, Sudarsanasu-ri (thirteenth centuryCE), in his commentary on the VS, the Ta-tparyadı-pika- (TD).

In the second section of Chapter 2 I examine the implications of Brahman’smaterial causality. The concepts of Brahman as a cause as a whole (avi-ses.n.aka-ran.a) and causality as a unique quality of Brahman’s essential nature(brahmasvaru-pavises.a) are unique aspects of Visis.t.a-dvaita. Ra-ma-nuja relieson the VP in developing these doctrinal positions that differentiate hisVeda-nta from that of his rivals.

In the last section of Chapter 2, I focus on the scriptural evidence thatsupports a divine body (divyaru-pa) for Brahman. Contrary to his Veda-ntapredecessors such as San.kara and Bha-skara, Ra-ma-nuja articulates a divinetranscendent body for Brahman, for which he utilizes the VP. In addition toan essential nature (svaru-pa), support for which is abundant in the upanis.ads,Ra-ma-nuja envisions Brahman as Vis.n.u possessing an anthropomorphic formunique to the deity. An examination of the sruti passages quoted as evidencefor Brahman’s divine form are inadequate and Ra-ma-nuja owes much to theVP to consolidate his perspective on this issue.

Chapter 3 explores the importance of the VP in Srı-bha-s.ya (SBh) 1.1.1,Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on Brahma Su-tra 1.1.1. The nature of Brahman, themetaphysical reality of the individual self, its relationship to Brahman,in both the embodied and liberated states, are the topics for which he relieson the VP. In these sections, the VP allows Ra-ma-nuja to overcome certainambiguities inherent in sruti passages in regard to the distinction between theindividual self and Brahman. Both Ra-ma-nuja in the SBh and his commentatorSudarsanasu-ri (thirteenth century CE), in the Srutapraka-sika- (SP) are indebtedto the VP in according the individual self a real metaphysical status.

An interesting feature of the use of the VP in the SBh is that Ra-ma-nuja hasthe objector (Advaitin) quote generously from the VP as well, in order toestablish the non-dual (Advaita) point of view. Ra-ma-nuja then reinterpretsthe same VP passages and numerous additional VP citations to establish hisVeda-nta of the unity-of-the-differenced (Visis.t.a-dvaita). Such use of the VP tosupport the objector’s point of view is not evident in Ra-ma-nuja’s other com-mentaries. There is a sense of a deliberate re-reading, reclaiming of the VP asa Visis.t.a-dvaita text that is not seen in his other commentaries. This suggeststhat perhaps the VP was also an important text for the Advaitins or thatRa-ma-nuja has the Advaitin utilize the VP for rhetorical purposes.

Chapter 4 identifies the role of the VP in the reinterpretation of key BhGdoctrines such as Sa-m. khya Yoga, the nature of Kr.s.n. a, and the concepts of

Introduction 11


bondage and liberation. Ra-ma-nuja’s task in his commentary on the BhG is tonot only interpret Kr.s.n. a’s teaching, but to also refute San.kara’s interpretationof the very same BhG passages. I show in this chapter how, both in his Bha-gavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya (RBhGBh) and in his commentator Veda-nta Desika’s Ta-t-paryadı-pika- (TD), the importance of this pura-n. a in recasting the BhG as aVisis.t.a-dvaita exposition contra-Advaita is significant.

Editorial notes

Reference to all Vis.n.u Pura-n.a passages is from the critical edition (Pathak 1997).Where relevant, I note any discrepencies found in content between the criticaledition and Ra-ma-nuja’s Vis.n.u Pura-n.a quotations. All citations of the Srı-

Bha-s.ya refer to Abhyankar’s (1916) critical edition, while I also indicate thecorresponding page numbers in George Thibaut’s (1996) translation.

Notes1 Ra-ma-nuja was the first to comment on all the foundational texts of Veda-nta and

differs from his predecessor, Ya-muna (10th century CE), who also contributed totheistic Veda-nta. For more on Ya-muna’s philosophy and his importance withinthe Srı-vais.n. ava tradition see van Buitenen 1971; Neeval 1977; Mesquita 1990;Narasimhachary 1998.

2 See Carman 1974: 24–64 for Ra-ma-nuja’s life and writings.3 Nayar 1992: 9 notes that “Ra-ma-nuja set the stage, even if selectively, for a more

complete blending of the Tamil and Sanskrit scriptures by creating the ‘scope’ forseveral salient features of Southern Religiosity … he provided certain theologicalopenings for several features of A

-lva-r spirituality – including the worship of God

in his iconic incarnations in the temple … the aesthetic appreciation of the love-liness of God’s form, and emotional bhakti – themes that occupy a prominentplace in the A

-lva-rs’ verses.” For more on A

-lva-r devotion and the interaction of

Tamil and Sanskrit traditions within Srı-vais.n.avism see Narayanan 1987 and 1992.4 This categorization of scripture as it concerns Ra-ma-nuja is discussed in Adluri 2006.5 The BhG is considered one of the foundational texts of Veda-nta philosophy. Its

status within the Hindu scriptural hierarchy is unique (van Buitenen 1981: 6–13).6 tasma-t ka-rya-ka-ryavyavasthita-v upa-deya-nupa-deyavyavastha-ya-m. sa-strameva tava pra-

ma-n.am. dharmasa-stretiha-sapura-n.a-diyupabr.ma-hita- veda- yadeva purus.ottama-khyam.param. tattvam. tatprı-n. aru-pam. tatpra-ptyupa-yabhu-tam. ca karma-vabodhayanti(RBhGBh 16.24).

7 For more on this see Pollock 2011.8 itiha-sapura-n.a-bhya-m. vedam. samupabr.mhayet. bibhety alpasruta-d vedo ma-m. ayam.

prataris.yati (MBh 1.1.264) iti sa-stren.a-sya-rthasyetiha-sapura-n. a-bhya-m upabr.m. han.am.ka-ryamiti jña-yate. upabr.mhan.am. na-ma viditasakalavedatadartha-na-m. svayogama-himasa-ks.a-tkr.tavedatattva-rtha-na-m. va-kyaih. sva-vagatavedava-kya-rthavyaktı-karan.am.sakalasa-kha-nugatasya va-kya-rthasya-lpabha-gasravan.a-d duravagamatvena tena vina-

niscaya-yoga-d upabr.m. han.am. hi ka-ryameva (SBh 72; cf Thibaut 1996: 91).9 I do not include Ra-ma-nuja’sVeda-ntadı-pa and Veda-ntasa-ra in this study. Both

these works are shorter commentaries on the Br Su- and are summary texts of hisVeda-nta and as such, they are not detailed and are rather unpersuasive in theirargumentation (Carman 1974: 58). Moreover, there is not much use of the VP inthese works.

12 Introduction


10 Pa-ñcara-tra is an extra-Vedic tradition that is incorporated into Srı-vais.n. avism.Ya-muna in his A

-gamapra-ma-n.yam argues for the validity of these texts as Vedic,

and so does Ra-ma-nuja in SBh 2.2.40–43.11 Although the numbering of these passages may be a little different, all passages

utilized by Ra-ma-nuja are found in the critical edition.12 The beginning verses such as VP 1.1.31 and the concluding passages such as VP

6.8.27 lend a cohesive wholeness to the pura-n. a.13 This is classified as Sa-m. khya prior to its systematization in the Sa-m. khyaka-rika- of

I-svarakr.s.n. a (Larson 1979).14 Exceptions to this are the MA thesis of Menzies (1991) and the Ph.D dissertation

of Ranganayaki (1999). Menzies explores the importance of the VP for Ra-ma-nuja’sconception of god only in a cursory manner. His thesis title, The Vis.n.u Pura-n.aas Sruti, suggests the importance of the VP for Ra-ma-nuja. He notes a fewinstances where Ra-ma-nuja uses the VP exclusively, such as the qualities of god(Menzies 1991: 152), but does not thoroughly evaluate the importance of the VPin regards to the Veda-nta texts used. I demonstrate, analyzing both the Veda-ntapassages and the VP verses, that the VP is crucial in establishing Ra-ma-nuja’s argu-ment. Ranganayaki has examined the commentary on the VP by Ra-ma-nuja’s dis-ciple, Vis.n.ucitta to demonstrate the latter’s reliance on Ra-ma-nuja’s Veda-nta tocomment on the VP. Additionally, Vis.n.ucitta seems to borrow Ra-ma-nuja’s inter-petation of the VP from commentaries such as the VS and SBh in commenting onthe pura-n. a (Ranganayaki 1999: 264–72).

15 tattvena yascidacidı-svaratatsvabha-vabhoga-pava-rgatadupa-yagatı-r uda-rah. sandarsyanniramimı-ta pura-n. aratnam. tasmai namo munivara-ya para- sara-ya (SR 4)

16 For instance, in SBhGBh 3.37, VP 6.7.74 and 78 are cited.17 Also, on the role of divine grace in San. kara’s soteriology, see Malkovsky 2001.18 VP 1.7.5 describes Daks.a as one of nine mind-born sons of god Brahma-.

Introduction 13


2 The individual self, cosmology, and thedivine body in the Veda-rthasam. graha

The Veda-rthasam. graha (VS) “summary of the meaning of the Veda” is theearliest exposition of Ra-ma-nuja’s philosophical oeuvre (van Buitenen 1956:30; Carman 1974: 50–51). While the Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya (RBhGBh) and theSrı-bha-s.ya (SBh) are commentaries on primary texts, the Bhagavadgı-ta- (BhG)and the Brahma Su-tras (Br Su-) respectively, the VS is not a commentary on asingle text, but rather is Ra-ma-nuja’s interpretation of the philosophy of allupanis.ads. In this chapter, I examine the exegetical use of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a(VP) in discussions on three topics, the individual self, Brahman’s causalnature, and the divine form. Ra-ma-nuja often relies solely on the VP to furtherhis argument on these key issues and even when he does use sruti it is hisinterpretation of the VP that is decisive. At times, he even uses the VP tointerpret sruti itself.The first section of this chapter addresses Ra-ma-nuja’s indebtedness to the

VP in his discussion of the individual self (Jı-va-tman), both in its essentialnature (svaru-pa), when liberated from matter, and in its embodied state (ks.e-trajña). Brahman’s originative causality is the second theme for which theVis.n.u Pura-n.a is essential. Though all Veda-ntins affirm the causal nature ofBrahman, none discuss it as an aspect of the essential nature (svaru-pavises.a)of Brahman.1 Ra-ma-nuja, in contrast claims that the created world of individualselves and matter is not an illusion (ma-ya-) and that the exact relationshipbetween matter, selves, and Brahman, in no way compromises the unity,eternity, and infinity of Brahman as defined by the upanis.ads. In addition tocausality as an aspect of Brahman’s essential nature, Ra-ma-nuja also affirmsBrahman as the material cause as a whole (avises.an.aka-ran.a) to establish creationas a positive manifestation of a causal Brahman that is eternally differentiated.To support both these salient doctrines of Visis.t.a-dvaita Veda-nta, on Brahman’scausality, he turns to the VP. The proto-Sa-m. khyan evolution of matter andthe conception of the world as Brahman’s power (sakti), discussed in the VP,aid Ra-ma-nuja significantly in differentiating his own perspective from that ofhis rivals. This pura-n. a, then, is the defining text that separates his interpretationof Brahman’s causality from that of other Veda-ntins.

A third issue for which the VP is utilized is the discussion of the divineform of Brahman. The concept of a divine body (divyaru-pa) for Brahman is


not accepted by Ra-ma-nuja’s Veda-ntic predecessors. He however argues thatthe upanis.ads not only declare Brahman as possessing a form but that theyenjoin worship and devotion to a specific divine form, that of Vis.n.u. Ra-ma-nuja’sdescription of the divine form relies solely on the VP. This chapter also takes thecommentary on the Veda-rthasam. graha, the Ta-tparyadı-pika- (TD) by his discipleSudarsanasu-ri (~thirteenth century CE), into consideration as a guide to furtherevaluate the importance of the VP.

The individual self

Unlike Advaita, which denies the metaphysical reality of the individual self,Ra-ma-nuja affirms the metaphysical reality of the individual self, both in itsessential nature (svaru-pa) and as an embodied entity. For Ra-ma-nuja, sinceconsciousness is both the essential nature and a defining property of the self itcannot be sublated. Instead, it is only the attributive quality of the individualself that is obscured during embodiment. This is in contrast to the Advaitaview that, “the absolute Self must be identified with consciousness, is con-sciousness, and the distinctions between the individual knower, object known,and the act of knowing cease to apply” from the ultimate point of view(Lipner 1986: 56). The next two sections examine VP’s role as evidencefor the essential nature of the individual self as consciousness and its embo-died manifestation. Ra-ma-nuja first quotes sruti and then the VP. However acloser examination, of his argument and the commentary, the Ta-tparyadı-pika-

(TD) of his disciple reveals that through some ingenious exegetical moves,the corroborative function of the VP is amplified considerably.

Sruti on the individual self

Immediately after the two invocatory verses, in the VS, Ra-ma-nuja states thatVeda-nta teaches:

1) the essential nature (svaru-pa) of the individual self as different from thebody; 2) the attributes (svabha-va)2 of the individual self; 3) the essentialnature (svaru-pa) of Brahman as the inner ruler; 4) the attributes (svabha-va)of Brahman; 5) the worship (upa-sana) of Brahman; 6) and the goal ofsuch worship: liberation (moks.a).3

He then cites the following sruti texts as support:

1 And that’s how you are(Ch Up 6.9.4)

2 Brahman is this self(Ma-n. d. Up 2)

The individual self, cosmology, and the divine body 15


3 He who, although residing in the soul, is different from that soul,whom the self does not know, whose body is the soul, and who directsthe soul from within, He is the immortal inner ruler of thy soul.

(Br. Up, Ma-d 3.7.22)

4 He is the inner self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, and solegod Na-ra-yan.a.

(Sub Up 7)

5 It is he that Brahmins seek to know by means of Vedic recitation,sacrifice, gift-giving, austerity, and fasting

(Br. Up 4.4.22)

6 A man who knows brahman obtains the highest there is.(Taitt Up 2.1)

7 Only when a man knows him does he pass beyond death; there is noother path for getting there.

(Sve Up 3.8)4

One inconsistency is that for the six-fold teaching of Veda-nta, Ra-ma-nuja citesseven upanis.ad examples. To justify the anomaly, the TD explains that thefirst upanis.ad passage (Ch Up 6.9.4) is a summation of all of the six teach-ings, whereas the rest correspond to each of the six topics.5 If that is the case,then evidence for the essential nature of the individual self as different fromthe body and its attributive nature is provided by Ma-n.d. Up 2 and the Br. Up3.7.22 (Ma-dhyandina recension) respectively. These citations correspond tothe first two of the six topics that Veda-nta is said to address:

the essential nature of the self is Brahman is this self Ma-n. d. Up 2different from the body

the attributive nature of the self He who, although residing in thesoul, is different from that soul,whom the self does not know,whose body is the soul, and whodirects the soul from within, Heis the immortal inner ruler of thysoul Br. Up, Ma-dhy, 3.7.22

The essential nature of the self as different from the body, but as of the natureof Brahman is supported by this self is brahman (Ma-n.d. Up 2). The TDexplains that this upanis.ad passage demonstrates the similarity of the selfwith Brahman, in the sense that only the individual self has the same natureas Brahman characterized as consciousness and bliss and is unlike the physicalbody.6 However, the individual self in its essential nature, lacks the creative

16 The individual self, cosmology, and the divine body


ability and other auspicious qualities that constitute the essential nature ofBrahman. The sruti passage is vague enough that it leaves open the possibilityof an Advaita interpretation—that the individual self is ultimately Brahman.To counter this, Ra-ma-nuja indicates the individal self ’s relationship to Brahmanwith a second example (Br. Up 3.7.22), which declares the attributive natureof the self as an accessory of Brahman as He is its inner self. Commenting onMa-n.d. Up 2 given as support for the essential nature of the self, the TD statesthat “[t]he essential nature (svaru-pa) of the self is that it is solely characterizedby consciousness and bliss and its attributive quality (svabha-va) is to be anaccessory (ses.a) to the Lord.”7

The attributive quality of the individual self as an accessory of Brahman isconveyed here. Neither Ra-ma-nuja, nor the sruti passages he cites, offer adequateinformation on the nature of the individual self itself, though the commenta-tor does try to rectify this. The upanis.ads, which Ra-ma-nuja has quoted,clarify the self ’s relation to Brahman, an important distinction, as we cannotspeak of the self existing outside such a relationship. Yet they do not conveythe individual self ’s essential characteristics. The emphasis in the upanis.adexamples is on Brahman, and the individual self is defined in relation to it.

Thus, sruti’s support for Ra-ma-nuja’s views on the essential nature of theindividual self is incomplete. Attentive to this deficiency the commentatorgoes on to say that:

[i]f the doubt arises as to how in these passages the essential nature of theindividual self alone is obtained, Ra-ma-nuja wishes to show that theessential nature of these two (self and Brahman) is obtained from srutiwhich is supported by corroboration.8

What does corroboration mean here? The commentator refers to Ra-ma-nuja’smethod of citing sruti along with smr.ti/VP passages as support. An exam-ination of the two sruti passages, Ma-n. d. Up 2 and Br. Up Ma-dh, 3.7.22 in noway intimate any information on the individual self only its relationship toBrahman. They do provide information that the self has Brahman for itsinner self; this relational definition, though important, does not speak of theself ’s essential nature directly.

The interpretation of the universe as the body of Brahman (sarı-rasarı-ribha-va)was “primarily a theological application”, where “the more purely philo-sophical aspects of Ra-ma-nuja’s thought—such as his position on the self(Jı-va-tman) as conscious and embodied … enter into the model’s theologicalcomprehension only indirectly” (Lipner 1986: 120–21). This “indirectness” ismirrored in the types of scripture that Ra-ma-nuja needs to utilize to supporthis views. In the several instances throughout the VS where Ra-ma-nuja dis-cusses the individual self and supports his assertions with scripture, he reliesonly on the VP, instead of the upanis.ad passages, as means of proof (pra-ma-n.a).9 The description of the real nature of the individual self, taken fromthe VP and outlined later, is said to be indescribable, self-knowing, and so on,



and speaks of the self in a direct sense than in its relation to Brahman, suchas an accessory of Brahman and so on, although this relationship cannot bedenied or trivialized. In other words, the scriptural evidence for the essentialnature of the individual self as Ra-ma-nuja envisions it is not from sruti.

Vis.n.u Pura-n.a on the individual self

Having evaluated the scriptural evidence from sruti we now examine VP’scontribution to Ra-ma-nuja’s exposition of the essential nature of the indivi-dual self. In the very beginning of the VS after Ra-ma-nuja gives a succinctaccount of his Veda-nta, he elaborates on the essential nature of the self, butdoes not provide any scriptural evidence:

The essential nature of the self is devoid of the differences, of distinctivemyriad forms such as gods, men and so on, which are a result of the evolu-tion of matter (prakr.ti). It is solely characterized by consciousness and bliss(jña-na-nandaikagun.a). Once these differences of form such as gods, which area result of the workings of karma, are removed, the self ’s essential indivi-duality is indescribable (va-ca-m agocara), known only by itself (svasam. vedya),and can only be defined as of the nature of consciousness (jña-nasvaru-pa).And this essential nature is common to all individual selves.10

Several concepts in regard to the essential nature of the individual selves arepresented here: first, when separated from matter the essential nature of theself is “solely characterized by consciousness and bliss” (jña-na-nanda-ikagun.a);second that their essential individuality is “indescribable” (va-ca-m agocara)third, that the essential nature of the self is “known only by itself” (svasam. vedya)and fourth, the essential nature of the self is of the nature of consciousness(jña-nasvaru-pa). The scriptural source for all these terms is the VP.

According to the commentary on the VS, the term that conveys the individualself ’s “essential nature as consciousness” (jña-nasvaru-pa) is a reference to VP1.4.40:

consciousness (jña-nasvaru-pa) is the nature of this whole world, those whoare ignoranterroneously perceive it as of the nature of the world and are lost in theocean of ignorance.11

(VP 1.4.40)

Chapter 1.4 of the VP, from which the description of the essential nature ofthe self as consciousness is taken, is a discussion of Vis.n.u as the boar(Vara-ha) incarnation. Beholding the body of Vis.n.u as the boar, the sagespraise him as pervading all existence and then declare the essential nature ofthis majestic form as of the nature of consciousness (Jña-na-tman). Subsequentlyin 1.4.40, the world is affirmed as comprised of consciousness as well. Those



who in ignorance see the world as an object of perception rather than of thenature of consciousness are mired in the cycle of birth and rebirth. In 1.4.41,the world is defined as of the nature of consciousness (Jña-na-tman) and as aform of Vis.n.u. Both Ra-ma-nuja and the commentator take the individual selfto be the topic of discussion of this VP section. Such an interpretation ispossible through the imposition of the soul–body paradigm; however, what isimportant for us here is that the essential nature of the individual self is seenas rooted in the VP according to Ra-ma-nuja and his followers.

As mentioned earlier, the connection of Ra-ma-nuja’s description of theindividual self to the VP does not end with VP 1.4.40. Previously, we identi-fied several terms that were used to describe the essential nature of the self byRa-ma-nuja, which are also from the VP: deva-dibhede’ apadhvaste (once dif-ferences such as gods and so on are removed) is from VP 2.14.33, va-ca-magocara (indescribable) is from VP 6.7.53, and svasam. vedya (self-knowing) isborrowed from VP 6.7.53.12 Neither Ra-ma-nuja nor his commentator Sudar-sanasu-ri, use any sruti passages to support this view of the essential nature ofthe individual self. Thus, even though we may doubt the commentator’sassertion that the term jña-nasvaru-pa refers to VP 1.4.40, the fact that the restof the individual self ’s description is taken from the VP 2.14.33 and 6.7.53,suggests that Ra-ma-nuja has the VP in mind.

Amplifying Ra-ma-nuja’s definition of the self as different from matter, andalso to illustrate that he does indeed rely on the VP, the commentary citesadditional passages from this pura-n. a.

Also, when the soul is associated with matter, it is defiled by I-nessThe self assumes the qualities of matter, although it is distinct from themand immutable

(VP 6.7.24)

A living being is neither god, nor human, nor animal, nor a tree.These different bodily forms are due to the effects of karma.13

(VP 2.13.94)

These verses clarify that the self takes on different physical forms due tokarma and that these embodiments are not due to the inherent nature of theself which is essentially consciousness. The commentator does not cite any srutiat this juncture. Chapter 6.7 of the VP, which is the context of 6.7.24 statedabove, is a dialogue between the brothers Kesidhvaja and Kha-n. d. ikya. Thelatter entreats the former to divulge the nature of discriminative knowledge.Kesidhvaja then proceeds to declare the distinction between the self/soul(a-tman) and the body that is comprised of matter (prakr.ti). In this context, it isdifficult to interpret the term a-tman in terms of Advaita, because Kesidhvaja inVP 6.7.30 distinguishes liberation utilizing the metaphor of a magnet (Brah-man) and pieces of iron (individual selves). Just as the pieces of iron drawn tothe magnet will never become magnets in their essential nature, so also,



the individual self at liberation is drawn to Brahman, but does not becomeBrahman. Thus the commentator’s interpretation of the term “self” as theindividual self and not Brahman, in VP 6.7.24, is accurate. So also is the casewith the context of VP 2.13.94, taken from a discussion on the distinctionbetween the self and the body.

To support the term that Ra-ma-nuja uses to describe the real nature of theself, jña-na-nanda-ikagun.a, the TD once again cites the relevant VP passage:

By means of jña-nada-ikagun.a the meaning of the following verse is aimed at:The self is by itself solely blissful, conscious (jña-nadaikagun.a) and pureThe qualities(dharma) of suffering, ignorance, and impurity are thoseof matter and not the individual self.14

(VP 6.7.22)

In other words, the TD makes it clear that the VP is the source of the voca-bulary utilized to discuss the essential nature of the individual self. Thepura-n. a is the only scripture cited thus far, that gives the specifics of the self ’sessential nature (svaru-pa). Furthermore, Ra-ma-nuja’s use of the term for “oncedifferences such as gods and so on are removed” (deva-dibhede’ padhvaste) isexplained by the commentary as a reference to another VP verse:

By means of karmakr.tadevadibhede’ padhavaste, the meaning of thefollowing verse is aimed at:The differentiation of this one nature is brought about by the con-sequences of outward actionsWhen differences such as gods are removed (deva-dibhede’ padvaste)there is absolutely no distinction.15

(VP 2.14.33)16

The context of VP 2.14 is the discussion of the difference between the selfand the body. The commentator, Sudarsanasu-ri, like Ra-ma-nuja turns to theVP to characterize the essential nature of the self when unassociated withmatter, as indescribable (va-ca-m agocara) and self-knowing or self-congnizant(svasam. vedya):

By means of the phrase “the essential individuality indescribable and self-conscious” Ra-ma-nuja explains the following verse:That consciousness which does not recognize distinctions, is purebeing, and is indescribable (vacasa-m agocaram)The self is cognizant of itself (svasam. vedya), that consciousness iscalled Brahman.17

(VP 6.7.53)

This pura-n. a, according to Ra-ma-nuja, offers a distinction between thesupreme self (Brahman), the individual self (a-tman), and matter (prakr.ti) that



is not an interpretation accessible through reading sruti that has been utilizedas support. In fact, the vocabulary for Ra-ma-nuja’s definition of the essentialnature of the self as jña-nandaikagun.a, deva-dibhede’ padhvaste, vacasa-m agocara,and svasamvedya is taken from the VP.

It is worth noting that the TD elaborates on VP 6.7.53 stated above, toreach another conclusion regarding the nature of the individual self:

The VP says that the self is self-conscious (6.7.53) in order to exclude thatit is empty (tuccha);18 and that the self has this consciousness as anessential nature (svaru-pa) and as an attribute (dharma).19

The distinction between consciousness as the substrate and as an attribute ofthe individual self is rooted in the pura-n. a. The importance of the distinctionbetween consciousness as both substrate and attribute of the individual self, Iaddress in the section on the embodied nature of the self.

In conclusion, in all the instances in the VS where Ra-ma-nuja speaks of theessential nature of the individual self, he always cites evidence from the VP,not from the upanis.ads.20 To prove that the essential nature of the individualself is of the nature of consciousness and bliss he cites passages such as VP6.7.22:

This self is made up of bliss, is conscious, and pureSorrow, ignorance, and impurity are the properties of matter, not the self.21

(VP 6.7.22)

The VP alone is used as scriptural support to establish that the individual selfis different from the body, which is comprised of matter, and that the indivi-dual self in its essential nature is consciousness and bliss. Furthermore, thedistinctions in various embodiments such as gods, and men, do not representthe real nature of the individual self. Both Ra-ma-nuja and his commentatorcite VP passages 1.4.40, 6.7.24, 2.13.94, 6.7.10, 2.14.33, and 6.7.53 as prooffor these assertions.

Vis.n.u Pura-n.a on the embodied self

In addition to the use of VP to articulate the essential nature of the self,Ra-ma-nuja utilizes it again to support his assertion that the individual self hasconsciousness, both for its essential nature (svaru-pa) and as its essential attri-bute (dharma/svabha-va). This distinction has important implications for therefutation of the Advaitin discussed below, as it allows him to distinguishbetween the liberated self, the self in its essential nature and the embodiedindividual self. Here he does not quote from sruti at all, but utilizes only theVP as scriptural support.

The concept of consciousness functioning as both substrate and quality isan important aspect of Ra-ma-nuja’s thought, and is illustrated with the



metaphor of the lamp or flame. Just as “the stuff of the flame (tejas) may bespoken of as functioning both as substance and as quality … because it hasthe flame as substrate, but it also possesses illumining-power and colour asits properties” so also the “a-tman, like the lamp—strictly speaking, theflame—is the substrate of consciousness while consciousness may be likenedto light. Just as light and its substrate are the dual form of the one tejas stuff,so also consciousness and its substrate (the a-tman or knowing self) areessentially of the same stuff” (Lipner 1986: 51–52).The implication of con-sciousness that exists both as the substrate of the self and as its attribute isthat during embodiment, in sam. sa-ra, it is only the attributive consciousnessthat is affected. Consciousness as the substrate, which is the self ’s essentialnature remains unchanged.

In the VS, Ra-ma-nuja’s refutation of the Advaita doctrine of the concealmentof Brahman leads the latter to pose the following question:

However, you too (Ra-ma-nuja), must hold that the essential nature of thea-tman is discriminative consciousness (vijña-nasvaru-pa) and that it is self-luminous/self-cognizant (svayam. praka- sa). Now, when the self is wronglyidentified with the body, as gods and so on, it must be assumed that itsessential nature is obscured (tiroda-na); because if the essential nature ofan entity is known, it is not possible to wrongly attribute to it, char-acteristics that do not belong to it. Therefore, the error you (Ra-ma-nuja)pointed out applies to you also.22

Both Ra-ma-nuja and the Advaitin agree that embodiment involves conceal-ment, how it operates, and what is concealed is a different matter. When theAdvaitin refers to the essential nature of the self he means Brahman, whereasRa-ma-nuja’s reply assumes the topic of discussion to be the individual self.However, the issue here is not what is being concealed, but rather how theconcept of concealment functions. The Advaitin’s view is that the Self/Brahman’sessential nature, which is conscious and self-conscious, wrongly identifies itselfwith the body, due to concealment by adjuncts. Ra-ma-nuja replies:

Our acceptance of the following view refutes your (Advaitin’s) entireobjection—that consciousness, which is an inherent attribute (svabha-va) ofthe individual self, is really existent, and contracts (san.koca) and expands(vika-sa) due to karma. However, for you (the Advaitin) illumination (con-sciousness) is not a quality (dharma), but rather the essential nature(svaru-pa) itself, whose contraction or expansion cannot be admitted.Factors that obscure the essential nature such as karma, restrict theunimpeded spread of illumination (consciousness).23

If ignorance (avidya-) obscures, that is, if ignorance is the concealingfactor, then it destroys the illumination (consciousness) which is theessential nature itself, as stated before. However, according to us, theeternal attribute (dharma) of the self ’s essential nature (svaru-pa)



contracts. By this contraction, the identification of the self with formssuch as gods and so on, comes about; this is the difference between ourviews.24

The important distinction Ra-ma-nuja makes here is between consciousness asthe individual self ’s essential nature (substrate) and consciousness as anessential attribute. Consciousness that is an attribute (dharmabhu-tajña-na)can be obscured; it can contract and expand due to karma, which is real.When consciousness itself is the essential attribute (svaru-pa), as the Advaitinclaims, any change must lead to the destruction of the eternal nature of theself; this idea runs counter to the upanis.ad teaching of a permanent,unchanging self. Whereas the Advaitin subscribes to the concept of conceal-ment of consciousness, Ra-ma-nuja prefers the model of contraction andexpansion of attributive consciousness. In this way the essential nature of theself remains unchanged (Lacombe 1966: 184–88).

While for San.kara the Self is neither an agent nor an enjoyer of actions andany reference to such a process is strictly within the realm of the empiricalexperience or illusion (ma-ya-) for Ra-ma-nuja, the individual soul when embo-died is subject to the viccisistudes of karma, as a performer of actions and soon, but remains unaffected in its essential nature. This very real experience ofthe embodied self in the cycle of birth and rebirth occurs without the essentialnature of the self being affected but only its attributive consciousness (Lipner1986: 66–74). For scriptural support of the concept of attributive consciousness,Ra-ma-nuja turns not to sruti, but to the VP:

It has been said thatVis.n.u’s power (sakti) is said to be supreme; when it is called theks.etrajña25 it is not supreme,the third power is ignorance (avidya-) called karma26

(VP 6.7.61)

O’ King, with karma the power called the ks.etrajña is enclosed (ves.t.ita)and suffers all the torment of repeated eternal worldly existence

(VP 6.7.62)

O’ King, concealed by that (illusion) the power called ks.etrajñaexists in all beings in different degress (ta-ratamya).27

(VP 6.7.63)

According to the first passage, VP 6.7.61, Brahman/Vis.n.u has completepower over ignorance (avidya-) as it belongs to Him, in contrast to theAdvaitin, for whom ignorance conceals Brahman. Ra-ma-nuja has shown ear-lier that if concealment affects the essential nature of the self, the inevitableimplication would be that the self as it succumbs to changes in its essentialnature, is no longer the imperishable entity described in the upanis.ads. He



circumvents this issue by arguing for a differentiation between consciousnessas an attribute and consciousness as constituing the essential nature of theself. He declares ignorance in the form of karma as the obscuring factor,based on VP 6.7.72, albeit a factor that is real (pa-rama-rthika). Both of theseperspectives find direct support in the VP verses cited above. Karma isreal because it is a power of Vis.n.u, just as the individual self as a power ofVis.n.u is also real, and because the individual self is one of the three distinctrealities (the supreme Brahman, the individual self, and karma) according tothe VP.28

Ra-ma-nuja takes his proof for the concept of contraction and expansionfrom VP 6.7.63, where the embodied self is said to exist in all beings, but indifferent degrees. Though the VP mentions the concept of ta-ratamya, it doesnot mention it in association with attributive consciousness. The TD commentson this concept of gradation (ta-ratamya) of the embodied self:

with the phrase “in different degrees”, the contraction and expansion ofconsciousness is established. Indeed, it cannot be the gradation of theessential nature of the individual self, which has the size of only an atom(an.uma-tra).29 Therefore there is gradation of the individual self only bymeans of consciousness which is the property (dharmabhu-ta) of the self.That consciousness is an attribute of the self is expressed by the followingverses:in the inanimate it is minute, it is more in the sentient but immovablethings.30

(VP 6.7.64 ab)

According to the TD, the term “gradation” refers to consciousness as theattribute of the individual self rather than its essential nature. The individualself is constant in its essential nature, and it is only its attributive conscious-ness that is concealed to various extents depending on one’s karma. Theconcept of gradation of karma as the means of contraction and expansion ofattributive consciousness is an important characteristic that distinguishesRa-ma-nuja’s Veda-nta from that of his predecessors and the VP’s support onthis perspective is significant.

VP 6.7.64 ab quoted by the commentator, states that the power calledconsciousness exists in a minute degree in things without life and in anascending degree from men to gods and other semi-divine beings. In Vis.n.u,however, attributive consciousness is never impaired, as in the case of theembodied self. Although the TD only quotes VP 6.7.64 ab, it states “by thefollowing verses”, which would mean at least three other passages (i.e. VP6.7.64 to VP 6.7.67). These passages describe how the energy of Vis.n.u, calledthe individual self, is present to a small degree in insects and to a higherdegree in divine beings. In the VS then, on the topic of the individual self, theVP is invaluable as the source text for the essential and embodied natures ofthe individual self.



Brahman’s originative causality

A second exegetical instance where the VP serves more than a corroborativefunction in the VS is in support of the doctrine of Brahman’s causality. ForSan.kara, the true intention of sruti discussions on causality are meant todeny the absolute as an effect, to affirm the non-difference of the cause andeffect, to reject the universe as self-caused, and to deny the world an independentnature. Then finally, the true nature of Brahman is conveyed by denying thatBrahman can be a cause either. This method of “false attribution followed byretraction” is one of the hallmarks of San.kara’s methodology (Sarasvati 1989: 41,76) and is ultimately meant to lead the mind of the meditator beyond the realmof causality and empirical reality altogether. In marked contrast to Advaita,Brahman’s causality “is central to Ra-ma-nuja’s theology to affirm the relatednessof his God to finite being” (Lipner 1986: 82). Thus, in all his works he spendsconsiderable time detailing this relationship and the VS is no exception.

According to Ra-ma-nuja, Brahman himself is the material and efficientcause of creation, but does not himself, undergo any modification. To upholdsuch a view, Brahman’s causality is addressed in two ways, for which the VP isutilized. First, Ra-ma-nuja illustrates that cause and effect are both differentconditions (avastha-) of Brahman and that Brahman, which is eternally dif-ferentiated into individual selves and matter, is the material cause as a whole(avises.an.aka-ran.a). Creation then is not so much a coming into being ofsomething new but simply a change from a causal state (ka-ran.a-vastha-) to theeffected state (ka-rya-vastha-) of this complex whole. For support, Ra-ma-nujaturns to the Proto-Sa-m. khyan concepts of the VP. As we shall see, he is unableto comprehensively support the claim that the effect (world) is simply achange in condition of a differentiated Brahman with content from the upanis.adsalone.

Second, Ra-ma-nuja understands causality as a specific characteristic ofBrahman’s essential nature (brahmasvaru-pavises.a). If in some ways the dis-cussion of Brahman as the material cause as a whole (avises.aka-ran.a) is aboutthe mechanics of creation, the concept of causality as an aspect of Brahmanessential nature (brahmasvaru-pavises.a) argues against the non-illusory natureof the world since it is Brahman itself:

Ra-ma-nuja in particular took seriously the many scriptural images andutterances which seemed naturally to imply that finite being emerges fromor issues out of Brahman, its permanent ground or substratum and thefund into which it is reabsorbed in dissolution. Philosophically-theologically,this meant that the ‘creational gap’, i.e., the ontological chasm betweeninfinite and finite being, represented by the ex-nihilo of the creatio doc-trine was eschewed, and that instead an existential ‘umbilical cord’, i.e., acontinuous existential relation between the originative cause (Brahman)and the finite order was posited.

(Lipner 1986: 83)



Both concepts of avises.an.aka-ran.a and brahmasvaru-pavises.a allow Ra-ma-nujato posit such a “continuous existential relation” between Brahman and theworld. At the same time, he is able to refute many of the objections that resultfrom upholding the eternal, unchanging Brahman as both the creator and thecreated. These two concepts are uniquely Visis.t.a-dvaitic, and Ra-ma-nuja findssupport in the VP. We begin with the discussion of Brahman as the materialcause as a whole (avises.an.aka-ran.a) and then address causality as an aspect ofBrahman’s essential nature (brahmasvaru-pavises.a).

Brahman as the material cause as a whole (avises.an.aka-ran.a)

Van Buitenen (1956: 39) describes Ra-ma-nuja’s apparent disinterest in themechanics of world evolution as follows: “Ra-ma-nuja’s and indeed Veda-nta’smain concern is with ontology: only when the ontological relation betweenthe supreme cause and the phenomenal effect has been established cosmologyand cosmogony can proceed.” In the case of Ra-ma-nuja, the cosmologicaldetails of the continuous existential link between Brahman and the world, isvital to his overall ontology. Although the fundamental paradigm of Ra-ma-nuja’stheology is the soul–body relationship, still scriptural support is needed toexplain the specifics of creative evolution within the framework of Visi-s.t.a-dvaita. Thus “cosmology and cosmogony” are very much relevant and therole of the VP in this matter is significant.

San.kara, Bha-skara, Ya-davapraka-sa, and Ra-ma-nuja all subscribe to thetheory of causality called satka-ryava-da, which states that the effect itself ispresent in the cause. But, exactly how this immanent causality manifests asthe effect and the relation of this effect to the cause is a point of contention.Ra-ma-nuja needs to show that Brahman eternally constituted of matter andindividual selves is the cause as a whole (avises.an.aka-ran.a). Furthermore, hemust provide scriptural support that Brahman is eternally differentiated intomatter and individual selves, that these are inseparable from him, and that itis only these modes as the body of Brahman that undergo transformation.Only then can the claim that the causal state (ka-ran.a-vastha-) transforms intothe effected state (ka-rya-vastha-) is intelligible. Though in the upanis.ads thatRa-ma-nuja utilizes there may be evidence of Brahman differentiated intomatter and selves, they lack a coherent framework to articulate ka-ran.a-vastha-

and ka-rya-vastha- as fundamental to the conception of Brahman as the causeas a whole (avises.an.aka-ran.a). First we examine the sruti passages provided assupport for the conception of Brahman as the material cause as a wholecomparing their contribution to evidence from the Bhagavadgı-ta- and theVis.n.u Pura-n.a.

Sruti support

In the siddha-nta section of the VS,31 Ra-ma-nuja summarizes his positionregarding Brahman and creation:



What has been said so far is that in the phrase ‘Brahman alone exists thus’(brahmaivam avasthitam), the reality which is the phenomenal world com-posed of myriad sentient and insentient entities in their subtle (sthu-la) andgross (su-ks.ma) state is a mode (praka-ra) denoted by words such as ‘thus’.32

Contrary to Advaita, where God (I-svara) is the cause (ka-ran.a) and effect(ka-rya) only provisionally, from the level of empirical truth, for Ra-ma-nuja,ultimate reality itself is Brahman comprised of selves and matter as hismodes. This whole complex of Brahman and his modes is denoted here by theterm “thus”; it is a single entity and is in line with Ra-ma-nuja’s assertion thatBrahman is eternally differentiated. He goes on to say that it is only fromsuch an understanding that even sruti such as may I become many, may Igrow forth (Ch Up 6.2.3) are meaningful.33 Ra-ma-nuja elaborates further onwhat he understands to be Brahman as the material cause as a whole:

Therefore, Brahman himself is also all effects, since he has the genericstructure of being modified by all things—prakr.ti, purus.a, mahat, aham. -ka-ra, tanma-tra, elements, and the senses, the egg of Brahma- consisting offourteen worlds that derive from the above entities and the gods, men,demons, plants etc. that live within the universe. So by knowing solelythat Brahman is the reason we know all. In this manner it is establishedvery well that knowledge of all can be had from knowledge of the one(Ch Up 6.1). At the same time it is stated on the strength of the causalrelation etc established hereby, that the sum-total of sentient and insentiententities is ensouled by the supreme Brahman in as much as it modifies him.34

Brahman comprised of purus.a and prakr.ti is the cause as a whole and isidentical to Brahman as the effect comprised of matter and selves. Ra-ma-nujanotes that “the sum-total of sentient and insentient entities” are “ensouled byBrahman (tada-tmaka).” It is in this sense that Ra-ma-nuja understands identity(ta-da-tmya) between cause and effect, which is in marked contrast to that ofthe Advaitin. San. kara takes ta-da-tmya as essential identity in a substantialsense. (Lacombe 1966: 51–52). To support the claim that Brahman is thematerial cause as a whole, first matter (prakr.ti) and individual selves (purus.a)must be established as eternal. Second, Brahman must be eternally differentiatedinto matter and individual selves. Third, such a Brahman must be a cause as awhole. Ra-ma-nuja utilizes sruti, BhG and the VP to support these claims.

To support purus.a and prakr.ti as eternal entities he turns to Svet Up 4.5and 4.9–10:

with the one uncreated (matter) that has form and that produces variouseffects of various kinds, one uncreated (soul) joins itself to enjoy it,whereas another uncreated (soul) goes free from it when it has ceased toenjoy it.35

(Svet Up 4.5)



One of the major precoccupations of this upanis.ad is “to establish that theGod who creates and from whom one expects salvation is one” (Olivelle 1998:413). It begins by stating that creation proceeds from Brahman and then dis-solves into him: in whom the universe comes together at the beginning anddissolves in the end (4.1). Svet Up 4.5 according to Ra-ma-nuja confirms thatmatter, embodied selves and liberated selves are all eternal. It is the embodiedsoul in association with matter that is the enjoyer of karma and it is the latterthat undergoes transformation. Sveta- svatara Upanis.ad 4.9–10 that Ra-ma-nujasubsequently cites, affirms further that it is matter (prakr.ti), by its essentialnature, which is the substratum of transformation:

from that the illusionist creates this whole world and in it the otherremains confined by the illusory power (ma-ya-)

(Svet Up 4.9)

one should recognize the illusory power (ma-ya-) as primal matter(prakr.ti), and the illusionist, as the great Lord.36

(Svet Up 4.10)

These passages clarify the eternal relationship between Brahman, matter, andindividual selves; Brahman as the controller of matter, which is his ma-ya- thatconfines individual selves. However, there is no mention of the exact rela-tionship of these as eternal modes of Brahman. More clarification is neededto articulate Brahman as the material cause as a whole. Also problematicis the use of the term ma-ya- to denote prakr.ti, which can color any discussionof the world as an illusion. As San.kara notes in Br Su- 1.4.3, matter which theupanis.ads define as ma-ya- is the power of I

-svara, illusion which cannot be

defined as either real or unreal. These verses do not supply the detail neededto affirm Brahman’s causality in the way that Ra-ma-nuja envisions it—in termsof an identity between the cause which is eternally differentiated and theeffected state of Brahman. Moreover, the use of the term ma-ya- in this upa-nis.ad to denote prakrti requires additional clarification so as to reject rivalinterpretations such as that of Advaita. In fact, in both Chapters 3 and 4,these upanis.ad verses are interpreted using the VP. These passages suggestthat Brahman is the cause, since it is matter (prakr.ti) that is modified in itsessential nature and not Brahman. In other words, these sr.uti passages cannotbe adequately interpreted to claim Brahman as the cause as a whole andBrahman as the effect as a whole and that the manifest world, is real.

Bhagavadgı-ta- support

Subsequent to quoting sruti and prior to turning to the VP, Ra-ma-nuja alsocites the BhG to support the view that matter (prakr.ti) and individual selves(purus.a) are both eternal and that they comprise Brahman who is the materialcause as a whole. In order to ascertain the importance of the VP, it is



necessary to evaluate the BhG’s contribution in comparison to this pura-n. a.As we have seen in the discussion of the Svet Up passages, in the previoussection, one of the initial moves in establishing Brahman as eternally differ-entiated is to establish these two entites as eternal and this is what the SvetUp and BhG accomplish. Ra-ma-nuja utilizes five BhG passages, but in factthe commentary on three of these verses in his Bhagavadgı-a-bha-s.ya relies onthe VP. That is, these BhG passages themselves cannot be interpreted adequatelyas Visis.t.a-dvaitic without the aid of the VP:

Be sure that matter (prakr.ti) as well as individual self (purus.a) are bothwithout beginningand the transmutations and gun.as alike are the products of prakr.ti.

(BhG 13.19)

Earth, water, fire, wind, ether, manas, buddhi, and aham. ka-ra are the eightcomponents of my nature (prakrti).

(BhG 7.4)

Know, however, that I have still another nature (prakr.ti) which is of ahigher order than the former,a nature (prakr.ti) that is constituted by embodied souls, on which thismaterial world is dependent O’ Arjuna.37

(BhG 7.5)

Ra-ma-nuja in his commentary on BhG 13.19 states that only matter and theindividual selves that are distinct entities associate with each other due tokarma. Though he does not at this juncture state these two as the modes ofKr.s.n. a, he assumes that the reader is interpreting this BhG verse in light ofthis soul–body paradigm. This is due to the fact that in his commentaryon13.4 he utilizes VP (2.13.69–71, 2.13.89, 2.13.102–3) to establish thatmatter and individual selves comprise the body of Brahman who is their innerself. This is also the case with BhG 7.4–7.6, where VP 1.2.24 and VP 6.4.38–39are utilized to the same effect. The significance of these VP passages forRa-ma-nuja’s interpretation of BhG verses is discussed in Chapter 4 and is notaddressed here in detail. However, we may note that it does support thetheory that the VP provides certain details not to be found elsewhere and thatto even read certain BhG passages requires the pura-n. a, for Ra-ma-nuja. In thisparticular context of the VS, these BhG passages (13.19, 7.4–5), reiterate theSvet Up claim that matter, liberated selves, and embodied selves are eternaland constitute Kr.s.n. a’s very nature (prakr.ti). Ra-ma-nuja concludes with twomore passages from Chapter 9 of the BhG:

taking my material from my own nature (prakr.ti) I create again andagain.

(BhG 9.8cd)



and under my guidance the matter (prakr.ti) with its animate and inanimatebeings is brought forth.38

(BhG 9.10)

BhG 9.8cd and BhG 9.10 also support matter and individual selves as eternalin Brahman who has complete control over them. In summary, thoughRa-ma-nuja cites the BhG here, some of the passages themselves require the VPto be interpreted according to Visis.t.a-dvaita. In regard to BhG 9.8 cd and9.10, these passages do contribute to the concept of Brahman’s lordship overthe eternal matter (prakr.ti) and individual selves (purus.a) but are still inade-quate to support the concept of Brahman as the material cause as a whole. Aswe see in Chapter 4, the VP is crucial in establishing Kr.s.n.a as the eternallyqualified cause who transforms into the world.

Vis.n.u Pura-n.a support

The VP cited here as corroboration along with the BhG, provides details onthe relationship not found in the previous sruti and BhG passages. Ra-ma-nujastates the following prior to citing from this pura-n. a:

Thus, matter (prakr.ti) also constitutes the body of I-svara (Vis.n.u). Theterm prakr.ti denotes I

-svara, who is the inner self of prakr.ti and has it as amode. The term individual self (purus.a) also denotes I-svara, who is the selfof purus.a and has it as a mode. Therefore, I-svara is the inner self of themodifications of prakr.ti as well as purus.a. Regarding this it is said—Vis.n.uis the manifested and unmanifested creation, purus.a, and time (VP 1.2.18),He the supreme lord is the agitator and that which is agitated (VP 1.2.31).39

According to Ra-ma-nuja, the VP supports matter and individual selves aseternal, but also that they are related to Brahman as His modes. Some of thedetails that were not supported by sruti passages but are evident in the VPverses are: a) Vis.n.u is prakr.ti, purus.a, and time, and thus all entities are eter-nal; b) matter is what modifies upon creation but since it is identified withVis.n.u, its independent causality is refuted; c) although the VP passages thathave been stated do not suggest a soul–body relationship, this is implied fromthe fact that Brahman is both agitator and the agitated. The complete contextof the verses that Ra-ma-nuja has only partially stated, support all these detailsand the soul–body relationship:

Vis.n.u being the manifested and unmanifested creation, purus.a, and time,sports like a playful boy, as you shall learn by listening to his frolics.

(VP 1.2.18)

Purus.ottama is both the agitator and the thing agitated;Being present in matter both when it is contracted and expanded.40

(VP 1.2.31)



The fact that Vis.n.u is present in matter both when it is contracted and expandedsuggests for Ra-ma-nuja, that He is the inner self of matter that is eternal.Hence, Ra-ma-nuja’s previous comment about modes is justified. It also con-firms the individual self as distinct from Brahman and disputes matter as anindependent cause.

Ra-ma-nuja concludes his discussion of Brahman’s causality with a descriptionof creation and dissolution for which he again turns to the VP:

Thus Brahman, when his body (sarı-ra) is constituted by matter (prakr.ti)and individual selves (purus.a) in their subtle form, not distinguishable bydifferences of name and form, is the causal state (ka-ran.a-vastha-). Thepassing of the world to this phase of existence is termed ‘dissolution’.Brahman having, as its body, the individual selves and nature, in theirgross manifested condition distinguished by differentiation of name andform is in the state of effect (ka-rya-vastha-). Brahman’s assuming this modeof manifestation and grossness is described as creation. As Bhagava-nPara-sara says—He is the cause of effects, the unborn prakr.ti and purus.a.41

(VP 1.9.37)

The context of VP 1.9 is the narrative of the churning of the ocean and thispassage is taken from Brahma-’s eulogy to Vis.n.u as the causeless cause. ForRa-ma-nuja, this narrative presents creation not as a new entity coming intobeing, but as simply a different state of the causal Brahman. These two stagesof creation/dissolution are the same since the changes taking place in themodes do not affect the complex as a whole (due to the soul–body relation).Ra-ma-nuja sums up his argument by quoting from VP 1.9.37, which reiteratesthe eternal nature of a differentiated Brahman into matter, and individualselves. Whereas most sruti passages need to be read assuming a differentiationof the causal Brahman into individual selves and matter, that is not the casehere, with the VP.

Causality as an aspect of the essential nature of Brahman(brahmsvaru-pavises.a)

In the previous section, the VP is crucial in establishing an eternally differ-entiated Brahman that remains the same as far as its essential nature isconcerned even through the creative process. The causal state (ka-ran.a--vastha-) of Brahman, which is an eternally differentiated whole, undergoes achange in its modes into what is called the effected state (ka-rya-vastha-) ofBrahman. In addition to Brahman as the material cause as a whole (avises.a-n.aka-ran.a), another way in which Ra-ma-nuja affirms the reality of the worldis to define causality as a characteristic of Brahman’s essential nature(brahmasvaru-pavises.a).42

Though other Veda-ntins affirm the causality of Brahman, none character-ize it as a quality of the essential nature of Brahman (brahmasvaru-pavises.a).43



Three constituents characterize Ra-ma-nuja’s definition of brahmasvar-u-pavises.a: a) Brahman as the cause; b) Brahman as inseparable from theworld; c) Brahman as the Lord over His creation from which he is completelydistinct and transcendent. While sruti affirms Brahman as the cause, hiscreative activity is not discussed as a characteristic of his essential nature(svaru-pavises.a) in the three-fold sense stated above.

Prior to utilizing the VP, Ra-ma-nuja also quotes MBh passages, 12.182.1,12.182.12, 12.7074.44 Here, Na-ra-yan.a as the inner self of the world is declaredas jaganmu-rti, one who has the world as His body. While it does underscorethe soul–body aspect of Brahman’s causality, the MBh does not compare tothe VP in terms of the detail it offers, and serves instead to foreshadow thecontent of the pura-n. a. Moreover, the TD scarcely discusses these passages,noting only that the MBh is also a sa-ttvic45 text and therefore authoritative.46

This scant attention to MBh passages by the commentator, as compared tothe VP passages, and also the sheer number of passages from the latter citedby Ra-ma-nuja, suggests that the pura-n. a is the main scripture for Ra-ma-nuja onmatters of causality.

What does Ra-ma-nuja gain by positing such a nature for Brahman? Theconcept of causality as brahmasvaru-pavises.a allows him to affirm the positivenature of reality in contrast to the Advaitin, for whom empirical reality is anillusion. Furthermore, the causality of Brahman seen as an aspect of hisessential nature (brahmasvaru-pavises.a) is much different from Bha-skara’s Bhe-da-bheda Veda-nta of the created world as essentially limited or conditioned(aupa-dhika). Ra-ma-nuja uses the VP, to delineate this three-fold character of theessential nature of Brahman: Brahman as the cause, Brahman as inseparablefrom the world, and Brahman’s lordship over creation. Though sruti passagescan be interpreted to yield all these three characteristics of Brahman sepa-rately, there are no sruti texts utilized by Ra-ma-nuja that affirm the three-foldcombination of characteristics, that is, causality as brahmasvaru-pavises.a as heunderstands it.

Throughout the discussion of the VP in this section, Ra-ma-nuja uses theterm brahma svaru-pavises.a in his exegesis of the VP passages. To begin with,he states that passages such as VP 1.1.31, to be discussed subsequently, havethe sole purpose of expounding an aspect of the essential nature of Brahman(brahmasvaru-pavises.a).47 Several passages later, when he compares the VP tothe Na-ra-yan.a Anuva-ka of the Taittirı-ya A

-ran.yaka, he twice declares that the

VP’s sole aim is the determination of this specific nature of Brahman alone.48

Having established the VP’s authority as a valid means of knowledge ofBrahman, Ra-ma-nuja cites twenty-five VP passages to support his view ofcausality as brahmasvaru-pavises.a. I will not analyze all of these VP citationswhich address causality as a svaru-pavises.a of Brahman, but only highlight thecontent of some of the significant passages.

Ra-ma-nuja’s first citations from the VP establish the relevance and authorityof the VP by noting that this pura-n. a shares the same goals as the upanis.adsand the Brahma Su-tras in the kinds of questions it seeks to answer:



Every wise man of the East, North, South, and West relies on the VP inthe determination of each and every duty (dharma) and in each and everyultimate reality (tattva); for that reason I have embraced this very textwithout reservation. We learn from the su-tra: from whom birth etc. of thisproceed (Br Su- 1.1.2) that the cause of the birth etc. of the world isBrahman. Now, the VP in answer to the question: what has caused theworld to be born etc. (VP 1.1.4–5), says: it has originated from Vis.n.u (VP1.1.31). Everyone agrees that this answer has only one purpose, namely,to establish an aspect of the essential nature of Brahman (brahmasvar-u-pavises.a) … even as in all srutis the Na-ra-yan.a section serves only toset forth a certain aspect of the Supreme Brahman’s essential nature(brahmasvaru-pavises.a), so does the VP.49

The fact that the discussion of Brahman’s causality as his svaru-pavises.a beginswith a eulogization of the authority of the VP suggests that the VP’s con-tribution is significant and that Ra-ma-nuja’s use of this smr.ti text might beobjected to by other Veda-ntins. Ra-ma-nuja affirms the VP’s authority in severalways: first, he invokes its pan-Hindu popularity as a scripture of importanceregarding matters of duty (dharma) and ultimate reality (tattva). Second, inregard to the issue of Brahman’s causality, he compares the authority of theVP to that of the Brahma Su-tras, the summary text of Veda-nta philosophy,and to the Na-ra-yan.a Anuva-ka, a section of the Taittirı-ya A

-ran.yaka. Having

validated the VP as an authority on the issue of Brahman’s causality as hedefines it, Ra-ma-nuja provides specific verses that qualify it as a source ofVeda-nta.The first VP passage, all this has originated from Vis.n.u (VP 1.1.31), identi-

fies Brahman as the supreme cause. He then quotes two passages to clarifythe origin of the world from Vis.n.u. With these verses Ra-ma-nuja and thecommentator introduce the concept of an eternally differentiated Brahman:

Both that which I (Para- sara) have called matter (prakr.ti) with a manifestand unmanifest nature,and individual self (purus.a) dissolve in the Supreme Self.

(VP 6.4.39)

The Supreme Self is the highest lord, the substratum of everything.He is praised in the Vedas and upanis.ads50 as Vis.n.u.51

(VP 6.4.40)

The context of VP 6.4 is the description of the different types of world dis-solution. This chapter describes the regression of the material world intoVis.n.u and speaks of matter and the individual self as portions of Vis.n.u. Tocounter the view that Brahman or a part of Brahman is modified in thisprocess, the TD interprets the term substratum in VP 6.4.40 as suggestive ofthe soul–body relationship, “He is the substratum indicates the soul–body



relationship.”52 Note also that matter in its two forms as both manifest andunmanifest is congruent with the theory that it is matter alone that undergoeschange. Additionally, the identity of the supreme self as the deity Vis.n.u is alsoestablished.

Subsequently, two VP passages from the beginning of the pura-n. a arestated. In this section of VP 1.1., Maitreya requests Para-sara for instructionon the nature of the world. The specificity of Maitreya’s questions in VP1.1.4–5 is exactly what Ra-ma-nuja needs as an entry point to the details of thecosmology needed to establish the concept of brahmasvaru-pavises.a:53

I wish to hear from you, O’ righteous one,the way the world was and how it will be again

(VP 1.1.4)

O’ Brahmin, what is the stuff the world is made of? Where do these animateand inanimate beings come from?How and into what is it brought to dissolution and into what does itdissolve?54

(VP 1.1.5)

For Ra-ma-nuja these are very specific questions about the causal state and theeffected state of Brahman, particularly the relation of matter (prakr.ti) and theindividual self (purus.a) to Brahman. Though the context is the dissolution ofthe world, this scenario holds equally true for world origination as well. Thecommentary indicates that the answer to these questions points to specifictypes of causal theories:

Because people who have studied Veda-nta ask the question how creationrelates to Brahman, with the word ‘how’ the VP introduces a question in orderto teach the ways of dissolution such as emptiness, illusion, modification,direct cause, or indirect cause etc.55

These passages (VP 1.1.4–5) do not simply qualify as questions on whetherBrahman is the cause of the world; they question how Brahman is the causeof the world. The VP then is said to provide the answers to these importantqueries. As the commentary states Brahman can be the material cause indifferent ways. Creation can be a modification of Brahman, a direct cause ofBrahman or an indirect cause of Brahman etc. Multiple Veda-nta theories ofcausality are referenced here. Both Ra-ma-nuja and the commentator utilizethese VP passages for a specific purpose, namely, to express the exact natureof Brahman’s involvement in the creative process and in effect distinguishVisis.t.a-dvaita from other types of Veda-nta.

According to Ra-ma-nuja, the next eleven VP passages he utilizes answer thequestion what is Brahman,56 but the context is still causality as a uniqueaspect of the essential nature of Brahman. Earlier, Ra-ma-nuja quotes only a



part of VP 1.1.31 to validate the authority of the VP, whereas now he cites thecomplete verse:

This world was produced from Vis.n.u Himself (saka-sa-t) and it exists in Him.He is the cause of its preservation and dissolution.He is the world.57

(VP 1.1.31)

This passage describes Vis.n.u’s function as the material and efficient cause ofthe universe. The fact that Vis.n.u is the world could suggest identity in essen-tial nature between the two. However, one of the interpretations that the TDoffers for saka- sa-t is that the world evolves out of a part of Brahman:

saka-sa means pa-rsva, ‘side’, ‘flank’, ‘ribs’, so that vis.n.oh. saka-sa-t means‘from a part of the body of Vis.n.u’.58

Once again, the commentator tries to limit the effects of modification, a con-seqeunce of being the material cause, to only a part or portion of Brahman, butthis still subjects Brahman to change and impermanence. To define “part”within the soul–body paradigm, the commentator goes back to the contextof this passage (1.1.31) in the VP. According to him, the word “Vis.n.u” in“this world was produced from Vis.n.u himself” (VP 1.1.31) denotes Vis.n.u withhis constituent parts, matter (prakr.ti) and individual selves (purus.a), whichare modes of Brahman. To establish the Lordship and transcendence ofBrahman over his creation, the commentary claims that because of the soul–body paradigm, Brahman’s engagement can be understood as indirect, yetinseparable:

The question of the place of dissolution expressed by the phrase, into whatin 1.1.5, is answered with there. The world exists in Him alone means inVis.n.u alone. Here, too, it is understood that the place of dissolution isindirect (sadva-raka).59

Thus, Brahman as an eternally differentiated entity possesses matter and indi-vidual souls as his modes. Even in the state of dissolution, when the world isreabsorbed into Brahman, they abide in him and are distinct, yet inseparable,and so Brahman is the indirect (sadva-raka) cause. The three-fold definition ofbrahmasvaru-pavises.a—Brahman as the cause, Brahman as inseparable fromthe world, and Brahman as the transcendent Lord distinct from the world, issupported by the VP according to Ra-ma-nuja and his commentator.

Having established Brahman who is eternally differentiated as the cause,the next VP passages are used to declare Brahman’s transcendent nature andHis absolute difference from all entities. This emphasizes the third componentof the brahmasvaru-pavises.a paradigm. The transcendent nature of Brahman istwo-fold—he is the cause of the world and yet he is completely different from



everything and every being. This dual affirmation of the transcendent natureof Brahman is the main contribution of VP 1.2.10–14 discussed below:

He is the highest of the high, he is the supreme almighty, he resides inthe individual selfand is without characteristics such as form and color etc.60

(VP 1.2.10)

The context of VP 1.2 is world evolution. In this chapter, it is declared thatmatter in its manifest and unmanifest forms, individual selves, and time,denote the supreme condition of Vis.n.u. As the self of all, He enters intomatter and spirit to promote creation. The fact that the supreme condition ofVis.n.u is comprised of the matter and individual selves is contrary to Bha-skaraand Ya-davapraka-sa’s view. The VP also discusses the evolution of matterfrom Vis.n.u, while affirming his transcendence over it.Utilizing the VP, Ra-ma-nuja maintains the continuity of being, but at the

same time rejects Brahman’s conditioning by the changes in his modes. Here,I shall only list some of the VP passages cited that declare such a transcendentnature of Brahman and his Lordship over creation:

He is free from decay, destruction, birth, change; He alone always exists.(VP 1.2.11)

Since he resides everywhere the wise call him Va-sudeva.(VP 1.2.12)

He is Brahman, supreme, eternal, unborn, without decay, imperishable,ever of the same essential nature, and because he has not faults, isstainless.

(VP 1.2.13)

All this is nothing but him. His own essential nature (svaru-pa) encompasseswhat is manifest and what is unmanifest,and he exists in the form of (individual selves) purus.a and in the formof time.61

(VP 1.2.14)

The three-fold definition of causality as brahmasvaru-pavises.a is constantlyaffirmed in these VP passages. Brahman is transcendent, yet resides every-where and since nothing exists apart from him, he is the cause of the world(1.2.11). VP 1.2.13 characterizes Brahman as entirely different, even as matterand individual selves constitute his essential nature (svaru-pa) (VP 1.2.14).

The discussion of causality as an aspect of Brahman’s essential naturecontinues with the next five VP passages (6.5.83–87). VP 6.5 begins witha discussion of the evils of the worldly existence and the different types of



hells. The last section which utilizes VP 6.5.83–87 is a discussion of themeaning of the term bhagavat which is a synonym for Vis.n.u in Srı-vais.n. avism.This section of the VP effectively identifies bhagava-n as Va-sudeva, who is thesupreme Brahman. Once again, I shall only address some of these utilizedpassages:

O’ Lord, He is beyond matter (prakr.ti) of all beings, beyond mutations,and beyond the faults of gun.as etc.He is beyond all concealment; He is the self of everything; everythingbetween heaven and earth is encompassed by Him.62

(VP 6.5.83)

He consists of all auspicious qualities; with a tiny portion of his power(sakti) He holds up the world.63

At his own discretion, if he so desires, he takes on a large body, accom-plishing the welfare of the entire world.

(VP 6.5.84)

Even as Brahman encompasses the world, he is unaffected due to the soul–body relationship, and so he is the essence of all auspicious qualities. This isthe participative-partitive theology that is the hallmark of Ra-ma-nuja’s theo-logical method (Lipner 1986: 83–86). The important concept of incarnation isalso articulated in 6.5.84 suggesting that His interest in the welfare of a worldthat is illusory negates the importance of the concept of incarnation. Brah-man’s direct activity in his creation via his descents (avata-ra) is said to be forthe benefit of a world that is real. The bodies that Vis.n.u assumes during hisincarnations are different from the vigraha, his divine form, which is discussedin the next section. The VP, then, allows for a reading that underscores salientVisis.t.a-dvaita principles more so than sruti.

The concept of the dual-character, ubhayalin.gatva, which is characteristicof Ra-ma-nuja’s definition of Brahman in these passages, asserts his auspiciousqualities and at the same time denies any faults due to prakr.ti:

He is I-svara, encompassing individual and aggregate existence, encompassingmanifest and unmanifest existence,lord (I-svara) of all, all pervasive, all knowing, and he is called parama-tman.64

(VP 6.5.86)

Through which this pure, stainless, transcendent, faultless, indivisible,sole realityis known that is true knowledge, all that is contrary to this is ignorance.

(VP 6.5.87)65

This is the explanation for the determination of the essential characteristicsof the Supreme Brahman (brahmasvaru-pavises.a).66



These VP passages chosen by Ra-ma-nuja, to confirm causality as an aspect ofBrahman’s essential nature are a strong refutation of the defnitions of causalityheld by other schools of Veda-nta. He concludes with the following passages tosum up his argument that causality is indeed an aspect of Brahman’s essentialnature (svaru-pavises.a):

Because the imperishable one is the immanent soul of all beings and isembodied by all, therefore creation etc localized in these beings are ultimatelyuseful to Him alone.

(VP 1.2.69)

So Vis.n.u, most excellent, beneficient and benevolent, is embodied by all,in the various modes of Brahma- etc., in which he is creating and created,protecting, consuming, and protected.67

(VP 1.2.70)

The mention of the world as an embodiment of Vis.n.u agrees with Ra-ma-nuja’ssoul–body paradigm. As the imperishable one, He is also the creator andcreated, the protector and protected. In other words, the world is Brahman.Passages 1.2.68–70 affirm the three-fold definition of causality as an aspect ofBrahman’s essential nature. They offer support for Brahman as the cause ofthe world that is inseparable from Him, and yet his complete transcendenceover it. Ra-ma-nuja elaborates:

because the imperishable One is the immanent soul of all beings andembodied by all, i.e. because the imperishable One is this by all embodiedimmanent soul of all beings. Later on the text will declare that all this isin truth Hari’s body (VP 1.22.36). In other words, there is no contra-diction in that Vis.n.u, the supreme Brahman is imperishable and yetensouls the world in so far as all constitute his body: for this defines therespective natures of body and soul from each other.68

The VP is the formative text for Ra-ma-nuja to organize and refine the detailsof his ontology. Brahman possesses an imperishable nature as he is the soul ofall things and even in the causal state, Brahman is the soul of all things.

Ra-ma-nuja’s view of the causality of Brahman as an aspect of his essentialnature (brahmasvaru-pavises.a), supported by the VP, illustrates creation as apositive cosmological development. The fact that both matter (prakr.ti) andindividual selves (purus.a) are eternal in order for Brahman to be the cause, asRa-ma-nuja understands it, is discussed in the section on Brahman as the causeas a whole. If prakr.ti, purus.a, and Brahman are all eternal, and the formertwo constitute His body, then the world which is the effect is not somethingthat originates anew, but is simply a change in condition (avastha-). Ra-ma-nujaweaves together a list of VP passages that illustrate the cosmology that cansupport his ontology. The evidence on the details of the causal state of



Brahman (with all its components), and the details of the effected state, alongwith the unchanging substantive self of Brahman, are the VP’s most significantcontributions, according to Ra-ma-nuja.

The divine body of Brahman

In the VS, following the refutation of the Pra-bha-kara-view of scripture, is adetailed account of the transcendent form of Vis.n.u (divyaru-pa) and his abode(divyastha-na). Ra-ma-nuja’s argument is in two parts, each of which beginswith summary descriptions of Brahman followed by scriptural support, fromboth sruti and smrti. Upanis.ads such as the Suba-la Upanis.ad and the Maha--na-ra-yan.a Upanis.ad identify Brahman as Vis.n.u, but they do not support atranscendent divine form, as Ra-ma-nuja envisions it here. While he may findupanis.adic evidence to support Brahman’s many metaphysical qualities suchas knowledge, bliss, and so on, the definition of Brahman as the four- oreight-armed Vis.n.u, the form he affirms for Brahman in the VS, is not foundin these sruti. The VP is the key text that supports Ra-ma-nuja’s conceptions ofthe divine form. Furthermore, though BhG 11 describes Vis.n.u/Kr.s.n. a’s uni-versal form (visvaru-pa), this fiercesome cosmic form is not the form Ra-ma-nujahas in mind.

Among Ra-ma-nuja’s predecessors there were some Veda-ntins who did notaccept the doctrine of the transcendent form of Brahman (Carman 1974:167). Thus Ra-ma-nuja, in affirming a divine form for Brahman, challenges hisrivals with this unique feature of his Veda-nta. To facilitate the identificationof Brahman’s form as that of the deity Vis.n.u, Ra-ma-nuja differentiatesbetween two concepts, the essential nature (svaru-pa) and the divine form(divyaru-pa). Distinct from Brahman’s essential nature, Ra-ma-nuja affirms adivine form which is “unique to him, anthropomorphic and male in appear-ance, having physical properties, yet constituted of a special substance whichis neither matter (prakr.ti) nor the result of karma and the focus of the hea-venly abode” (Lipner 1986: 94). Whereas the divine form is “a body of somesort, owning a physical disposition of parts, localisable and localized” theessential nature is defined “by the five characteristics [reality, knowledge, bliss,purity, and infinitude] … not localisable in the manner of the supernal form”(Lipner 1986: 95).

Although Ra-ma-nuja’s use of svaru-pa is flexible enough to allow thedescription of Brahman from different perspectives, “there is a strict use ofsvaru-pa … at least in the sense of Brahman’s quiddity or essential nature, i.e.Brahman per se or in himself, in his innermost core” and this definition ofBrahman’s svaru-pa is from Taittirı-ya Upanis.ad 2.1.1, Brahman is reality,consciousness, and bliss (Lipner 1986: 80). Though these three qualities formthe “core” of Brahman’s svaru-pa, elsewhere, Ra-ma-nuja expands these threecharacteristics to five defining attributes, reality (satya), consciousness (jña-na),bliss (a-nanda), infinity (anantatva), and purity (amalatva), and this he believedto be the upanis.adic definition of the supreme self (Carman 1974: 93). This



understanding, however, is much different from what he calls the divine formcharacterized by ornaments, weapons, and so on. Thus for Ra-ma-nuja, Brahman’ssvaru-pa is defined in metaphysical terms such as brilliance, knowledge, blissand so on, but the divyaru-pa is akin to the images of Vis.n.u possessing a(somewhat) anthropomorphic form.

In the VS, VP 6.7 is the only text Ra-ma-nuja depends on to articulate thisspecific form for Brahman. In his rather long discussion of Brahman’s divineform, Ra-ma-nuja attempts to reconcile this distinction between svaru-pa anddivyaru-pa. After a brief overview of the structure of Ra-ma-nuja’s argument,the following sections address the exegetical use of the VP in establishing adivine form for Brahman.

Structure of Ra-ma-nuja’s argument

As mentioned earlier, Ra-ma-nuja’s argument is divided into two subsections,each of which begins with a summary description of Brahman followedby scriptural support from both sruti and smr.ti. In the two descriptions ofBrahman, Ra-ma-nuja seamlessly alternates between defining Brahman interms of essential nature (svaru-pa) and divine form (divyaru-pa). The purposeof the two sections to establish a divine form of Brahman is an exegeticalmanoeuver to reconcile the upanis.adic descriptions of Brahman’s svaru-pawith the divyaru-pa depictions from popular religion, prevalent in the textssuch as the pura-n. as. As a member of the Srı-vais.n. ava religious communitysuch pura-n. ic depictions of the deity were very important for devotion andworship. Though Ra-ma-nuja views the svaru-pa and divyaru-pa of Brahman as“twin manifestations” of the divine being that are inseparable, the fact that adivyaru-pa was not accorded to Brahman by previous Veda-ntins makes a studyof the distinction and relation between svaru-pa and divyaru-pa all the moreimportant (Sydnor 2008: 19). The structure of Ra-ma-nuja’s two descriptions ofBrahman’s form, then, reflects his attempts to introduce a divine form forBrahman into the Veda-nta tradition.

Whereas, the first description of Brahman is followed by scriptural supportfrom both sruti and smr.ti, the second description of Brahman is followed bysupport from sruti only. However, this second description itself is influencedby VP 6.7. Overall, though it seems that Ra-ma-nuja adheres to the traditionalexegetical method of citing sruti first and then using smr.ti corroboratively, hisdependence on the VP is considerable.

In regard to the two descriptions of Brahman, the second description isthe ‘locus classicus’ of the experience (anubhava) of the divine form (Lipnez1986: 94). This characterization of the body of God is a limb-by-limb enjoy-ment of the deity, a head-to-toe description based on VP 6.7.79-83 (Hopkins2002: 146–156).

The context of VP 6.7 is a discussion on yoga between the brothers Kha-n.d. ikhyaand Kesidhvaja. In Chapter 7, beginning with verse 6.7.46 the conversation



turns to the auspicious object (subha- sraya) of meditation. According toRa-ma-nuja, this section espouses meditation on the divine form of Vis.n.u, dif-ferent from the material world which is also theologically understood as aform of the deity. VP 6.7 provides the definitive description for Ra-ma-nuja’ssecond and final description of Brahman’s transcendent divine form, thedivyaru-pa, which is suggestive of the iconic forms of Vis.n.u.69

The first description of Brahman’s divine form70

Ra-ma-nuja begins with a summary description, followed by scriptural support:

this supreme Brahman, Na-ra-yan. a’s, essential nature (svaru-pa) is one ofconsciousness, bliss, and purity that is indivisible he has countless auspiciousqualities (kalya-n.agun.a) that are unsurpassed and perfect; such as con-sciousness, power, strength, sovereignty, vigor, and radiance he producesby his own will, the aggregate of all things sentient and insentient, which aredifferent from him; his uniform divine form (ekaru-padivyaru-pa) is agree-able and appropriate to him; his endless variety of unsurpassed, auspiciousornaments are suited to him; his various types of marvelous, endless,immeasurable, weapons are suited to his power.71

Two points regarding this description are important. First, Ra-ma-nuja beginsby enumerating Brahman’s essential nature (svaru-pa) and ends with adescription of Brahman’s divine form (divyaru-pa). Second, the sruti passageshe cites as scriptural evidence support the former svaru-pa description but notthe divyaru-pa.

The first compound in the above decription, enumerates three of the fivemetaphysical qualities, consciousness, bliss, and purity, which constitute the“core” of Brahman (Lipner 1986: 80). There is no mention of a divine formhere. In the next compound, Ra-ma-nuja states the six auspicious qualities(kalya-n.agun.a) of Vis.n.u: consciousness, power, strength, sovereignty, vigor,and radiance. This order of listing the auspicious qualities is in fact, close tothe enumeration that is found in VP 6.5.79. Another essential quality ofBrahman is also stated, namely, his role as the creator and inner controller ofall creation. This concept of creation by Brahman’s own will or satya-sam. kalpa is mentioned in the upanis.ads, such as Ch Up 8.1.5 and Ch Up3.14.2.72 The next aspect of Brahman mentioned in this first description is hisone divine form (ekaru-padivyaru-pa), and that he is adorned with variousornaments and weapons suited to him. According to Ra-ma-nuja this descriptionis “supported by thousands of sruti”.73 However, we shall see that there is nodescription of Vis.n.u’s ornaments and weapons, at least not in the upanis.adsthat Ra-ma-nuja has utilized.

In the above-mentioned first description of Brahman, the distinctionbetween svaru-pa and divyaru-pa is supported by the commentator as well asRa-ma-nuja:



The words essential nature (svaru-pa) denote qualities that describe Brah-man’s essential nature (svaru-paniru-pakadharma). Its essential nature issaid to be indivisible. Knowledge, bliss, and purity etc. are Brahman’squalities. The term he produces by his own will indicates that it has amanifestation (vibhu-ti). The manifestation of qualities that compriseBrahman’s essential nature is the divine form, established by examplesfrom scripture; this establishes the divine form (vigraha) etc. Brahman’sessential nature, qualities, and vibhu-ti are given as examples for theauthoritativeness of divyaru-pa etc. The divine vigraha etc. remains to beproved.74

According to Sudarsanasu-ri, qualities (gun.a/dharma) such as jña-na, bala, ais-varya, and so forth are the defining attributes of Brahman’s defining essentialnature (svaru-paniru-pakadharma) and so can be equated with the essentialnature (svaru-pa) itself and the world that he creates by his own will is amanifestation (vibhu-ti) of these essential defining qualities (svaru-panir-u-pakadharma) of Brahman.75 The divine form is also a manifestation of theessential nature of Brahman, such as consciousness, bliss, purity, and so on;but as the commentator points out this “divine vigraha etc. remains to beproved”. What is provided thus far is the authoritativeness or rationale toestablish a divine form generally.

The commentary’s identification of the words vigraha and divyaru-pa sug-gests that a connection between these two is perfectly acceptable. The termvigraha utilized to denote the divine form of Brahman is a term commonlyused to suggest both a concrete form/figure and the images of deities. As weshall see, sruti evidence for such a form is not adequate. Both Ra-ma-nuja andhis commentator agree on the distinction between essential nature and form,but each expresses this agreement in a slightly different manner: while thecommentator explicitly describes the relationship between the essential natureand the divine form of Brahman, Ra-ma-nuja infers it. This first summarydescription of Brahman, then, affirms a distinction between his essentialnature and his divine form, and in order to establish a relation between thesetwo, the commentator states that the divine form is a manifestation of thequalities that comprise Brahman’s essential nature.

Following this first description of Brahman, Ra-ma-nuja provides a series ofsruti and smr.ti passages as evidence for his conclusions. The upanis.ad defini-tions of Brahman, for the most part, support Ra-ma-nuja’s definition of theessential nature (svaru-pa) of Brahman as knowledge, bliss, and so forth.However, even when the sruti passages affirm a Brahman with form it is quitegeneral and the specifics of form such as a head-to-foot description thatmention Vis.n.u’s ornaments, his beauty, and his weaponry is supplied by smr.ti.At most Ra-ma-nuja is successful in using sruti to prove that Brahman has aform, which by Veda-ntic standards was quite radical; however, for the four-armedform of Vis.n.u, he relies on smr.ti.



Sruti support

To support this first description of Brahman, Ra-ma-nuja follows the traditionalmethod of citing the relevant sruti first, and then smr.ti. The informationdeclared in the sruti passages is meant to support a divine form for Brahman.Sruti passages, however, do not speak of a divine form, akin to Vis.n.u’s divineform, with ornaments and other accoutrements:76

I know that immense person, having the color of the sun (a-dityavarn.a),and beyond darkness (tamas).77

(Sve Up 3.8)

the golden (hiran.maya) person we see within the sun … his eyes are likedeep blue lotuses.78

(Ch Up 1.6.6–7)

In the space here within the heart lies the immortal and golden person(purus.a) consisting of the mind.79

(Taitt Up 1.6.1)

All flashes of lightning originate from this purus.a.80

(Maha- Na-r Up 1.6)81

In these passages, Ra-ma-nuja identifies purus.a as Brahman, possessed of aform and a golden complexion, with eyes like a lotus. This interpretation israther forced, as will be seen after the examination of the context of eachpassage. Note that the above-mentioned passages and their contexts havebeen analyzed only in so far as the concept of a divine form of Brahman, asdefined by Ra-ma-nuja, is concerned. Though Ra-ma-nuja does not cite thewhole verse of the Sveta-svatara Upanis.ad 3.8, it is as follows:

only when a man knows him does he pass beyond death; there is no otherpath for getting there

(Sve Up 3.8)

This whole world is filled by that person, beyond whom there is nothing;beneath whom there is nothing; smaller than whom there is nothing;larger than whom there is nothing; and who stands like a tree firmlyplanted in heaven.82

(Sve Up 3.9)

In the Sveta- svatara Upanisad, purus.a is spoken of in metaphysical terms and,though suggestive of a form, it is not exactly the form of Vis.n.u whichRa-ma-nuja has in mind. The upanis.ad goes on to describe the form of Brahmanas follows:



The person has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet.Having encompassed the earth on all sides; he extended ten fingers’breadth beyond it.

(Sve Up 3.14)

With hands and feet everywhere, with eyes, heads, and faces everywhere,and with ears everywhere, that remains encompassing everything in theworld.83

(Sve Up 3.16)

Though these passages suggest a form for purus.a, the context is completelycosmic, conveying an inexpressible dimension of this being. Thus althoughRa-ma-nuja has cited Sve Up 3.8 as proof for Vis.n.u’s form, only a general formcan be inferred from the scriptural support that is provided.

The purus.a motif is also present in Cha-ndogya Upanis.ad 1.6. 6–7. Here,too, some information regarding a general form is given:

Now, the golden person we see within the sun—he has golden hair and agolden beard; he is completely golden, down to the very tips of his nails.

(Ch Up 1.6. 6)

His eyes are replendent like the lotus. His name is ‘Up’ (ud), for he hasrisen up (udita) above all evils.84

(Ch Up 1.6.7)

Again, though this passage supports a general form and several other fea-tures, such as golden hair, for Brahman, the context of speculation hereremains one of cosmic correspondences. Likewise, Taittirı-ya Upanis.ad 1.6.1:

In this space here within the heart lies the immortal and golden personconsisting of the mind. And this thing that hangs like a nipple betweenthe two palates; it is Indra’s passage. Bursting through the two halves ofthe skull at the point where the hairs part, he establishes himself in thefire by making bhu-r, in the wind by making the call bhu-vas.85

(Taitt Up 1.6.1)

The correspondences between the cosmos, the body, and sacrifice suggest thatthe context is rooted in Vedic ritual. There is nothing here that implies that thedivine form of Brahman is Vis.n.u’s form. So also is the case with the Maha--na-ra-yan.a Upanis.ad 1.6,86 where purus.a, i.e., Brahman, is described as thesource of lightning, though Ra-ma-nuja interprets this passage to be declaringBrahman’s complexion.

He cites additional passages from the upanis.ads to support Brahman’spossession of a divine form:



Like a bright flash of lightning in the middle of a dark cloud.87

(Maha- Na-r Up 3.12)

… it is made of mind; the vital functions are its physical form; luminousis its appearance; the real is its intention; space is its essence; it containsall actions, all desires, all scents, all tastes; it has captured this wholeworld; it neither speaks nor pays any heed.

(Ch Up 3.14.2)

… like a golden cloth.88

(Br. Up 2.3.6)

At most, these passages can be understood to support a form for Brahman in ageneral way, but they still do not provide any specific support of Brahman asthe deity Vis.n.u. Ra-ma-nuja, interpreting Maha-na-ra-yan.a Upanis.ad 3.12 says:

that bundle of flames that burns within the space in the middle of theheart of the lotus and within it the essential nature (svaru-pa) of thesupreme self shines bright like a blue cloud; he blazes like a flash oflightning that has a dark cloud within it.89

Although there is no reference to the divine form of Brahman, the TD inter-prets the word svaru-pa as “referring to vigraha”, which as we mentioned ear-lier he uses to designate the divine form.90 The commentary tries to ascribe adivine form to Brahman by indicating that “complexion” implies a divineform. Moreover, the word svaru-pa is not found in the upanis.ad passageitself.91 We see here, both Ra-ma-nuja and the commentator extending themeaning of the sruti passages to support a divine form for Brahman.

In Cha-ndogya Upanis.ad 3.14.2, Brahman is identified as one’s self withinthe heart. Again, there does not seem to be specific information here regard-ing Brahman’s divine form. Once again, the TD, as in its comment onMaha-na-ra-yan.a Upanis.ad passage 3.12, interprets this passage as a descriptionof Brahman’s form:

Thus, by these two phrases, he has all actions and has all desires; the factthat Brahman has both manifestations (ubhayavibhu-ti) is stated. With thephrase has all smells and all tastes, the form (vigraha) of Brahman isestablished.92

Other than the fact that Brahman “possesses all tastes and all scents”, whichis, according to the TD, suggestive of a form (vigraha), the other descriptionsdo not establish anything in regard to Brahman’s form. The commentatortoo, is unable to argue convincingly that the upanis.ad passages Ra-ma-nuja hasutilized do support the divine form of Vis.n.u. Even the introduction of theconcept of ubhayavibhu-ti, which is the dual manifestation of the eternal realm



(nityavibhu-ti) and the realm of sport or creation (lı-la-vibhu-ti), does not con-vey specifics on the divine form of Vis.n.u, except that he possesses a form ofsome sort.

The context of the last example from the Br.hada-ran.yaka Upanis.ad 2.3.6is a discussion of the two visible appearances of Brahman, one in reference tothe divine sphere and the other in reference to a physical form. Here again,the text makes correspondences between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Thecomplete passage, which is not cited by Ra-ma-nuja, is as follows: “Nowthe visible appearance of this person is like (yatha-) a golden cloth, or whitewool, a red bug, or a flame, or a white lotus, or a sudden flash of lightning”(Br. Up 2.3.6). The TD interprets this to mean saffron-robed: “Maha-rajata isa kind of dye or coloring substance; maha-rajata is something dyed withit.93 The commentator does not specify the color, but only interprets theterm maha-rajata, to denote the possession of color. Here appearance of thisperson like a golden cloth is interpreted as suggestive of divine form, sincethis “person” is depicted as robed in gold-colored cloth. This seems a con-trived interpretation of the term “something dyed with it”, and is not at allconvincing.

In conclusion, it is difficult to envision Brahman, from these, sruti exam-ples, as more than purus.a with lotus eyes, golden complexion, golden hair,thousand-headed and in golden robes, that is, possessing a general form. Certaincharacteristics from Ra-ma-nuja’s first description have not even been touchedupon by the scriptural evidence, such as possession of auspicious ornaments,weapons, attendants and retinue, and the divine abode. Neither Ra-ma-nujanor the commentator is able to support Brahman’s divine form from the srutipassages.

Smr.ti support

The smr.ti support, which is discussed in this section, begins to establish thekind of divine form that Ra-ma-nuja envisions for Brahman. However, prior tociting from smr.ti texts, Ra-ma-nuja thinks it necessary, yet again, to establishthe authority of smr.ti literature:

The epics and pura-n. as which augment the Vedas declare the sametruth—seeing that both (Lava and Kusa) were intelligent and well-establishedin the Vedasthe Lord, took them on as his students in order to corroborate theVedas.94

(Ra-ma-yan.a 1.4.6)

Just as in the discussion on Brahman’s casuality (VS #110) where the impor-tance of the VP is reiterated, so once again, he undertakes to defend the



pura-n. a’s authority. A possible reason for this repetition is that the smr.ti pas-sages function as more than corroborative evidence. That is, they introducesomething entirely new that is lacking in sruti. Having justified the use ofsmr.ti, Ra-ma-nuja cites evidence from the Ra-ma-yan.a, and the VP:

The divine form as stated in the Ra-ma-yan.a verses is considered first:that great yogin, the supreme self, the primeval one,is without a beginning, middle, or end, he is great beyond the great.95

(Ra-ma-yana 6.1.4.14)

This passage is reminiscent of the many sruti passages that affirm Brahmanin abstract metaphysical terms. Indeed, this passage speaks more to the uni-verse as a form of Brahman than it does to the divine transcendent formwhich is actually the topic of the discussion. According to the commentary,without beginning, middle, or end, declares “the essential nature or svaru-pa ofBrahman as eternal”,96 but there is little to be gleaned here regarding thedivyaru-pa. The first indication of Vis.n.u’s divine form is provided by the nextverse:

He is beyond matter, he is the creator who bears the conch, discus, andmaceHe has the Srı-vatsa mark on his chest; He has Srı- eternally for his consort,he is invincible, eternal, and immutable.97

(Ra-ma-yan.a 6.1.4.15)

The ornaments and weapons specific to Vis.n.u are iconographic details andsuch specificity is not seen in the sruti passages. The Ra-ma-yan.a is then thefirst text, sruti or smr.ti, which addresses Vis.n.u’s divine form that is consonantwith Ra-ma-nuja’s description of Brahman’s divine form. The other Ra-ma-yan.apassages utilized are:

the various types of arrows and the drawn-bow assumed personal formsand accompanied the descendent of Ka-kutstha, all follow him.

(7.109.7)

with body and with his entourage he enters the realm of Vis.n.u.98

(7.110.13ab)

These verses are not explained by the commentator. However, they deal pri-marily with the incarnated form and its relation to the supernal form of Vis.n.urather than the latter, which is the topic of discussion here. The description ofVis.n.u adorned with his various ornaments and weapons is evidence for thekind of divine form that Ra-ma-nuja intends and additionally, these epic pas-sages provide scriptural support for the connection between Vis.n.u’s transcen-dent form (described in Ra-ma-yan.a 6.1.1.14) and his incarnations. For



Ra-ma-nuja, the incarnation “is a particular manifestation of the supernal formitself.” However, the “supernal form [divine form], though closely related tothe Lord’s avata-ric forms … is logically closer to the divine quidditativecenter than the [supernal form]”(Lipner 1986: 96). Moreover, the incarnationderives from the supernal form and is conditioned by factors such as theparticular world epoch, which does not apply to the divine form.

The Ra-ma-yan.a verses establish the incarnations themselves, as forms notonly worthy on their own merits, but all the more so because of their acces-sability to the worshipper. The fact that Ra-ma and his followers passed intothe realm of Vis.n.u with their bodies, indicates that they are not comprised ofmatter (prakr.ti). Even the incarnations, though of human or animal form, arenot material. The contribution of the Ra-ma-yan.a passages is that for the firsttime a scripture is cited from which Vis.n.u’s form does not need to be inferred,but its main function is to establish the concept of Vis.n.u’s incarnations.

To support his interpretation that Brahman has a divine supernal form,Ra-ma-nunja utlilizes additional passages from the VP followed by some passagesfrom the MBh:

Wherever, all these powers are established, O’ King,there is another grand form that is different from Hari’s universal form(visvaru-pa).99

(VP 6.7.70)100

What are the two forms that are mentioned here? Sudarsanasuri does notcomment on this passage in the TD, but does so in his commentary, theSrutapraka-sika- , on the Maha-siddha-nta section of the SBh 1.1.1. He notes thatthe form of Brahman in which all the powers are established is the divineform of Brahman:

Now, in this very pura-n. a, even though at the conclusion he (Ra-ma-nuja)quotes texts in detail, he demonstrates that Brahman has a divine form, avigraha as in VP 6.7.70 … That is different from the universal form (VP6.7.70) means that the two forms do not coincide.101

The VP indicates two distinctly different forms of Vis.n.u. One, the form ofHari with the universe in the effected state, the other is his divine form. Inother words, different from the world that comprises the body of Brahman,there is another divine form. The powers that are mentioned in VP 6.7.70 arethe three powers (sakti) that are said to abide in this particular form of Hariknown theologically as the body of Brahman. The primary power is theenergy which resides in the supreme nature of Vis.n.u; a secondary powerresults when that energy is embodied, while the third power is ignorance (VP6.7.69–71). By using this VP passage Ra-ma-nuja intends to differentiatebetween the divine transcendent body, which is the current topic of discussionand the material world envisioned as a divine form as well.



The term visvaru-pa that occurs in VP 6.7.70 stated above has a differentconnotation in the BhG, where it refers to the terrible form of Vis.n.u in bothhis creative and destructive capacities; even in the BhG, there is a distinctionmade between the visvaru-pa and the more benign four-armed form. Kr.s.n. aclaims that the visvaru-pa is only accessible by divine vision. Terrified of thisvisvaru-pa, Arjuna implores Kr.s.n. a to once again assume his benign four-armed form. It is important to note here that Ra-ma-nuja does not cite anypassages from Chapter 11 of the BhG, which elaborates on the divine form,because the form depicted therein is frightening and is unlike the divine formRa-ma-nuja depicts here. In the VP context, the term visvaru-pa designates thetranscendent divine body of Brahman akin to icons.

The next set of scriptural passages is from VP 1.22, which also differentiatestwo forms of Brahman:

Vis.n.u as comprising all powers is the highest essential nature of BrahmanThis form is reflected on first by yogins at the beginning of their yogicpractices.

(VP 1.22.59)

Hari is the highest and closest of all the powers of BrahmanO’ Great Sage, Hari is a form (mu-rta) of Brahman, he comprises theentire Brahman.102

(VP 1.22.61)

Ra-ma-nuja only cites the first half of 1.22.61ab, but this section of the VPidentifies Hari as a form of Brahman. Moreover, the form of Hari presentedhere is the one endowed with weapons and ornaments. The different weaponsand ornaments in this section are identified with different aspects of the uni-verse (VP 1.22.65ff). For example, pradha-na or matter is identified with theSrı-vatsa mark (VP 1.22.67), and his necklace, Vaijayanti, composed offive precious stones, is said to be the aggregate of the five elements, and soon. The importance of the VP passages cited here is that the embodiedform of Vis.n.u, with ornamentation and weaponry, is declared to be real anddifferent from the svaru-pa.103 Whereas, the Ra-ma-yan.a passages establish theconnection between the divine form and the incarnations, the VP passagesestablish that the world as Brahman’s body is quite different from hisdivine form.

In the first section, then, the sruti examples cited to support Ra-ma-nuja’sdefinition of the divine form are inadequate. The divine form as suggested byRa-ma-nuja’s first summary are developed mainly with the use of the VP, andto a certain degree, the Ra-ma-yan.a. The descriptive summary in the secondsection, though it does not utilize the VP directly, is influenced by the VP (vanBuitenen 1956: 290).

It is interesting that Ra-ma-nuja only cites sruti passages as support for thissecond section on the divine form. It would seem that if the whole discussion



on the divine form of Brahman is taken into account, Ra-ma-nuja does notwant to draw attention to the definitive description of Brahman in the secondpart. The interpretive strategy of Ra-ma-nuja in this section is worth noting.He begins, as tradition requires, with support from sruti, but these passagesonly portray the essential nature of Brahman in metaphysical terms. BothRa-ma-nuja and the commentator create, through exegesis, the possibility toassociate the two separate concepts (svaru-pa and divyaru-pa) to combinein such a way that the VP definitions of the iconic form of Vis.n.u can beincorporated into Veda-nta.

The second description articulates the divine form of Vis.n.u, not His essen-tial nature (svaru-pa) and it is the former not the latter that commands wor-ship and devotion from devotees. One of the main differences between thesetwo descriptions is that the former affirms the divine form of Brahman in ageneral way. That is, Brahman is declared to possess auspicious qualities,weapons, ornaments, consorts, and a divine abode, but no specifics are pro-vided to identify His unique form of divinity. Such a description could beused to describe many divinities in the Hindu pantheon. However, Ra-ma-nuja’sgoal is to identify Brahman as the deity Vis.n.u, his task is not yet complete.He begins with a second description of Brahman and provides a new set of srutipassages as support.

The second description of Brahman’s divine form

In support of the second description only sruti passages are cited. However,this description of Brahman itself is taken from the VP and so in a senseRa-ma-nuja is citing the VP first and then interpreting sruti through the infor-mation gained from the pura-n. a. In this description, as in the first, Ra-ma-nujabegins with an upanis.adic depiction of purus.a, but the rest of the imagery isnot found in sruti. It begins with a description of the metaphysical qualities ofBrahman:

He dwells inside the circular orb of the sun; he has the splendor of acolossal mountain of molten gold, whose brilliance is like that of the raysof hundreds of thousands of suns; his long eyes, spotless like the petals ofa lotus that sprouting from deep waters on a stalk, blooms in the rays ofthe sun.104

This description of Brahman is reminiscent of sruti passages, which have beenalready cited in support of the first description. Here, I only evaluate the newcitations. Included among these are the views of the Bha-s.yaka-ra (Dramid.a),and the Va-kyaka-ra105 (T.an

.ka), on the Brahmasu-tras.106 All these passagesreiterate the lordship of Vis.n.u over creation, but do not provide details onthe divine form (divyaru-pa).107 Even the comments of the Bha-s.yaka-ra and theVa-kyaka-ra do not supply the needed specifics for Ra-ma-nuja’s definition of thedivine form (divyaru-pa), although they do affirm that Brahman possesses a form.



Proof of Ra-ma-nuja’s attempt to connect these sruti passages to the smr.tipassages declaring the divine form of Vis.n.u is evident from the examples wehave already evaluated. Furthermore, the TD’s view that the smr.ti examplesare for the explication of Cha-ndogya Upanis.ad 1.6.6, which itself does notprovide support in regard to the specifics of the divine form, is further evi-dence of this insufficiency. Additional evidence is provided by Ra-ma-nuja’sconcluding remarks. Here he attempts to relate the divine form to the svaru-paof Brahman:

Because in the text being alone this was in the beginning my dear son, oneonly without a second (Ch Up 1.6.6), his attendants, his abode etc. areincluded in the essential nature (svaru-pa) of the supreme Brahman, whichpossesses a host of auspicious qualities such as knowledge, strength,sovereignty.108

The word svaru-pa is here used to denote essential attributes such as knowl-edge, bliss, and so on, but it now also includes attendants and the divineabode. This meaning of “essential nature” does not correlate with the com-mentator’s definition of essential nature as distinct from the the divine form,mentioned in the discussion of the first description of Brahman. The commen-tator himself seems aware of this discrepancy, since he once again re-definesdivine form:

Just as the qualities of knowledge and so on are included in the cause,those qualities such as the abode etc., cannot be explained as non-existentin it. Therefore, because the eternal realm (nityavibhu-ti) is included inthe cause as known from scripture such as being only, by the wordsbeing only, one alone, without a second, the inner nature of Brahman isunderstood.109

This is a circuitous way to argue for a divine form and abode for Brahman.The causal state of Brahman, which includes everything, according to Ch Up1.6.6, is taken to include divine form and divine abode. This is a re-interpretationof Ch Up based on the fact that sm. rti affirms a divine form.

Continuing with Ra-ma-nuja’s second description of Brahman’s form, we seea head-to-foot description of Vis.n.u similar to the one found in the VP pas-sages. The juxtaposition of his second description of Brahman with the VPpassages underscores the vocabulary common in both. Beginning with Vis.n.u’sforehead, the description does not match any sruti passages that Ra-ma-nujahas thus far cited. The vocabulary that is common to both the VP andRa-ma-nuja’s second description of Brahman are highlighted:

he has a forehead with beautiful eyebrows and a handsome nose; hiscoral-like lips are smiling pleasantly; his cheeks are tender and radiant;



his conch-like neck is raised uplifted and pendulous; his divine ears,tender as buds hang touching his divine shoulders.110

Some of the VP passages that correspond to the description of Vis.n.u’s fore-head, his pleasant smile, his cheeks, forehead, conch-like neck, broad chest, andso on, are:

Let him meditate on the one who is Brahman: a pleasantly smiling face,eyes resembling lotus leaves,lovely cheeks, beautiful wide forehead, shining and flat.

(VP 6.7.80)

ornamented with beautiful earrings placed close to the earsa conch-like neck, a broad chest adorned by the Srı-vatsa.111

(VP 6.7.81)

Though such details are not unique to the VP and can be found in manyother smr.ti texts as well, the fact that Ra-ma-nuja in his first descriptionemploys numerous passages from the VP, especially VP 6.6, makes it likelythat he was again inspired by VP 6.7.80–84. In this section of the VP, thedivine form of Vis.n.u as the auspicious object (subha- sraya) of worship isestablished and is an important section of the pura-n. a for Ra-ma-nuja.112

Moreover, earlier in the VS, Ra-ma-nuja himself states that the sixth book ofthe VP is the source text for information on Brahman’s body, the divine bodyand its incarnations.113

The rest of the second description of Brahman’s form according to Ra-ma-nujais as follows:

his arms are round, well-developed, and long; his beautiful palms arereddish adorned with fingers that are the same color; his body, slenderwaist, and broad chest are well-proportioned in all places; his shape is ofan inexpressibly divine form; his color is pleasing; his feet are as beautifulas budding lotuses; he wears a yellow robe that suits him; he is adornedwith immeasurable, divine, endlessly marvelous ornaments like a spotlesscrown (kirı-t.a), earrings (kun.d.ala), necklaces (ha-ra), the kaustubha gem,bracelets (keyu-ra), armlets (kat.aka), anklets (nu-pura), belt (udar-abandhana) and so on, a conch (san.kha), discus (cakra), mace (gada-), bow(sa-rn.ga), the srı-vatsa curl, and the garland (vanama-la).114

The following passages are suggestive of the description stated above andprovide information on Vis.n.u’s arms, ornaments, weapons, and his robe:

the navel caving into the three folds of the belly and by the bellyeight long arms, hanging, or even four-armed Vis.n.u.

(VP 6.7.82)



firm thighs and calves, well-formed feet and toes[ … ] he who is in a pure yellow robe.

(VP 6.7.83)

wearing a beautiful crown (kirı-t.a), bracelets (keyu-ra), and armlets(kat.aka) holding in his hands the bow (sa-rn.ga),conch (san.kha), mace (gada-), sword (khad.ga), and the mighty discus(cakra).115

(VP 6.7.84)

This description of Vis.n.u’s divine form, either four-armed or eight-armed,does not correlate exactly to any of the iconographic specifications of imagesfound in texts such as the Vaikha-nsa-gamas (Champakalaksmi 1981). Never-theless, it is evocative of Vis.n.u images and is in stark contrast to the descriptionsof Brahman from the upanis.ads.

Following the head-to-foot description of Vis.n.u, Ra-ma-nuja ends with areiteration of qualities of the divine form that evokes devotion from theworshipper:

By his surpassingly sublime beauty he captivates the eyes and hearts ofall; the nectar of his pervasive loveliness fills and overflows the entireexistence, sentient and non-sentient; his eternal and inconceivable youth-fulness is infinitely marvelous; he is delicately tender as blossoming flowers;he perfumes the endless expanse of the universe with his divine fragrance;he shines in his supreme majesty as he enevelops the three worlds; helooks at his devotees with a look of compassion and affection.116

Carman (1974: 79) in his discussion of Vis.n.u’s auspicious qualities (kalya-n.a-gun.a) notes that saundarya or beauty of bodily form was important forRa-ma-nuja as “this characterized the Lord both in his transcendent realm andhis incarnations.” Descriptions of divine beauty however are rare in sruti pas-sages. To comment on these last descriptive statements, the TD cites mostlyfrom the Ra-ma-yan.a. It reiterates that all the descriptions of Vis.n.u thus far(taken from smr.ti) are meant to explain divine descriptions in passages suchas Ch Up 1.1.6–7. However, the addition of information from the VP hasmade it possible to broaden the context for understanding the nature of thedivine form.117 Ra-ma-nuja concludes his description of the divine form byciting a series of sruti passages to substantiate this second description ofBrahman’s divine form. These examples all refer to Brahman’s metaphysicalqualities and not to a specific form of Brahman. Furthermore some of thesepassages were already cited as evidence in the discussion on the first descriptionof Brahman.118

This rather long two-part discussion of the divine form illustrates thatBrahman as Vis.n.u is possessed of a divine form, and to substantiate this



Ra-ma-nuja depends on the VP. For Ra-ma-nuja, then, Brahman or Vis.n.u pos-sesses an essential nature (svaru-pa) comprised of metaphysical attributes suchas knowledge, brilliance, bliss, splendor, support for which is readily availablein Veda-nta. Additionally, Brahman possesses a divine transcendent form(divyaru-pa) comprised of a non-material substance, which is four armed withornamentation and weaponry. It is an embodied form that is exclusivelyproper to Brahman and for this Ra-ma-nuja turns to the VP.

Conclusion

In the course of this chapter we have examined Ra-ma-nuja’s exegetical use ofthe VP in the Veda-rthasam. graha to support the concepts fundamental to histheology namely, the essential nature of the individual self, Brahman’s caus-ality, and His divine form. In the discussion on the individual self, Ra-ma-nujafollows the principle of corroboration (upabr.m. hana) and cites the upanis.adsand then the VPas scriptural evidence for his view of the nature of the indi-vidual self. In the sruti examples that he utilizes, he finds support for Brah-man’s relationship to the individual self as one of soul to body. The srutiexamples offer little on the individual self as a distinct entity sans its relationto Brahman. Since for Ra-ma-nuja, although the liberated individual self sharescertain qualities with Brahman such as knowledge and bliss, it has a real anddistinct existence, though always in relation to Brahman. The terminology todescribe the essential nature of the individual self as one of knowledge (jña--nasvaru-pa), as one of knowledge and bliss (jña-nandaikagun.a), and as inde-scribable (va-ca-m agocara) is provided by the VP. Furthermore, the pura-n. aalso provides evidence to argue the metaphysical reality of the embodiedindividual self. First, the individual self is said to be a power (sakti) of Vis.n.uand then the concealment of its attributive nature by another power of Vis.n.u,namely karma is stated. Associating with karma the individual self is said toexist in all beings with its attributive nature concealed to different degrees(ta-ratamya).

In contrast to Advaita, Brahman’s causality is an important aspect ofRa-ma-nuja’s Veda-nta. For him any discussion of the world as empirically realis related to the issue of Brahman’s causality. Utilizing the VP, Ra-ma-nujaargues for the concept of Brahman as eternally differentiated into matter andindividual selves and thus the material cause as a whole (avises.an.aka-ran.a).Included in this discussion is creation as simply a transformation in the causalcondition (ka-ran.a-vastha-) of Brahman to its effected condition (ka-rya-vastha-).For the cosmological details such as Brahman as eternally differentiated intomatter and individual selves and his lordship over the two entities that com-prise his body, Ra-ma-nuja finds in the VP passages such as Vis.n.u is manifestand unmanifest creation, He is the Lord and the agitator and that which isagitated, He is present in matter both when it is contracted and expanded, Heis the cause of effect, the unborn matter (prakr.ti) and individual selves



(purus.a). While sruti, BhG, and MBh passages precede the VP citations, theydo not compare to the specifics on creation that are found in the pura-n. a. TheSveta-svatara Upanis.ad does speak of matter (prakr.ti) as eternal and as mani-festing from Brahman, but it also goes on to describe it as illusory (ma-ya-) andBrahman as the illusionist (ma-ya-vin) which then would require clarification ofthe term ma-ya- in a positive light. The five BhG passages cited prior to the VPverses provide more detail than sruti, but considerably less than the VP.Moreover, the fact that Ra-ma-nuja turns to the VP to interpret most of theBhG passages in his commentary on that text suggests that the pura-n. a is vitalto the “correct” reading of the BhG as well.

To support causality as a unique attribute of Brahman’s essential nature(brahmasvaru-pavises.a) also, Ra-ma-nuja relies on the VP. The three-fold defi-nition of causality as a unique quality of Brahman’s essential nature requiresthe simultaneous affirmation of Brahman as the cause, Brahman as insepar-able from the world, and Brahman as the lord over his creation. Ra-ma-nujadoes not even cite sruti in this context, but spends considerable time legit-imizing the authority of the VP as equal to that of the certain upanis.ads andthe Brahma Su-tras. Brahman’s causality as envisioned in the VP fulfills thecriteria that comprise the concept of brahmasvaru-pavises.a such as: the worldproduced from Vis.n.u exists in him … he is the world, He resides in the indivi-dual self, His own essential nature (svaru-pa) encompasses what is manifest andunmanifest, he exists in the form of purus.a and in the form of time, he holds upthe world with a tiny portion of his power and takes on form … for the welfareof the world, encompassing manifest and unmanifest, he is the Lord of all. ForRa-ma-nuja’s purposes sruti passages are too general and only the VP providesconcrete details needed to affirm the causality of Brahman and the reality ofthe the world.

Lastly, in addition to the conception of the world as the body of Brahman,Ra-ma-nuja affirms a divine body (divyaru-pa) that is akin to the iconic forms ofVis.n.u, and support for this is lacking in sruti. The divine body of Brahman isa specific form of Vis.n.u and the discussion of the auspicious object (sub-ha-sraya) of meditation in VP 6.7 is the sole scriptural source. While the srutievidence is adequate to establish the essential nature of Brahman (svaru-pa), itis ill-suited as support for the divine form. That is, descriptions of Brahmansuch as like a bright flash of lightning, luminous in appearance, whose visibleappearance is like a golden cloth are starkly different from pura-n. ic port-rayals such as a pleasantly smiling face, eyes resembling lotus leaves, lovelycheeks, beautiful wide forehead, shining and flat, ornamented with beautifulearrings placed close to the ears, a conch-like neck, and a broad chest adornedby the Srı-vatsa.

Notes1 Whereas, San.kara accepts the reality of creation only provisionally, Bha-skara

(tenth century CE), the proponent of Aupa-dhika Bheda-bheda (identity and



difference due to adjuncts) Veda-nta advocates the influence of adjuncts such askarma on Brahman as the cause of creation (Dasgupta 1991: Vol. III, 6–11).According to him, though Brahman possesses auspicious qualities and is freefrom sin, due to limiting adjuncts it transmigrates in sam. sa-ra. Ya-davapraka-sa(eleventh century CE), who championed Sva-bha-vika Bheda-bheda (identity anddifference due to Brahman’s way of being), declares that Brahman itself, throughits potential power (sakti), differentiates into God (I-svara), matter (acit), andindividual selves (cit). God, according to Ya-davapraka- sa, is not the same asBrahman but is possessed of only a part of Brahman’s perfections (Oberhammer1997: 10–11).

2 For more on svaru-pa and svabha-va, see Carman 1974: 88–97 and Lipner1986:158 fn 6.

3 VS #4.4 VS #4. Br. Up 3.7.22 and Sub Up 2 are van Buitenen’s translations. Here and

elsewhere, all the upanis.ad translations are from Olivelle 1998, unless otherwiseindicated.

5 s.ad.vidhata-tparyalin. gopetatva-t tatprathamam uktam (TD 9).6 TD 9.7 deha-tirikta-tmasvaru-patatsvabha-va iti. svaru-pam. jña-na-nadaikalaks.an. am. svab-

ha-vo bhagavacches.atvam (TD 8).8 es.u va-kyes.u jı-vaparayosh. svaru-pam. katham. pratipannam ity a-ka-n.ks.a-ya-m

upabr.m. han. a-nugr.hı-tasrutipratipannam tayoh. svaru-pam. vivaks.an (TD 10).9 VS #5, 43, 78–79, 143–44.

10 jı-va-tmanah. svaru-pam devamanus.ya-diprakr.tiparin.a-mavises.aru-pana-na-vidhabhedar-ahitam. jña-na-nandaikagun.am. tasyaitasya karmakr.tadeva-dibhede’ padhvaste svar-u-pabhedo va-ca-magocarah. svasam. vedyah. jña-nasvaru-pam ityeta-vadeva nirdesyam.tacca sarves.a-m a-tmana-m. sama-nam (VS #5).

11 jña-nasvaru-pam akhilam jagad etad abuddhayah.arthasvaru-pam. pasyanto bhra-m. yante mohasam. plave.(VP 1.4.40) (TD 11).

12 Indicated by TD and van Buitenen 1956: 186; fn 34.13 tatha-tma- prakr.teh. san

. ga-dahamma-na-didu-s.itah.bhajate pra-kr.ta-ndharma-n anyastebhyo’ pi so’ vyayah. .(VP 6.7.24).puma-n na devo na naro na pasur na ca pa-dpah.sarı-ra-kr.tibheda-s tu bhu-paite karmayonayah.(VP 2.13.94) (TD 10).

14 jña-nadaikagun.am ity anenanirva-n.maya eva-yama-ta- jña-namaya’ malah.duh.kha-jña-namala- dharma-h. prakr.tes te na ca-tmanah.(VP 6.7.22).ity asya-rtho’ bhipretah. (TD 10).

15 karmakr.tadeva-dibhede’ padhvaste ity anenaekasvaru-pabhedo hi ba-hyakarma-vr.tiprajah.deva-dibhede’ padhvaste na-styeva-varan. o hi sah.(VP 2.14.33).ityasya-rtho vivr.to bhavati (TD 10–11).

16 VP 2.14.33 ab is slightly different in the critical edition of the VP. It reads: ekatvam.ru-pabhedasca ba-hyakarma-vr.tiprajah. .

17 svaru-pabhedo va-ca-magocarah. svasamvedyam ity anena pratyastamitabhedam(VP 6.7.53). itya-divacanam. vya-khya-tam. bhavati. The compelete VP verse ispratyastamitabhedam yat satta-ma-tram agocaramvacasa-m a-tmasamvedyam. tajjña-nam. brahmasam. jñitam.(VP 6.7.53) (TD 11).



18 A reference to Buddhism.19 tucchutvavya-vr.tyarthama-ha a-tmasamvedyam’ iti. tac ca svaru-pato dharmatas ca

jña-nam (TD 11).20 VS #74.21 nirva-n.maya eva-yama-tma- jña-namayo’ malah.

duh.kha-jña-namala- dharma-h. prakr.teste na ca-tmanah. .(VP 6.7.22) (VS #79).

22 nanu ca bhavato’ pi vijña-nasvaru-pa a-tma-bhyupagantavyah. . sa ca svayampraka-sah. .tasya ca deva-disvaru-pa-tma-bhima-ne svaru-papraka-satirodha-nam avasya-srayan. ı-yam.svaru-papraka-se sati sva-tmany a-ka-ra-ntara-dhya-sa-yoga-t. ato bhavatasca-yam sama-nodos.ah. (VS #41).

23 evamabhyupagacchata-m asma-kam a-tmadharmabhu-tasya caitanyasya svabha-vi-kasya-pi karman. a- pa-rma-rthikam. san.kocam. vika-sam. ca bruvata-m. sarvamidam.parihr.tam. bhavatastu praka-sa eva svaru-pamiti praka-so na dharmabhu-tas tasyasan.kocavika-sau vana-bhyupagamyate. praka-saprasa-ra-nutpattim eva tirodha-nabhu-ta-h.karma-dayah. kurvanti (VS #43).

24 avidya- cet tirodha-nam. tirodha-nabhu-taya-’ vidya- svaru-pabhu-tapraka-sana-seti pu-rva-mevoktah. . asma-kam. tv avidya-ru-pen.a karman.a- savru-panityadharmabhu-tajña-napra-ka-sah. san

. kucitas. tena deva-diru-pa-tma-bhima-no bhavatı-ti vises.ah. (VS #43).25 Ra-ma-nuja only cites VP 6.7.61cd.26 yatha- uktam—

vis.n.usaktih. para- prokta- ks.etrajña-khya- tatha-para-

avidya- karmasamjña-nya- tr.tı-ya- saktir is.yate.(VP 6.7.61) (VS #43).

27 yaya- ks.etrajñasaktih. sa- ves.t.ita- nr.pa sarvaga-

samsa-rata-pa-n akhila-n ava-pnoti atisantata-n.(VP 6.7.62).taya- tirohitatva-c ca saktih. ksetrajñasamjñita-

sarvabhu-tes.u bhu-pa-la ta-ratamyena vartate.(VP 6.7.63) (VS #43).

28 The VP also identifies karma as matter (prakr.ti).29 The atomic nature (an.utva) of the individual self is discussed in Lipner 1986:

63–68.30 ta-ratamyena vartate ityanena jña-nasya san.kocavika-sau siddhau. na hy an.uma--

trasya svaru-pasya ta-ratamyam. tasma-d dharmabhu-tajña-nadva-rakameva a-tmanasta-ratamyamiti. jña-nadva-rakatvam. ca tatraivoparitanaih. slokair vivr.tam apra-n.avatsusvalpa-lpa- stha-vares.u tato’ dhika- (VP 6.7.64 ab).itya-dibhih. (TD 95).

31 Prior to this discussion, Ra-ma-nuja begins his siddha-nta by citing scriptural evi-dence from both, sruti and smr.ti. The sruti passages utilized are Br. Up 3.7.3; Br.Up 3.7.22 (Ma-dhyandina); Sub Up 7. Mun.d. Up 3.1.1; Taitt A

-ra 3.11; Taitt Up

2.6; Ch Up 6.3.2; Svet Up 1.6; Svet Up 1.12; Svet Up 6.13. The smr.ti examplesare from the Ra-ma-yan.a 6.120.26; VP 1.22.36; BhG 10.20; BhG 15.15. Accordingto Ra-ma-nuja, these scriptures prove that Brahman is the self of all, that matterand individual selves comprise Brahman’s body, and therefore the whole worldcan be said to be Brahman’s body. Additionally, because of the soul–body rela-tionship between the world and Brahman, world and Brahman can be identifiedwith each other through sa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya. That is, the term “world” denotesnot just creation, but Brahman who is the inner self of this creation (VS #65).Though these examples suggest the distinction between Brahman, individualselves, and matter, and the soul–body relation shared by these three, it is difficultto use them as proof when describing the transformation of the causal state ofBrahman into the effected state. Only the BhG and VP passages contribute to theconcept of Brahman as the material cause as a whole.



32 etaduktam. bhavati brahmaivam avasthitam ityatraivam sabda-rthabhu- tapraka-r-atayaiva vicitracetana-cetana-tmakaprapañcasya sthu-lasya su-ks.masya ca sadbha-vah.(VS #66).

33 VS #69.34 atah. prakr.tipurus.amahadahamka-ratanma-trabhu-tendriyatada-rabhdhacaturdasab-

huvana-tmakabrahma-n. d. atadantarvartidevatiryan.manus.yastha-vara-disarvapraka-ra-

samstha-nasamsthitam. ka-ryamapi sarvam. brahmaiveti, ka-ran.abhu-tabrahmavij-ña-na-deva sarvam. vijña-tam. bhavatı-tiyekavijña-nena sarvavijña-nam upapannataram.tadevam. ka-ryaka-ran.abha-va-dimukhena kr.tsnasya cidacidvastunah. parabrahma-praka-rataya- tada-tmakatvam uktam (van Buitenen translation) (VS #69).

35 aja-m eka-m. lohitasuklakr.s.n. a-m. bahvı-m. praja-m. janayantı-m. saru-pa-majo hyeko jus.ama-n.o’nusete jaha-ty ena-m. bhaktabhoga-m ajo’nyah.(Svet Up 4.5).iti prakr.tipurus.ayor ajatvam. darsayati. (VS #72) my own translation.

36 asma-n ma-yı- sr.jate visvam etat tasmim. s ca-nyo ma-yaya- sanniruddhah. ma-ya-m tuprakr.tim. vidya-n ma-yinam. tu mahesvaram (Sve Up 4.9–10) (VS #72).

37 prakr.tim. purus.am. caiva viddhyana-dı- ubha-vapivika-ra-m. sca gun.a-m. scaiva viddhi prakr.tisam. bhava-n(BhG 13.19).bhu-mira-po’nalo va-yuh. kham. mano buddhireva caahamka-ra itı-yam. me bhinna- prakr.tiras.t.adha-.apareyamitastvanya-m. prakr.tim. viddhi me para-mjı-vabhu-ta-m. maha-ba-ho yayedam. dha-ryate jagat.(BhG 7.4–5) (van Buitenen translation) (VS #72).

38 prakr.tim. sva-mavas.t.abhya visr.ja-mi punah. punah. (BhG 9.8).maya-dhyaks.en.a prakr.tih. su-yate sacara-caram (BhG 9.10) (van Buitenen translation)(VS #72).

39 evam. ca prakr.iterapı-svarasarı-ratva-t prakr.tisabdo’pi tada-tmabhu-tasyesvarasyatatpraka-rasamsthitasya va-cakah. . purus.asabdo’pi tada-tmabhu-tasyesvarasya pur-us.apraka-rasam. sthitasya va-cakah. . atas tadvika-ra-n. a-mapi tathaisvara eva-tma-.tada-ha vyaktam. vis.n.ustatha-vyaktam. purus.ah. ka-la eva ca (VP 1.2.18), sa evaks.obhako brahman ks.obhayasca paramesvarah. (VP 1.2.31) iti (VS #73).

40 vyaktam. vis.n.ustatha-vyaktam. purus.ah. ka-la eva cakrı-d. ato ba-lakasyeva ces.t.a-m. tasya nisa-naya.(VP 1.2.18).sa eva ks.obhako brahman ks.obhasca purus.ottamah.sa sankocavika-sa-bhya-m. pradha-natve’ pi ca sthitah. .(VP 1.2.31).

41 tad evam. na-maru-pavibha-ga-narhasu-ksmadasa-pannnaprakr.tipurus.asarı-ram. brahmaka-ran.a-vastam. jagatas tada-pattireva ca pralayah. . na-maru-pavibha-gavibhaktasth-u-lacidacidvastusarı-ram. brahma ka-rya-vastham. brahman.as tatha-vidhasthu-labha-vaeva jagatah. sr.s.t.ir ityucyate. yathoktam. bhagavata- para-saren.a pradha-napum. sorajayoh.ka-ran.am. ka-ryabhu-tayor iti (VP 1.9.37) (VS #74).

42 Van Buitenen titles this VS section as “Miscellaneous Discussions”, suggestingthat this section is simply an addendum to the previous more important sectionsthat discuss the identity of Brahman as Vis.n.u. However, in light of the connectionbetween this section and the beginning of the siddha-nta on Brahman’s causality(the avises.an.aka-ran.a section), this VS section is in fact the conclusion of Ra-ma--nuja’s argument begun earlier. Making use of the VP in this section, Ra-ma-nujaestablishes the supreme cause as the unique quality of the essential nature ofNa-ra-yan.a—brahmasvaru-pavises.a. Thus these two sections, in terms of content,which is Brahman’s causality, comprise a complete unit.

43 For a succinct exposition on Brahman’s causality in Veda-nta, see Lipner 1978:60–64.



44 Only MBh 12.7074 is included in the MBh critical edition.45 For Ra-ma-nuja’s classification of smr.ti as sa-ttvic (most authoritative), ra-jasic, and

ta-masic, see Adluri 2006.46 TD 247.47 … itya-dina- brahmasvaru-pavises.apratipa-danaikaparataya- pravr.ttam (VS #110).48 … kevalaparabrahmasvaru-pavises.apratipa-dana-yaiva pravr.tto na-ra-ryan.a-nuva-kas

tathedam vais.n. avam ca pura-n. am (VS #110) and … ityparabrahmasvau-pavi-ses.anirn. aya-yaiva pravr.ttam (VS #110).

49 pra-cyodı-cyada-ks.in. a-tyapa- sca-tyasarvasis.t.aih. sarvadharmasarvatattvavyavastha-ya-midameva parya-ptam ity aviga-naparigr.hı-tam. vais.n. avam. ca pura-n. am. . janma-dyasya yata (Br Su- 1.1.2) iti jagajjanma-dika-ran. am. brahmetyavagamyate. tajjan-ma-dika-ran. am. kimiti prasnapu-rvakam. vis.n.oh. saka-sa-d udbhu- tam (VP 1.1.31)itya-dina- brahmasvaru-pavises.apratipa-danaikaparataya- pravr.ttam iti sarvasam. ma-tam … yatha- sarva-su srutis.u kevalaparabrahmasvaru-pavises.apratipa-dana-yaivapravr.tto na-ra-yan. a-nuva-kas tathedam. vais.n. avam. ca pura-n. am. (VS #110).

50 Since Veda-nta is in the plural, I have translated it as the “upanis.ads”.51 prakr.tir ya- maya-khya-ta- vyakta-vyaktasvaru-pin. ı-

purus.as ca-py ubha-v etau lı-yete parama-tmani.(VP 6.4.39).parama-tma- ca sarves.a-m a-dha-rah. paramesvarah.vis.n.una-ma- sa vedes.u veda-ntes.u ca gı-yate.(VP 6.4.40) (VS #110).

52 a-dha-ra iti sarı-ra-tmabha-vah. (TD 249).53 Also see Lacombe 1966: 108.54 so’ham iccha-mi dharmajña srotum. tvat tu yatha- jagat

babhu-va bhu-yas ca yatha- maha-bha-ga bhavis.yati.(VP 1.1.4)yanmayam. ca jagadbrahman yatascaitaccara-caramlı-nam a-sı-d yatha- yatra layames.yati yatra ca.(VP 1.1.5) (VS #110).

55 srutaveda-ntasya prasnatva-t tucchatvavivartatvaparin. a-matvasadva-rakatva-dva-r-akatva-dipraka-rajña-pana-rtham. ‘yatha- ’ iti prasnah. (TD 250).

56 param. brahma kimiti prakramya (VS #110).57 vis.n.oh. saka- sa-d udbhu-tam. jagattatra evaca sthitam

sthithisam. yamakarta-sau jagato’sya jagacca sa.(VP 1.1.31) (VS #110).

58 saka-sah. pa-rsvah. , sarı-raikadesa-d ity arthah. (TD 251).59 ‘yatra’ iti layastha-naprasnasyottaram a-ha tatra iti. tatraiva. vis.n. a-veva. atra-pi vis.-

n.usabdena layastha-natvam. sadva-rakam iti siddham (TD 251–52).60 parah. para-n. a-m. paramah. parama-tma-tmasam. sthitah.

ru-pavarn. a-dinirdesavises.an. avivarjitah. .(VP 1.2.10) (VS #110).

61 apaksayavina- sa-bhya-m. parin. a-mardhijanmabhih.varjitah. sakyate vaktum. yah. sada-stı-ti kevalam.(VP 1.2.11).sarvatra-sau samastam. ca vasaty atreti vai yatah.tatah. sa va-sudeveti vidvadbhih. paripat.hyate.(VP 1.2.12).tad brahma paramam. nityam ajam aksayam avyayamekasvarupam. ca sada- heya-bha-va-c ca nirmalam.(VP 1.2.13).tad eva sarvamevaitad vyakta-vyaktasvarupavattatha- purus.aru-pen.a ka-laru-pen.a ca sthitam.(VP 1.2.14) (VS #110).



62 sa sarvabhu-taprakr.tim. vika-ra-n gun. a-didos.a-m. sca mune vyatı-tah.atı-tasarva-varan. o’khila-tma- tena-str.tam. yad bhuvana-ntara-le.(VP 6.5.83) (VS #110).

63 VP 6.5.84 ab is slightly different in the critical edition: samastakalya-n. agun.a-tmakohi svasaktilesa-vr.tabhu-tasargah. .

64 sa ı-svaro vyas.t.isamas.t.iru-po’vyaktasvaru-pah. prakat.asvaru-pah.sarvesrah. sarvadr.k sarvavetta- samastasaktih. paramesvara-khyah. .(VP 6.5.86) (VS #110).

65 In the critical edition, VP 6.5.87 cd states avagamyate instead of adhigamyate.66 samjña-yate yena tadastados.am. suddham. param. nirmalam ekaru-pam

samdr.syate va-py adhigamyate va- tajjña-namajña-mato’ nyad uktam.(VP 6.5.87).iti parabrahmasvaru-pavises.anirn. aya-yaiva pravr.ttam (VS #110).

67 sa eva sarvabhu-ta-tma- visvaru-po yato’ vyayah.sarga-dikam. tato’syaiva bhu-tastham upaka-rakam.(VP 1.2.69).sa eva sr.jyah. sa ca sargakarta- sa eva pa-tyatti ca pa-lyate cabrahma-diavastha-bhir ses.amu-rtir vis.n.ur varis.t.ho varado varen.yah. .(VP 1.2.70) (VS #112).

68 sa eva sarvesvarah. parabrahmabhu-to vis.n.ureva sarvam. jagaditi pratijña-ya sar-vabhu-ta-tma- visvarupo yato’ vyaya iti heturuktah. . sarvabhu- ta-na-m ayama-tma- vis-vasarı-ro yato’ vyaya ityarthah. . vaks.yati ca—tat sarvam. hares tanur iti (VP1.22.36). etad uktam. bhavati. asya-vyayasya-pi parasya brahman.o vis.n.or visvasarı-

rataya- ta-da-tmyam aviruddham itya-tmasarı-rayosca svabha-va- vyavasthita- eva (vanBuitenen translation) (VS #113).

69 For more on icons and images in Srı-vais.n. avism see Nayar 1992.70 In this first section, a description of Brahman’s divine form also includes discus-

sion of Brahman’s divine abode and his consort (s). I address only the discussionof the divine form and the scriptural examples utilized to support the existence ofa divine form. Additionally, I exclude discussions on the nature of the divineabode and the meaning of the important yet ambiguous term paramam. padam(VS #128–31).

71 tasyetasya parasya brahman.o na-ra-yan.asya-paricchedyajña-na-nanda-malatvasvar-u-pavajjña-nasakti balaisvaryavı-ryatejah.prabhr.tynavadhika-tisaya-sam. khyeyakalya--n. agun.avatsvasam. kalpapravartyasvetarasamastacidacidvastuja-tavatsvabha-bhimatasva-nuru-paikaru-padivyaru-pataducitaniratisayakalya-n. avividha-n antabhu-s.an. asvasa-ktisadr.sa-parimita-nanta- scaryana-na-vidha-yudha … (VS #127).

72 Also Ch Up 8.1.5, 8.7.1, 8.7.3, and Maitri Up 7.7 (Jacob 1891: 961).73 … sahasrasah. srutayah. santi (VS #127).74 svaru-pasabdah. svaru-paniru-pakadharmava-cı-. aparicchedyeti svaru-pam uktam. jña--

neti gun.a- ukta-h. . svasam. kalpeti vibhu-timattvam uktam. svaru-patadgun.avibhu-tayodivyaru-pa-dı-na-m. pra-ma-n. ikatve dr.s.t.a-ntataya- ukta-h. . divyavigraha-dayah. sa-dhya-h.(TD 306).

75 For more on the concept of vibhu-ti, see Oberhammer 2000.76 I do not discuss all the sruti passages because their contribution is identical to

that of the other examples discussed here. These passages are: Mun.d. Up 3.1.8,Sub Up 6, Taitt Sam. hita- 2.2.12.5, Maha- Na-r Up 1.5, Taitt Up 2.1, RV 10.129,RV 10.90. Additionally, I do not discuss sruti passages that mention the divineabode and Vis.n.u’s consorts (Taitt Sam. hita- 4.4.12.5; Taitt A

-r 3.13.1) as these

passages refer to “Vis.n.u’s abode” and “Srı- and Hrı- as his consorts” and do notmention his divine form (VS #127).

77 Van Buitenen 1956 and Olivelle 1998 translate tamasah. as darkness, but it canalso denote one of the three qualities (gun.a) of matter (prakr.ti), which is how



Ra-ma-nuja interprets this term in VS #131. In the same way rajas, is also renderedas “matter” by Ra-ma-nuja.

78 Van Buitenen 1956, VS #127, translates kapya-sam. pun.d.arı-kam evam aks.in. ı-sam as“many-colored lotus.” He summarizes the discussion regarding the meaning ofkapya-sam. pun.d.arı-kam evam aks.in. ı-, as found in the TD (TD 323ff). The threeacceptable meanings van Buitenen lists are: a-dityaks.itam. srı-mattva-t (splendor)emitted by the sun, for (the lotus) is resplendent, na-la-sanam, jalabhuvam. Thereasoning for a translation of “many-colored” is not clear. There are variantreadings for kapya-sam. See Olivelle 1998: 536.

79 Ra-ma-nuja explains the word comprised of the mind as follows: the mayat. affixdenotes a relation of abundance; here the relation is different, and it is one ofgrasping and being grasped. The meaning is as stated in sruti: however, by thepure mind [it is known].

80 veda-hametam. purus.am. maha-ntam a-dityavarn.am. tamasah. parasta-t (Sve Up 3.8).ya es.o’ntara-ditye hiran.mayah. purus.ah. … tasya yatha- kapya-sam. pun.d. arı-kamevam aks.in. ı- (Ch Up 1.6.6–7).sa ya es.o’ntarhr.daya a-ka-sah. . tasminn ayam. purus.o manomayo’mr.to hiran.mayah.manomaya (Taitt Up 1.6.1).sarve nimes.a- jajñire vidyutah. purus.a-d adhi (Maha- Na-r Up 1.6) (VS #127).

81 Maha- Nar Up 1.6 translation is my own.82 tameva viditva-ti mr.tyumeti na anyah. pantha- vidyate’yana-ya (Sve Up 3.8).

yasma-t param. na-paramasti kim. cidyasma-nna-n. ı-yo na jya-yo’sti kim. citvr.ks.eva stabdho divi tis.t.haty ekastenedam. pu-rn. am. purus.en. a sarvam(Sve Up 3.9).

83 sahasrası-rs.a- purus.ah. sahasra-ks.ah. sahasrapa-tsa bhu-mim. visvato vr.tva- atyatis.t.haddasa-n

. gulim(Sve Up 3.14).sarvatah. pa-n. ipa-dam. tatsarvato’ks.isiromukhamsarvatah. srutimalloke sarvama-vr.tya tis.t.hati(Sve Up 3.16).

84 atha ya es.ontara-ditye hiran.mayah. purus.o dr.syate hiran.yasmasrurhiran.yakesaa- pran. akha-tsarva eva suvarn. ah. .(Ch Up 1.6.6).tasya yatha- kapya-sam. pun. d. arı-kamevamaks.in. ı-. tasyoditi na-ma. sa es.a sarvebhyah.pa-pmabhya uditah. . udeti ha vai sarvebhyah. pa-pmabhyo ya evam. veda.(Ch Up 1.6.7).Olivelle 1998 translation.

85 sa ya es.o’ntarhr.daya a-ka-sah. . tasminnayam. purus.o manomayah. . amr.to hir-an.mayah. . antaren. a ta-luke. ya es.a stana iva-lambate. sendrayonih. . yatra-sau kesa-ntovivartate.vyapohya sı-rs.akapa-le. bhu-rityagnau pratitis.t.hati. bhuva iti va-yau.(Taitt Up 1.6.1).Olivelle 1998 translation.

86 For more on this upanis.ad, see Varenne 1960.87 In Maha- Na-r Up 3.12, nı-latoyadamadhyastha- vidyullekheva bha-svara- is translated

as, the middle of the blue cloud is radiant like a streak of lightning. HoweverRa-ma-nuja takes nı-latoyadamadhyastha- to be a bahuvrihi compound rather than asas.t.hi tatpurus.a, madhyastanı-latoyada-vidyullekheva. The TD provides the ratio-nale for this—the compound “within the blue-cloud” is a bahuvrı-hi; the irregularposition of the first member is accepted as a Vedic exception (TD 308).

88 nı-latoyadamadhyastha- vidyullekheva bha-svara- (Maha- Na-r Up 3.12).manomayah. pra-n. asarı-ro bha-ru-pah. satyaka-mah. satyasam. kalpah. . a-ka- sa-tma-

sarvakarma- sarvaka-mah. sarvagandhah. sarvarasah. sarvamidam abhya-tto’ va-kya--na-darah. .



(Ch Up 3.14.2).maha-rajanam. va-sa (Br. Up 2.3.6) (VS #127).Olivelle 1998 translation.

89 madhyasthanı-latoyada- vidduyullekheva seyam. daharapun.d. arı-kamadhyastha-ka--savartinı- vahnisikha- sva-ntarnihitanı-latoyada-bhaparama-tmasvaru-pa- sva-ntarnihi-tanı-latoyada- vidyudiva-bha-ti ityarthah. (VS #127). madhyastanilatoyada here, is aforced interpretation (van Buitenen 1956: 283).

90 svaru-pasabdo vigrahaparah. (TD 308).91 The term svaru-pa is found in a handful of upanis.ads such as Maitri Upanis.ad

7.11, Sarva Upanis.atsa-ra 3–5, Gopichandana 5, Muktika Upanis.AD 1.3, and 2.60(Jacob 1891: 1063).

92 evam. padadvayena ubhayavibhu-timattvam uktam. bhavati. sarvagandhah. sarvarasah.ityanena ca vigrahasiddhih. (TD 308–9).

93 maha-rajatam. ra-gadravyavises.ah. ; tena rañjitam. maha-rajatam (TD 309).94 itiha-sapura-n. ayor vedopabr.mhan.ayos ca-yam artha ucyate—

tau te medha-vinau dr.s.t.va- vedes.u parinis.t.hitauvedopabr.mhan.a-rtha-ya ta-vagra-hayata prabhuh. .Ra-ma-yan.a 1.4.6 (VS #133).

95 vyaktam es.a maha-yogı- parama-tma- sana-tanah.ana-dimadhyanidhano mahatah. paramo maha-n.(Ra-ma-yan.a 6.1.4.14) (VS #133).

96 ana-dimadhyanidhana iti svaru-panityatvam (TD 321).97 tamasah. paramo dha-ta- san. khacakragada-dharah.

srı-vatsavaks.a- nityasrı-r ajayyah. sa-svato dhruvah. .(Ra-ma-yan.a 6.1.4.15) (VS #133).

98 sara- na-na-vidha-s ca-pi dhanura-yatavigrahamanvagacchanta ka-kutstham. sarve purus.avigraha-h. .(Ra-ma-yan.a 7.109.7).vivesa vais.n. avam tejah. sasarı-rah. saha-nugah. (Ra-ma-yan.a 7.110.13ab) (VS #133).(not found in the critical edition of the epic).

99 samasta-h. saktyascaita- nr.pa yatra pratis.t.hita-h.tadvisvaru-pavairu-pyam. ru-pam anyad hareh. mahat.(VP 6.7.70).

100 Alternate readings for VP 6.7.70 cd are tadvisvavairu-pyam. ru-pam anyad hareh.mahat in VS #164 and in the critical edition of the VP it is tadvisvaru-paru-pam. vairu-pam anyad hareh. mahat.

101 atha tasminneva yogaprakaren.a upasam. ha-re’pi savises.aparava-kya-ni darsayandivyavigrahavatvam. ca-ha samasteti … tad visvaru-pavairu-pyamiti sannivesavai-laks.an.yam uktam (SP. Vol I. 215).

102 sarvasaktimayo vis.n.uh. svaru-pam. brahman.o’ parammu-rtam. yad yogibhih. pu-rvam. yoga-rambhes.u cintyate.(VP 1.22.59).sa parah. sarvasaktı-na-m. brahman.ah. samanantarah.mu-rtam. brahma maha-bha-ga sarvabrahmamayo harih. .(VP 1.22.61) (VS #133).

103 I do not address additional smr.ti examples as they do not add anything to theargument at hand. These passages are VP 1.8.39, VP 4.1.84ab, MBh 12.5.27, andMBh 12.191.9ab (VS #133). In closing the discussion of this first descriptionof Brahman, Ra-ma-nuja ends by citing Br Su- 1.1.21, which he claims suggeststhat Brahman has a transcendent form. But, this su-tra only mentions the term“attributes”.

104 yo’sa-va-dityaman.d. ala-ntarvartı- taptaka-rtasvaragirivaraprabhah. sahasra-m. susatasa-hasrakiran. o gambhı-ra-mbhah. samudrabhu-tasumr.s.t.ana-laravikaravikasitapun. d. arı-

kadala-mala-yateks.n. ah. … (VS #134).



105 Ra-ma-nuja refers to the Veda-nta of predecessors such as Bodha-yana, Tan.ka, andDramid.a whose works are not extant, as support for his view.

106 Van Buitenen 1956: 24–29.107 VS #135.108 etes.a-m. parijanastha-na-dı-na-m. sad eva somyedam agra a-sı-d ity atrajña-nabalaisvar-

ya-dikalya-n. agun.agan.avatparabrahmasvaru-pa-ntarbhu-tatva-t (VS #132).109 yatha- ka-ran. avastvantarbhu- tatva-j jña-na-digun. a-na-m. sad eva itya-diva-kye tes.a-m

abha-vo na pratipa-dyate; evam. nityavibhu-ter api ka-ran.avastvantarbhu-tatva-t sadeva itya-diva-kyagataih. sad eva, ekam eva, advitı-yam iti sabdair brahma-ntarbha-vo’vagamyate. nityavibhu-tivisis.t.am. brahmaiva avagamyatetyarthah. (TD 319).

110 subhru-lala-t.ah. suna-sah. susmita-dharavidrumah. surucirakomalagan.d. ah. kambugrı-

vah. samunnata-m. savilambica-ruru-padivyakarn. akisalayah. … (VS #134).111 prasannaca-ruvadanam. padmapatropamejñan.am

sukapolam suvistı-rn. alala-t.aphalakojjvalam.(VP 6.7.80).samakarn.a-ntavinyastaca-rukarn.avibhu-s.an. amkambugrı-vam. suvistı-rn. asrı-vatsa-n

. kitavaks.asam.(VP 6.7.81).

112 SBh 1.1.1.113 VS #133.114 … pı-navr.tta-yatabhujasca-rutara-ta-mrakaratala-nurakta-n. gulı-bhir. alam. kr.tas tanu-

madhyo visa-lavilaks.h. asthalah. samavibhaktasarva-n. go’nirdesyadivyaru-pasam. -hananah. snigdhavarn. ah. prabuddhapun.d. arı-kaca-rucaran. ayugalah. sva-nuru-papı-

ta-mbaradharo’malakirı-t.akun.d. alaha-rakaustubhakeyu-rakat.akanu-purodarabandha-na-dyaparimita-s carya-nantadivyabhu-s.an. ah. san.khacakragada-sisa-rn. gasrı-vatsavana-ma-la-lam. kr.tah. (VS #134).

115 valı-tribhan.gina- magnana-bhina- codaren.a vaipralamba-s.t.abhujam. vis.n.um athava-pi caturbhujam.(VP 6.7.82).samsthitorujan. gham. ca susthita-n. ghrikara-mbhujamcintayed brahmabhu-tam. tam. pı-tanirmalava-sasam.(VP 6.7.83).kirı-t.aca-rukeyu-rakat.aka-divibhu-s.itamsa-rn. gasan.khagada-khad. gacakra-ks.avalaya-nvitam.(VP 6.7.84).

116 anavadika-tisayasaundarya-hr.ta-ses.amanodr.s.t.ivr.ttir la-van.ya-mr.tapu-rita-ses.acara-carabh-u-taja-to’tyad bhuta-cintyanityayauvanah. pus.paha-rasasukuma-rah. pun.yagandhava-sita--nantadigantara-las trailokya-kraman.apravr.ttagambhı-rabha-vah. karun.a-nura-gamadhu-ralocana-valokita-sritavargah. purus.avaro darı-dr.syate (VS #134).

117 evam. ya es.o’ ntara-ditye (Ch Up 1.6.6) itya-di va-kyasya-rtha uktah. (TD 329).118 Ch Up 1.6.7, Br. Up 4.4.22, Ch Up 8.1.5, Maha- Nar Up 11.2–3, Mun.d. Up 3.1.8,

Br. Up 2.3.6, Svet Up 3.7, Taitt Sam 4.4.12.5, Taitt A-r 3.13.1, Taitt Up 2.1,

Mun.d. Up 2.3.10 (VS #135–37). There is also one passage whose source isunknown (VS #135).



3 Brahman, the individual self, andignorance in the Srı-bha-s.ya

In the last chapter on the Veda-rthasam. graha (VS), we examined Ra-ma-nuja’suse of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a (VP) as valid means of knowledge (sabdaprama-n.a) inconsolidating his views on the individual self, the causal nature of Brahmanand the divine form. This chapter examines the importance of the VP as validmeans of knowledge (sabdaprama-n.a) in Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on theBrahma Su-tras (Br Su-), the Srı-bha-s.ya (SBh). In the SBh, Ra-ma-nuja cites 161passages from the VP considerably exceeding the 133 from the Br.hada-ran.yakaUpanis.ad and 132 from the Bhagavadgı-ta- (Hohenberger 1960: 20–21). Aninteresting characteristic of the SBh is its lengthy commentary on Br Su- 1.1.1.It is in the commentary on this su-tra in particular, that we find sustained useof the VP. For this reason, this chapter addresses the significance of the VP inthe commentary on Br Su- 1.1.1 only. Furthermore, SBh 1.1.1, is comprised oftwo sections addressing the prima facie view—a Minor Objection (Laghu-pu-rvapaks.a) and a Major Objection (Maha-pu-rvapaks.a), and two correspond-ing conclusions (siddha-nta)—a Minor Conclusion (Laghusiddha-nta) and aMajor Conclusion (Maha-siddha-nta).1 Of these it is only the Major Objection,which presents the Advaita perspective, and the Major Conclusion, that arerelevant to our evaluation of the exegetical function of the VP.

The VP is crucial in Ra-ma-nuja’s arguments in SBh 1.1.1 in three ways.First, it helps define and provides support for Brahman’s nature. Second, itconclusively differentiates the individual self (both in its liberated and embo-died states) from Brahman. Third, it explains the relationship between Brah-man and ignorance (avidya-). In contrast to the VS, the SBh as a commentaryon the Brahmasu-tras constrains Ra-ma-nuja’s exegetical freedom in some ways;however, an interesting strategy of symmetry is evident in regard to his use ofthe VP. The very same scriptural passages cited as support of the prima facieview in the Major Objection are then reinterpreted in the Major Conclusion.Some possible reasons for such a hermeneutic strategy, I address below;however, the fact that the sections on scriptural support in the Major Objec-tion more or less mirror those in the Major Conclusion seems to be a uniquefeature of the SBh. This is not something that we witness in the VS, perhapsdue to the fact that it is not a commentary on a primary text. Since in thecourse of my analysis of SBh 1.1.1 I frequently refer to the structure of the


sections of the Major Objection and the Major Conclusion that addressscripture as a valid means of knowledge, I summarize the data in Table 3.1.

Though there are similarities in terms of the specific scriptural passagesthat are discussed in the Major Objection and the Major Conclusion, thereare also important variations as concern the VP. In the Major Objection,Ra-ma-nuja has the Advaitin cite sruti, Brahma Su-tras, Vis.n.u Pura-n.a, and theBhagavadgı-ta- to argue that Brahman alone is the only reality lacking anydifferentiations or qualities whatsoever. In the Major Conclusion, he firstrefutes the interpretation of these sruti and Br Su- passages and then cites anadditional thirty-three VP passages to establish the Visis.t.a-dvaita perspectiveon the nature of Brahman (noted in italics in Table 3.1). Though it may seemthat Ra-ma-nuja turns to sruti first and then smr.ti, namely the VP, we shall seethat it is the passages from the pura-n. a that directly address his concerns; infact, he interprets sruti based on his reading of the VP. Thus, in this section itis the content of this pura-n. a that supports his vision of the nature of Brahman.

After refuting the Advaita interpretation of sruti, Ra-ma-nuja then turns tothe VP passages and BhG passages cited in the Major Objection. He refutesthese passages by a detailed examination of the context of these verses andcites additional sruti and smr.ti to argue that the VP passages do not, as theAdvaitin claims, support attribute-less Brahman, but in fact address the indi-vidual self. Thus, the role of the VP in this second section of this chapter is tosupport the metaphysical reality of the individual self and to define its essentialnature, something that is not of concern to the objector. Having establishedthat the VP passages cited in the Major Objection in fact address the indivi-dual self rather than Brahman, Ra-ma-nuja goes on to cite additional VP andsruti to establish the distinction between the individual self (in both itsembodied and liberated states) and Brahman. These topics are examined inthe third section of this chapter.

Lastly, in the Major Objection, sruti and VP passages are utilized as supportfor ignorance as indescribable as either an entity or a non-entity and as thecause of the superimposition of the empirical world on Brahman. Subse-quently, in the Major Conclusion, after a refutation of the Advaita under-standing of ignorance as indefensible by means of logic, Ra-ma-nuja arguesthat scripture also does not support such a notion of ignorance. He does thisby re-interpreting certain terms such as anr.ta, satya, sat, asat, and so on,which denote ignorance (avidya-) for the Advaitin. Additionally, Ra-ma-nujaalso undertakes a systematic re-interpretation of sections of the VP that wereused in the Major Objection to support the prima facie view and uses these inturn to interpret sruti. This discussion on the nature of ignorance is covered inthe last section of the chapter.

Why does Ra-ma-nuja have the objector utilize the VP passages to supportthe Advaita worldview? There are three possible reasons for such use of theVP. First, Ra-ma-nuja, intending to use the VP later in his Major Conclusion,gives the Advaitin the opportunity to utilize the same scripture. Second, theVP may have been an important text within the Advaita tradition and a

Brahman, the individual self, and ignorance 65


Table 3.1 Scriptural Use in the Major Objection and Major Conclusion of Srı-bha-s.ya

Major Objection(Maha-pu-rvapaks.a)

Major Conclusion (Maha-siddha-nta)

Scripture supports attribute-less Brahman

� Ch Up 6.2.1, Mun.d. Up1.1.6, Taitt Up 2.1.1, SvetUp 6.19, Kena Up 2.3, Br.Up 3.4.2, Taitt Up 3.6.1,Br. Up 4.5.72, Br. Up4.4.19,3 Br. Up 2.4.14,4

Ch Up 6.1.4,5 Taitt Up2.7.1, Br Su 3.2.11, Br Su3.2.3

� VP 6.7.53, 1.2.6,1.4.38–41, 2.14.31,2.13.86, 2.14.32,2.16.23–24, 6.7.96

� BhG 10.20, 13.2, 10.39

Scripture does not teach a Brahmandevoid of all difference

Nature of Brahman

� Ch Up 6.2.1, Br Su 2.1.5,6 Mun.d. Up1.1.6, Taitt Up 2.1.1, Ch Up 6.2.3,6.2.1, Adhy Up 68, Svet Up 6.19,Mun.d. Up 1.1.9, Ch Up 6.2.3, Ch Up6.2.1, Ait Up 1.1, Kat.h Up 5.13, SvetUp 6.13, Svet Up 1.9, Svet Up 6.7–8,Ch Up 8.1.5, 8.7.1, 8.7.3, Taitt Up 2.8,Taitt Up 2.1.1, Ch Up 8.1.1, Ch Up3.14.1, Kena Up 2.3, Taitt Up 2.1.1,Mun.d. Up 3.2.9, Taitt Up 2.6.1, Br. Up2.4.14, Br. Up 3.4.2, Taitt Up 3.6.1, Br.Up 3.9.28, Taitt Up 2.8.1, Taitt Up2.9.1, Br. Up 4.4.19, Br. Up 2.4.14, TaittUp 2.6.1,7 Taitt Up 2.7.1, Br Su 3.2.11,Br Su 3.2.3

� BhG 10.3, 9.4–5, 7.6–7, 10.42, 15.17–18� VP 6.5.82–87, 6.5.72–77, 6.7.70–72,

1.22.53, 1.2.10–14, 6.4.39–40, 1.22.53–54, 6.7.61–63, 2.7.29–31, 1.22.60

Nature of the Individual Self

� VP 6.7.53, Svet Up 3.8, BhG 8.9,VP 6.7.55, 6.7.69–70, Vis.n.u Dharm114.23–26, VP 1.2.6, Taitt Up 3.1.1,MBh 1.1.264, VP 1.1.4–5, VP 1.1.31,VP 1.2.10, VP 1.1.2, VP 1.3.1–3,VP 1.4.38–41

Plurality of Individual Selves

� VP 2.14.31, BhG 5.18–19, VP 2.13.86,2.14.32, 2.16.23–24, VP 6.7.96 Mun.d.Up 3.1.1, Kat.h Up 3.1, Taitt A

-ran. 3.21,

VP 6.5.83.85, 6.7.61–62, Br Su 1.2.21,1.1.22, 2.1.22, Br. Up (Ma-dhy) 3.7.22,Br. Up 4.3.21, 4.3.35

Liberated Self is also distinct from Brahman

� VP 2.14.27, BhG 14.2, VP 6.7.30, BrSu 4.4.17, 4.4.21, 1.3.2, Ch Up 8.1.6,Taitt Up 2.1.1, Taitt Up 3.10.5, Ch Up8.12.3, Taitt Up 2.7.1, Mun.d. Up 3.2.8,Mun.d. Up 3.1.3, Br Su 3.3.11, 3.3.57,Mun.d. Up 3.2.9, Mun.d. Up 3.2.8, Ch Up8.3.4, VP 6.7.93–95, 2.14.33, 6.7.96,Vis.n.u Dharm 120, VP 6.7.61, BhG13.2, 15.16–17, 18.61, 15.15

� BhG 10.20, 13.2, 10.39� BhG 10.41–42


detailed analysis of this pura-n. a was a means of appropriating it as a Visi-s.t.a-dvaita text. To my knowledge, there is no evidence of the use of the VP inthe Veda-nta treatises of San.kara’s immediate disciples. This does not rule out,however, the possibility that the VP was popular within Advaita Veda-ntainterpretive communities as mentioned in Chapter 1.8 A third reason mightbe that Ra-ma-nuja was better able to counter the Advaita claim of attribute-less Brahman with the VP. In the analysis that follows, reasons two and threeseem the most plausible.

The nature of Brahman

In the Major Objection, Ra-ma-nuja has the Advaitin claim the followingabout Brahman:

Brahman alone, who is only consciousness and contrary to all character-izing attributes, is real; all entities other than it, such as the distinctions ofknowledge due to various types of knower and the known are thought toexist in him and are unreal.9

As pure consciousness, Brahman is perceived with attributes due to adjuncts(upa-dhi), when in fact it is identical with supreme knowledge and is theabsolute reality (vastusat) (De Smet 1953: 64, 83–84). To fully comprehendthe significance of the VP, in this discussion of the nature of Brahman webegin by juxtaposing Ra-ma-nuja’s summary statement on the nature of Brahmanwith that of the Advaitin:

The Highest Brahman, by his very nature, is declared to be devoid ofassociation with all faults, has the nature of all auspicious qualities, and

Table 3.1 (continued)

Major Objection(Maha-pu-rvapaks.a)

Major Conclusion (Maha-siddha-nta)

Scripture supports ignorance(avidya-)

� Ch Up 8.3.2, 8.3.1, RV10.129.1–3, Svet Up 4.10,Br Up 2.5.19, BhG 7.14,Mun.d. Up 2.21

� VP 2.12.39–40,VP 2.12.43–45

Scripture does not teach ignorance(avidya-)

� Ch Up 8.3.2, 8.3.1, RV 10.129.1–3, SubUp 2, Svet Up 4.10, VP 1.19–20, SvetUp 4.9, Ma-n.d. Up 2.21, Br Up 2.5.19,BhG 7.14

� VP 2.12.39–40, VP 2.12.43–45� VP 2.12.36, 2.12.38, 1.22.86, 1.22.38,

1.2.69, 2.12.39, 2.12.40, 2.12.41–45,2,12,38, 2.12.45–47, 2.13.100, 2.14.24,VP 2.13.2, VP 2.12.38



for purposes of sport (lı-la-), creates the world, preserves it, destroys it,enters into it, and controls it; all sentient and insentient beings under allkinds of conditions are undoubtedly real and are said to be the bodilyform of the Highest Brahman; the world has been stated to be so bywords such as body (sarı-ra), form (ru-pa), body (tanu),10 part (am. sa),power (sakti), and glorious manifestation (vibhu-ti) and so on; and bysa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya11 these are equated with the word ‘that’ (as in youare that Ch Up 6.8.7); the sentient being, which forms the vibhu-ti ofBrahman, exists in its own essential nature, and in the form of theembodied soul due to its association with insentient matter, because thecondition of the embodied self, which is veiled by ignorance (avidya-) inthe form of meritorious and sinful acts, does not recognize its essentialnature as comprised of sentience, but as having the nature of matter.Therefore, the Highest Brahman who is possessed of attributes and theworld, which is his manifestation (vibhu-ti), is known to be undoubtedlyreal as well.12

This description of Brahman utilizes terminology from the VP. Ra-ma-nujafinds several concepts in the pura-n. a that are important in establishing thesoul–body paradigm he uses so often to interpret sruti such as: the world asBrahman’s glorious manifestation13 (vibhu-ti), the world as His body (sarı-ra/tanu), the concept of ubhayalin.gatva (fact of possessing dual characteristics—infinite auspicious qualities and no faults whatsoever), Brahman’s creativeactivity as divine sport (lı-la-), and the nature of the individual self and itsassociation with ignorance (avidya-). These concepts for which he finds sup-port in the VP to counter the Advaita view of the world as only provisionallyreal are fundamental to his articulation of Veda-nta. In contrast to his refuta-tion of such a non-dual interpretation of sruti which focuses mainly on prov-ing that the upanis.ads teach a Brahman possessed of various attributes, theinformation provided by the VP is vastly different not only in terms of thedetail they provide, but also support for the soul–body framework so centralto Visis.t.a-dvaita Veda-nta.

Thus, as far as the nature of Brahman is concerned, in the Major Conclu-sion, both sruti and VP passages have been utilized, even though the pura-n. icpassages are mentioned only by Ra-ma-nuja. Though, it may seem that he hasutilized sruti and then smr.ti maintaining the traditional view of the corro-borative function of smr.ti, his re-interpretation of sruti mentioned in theMajor Objection is only to establish that a Brahman devoid of attributes isnot what the upanis.ads teach. That is, he engages with sruti cited in supportof the prima facie view only to argue that Brahman is not quality-less (nir-gun.a). For the additional information which characterizes his view of Brah-man, as stated in the summary statement above, he resorts to the VP. I firstevaluate Ra-ma-nuja’s refutation of the sruti that is mentioned in the MajorObjection and then address the BhG and VP passages, which are introducedby Ra-ma-nuja in his Major Conclusion.

68 Brahman, the individual self, and ignorance


Sruti support

In the Major Objection the following sruti passages are utilized to support theAdvaita view of Brahman as devoid of all attributes: Ch Up 6.2.1, Mun.d. Up1.1.6, Taitt Up 2.1.1, Svet Up 6.19, Kena Up 2.3, Br. Up 3.4.2, Taitt Up3.6.1, Br. Up 4.5.7,14 Br. Up 4.4.19,15 Br. Up 2.4.14,16 Ch Up 6.1.4,17 Br Su-

3.2.11, Br Su- 3.2.3. In the Major Conclusion, Ra-ma-nuja takes up these pas-sages to refute the Advaita characterization of Brahman. We will not discussall of these passages, but rather look at the exegetical strategies he employs tocounter the prima facie claims.18 To establish that the sruti in question in factsupport the Visis.t.a-dvaita point of view he utilizes the soul–body paradigm,the concept of Brahman’s dual nature (ubhayalin.gatva), and the postulate ofscriptural harmony (samanvaya). For re-interpreting the Br Su- passages3.2.11 and 3.2.3 he depends indirectly on the VP.

Ch Up 6.2.1, in the beginning, son, this world was simply what is existent,one only, without a second is the first scripture that is provided as support bythe objector. Chapter 6 of the Cha-ndogya Upanis.ad is the source text for thesatka-ryava-da doctrine, that the cause and effect are non-different. For San. -kara, however, these “creation texts are no more than a device for suggestingthe idea that the individual self and the highest self are (in their true nature)identical” and are only a means to point beyond empirical reality (Alston1980, Vol. II: 191). For Ra-ma-nuja, on the other hand, Brahman’s originativecausality is an important aspect of “God’s relatedness to finite being” and thispassage is indeed one of Ra-ma-nuja’s maha-va-kyas, “great utterances” thatembody core Veda-ntic truths (Lipner 1986: 82). Refuting the Advaitic inter-pretation of this sruti as supporting a Brahman devoid of all attributes, heargues instead that this scripture affirms the highest Brahman denoted by satas the material and efficient cause of the world, who is omniscient, omnipo-tent, wills the truth, pervades all, supports all, controls all, and is character-ized by innumerable auspicious qualities and is the inner self or soul to theworld that comprises his body. Thus, unless the soul–body paradigm isinvoked to read Ch Up 6.2.1, it will not yield an interpretation conducive toVisis.t.a-dvaita, in this particular instance. Indeed, “Ra-ma-nuja’s belief thatfinite selves [and matter] constitute the body of the Supreme Self is for him,not the conclusion of a rational argument, but a fundamental fact vouchedfor by scripture” (Carman 1974: 127).19

The soul–body paradigm is also closely associated with Ra-ma-nuja’sconcept of Brahman’s causality and the rejection of the world’s status asprovisionally real, and it is crucial in his redefinition of the concepts ofdiversity and manifoldness. Br. Up 4.4.19/Br. Up 4.5.15 is cited in the MajorObjection as evidence that there is no other reality than the attribute-lessBrahman:

there is here nothing diverse at all. From death to death he goes, who seeshere any kind of diversity20



when however, the whole has become one’s very self, then who is there forone to see and by what means?21

Once Again, Ra-ma-nuja notes that the Advaitic view is to be dispensed with:

this whole world being an effect of Brahman and having Brahmanas its inner ruler is one with Brahman, because Brahman is its self.Manifoldness contrary to this (understating of diversity) is rejected bythese texts.22

Additionally, he employs the principle of scriptural harmony (samanvaya) toclaim that unless these passages are interpreted in this way they would con-tradict other sruti such as may I become many, may I be born (Ch Up 6.2.3).Ra-ma-nuja redefines what “diversity” means in this upanis.ad as somethingthat issues forth from the unitary complex of Brahman, matter, and indivi-dual selves, and as such is not contrary to the “one-ness” that this scriptureteaches.

The second mode of interpretation that Ra-ma-nuja employs is the conceptof ubhayalin.gatva, the fact that Brahman possesses all auspicious perfectionsand is devoid of any imperfections whatsoever (Carman 1974: 88). Mun.d. Up1.1.5–6 states:

whereas the higher (knowledge) is that by which one grasps the imper-ishable. What cannot be seen, what cannot be grasped, without color,without sight or hearing, without hands and feet; what is eternal and all-pervading, extremely minute, present everywhere … that is immutable,which the wise fully perceive.23

Applying the concept of dual characteristics of Brahman to the passage, theconclusion he reaches is that this passage only denies Brahman’s possession ofdefects pertaining to matter (prakr.ti), but that it does not in fact support aBrahman that is attribute-less. That is, Ra-ma-nuja takes all the qualitiesdenied of Brahman by scripture and the Advaitin as only those that concernmaterial nature. He elaborates that “[i]n Mun.d. Up 1.1.5–6, the highestBrahman is said to possess innumerable auspicious qualities, is all-knowing, isthe root of all beings, immutable, omnipresent, subtle, manifest, eternal andfree from qualities of matter (prakr.ti)”.24 Whereas, for the Advaitin Brahmanqualified with attributes, even auspicious perfections results from the verysame adjuncts that produce ignorance (De Smet 1953: 47). Similarly, Ra-ma--nuja interprets sruti such as … without parts, inactive, tranquil, unblemished,spotless (Svet Up 6.19) as affirming the perfections of Brahman and thenegation of all faults. In fact, for Ra-ma-nuja this dual nature of Brahman inregard to the qualities He possesses is one of the unique and defining featuresof Brahman and which distinguishes Him from all other entities (Carman1974: 103–4).



As a third exegetical strategy, Ra-ma-nuja resorts to the concept of scripturalharmony (samanvaya) to re-interpret passages such as Kena Upanis.ad 2.3,which states:

it is envisioned by one who envisions it not; but one who envisions itknows it not. And those who perceive it perceive it not; but it is perceivedby those who perceive it not.

(Kena Up 2.3)

According to San. kara, in this upanis.ad:

it is first said that the projection of the world proceeds from the Absolute.And in the end it is declared that one finds perfect stability bringingfreedom from all fear, in identifying oneself with the absolute bereft of allrelation with the perceptible and imperceptible aspects of the world.

(Sarasvati 1989: 75)

So, while one’s inner Self, Brahman as pure consciousness, is beyond the dis-tinctions of subject, object, and the act of knowing, the realization of this Selfis initialized through the study of scripture (Hirst 2005: 39ff; Rambachan1991: 113–16).

Ra-ma-nuja replies that if indeed Brahman is not an object of knowledge asthe objector claims, then other scriptural passages such as he who knowsBrahman attains the highest (Taitt Up 2.1.1), he who knows Brahman becomesBrahman himself (Mun.d. Up 3.2.9) that speak of the effect of the knowledgeof Brahman would contradict the Advaita reading of Kena Upanis.ad. Notehere, that the Mun.d. Up passage is more conducive as support for the Advaitaperspective. However, Ra-ma-nuja counters that this cannot be the meaning ofMun.d. Up 3.2.9, otherwise passages which affirm the identity of Brahmanwith the world such as, Brahman, you see, is this whole world. With innertranquility, one should venerate it as jala-n25 (Ch Up 3.14.1) would be mean-ingless. Ra-ma-nuja as we mentioned earlier takes Brahman’s originative caus-ality as one of the defining features of the divine essential nature, and sothis passage which identifies Brahman with the world can only make senseif Brahman is understood as a differentiated whole and the knowledge ofsuch a Brahman is stated in scripture to be of the form of worship andmeditation.

Lastly, the Major Objection also cites Brahma Su-tras (Br Su-) as support foran attribute-less Brahman.26 Though the Br Su- is a smr.ti text, since it is asummary text of the meaning of sruti, it is deemed as a relevant source afterthe sruti citations. For instance Br Su- 3.2.11 is utilized which states, not evenaccording to place, two fold characteristics belong to the highest for everywhere(it is taught). This su-tra is meant to reconcile two types of sruti, the ones thataffirm that Brahman possesses attributes and those that claim that it is devoidof any qualities. San.kara argues in his commentary on this su-tra that it is not



logical to uphold both these assertions in regard to Brahman and concludesthat those texts that speak of Brahman endowed with qualities are simply dueto limiting adjuncts which result from ignorance. Ra-ma-nuja on the otherhand, utilizing VP 6.5.84–85 and VP 1.22.53, argues essentially what hehas done in his exegesis of Mun.d. Upa 1.1.5–6 which we mentioned earlier.This strongly suggests that Ra-ma-nuja needs VP particulars to interpret srutipassages according to Visis.t.a-dvaita. This is a rather ingenious exegeticalmove and we have come across this even in the VS where he cites BhG pas-sages as support for his point of view, but his reading of those very verses (inthe Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya) utilize the VP. Thus this pura-n. a is, in a sense, thethread (su-tra) on which hangs Ra-ma-nuja’s interpretations of scripture throughhis various texts and commentaries.

In summary, some of the exegetical strategies Ra-ma-nuja employs to inter-pret sruti to refute the Advaita interpretation of sruti are: to utilize the soul–body paradigm coupled with his view of Brahman’s originative causality tore-interpret concepts of diversity and manifoldness; the concept of Brahman’sdual characteristics (ubhayalin.ga) and also the use of the concept of scripturalharmony (samanvaya) to reconcile contradictions within texts on the natureof Brahman. Moreover, in some of the Brahma Su-tras that are cited, Ra-ma-nujautilizes the VP to interpret the su-tra according to Visis.t.a-dvaita. What isstriking in this polemic on the interpretation of sruti is that he engages withthe Advaitin only in so far as to argue against a quality-less Brahman,whereas in his engagement with smr.ti, which immediately follows and whichhe himself introduces, he broadens the scope of this rather limited definitionof Brahman.

In the next two sections we discuss Ra-ma-nuja’s citations from the BhG andVP as support for his views on the nature of Brahman. Again, these passagesare not cited in the Major Objection. The insertion of such smr.ti support inthe Major Conclusion is significant, particularly the VP, because the vocabu-lary Ra-ma-nuja utilizes to define Brahman in his summary statement is takenentirely from this pura-n. a, details essential to support the very paradigms(soul–body and so on) he has utilized to read sruti.

Bhagavadgı-ta- support

Prior to citing passages from the VP, Ra-ma-nuja also quotes eight verses fromthe BhG that he has not had the Advaitin utilize in the Major Objection. Themain function of the BhG passages is to foreshadow the content of the VP. Ina sense they give more information than the sruti, but considerably less thanthe subsequent VP verses. The first BhG passage is taken from Chapter 10traditionally referred to as vibhu-tiyoga that emphasizes Kr.s.n. a’s lordship overcreation. As we saw earlier in this chapter, in Ra-ma-nuja’s summary statement,the concept of the world as a manifestation (vibhu-ti) of Brahman is one of theways in which the Advaita view of Brahman is countered. According to



Ra-ma-nuja, BhG 10.3 ab, he who knows me as unborn, beginning-less and thegreat Lord of the universe27 conveys the knowledge of Kr.s.n. a’s true nature(ya-tha-tmyavis.ayajña-na), specifically as the supreme creator and controllerover his created manifestation which he pervades (Carman 1974: 140). ThisBhG passage is also indirectly related to the VP.

In his Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya, commenting on BhG 10.3, Ra-ma-nuja refer-ences VP 6.7.46ff on the three innate tendencies (bha-vana) that characterizeall embodied beings.28 Karmabha-vana is the suitability to work, brahmabha--vana translates as fitness for meditation and yoga, and ubhayabha-vana is thecapability to engage in both actions and meditation. All beings operate withinthese three propensities and the point of the VP is that Brahman is unique inthat he is beyond such tendencies, which fall under the purview of matter andsam. sa-ra. The importance of this section of the VP, called the Sub-ha-srayaprakaran.a (Treatise on the Auspicious Object) is solely devoted to thedescription of Vis.n.u as the most auspicious and worthy object of meditation,who as the supreme reality, is indeed a unique being, both creator and thecreated and stands as the controller of his manifest creation. The fact that thecommentary on BhG 10.3ab itself which is cited here as evidence depends onthe VP, highlights Ra-ma-nuja’s dependence on the VP as a text that is crucialeven for reading the BhG in a “correct” way.

While BhG 10ab is meant to support Ra-ma-nuja’s view of Brahman as thesupporter and controller of a world that is his glorious manifestation, the nexttwo BhG passages highlight another aspect of Vis.n.u’s lordship:

All beings abide in me, however I do not abide in them.(BhG 9.4cd)

And yet beings do not abide in me. Behold my divine yogaI am the upholder of all beings and yet I do not abide in themMy will keeps them in existence.29

(BhG 9.5)

According to Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on these passages the idea of Brahmanas the abider or pervader of all creation (9.4cd) intimates that he is the innercontroller and the master (ses.in) who rules and controls the world that hepervades. So too 9.5, where he interprets upholder of beings as the supporterwho sustains all simply with his will. These two BhG passages along with10.3 highlight the important aspects of the soul–body paradigm of thesupport/supported (a-dha-ra/a-dheya), controller/controlled (niyanta/niyamana),and master/servant (ses.in/ses.a) (Carman 1974: 127ff). Though these BhG pas-sages as Ra-ma-nuja interprets them seem more comprehensive in refuting theAdvaita view of an attribute-less Brahman than sruti, the specific details thatprovide evidence for this soul–body relationship itself is mentioned only inthe VP.



Ra-ma-nuja also cites BhG 10.42cd, 7.6cd, 7.7, 15.17, and 15.18 in hisMajor Conclusion. In his commentary on all these BhG passages he utilizesthe VP. I discuss the importance of this pura-n. a in countering an Advaitainterpretation of these BhG verses in Chapter 4.30 The use of the BhG priorto the VP signals its importance within Veda-ntic circles. After all, it was oneof the three foundational texts of Veda-nta philosophy in addition to theBrahma Su-tras and the upanis.ads. More importantly, Ra-ma-nuja takesKr.s.n. a’s instructions as a “theological directive” seriously as he understandsthe BhG as Brahman’s self-revelation (Ram-Prasad 2013: 112). So, how canwe evaluate the contribution of the BhG passages on the nature of Brahman?The fact that the VP is utilized to interpret a majority of these BhG passagesillustrates the importance of this pura-n. a and that Ra-ma-nuja has it in mindregardless of whether he’s commenting on the upanis.ads, the Brahma Su-trasor the Bhagavadgı-ta- . As we shall see in Chapter 4 on the Bhagavadgı-ta-bha--s.ya, though the BhG itself may provide Ra-ma-nuja with the general Visi-s.t.a-dvaita framework, much more so than some sruti, the VP is essential forparticulars that serve as evidence for important doctrines such as the soul–body paradigm and to his overall project of establishing certain scripture asexpositions of Visis.t.a-dvaita Veda-nta.

Vis.n.u Pura-n.a support

Thus far, to support the nature of Brahman as envisioned in Visis.t.a-dvaita,Ra-ma-nuja has countered the Advaita interpretation of sruti cited in theMajor Objection and has then gone on to provide evidence from the BhG.Subsequently, he cites an additional thirty VP passages as support. Though atfirst, it may seem that he has primarily relied on sruti and then cited smr.tias support, it is the VP that provides concepts salient to his philosophythat are lacking in sruti, at least the ones that he has utilized. In the previoussection we saw that even smr.ti passages such as the BhG need the VP tointerpret Kr.s.n. a as the supreme Brahman eternally differentiated and as theensouler of creation. While Ra-ma-nuja imposes the soul–body paradigmto read sruti, the VP is the source, where he finds direct evidence of sucha relationship to begin with, at least in this particular section of his Br Su-

commentary.The rest of this section evaluates the significance of some of the VP pas-

sages, which provide details on the nature of Brahman not found in sruti. Thefirst set of passages (VP 6.5.83–87) is taken from Chapter 6.5 of the pura-n. adescribes the various types of dissolutions, hells, and heavens, and ends with asyllabic exegesis of the term “Lord” (bhagava-n), which is said to primarilydenote Va-sudeva, the Supreme Brahman (VP 6.5.5.69–79):

O’ sage, He is beyond matter that comprises all beings, its modifications31

and faults such as those arising due to the qualities of matter Beyond all



concealment, He is the self of all, and in this way32 invincible, He pervadeswhatever is in the intermediate region.33

(VP 6.5.83)

His nature is constituted of all auspicious qualities, he supports the wholeof creation with a small part of his power; assuming at will any desiredform, He accomplishes the good of the world.34

(VP 6.5.84)

He is a collection of qualities such as splendor, strength, sovereignty,knowledge, renown, and power. He is the highest of the high, who is thelord of the high and low devoid of faults and so on.35

(VP 6.5.85)

He is the lord, has the form of separate and aggregate matter, He has theessential nature of the unmanifest and manifest; He is the lord of every-thing, seeing everything, omniscient, having power over everything, andcalled the highest lord.36

(VP 6.5.86)

That by which it (Brahman) is understood as devoid of faults, pure,highly stainless, of one form,that is knowledge; all else is called ignorance.37

(VP 6.5.87)

In his re-interpretation of Mun.d. Up 1.1.5–6 earlier, Ra-ma-nuja depends onthe concept of ubhayalin.gatva, the fact that Brahman possesses auspiciousqualities and is, in addition, devoid of any fault or imperfections associatedwith matter. This is in contrast to the Advaitin, for whom this upanis.ad con-veys a Brahman who is devoid of any qualities. Since the upanis.ad itself doesnot mention particulars to support either view, the VP, which is much moredirect on this issue serves a significant purpose. VP 6.5.83 rejects Brahman’sassociation with matter and the faults thereof and read together with 6.5.84–85which states Brahman as beyond all concealment, invincible and as the repositoryof auspicious qualities, offers direct evidence of the dual nature of Brahman. Asfar as the nature of the world and its relationship to Brahman go, these passagesin no uncertain terms assert creation as a positive manifestation of Brahman.Even while rejecting Brahman’s association with matter, these verses speak ofthe world of separate and aggregate matter as His form (ru-pa) and theunmanifest and manifest as comprising his essential nature (svaru-pa).Additionally, support for the reality of the world and its connection to

Brahman is found in VP 6.5.84. That Brahman incarnates and is concernedwith world welfare contradicts the Advaita perspective. The concept ofVis.n.u’s incarnation has no reference in sruti that Ra-ma-nuja has utilized.Moreover, the commentator on the SBh, Sudarsanasu-ri, connects the



incarnation of Vis.n.u to a worshipable form of the deity, he states that whenthe VP claims that “He accomplishes the good of the world by means of thisvery descent”, the use of this (form) as a vigraha (worshipable form) isestablished.38 The term vigraha suggests a concrete image, perceptible to thehuman eye. Both Ra-ma-nuja and the commentator contextualize the world,incarnations, devotion and worship as relevant and real contra-Advaita. ForSan. kara, Brahman as the Lord over his creation who incarnates periodically is apossibility only in the realm of ignorance.

The VP passages that follow, 6.5.86–87, affirm the identity between Brahmanand the world and, at the same time, underscore His difference from themprecisely because he is bereft of the faults of matter (prakr.ti). The fact that6.5.86 states that matter and spirit are the very form (ru-pa) of Brahman overwhich he exercises power, also contradicts the Advaita view of an attribute-lessBrahman alone as real. The commentator notes that:

the expression separate and aggregate matter, stands for the whole ofintelligent beings, in their condition (avastha-) of cause and effect … ThatBrahman has these as his form means that they constitute His body. ThatBrahman has this manifestation as His essential nature (svaru-pa) meansthat it is a body unique to Him alone.39

As Brahman’s body, creation in its manifest and unmanifest forms is real.And as His body, it does not affect the essential purity of Brahman. VP 6.7.87then goes on to define knowledge of Brahman as the possessor of a body overwhich he is sovereign.

We mentioned earlier that though these VP passages are clear on the natureof Brahman as Ra-ma-nuja envisions it, there are some phrases that are pro-blematic and can be taken as supportive of the Advaita perspective. Twophrases in VP 6.5.83 might be seen as problematic, that Brahman is the selfof all and that he pervades certain cosmic regions, which are Advaitic intenor. However, as we have already seen in the discussion of BhG 9.4cd and9.5, Ra-ma-nuja interprets pervasion in the context of the soul–body relation-ship. To refute the Advaita interpretation of the world as unreal, the com-mentator of the SBh interprets pervasion (a-str.ta), in VP 6.5.83, as follows: “inthe intermediate region (6.5.83) means within the two-fold manifestation(vibhu-ti)”.40 This is a reference to the world of sport/creation (lı-la-vibhu-ti) andthe eternal manifestation (nityavibhu-ti) which comprises the supreme gloriousmanifestation (anantamaha-vibhu-ti) of Vis.n.u in later Srı-vais.n. avism. The in-troduction of the concept of vibhu-ti is meant to refute the Advaita concept ofthe empirical reality as an illusion.41 Even in the VS, using the concept ofvibhu-ti, Ra-ma-nuja prevails over the Advaita idea of the world as illusion.Thus the VP is not entirely amenable to a Visis.t.a-dvaitic reading and after allRa-ma-nuja has the Advaitin cite this very pura-n. a as support in the MajorObjection; however, he weaves together passages from various sections of thepura-n. a to accentuate details such as world as the form (ru-pa) of Brahman



and creation as an essential nature (svaru-pa) of Brahman that assist himgreatly.

The next four VP passages (6.7.70–72; 1.22.51) introduce the reason forcreation as well as present more information on the different forms of Brahman.I will only discuss VP passages 6.7.70–71 here, as VP 6.7.72 and 1.22.51assert the transcendence of Brahman from the world, which is a concept alsomentioned in sruti:

O’ King, where all these powers are established, that is anothergreat form of Hari, that is a different form42 from the universal form.43

(VP 6.7.70)

Out of His own playfulness, He causes that form, endowed with allpowers to manifest as gods, animals, men, and so on.44

(VP 6.7.71)

The first passage affirms two forms of Brahman: the universal form of Hariwherein the three powers of Vis.n.u are established and the great form of Hari.The former is the very form that manifests itself as created beings and ismentioned in earlier passages of the same VP chapter (6.7.60–61) and also inVP 6.7.71 here. The second form, the great form of Hari, is the divine form ordivyaru-pa discussed in the VS from which result the various incarnations ofVis.n.u. The concept of divine sport (lı-la-) and the fact that the world is simplya transformation of one of the forms of Vis.n.u also affirms creation and itspositive relationship to Brahman. This association between Brahman and theworld as a vital part of the nature of the supreme reality is a strong critique ofAdvaita.

Brahman as the inner self of both individual selves and matter is addressedin VP 1.2.10–1445 and VP 6.4.39–40, and forms the basis for the soul–bodyparadigm that Ra-ma-nuja takes for granted in his earlier re-interpretation ofsruti such as Ch Up 6.2.3:

The supreme self is the highest of the high, the highest self; He abides inthe selfand is devoid of distinguishing attributes such as form, color, and so on.46

(VP 1.2.10)

He is everywhere, and all things abide in him,therefore He is called Va-sudeva by the learned.47

(VP 1.2.12)

That Brahman is the highest, eternal, unborn, imperishable, and indivisibleof one essential nature and is pure, always devoid of faults.48

(VP 1.2.13)



That alone is all this, possessing the essential nature of manifest andunmanifest;and also existing in the form of the individual self (purus.a) and time.49

(VP 1.2.14)

In 1.2.10, Brahman as the highest self is said to abide in the self, thereby dis-tinguishing the individual self from Brahman, for Ra-ma-nuja. This verse clari-fies the ambiguity we saw with VP 6.5.83, where Brahman is declared as theself of all, which had an Advaitic tenor. The commentator also notes that withthis phrase, Brahman’s continuity with things (vastvapariccheda) is estab-lished.50 That is, as the inner self of individual selves and matter, the originativecausal link with Brahman is ever present. Whereas in VP 6.5.86 all things asforms of Brahman is mentioned, here, Brahman as the inner self of the (indi-vidual) self, highlights the soul–body paradigm.51 Two other concepts from thisprevious verse (6.5.86) are also echoed in VP 1.12.13–14. First, to illustrate thepositive relation of Brahman to the world, these two passages speak of the worldas an essential nature (svaru-pa) of Brahman which we find in VP 6.5.86 as well.

Second, while describing Brahman as completely transcendent, entirelydifferent from any other entity, and of one essential nature (ekasvaru-pa), theVP also describes him as possessing the essential nature of the manifest andthe unmanifest (vyakta-vyaktasvaru-pa). To define creation as an aspect of Brah-man’s essential nature in this way conclusively denies the status of the worldas only provisionally real. Having stressed the innate difference betweencreation and Brahman, Ra-ma-nuja affirms Brahman as the source from whicheverything manifests and is reabsorbed.52 The fact that 1.2.10–14 articulatedifferent aspects that comprise the soul–body relationship makes the discussionof emanation and reabsorption of the world from and into Brahman distinctfrom that of San.kara who also asserts the same, though not in an ultimate sense.

VP 1.2.14 mentions individual self (purus.a) and matter (prakr.ti) as powers orforms of Brahman and these next two passages from VP 1.22 are an elaborationof this concept. The fact that Ra-ma-nuja cites passages from the beginning ofBook One, Chapter 1.2 and then the last chapter of the same book 1.22, suggeststhat for him, this pura-n.a as a coherent whole supports his Veda-nta:

Brahman has two forms,53 embodied and unembodied; these two forms,perishable and imperishable, exist in all beings.

(VP 1.22.53)

The imperishable is the highest Brahman, the perishable is this entire world.Just as fire situated in one place spreads all around, so is this whole worldthe manifestation of Brahman’s power.54

(VP 1.22.54)

There may also be another reason that Ra-ma-nuja mentions passages from VP1.2 and VP 1.22 in conjunction. There is some ambiguity here as to what the



imperishable in 1.22.53 denotes. Having stated that two forms of Brahman,the perishable and imperishable exist in all things, it is identified as the world,that is, the world of matter, whereas the imperishable is said to be the highestBrahman Himself. It is difficult to identify the imperishable here with theindividual self which is mentioned in 1.2.14. Ra-ma-nuja, however, reads this inthe context of the soul–body paradigm. According to him, the statement theimperishable is the highest Brahman can refer to the individual self throughsa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya. That is, the individual self can be referred to as Brahman,since Brahman has already been stated to be the inner self of the individualself in VP 1.2.10. Subsequent to this, Ra-ma-nuja discusses the essential natureof the individual self and the concealment of the attributive nature of theindividual self by karma (VP 6.7.61–63). I shall not discuss these here, asthese passages are addressed in the section on the individual self in Chapter 2.However, they illustrate that we cannot speak of Brahman’s nature withouttaking individual selves and matter into account.

Ra-ma-nuja concludes the section on the nature of Brahman by citing twomore passages from the VP:

O’ wise one, matter (pradha-na) and individual self (purus.a) are envelopedby the power of Vis.n.u, which is the self residing in all beings.

(VP 2.7.29)

That same power is the cause of their separation and conjunction.55

(VP 2.7.30ab)

Vis.n.u as the inner self residing in all beings wills (sam. kalpa) the associationand dissociation of matter and individual selves. These passages again, couldbe read in an Advaita context; however, when read together with the previousVP passages they yield a different interpretation. Note that even in the stateof dissolution, matter (prakr.ti) and the individual selves (purus.a) dissociatedue to Brahman’s will, but continue to exist as attributes of Brahman. Ela-borating on the lordship of Brahman over his attributes, the individual selfand matter, he quotes two more passages to decisively refute Brahman’s directassociation with them:

Just as the wind when it touches water carries hundreds of drops so doesthe power of Vis.n.u carry the world consisting of pradha-na and purus.a.56

(VP 2.7.31)

O’ best among sages, this world, which undergoes modifications due toexpansion, contraction, birth, and decay is imperishable and eternal.57

(VP 1.22.58)

The claim in VP 1.22.58 that the world is eternal and imperishable coincideswith Ra-ma-nuja’s thesis that Brahman is an eternally differentiated being and



so matter (prakr.ti) and individual self (purus.a) are eternal. Thus change ortransformation does not render prakr.ti non-eternal, since as an eternal com-ponent of Brahman’s body it merely undergoes change in its condition. Thecommentator expands on the metaphor of wind and rain used to convey thistranscendent, yet immanent nature of Brahman:

The example illustrates the distinction of the cause from the effect. The windcarries the drops of water away from it separately. Or else the example isillustrative of conjunction and separation: the wind carries the dropsmutually connected or separated. Or else, the example illustrates thatVis.n.u is free from any traces of defects due to his association with matterand individual selves. Indeed the wind carries hundreds of drops of waterwithout being affected in its nature.58

From these passages Ra-ma-nuja finds support for what he has claimed is thenature of Brahman in his summary statement mentioned earlier: that thehighest Brahman is declared by nature to be free from even the slightest offaults, is comprised of all auspicious qualities, and engages out of sport in thecreation, preservation, destruction of the world, which is not an illusion butthe divine body (sarı-ra,ru-pa, sakti, vibhu-ti) itself. Ignorance itself is karmathat conceals and is also real. The inner differentiation of Brahman comprisedof matter and individual selves is a concept that is most clearly articulated inthe thirty passages he introduces in the Major Conclusion to counter theprima facie view of attribute-less Brahman in the Major Objection.

In conclusion, based on the specifics from the VP, Ra-ma-nuja states that theconcepts of manifestation (vibhu-ti) and so on can be equated to the term“that” (Ch Up 6.8.7) by sa-ma-n.a-dhikaran.ya or co-ordinate predication. Heunderstands this sruti to equate two different states (avastha-) of Brahman: theterm you which refers to Brahman as the inner self of the individual self, andthe term that denotes Brahman as the creator. Both these conditions ofBrahman are non-different but not due to the fact that one’s inner most self isultimately Brahman itself.

As we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Ra-ma-nuja has theAdvaitin, in the Major Objection, also cite VP and BhG passages along withsruti discussed in this section. Ra-ma-nuja has not addressed the smr.ti support,BhG and VP from the Major Objection, yet. He proceeds to do this afterhis introduction of these VP passages. While certain VP passages arementioned in the Major Objection as support of a non-dual Brahman, as theAdvaitin envisions it, Ra-ma-nuja claims that the context of these passages isin fact the individual self and not Brahman. Thus, utilizing the same VPevidence that supports the prima facie view of the attribute-less Brahman,Ra-ma-nuja re-interprets these in his Major Conclusion. The next sectionexamines his re-interpretation of the VP passages cited in the Major Objection assupport.



The nature of the individual self

In reclaiming the VP as a Visis.t.a-dvaitic text, Ra-ma-nuja undertakes a detailedanalysis of the context of the VP passages cited in the Major Objection.He argues that the VP does not support a quality-less (nirgun.a) Brahman asthe Advaitin claims, rather these passages refer to the individual self in itsessential nature. For the Advaitin, the metaphysical reality of the individualself is not an issue of much importance, as it is for Ra-ma-nuja. In SBrSuBh1.2.6, San. kara comments that “the supreme self is loosely spoken of by theimmature souls as the embodied individual soul, taken to be limited by itsapparent conditioning adjuncts, the body, sense-organs, mind and intellect …this remains true as long as the teaching of the existence and the sole realityof the self in the text ‘that thou art’ has not been properly assimilated” (Sarasvati1989: 59). Ra-ma-nuja’s counter-claim that the eleven VP passages cited in theMajor Objection address the individual self rather than Brahman undercutsthe prima facie view significantly. To establish the metaphysical reality of theindividual self, three59 important concepts are addressed: the essential natureof the self, the metaphysical reality of a plurality of individual selves, andBrahman as distinct even from the individual self that is liberated.

The essential nature of the individual self

The first VP passage utilized by the Advaitin to support a quality-less Brahmanis VP 6.7.53:

That in which distinctions have disappeared, which is only pure existence,inexpressible by words, self-knowing, knowing that is called knowingBrahman.60

It is easy to see why the Advaitin claims that the topic of discussion here isBrahman. Ra-ma-nuja however launches into an exegesis of VP 6.7 to establishthe individual self as the topic of discussion. VP 6.7.53 is part of the Sub-ha-srayaprakaran.a (Treatise on the Auspicious Object),61 which is an impor-tant section for Ra-ma-nuja. Indeed we have come across his use of this sectionof the VP in both the VS and the SBh (section on the nature of Brahman). Toreiterate briefly, in VP 6.7, yoga is declared as the only means for the cessa-tion of sam. sa-ra and then a detailed explanation of the various steps of thisyogic path are stated. The discussion then turns to a worthy and appropriateobject of meditation. The pura-n. a posits as possibilities two forms (ru-pa) ofVis.n.u, denoted as his two powers (sakti)—the unembodied power and theembodied power, that is the individual self in its essential nature and theembodied individual self associated with matter called ignorance (avidya-) orkarma. Karma also is a power of Vis.n.u. After denying that these forms ofBrahman, the embodied individual self and the unembodied individual self,are worthy as objects of meditation, the VP claims that only the universal



form of Brahman that is the source of these three powers qualifies as theauspicious object of meditation.

Based on this interpretation of the context of VP 6.7, Ra-ma-nuja elaborates:

VP 6.7.53, declares that the essential nature of the self, even whenassociated with particular modifications of matter (prakr.ti) such as gods,men and so on, is inexpressible by words which denote such distinc-tions, because it is devoid of distinctions existing in them; that it isdefined solely as consisting of knowledge and existence; and that it is self-knowing, i.e., it is not known to the mind of one who is not competent inyoga. Therefore, from this passage the negation of the world does notfollow.62

It is only when the individual self associates with matter that distinctionsarise. That which is denoted as “Brahman” in VP 6.7.53 is, according toRa-ma-nuja, a form of Brahman, i.e., the individual self in its essential nature,which is eventually rejected for the divine form of Vis.n.u as an object worthyof meditation.63 The VP passage cannot be used as support of a quality-lessBrahman as has the Advaitin since the topic of discussion here is the individualself. The knowledge of the essential nature of the individual self is knowingBrahman. Thus knowing Brahman mentioned in the pura-n. a is according toRa-ma-nuja knowing the essential nature of the individual self as the “body” ofBrahman.

The second passage in the Major Objection that is provided as support foran attribute-less Brahman is VP 1.2.6:

Him alone, who in reality is of the nature of knowledge and is infinitelypure,and who nevertheless exists in the form of material entities due toillusion.64

(VP 1.2.6)

For the Advaitin, Brahman, which is of the nature of knowledge, is maskedby adjuncts that arise due to ignorance. This one Brahman then, is said toexist in myriad forms such that it seems to be embodied. This continues untilignorance is sublated by true realization. Ra-ma-nuja replies that:

because it is said in the sa-stra (VP) that Vis.n.u who is the highest Brah-man is devoid even of any taint due to faults such as ignorance andso on, who is comprised of all auspicious qualities and who possessesthe glorious manifestation (maha-vibhu-ti), it is not possible to have anillusory vision in regard to him. Moreover, it will be established immedi-ately hereafter, saying that the world and Brahman are one due to theirsa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya; it does not allow either one to be sublated, and isincontrovertible.65



Since the world and Brahman are equated by sa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya, due to thesoul–body relationship, the world as the manifestation of Vis.n.u cannot besublated as the Advaitin claims.

The context of VP 1.2 itself does not support the unreality of the world andthe necessity of its sublation prior to liberation. VP 1.2 begins with Para- sarapaying homage to the eternal, unchangeable Vis.n.u (1.2.1) and this is followedby a eulogy first to his three forms—the trinity of Brahma-, Hari, and San. kara(1.2.2) and then his other forms such as embodied and unembodied selves(sthu-lasu-ks.ma-tman), and single and aggregate entities (avyaktavyaktabhu-ta)(1.2.3–4). Based on this, Ra-ma-nuja argues that from the commencement ofthis pura-n. a itself the reality of the world as a form of Brahman is affirmedand cannot thus support creation as illusory. However, Ra-ma-nuja’s perspec-tive is not entirely unproblematic. The pura-n. a still discussing the nature ofVis.n.u refers to Him as of the nature of knowledge and as existing in materialform due to illusion (1.2.6). Clearly, it is Vis.n.u that VP 1.2.6 is addressing,but Ra-ma-nuja interprets this verse as a reference to a form of Brahman, theindividual self (ks.etrajña) that is embodied in sam. sa-ra. This interpretation of1.2.6 is rather forced and there is no rationale in the content of the VP itselfto conclude that this passage addresses the individual self. To counter this,Ra-ma-nuja spends considerable effort and invokes the principle of scripturalharmony (samanvaya) to support his interpretation.

According to him one of the reasons as to why VP 1.2.6 does not articulatethe Advaita view of Brahman is because it conflicts with sruti such as Taittirı-

ya Upanis.ad 3.1.1: that from which these beings are born; which once born,they live and into whom they pass upon death—seek to perceive that! That isBrahman!66 According to Ra-ma-nuja, this upanis.ad passage teaches thatBrahman is the cause of the world and as such the effect cannot be unreal andmirrors the commencement of VP 1.2. However, Ra-ma-nuja is aware that alter-nate interpretations are also possible for this sruti, so he launches immediatelyinto a passionate argument on the importance of smr.ti (VP) and the principle ofcorroboration. He begins with a Maha-bha-rata (MBh) verse and then elaborates:

The Veda should be amplified by the itiha-sas and pura-n. as.The Veda fears that he of little learning will do me wrong.

(MBh 1.1.264)

This is what is taught by scripture ‘the act of amplifying’ the meaning ofepics (itiha-sa) and pura-n.a. To amplify means to gain a clear perception ofthe meaning of Vedic passages known to oneself, by means of the state-ments of those who know the entire Veda and its meaning and those whohave directly perceived the essential nature of the Veda and its meaning,by means of the great power of their yoga. Indeed, amplification of Vedaought to be done, because without it one cannot reach a settled conclusion,since the knowledge of all the branches (of the Veda) is not comprehensiblefrom listening to a small portion.67



In no uncertain terms Ra-ma-nuja asserts that Taitt Up 3.1.1 cannot be readwithout the help of the aid of those who know the entire Veda and its meaning,such as the sage Para-sara of the VP who possessed the true knowledge ofBrahman. And it is with this intention of amplifying his own knowledge ofthe Veda that Maitreya himself appeals to Para-sara for instruction (VP 1.1.6–7).Because Maitreya is well-versed in the Veda, his queries in the VP could notpossibly contradict an important sruti text such as the Taitt Up 3.1.1. More-over, the content of the upanis.ad itself is understood as an ideal response toquestions posed in the VP such as:

I wish to hear from you, O’ knower of dharma, how this worldcame into existence, what it will become again, O’ reverend one,

(VP 1.1.4)

What does the world consist of, wherefrom all the movable and immovableentities have arisen?Where was it resting? And into what will it be absorbed?68

(VP 1.1.5)

In response to 1.1.4–5, the VP, in agreement with Taitt Up 3.1.1, according toRa-ma-nuja goes on to state that Brahman is the material and efficient cause ofthe world. The reply to Maitreya’s question, What does the world consist of?which enquires about the nature of the creation, is given at the end of VP 1.1in passage 31 as this world is Brahman.69 That is Brahman as the cause of theworld is this very world.

Ra-ma-nuja is quick to point out that Brahman as the inner ruler or self ofthe world is the reason for this identity and it is not due to substantial one-ness (vastvaikya). The concept of soul–body relationship is used to interpretthe concept of pervasion in the VP passages themselves.70 He reasons that theAdvaita understanding of VP 1.2.6 as instruction on attribute-less Brahmancannot be justified as all the questions and answers in the VP, prior to thisverse, would be inappropriate if the pura-n. a was in fact a text devoted to theelucidation of the illusory nature of the world.

Thus not only is VP 1.2.6 to be understood in accordance with the broaderscriptural tradition of the upanis.ads (Taitt Up 3.1.1) but also with the com-mencement and subsequent sections of the pura-n. a as well. If in fact, the VP isunderstood to affirm Brahman whose nature is consciousness devoid of attri-butes, then the subject matter in the chapters that follow, that is 1.3, would notbe understandable. Ra-ma-nuja elaborates:

If the VP is meant to establish that illusion based on Brahman, who issolely comprised of knowledge and without attributes, then there wouldbe no place for the question:How is it possible for Brahman who is without qualities, unknowable,pure, and free from faults



to be the agent of creation, and the like.(VP 1.3.1)

nor for the answer to it:

O’ best of ascetics, there are in all things powers which cannot be broughtwithin the realm of the knowableand for that very reason those creative acts constitute the inherent powersof Brahman like heat constitutes the inherent power of fire.71

(VP 1.3.2–2ab)

For Ra-ma-nuja the VP itself by its context illustrates that creative agency is apeculiar power of Brahman alone, just as heat is the peculiar nature of fireand not of, for instance, water. However, if the world is thought to be anillusion, then all these passages of this pura-n. a would be contradicted.Appealing to the harmony across different scriptures and harmony within aparticular scripture (VP) seems to be Ra-ma-nuja’s main exegetical strategy inthis rather lengthy reinterpretion of VP 1.2.6.

Plurality of individual selves

Having established the essential nature of the individual self, Ra-ma-nuja rein-terprets the next set of VP passages cited in the Major Objection. These aresaid to affirm Brahman as the sole reality, but in the Major Conclusion, heargues instead that they support the plurality of individual selves:

Although he is to be found in one’s own body and in that of othersknowledge which is one, is, indeed the reality; dualists see things wrongly.72

(VP 2.14.31)

While the Advaitin understands this passage as reference to Brahman,Ra-ma-nuja does not agree. For him, the topic of discussion is the individualself and the pura-n. a affirms the similar essential nature of individual selvesthough present in various bodies. Due to the associations with various physi-cal forms the individual selves are seen as of different types. Note thatRa-ma-nuja affirms the plurality of individual selves, but rejects their multi-plicity based on difference in their essential nature, which is consciousness/knowledge. He elaborates:

What is stated in this passage (VP 2.14.31), is that since all individualselves are similar because they are solely comprised of knowledge, theview of duality in the individual selves as though their association withspecific modifications of matter, known as gods etc. denotes that theypossess such a nature, is wrong.73



The duality that exists in relation to masses of matter and in relation todifferent individual selves is not denied. It means that, the entity calledthe self, which associates with masses of varied, wonderful matter such asgods, men, etc., is all alike.74

Individual selves are countless but since all are similar in their essential nat-ures they are all understood to be alike. The duality that exists between theindividual self and the body/matter is not denied because 2.14.31 claims thatsomething that is other than the body is found in one’s own body and inthose of others. Whereas, for the Advaitin the distinction spoken of here isa distinction between Brahman the sole reality and everything else, forRa-ma-nuja it is the distinction between the individual self and matter that iselucidated here.

As support for this interpertation of VP 2.14.31, Ra-ma-nuja turns to whathe claims has been stated by the Lord himself (yathoktam bhagavata-) in BhG5.18 cd-19. These verses refer to the equanimity with which the advancedsages look upon a dog and an outcaste and view Brahman, devoid of alldefects, as the same in all beings. Once again, the Advaitic sensibility of theseBhG passages is evident as the subject of discussion is Brahman. Ra-ma-nuja,however, reads the term “Brahman” as the individual self (a-tman). Why?Commenting on BhG 5.16, in his Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya, he explains that theplurality of individual selves is not due to adjuncts super-imposed on Brahman,but rather is the result of the contraction of the attributive consciousness ofthe individual self due to embodiment. We have already discussed this topic inChapter 2. Ra-ma-nuja seems to be making a subtle exegetical move here.What he is really concerned with is the rationale, the acceptance a plurality ofselves. While the Advaitin claims that the plurality of individual selves is dueto the effect of adjuncts, Ra-ma-nuja does not deny the metaphysical reality ofa plurality of selves or their embodiment, but simply rejects the Advaita rea-soning. Though the use of BhG passages may not seem convincing, the pointof citing them at this point is to convey that the term “Brahman” need not infact refer to the supreme reality but rather can denote the individual self.Also, the authority of the BhG as Kr.s.n. a’s self-revelation and the interpreta-tion of BhG 5.18–19 as Visis.t.a-dvaitic perhaps validate their authority aswell. Similarly, Ra-ma-nuja interprets the next VP passage cited in the MajorObjection as affirming the non-difference between individual selves basedon their essential nature, which is all the same, but as rather due to physicalembodiment:

If there were anything else (anya) like me, or anything else (para) differentfrom me,only then would it be proper to say that such a thing is me and such athing is not me.75

(VP 2.13.86)



Ra-ma-nuja understands this passage to mean:

if any individual self other than my own self is different in nature fromconsciousness which is my nature, then it is possible to say “I am of thisnature,” “he is of a different nature.” However, this is not so, because allindividual selves are equal as comprised of the same knowledge.76

The Advaitin reads VP 2.13.86 as evidence of Brahman, the sole reality:

If there were any other thing than me then alone would it be possible to saythat such a thing is me and such a thing is not me.

(VP 2.13.86)

But Ra-ma-nuja appeals to grammatical reasoning to refute the Advaitainterpretation:

In this passage the identity among individual selves is not taught, becauseit is not possible to use the word para and the word anya in one and thesame sense as “if there were any one other than me.” [See objector’stranslation above.] Indeed, the word para denotes another self which isdistinct from one’s own self, and, inasmuch as that self is also altogetherof the nature of intelligence, the word anya denies that its nature is differentfrom mine.77

He concludes in regard to VP 2.13.86 that since liberated selves are all com-prised of knowledge, it is not possible to say one is different from the other asthey are all, in this sense, of the same kind.

The difference denied is the one that exists between the true nature of theindividual self, which is knowledge, and the perceived nature of the self aspossessing material qualities. This is exemplified in the next VP passage,according to Ra-ma-nuja:

It is in consequence of the different holes in a flute that the distinctions ofthe air which pervades all without distinction is named sadja etc.;so also is the case with the distinction of the supreme self.78

(VP 2.14.32)

He comments:

there is no substantial sameness between particles of air, which are asso-ciated with several different holes of the flute, but there is only similarityof essential nature between them. Indeed all the particles of air have thesame nature, because they possess the same nature of air. So also is thecase with individual selves, the differences that result are due to namessuch as gods, men etc.79



He reiterates that “the difference in form of the individual selves is not due totheir essential nature, but, due to their having entered various masses ofmatter known as gods, men, etc.; it is not declared in this example (VP2.12.32) that all individual selves are one.”80 What this VP passage allowsRa-ma-nuja to argue is the similarity of essential nature between individualselves without erasing the distinctions between them and all the while affirmingtheir distinction from matter.81

The discussion on the plurality of individual selves concludes with VP2.16.23cd–24ab and VP 6.7.96:

He is me and he is you, and all this is the same as that,the essential nature of the self; give up the illusion of distinctions.Thus taught by Bharata that great king saw the highest reality and gaveup distinction.82

(VP 2.16.23cd–24ab)

These verses are taken from the narrative of Bharata, an important section ofthe VP for Ra-ma-nuja. Contrary to the Advaitin, for whom these passagesaffirm ultimate reality as beyond all plurality and the destruction of multi-plicity as the goal of right knowledge, for Ra-ma-nuja, again, the distinctiondenied here is the one between individual selves in their essential nature. Tofurther support this reading of the pura-n. a passages, he resorts to the principleof intra-textual harmony. According to him “this teaching (of Bharata tothe king), in fact begins with VP 2.13.89 that states because the body whichis characterized by head, hand etc., is different from the individual self(purus.a).”83 Thus, the distinction between the body and the self mentionedhere needs to be considered in the interpretation of later verses such as VP2.16.23ce–24ab. Though these later passages when read independently of theformer seem Advaitic, if the broader VP context is taken into account, theprima facie view that these passages refer to Brahman cannot be maintained.For similar reasons also the last passage utilized in the Major Objection,Ra-ma-nuja argues, does not teach the identity of the individual self andBrahman:

When the knowledge which produces distinctions has undergone completedestruction,then who will create the unreal difference between the self (a-tma) andBrahman.84

(VP 6.7.96)

So, for the Advaitin, the knowledge which produces distinctions is the perceptionof multiple individual selves, for Ra-ma-nuja this plurality is based on theirassociation with matter and not due to any difference in their essential natures.

With these last set of VP passages, Ra-ma-nuja redirects the discussion fromthe Advaita concern of the non-difference of the Self and Brahman to the



Visis.t.a-dvaita issue of the non-difference between individual selves in theiressential nature. In the Major Objection, scriptural support concludes afterthe VP verses, with BhG 10.20, 13.2, and 10.39. Though Ra-ma-nuja hasaddressed all the VP passages from the Major Objection, he does not engagethe BhG evidence (BhG 10.20, 13.2, 10.39) yet. He defers discussion ofthese passages and instead inserts an additional section at this juncture inhis Major Conclusion on the distinction between the liberated self as dis-tinct from Brahman. As this is not a concern for the Advaitin there is noscriptural support to argue this perspective. The next section evaluatesthe use of the VP in supporting this last claim of Ra-ma-nuja on the topic ofthe individual self.85

The liberated self is distinct from Brahman

We have already encountered Ra-ma-nuja’s assertion that the liberated self is notidentical to with Brahman. He now reiterates this claim and provides scripturalevidence:

Even when one is released from ignorance (avidya-) by adopting thenecessary means, essential identity with Brahman does not result, becausethat which is fit to be the seat of ignorance, can never become an entitythat is unfit to be the seat of ignorance.86

Ra-ma-nuja only cites from smr.ti, specifically the VP and the BhG:

The union of the self with the supreme self is said to be the greatest goal of all.But this is false, because one substance cannot acquire the nature ofanother substance.

(VP 2.14.27)

Relying on this knowledge, acquiring qualities equal to mine,they are neither born at the time of creation, nor suffer at the time ofdissolution.

(BhG 14.2)

Brahman, by his own power makes his worshiper, who is deserving of change,acquire his own nature, even as a magnet attracts metal.87

(VP 6.7.30)

First, these passages affirm that an essential identity between the liberatedindividual self and Brahman is impossible (VP 2.14.27). Second, once liber-ated, the individual self is said to acquire only certain qualities of Brahmanand quits the cycle of birth and rebirth (BhG 14.2). Third, Brahman is said tobe the goal to be attained by the individual self (worshiper) and absoluteidentity between the liberated self and Brahman is denied utilizing the



illustration of magnet and pieces of metal. Just as a piece of metal canbecome magnetized by contact with a magnet, but does not become a magnetin nature, so also is the case with the liberated self and Brahman. The com-mentator points out that it is with such passages in mind that sruti whichaffirm the non-difference between the self and Brahman are to be inter-preted.88 Passages such as one who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman, one ofthe great satements (maha-va-kya) for the Advaitin, are to be interpreted relyingon the evidence from smr.ti.89

A detailed explanation for why that which is fit to be the seat of ignorance(avidya-) never becomes Brahman is given in VP 6.7. Here, Brahman, the highestself, is affirmed as unique and different from individual selves because he iseternally free from the three dispositions (bha-vana) that characterize embo-died selves90—karmabha-vana, brahmabha-vana, and ubhayabha-vana. This sec-tion of the VP was referenced earlier in this chapter in the discussion on theessential nature of Brahman. Bha-vanas are tendencies, capacities, or concep-tions that envelop all embodied beings from Brahma- down to the lowest formof life. Karmabha-vana comprehends only actions, brahmabha-vana is the abil-ity to achieve Brahman, and ubhayabha-vana is the capacity to engage in bothactions and the capability of achieving Brahman. It is because of these ten-dencies that there is a difference in essential nature between Brahman and theindividual selves and why even the liberated self cannot share all qualities ofBrahman, such as His creative abilities. According to the VP, the embodiedself that is worthy of liberation, has exhausted all these three bha-vanas and ishence worthy of liberation:

O’ King that which leads to the object of attainment is knowledge.Similarly, what has to be led is the individual self in whom all bha-vanasare extinguished91

(VP 6.7.92)

the individual self is the user of the means (to liberation) andknowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained.Having gained liberation, and attained the object, that knowledge willcease to function.92

(VP 6.7.93)

Once all the bha-vanas are extinguished, the practices such as acquisition ofright knowledge and meditation cease to function as they lose their relevance.The description of liberation in the VP passages is, however, problematic asthe passages are more conducive to an Advaita interpretation of the ultimatenon-difference of the individual self and Brahman:

When one attains the state (tadbha-va) that corresponds to that (Brahman),93

then he is non-different (abha-va) from the highest self and differences areproducts of his ignorance (ajña-na).94

(VP 6.7.94)



In contrast, for Ra-ma-nuja, this passage does not assert non-difference of selfand Brahman; rather it is:

the essential nature of the liberated self [that] is stated in VP 6.7.94. Thephrase tadbha-va means attributive qualities of Brahman, his attributivenature, not identity between the individual self and Brahman in essentialnature; because if it did the second bha-va in tadbha-vabha-vawould be useless.Also, this would be contrary to what has been taught previously in the VP.95

If this passage is interpreted from the Advaita point of view, Ra-ma-nuja cau-tions that there would be a redundancy of the term bha-va as the second of thetwo bha-va-s in tadbha-vabha-va would be out of place. Moreover, he invokesintra-textual harmony to garner support for his interpretation—the teachingof the other VP passages stated such as VP 2.14.27 and VP 6.7.30 as contraryto VP 6.7.94.

Non-difference of the individual self and Brahman mentioned in 6.7.94 isalso re-interpreted by Ra-ma-nuja to mean only the sharing of some qualities:

Because it possesses the same nature of consciousness, the individual selfis of the same nature as the supreme self. The difference of the individualself from Brahman consists in its acquiring forms such as gods etc.These differences are a result of ajña-na in the form of karma. However,the distinctions such as god etc. is not due to the individual self ’sessential nature. When the karma, which has the nature of ignorance andforms the root of all distinctions, is destroyed by means of meditation onthe supreme Brahman, then those distinctions cease due to the cessationof their cause. Therefore, the individual self does not differ fromBrahman.96

To further disqualify an Advaita reading of VP 6.7.94, the commentatorstates that “the word ignorance (ajña-na) in VP 6.7.94 refers not to somethingthat cannot be explained; [but] it derives from popular use, not from thesa-stra. Its interpretation as denoting karma has been demonstrated in thisvery book (VP).”97 Whereas the liberated individual self at one time inits embodied condition associates with karma and the three dispositions,Brahman never does. Non-difference means between Brahman and the individualself simply the sharing of the quality of consicousness.

Moreover, the scriptural statements that do affirm the non-difference ofindividual selves and Brahman can also be interpreted in another sense: thenon-difference is said to be due to the fact that both the liberated self andBrahman are free from association with matter:

However, the distinction of the one individual self from other98 individualselves, which are of the same essential nature, is the result of the outeractivity of karma.



When the distinctions such as gods etc. cease to exist, the activity ceasesto exist and indeed he alone remains.

(VP 2.14.33)

When the knowledge which produces distinctions has undergone completedestructionthen who will create the unreal difference between the self and Brahman?99

(VP 6.7.95)

The context of VP 2.14.33 is the soul–body relationship and refers to ignor-ance or karma that renders one unable to discern the essential nature of theindividual self from the body. VP 6.7.95 on the other hand, is concerned withthe distinction between the individual self and Brahman. The contexts of2.14.33 and 6.7.95 are different. Ra-ma-nuja reconciles this by interpreting theword difference (vibheda) in VP 6.7.95 as denotative of distinctions that arisedue to association with matter only, rather than difference between self andBrahman.100 That is, when the individual self is liberated and free fromassociation with karma, then distinctions of physical form and so on, whichare thought to belong to the individual self cease to exist. Therefore, what ismeant when Brahman and the liberated self are stated as non-different has todo with their freedom from material association and it is only in this sensethat they do not differ.

An extension of the exegetical strategy of intra-textual coherence is to takepassages such as the power of Vis.n.u is said to be higher, the lower one is calledthe ks.etrajña, avidya- called karma is the third power (VP 6.7.61) and know thefield-knower in all bodies as Myself (BhG 13.2) into consideration. Usingsuch passages scriptural statements that affirm the one-ness of the individualself and the supreme self are to be re-intepreted to mean that there is non-difference only due to the fact that Brahman constitutes the inner self, theinternal ruler of all. Thus the identity between self and Brahman that ismentioned in scripture is to be read either utilizing the soul–body paradigmor in the sense that the non-difference is due to non-association of both enti-ties with matter. That non-difference between Brahman and the liberatedself is to be understood in this way is supported by the VP, according toRa-ma-nuja.

In concluding his discussion on the nature of the individual self, Ra-ma-nujaonce again invokes the principle of scriptural harmony (samanvaya) to arguethat unless the identity of the liberated self and Brahman is understood in theabove-mentioned way, there would be serious contradictions with certain BhGpassages such as BhG 10.20, 13.2, and 10.39. These BhG passages were citedin the Major Objection to support an attribute-less Brahman, but here theyare called on to support the Visis.t.a-dvaita perspective of the liberated self asdistinct from Brahman. BhG 13.2 (also mentioned above), where Kr.s.n. a’sclaim that he is the field-knower in all fields is discussed in detail in Chapter 4and so is not considered here. In the next chapter, the importance of the VP



in interpreting this passage is discussed in the section on the field and thefield-knower.101

In the Major Objection, Ra-ma-nuja has the Advaitin cite from the upani-s.ads, the VP, and the BhG. We have seen that he first counters the prima facieview of the quoted upanis.ads in his Major Conclusion in section on thenature of Brahman, but also includes a number of VP passages as support.He then refutes the Advaita interpretation of the VP passages to establish thedistinction between Brahman and the individual self, once again insertingboth sruti and VP to support his claims. He finally cites the BhG passagesfrom the Major Objection at the end of this rather long section on the indi-vidual self and refutes the Advaita interpretation of them using the rationaleof scriptural harmony between the BhG and the VP.

Defining ignorance

In the Major Conclusion, independently from the section on the nature ofBrahman and the individual self discussed in the previous sections of thischapter, Ra-ma-nuja undertakes a sustained refutation of the Advaita under-standing of ignorance (avidya-). Titled, the Seven Untenables (Saptvidha-na-nu-papatti), this section aims to disprove avidya- as posited by the Advaitinthrough valid means of knowledge (prama-n.a) such as perception, inference,and scripture.102 We are only concerned here, with the last of the three validmeans of knowledge. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the sec-tion on ignorance in the Major Objection mirrors the one in the MajorConclusion in terms of scriptural citations (Table 3.1). That is, the veryscripture utilized to support the prima facie view is now taken up by Ra-ma-nujafor reinterpretation and to support the Visis.t.a-dvaita concept of ignorance askarma. The Major Objection cites both sruti and the VP to argue thatignorance is indescribable as neither existence nor non-existence and that itobscures the true nature of Brahman until it is sublated by the realization oftrue knowledge. We first examine Ra-ma-nuja’s refutation of the Advaiticinterpretation of sruti as it concerns the topic of ignorance and then VP2.12.39–40, 43–45. If his exegetical strategy in refuting the Advaitic inter-pretation of sruti is to resort to scriptural harmony across different upanis.adtexts, his approach in the discussion of VP is to rely on intra-textual coherence,that is reading a particular text, in this case the VP in a way that harmonizespassages from its various books and chapters.

Sruti support

In the Major Objection, the Advaitin describes unreality (mithya-) as the faultthat misguides us and is beginning-less ignorance (avidya-) which cannot bedescribed as either existence or non-existence and causes varied and manifoldsuperimpositions on the essential nature of Brahman. Two sruti that purportedlysupport this definition of ignorance (avidya-) are:



Indeed, being drawn away by the unreal (anr.ta), they do not obtain thisworld of Brahman (brahmaloka).

(Ch Up 8.3.2)

Although they (desires) are real (satya), they have the unreal (anr.ta) for amask.103

(Ch up 8.3.1)

The context of these passages is the investigation as to whether the spacewithin the heart (dahara-ka- sa) can be indentified as elemental space (a-ka-sa),the individual self, or Brahman. A full exposition of these passages in thecontext of Advaita and Visis.t.a-dvaita would lead our discussion far-a-field.I only discuss the terms that are of importance in the argument on ignor-ance.104 For the Advaitin, the unreal (anr.ta) denotes ignorance whichmasks the true nature of Brahman whereby the world of Brahman, is notobtained.105

Contrary to this interpretation, Ra-ma-nuja understands anr.ta as denotingactions that are performed without attachment to the results. The evidence forthis he finds in Kat.h Up 3.1 (the two enjoying r.ta) where r.ta is defined askarma free from attachment to the results of actions, and consists in theworship of the highest person (paramapurus.a-ra-dhana). The goal (pratiphala)of such action is the attainment of Brahman. Anr.ta, then, is not avidya- thatsuperimposes the world on the true nature of Brahman, but it simply denoteskarmic actions not performed as worship of Vis.n.u, without attachment to theresults. In this instance, Ra-ma-nuja relies on the context of other sruti tointerpret the Ch Up 8.3.2 and 8.3.1 cited in the Major Objection. This seemsto be his main strategy in the refutation of the Advaita interpretation of othersruti passages as well.

Ignorance (avidya-) is also referred to in scripture by the term tamas,according to the Advaitin, as in the following passage:

Then, there was neither non-existence (asat) nor existence (sat) … therewas darkness (tamas). In the beginning knowledge was concealed bydarkness (tamas).106

(RV 10.129.1–3)

San. kara in his commentary on Br Su- 2.1.8, claims that the subject of thispassage is Brahman, and tamas as avidya- is neither existence (sat) nor non-existence (asat), which conceals Brahman. Ra-ma-nuja counters this inter-pretation with Suba-la Upanis.ad 2 that provides a different context for theterm tamas: unmanifest (avyakta) is absorbed into the imperishable (aks.ara),the imperishable (aks.ara) into darkness (tamas). The context of this upanis.adis world dissolution and its reabsorption into Vis.n.u. In this sequential processof reabsorption darkness or tamas is unmanifest matter (prakr.ti), which evenin this primordial state exists as the body of Brahman.107 So resorting to the



doctrine of Brahman’s causality, he attempts to reinterpret the meaning oftamas as something definable and that exists in a positive relation to Brahman.The Suba-la Upanis.ad, though, does not clarify the relationship betweenBrahman and tamas. But since even San.kara affirms the creation and dis-solution of the world from Brahman, this passage as evidence is rather weak.Though, it is important in relocating the cognitive context of Advaita to theontological one in Visis.t.a-dvaita—tamas as concealment of knowledge to tamasas the material substance (though unmanifest) of the universe. Ra-ma-nuja’s viewon causality of Brahman discussed in the VS, requires more detail as heunderstands Brahman’s causality in a much different sense than the Advaitin.

The Advaitin also interprets the term ma-ya- as denotative of avidya- utilizingSve Up 4.10: know that ma-ya- is prakr.ti, and the Lord is the possessor ofma-ya- .108 In his commentary on Br Su- 1.4.3, San. kara notes that in this pas-sage, ma-ya- is the unmanifest (avyakta), which cannot be determined to bereal or as unreal and is the limiting adjunct (upa-dhi) that brings about thestate of personhood. Consequently, prakr.ti as ma-ya- is something unreal.Ra-ma-nuja first counters this claim by turning to VP 1.19.20, shielding thebody of the boy, moving quickly it (Vis.n.u’s discus) destroyed those thousandweapons (ma-ya-) of Sam. bara one after the other. For now, we note thatRa-ma-nuja defines ma-ya- based on the VP context as a wonderful power ofcreation. Through ma-ya- the demon Sam. bara manifests real weapons, fromwhich the boy Prahla-da requires protection. The reasoning here is that if theweapons were simply illusory, Vis.n.u’s intercession would be meaningless. Thispassage is discussed in more detail in the section on ma-ya- (BhG 7.14) in thenext chapter as Ra-ma-nuja’s reading of this BhG passage itself requires the VPand so I do not address it here. It is significant that having cited VP 1.19.19–20 Ra-ma-nuja also turns to Svet Up 4.9: from that (prakr.ti) the illusionistcreates this whole world, and in it the other remains confined by the illusorypower109 to support matter (prakr.ti/ma-ya-) as a source of wonderful manifes-tations. This means that he turns to VP in order to interpret the upanis.ad,which would otherwise risk rival Veda-nta interpretation(s) as illustratedalready by San.kara’s interpretation of Svet Up 4.10.

Contrary to the Advaita claim that Brahman’s nature is occluded by ma-ya-

and to support his view that it is a power that is wielded by Brahman (ma-ya-vin)but who is very much in control of it, Ra-ma-nuja cites passages such as:

When the individual soul (jı-va), that has been asleep under the influenceof the beginning-less ma-ya- wakes up

(Ma-n. d. Up 2.21)

Indra (Brahman) by his ma-ya- moves about in many forms.110

(Br. Up 2.5.19)

He shines very much like Tvas.t.r.(R.V 6.47.19)111



My ma-ya- is difficult to overcome.112

(BhG 7.14)

For Ra-ma-nuja in all these examples ma-ya- is spoken of as the wonderfulpowers of Brahman (Br. Up 2.5.19), who since He shines forth like the godTvas.t.r. cannot be concealed by something that is unreal (R.V. 6.7.19). Ma-n. d.Up 2.21, identifies ma-ya- as matter which conceals the individual self, the useof the tem jı-va instead of a-tman or Brahman allows for a less ambiguousinterpetation. If this passage implies that matter is ma-ya- that conceals theindividual self, BhG 7.14ab, not cited here, affirms ma-ya- as comprised ofqualities (gun.a) and as matter quite clearly. The use of BhG 7.14 is also sig-nificant for one other reason. In his Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya on this verse,Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the VP to read this passage “correctly”. Thus far Ra-ma--nuja has refuted the sruti interpretations of the Advaitin utilizing other sruti,but also relyies on the VP. He cites VP 1.19.20 to clarify his definition ofma-ya- and to use it as a guide to read Svet Up. He also cites BhG 7.14 thatidentifies avidya- as prakr.ti with the three qualities (gun.a) which is the nature(prakr.ti) of Kr.s.n. a, but as mentioned, the connection to the VP is quitesignificant as we explore in Chapter 4.In each of the sruti examples discussed above, the Advaitin interprets the

terms anr.ta, tamas and ma-ya- in the context of sublation. That is, anr.ta maskswhat is real, tamas conceals Brahman, and ma-ya- is the limiting adjunct thatbrings about the illusion of personhood. It is only when ignorance is sublatedby true knowledge that Brahman is realized. What Ra-ma-nuja needs to coun-ter ignorance defined in terms of concealment and sublation is to find scrip-tural evidence that transposes the focus from the cognitive context to anontological one. Utilizing other sruti he argues that anr.ta denotes actions(karma) that are not dedicated to Vis.n.u, tamas signifies unmanifest matter(prakr.ti), and ma-ya- as wonderful creations or manifestations that are real. Heonly accomplishes this much in his refutation of sruti but his ultimate goal aswe see in the next section is to define ignorance as something whose essentialnature is to undergo transformation that requires new denotations. Anr.tadefined as certain types of actions (karma), tamas as unmanifest matter, andso on do not support ignorance as Ra-ma-nuja defines it. His interpretation oftamas only loosely points to the detail that will be provided by the VP and inthe last example that discusses ma-ya- , he even utilizes VP 1.9.20 to argue hisperspective. As we shall see, without the evidence from the VP, his task is notyet complete.

VP (2.12.36–46) support

In the Major Objection, the Advaitin argues that:

the Highest Brahman, who is of the essence of sentience alone (cinma--tra), the manifestation of this whole world which is made up of



distinctions such as gods, animals, men, etc. assumed to exist in Brah-man, is unreal (mithya-). And the defect, which is endless ignorance(avidya-) is inexpressible as either existence or non-existence, causes the variedand wonderful superimpositions that veil (tirodha-na) the true nature ofBrahman.113

To support this point of view the sruti discussed above were cited, and nowVP 2.12.39–40, 43–45 are provided as evidence. Ra-ma-nuja claims that if thecontext of these VP passages is rightly understood they, in fact, reject such aconception of ignorance. In a sense, then, this is the second reclamation of theVP that Ra-ma-nuja undertakes in SBh 1.1.1. The first instance of such exten-sive re-interpretation of the VP we saw in the section on the essential natureof the individual self. In contrast to the prima facie view, which begins thesequence of citations from the VP, 2.12.38, he begins his analysis in the MajorConclusion with 2.12.36–37:

And their regions and those who inhabit them,their essential nature has been explained, Listen as I briefly reiterate114

(VP 2.12.36)

From the waters which constitute the body of Vis.n.u, was produced thelotus-shaped earth, together with its mountains and seas.115

(VP 2.12.37)

Chapters 1–12 of Book Two of the VP describe the world as a lotus bud(bhuvanakosa). Passages 2.12.1–2.12.35, provide a description of the variousplanets, constellations, and regions inhabited by the progenitors and so on. In2.12.36, the sage Para- sara having described the various regions of the cosmosto Maitreya claims that the following passages (37ff) present that very infor-mation in a summary (samks.epa) format. But it is noteworthy that this worldwith its various regions and beings is affirmed as a manifestation of Vis.n.u’sbody (am. bu). For Ra-ma-nuja this supports his soul–body doctrine. Thus thesepassages that set the context for the verses that follow have not been takeninto account in the Major Objection as the sequence of VP citations beginswith 2.12.38. The fact that VP 2.12.37 supports, according to Ra-ma-nuja, thesoul–body paradigm allows him to re-interpret 2.12.38 quite differently thanthe Advaitin:

O’ Best among Brahmins, the stars are Vis.n.u, the worlds are Vis.n.u, theforests are Vis.n.u, the mountains, directions, rivers, and seas are Vis.n.u; Healone is all that exists (asti) and all that does not exist (na-sti).116

While the Advaitin reads this verse as affirming the sole reality that is Brahmanand all else as a result of ignorance (avidya-), Ra-ma-nuja argues that it in fact



articulates an identity based on the soul–body relationship that was alreadyposited in 2.12.37. He elaborates:

In the world which is a combination of sentient and insentient beings, thesentient (cid) part (am. sa) has an essential nature that is self-knowing andinexpressible by speech and the mind, is entirely of the nature of knowl-edge, is untouched by materiality (pra-kr.tatva), and, because it is indestruc-tible, is denoted by the word ‘existence’. On the other hand, the insentient(acid) part undergoes modifications due to the karma of the sentient part,is destructible, and is denoted by the word ‘non-existence’. However, boththese parts are the body of Va-sudeva, the highest Brahman, and thereforeboth are His.117

Brahman encompasses the whole world as its soul with the sentient individualselves as existence and insentient matter as non-existence comprise his body(sarı-ra). Having defined existence and non-existence, ignorance is discussednot in terms of sublation, but rather in terms of change or transformation. Asthe commentator notes:

Do the words ‘non-existence’ and ‘unreal’ relate to sublation of knowledgeduring creation and dissolution, or do the terms relate to the view thatBrahman is subject to modifications, aview similar to Bheda-bheda [Veda-nta]?Moreover, the word ‘ignorance’ does not indicate something that isinexpressible; on the contrary, it refers to karma only.118

The juxtaposition of both the Advaita and Bheda-bheda view of the doctrineof causality suggests the importance of the VP in articulating a Veda-nta thatis quite distinct from these existing schools of thought. Ra-ma-nuja utilizing theVP in the Veda-rthasam. graha has argued the metaphysical reality of ignorance(avidya-) as a real power of Brahman. For him the relation between “exis-tence” (sat) and “non-existence” (asat) is dependent on the capacity fortransformation—“the words ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ mean ‘that whichchanges’, and ‘that which does not’; they do not mean sublation or non-sublationof knowledge.”119 Vis.n.u as the inner self of the individual selves and matter isboth existence and non-existence, “as the body of Brahman, the cid and acidforms come together and disassociate.”120 In the discussion of sruti providedas support Ra-ma-nuja does not consider the interpretation of the terms “existence”and “non-existence” such as Ch Up 8.3.1 and R.V.10.129.1–3.

As we noted in the earlier section on the discussion of sruti, the indivi-dual self as metaphysically real is a major concern for Ra-ma-nuja. Here hecomments:

the acid part is explained as of the nature of non-existence only; this isthe essence of the discussion. Indeed, the doubt that the acid part could



be illusion must be excluded. Therefore, because the acid part is subjectto modification, it is of the nature of non-existence only; this is themeaning.121

On the other hand, “because the cid part is not subject to modification itwould follow that it is of the nature of existence.”122 Thus VP 2.12.38 is cru-cial in allowing Ra-ma-nuja to interpret existence and non-existence quite dif-ferently, to refute the Advaita claim of sublation and the Bheda-bheda view oftransformation. Ra-ma-nuja also provides additional passages from otherchapters of the VP to support this reading of the world as the body of Vis.n.u,such as they are all His body (VP 1.22.84), the whole of that is the body ofHari (VP 1.22.36), being indestructible, He alone is the self of all and has theuniverse as His form123 (VP 1.2.68), which reinforce a Visis.t.a-dvaita reading ofthe VP verses thus far.

Not only has the Advaitin failed to take the complete context of VP 2.12into account, according to Ra-ma-nuja, he also mistakes the passages thataddress the individual self as referring to Brahman. Thus, while in the MajorObjection VP 2.12.39 and 40 are understood as articulating the nature ofBrahman, Ra-ma-nuja understands the individual self and not Brahman as thesubject matter of these verses. This is an exegetical move we have come acrossin the section on the nature of the individual self. The soul–body paradigmthat Ra-ma-nuja was able to establish based on VP 2.12.37 can in fact supportsuch a reading of these passages:

the Lord, whose essential nature is knowledge, He is without form, but isnot an entity.Therefore, know that the distinctions such as mountains, oceans etc. areindeed due to illusion of apprehension.124

(VP 2.12.39)

But, when knowledge is pure, in its true form, devoid of karma, anddis-associated from faults,then the tree of desire bears fruit: the distinctions of things, no longerexist.125

(VP 2.12.40)

Contrary to San.kara, for whom individuation results due to “the connectionof immutable consciousness with superimposed adjuncts” (Alston 1981, Vol.III: 1), Ra-ma-nuja takes “the Lord” referred to here as the individual selfwhose essential nature is knowledge. However, in the state of embodiment theindividual self associates with various physical forms that are a result of theendless cycle of karma. This is how karma and matter (prakrti) are relatedand in some instances Ra-ma-nuja refers to these two terms indiscriminately asignorance (avidya-). “Thus the material thing is the seat of modifications in



proportion with the karma of the individual self, therefore, it has been rightlysaid to be denoted as ‘non-existence’ and everything else as ‘existence’.”126

The illusion spoken of in this pura-n. ic verse relates to the erroneous identifi-cation of the individual self with the body it inhabits as a result of the karmathat is accrued. The fact that Ra-ma-nuja makes such a distinction between theindividual self and Brahman is not only significant for his theology, but isonly possible through his reading of the VP.

The next two verses, VP 2.12.41–42, elaborate on the distinction betweenthe individual self and matter rather than Brahman and the empirical worldas the Advaitin claims:

What and where is the thing that is devoid of beginning, middle, end, andforever of a uniform nature?For how can reality be attested to that which is subject to changeand that which does not possess its original character anymore? O’twice-born one!

(VP 2.12.41)

Earth is made into a pot, the pot is broken into pieces, and the piecesground to dust, the dust to atoms.Tell me, is there any object in this, though it is thus understood by manwhose self-knowledge is restricted by his own actions?127

(VP 2.12.42)

While the Advaitin reads phrases such as “uniform nature” and “subject tochange” as related to change in cognitions for Ra-ma-nuja due to karma,which is real, the attributive knowledge of the individual self is restricted (seeChapter 2). The commentator elaborates: “Those who through their ownkarma exist as gods, men and so on, and consequently are incapable ofhaving the correct ideas regarding the sentient thing (self), they experience theinsentient thing (matter), which is an object of their enjoyment, as changingevery moment.”128 Therefore, karma restricts correct understanding of thetrue nature of the individual self because karma affects the kind of embodi-ment one must experience. For Ra-ma-nuja the reference to the destruction ofthe pot made of clay down to atoms illustrates constant physical transformationthat matter undergoes as it is its essential nature to be so.

In the Major Objection, the last three passages, VP 2.12. 43–45 are under-stood to “sum-up the already stated idea that anything other than Brahman isunreal” and “it is made clear that one’s own karma alone is the cause of theignorance, which in turn is the cause of the perception of difference in Brahman,whose essential nature is knowledge.”129 Note that though both San.kara andRa-ma-nuja admit that karma leads to ignroance, for the latter karma is apower of Brahman himself. In the following VP passages the Advaitic tenorhas to be explained:



Therefore, O’ twice-born one, without vijña-na, none of the many entitiesexist anywhere, at anytime.The one discriminative knowledge is understood as manifold by thosewhose minds are scattered by distinction created by their own karma

(VP 2.12.43)

Knowledge, perfect, pure, stainless, free from suffering, and unattached todesires such as endless greed;single, always one, it is the supreme highest Lord, Va-sudeva other thanwhom there is nothing else.130

(VP 2.12.44)

Thus has the truth been stated to you, by me: how that knowledge isreal131 and all else unreal;however, that which is of a temporal and worldly nature has also beentaught to you.132

(VP 2.12.45)

Based on the soul–body paradigm of VP 2.12.37, Ra-ma-nuja reads these pas-sages as addressing the individual self rather than Brahman. The distinctionssuch as gods, men, and so on “are not due to anything in the essential natureof the self” since it is “free from karma, and for this very reason is untouchedby matter (prakr.ti) in the form of faults.”133 The individual self is referred toas Brahman here:

because it is one, it is not subject to increase and decrease and for thisvery reason always of one form, and forms the body of Va-sudeva, andtherefore has Him for its self.134 The world which in this way is made upof cid and acid forms the body of Va-sudeva, and has Him for its self.135

As the body of Va-sudeva, the individual self can be denoted as Va-sudeva asin these passages. Moreover, since the individual self shares consciousness andan eternal nature with Brahman compared to matter, denoting the individualself as Brahman is also acceptable. On the whole then, it is easier for Ra-ma-nujato interpret the entity spoken of in these passages as Brahman, based on thesoul-body paradigm articulated in VP2.12.37.

Ra-ma-nuja, utilizing the VP,136 affirms the world as real and “knowledge ofthe reality of the world is to induce the effort to secure the means of libera-tion.”137 Moreover, “the whole world denoted by the words existence andnon-existence, made up of sentient and insentient things, constitutes thebody of the most high, highest lord, Vis.n.u, who is their self.”138 Ra-ma-nuja’smain goal in discussing these VP passages is to establish the distinctionbetween existence and non-existence and the rejection of the sublation ofknowledge, which is a distinguishing feature of his Veda-nta from the primafacie view:



The words non-existence and unreality are opposites (of existence andreality). Therefore they indicate unreality; but they really mean des-tructibility. In VP 2.12.41 and VP 2.12.42 also only destructability isdeclared, but not that they cannot be proved, or that they are set aside byknowledge.139

The VP, then, according to Ra-ma-nuja, does not present us with any vocabu-lary or context that can be used to denote a Brahman completely devoid ofattributes nor indicate the world as a result of ignorance (avidya-).

He concludes this section by providing support for his interpretation ofthese verses from other chapters of the VP to prove that his interpretationof these passages is in line with the rest of the pura-n. a:

O King! What is that entity that, even at other times does not go byanother name, corresponding to its alterations (parin.a-ma) etc.?

(VP 2.13.96)

The ultimate truth (parama-rtha) is understood by the wise to be eternal;however, it would be impermanent if it were obtained through imperishablethings.140

(VP 2.14.24)

These passages that occur subsequent to the discussion of VP 2.12.36–46are meant to illustrate that there is a continuity of meaning through the var-ious chapters of the pura-n. a contra the Advaitin if understood accordingto Visis.t.a-dvaita. To further support his interpretation as the correct one,Ra-ma-nuja uses verses from the commencement of the very next chapter, VP2.13, as well:

You have told me how the three worlds exist supported (a-dha-ra) by Vis.n.uPlease tell me now, how the one you called parama-rtha is essentiallyknowledge.141

(VP 2.13.2)

With this verse also a concrete relationship between the Brahman and theworld is posited as he is affirmed as the supporter (a-dha-ra) of the latter. Wehave already seen that the a-dha-ra/a-dheya relationship is a significant aspect ofthe soul–body relationship that Ra-ma-nuja envisions. Therefore, the passagethe stars are Vis.n.u (2.12.38) is not meant to denote identity in essentialnature, but rather an identity based on the soul–body relationship.

Conclusion

SBh 1.1.1 presents a unique case of the exegetical use of the VP. As we notedearlier in the chapter, the sections that present scripture as valid means of



knowledge (sabdaprama-n.a) in the Major Objection mirror Ra-ma-nuja’sresponse in the Major Conclusion. He takes up the very scriptural passagespresented as support for the prima facie view and re-interprets them in the MajorConclusion. There are however important differences. For instance, thoughRa-ma-nuja does address most of the scriptural passages cited in the MajorObjection, he however breaks up the sequence of the passages in hisre-interpretation of them to introduce additional scripture, especially the VP.The Major Objection cites sruti and VP as evidence for an attribute-lessBrahman, which alone is claimed as real; all plurality is claimed as unrealand as due to the effect of adjuncts (upa-dhi).

Ra-ma-nuja first takes up the refutation of these sruti while he includes thirtyVP passages to redefine the nature of Brahman. As for the VP passages citedin the Major Objection as further evidence for an attribute-less Brahman,Ra-ma-nuja claims these pura-n. a passages in fact address the individual self andnot Brahman. Through such an exegetical move, he makes a case for themetaphysical reality of the individual self based on scripture, something thatdoes not concern the Advaitin in the Major Objection. So, whereas in theMajor Objection, sruti, BhG, and VP are presented seamlessly as support forthe Advaita view, Ra-ma-nuja in his Major Conclusion introduces additionaltopics such as the discussion of the individual self in its embodied and liberatedstate that is so important for his Veda-nta.

In the section on the nature of Brahman, Ra-ma-nuja re-interprets the srutiutilized in the Major Objection by imposing certain ontological frameworksto read these passages. He uses the soul–body (sarı-rasarı-ri/lipner) paradigmand the concept of the dual nature of Brahman (ubhayalin.gatva) to reach verydifferent interpretations of sruti than the objector on the nature of Brahman.He also utilizes the concept of scriptural harmony (samanvaya) to argue hisre-reading of sruti. However, the additional citations from the VP thataccompany the re-interpretation of sruti provide support for the very frameworksthat Ra-ma-nuja utilizes to reinterpret sruti, such as the soul–body relationshipand so on. Thus the VP is the source text that supports Ra-ma-nuja’s view ofBrahman and the world providing evidence for the very doctrines that areutilized to re-interpret sruti contra-Advaita.

Having refuted the Advaita interpretation of sruti, Ra-ma-nuja turns to theVP passages cited in the Major Objection as evidence for an attribute-lessBrahman. In the Major Conclusion, however, these passages are understoodas addressing the individual self. This section which argues the metaphysicalreality of the individual self and its distinction from Brahman, in its embo-died and liberated states is extensive. The section on the essential nature ofthe individual self and its distinction from Brahman is solely supported by thevery same VP passages utilized in the Major Objection. The re-interpretationof these VP passages is a reclamation of this pura-n. a as a Visis.t.a-dvaitic text,where large sections of the VP are re-read to refute Advaita. We see this kindof exegetical strategy in the section on ignorance as well. In addition torefuting the Advaita interpretation of the VP, Ra-ma-nuja introduces scriptural



passages from sruti and VP to establish the distinction between Brahman andthe individual self even in its liberated state. As we see in these sections, theVP is invariably called on to interpret sruti.

To counter the Advaita claim that ignorance (avidya-) that cannot be definedas either existence (sat) or non-existence (asat) is a cognition sublatable bytrue knowledge, Ra-ma-nuja resorts to the VP. His main task is to re-define theconcepts of existence and non-existence and also to refute the cognitive con-text of ignorance as the Advaitin understands it. In this section in the MajorObjection, the Advaitin provides sruti and VP examples to support his claim.In the Major Conclusion, then, Ra-ma-nuja re-interprets ignorance as karma,as not simply a cognitive error, but as physical transformation. As is tradi-tional, the prima facie view cites sruti and then smr.ti. His refutation of theAdvaita interpretation of the VP, in the Major Conclusion, then, is the secondreclamation of this pura-n. a as a Visis.t.a-dvaita text in SBh 1.1.1. The VP iscalled on to provide detail on ignorance as karma, a power (sakti) and form(ru-pa) of Brahman, and to define a type of relationship between ignoranceand Brahman that does not depend on the concept of sublation. For both,Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the same VP passages as the Advatin in the Major Objec-tion. The significant difference and indeed his critique of the Advaita readingof the VP is that the entire context of VP 2.12 is not taken into account.Specifically VP 2.12.37, which states that from the waters which consti-tute the body of Vis.n.u, was produced the lotus-shaped earth. This passageRa-ma-nuja understands as affirming the soul–body relationship which is thenutilized to read the rest of VP 2.12.37ff and facilitates the Visis.t.a-dvaita viewof ignorance.

Notes1 One of the reasons for this two-fold division is that the “Minor” and “Major”

sections are said to address different aspects of Br Su- 1.1.1. The su- tra underconsideration reads then therefore the enquiry into Brahman (athato brahma-jijña-sa-). Traditionally, it is believed that the Minor Objection and Conclusion(Laghupu-rvapaks.a and Laghusiddha-nta) address the different interpretations ofthe term then, whereas, the Major Objection and Conclusion (Maha-pu-rvapaks.aand Maha-siddha-nta) examine the analysis of the word therefore (Carman 1974:55). Thibaut’s division of the SBh 1.1.1 (20–129).

2 Ra-ma-nuja does not address this passage.3 Also Kat.h Up 4.10.4 Also Br. Up 4.5.15.5 Ra-ma-nuja does not address this passage.6 He also refers to the Veda-rthasam. graha that discusses Ch Up 6 in detail.7 Also in Ch Up 6.2.3.8 For the purposes of this study, I define interpretive community as proficients of

expert knowledge (sa-stra) of a particular tradition that are actively engaged increation of new texts whilst depending on prior textual traditions. These expositionsare usually directed towards similar experts in rival traditions (Olivelle 2004;Ganeri 2010).



9 yadapy a-hur ases.avises.apratyanı-kacinma-tram brahmaiva parama-rthah. . tadatirekina-na-vidhajña-tr.ajñeyatatkr.tajña-nabheda-di sarvam tasminneva parikalpitam mithya-b-hu-tam (SBh 13, cf Thibaut 1996: 20).

10 Abhyankar 69, fn 9.11 This concept of co-ordinate predication, sa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya, has both grammatical

and ontological significance for the Veda-ntins. Grammatically, in Sanskrit, itmeans that non-synonymous terms having the same case-ending can be applied toone particular thing. So, in the statement, Brahman is reality, knowlegde, infinity(Taitt Up 2.1.1), all three terms, being in the same case-ending are at the samelevel, that is, are applied to the one entity, Brahman. Ontologically, for Ra-ma-nuja,this means that Brahman, though one, is a differentiated entity (Lipner 1986: 29).

12 param. brahma svabha-vata eva nirastanikhilados.agandham. samastakalya-n.agu-n.a-tmakam. jagadutpattisthitisamha-ra-ntah.pravesaniyamana-dilı-lam. pratipa-dyakr.tsnasya cidacidvastunah. sarva-vastha-vashtitasya pa-rama-rthikasyaiva parasyabrahman.ah. sarı-rataya- ru-patvam. sarı-raru-patanvam. sasaktivibhu-tya-disabdais tattac-chabdasa-ma-na-dhikaran.yena ca-bhidha-ya tadvibhu-tibhu-tasya cidvastunah. svar-u-pen.a-vasthitam. acinmisrataya- ks.etrajñaru-pen.a-vasthiti coktva- ks.etrajña-vastha-ya-m.pun.yapa-pa-tmakakarmaru-pa-vidya-ves.t.itatvena sva-bha-vikajña-naru-patva-n anusand-ha-nam. acidru-pa-rtha-ka-rataya-nusandha-nam. ca partipa-ditam iti param. brahma savi-ses.am. tadvibhu-tibhu-tam. jagadapi pa-rama-rthikameveti jña-yate (SBh 69; cf Thibaut1996: 88–89).

13 VS #42. Ra-ma-nuja uses only VP 6.5.72, 79, 76, and 77.14 Ra-ma-nuja does not address this passage.15 Also Kat.h Up 4.10.16 Also Br. Up 4.5.15.17 Ra-ma-nuja does not address this passage.18 Since I examine Ra-ma-nuja’s exegetical strategies thematically I do not address his

interpretation of all the sruti discussed in the Major Objection and the MajorConclusion as some fall into the categories of exegesis that are already mentioned.

19 He refers to his discussion of this in the VS, where the soul–body paradigm isutilized to interpret this upanis.ad and states that he addresses it yet again in hiscommentary on Br Su- 2.1.15.

20 Also Kat.h Up 4.10.21 Also Br. Up 2.4.14.22 tatkr.tsnasya jagato brahmaka-ryataya- tadantarya-mikataya- ca tada-tmakatvena

aikya-t tatpratyanı-kana-na-tvam pratis.idhyate (SBh 63; cf Thibaut 1996: 84–85).23 atha para- yaya- tad aks.aram adhigamyate yat taddresyam agra-hyam agotram avar-

n.am acaks.uh. srotram. tad apa-n. ipa-dam nityam. vibhum. sarvagatam. susu-ks.mam.tadavyayam yadbhu-tayonim. paripasyanti dhı-ra-h. (Mun.d. Up 1.1.5–6).

24 SBh 58–59; cf Thibaut 1996: 78–79.25 Jala-n is a hapax. See Olivelle 1998: 544.26 I do not discuss Br Su- 3.2.3 as this su-tra is a discussion of the individual self in

the dream and waking states and though important does not add to our discus-sion here on exegetical strategies and would be too tangential of a topic toaddress at this juncture.

27 yo ma-m ajam ana-dim ca vetti lokamahesvaram (BhG 10.3ab).28 On the meaning of the term bha-vana see van Buitenen 1955.29 matstha-ni sarvabhu-ta-ni na ca-ham tes.vavasthitah. (BhG 9.4cd).

na ca matstha-ni bhu-ta-ni pasya me yogam aisvarambhu-tabhr.nna ca bhu-tastho mama-tmabhu- tabha-vanah. .(BhG 9.5) (SBh 65; cf Thibaut 1996: 86).

30 Except 10.42, which is also connected to the VP in that Ra-ma-nuja utilizes VP1.9.53 to interpret this verse in his Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya.

31 VP 6.5.83ab in the critical edition has vika-ram instead of vika-ra-n.



32 VP 6.5.84ab in the critical edition has samastakalya-n.agun.a-tmako hi svasaktile-sa-vr.tabhu-tasargah. .

33 sa sarvabhu-taprakr.tim. vika-ra-n gun. a-didos.a-m. sca mune vyatı-tah.atı-tasarva-varan. o’ khila-tma- tena-’str.tam. yad bhuvana-ntara-le.(VP 6.5.83).

34 samastakalya-n. agun.a-tmakosau hi svasaktilesoddhr.tabhu-tasargah.iccha-gr.hı-ta-bhimatorudehah. sam. sa-dhita-ses.ajagaddhitosau.(VP 6.5.84).

35 tejobalaisvaryamaha-vabodhasuvı-ryasaktya-digun. aikara- sih.parah. para-n. a-m sakala- na yatra klesa-dayah. santi para-varese.(VP 6.5.85). (SBh 65–66; cf Thibaut 1996: 86–87).

36 sa ı-svaro vyas.t.isamas.t.iru-po’vyaktasvaru-po prakat.asvaru-pah.sarvesvarah. sarvadr.ksarvavetta- samastasaktih. paramesvara-khyah. .(VP 6.5.86). (SBh 66; cf Thibaut 1996: 86–87).

37 sam. jña-yate yena tad astados.am. suddham. param. nirmalamekaru-pamsamdr.syate va- ’pyavagamyate va- tajjña-namajña-nam ato’nyad uktam.(VP 6.5.87). (SBh 66, cf Thibaut 1996: 86–87).

38 atha-vata-radva-ren. a sa-dhyam. vigrahaprayojanama-ha sam. sa-dhiteti (SP Vol. I 212).39 vyas.t.isamas.t.isabda-bhya-m. ka-ryaka-ran.a-vasthas cetanavargocyate. ru-pam. sarı-ram.

svaru-pam. sva-sa-dha-ran. am. sarı-ram. sarı-rilaks.an. am. su-cayati sarvesvareti. ı-svaraniyanta-. anena niya-myatvam. sarı-ratvam. siddham (SP Vol. I 212).

40 bhuvana-ntara-le ubhayavibhu-tyantara-le (SP Vol. I 211).41 For the historical development of this term in the BhG, VP, and San.kara’s works,

see Oberhammer 2000: 11–41.42 In the critical edition, VP 6.7.70 cd reads: tadvisvaru-paru-pam. vai ru-pam anyad

dharer mahat.43 samasta-h. saktayas caita- nr.pa yatra pratis.t.hita-h.

tadvisvaru-pavairu-pyam. ru-pam anyad dharer mahat.(VP 6.7.70).

44 samastasaktiru-pa-n. i tatkaroti janesvaradevatiryan.manus.ya-dices.t.a-vanti svalı-laya-.(VP 6.7.71) (SBh 67; cf Thibaut 1996: 87).

45 I skip 1.2.11 as it does not add to the discussion at hand.46 parah. para-n. a-m paramah. parama-tma-tmasamsthitah.

ru-pavarn. a-dinirdesavises.an. avivarjitah. .(VP 1.2.10) (SBh 67; cf Thibaut 1996: 87).

47 sarvatra-sau samastam ca vastyatreti vai yatah.tatah. sa va-sudeveti vidvadbhih. paripat.hyate(VP 1.2.12).

48 tadbrahma paramam nityam ajam aks.ayam avyayamekasvaru-pam ca sada- heya-bha-va-cca nirmalam(VP 1.2.13, SBh 67, Thibaut 1996: 87–88).

49 tadeva sarvam evaitad vyakta-vyaktasvaru-pavattatha- purus.aru-pen.a ka-laru-pen.a ca sthitam.(VP 1.2.14) (SBh 67; cf Thibaut 1996: 88).

50 SP 216–17.51 I do not discuss VP 1.2.11, which reaffirms the sruti claims that Brahman alone

always is (sad).52 This is also stated in VP 6.4.39–40. These passages are not discussed as they do

not add anything significant to the discussion at hand.53 VP 1.22.53 cd in the critical edition reads: ks.ara-ks.arasvaru-pe te sarvabhu-tes.vavasthite.54 dve ru-pe brahman.astasya mu-rtam ca-mu-rtam eva ca

ks.ara-ks.arasvaru-pe te sarvabhu- tes.u ca sthite.(VP 1.22.53).



aks.aram tatparam brahma ks.aram sarvamidam. jagatekadesasthitasya-gner jyotsna- vista-rin. ı- yatha-

parasya brahman.ah. saktis tathedam akhilam. jagat.(VP 1.22.54) (SBh 68; cf Thibaut 1996: 88).

55 vis.n.usaktya- maha-buddhe vr.tau samsrayadharmin.au(VP 2.7.29 cd).tayoh. saiva pr.thagbha-vaka-ran. am sam. srayasya ca(VP 2.7.30ab) (SBh 68; cf Thibaut 1996: 88).

56 The VP critical edition has saktam instead of sakto in VP 2.7.31ab.57 pradha-nam ca puma-mscaiva sarvabhu-ta-tmabhu-taya- and pradha-napurus.a-tmakam

instead of pradha-napurus.a-tmanah. in VP 2.7.31 cd.yatha- sakto jale va-to bibharti kan. ika-satamsaktih. sa-pi tatha- vis.n. oh. pradha-napurus.a-tmanah. .(VP 2.7.31).tad etad aks.ayam nityam. jaganmunivara-khilama-virbha-vatirobha-vajanmana-savikalpavat.(VP 1.22.58) (SBh 68–69; cf Thibaut 1996: 88).

58 ka-ran.a-t ka-ryasya vibha-ge dr.s.t.a-ntah. . jalasya kan. ika-h. tasma-dbhedena bibhartiva-yuh. . sam. yojakatvaviyojakatvayor va- dr.s.t.a-ntah. . parasparam. san.kalita-san. kali-ta-sca bibharti va-yuh. . yadva- prakr.tipurus.agatados.alesara-hitye dr.s.t.a-ntah. . va-yur hikan. ika-satam. tatsvabha-va-spr.s.t.o bibharti. pradha-napurus.a-tmanah. pradha-napur-us.ayor a-tmanah. (SP 220).

59 Subsequent to the discussion of the essential nature of the individual self, Ra-ma--nuja using VP 1.4.38–41 argues that Brahman is the inner self of the individualself. However, since we have already considered this to a certain extent in thesection on the nature of Brahman, I will not do so here.

60 pratyastamitabhedam yat satta-ma-tram agocaramvacasa-m a-tmasam. vedyam, tajjña-nam brahmasam. jñitam(VP 6.7.53).

61 The discussion on the worthy object of meditation begins with verse 6.7.28 in thepura-n. a.

62 pratyastamitabhedam ityatra devamanus.a-diprakr.tiparin. a-mavises.asam. sr.s.t.asya--pya-tmanah. svaru-pam tadgatabhedarahitvena tadbhedava-cideva-disabda-gocaramjña-nasattaikalaks.an. am svasamvedyam yogayun.manaso na gocara ityucyata itianena na prapañca-pala-pah. (SBh 69; cf Thibaut 1996: 89).

63 Ra-ma-nuja concludes this discussion by citing from the Vis.n.udharmottara Pura-n.a114.23–26 that explains that both the embodied and unembodied selves are notworthy as objects for meditation because of the association with karma of theformer and as far as the latter is concerned its knowledge is derived from anothersource and is not intrinsic to it as in the case of the Highest Brahman.

64 jña-nasvaru-pamatyantanirmalam parama-rthah.tameva-rthasvaru-pen.a bhra-ntidarsanatah. sthitam(VP 1.2.6).

65 asmin cha-stre parasya brahman.o vis.n.ornirasta-jña-na-dinikhilados.agandhasyasamastakalya-n.agun.a-tmakasya maha-vibhu-teh. pratipannataya- tasya bhra-ntidarsa-na-sambhava-t. sa-ma-na-dhikaran.yena aikyapratipa-danam ca ba-dha-sahamaviruddhamcetyanantaram evopapa-dayis.yate (SBh 71; cf Thibaut 1996: 91).

66 yato va- ima-ni bhu-ta-ni ja-yante, yena ja-ta-ni jı-vanti yat pratyantyabhismavisantitadvijiña-satva tadbrahmeti (Taitt Up 3.1.1) (Olivelle 1998 translation).

67 Introduction, fn 8; Also see SBh 72; cf Thibaut 1996: 91–92.68 so’ham iccha-mi dharmajña srotum tvatto yatha- jagat

babhu-va bhu-yasca yatha- maha-bha-ga bhavis.yati(VP 1.1.4).yanmayam ca jagad brahman yatascaitaccara-caram



lı-nama-sı-d yatha- yatra layames.yati yatra caVP 1.1.5 (SBh 72; cf Thibaut 1996: 92–93).

69 jagacca sa VP 1.1.31.70 For instance, in the question what does the world consist of (yanmayam ca jagad),

the mayat.a affix in yanmayam does not denote modification. That is, the questionis not how does the world come about or transform because if this was the casethen this question would be redundant as Maitreya already previously questionshow this world came into existence and what will it become again? The mayat.aaffix in yanmayam also does not designate the sense of the word to which it isattached such as pra-n.a-maya means “pra-n.a only.” For in that case the answershould have been “Vis.n.u only” rather than the world is Brahman (1.1.31), whichimplies a difference between Brahman and the world. Thus the most appropriatemeaning according to Pa-n. ini Su-tras 5.4.21 is that the affix-maya denotes abun-dance and the answer to the question, what does the world consist of, as theworld is Brahman is appropriate as it suggests that the world is abundantly pre-sent in the world. Thus through some grammatical maneuvers Ra-ma-nuja arguesthat the world is a positive manifestation of Brahman and is identical to the latterin so far as it is His body.

71 yadi nirvises.ajña-naru-pabrahma-dhis.t.ha-nabhramapratipa-danaparam sa-stram tarhi—nirgun.asya-prameyasya suddhasya-mala-tmanah.katham sarga-dikartr.tvam brahman.o’bhyupagamyate (VP 1.3.1).iti codyam,saktyah. sarvabha-va-na-m acintyajña-nagocara-h.yato’to brahman.asta-stu sargadya- bha-vasaktyah.bhavanti tapta-m sres.t.ha pa-vakasya yathos.n. ata- (VP 1.3.2–3ab).iti pariha-rasca na ghat.ate (SBh 73–74; cf Thibaut 1996: 94).

72 tasya-tmaparadehes.u sato’pyekamayam hi yatvijña-nam parama-rtho ’sau dvaitino’ tathvadarsinah.(VP 2.14.31).

73 ‘tasya-tmaparadehes.u sato’pyekamayam’ ityatra sarves.va-tmasu jña-naika-ka-rataya-

sama-nes.u satsu devamanus.ya-diprakr.tiparin. a-mavises.aru-papin. d. asamsargakr.tam-a-tmasu deva-dya-ka-ren. a dvaitadarsan. amatathyamityucyate (SBh 75–76; cf Thibaut1996: 96).

74 pin. d. agatam a-tmagatamapi dvaitam na pratis.idhyate. devamanus.ya-divivibhavici-trapin. d. es.u vartama-nam sarva-tmavastu samam ityarthah. (SBh 76; cf Thibaut1996: 96).

75 yadyanyosti parah. kopi mattah. pa-rthivasattamtadais.o’hamayam ca-nyo vaktumevamapı-s.yate(VP 2.13.86).

76 etaduktam bhavati yadi madvyatiriktah. ko’pya-tma- mada-ka-rabhu- tajña-na-ka-ra-danya-ka-ro’sti tada-hamevam a-ka-royam ca-nya-dr.sa-ka-rah. ’ iti sakyate vyapades.t.um.na caivamasti; sarves.a-m jña-naika-ka-ratvena sama-natva-deveti (SBh 76; cf Thibaut1996: 97).

77 ‘yadyanyo’sti parah. ko’ pi’ ityatra-pi na-tmaikyam pratı-yate; ‘yadi mattah. parah.ko’py anya’ iti ekasminnarthe parasabda-nyasabdayoh. prayoga-yoga-t. tatra para-sabdah. svavyatirikta-tmavacanah. anyasabdastasya-pi jña-naika-ka-ratva-danya-ka-rat-vapratis.edha-rthah. (SBh 76; cf Thibaut 1996: 97).

78 ven.urandhravibhedena bhedah. s.ad. ja-disamjñitah.abhedavya-pino va-yostatha- ’sau parama-tmanah.(VP 2.14.32).VP critical edition reads: va-yostatha- tasya maha-tmanah. .

79 dr.s.t.a-nte ca-nekarandhravartina-m va-yvamsa-na-m na svaru-paikyam api tva-ka-ras-a-myameva tes.a-m. va-yutvenaika-ka-ra-n. a-m randhrabhedanis.kraman.akr.to hi s.ad. ja-di-sañjña-bhedah. ; evama-tmana-m deva-disamjña-bhedah. (SBh 76; cf Thibaut 1996: 97).



80 a-ka-ravais.amyam a-tmana-m na svaru-pakr.tam, api tu deva-dipin.d. apravesakr.tami-tyupadisyate; na-tmaikyam (SBh 76; cf Thibaut 1996: 95).

81 The commentary irons out the grammatical problems of such an interpretationby utilizing VP 2.13.86 (SP Vol. I 241–42).

82 so’ham sa ca tvam sa ca sarvam etad a-tmasvaru-pam tyaja bhedamohamitı-ritas tena sa ra-javaryastatya-ja bhedam parama-rthadr.s.t.ih.(VP 2.16.23cd–24ab).

83 tacca ‘pin.d.ah. pr.thag yatah. pumsah. sirah.pa-n.ya-dilaks.an.ah. ’ (VP 2.13.89) iti prakrama-t(SBh 77; cf Thibaut 1996: 97).

84 vibhedajanake’jña-ne na- sama-tyantikam gatea-tmano brahman.o bhedam asantam kah. karis.yati(VP 6.7.96) (SBh 77; cf Thibaut 1996: 97).

85 Prior to the discussion on the distinction between the liberated individual self andBrahman, Ra-ma-nuja once again cites from various sruti, VP, and Br Su- toestablish that the individual self is distinct from Brahman. Since, we have coveredthis topic in some depth in earlier sections of this chapter and the chapter on theVeda-rthasam. graha, I do not examine these scriptural citations here. Ra-ma-nujacites, Mun.d. a Up 3.1.1, Kat.h Up 3.1, Taitt A

-ra 3.21, VP 6.5.83–85, VP 6.7.61–62,

Br Su- 1.2.21, Br Su- 1.1.22, Br Su- 2.1.22, Br. Up Ma-dh 3.7.22, Br. Up 4.3.21,Br. Up 4.3.35 (SBh 77–78; cf Thibaut 1996: 98).

86 na-pi sa-dhana-nus.t.ha-nena nirmukta-vidyasya paren. a svaru-paikyasam. bhavah. , avidy-a-srayatvayogyasya tadanarhatva-sam. bhava-t (SBh 78; cf Thibaut 1996: 98).

87 parama-tma-tmanor yogah. parama-rtha itı-s.yatemithyaitad anyad dravyam. hi naiti taddravyata-m. yatah. .(VP 2.14.27).idam. jña-nam upa-sritya mama sa-dharmyam a-gata-h.sarge’pi nopaja-yante pralaye na vyathanti ca.(BhG 14.2).a-tmabha-vam. nayaty enam. tad brahma dhya-yinam munevika-ryama-tmanah. saktya- loham a-kars.ako yatha-.(VP 6.7.30) (SBh 78–79; cf Thibaut 1996: 98–99).

88 atha brahma veda brahmaiva bhavatı-tya-di va-kya-ni hr.di nidha-ya asya-nyatha-sid-dhim. san.kate (SP. Vol I. 247).

89 Subsequent to the VP 2.14.27, 6.7.30 and BhG 13.2, Ra-ma-nuja cites the BrahmaSu-tras (4.4.17, 4.4.21, 1.3.2) and former Veda-nta commentators such as Bod-ha-yana and Dramid. a to illustrate that though the liberated selves may sharequalities such as enjoyment and bliss with Brahman, their new found powers donot include the capability of the creative act. Ra-ma-nuja cites a series of srutipassages. He reads these sruti passages in the context of the information arrivedat with the VP passages. Some of these passages claim that the liberated selfacquires “freedom of movement” (Ch Up 8.1.6), “attains all his desires” (TaittUp 2.1.1), “moves about there” (Ch Up 8.12.3; Ch Up 8.12.3), “attains bliss”(Taitt Up 2.7.1), and can take on whatever form he likes (Taitt Up 3.10.5). TheAdvaitin would read all these passages as referring to the Supreme Self, but sinceRa-ma-nuja has cited the VP he takes liberation to be the realization of the highestidentity as the servant (ses.a) of Brahman. He also utilizes the concept of scrip-tural harmony (samanvaya) to reconcile certain contradictory sruti such as Mun.d.Up 3.2.9, 3.2.8, 3.1.3, and Ch Up 8.3.4. All this does not grant us any newinformation as to his exegetical strategy at this point.

90 Van Buitenen 1955.91 vijña-nam pra-pakam pra-pye pare brahman. i pa-rthiva

pra-pan. ı-yastathaiva-tma- praks.ı-n. a-ses.abha-vanah.(VP 6.7.92).

92 ks.etrajñah. karan. ı- jña-nam karan.am tena tasya tat



nis.pa-dya muktika-ryam vai kr.takr.tyam nivartate(VP 6.7.93).

93 In the VP critical edition 6.7.94 ab ends with tatha-’ sau.94 tadbha-vabha-vam a-pannas tada-sau parama-tmana-

bhavaty abhedı- bhedas ca tasya-jña-nakr.to bhavet.(VP 6.7.94) (SBh 81; cf Thibaut 1996: 100).

95 muktasya svaru-pam a-ha tadbha-vo brahman.o bha-vah. svabha-vah. ; na tu svaru-paikyam.tadbha-vabha-vam a-panna iti dvitı-yabha-vasabda-nanvaya-t; pu-rvokta-rthavirodha-cca(SBh 81; cf Thibaut 1996: 100).

96 jña-naika-ka-rataya- parama-tmanaikapraka-rasya-sya tasma-d bhedo deva-diru-pah. .tadanvayo’sya karmaru-pa-jña-namu-lo na svaru-pakr.tah. . sa tu deva-dibhedah. para-brahmadhya-nena mu-labhu-ta-jña-naru-pe karman. i vinas.t.e hetvabha-va-n nivartataityabhedı- bhavati (SBh 81; cf Thibaut 1996: 100).

97 ajña-nasabdasya anirvacanı-yaparatvam lokatah. sa-stratas ca na vyutpannam. karma-va-citvavyutpattir asmin prabandha eva darsita- (SP. Vol I. 255).

98 VP 2.14.33 ab in the critical edition reads: ekatvam ru-pabhedasca ba-hyakarma-pravr.ttiprajah. .

99 ekatvasvaru-pabhedas tu ba-hyakarmapravr.ttiprajah.deva-dibhede’padhvaste na-sty eva-varan.o hi sah. .(VP 2.14.33).vibhedajanake’jña-ne na- sam a-tyantikam. gatea-tmano brahman.o bhedam asantam. kah. karis.yati.(VP 6.7.95) (SBh 81; cf Thibaut 1996: 100).

100 SP. Vol I. 255.101 In addition to these passages, Ra-ma-nuja also cites BhG 15.16–17, 18.61, 15.15,

10.41–42. All verses are meant to be read through the soul–body framework.Chapter 4 discusses the importance of the VP for 15.16–17, 15.15, and BhG 10.

102 For more on this see Grimes 1990.103 etam brahmalokam. na vindati anr.tena hi pratyud. ha-h. (Ch. Up 8.3.2).

tes.a-m. satya-na-m. sata-m anr.tam apidha-nam (Ch Up 8.3.1).104 The daharavidya-dhikaran.a in Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary comprises su-tra 1.3.13–1.3.22.

In San.kara’s commentary the numbering is 1.3.14–1.3.21.105 San. kara of course does not mean that the world of Brahman is a place to be

obtained. As he comments on this upanis.ad in the Br Su Bh 1.3.15, he does nottake the terms in the compound brahmaloka in the sense of the sixth-case ending,but rather in the sense of sa-ma-na-dhikaran.a (co-ordination), that is, he readsbrahmaloka not as “world of Brahman”, but as “the world that is Brahman.”

106 na-sada-sı-nno sada-sı-t tada-nı-m … tama-sı-t. tamasa- gu-d.hamagre praketam (RV10.129.1–3).

107 SBh 1.2.27108 ma-ya-m. tu prakr.tim vidya-n ma-yinam tu mahesvaram (Sve Up 4.10).109 Olivelle 1998 translation.110 ana-dima-yaya- supto yada- jı-vah. prabudhyate (Ma-n.d. Up 2.21).

indro ma-ya-bhih. puraru-pa ı-yate (Br. Up 2.5.19) (SBh 102; cf Thibaut 1996:125–26).

111 Tvas.t.r. is the divine architect of the gods in Hindu mythology.112 tavas.t.eha ra-jati (R.V. 6.47.19)

mama ma-ya- duratyaya- (BhG 7.14).113 evam cinma-travapus.i pare brahman. i dos.aparikalpitam idam devatiryan.manu-

s.yastha-vara-dibhedam sarvam jagad yatha-vasthitabrahmasvaru-pa-vabodhaba-dh-yam mithya-ru-pam. dos.asca svaru-patirodha-navividhavicitraviks.epakarı- sadasads-nirvacanı-ya- ana-dyavidya- (SBh 15–16; cf Thibaut 1996: 22–23).

114 vars.a-n. a-ñ ca nadı-na-ñ ca ye ca tes.u vasanti vaites.a-m svaru-pama-khya-tam sam. ksepa- sru-yata-m punah.



(VP 2.12.36).115 yadambu vais.n. avah. ka-yastato vipra vasundhara-

padma-ka-ra- samudbhu-ta- parvata-bdhya-disamyuta-

(VP 2.12.37).116 jyotı-m. s.i vis.n.urbhuvana-ni vis.n.ur vana-ni vis.n.urgirayo disasca

nadyah. samudra- sca sa eva sarvam yadasti yanna-sti ca vipravarya(VP 2.12.38).

117 cidacinmisre jagati cidam. so va-n.manasa-gocarasvasam. vedyasvaru-pabhedo jña-nai-ka-ka-rataya- aspr.s.t.apra-kr.tabhedo vina-sitvena-stisabdava-cyah. . acidam. sas tu cidam. -sakarmanimittaparin. a-mabhedo vina-sı-ti na-stisabda-bhidheyah. . ubhayam. tuparabrahmabhu-tava-sudevasarı-rataya- tada-tmakam ity etadru-pam. sam. s.kepen.a--tra-bhihitam (SBh 104; cf Thibaut 1996: 127).

118 tatra na-styasatyasabdayoh. kim. jña-naba-dhyatvam. pravr.ttinimittam, uta par-in. a-mitvam iti vica-re parin. a-mitvapaks.e sva-rasyam asti; mahı-ghat.atvam (VP2.12.42) ityupapa-dana-t. ajña-nasabdasya ca na-nirvacanı-yaparatvam; api tu kar-maparatvameva. (SP. Vol I. avidya- section. 42).

119 parin. a-mitva-parin. a-mitve eva na-styasatya-disabdartha-h. ; na tu jña-naba-dhyatva--ba-dhyatve (SP. Vol I. avidya- section. 43).

120 cidacidru-pam anyonyasamsr.s.t.am nis.kr.s.t.am ca bhagavaccharı-ram ityarthah. (SP.Vol I. avidya- section. 43).

121 acidamsasya na-stya-tmakatvanibandhanameva ta-tparyavis.ayah. . acidamsasya himithya-tvasanka- vyudasanı-ya-. atastasya parin. a-mitva-t na-stya-tmakatva eva ta-tpar-yam (SP. Vol I. avidya- section. 44).

122 cidamsasya … aparin. a-mitva-dstya-tmakatvam phalitam sya-d (SP. Vol I. avidya-

section. 44).123 asmiñccha-stre pu-rvam apy etad asakr.d uktam. ta-ni sarva-n. i tadvapuh. (VP 1.22.84)

tat sarvam vai hares tanuh. (VP 1.22.36), sa eva sarvabhu-ta-ma- visvaru-po yato’-vyayah. (VP 1.2.68) iti (SBh 104; cf Thibaut 1996: 127).

124 jña-nasvaru-po bhagava-n yato’sa-vises.amu-rtina tu vastubhu-tah.tato hi saila-bdhidhara-dibheda-ñ ja-nı-hi vijña-navijr.mbhita-ni(VP 2.12.39).

125 yada- tu suddham nijaru-pi sarvam karmaks.aye jña-namapa-stados.am.tada- hi samkalpataroh. phala-ni bhavanti no vastus.u vastubheda-h.(VP 2.12.40).

126 ases.aks.etrajña-tmana-vasthitasya bhagavato jña-nam eva sva-bha-vikam ru-pam; nadevamanus.ya-divasturu-pam. yata evam tata eva-cidru-padevamanus.yasaila-bdhidhar-a-dayasca tadvijña-navijr.mbhita-h. . tasya jña-naika-ka-rasya sato deva-dya-ka-ren. a sva-t-mavaividhya-nusandha-namu-la-h. deva-dya-ka-ra-nusandha-namu-lakarmamu-la- ityarthah. .yatasca-cidvastu ks.etrakjñakarma-nugun.am parin. a-ma-spadam, tatas tan na-stisabd-a-bhidheyam itaradastisabda-bhidheyam ityartha-duktam bhavati (SBh 105; cfThibaut 1996: 126–27).

127 vastvasti kim kutracid a-dimadhyaparyantahı-nam satataikaru-pamyacca-nyatha-tvam dvija ya-ti bhu-yo na tattatha- kutra kuto hi tattvam(VP 2.12.41).mahı- ghat.atvam ghat.atah. kapa-lika- kapa-lika- cu-rn. arajasyato’ n.uh.janaih. svakarmastimita-tmaniscayaira-laks.yate bru-hi kimatra vastu(VP 2.12.42).

128 svakarman.a- devamanus.ya-dibha-vena stimita-tmaniscayaih. svabhogyabhu- tama-cidvastu pratiks.an. am anyatha-bhu-tama-laks.yate anubhu-yata ityarthah. (SBh 106;cf Thibaut 1996: 127).

129 ‘tasma-nnavijña-namr.tam’ (VP 2.12.43) iti pratijña-tam brahmavyatiriktasya-satyatvamupasamhr.tya ‘vijña-namekam’ (VP 2.12.43) iti jña-nasvaru-pe brahman. i bhedadarsa-nanimitta-jña-namu-lam nijakarmaiveti sphut.ı-kr.tya (SBh 103; cf Thibaut 1996: 127).

130 tasma-n na vijña-nam r.te’sti kiñcit kvacit kada-cid dvija vastuja-tam



vijña-nam ekam nijakarmabhedavibhinnacittair bahudha- ’bhyupetam.(VP 2.12.43).jña-nam visuddham vimalam visokam ases.alobha-dinirastasan

.gamekam sadaikam paramah. paresah. sa va-sudevo na yato’nyad asti.(VP 2.12.44).

131 VP 2.12.45 ab in the critical edition has es.o instead of evam.132 sadbha-va evam. bhavato mayokto jña-nam. yatha- satyamastyamanyat.

etat tu yat sam. vyavaha-rabhu-tam. tatra-pi coktam. bhuvana-sritam te(VP 2.12.45).

133 tadbheda-nusandha-nam na-tmasvaru-paprayuktamitya-ha’vijña-namekam’ (VP2.12.43) iti. a-tmasvaru-pam tu karmarahitam tat eva malaru-paprakr.tisparsar-ahitam (SBh 107; cf Thibaut 1996: 128).

134 upacaya-pamcaya-narhatayaikam tata eva sadikaru-pam. tacca va- sudevasarı-ramititada-tmakam (SBh 107; cf Thibaut 1996: 129).

135 evamru-pamcidacida-tmakam jagad va-sudevasarı-ram tada-tmakamiti jada-gya-tha-tmyam (SBh 107; cf Thibaut 1996: 129).

136 Ra-ma-nuja also cites VP 2.12.46, which reinforces the individual self and matteras his body.

137 jagadya-tha-tmyajña-naprayojanam. moks.opa-yatanam (SBh 107; cf Thibaut 1996: 127).138 astina-stisabda-bhidheyam. cidacida-tmakam. kr.tsnam. jagatparamasya paresasya

parasya brahman.o vis.n.oh. ka-yatvena tada-tmakam (SBh 108; cf Thibaut 1996: 129).139 na-styasatyasabda-vastisatyasabdavirodhinau. atas caita-bhya-m asattvam. hi pratı-yate

na nirvacanı-yatvam. api tu vina-sitvaparau. vasvasti kim (VP 2.12.41) mahı- gha-t.atvam (VP 2.12.42) ityatra-pi vina-sitvameva hy upapa-ditam; na nis.prama-n.akatvam.jña-naba-dhyatvam. va- (SBh 108; cf Thibaut 1996: 129).

140 yattu ka-la-ntaren. a-pi na-nya-m samjña-mupaitu vaiparin. a-ma-disambhu-ta-m tadvastu nr.pa tacca kim(VP 2.13.96).ana- sı- parama-rthastu pra-jña-irabhyupagamyatetattu na-si na sandeho na-sidravyopapa-ditam(VP 2.14.24).VP 2.14.24ab critical edition reads parama-rthasca.

141 vis.n. ava-dha-ram yatha- caitat trailokyam samavasthitamparama-rthastu tenokto yatha-jña-nam pradha-natah.(VP 2.13.2).VP 2.13.cd critical edition states parama-rthasca me prokta- …



4 Sa-m. khya-Yoga, Kr.s.n.a, andthe foremost devotee inthe Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya

Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on the Bhagavadgı-ta- (BhG), the Bhagavadgı-ta-bha--s.ya (RBhGBh), is thought to have been written after the Srı-bha-s.ya (SBh)(Carman 1974: 60). In this commentary Ra-ma-nuja does not quote scriptureas evidence for his arguments as liberally as he does in his other writings. Aplausible reason for this sparing use of scripture is that the RBhGBh mayhave been his last work and, as such, he takes for granted a number of con-cepts established in his two earlier expositions, the Veda-rthasam. graha (VS)and the SBh (van Buitenen 1956: 12–15). Furthermore, the BhG was perhapstheologically closer to Ra-ma-nuja’s own Veda-nta and thus it did not need thesupport of the Vis.n.u Pura-n.a (VP) as often, as there are some commonalitiesbetween the BhG’s reaction to the monism of the upanis.ads and Ra-ma-nuja’sresponse to the monism of Advaita (van Buitenen 1956: 4). Regardless ofthis sparing use of the VP, Ra-ma-nuja does utilize it in discussions salientto his theology. In the exegetical instances that are explored in this chapter,both Ra-ma-nuja and his commentator Veda-nta Desika take San. kara’s com-mentary on the BhG as representative of the Advaita perspective. So, inthis chapter the terms “Advaita Veda-nta” and “San.kara’s Veda-nta” are usedindiscriminately.

Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the VP as support to clarify his interpretation on thefollowing issues: the question of Being and Non-being (2.16), the man ofsteady wisdom (2.61), the two natures of Kr.s.n. a (7.6), the field and the field-knower (13.4), Kr.s.n. a’s ma-ya- (7.14), and the foremost devotee (7.17).1 Struc-turally, these passages are crucial in their respective chapters and as such theuse of VP in their interpretation is significant. Not only is the VP importantin Ra-ma-nuja’s interpretation of these verses, it is essential to refute theAdvaita perspective on the same verses, in order to establish the BhG as aVisis.t.a-dvaita text. In a sense then, the VP is an exegetical link, a kind of inter-textual connection between the two Veda-nta commentaries, whilst it also dif-ferentiates them. This chapter is concerned only with San.kara’s and Ra-ma-nuja’sinterpretion of the BhG; it is neither a study of the philology nor thedoctrines and contexts of the BhG as such, unless they are applicable to thediscussion at hand.2


Defining Sa-m. khya and Yoga

Arjuna’s reluctance to fight his kinsmen in Chapter 1 of the BhG and theopening verses of Chapter 2 (BhG 2.1–10), prompt Kr.s.n. a’s instruction onSa-m. khya and Yoga. These speculations, of course, are not those of the dar-sanas, but rather proto-classical forms.3 In the BhG, Sa-m. khya refers to thediscipline of knowledge and Yoga is disciplined activity rooted in the realiza-tion that the body is distinct from the individual self.4 Verses 11–37 of BhG 2affirm the immortal individual self as distinct from the body in 2.16–18, andthe VP is utilized as support in 2.16. The latter portion of Chapter 2 of theBhG (39–72) addresses Yoga and the man of steady wisdom5 and Ra-ma-nujaalso relies on this pura-n. a in his commentary on 2.61. As we shall see in boththese strategically important verses, 2.16 and 2.61, the role of the VP in theirinterpretation is important.

Being (sat) and Non-being (asat)

Verses, 2.16–2.18, on the immortality of the soul are meant as an antidote toArjuna’s misplaced grief, but for San. kara and Ra-ma-nuja, this discussion isonly relevant within the larger interpretive contexts of Advaita and Visi-s.t.a-dvaita respectively. Defining discrimination as knowledge that discerns thesoul from the body, Kr.s.n. a mentions several terms such as, sat,6 asat, bha-va andabha-va, which due to their semantic polyvalence problematize the translation ofBhG 2.16.7 We first address San. kara’s interpretation of this verse and thenevaluate the contribution of the VP in Ra-ma-nuja’s refutation of the Advaitin.

San.kara reads BhG 2.16 as follows: there is no coming to be (bha-va) of thenon-existent/unreal (asat), there is no ceasing to be (abha-va) of the existent/real(sat). However, the correct conclusion of both is seen by those who see reality8

(tattva).9 Commenting on this passage he states “indeed, cold, heat, and so onand their causes evaluated by the valid means of knowledge are not abso-lutely real (vastusat); for they are transformations (vika-ra), and transforma-tions are not continuous.”10 According to San.kara, BhG 2.16 refers tosatka-ryava-da, the doctrine that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. Citingthe illustration of the clay and its transformations into pots and so on, heremarks that every effect is unreal because it is not perceived as different fromits cause. That is, the pot, which is a transformation of clay, is not seen toexist before its creation and also after its destruction. Moreover, the same isthe case with the cause of pots and so on, such as clay, for those causes arealso not perceived apart from their causes.11 Here, San.kara identifies truereality (vastusat) with cognitive unchangeableness. For him “that is real ortrue, of which the consciousness is never negated; that is unreal or untrue, ofwhich the consciousness can be negated” (De Smet 1953: 44).

His rationale in introducing the concept of causality is to ultimately denythe reality of anything that is caused. The significance of the doctrine ofcausality does not lie in its factual framework, but rather in the suggestion

114 Sa-m. khya-Yoga, Kr.s.n.a, and the foremost devotee


that nothing new is ever produced. It also intimates that cause and effect arenon-different, and that only the cause is real while “all effects not cognizableapart from the cause are unreal.”12 Thus far, San. kara has grounded his ana-lysis of the real and unreal in the context of cause and its effects utilizingillustrations of clay and its transformations. But though he claims clay as realand its transformations as unreal, he also refrains from labelling clay as ulti-mately real, because even clay is dependent on its own causes. Though clay isreal in comparison to a pot (made of clay) which is unreal, it is only anillustration that is meant to point the seeker to what is ultimately real—theSelf or Brahman.

San.kara’s discussion transitions from the context of cause-effect to the dis-tinction between the Self and non-Self, where he employs the method ofanvayavyatireka. Cardona (1981: 93) remarks that San. kara utilizes this modeof reasoning “to discriminate between what is and is not the Self as well as toshow what meanings may be attributed to given words.”Typically, anvaya-vyatireka for San.kara allows for the cognition of continuity-and-discontinuityas a means of achieving discrimination (Halbfass 1991: 166–67). What continueswithout disruption is real and all else is unreal. He states:

always, two cognitions obtain, the cognition of the real (sadbuddhi) andthe cognition of the unreal (asadbuddhi). The cognition of that objectwhich does not discontinue (avyabhicarati) that is real, that cognitionwhich discontinues (vyabhicarati) is unreal. Therefore, the distinction ofreal and unreal depends on the issue of cognition … hence the cognitionof a pot because it is discontinuous is unreal; not so, the cognition of the‘real’ because it is continuous.13

“San. kara is not seeking to investigate the nature of objects, that is to say, howone distinguishes between different elements of the order of things” rather “hedraws the line between Being and non-Being, not by way of subjective andobjective states, but by distinguishing between the changeful and the perma-nent”(Ram-Prasad 2013: 2–4). Because for him “what is essential never‘deviates’ or ‘departs’ (vyabhicar), while what is ‘accidental’ may always bediscontinued and cease to accompany what is essential.”14 “Thus there is noexistence of unreal and caused entities like bodies or dual entities (like heatand cold), nor does the real—the Self—ever cease to exist because it is said tobe present everywhere (avyabhicar).”15 So, in the subsequent verse whenKr.s.n. a in 2.17 states however, know that to be imperishable, by which thiswhole universe was spun. No one can bring destruction to that which is imper-ishable,16 San. kara comments that this whole world is pervaded by Brahmanjust as pots are pervaded by the sky, and in fact “this Brahman, known as sat,does not change its own nature.”17

Having suggested the distinction between real and unreal as one dependenton the characteristic of perishability and destruction in BhG 2.17, Kr.s.n. a in2.18 illustrates this distinction:

Sa-m. khya-Yoga, Kr.s.n.a, and the foremost devotee 115


Those bodies of the self (sarı-rin) have an end while the self itself is eternal,indestructible, and incomprehensible, therefore, fight O’ Arjuna.18

(BhG 2.18)

For Kr.s.n.a, the perishable–imperishable distinction is the soul–body opposition.San.kara recasts this distinction as an epistemological one. The perishable–imperishable dichotomy that the BhG utilizes to distinguish the body as opposedto the Self is not according to him, one of physical destruction or change. Hecompares physical bodies to the bodies one finds in dreams—(which are) justas unreal and just as perishable:

The meaning is, just as the cognition of the reality in mirage and so oncontinues until it is interrupted at the conclusion of investigation by validmeans of knowledge (prama-n.a)—this is the end of it. So also, thesebodies of the impermanent, eternal soul are like bodies of the indestruc-tible, imperishable self as seen in a dream or due to illusion (ma-ya-), menof discrimination affirm this.19

Thus sat-asat denotes Self and non-Self not based just on perishable (vina- si)nature (as in the individual self and the body), but on discontinuing cognitions,even though Kr.s.n. a in 2.18 seems to suggest that the perishable (vina- si)-imperishable (avina-si) distinction denotes the body and the individual self, forSan. kara this distinction is one between Brahman, the true Self and all that isother than this, which is evident in the doctrine of causality which is introducedin 2.16 itself.

To refute San.kara’s interpretation of BhG 2.16 based on the doctrine ofcausality (satka-ryava-da), Ra-ma-nuja explicitly states in his commentary on2.16 that “this verse has no reference to satka-ryava-da and as such this doc-trine has no relevance here.”20 Because it is reading these BhG passages usingthe doctrine of causality that has led San.kara to address the distinctionarticulated here as one between Brahman and the world that is ultimately asublatable cognition. Unlike San.kara, Ra-ma-nuja reads the sat–asat distinctionas ontologically real and as a distinction between the individual self and thebody—not as different orders of being, but categories of being (Ram-Prasad2013: 43). To understand the role of the VP in Ra-ma-nuja’s refutation ofSan. kara’s definition of these terms, we begin with the his interpretation ofBhG 2.16:

[t]he non-being (asat) has no existence/reality (bha-va), the being (sat) nonon-existence (abha-va);however, those who see the true nature of both see this conclusion (anta).21

(BhG 2.16)

New concepts are introduced from the VP, to establish Being and Non-beingas the individual self (a-tman) and the physical body (deha):



[t]he non-being (asat), the body, has no existence/reality, whereas (ca) thebeing (sat), the self, has no non-existence. When they observe both,the body and the self, those who see their true nature as they observe it,see this conclusion … that means: they see the conclusion that the truenature of the body, an insentient object, is complete (eva) non-being,whereas, the true nature of the self, a sentient element, is pure being.Indeed, the true nature of non-being is that it is perishable, whereas thetrue nature of being is that it is imperishable.22

The attribute of consciousness (cetana) differentiates existence from non-existence.Whereas, the individual self possesses consciousness the body does not. Thelatter is understood as non-existence in that it is purely unreal (asattvam eva)because it is an insentient object (acidvastu) lacking consciousness (cetana).Thus non-being (asat) is equated with the body which is said to be unrealbecause it has insentience as its property. Sat or Being is the individual self(jı-va-tman) that is sentient. First, Ra-ma-nuja does not take asat to mean causedentities. Second, he defines non-being (asat) as possessing an inherently per-ishable (vina-sasvabha-va) nature and being (sat) as characterized by eternal orimperishable nature (avina- sasvabha-va). His interpretation echoes BhG 2.18and he in fact claims that his reading of 2.16 is more in line with the rest ofthe BhG passages, namely 2.17 and 2.18.

As support for his interpretation he utilizes four VP passages: VP2.12.43ab, 2.12.45ab, 2.14.24, and 2.13.96.23 Each of these passages providesscriptural evidence for Ra-ma-nuja’s claim that the ‘unreal’ refers to the bodyand ‘real’ to the individual self. According to him, one of the defining char-acteristics of the ‘real’ is sentience and perishability denotes destruction, change,transformation unrelated to the issue of sublatable or unsublatable cognitions.VP 2.12.43ab and 2.12.45ab provide the scriptural support to distinguish the‘real’ and ‘unreal’ based on the characteristic of sentience:

Therefore, O’ twice-born One, of all possible objects (vastuja-ta) none,anywhere, at any time exists (asti), except for discriminative knowledge(vijña-na)24

(VP 2.12.43ab)

I have told you this about existence: knowledge (jña-na) is being (satya),all else is non-being (asatya).25

(VP 2.12.45ab)

Ra-ma-nuja skips 2.12.43cd and 2.12.44 here and the significance of this isexplained shortly. For now, in these two passages, the dichotomy of asti–na-stiand satya–asatya is drawn along the lines of insentient objects (vastu) andconsciousness (vijña-na/jña-na) not based on the distinction between cause andits effects. 2.12.45ab explicitly identifies knowledge as Being (satya) or whatreally exists, and everything else that exists, as Non-being (asatya). This is an



important distinction that Ra-ma-nuja finds in the VP only, to refute San.kara.In addition to delineating Being and Non-being along the lines of sentienceand insentience, the next VP passage introduces the additional characteristicof perishability. The discussion of perishability has come up in BhG 2.18 andwe saw that San.kara takes it to denote sublatability. With the use of the VP,Ra-ma-nuja reaches a different conclusion:

The wise regard the highest reality (parama-rtha) as imperishable (avina- si),whereas there is no doubt that anything derived from perishable matter(na-sidravya) is perishable (na-si).26

(VP 2.14.24)

This verse provides evidence that Being is a higher reality that is imperishable andis of the nature of consciousness (vijña-na/jña-na), in contrast to the worldly perish-able existence, which though it exists, is not real in this sense. Desika commentingon Ra-ma-nuja’s interpretation in the Ta-tparyacandrika- (TC), notes that:

the words sat and asat have to do with being worthy or unworthy ofpractical use. If the doubt arises as to how these words satya and asatyaare concerned with empirical and ultimate reality, destruction and non-destruction alone as the cause for the use of the terms ‘empirical’ and‘ultimate’ are stated in sage Para-sara’s VP verse 2.14.24.27

That is, ultimate/highest and empirical reality is distinguished by the issue ofphysical transformation and change and not by sublation, as San.kara wouldhave it. Ra-ma-nuja claims:

It is also said in the Bhagavadgı-ta-—those bodies have an end (BhG 2.18); however know that to be imper-ishable (BhG 2.17).28 It is seen that this (perishability of body andimperishability of self) alone is the reason for the designations ‘being’and ‘non-being’.29

Desika notes:

in the BhG, this alone is the meaning of the two later verses (2.17 and2.18). The claim is that even though the word sat is used to indicate sen-tient being, it is only in regard to the particular state of giving up nameand form such as gods etc. But strictly speaking, essential nature withoutmodification is denoted by the word sat.30

This further characterization of sat as sentient being but in the context of itsassociation with matter is a reason as to why sat here does not refer toBrahman, though the supreme reality is also characterized by sentience andwhose essential nature is not subject to change or transformation.



The last VP verse, 2.13.96, defines higher reality (parama-rtha), Being, asnot subject to modification, that warrants a new designation:

O’ King, that which even at different times does not come to have differentnames (sam. jña)brought about by being transformed (parin.a-ma) and the like, whatis that?31

(VP 2.13.100)

Matter which is perishable (na-sidravya) mentioned in VP 2.14.24 is readtogether with the physical transformations it undergoes that signal a changein denotation. As Desika comments:

that which is characterized by aging, change, and destruction, is char-acterized by relinquishing a previous condition, due to the difference indenotation alone is denoted by the word acidvastu and what is not that isdenoted by the word vastu. That this meaning is articulated clearly,Ra-ma-nuja shows with VP 2.13.96.32

These VP passages decisively recast the Advaita interpretation of BhG 2.16–2.18 adding a new dimension to perishability as transformation and changerather than sublatability. As a result, the entities spoken of in BhG 2.16–18are now understood as the individual self and the body contrary to San.kara’sinterpretation.

We mentioned earlier that Ra-ma-nuja does not cite VP 2.12.43 cd and2.14.44. These passages have a clear Advaitic tenor in that they affirm dis-criminative knowledge (vijña-na) mentioned in 2.12.43ab as one (eka), is saidto be perfect, pure, and free from pain and afflictions, single, eternal and isdeclared to be the supreme Va-sudeva, apart from which nothing else exists.33

Perhaps Ra-ma-nuja omits these verses because of their monistic sensibility. Hemay also omit them because, from the perspective of the VP context, thesestanzas address the Supreme Self, Vis.n.u, and not the individual self, which iscontrary to his perspective. However, we have seen in the previous chapter onthe SBh that he undertakes a detailed interpretation of these very VP verses,from 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14, to establish the topic of discussion as the individualself and not Brahman. Hence, even though these particular VP passages maysupport San. kara, they are re-interpreted by Ra-ma-nuja.

Desika remarks in Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on BhG 2.16 that:

by ten verses, in the middle of the commentary on the Brahma Su-tras[SBh] with the beginning and concluding sections of the pura-n. a, and inaccord with perception and the various sruti and smr.ti, the meaning ofthe words thing, no-thing, existence and non-existence is established withVP 2.12.42 and so on as based on modification and non-modificationalone.34



So as far as Ra-ma-nuja is concerned the VP passages, and now BhG 2.16–18,denote Being and Non-being as the individual self and the body.

Realization of Brahman (samyagdarsana) and realization of theindividual self (a-tmadarsana)

The VP is utilized in Chapter 2 of the BhG a second time in the discussion ofYoga,35 specifically, to address the man of steady wisdom (2.61) who accord-ing to Kr.s.n. a successfully implements the teaching of this chapter.36 In addi-tion, to the different perceptions of the discipline of knowledge and disciplineof action and their relationship, San.kara and Ra-ma-nuja also disagree on thepath to achieving the goal and the definition of that goal itself. For San.kara,the man of discipline through renunciation of actions, control of senses,thinking Brahman to be the inner self of all, attains the experience of theabsolute—samyagdarsana. On the other hand, for Ra-ma-nuja, the man ofsteady wisdom conquers his senses and his desires for objects through medi-tation on a form of Vis.n.u. His argument is rooted in scriptural evidence fromthe VP.

San.kara views the paths of Sa-mkhya and Yoga, presented by Kr.s.n. a, asdifferent and incompatible since the discipline of knowledge (sa-m. khya) andthe discipline of action (yoga) are rooted in two different types of under-standing (buddhidvaya-sraya).37 As the path of knowledge, Sa-mkhya, a kind ofmeditative reflection teaches that “the self because it is free (abha-va) from thesix-fold transformation like birth and so on (janma-dis.ad.vikriya), is a non-agent (akarta-).”38 Whereas, Yoga is the performance of actions based on theunderstanding of dharma and adharma (dharma-dharmaviveka) is based on theview that the Self is other than the body (deha-divyatirikta). The Self isunderstood as an agent of actions (kartr.) an enjoyer (bhoktr.) of results and soon.39 Thus Sa-m. khya, the path of knowledge and Yoga, the path of action aretwo different paths, rooted in two different concepts of non-agency (akartr.tva)and agency (kartr.tva) of the Self and the understanding of unity (ekatva) andplurality (anekatva) respectively.40 Given such an understanding of the rela-tionship of Sa-m. khya to Yoga, the man of steady wisdom, one who has cor-rectly understood the teaching of BhG 2, according to San.kara follows Sa-m. khyaand not Yoga.

BhG 2.61 characterizes the man of steady wisdom as follows: controllingall of them (senses), let him be intent upon Me as the supreme (matpara); for,he who has his senses under control has his knowledge firmly established(sthitaprajña).41 For San.kara, the one who is “established firmly in thewisdom ‘I am the Supreme Brahman’ is a sthitaprajña.”42 However, one whodesires such knowledge characterized as samyagdarsana (samyagdarsana-laks.an.a), must first control his senses. How is this to be accomplished? San. -kara understands this to mean that one must sit in concentration thinking “Iam not different from Him” (na anyo’ham tasma-t), that is Va-sudeva, who isthe inner self of all. Furthermore, it is through force of such repeated practice



(abhya-sabala) that the senses are brought under control. This then is howSan. kara portrays the man of steady wisdom, as one who engages in thepractice of Sa-m. khya, but not Yoga.

Contrary to San. kara, Ra-ma-nuja defines the man of steady wisdom as onewho integrates the Sa-m. khya teaching of the difference in essential natures ofthe body and the soul and applies it in his spiritual practice (Yoga).43 Theman of steady wisdom engaged in devotion to knowledge perfects the goal ofvisualizing the essential nature of the self. His mind depends on only the selfwithin himself (manasa- a-tmaika-valambana) and expels all desires. Ra-ma-nujacalls this the highest devotion to knowledge (jña-nanis.t.ha-ka-s.t.ha-).44 The dif-ferences between San. kara’s and Ra-ma-nuja’s understanding of the goal of thesthitaprajña, whether it is a-tmadarsana or samyagdarsana, is reflected in thenature and extent to which the aspirant depends on Kr.s.n. a. For scripturalsupport for this view, Ra-ma-nuja turns to the VP. Commenting on BhG 2.61,he states:

[d]esiring to abandon all faults, restraining the senses, which are difficultto conquer because of their attachment to objects, fixing the mind on me, theauspicious object of meditation (subha-sraya), he should remain composed.When the mind has me [Kr.s.n. a] as its object, then such a mind, purifiedbecause of the burning away of all impurities and without attachment tosense-objects, brings the senses under its control. Then the mind,restraining the senses, will be able to see the self.45

The mind requires an auspicious object of meditation (subha- sraya) in orderto control the senses and gain the true realization of the individual self(a-tmadarsana). Restraint of senses alone is not enough:

for one who is restrained without the experience of the self, the passionfor objects does not cease, when the longing for objects does not end, thetroubling senses of even a wise man, whose mind is restrained, provestrong, that is, carry away the mind by force. Thus the overpowering ofthe senses depends on experiencing the self, and the experiencing of theself is dependent on the overpowering of the senses; thus, firm establishmentin knowledge is difficult to achieve.46

The uncontrollable hankering of the senses, even for one whose mind isrestrained, is due to the accumulation of karma from innumerable previousbirths. This deposit of karma is what needs to be consumed allowing for theunrestricted reflection on the true nature of the individual self. This then is thecomplete definition of subduing the senses—not simply turning away fromexternal objects but curbing the inner temptation that continually leads themind astray from the vision of the self. Whereas, San. kara understands“focusing of the mind on Vis.n.u” as contemplation of “I am Va-sudeva”, forRa-ma-nuja it is a form of Vis.n.u, the object of meditation is the sole aid. VP



6.7 traditionally referred to as the Treatise on the Auspicious Object of Medi-tation (Subha- srayaprakaran.a) provided scriptural evidence to support theview that Vis.n.u alone can be an efficient object of meditation.

We have come across VP 6.7, a section that is very important to Ra-ma-nujain the earlier chapters on the VS and the SBh. The context of VP 6.7 isa dialogue between the brothers Kesidhvaja and Kha-n.d. ikya. The formerteaches the latter the path of Yoga just as Kr.s.n. a imparts his teaching toArjuna. Though the VP does not mention the term “Sa-m. khya”, the spiritualpractice presented as an antidote to ignorance (VP 6.7.11–16.7.25) prior tothe path of Yoga (VP 6.7.26–6.7.104) is remarkably similar to Kr.s.n. a’s teach-ing in the BhG 2. According to Kesidhvaja, the path of Yoga begins with theknowledge that the body is distinct from the self and that the properties ofmatter (prakr.ti), which comprises the body do not taint the self. The purifica-tion of the mind by the knowledge that the self is not the body is a precursor tothe practice entailed in subsequent stages of Yoga.

The Yoga described in the VP is of course not the Yoga of BhG 2. However,the fact that the VP charts a spiritual path called “Yoga” that begins withawareness of the knowledge of the distinction of body and self mirrors thestructure of Chapter 2 of the BhG itself. According to Ra-ma-nuja, just asKr.s.n. a begins by praising Sa-m. khya and then Yoga, which are to be integratedin the man of steady wisdom, so too, the VP presents a regimen that integratesthe discrimination of the self from the body with further spiritual practice.

In addition to the structural similarities between Chapter 2 of the BhG andVP 6.7, when Kr.s.n. a in BhG 2.61 claims one must be intent upon me (Kr.s.n. a)as the supreme (matpara), he takes this literally. As Ram-Prasad remarks:

San.kara does not see Kr.s.n. a as a creator god, a being whole and distinctbefore there is creation, bringing beings into creation—ex nihilo—andcontinuing to be a being distinct from creation. … [instead he] readsKr.s.n. a’s statements about his power in relation to being and things in away that does not challenge Kr.s.n. a’s divinity, yet subtly re-presents itwithin a metaphysics of non-duality.47

So, when Kr.s.n. a in 2.61 claims that He ought to be the object of devotion, forRa-ma-nuja this is to love the Supreme Being who is the controller and supporterof the world and not in the non-dual sense as San.kara interprets it.

The VP passage that Ra-ma-nuja utilizes is part of the section of the VP thatrecommends the yogin to mediate on the “great form of Hari”, which is theorigin of all the incarnations, similar to the one seen by Arjuna in the BhG,that are assumed by Him in sport (VP 6.7.70) and it is this very form, whichas an object of purification in the elimination of sins and it is this passage thatRa-ma-nuja utilizes in his commentary on BhG 2.61:

just as the rising flames of fire, fanned by wind burns away a forest of drytrees



so also, Vis.n.u, who is established in the minds of all yogis, (destroys)all sins.48

When Kr.s.n. a claims in BhG 2.61 “be intent upon me”, Ra-ma-nuja interpretsthis to mean that the supreme person, Vis.n.u, is to be understood as the auspiciousobject (subha-sraya) of meditation as mentioned in the VP.

But in what sense is Vis.n.u the object of meditation in the VP? It seems thatthe VP itself oscillates between different ontologies, never clearly advocatingone view or the other. In one instance, the end result of such yogic behavior isdefined as the absorption into Brahman (brahmalaya, 6.7.27).49 However, thepura-n. a says a few stanzas later that if the person is steeped in this kind ofmeditation, Brahman attracts the individual self to himself, like a magnetattracts iron. This analogy is anything, but monistic. It speaks of a closerconnection between the individual self and Brahman, but does not suggest aconvergence of the two (VP 6.7.30).50 The next verse is even more explicit inits non-Advaitic perspective, when Yoga is defined as union (samyoga) inBrahman (VP 6.7.31).51 However, the term subha- sraya utilized by Ra-ma-nujaas the object of meditation, occurs in VP 6.7.54, where begins the descriptionof the stages of meditation focusing on forms of Vis.n.u including incarnatedform such as the Kr.s.n. a of the BhG. That Ra-ma-nuja considers this sectionof the VP as analogous to the BhG teaching is also reflected in the soleuse of this pura-n. a as scriptural evidence. In the next section the VP’s role incharacterizing the nature of Kr.s.n. a as discussed in BhG 7 and BhG 13 isexamined.

Kr.s.n.a’s nature

Two of the most important instances in the BhG where the nature of Kr.s.n. avis-à-vis his relationship to the world is addressed is in chapters 7 and 13.Within these chapters, passages 7.4–6 and 13.2–4 are significant. Ra-ma-nujautilizes the VP in both these contexts (7.6 and 13.4) to establish the Visi-s.t.a-dvaita view of Brahman’s relationship to creation. Here too, Ra-ma-nujaturns to the VP to refute San. kara’s reading of these BhG passages. We firstexamine the interpretation of San.kara and then address Ra-ma-nuja’s response,but first a brief comment on the structural importance of these passageswithin their respective chapters.

Chapter 7 of the BhG marks the beginning of a comprehensive Kr.s.n. atheology that continues into the rest of the chapters. This self-revelation ofKr.s.n. a in a monotheistic context differs from older revealed literature andhence Chapter 7 marks a crucial juncture in the BhG narrative (van Buitenen1981: 6–13). Kr.s.n. a presented as the creator, the maintainer of dharma, is alsothe liberator from sam. sa-ra for those who knowing his true nature are devotedto him (Malinar 2007: 128–29). Within this broader context, an exposition ofKr.s.n. a’s nature is begun where his lower nature and higher nature are defined(7.5) and then through these He declares Himself the womb (yon. i) of all



beings (7.6). It is in the commentary on 7.6 that Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the VP asscriptural support for his interpretation of Kr.s.n. a’s nature and His relation-ship to the created world. This very topic is explored further in Chapter 13also and in some ways it is a continuation of what was begun in Chapter 7.52

In Chapter 13, the two constituents of being—the field (ks.etra) and theknower of the field (ks.etrajña), and their relationship to Kr.s.n. a are exploredand Kr.s.n. a assumes “the role of the ks.etrajña in all fields of consciousness, inall bodies” (13.2). What is problematic here is the interpretation of the field-knower (ks.etrajña) and its connection to the field (ks.etra). The BhG refer-ences the field-knower twice, once to refer to Kr.s.n. a’s higher nature (BhG 7.5)and once to claim that he himself is the ks.etrajña in all beings (BhG13.2).San.kara interprets the field-knower as one’s true Self/Brahman. For Ra-ma-nujathe field-knower is the individual self not ultimately Brahman. BhG 13.2 isinterpreted from the Advaita perspective much more easily as the field-knoweris ultimately Brahman limited by adjuncts. Nevertheless, for Ra-ma-nuja BhG13.2 and 13.4 affirm the distinction between the Brahman and the individualself. To read the BhG 13.2–13.4 in this way, he relies on the VP. First, weevaluate the function of the VP in Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on BhG 7.5–6and BhG 13.2–4.

The two natures (prakr.ti) of Kr.s.n.a

At the beginning of Chapter 7 Kr.s.n. a articulates his relationship to the worldthrough a discussion of His two natures—a lower (apara) nature constitutingthe eight elements and their evolutes that comprise matter and a higher (para)nature, the jı-vabhu-ta, the soul, which supports the world.53 Then, these twonatures are declared to be the source of the entire world:54

Keep in mind that all beings originate out of these (prakr.ti-s)I am the origin (yoni) of the entire universe and its dissolution as well.55

San. kara understands the lower nature of Kr.s.n. a as impure and inferior. Itsessential nature is one of bondage in sam. sa-ra (sam. sa-rabandhana-tmika-)56 andas the illusory-power belonging to I-svara (aisvarı- ma-ya-sakti) that is eight-fold.57 Since, San.kara uses ma-ya- in different senses in his commentaries,58 tounderstand his interpretation of matter as ma-ya- we turn to BhG 4.6, whereKr.s.n. a claims even though I am unborn, being the imperishable self, though Iam the lord of all beings, still, controlling my material nature (prakr.ti), I comeinto being by my own supernatural power (a-tmama-yaya-).59 The context of thediscussion here is Kr.s.n. a’s incarnations, however, it gives us a glimpse of howSan. kara views prakr.ti. In the BhG context he comments that Kr.s.n. a, beingthe I

-svara of all beings, from Brahma- down to the blade of grass, controls his

own nature (prakr.ti), which is Vis.n.u’s ma-ya- (vais.n.avı- ma-ya-), composed of thethree qualities (gun.a). It is on this power (vasa) that this whole world restsand being deluded by it, the world does not know its own self as Va-sudeva.60



Prakr.ti as creative energy essentially deludes, because it prevents the recognitionof one’s true self as Brahman.

If San. kara defines the lower nature, matter, as an illusory power, heunderstands the higher nature as Kr.s.n. a’s very self (mama a-tmabhutam) thatpenetrates (antah.pravis.t.a) and supports (dharyate) the world. San. kara under-stands the jı-va as Brahman with adjuncts, and thus the ks.etrjña is ultimatelyBrahman itself, the Self of all; any discussion of the two prakr.ti-s is rooted inignorance. The connection of the Supreme Self to adjuncts is due to ignorancethat results from past experiences and presents itself as the ks.etrajña and“which is a consequence of our psychophysical limitation a cognitive failure”(Alston 1980, Vol III: 1–3; Ram-Prasad 2013: 106). Basically, Ra-ma-nujaneeds to prove the metaphysical reality of the individual self in relation toBrahman. Furthermore, though Ra-ma-nuja would agree with San.kara thatprakr.ti can be deluding, he would not agree with its characterization asdelusion/ma-ya-.In BhG 7.4, commenting on Kr.s.n. a’s lower nature Ra-ma-nuja claims:

this prakr.ti of this universe which exists in the form of different and lim-itless objects of enjoyment, means of enjoyment and places of enjoyment,is divided eight-fold in the forms of earth, water, fire, ether, and so on,which have smell and other characteristic qualities, in the form of mind(manas) and other organs of sense, and in the form of principles such asmahat and aham. ka-ra—it belongs to me.61

This is essentially similar to San.kara’s view of prakr.ti and though Kr.s.n. aasserts that this lower prakr.ti encompasses all the qualities and faults of animpermanent nature, it belongs to Kr.s.n. a. The higher prakr.ti is the animatingprinciple of this whole world:

whose nature is different from this inanimate prakrti, which is the objectof enjoyment for animate beings. It is higher, i.e., more pre-eminentcompared to the lower prakr.ti which is constituted only of inanimatesubstances. My higher prakr.ti, is the individual self; know this as myhigher prakr.ti by which the whole inanimate universe is supported.62

Commenting on the two natures of Kr.s.n. a as the womb of all beings, hestates:

keep in mind that all beings, from Brahma- to a blade of grass, situated athigher or lower levels, mixtures of spirit and matter, originate out ofthese, my two natures involving an aggregate of cetana and acetana; theyare mine. Indeed, since they originate out of my two natures, they belongto me alone. So, keep in mind that, since the entire universe originatesfrom my two natures, and since both (all beings and the universe) origi-nate from me and are mine, I alone am the origin of the entire universe,



that I alone am its dissolution, and that I alone am the master (ses.in).The fact that both prakr.ti and purus.a, which are an aggregate of sentienceand insentience, originate out of the Supreme person, is established insruti and smr.ti.63

In this comment the world comprised of matter and individual selves isrepeatedly affirmed as belonging to Kr.s.n. a for instance—my two naturesinvolving an aggregate of cetana and acetana, they are mine; they originateout of my two natures, they (matter and individual selves) belong to mealone; since both (all beings and the universe) originate from me and aremine. Having affirmed that the world belongs to Kr.s.n. a, Ra-ma-nuja decisivelyrejects the Advaita perspective by claiming the relationship between Kr.s.n. aand his two natures as that between master–servant (ses.a–ses.in), which is animportant aspect of the soul–body paradigm. In fact, in his commentary on 7.7,Ra-ma-nuja claims that just as the individual self is the ses.in over physicalbodies, so also Kr.s.n. a is the ses.in in all individual selves. Whereas, the field-knower, for San.kara, is ultimately Brahman himself, for Ra-ma-nuja, it is theindividual self. The former distinguishes Brahman (field-knower) from theworld (field) while Ra-ma-nuja differentiates between the world (field), theindividual self (field-knower), and Brahman. Ra-ma-nuja reads these three BhGverses (7.4–7.6) as articulating the body – soul relationship between Kr.s.n.a andhis two prakr.ti-s in contrast to San.kara for whom the world, including thefield-knower, is only provisionally real.

Ra-ma-nuja turns to the Suba-la Upanis.ad and the VP for scriptural support tocounter the Advaita claim. Although, it may seem that he utilizes sruti firstand then resorts to smr.ti for corroboration, the concept of master–servant(ses.a–ses.i), which is used to interpret BhG 7.4–7.6, is not articulated in theupanis.ad, but is drawn from the VP. But first, the sruti support:

The mahat is absorbed into the unmanifest (avyakta), the unmanifest isabsorbed into the imperishable (aks.ara), the imperishable is absorbed intodarkness (tamas), the darkness becomes one with the supreme lord.64

(Sub Up 2)

The section of the Suba-la Upanis.ad from which this passage is taken addres-ses the origin of the world and the creation of beings. Here, it is cited tosupport the view that creation manifests out of Vis.n.u and is reabsorned intoHim. This upanis.ad is a synthesis of the various upanis.ad teachings on crea-tion such as, “that one which was neither existence nor non-existence”, theconcept of the primordial egg, the sacrifice of the divine primordial being(purus.a),65 and a type of Sa-m. khyan theory of evolutes that eventually givesrise to the manifest world (Radhakrishnan 1996: 863–65). The passage thatRa-ma-nuja utilizes teaches the latter, where all creation is reabsorbed into theSupreme Being—proceeding from mahat to the unmanifest to the imperish-able to darkness to Brahman. Tamas here is not one of the qualities (gun.a) of



prakr.ti, but it is the unmanifest darkness from which all the subtle elementssuch as air, water, and so on are meant to evolve. By stating that mahat iseventually reabsorbed into Vis.n.u, the Suba-la passage does not clarify the issueof distinction of the world from Vis.n.u.

Though, it clearly supports the concept of Vis.n.u as the source of all creation,but the fact that it is reabsorbed into Vis.n.u suggests His close associationwith the vicissitudes of matter, which is contrary to the perfections thatcharacterize Him. The main reason for the use of Suba-la Upanis.ad seems to be tosupport the view that Brahman as the cause of creation is source of manifestationand reabsorption of the world.

Perhaps, Ra-ma-nuja cannot at this point cite any of the upanis.ad passageson creation such as Cha-ndogya Upanis.ad 6 on sadvidya- without creatingfurther exegetical complications; besides those passages do not address creationin terms of purus.a and prakr.ti. One upanis.ad that could support Ra-ma-nuja’sview is Svetasvatara 4.10—One unborn male [billy-goat], burning with passion,covers one unborn female [nanny-goat] colored red, white, and black, and givingbirth to numerous offspring with the same colo[u]rs as hers.66 Though Ra-ma-nujahimself does not cite this passage, Desika comments that the VP passage1.2.24 that is utilized does support the Sveta-svatara Upanis.ad:

Because the essential nature of substance is eternal, by this, there is nocontradiction with passages such as Sve Up 4.5 etc. This he illustrateswith VP 1.2.24.67

But note also that San.kara reads matter as a ma-ya-, an illusory power ofI-svara and this upanis.ad passage might complicate Ra-ma-nuja’s assertion thatmatter (prakr.ti) is real.

Regardless of whether Ra-ma-nuja had this upanis.ad in mind, he does notcite it and relies instead on the VP, and the pura-n. ic vocabulary is more sui-table to the BhG discussion. Subsequent to Sub Up 2, three VP passages areutilized to counter San.kara’s Advaitic interpretation of the field-knower asBrahman associated with adjuncts. The context of VP 1.2 is the evolution ofcreation. Here, it is stated that prakr.ti in its manifest and unmanifest state,purus.a, and time are the three aspects that comprise the supreme Vis.n.u.68

Furthermore, Hari of His own will is said to enter prakr.ti and purus.a, whichcommences the process of creation:69

O’ sage (Maitreya) different from the essence of Vis.n.u are the two formspurus.a and pradha-na.70

(VP 1.2.24ab)

This gives Ra-ma-nuja the necessary context to establish the distinction andunity between Kr.s.n. a and his two natures and at the same time affirm theirreality. That the VP provides the necessary evidence is reflected in Desika’scomment that the next two VP passages utilized as support [by Ra-ma-nuja]are “for the sake of clearly articulating our position”:71



the prakr.ti which was spoken of, by me, as having the nature of manifestand unmanifestand purus.a they are both absorbed into the supreme self

(VP 6.4.39)

the supreme lord is the support (a-dha-ra) of all and the supreme self,he is praised by the name Vis.n.u in the Veda and the upanis.ads.72

(VP 6.4.40)

In VP 1.2.24ab the relationship between Brahman, matter, and individualselves is established as matter (pradha-na) and individual selves (purus.a) areaffirmed as forms [Ra-ma-nuja reads modes] of Vis.n.u. Here, in VP 6.4.39–40,Vis.n.u is declared as not only the source, but the supporter and lord of alleven during after the dissolution of creation. Ra-ma-nuja notes that matter andindividual selves exist as modes of the Supreme Reality eternally:

Thus, since everything constitutes the body of the supreme person and isonly a mode of the supreme person who is their self, the supreme personalone exists; all words denote him only. The four-armed one (Vis.n.u),teaches this here, by sa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya.73

Though reabsorbed into Vis.n.u, matter and individual selves remain as modeseven in the unmanifest state, distinct yet dependent on Him. The commenta-tor remarks that the “dissolution of prakr.ti and purus.a in the supreme self isjust as water in milk, the nature of their union or connection is unworthy ofdistinction [though there is a distinction].”74 This interpretation of purus.a andprakr.ti as modes is not supported by the upanis.ad passage, while the VPpassage is more conducive to this interpretation.

What follows from BhG 7.8 to 7.13 is an elaboration of this nature ofthe Supeme Being as the mode-possessor (praka-rin) (van Buitenen 1974:101). Thus BhG 7.7 is crucial in guiding the interpretation of subsequentverses through the Visis.t.a-dvaita perspective. The VP verses provide a muchmore detailed picture of the process of creation and the Supreme Being’srelationship to it, which supports more effectively Ra-ma-nuja’s interepretationof the BhG. Utilizing the same terminology of the prakr.ti and purus.a asin the BhG, the VP clearly differentiates between these entities and Brahman,while articulating the connection amongst them as one of unity. At thesame time, the VP also counters San. kara’s interpretation of the world assimply ma-ya- .

The field (ks.etra) and the field-knower (ks.etrajña)

The topic of Kr.s.n. a’s nature, particularly his relationship to the created worldin terms of his lower prakr.ti (ks.etra) and higher prakr.ti (ks.etrajña), is explorednot only in Chapter 7, but in Chapter 13 of the BhG as well.75 However, in



this chapter, the issue is complicated by Kr.s.n. a’s claim that he is also the field-knower (ks.etrajña) in all beings: “and know me also as the field-knower in allfields, O’ Arjuna. In my view, the knowledge of the field and its knower, is thehighest knowledge.”76 The BhG is clear that the knowledge of the distinctionbetween the two entities, the field and the field-knower is true knowledge.However, who is the field-knower? Is it simply the individual self or ultimatelyBrahman as San. kara understands this verse? The discussion begins in 13.2and is summarized in 13.4. It is in his commentary on the latter verse thatRa-ma-nuja turns to the VP. We will first examine San.kara’s commentary andthen Ra-ma-nuja’s response to this Advaita interpretation.

For San.kara, Chapter 13 of the BhG is a continuation of Chapter 7 as bothaddress the relationship of the field (ks.etra) and the field-knower (ks.etrajña):

In Chapter Seven, the two prakr.ti-s of I-svara were mentioned. The infer-

ior prakr.ti is of the nature of the three qualities (gun.a), which divideseight-fold; this is the cause of sam. sa-ra; the superior prakr.ti, existing asthe individual self (jı-va), named ks.etrajña, is of the nature of I-svara. Bythese two prakr.ti-s, I

-svara is the cause of world creation, sustenance, and

dissolution. The chapter on ks.etra (13) is begun to determine the truth ofI-svara by means of an investigation of the two prakr.ti-s called ks.etra andks.etrajña, which he possesses.77

In the previous section on BhG 7.4–7, we saw that for San.kara the knoweris one who knows the truth of Visnu (vis.n.os tattvavit), that is, knows thatVa-sudeva is his own Self. Knowing this he seeks to gain knowledge bycontemplating “I myself am the Lord Va-sudeva, I am none else” (7.18). Thusthough a plurality of transmigrating individual sleves may be real empirically,there is only Va-sudeva, the Supreme Brahman. His discussion of ks.etra andks.etrajña in the present chapter (13) is also in line with such a reading. Whatstrengthens San.kara’s interpretation is Kr.s.n. a’s claim in 13.2, “know me alsoas the field-knower present in all fields” (ks.etrajñam ca-pi ma-m viddhi sarvak-s.etres.u). His comment on this BhG verse is as follows: “For this reason, thefield-knower who in reality is I

-svara, due to difference of adjuncts created by

avidya- , becomes as it were a transmigrator, just as the nature of the body isidentified with that of the self.”78

The error of personhood is a cognitive error. Due to the influence ofadjuncts “the purus.a, jı-va, field-knower, enjoyer are all synonyms” that cometo denote the Self.79 However, according to San. kara, any discussion of thefield-knower is not of importance as is the attempt to differentiate betweenthe field and the field-knower:

The union characterized by the reciprocal superimposition of the attributesof field and field-knower, subject and object and their different essentialnatures, this union resembles the superimposition of the rope and shell-silver etc. and that of the snake and silver etc. due to the lack of



knowledge of their difference. For him who discriminates between the fieldand field-knower, this union which is of the nature of superimposition iscalled ignorance.80

The apparent association between the field and the field-knower is in fact“essentially superimposition [which is] of the nature of wrong knowledge(mithya-jña-na)” (Sarasvati 1989: 46–47). According to San.kara 13.2 affirmsthe distinction between the field and the field-knower, but is relevant only inthe context of ignorance (avidya-). BhG 13.4 is a reiteration of 13.2. So, whenKr.s.n. a claims in 13.4 “it is this truth about the field and field-knower that hasbeen sung manifold by the sages, separately with various chants, and withwords from the Brahma Su-tras, having valid reasons, and drawing the rightconclusions,”81 the truth mentioned here is the illusory nature of the asso-ciation between the field and field-knower, which results from ignorance asdiscussed in 13.2.

Before we discuss San.kara’s interpretation of 13.4, a brief comment here onthe translation of this verse is needed. According to Ra-ma-nuja, BhG 13.4articulates three different genres of literature—those sung by the sages,hymns, and the Brahma Su-tras.82 However, this verse can also be interpretedas referring to two types of texts only—the hymns sung by various seers andthe Brahma Su-tras (Zaehner 1969: 355). San.kara opts for the latter inter-pretation. Interpreting brahmasu-trapada as statements regarding Brahman, i.e.,upanis.ad passages, San.kara only cites Br Up 1.4.7 “one should consider themas simply his self.”83 This upanis.ad echoes Kr.s.n. a’s claim that He is the Self inall beings. In summary, San.kara does not cite scripture to differentiate therelationship between the field and the field-knower, because such a conjunc-tion itself is unreal. In BhG 13.4 he couches the discussion in the context ofknowledge and ignorance, which is the only distinction that is important forhim. To affirm the difference between field (ks.etra) and field-knower (ks.e-trajña) as real, Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the VP. His use of the VP facilitates hisrefutation of San. kara’s interpretation of the apparent association between thefield and the field-knower.

As mentioned earlier, Ra-ma-nuja interprets BhG 13.4 as speaking of threegenres of texts. He understands “sung by sages” to refer to smr.ti, and “byhymns (chandas)” to mean upanis.ads, and so in his commentary he cites fromthe VP and the Maha-bha-rata (Sa-ntiparvan), and then concludes with the-Taittirı-ya Upanis.ad.84 The interpretation that BhG 13.4 refers to three typesof texts rather than two, gives Ra-ma-nuja the opportunity to utilize the VPand the MBh, which broaden the context of the BhG. The inclusion of smr.tiliterature as relevant in these matters is a distinctively Visis.t.a-dvaitic position.The commentator, Veda-nta Desika notes, by means of smr.ti passages that areclear (visadopabr.m. han.ava-kya-nusa-ren.a) Ra-ma-nuja determines the meaning ofunclear Vedic passages (avisadavedava-kya-rthaniscaya).85

The VP episode that Ra-ma-nuja turns to once again is the narrative ofBharata, who though a devotee of Vis.n.u, because of his attachment to a



mother-less fawn succumbs to repeated births. He ultimately understands thedistinction between the body and the soul that allows him to overcome allattachments. Born as a palanquin-bearer for a local king, in one of his births,Bharata imparts this discriminative knowledge to him. This section of the VPis also cited in the SBh to establish the metaphysical reality of the individualself and in the discussion on the plurality of selves. Overall, VP 2.13 is dedi-cated to the recognition of the distinction between the body and self and theresult of such an understanding as liberating. Thus to a certain degree,Ra-ma-nuja is justified in utilizing these verses to support his interpretation ofBhG 13.4. Yet, there are passages in this section of the pura-n. a that seem tosupport the Advaita perspective. For instance, VP 2.13.91 mentions that onlyone soul is dispersed in all bodies (samasta dehes.u puma-n eko). In the SBh,Ra-ma-nuja undertakes an extended re-interpretation of VP 2.12, 2.13, and2.14 to argue that it is indeed the relationship of Brahman to the world andindividual selves as one of soul to body that is articulated. We have alreadydiscussed this in Chapter 2 in the section on the nature of the individual selfand also the section on ignorance. I do not restate that entire argumenthere, but instead note that, for Ra-ma-nuja, VP 2.13 exemplifies the soul–bodyrelationship, with the Supreme Being as the supporter (a-dha-ra) of the indivi-dual selves and matter. Thus 2.13.91 is re-interpreted from the Visis.t.a-dvaitaview rather than from that of Advaita.

Coming back to the commentary on BhG 13.4, Ra-ma-nuja utilizes thefollowing VP quotes to support the distinction between the body and theindividual self:

It, the true nature (ya-tha-tmya) of the field and the field-knower, has beensung manifold, in various ways, by the sages, Para-sara and others—O’ King, I, you, and others as well, are borne by elementsthis group of elements in turn moves, moving along in the stream ofqualities

(VP 2.13.65)

Now these qualities, goodness and the rest, depend on acts. O’ Kingand those acts are obstructed by avidya- in all living beings.

(VP 2.13.66)

The self is pure, imperishable, tranquil, quality-less and higher thanmatter (prakr.ti)it alone does neither increase nor decrease in any living being.86

(VP 2.13.67)87

Here the material body is stated as comprised of gun.as (the three qualitiesthat comprise matter/prakr.ti) and that it functions according to their respectivepredispositions. The flow of these qualities in the cycle of sam. sa-ra is dictated



by one’s karma. To such a description of the body is contrasted the definitionof the self as higher than matter (prakr.ti) and as eternal, free from gun.as andpeaceful. Though Ra-ma-nuja does not reiterate his discussion from the SBh onthe interpretation of VP 2.13, Veda-nta Desika commenting on Ra-ma-nuja’sinterpretation of BhG 13.4 remarks that VP 2.13.65 opposes the meaning thatthe non-difference of the self and body is the non-difference between the palan-quin-bearer (Bharata) and the king who is to be carried, which is precisely whatSan. kara would claim.88

The distinction between matter (ks.etra) and the individual self (ks.etrajña)is further elaborated in the subsequent discussion on the topic of whatconstitutes “I”. Bharata poses the following questions to the king:

Since the body of a man is characterized severally by his head, hands andso on,to what shall I attach the term ‘I’ O’ King

(VP 2.13.85)

Is this head of yours ‘you’, or your neck, or stomach?89

are your feet etc. ‘you’? what part of you is ‘you’ O’ King?You are actually distinct from all your parts O’ KingO’ King think seriously about the question ‘who am I’.90

(VP 2.13.98–99)

The individual identity one derives based solely on the physical body iserroneous. The true “I”, which is one’s individual self, is distinct from allanatomical parts, indeed the body as a whole. Bharata urges the king to re-consider individuality that a person takes for granted, which derives from themisidentification of the self with the body.

Though for Ra-ma-nuja, the VP passages discriminate the individual con-scious self and the physical body, the risk of an Advaita interpretation of thesepura-n.a passages remains, as is evident from Desika’s comment mentioned ear-lier. In the SBh, Ra-ma-nuja’s extended polemic counters such rival interpreta-tions of these VP passages by arguing the soul–body paradigm. Here in hiscommentary on BhG 13.4 he cites a MBh passage instead as evidence of thesoul–body relationship between Brahman and the world:

They say that the senses, mind, intellect, vigor, splendor, strength, andconstancy,have Va-sudeva as their self, and so do the field and the knower of thefield.91

(MBh Sa-ntiparvan 13.135.136)

Va-sudeva as the self of both the matter and individual selves validates thesoul–body connection so important to refute the Advaitin. This verse alsodenotes matter and individual selves as field and field-knower, the terms utilizedin BhG 13.4 as well. The VP and MBh verses support all aspects of Ra-ma-nuja’s



Veda-nta necessary to establish the distinction between the individual self andmatter as real.

Subsequent to the VP and MBh passages, Ra-ma-nuja also cites from theupanis.ads. He glosses the phrase in 13.4, “by various Vedic hymns” as areference to the Veda-nta portion of the Veda and utilizes the Taittirı-ya Upa-nis.ad 2. Chapter 2 of this upanis.ad is called the “chapter on bliss” (a-nanda-vallı-) wherein the nature of the self as food, mind, breath, and finally bliss isaddressed.92 This text is also discussed in the A

-nadamaya-dhikaran.a (1.1.13–

20)93 of Ba-dara-yana’s Brahma Su-tras. For Veda-ntins this text is a scripturalsource for the doctrine of Brahman and, “various schools of Veda-nta …invest a great deal of energy in arguing, on the basis of Taittirı-ya Upanis.ad 2,the relationship of brahman and the human self.”94 San.kara’s commentary forinstance, concludes that ultimately this upanis.ad does not refer to Brahmanas the self consisting of bliss (a-nandamaya), it in fact suggests that Brahmancannot be an object of knowledge to be known.95 According to Ra-ma-nuja in theTaittirı-ya Upanis.ad:

the nature of the body is described thus:From this very self (a-tman) space was produced, from space wind, fromwind fire, from fire water, from water earth, from earth plants, from plantsfood, from food man (purus.a). Surely the essence of man is food (annamaya)

(Taitt Up 2.1)

after this is described another self (a-tman) different from this,the essence of which is breath (pra-n.amaya), and one different from this,the essence of which is the mind (manomaya)

(Taitt Up 2.3–4)

and after describing the nature of the knower-of-the field (ks.etrajña), thisis said:Surely, different from this self (a-tman) the essence of which is mind, there isanother interior self (antara-tman) that consists of vijña-na (vijña-namaya)

(Taitt Up 2.4)

The knower-of-the-field (ks.etrajña) being the inner self (antara-tman), thetext describes the highest self (parama-tman) consisting of bliss:There is another inner self, different from the one that consists of vijña-na,and which consists of bliss (a-nandamaya).96

(Taitt Up 2.5)

In his reading, Ra-ma-nuja distinguishes the body (2.1), the individual self(ksetrajña or anatara-tman) which consists of knowledge (vijña-namaya) (2.4),and the parama-tman which consists of bliss (a-nandamaya) (2.5). However, theconnection of these three entities to each other is not stated; the soul–bodyrelationship is understood based on evidence from the VP and MBh verses.



The significance of these smr.ti is underscored when we examine anotherinstance of Ra-ma-nuja’s engagement with the Taitt Up.

In SBh 1.1.13–20, where he discusses these Taitt Up passages, Ra-ma-nuja:

inserts a lengthy exposition of the claim that the Taittiriya text cannot beread as equating the self consisting of bliss with Brahman on the groundsthat from scripture and reason we (already) know that brahman and thehuman self are not identical. The adhikaran.a thus becomes the placewhere Ra-ma-nuja chooses to detail his position on the difference between[B]rahman and the human self.97

Additionally, whereas, there he imposes the soul–body paradigm to interpretthese very passages, here, in BhG 13.4, that ontological framework is pro-vided by the VP and MBh passages. Thus smr.ti serves the same function asthis “lengthy exposition” in the Br Su- commentary.98 Taitt Up is not adequateas support, in the sense that it only supports the differentiation betweenBrahman, the individual self, and the world, and neglects to explain theirrelation to each other. The nature of the soul–body relationship amongstthem is not evident in the Taitt Up passages Ra-ma-nuja has cited. In conclu-sion, though this upanis.ad garners enough evidence to distinguish the indivi-dual self, matter, and Brahman, the VP and MBh mentioned earlier, need tobe taken into account to complete the reading of this upanis.ad as validatingthe soul–body association. Only when read together with the VP and MBhdoes this upanis.ad affirm the differentiation and the modal relation betweenBrahman, individual selves, and matter.

Bondage and liberation

In Chapter 7 of the BhG, Kr.s.n. a not only claims that he is the creator throughhis higher and lower natures (prakr.ti), but that he is also the liberator. Due tothe delusory nature of his creative nature denoted by the term ma-ya- , refuge inKr.s.n. a is the only antidote to the bondage of sam. sa-ra (Malinar 2007: 131). Inthe discussion of the path to liberation, Kr.s.n. a mentions four types of devoteesof Kr.s.n. a and among them the true seeker, the knower or jña-nı-n, is deemed thebest. This type of devotee alone, is the one who knows Kr.s.n. a’s true nature, issolely dedicated to Him and thus worthy of liberation (7.16–17). The“knower” however, has different connotations for San.kara and Ra-ma-nuja. Inhis commentary on both BhG verses (7.14 and 7.17), which concern thedeceptive nature of Kr.s.n. a’s ma-ya-, and the devotee truly worthy of being savedfrom it, Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the VP once again to distinguish his interpretationfrom that of San. kara. If we take into consideration the beginning of thechapter (7.1–2), where Kr.s.n. a proclaims that through knowledge and its rea-lization, Arjuna will know Him without any doubt whatsoever, then BhG7.14 and 7.17 are key passages that provide a road map to understanding thenature of ignorance and overcoming it. The fact that Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the



VP in the commentary on these passages is thus significant. In the previoussection to interpret the knowledge of the two natures of Kr.s.n. a, Ra-ma-nujautilizes the VP and the next two sections demonstrate this pura-n. a’s impor-tance in solidifying the path to Kr.s.n. a-realization as interpreted by Ra-ma-nuja.We will first address the concept of ma-ya- and then the means to transcend itas stated by Kr.s.n. a and as understood by the two Veda-ntins.

Kr.s.n.a’s ma-ya-

Both Ra-ma-nuja and San. kara invoke Vis.n.u’s ma-ya- as an explanation forbondage in sam. sa-ra, however, their interpretations of it are quite different. Asnoted earlier in the section that discusses BhG 7.6, San.kara’s understandingof ma-ya- vacillates between a few different meanings ranging from magicalillusion to the magical power of God.99 In the BhG, he does not directly takeup ma-ya- ’s metaphysical status as less than real (mithya-),100 but describes it asthe wonderful power of god, which is also deceptive. This is the same con-notation of ma-ya- found in the Svesta-svatara Upanis.ad, the Maha-bha-rata, andthe pura-n. as, where “the power of the Lord to undergo manifestation inmanifold form is objectivized as the world of nature (prakr.ti) giving birth tothree constituents, bodies and so on.”101 So how does San. kara’s under-standing of ma-ya- differ from that of Ra-ma-nuja in the BhG? In the discussionof the three qualities of prakr.ti and their effects, Kr.s.n. a claims that:

by these three conditions composed of qualities (gun.a), the whole worldis deluded and does not know me as the highest, as the immutable.102

For San. kara, this means that modifications of these qualities (gun.avika-ra)lead to states such as delusion (moha), hatred (dves.a), passion (ra-ga), and soon.103 Deluded by these they cannot discriminate, cannot attain the absolute(sat). Kr.s.n. a clearly equates his lower nature, prakr.ti, with his magical poweror divine ma-ya- , but offers a solution to end delusion:

For this divine ma-ya- of mine, consisting of qualities, is difficult to traverseHe who seeks refuge in me alone, cross over this ma-ya-.104

If Kr.s.n. a’s ma-ya- is hard to navigate, the only antidote is surrender to Him.According to San.kara taking refuge in Kr.s.n. a entails having renounced alldharma-s (sarvadharma-n paritya-jya) whole-heartedly to Him. For He who isthe wielder of ma-ya- is the devotee’s very self.105 As Ram-Prasad remarks,“Kr.s.n. a is not the culminating point of [San.kara’s] inquiry; nor is a devotionallove of God the ultimate human mode of fulfillment” and “God understoodin the language of prayer and poetry is for San. kara a God described throughcontingent limiting adjuncts.”106 Renunciation of all actions is essentialbecause the Self is not a knower, a doer, or an agent. Thus with the notion



that one’s Self is the very Va-sudeva, one must seek refuge from bondage. Thisis San. kara’s understanding of surrender to Kr.s.n. a.

Ra-ma-nuja also agrees with the claim that divine ma-ya- is deluding butcharacterizes delusion and surrender to Kr.s.n. a differently. Though prakr.ti canbe read as divine ma-ya-, it does not have the same sense of delusion thatSan. kara’s interpretation conveys. To distinguish his definition of ma-ya- fromthat of San. kara, Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the VP:

Since, this ma-ya- of mine consisting of qualities, ie., composed of sattva,rajas, and tamas, is divine, made by a god, made by me alone, while engagedin sport, it is difficult to overcome, difficult to traverse, by anyone. Even asthe weapons of the a-suras and ra-ks.asas, and the like, bears the namema-ya- because it produces wonderful effects. Compare verses such asthese—Then the excellent discus, Sudarsana, commanded by the Lord,approached blazing, for his (Prahla-da) protection. Shielding the bodyof the boy, moving quickly it destroyed those thousand weapons(ma-ya-) of Sam. bara one after other.

(VP 1.19.19–20)107

The VP example is taken from the narrative of Prahla-da, who is besieged byhis father Hiran.yakasipu’s minion, Sam. bara. The VP passage uses ma-ya- in acontext that counters San. kara’s understanding of the term. Even the ra-ks.asa’sweapons, which the VP denotes by the word ma-ya-, do not signify illusionbecause “truthfully even in the case of the weapons of the a-suras, the use ofthe word ma-ya- does not support illusion … for it is not possible to harm withweapons that are illusory in nature”:108

hence the word ma-ya- does not mean something that is false. On the otherhand, the word ma-ya-vin is used for jugglers and the like, because withthe help of spells, herbs, and the like, they evoke knowledge which,though based on things that are false, is perfectly real. Thus, in that case,ma-ya- is nothing but spells, herbs, and so on, because a word has only onemeaning, adapted to its various usages. In that case the use of the wordma-ya- for things that are false is metaphorical, in so far as it refers toknowledge that is the result of ma-ya-, as in the expression, “the benchesscream.”109

Ma-ya- according to Ra-ma-nuja is that which has the power of creating realimpressions and is applicable as illusion only in the metaphorical sense.Desika comments that even those “who practice indraja-la or illusionist magiccreate real knowledge in the minds of the spectators, even though the objectof the knowledge is unreal … the incantations and the herbs are … real thingshaving the power of producing wonderful effects.”110 Since even the knowl-edge that comes about by deceptive means is real, Visnu is compelled to aid



Prahla-da who is terrified by the weaponry generated by the demon’s ma-ya-.Ra-ma-nuja concludes his commentary on BhG 7.14 citing Svet Up 4.10:

This ma-ya- of the Lord, consisting of qualities (gun.as) is true (in BhG7.14), is addressed in texts such as thisHowever, know that ma-ya- is prakr.ti and the possessor of ma-ya- isMahesvara.

(Sve Up 4.10)

Its purpose is to obscure the true nature of the Lord and create a state ofmind that one should enjoy one’s own nature. As a result, the entire uni-verse is deluded by the ma-ya- of the Lord and does not recognize that thetrue nature of the Lord is the limitless highest bliss.111

In this context, ma-ya- identified as prakr.ti obscures the essential nature ofKr.s.n. a but also creates a mind-set that makes the world enjoyable and asindependent of Him:

As a means of freeing oneself of ma-ya-, the text says—those who seekrefuge in me alone, who wills the truth, the most compassionate, therefuge of people without regard to their differences, they cross over thisma-ya- of mine which is composed of gun.as. That means: they cast forthma-ya- and worship Me alone.112

As we saw earlier, Svet Up 4.10 is utilized in the discussion of ignorance inthe Major Objection to support ma-ya- as the unmanifest, avyakta, whichcannot be determined to be real or as unreal. Ma-ya- is a limiting adjunct(upa-dhi) that brings about the state of personhood. Consequently, matter(prakr.ti) as ma-ya- is something unreal. In the Major Conclusion, Ra-ma-nujacites this very VP passage (1.19.20) to counter the Adviata claim. In a waythen, Svet Up 4.10 cannot be read without the VP and this is evidentthroughout Ra-ma-nuja’s Veda-nta expositons. Immediately following this verseKr.s.n. a elaborates on the types of people who surrender to Him and those whodo not, and in verse BhG 7.17 the model of perfect devotion is Prahla-da. In away even in BhG 7.14 Ra-ma-nuja has the Prahla-da narrative in mind to defineVis.n.u’s ma-ya- and also to characterize the perfect devotee.

The foremost devotee (jña-nin)

If right knowledge is the correct understanding of Kr.s.n. a’s ma-ya- , then the onewho comes to know and realize this knowledge is the knower (jña-nin). BhG7.16 enumerates four types of devotees:

the men of good deeds who worship me, are four-fold, O’ Arjunathese are the afflicted, seekers of knowledge, seekers of wealth, and menof wisdom.113



Among them, the afflicted (a-rta), the seekers of knowledge (jijña-su), the see-kers of wealth (artha-rthin), and the man of wisdom (jña-nin), the jña-nin isdeemed the foremost devotee of Kr.s.n. a. San

. kara defines these four types ofaspirants as follows:

the afflicted are those who are in the grasp of suffering, attacked by ban-dits, tigers, or succumbing to ill health. The seeker of knowledge is onewho desires to know the truth of the Lord (Bhagavan). The seeker of wealthdesires prosperity. The knower is he who knows the truth of Vis.n.u.114

That is the knower thinks, “my self is Va-sudeva’s self and as such he isexceedingly dear to me.”115 “Indeed the knower, begins to ascend the peak ofknowledge resorting to the truth that ‘I myself am the Lord Va-sudeva, I amnone else.’”116 Such wisdom requires renunciation of all dharma and thenotion that the self is an agent. Even the seeker of knowledge still operatesaccording to San.kara, in the realm of ignorance, wishing to understandI-svara as the supreme deity, the creator of the world, while the knowerachieves true discrimination.

For Ra-ma-nuja, the man of wisdom (jña-nin) is the foremost devotee whocorrectly realizes the true delusory nature of matter. Juxtaposing the knowledge-seeker and the knower he argues contra-San.kara:

The seeker of knowledge is one who desires to realize the real nature ofthe self, as different from prakr.ti. A knower, is one who knows that itis the essential nature of the self to find joy solely as the servant (ses.a) ofthe Lord, as taught in the text beginning with but know that which isother than this (lower prakr.ti) to be the higher prakr.ti (BhG 7.5). Withoutconcluding with the knowledge of self as different from prakr.ti, he desiresto attain the Lord. He considers the Lord alone as the highest object tobe attained.117

Whereas, San. kara understands the knowledge-seeker (jijña-su) as simply sub-mitting to an all-powerful I

-svara, for Ra-ma-nuja such a person discriminates

between the body and soul and, though important, discontinues his spiritualpractice at this stage. The knower (jña-nin), on the other hand, is superior tothe seeker of knowledge because he goes a step beyond simply realizing thedistinction between the individual self and the physical body; he yearns toattain Kr.s.n. a as his master (ses.in); this is his highest aim. Kr.s.n. a claims inBhG 7.18 “indeed, I am exceedingly dear to the man of wisdom and he isdear to me.”118 Ra-ma-nuja elaborates:

Among them (devotees) the knower is special. Why? Because He is con-stantly attached, his devotion is single-minded. Indeed, he, for whom Iam the only one to be reached, is constantly attached to me, whereas theother two (types of devotees) are attached to me until they obtain what



they desire. Also, the knower is devoted to me alone, whereas the othertwo119 (are devoted to me) in regard to what they desire, and as a meansof obtaining it.120

As for the other devotees their connection with Kr.s.n. a lasts as long as theirdesires are obtained. Their attachment to Kr.s.n. a is a way to fulfill their owndesires. Not so the man of knowledge. Ra-ma-nuja goes on to say:

Moreover, I am infinitely dear to the knower. Here the word ‘infinitely’means something that cannot be expressed in words. That means: the wayin which I am dear to the man of wisdom even I the all-powerful one amunable to express in words, because there is no limitation on love.121

Carman discussing this section of Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on the BhG notesthat Kr.s.n. a reciprocates the exclusive devotion of the knower, when he says“Ra-ma-nuja understands Lord Krishna to be teaching in the Gita that heis similarly dependent upon his exclusive devotees” (Carman 1974: 191). Infact in the commentary on 7.18 Ra-ma-nuja writes that just as the devotee isutterly dependent on Kr.s.n. a and cannot support himself without the lord, soalso Kr.s.n. a finds it impossible to be without the devotee. In this sense,Ra-ma-nuja understands Kr.s.n. a as saying “thus verily he is my very self” (tatomama api a-tma- hi sa). To support this interpretation of the man of knowledge,in contrast to San. kara he turns to the VP:

Just as in the case of Prahla-da,122 the foremost among the men ofknowledgeBut, he while being bitten by great serpents, his mind fixed on Kr.s.n. a,was not conscious of his body, absorbed in the joy of recollecting him

(VP 1.17.39)

He (man of knowledge) in return is equally dear to me.123

As an ideal devotee, a jña-nin, Prahla-da is immersed in constant recollectionof Vis.n.u. The passage cited by Ra-ma-nuja is in reference to the incident wherethe young boy is bound by serpents and thrown into the sea, but he is obliv-ious to the serpents striking him as he is engrossed in recollections of Vis.n.u(VP 1.19.55). Biardeau (1975) notes that the state of bondage of Prahla-da isakin to the image of beings striving in the ocean of sam. sa-ra bound by karma.Only Vis.n.u is the liberator from these cosmic constraints.124 Ra-ma-nujaunderstands Kr.s.n. a as saying that regardless of birth or status, when one sur-renders to Kr.s.n. a, abides in Kr.s.n. a, the Lord also abides in the devotee asthough he/she is His superior.125 Thus, when Prahla-da though an a-sura seeksrefuge, Vis.n.u cannot refuse.

Though the VP presents Prahla-da as a devotee of Vis.n.u, the nature ofdevotion (bhakti) and the characterization of liberation are sometimes in



stark contrast to that of Ra-ma-nuja’s interpretation of these concepts. Forinstance, on the one hand, Prahla-da is presented as meditating on Vis.n.u asidentical with his own self and is said to have become one with Vis.n.uregarding himself as the deity (VP 1.20.1–3). On the other hand, Vis.n.u is saidto have appeared to the young boy in response to his intense devotion.Moreover, this ambiguity in the VP version of this narrative leads Hacker(1959) to comment that once Prahla-da realizes his own self as identical withthat of Kr.s.n. a, this type of intellectual devotion (bhakti) that privileges lib-eration undermines the purpose of the incarnation (avata-ra) in the sense thatthe whole narrative of Narasim. ha as an incarnation that descends to upholddharma and protect the good loses its importance.126 Soifer (1991: 98) how-ever, notes that “in the VP we find a bhakti that transcends and perhapstransgresses or ignores dharma. Therefore the incarnation, which the BhGinextricably binds to dharma, is … not an integral part of the VP.”127 In thecase of Ra-ma-nuja too, Arjuna’s dha-rmic dilemma is mapped onto the promi-nence given to liberation in the Veda-nta system and though Ra-ma-nuja alsoclaims that the man of wisdom is Brahman’s own self he is quite clear on thequalitative distinction between Brahman and the individual self and the latteras the ses.a of the Lord. Indeed, Prahla-da has a long history in the Srı-vais.n. avatradition as an embodiment of true devotion (bhakti,) an ideal devotee clearlynot in the Advaitic sense (Clooney 1988: 247).

Ra-ma-nuja is aware of this ambiguity in the VP, and puts it in perspective inthe Veda-rthasam. graha, citing VP 1.19.85, where Prahla-da claims he is theinfinite one, the primeval one, all-pervading and that all things arise out ofhim and dwell in him.128 According to Ra-ma-nuja, Prahla-da can say that he isVis.n.u since all beings form His body. The identity between Vis.n.u and Prah-la-da is due to the fact that the young devotee constitutes a mode of theSupreme Being. Through sa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya, the attribute or mode can beidentified with the substrate or mode-possessor. Prahla-da as interpretedby Ra-ma-nuja is in stark contrast to San.kara’s renunciant scaling the peak ofknowledge thinking “I myself am Lord Va-sudeva, I am none else” (SBhGBh7.18). What the Prahla-da narrative allows Ra-ma-nuja is a way to underscorehis interpretation of ma-ya- and the dependence of the individual self onBrahman, its servant-hood (ses.atva) that cannot be transcended even afterliberation.

Conclusion

We have mentioned in the earlier chapters on the VS and SBh that a majorityof the BhG passages that Ra-ma-nuja utilizes as support for his arguments inthose commentaries depend on the VP for scriptural evidence. That is, tointerpret many of the BhG passages themselves the use the VP is crucial as wesee in this chapter on the Bhagavadgı-ta-bha-s.ya (RBhGBh). An interestingaspect of VP use in RBhGBh is that he relies on the VP to not only interpretKr.s.n. a’s teaching in terms of Visis.t.a-dvaita Veda-nta, but also to consistently



refute the Advaita interpretation alluding to San. kara’s commentary on theBhG (SBhGBh). So, whereas the Advaita “presence” is evident as the MajorObjection of the SBh 1.1.1, in the RBhGBh, Ra-ma-nuja’s reference to San.kara’scommentary and his use of the VP go hand in hand.

In this chapter the exegetical use of the VP in RBhGBh is evaluated in thediscussion of three topics: the teaching of Sa-m. khya-Yoga, Kr.s.n. a’s nature inrelation to creation, and the nature of bondage and path to liberation. Theteaching of Sa-m. khya-Yoga in Chapter 2 of the BhG is important as one ofthe first teachings of Kr.s.n. a, but it also sets the tone for interpreting the restof the BhG consonant with a particular Veda-nta system. In the teaching ofSa-m. khya (BhG 2.16) the VP is important in clarifying the meaning of theterms Being (sat) and Non-Being (asat). Relying solely on the VP, Ra-ma-nujaintroduces the concept of sentience (cetana) from the pura-n. a, to argue thatsat and asat refer to a sentient thing (cidvastu) and an insentient thing (acid-vastu) respectively. This counters the Advaita interpretation of sat and asat assimply cognition of the real (sadbuddhi) and cognition of the unreal (asad-buddhi). To further define Non-being as unreal Ra-ma-nuja draws on the VP’sdefinition of the unreal as based on transformation and change (vika-ra),rather than sublatability of cognition. Similarly, in the discussion of Yoga inBhG 2.61, VP 6.7, titled the Subha-srayaprakaran.a, is utilized to argue that itis in fact the realization of the individual self that is stated in BhG 2.39–72and not Brahman realization as San. kara claims. Exploiting some of thestructural and conceptual similarities between VP 6.7 and BhG 2, Ra-ma-nujaargues that the realization at the end of the teaching of Chapter 2 of the BhGis not that one’s innermost self is Va-sudeva, but rather that the individual selfwhich is distinct from the body exists in a dependent (soul–body) relationshipwith Him.

Kr.s.n. a’s nature in relation to the world is taught in Chapter 7 and Chapter13 of the BhG. To articulate Brahman’s association with his creation in 7.6and 13.4, Ra-ma-nuja turns to the VP. While San.kara takes the higher andlower nature of Kr.s.n. a to be the individual self and the body, his perspective isthat ultimately both exist due to cognitive misconceptions. Ra-ma-nuja needs toprove that individual selves (higher nature of Kr.s.n. a) and matter (the lowernature of Kr.s.n. a) are real and comprise His body. Though as scriptural sup-port, Suba-la Upanis.ad 2 is mentioned first, the context of that passage whichis world dissolution only affirms that the Supreme Self is the source ofunmanifest matter which later evolves into manifest creation. This affirms theclaim of BhG 7.6 that matter is the lower nature of Kr.s.n. a. However, thispassage lacks the kind of detail that is required to counter San. kara’s inter-pretation. For the Advaitin too can use the Suba-la Upanis.ad passage as supportfor his Veda-nta. Compare the following phrases from the VP passages cited ascorroborative evidence after the upanis.ad that clearly articulate the distinc-tion between the individual selves and matter existing in an inseparable rela-tionship with Brahman: “different from the essence of Vis.n.u are the twoforms, matter (prakr.ti) and individual self (purus.a); prakr.ti and purus.a are



absorbed into the Supreme Self,” and the Supreme Self is “the support of all.”The individual self and matter as forms of Vis.n.u, which Ra-ma-nuja is able tointerpret as modes of Vis.n.u though when reabsorbed into Him do not affectHis perfections.

The discussion of the two natures of Kr.s.n. a continues in Chapter 13 of theBhG though the terminology used to denote matter (prakr.ti) and the indivi-dual self (purus.a) here are ks.etra and ks.etrajña. What complicates matters forRa-ma-nuja is that in BhG 13.2 Kr.s.n. a declares himself as the field-knower inall fields. He goes on to claim in BhG 13.4 that this distinction between thefield and field-knower has been professed in scripture in many ways. San.karareads BhG 13.2 and 13.4 together and understands the distinction mentionedhere as the one between the individual self and Brahman. Ra-ma-nuja on theother hand, interprets the distinction as a reference to the difference betweenmatter and individual selves. The scriptural passage cited by San.kara as sup-port in SBhGBh 13.4 is Br. Up 1.4.7, one should consider them simply as hisself. To counter this Advaitic perspective Ra-ma-nuja cites the VP, the MBh,and the Taitt Up. This is one of the clearest examples where, because of thesequence of citations dictated by the BhG verse 13.4, we discern how thepura-n. a cited first is used to read the sruti that follows. The VP according toRa-ma-nuja articulates the distinction between the individual self and the bodyin a way that is consonant with his Veda-nta. Utilizing VP passages such as“the self is pure, imperishable, tranquil, quality-less and higher than matter(prakr.ti) it alone does neither increase nor decrease in any living being”;“since the body of a man is characterized severally by his head, hands and soon, to what shall I attach the term ‘I’”; “is this head of yours ‘you’, or your neck,or stomach? are your feet etc ‘you’? what part of you is ‘you’”; “you are actuallydistinct from all your parts O’ King” he argues the metaphysical reality of theself and its relation to matter, while affirming their dependence on Kr.s.n. a.Having established that such a distinction is real, Ra-ma-nuja re-interprets thevery important Taittirı-ya Upanis.ad 2 also, quite differently from the Advaitin.On the topic of bondage and liberation in the BhG, Ra-ma-nuja yet again

relies on the VP. In the discussion of Kr.s.n. a’s ma-ya- (7.14) and the devoteewho successfully overcomes this (7.17) he turns to the Prahla-da narrativefrom the VP. San.kara understands Kr.s.n. a’s ma-ya- as illusory, unreal, and acognitive deception. To counter this view of ma-ya- , Ra-ma-nuja cites from theVP where ma-ya- does not denote delusion but rather fantastical or wonderfulcreations. For Ra-ma-nuja though ma-ya- may be delusory, the knowledge itproduces is real. VP 1.19.19–20 refers to the demon Sam. bara’s many weaponsthat torture the young boy Prahla-da as ma-ya- . Having re-interpreted ma-ya-

according to the VP, He then cites Svet Up 4.10, where ma-ya- is also used todenote matter (prakr.ti). San

. kara identifies ma-ya- in this upanis.ad passage withignorance (avidya-) that is illusory. However, based on the understanding ofma-ya- in VP 1.19.19–20, Ra-ma-nuja counters this rival claim. The Prahla-danarrative is also important as he is identified as the foremost devotee thatKr.s.n. a mentions in BhG 7.17, who successfully traverses His ma-ya- . No sruti,



only the VP is cited here as evidence, to characterize the foremost devotee inthe BhG. Though, the Prahla-da narrative in the VP reflects a type of Advaitadevotion (bhakti) that is not really consonant with the Visis.t.a-dvaita, we seethat Ra-ma-nuja and the commentator make great effort to translate it into theSrı-vais.n. ava context.

Notes1 Ra-ma-nuja utilizes the VP in the following BhG verses: 2.16, 2.61, 4.14, 6.6, 7.4,

7.14, 7.17, 10.42, 11.50, 13.4, 15.15, 15.18, 16.8, and 18.11. Among these only2.16, 2.61, 7.4, 7.14, 7.17, and 13.4 are examined as a representative sample.

2 For such studies, the reader may consult sources such as Malinar 2007, Edgerton1964, and Zaehner 1969.

3 For discussions on the historical development of these systems of thought seeBurley 2005: 15–35.and Larson 1998: 73–153.

4 Malinar 2007: 62–75; Edgerton 1964: 165ff; Zaehner 1969: 120–22.5 Zaehner 1969: 120–21.6 Historically, the study of Being (sat), sadvidya-, has been an important pre-

occupation of Indian thought since the Vedas. It is of particular importance inthe Sa-m. khya and Veda-nta systems, although it assumes different meanings ineach of these two philosophies, “[f]or Veda-nta as a whole sat is the transcendentand immaterial, for Sa-m. khya the immanent and material first cause of the world”(van Buitenen 1956: 3).

7 Zaehner 1969: 127–29; Edgerton 1964: 10; Hill 1953: 85; Sargeant 1979: 113 forvariant translations.

8 San.kara interprets tattva in the term tattvadarsibhih. as the “all”, “ultimate reality”,or Brahman (SBhGBh 2.16).

9 na asato vidyate bha-vo na abha-vo vidyate satah.ubhayor api dr.s.t.o ‘ntas tv anayos tattvadarsibhih. .(BhG 2.16).

10 na hi sı-tos.n.a-di saka-ran.am prama-n.air niru-pyama-nam vastu sat bhavati. vika-ro hi so,vika-rasca vyabhicarati (SBhGBh 2.16).

11 SBhGBh 2.16.12 sarvo vika-rah. ka-ran.avyatireken.a anupalabhdher asan (SBhGBh 2.16).13 sarvatra buddhidvayopalabdheh. sadbuddhir asadbuddhir iti. yadvis.aya- buddhir

na vyabhicarati, tat sat, yadvis.aya- buddhir vyabhicarati tad asat iti sadasadvibh-a-ge buddhitantre sthite…tasma-d ghat.a-dibuddhi-vis.ayo’ san vyabhica-ra-t na tusadbuddhivis.ayo’ vyabhica-ra-t (SBhGBh 2.16)

14 Halbfass 1991: 167.15 tatha- satas ca a-tmano rbha-vo rvidyama-nata- na vidyate, sarvatra avyabhica-ra-d iti

avoca-m (SBhGBh 2.16).16 avina-si tu tadviddhi yena sarvamidam. tatam

vina-samavyayasya-sya na kascitkartumarhati.(BhG 2.17).

17 na etat sada-khyam brahma svena ru-pen. a vyeti (SBhGBh 2.17).18 antavant ime deha- nityasyokta-h. sarı-rin. ah.

ana- sino’prameyasya tasma-dyudhyasva bha-rata.(BhG 2.18).

19 yatha- mr.gatr.s.n. ika-dau sadbuddhih. anuvr.tta- prama-n. aniru-pan.a-nte vicchidyate, satasya antah. ; tatha- ime deha-h. svapnama-ya-deha-divacca antavantah. nityasya sarı-

rin.ah. sarı-ravatah. ana-sinah. aprameyasya a-tmanah. antavanta iti ukta-h. vivekibhirityarthah. (SBhGBh 2.18).

20 atra tu satka-ryava-dasya asan. gatva-n na tatparo’yam slokah. (RBhGBh 2.16).



21 na asato vidyate bha-vo na abha-vo vidyate satah.ubhayor api dr.s.t.o ‘ntas tv anayos tattvadarsibhih. .(BhG 2.16).This translation is based on Ra-ma-nuja’s commentary on this verse.

22 asato dehasya sadbha-vo na vidyate satas ca a-tmano na asadbha-vah. . ubhayordeha-tmanor upalabhyama-nayor yathopalabdhitattvadarsibhir anto dr.s.t.ah. …dehasya-cidvastuno’ sattvameva svaru-pam a-tmanas cetanasya sattvam eva svar-u-pamiti nirn. ayo dr.s.t.etyarthah. . vina- sasvabha-vo hyasattvam, avina- sasvabha-vascasattvam (RBhGBh 2.16).

23 The passages from VP 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14, as mentioned in the Introduction,discuss the legend of Bharata who is cursed to undergo several rebirths because ofhis attachment to a fawn. He ultimately achieves liberation after expounding thetrue nature of existence to a certain king.

24 tasma-nna vijña-nam r.te’sti kim. cit kvacit kada-cid dvija vastuja-tam (VP 2.12.43ab).25 sadbha-va evam. bhavato mayokto jña-nam. yatha-satyam asatyam anyat (VP

2.12.45ab) (RBhGBh 2.16).26 ana- sı- parama-rthasca pra-jñair abhyupagamyate

tattu na-si na sandeho na-sidravyopapa-ditam.(VP 2.14.24) (RBhGBh 2.16).

27 vyavaha-ra-rhatva-na-rhatva-divis.ayau sadasacchabdau tayoh. parama-rtha-parama-rtha-vis.ayasatya-satyasabda-bhya-m katham aika-rthyam iti san.ka-ya-m na-sa-na-sayor evaparama-rtha-parama-rtha-disabdaprayogahetutve mahars.ivacanam upadatte ana-sı-ti(TC 2.16).

28 However, know that to be imperishable, by which this whole universe was spun.No one can bring destruction to that which is imperishable (BhG 2.17).

29 atra-pi antavanta ime deha-h. (BhG 2.18) avina-si tu tadviddhi (BhG 2.17) ity ucyate.tadeva sattva-sattvavyapadesahetur iti gamyate (RBhGBh 2.16).

30 atra uttaraslokadvayaikya-rtha-cca ayam eva-rthaitya-ha atra-pı-ti etena kvacicceta-navisaya--sacchabdo’ pi deva-dina-maru-papraha-n. a-dyavastha-visesa-peksayetyuktambhavati. svaru-patastu nirvika-ratva-t sacchabdva-cyatvam eva.

31 yattu ka-la-ntaren. a-pi na-nyasamjña-m upaiti vaiparin. a-ma-disambhu-ta-m. tadvastu nr.pa tacca kim.(VP 2.13.96) (RBhGBh 2.16).

32 vina-sopalaksitanparin.a-mavr.ddhya-dibhih. pu-rva-stha-praha-n.ena sam. jña-ntarayoga-devaavastusabdava-cyatvam, tadabha-va-cca vastusabdava-cyatvam ityasminarthe spas.-t.oktim darsayati yattviti (TC 2.16).

33 jña-nam. visuddham. vimalam. visokamases.alobha-dinirastasan.gam

ekam. sadaikam. paramah. paresah. sa va-sudevo na yato’nyadasti.(VP 2.12.44).

34 dasaslokya-m vastvavastvastina-stisatya-satyasabda-na-m sa-rı-rakabha-s.ye pura-n.opakr-amopasam. ha-ra-dina- tatprakaran.opakramopasam. ha-ra-dina- madhye ‘mahı- ghat.atvamghat.atah. kapa-lika-’ (VP 2.15.41) itya-dina- ca savika-ratvenaiva-vastutvopapa-dana-tsrutismr.tyantarapratyaks.a-dyanurodha-cca nirvika-rasavika-rataya- nitya-nityacetana--cetanavis.ayatvam stha-pitam (TC 2.16).

35 For more on the connections between Yoga as defined by Ra-ma-nuja and thesystem of Patañjali see Lester 1976.

36 Zaehner 1969: 120–21; Malinar 2007: 69–77.37 SBhGBh 2.11.38 a-tmanah. janma-dis.ad.vikriya-bha-va-t akarta- a-tma- (SBhGBh 2.11).39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 ta-ni sarva-n. i sam. yamya yukta a-sı-t matparah.

vase hi yasyendriya-n. i tasya prajña- pratis.t.hita-

(BhG 2.61).



42 sthita- pratis.t.hita- ‘aham asmi param brahma’ iti prajña- yasya sa sthitaprajñah.(SBhGBh 2.54).

43 Van Buitenen 1974: 59.44 RBhGBh 2.55.45 asya sarvasya dos.asya parijihı-rs.ayavis.aya-nura-gayuktataya- durjaya-ni indriya-n. i

sam. yamya cetasah. subha-srayabhu-te mayi mano ivastha-pya sama-hita a-sı-ta. manasimadvis.aye sati nirdagdha-ses.akalmas.ataya- nirmalı-kr.tam vis.aya-nura-garahitam manaindriya-n. i svavasa-ni karoti. tato vasyendriyam mana a-tmadarsana-ya prabhavati(RBhGBh 2.61).

46 a-tmadarsanena vina- vis.ayara-go na nivartate, anivr.tte vis.ayara-ge vipascito yatama--nasya api purus.asya indriya-n. i prama-thı-ni balavanti manah. prasahya haranti. evamindriyajaya a-tmadarsana-dhı-nah. a-tmadarsanam indriyajaya-dhı-nam; iti jña-nanis.t.ha-

dus.pra-pya- (RBhGBh 2.60).47 Ram-Prasad 2013: 12.48 uktam ca—yatha-gnir uddhatasikah. kaks.am dahati sa-nilah. tatha- cittasthito vis.n.ur

yogina-m sarvakilbis.am (VP 6.7.74) iti (RBhGBh 2.61) tada-ha—vase hi yasyen-driya-n. i tasya prajña- pratis.t.hita- iti.

49 yogasvaru-pam kha-n.d. ikya sru-yata-m gadato mamayatra sthito na cyavate pra-pya brahmalayam munih.(VP 6.7.27).

50 a-tmabha-vam nayatyenam tadbrahma dhya-yinam munevika-ryyama-tmanah. saktya- lohama-kars.ako yatha-

(VP 6.7.30).51 a-tmaprayatnasa-peks.a- visis.t.a- ya- manogatih.

tasya- brahman. i samyogo yogai tyabhidhı-yate(VP 6.7.31).See also verses 53, 94. However, in the SBh on the section of the individual self,Ra-ma-nuja argues that these verses refer to the individual self and not Brahman.This is examined in Chapter 3.

52 Malinar 2007: 192–93.53 BhG 7.4–5.54 Zaehner 1964: 246 “etad—in compounds can be taken as either singular or

plural. S[ankara] and R[amanuja] take it to refer to both natures of God”. Thatis, it could refer to either of the natures individually or both together.

55 etadyonı-ni bhu-ta-ni sarva-n. ı-tyupadha-rayaaham kr.tsnasya jagatah. prabhavah. pralayastatha-

(BhG 7.6).56 SBhGBh 7.5.57 SBhGBh 7.4.58 Halbfass 1995: 78–81; Alston 1981 Vol. III: 69–85.59 ajo’pi sannvyaya-tmabhu- ta-na-mı-svaro’ pi san

prakr.tim sva-madhis.t.ha-ya sambhava-my a-tmama-yaya-

(BhG 4.6).60 SBhGBh 4.6.61 asya vicitra-nandabhogyabhogopakaran. abhogastha-naru-pen.a avasthitasya jagatah.

prakr.tir iyam. gandha-digun. akapr.thivyaptejova-yva-ka- sa-diru-pen.a manah. prabhr.tı-

ndriyaru-pen. a ca mahadahamka-raru-pen.a ca as.t.adha- bhinna- madı-yeti vidhi(RBhGBh 7.4).

62 itas tu anya-m ito’ cetana-ya-s cetanabhogyabhu-ta-ya-h. prakr.ter visaja-tı-ya-ka-ra-m. jı-

vabhu-ta-m. param. tasya- bhoktr.tvena pradha-nabhu-ta-m. cetanaru-pa-m. madı-ya-m.prakr.tim. vidhi yaya- idam acetanam. kr.tsnam. jagad dha-ryate (RBhGBh 7.5).

63 etaccetana-cetanasamas.t.iru-pamadı-yaprakr.tidvayayon. ı-ni brahma-distambaparyanta-niucca-vacabha-vena-vasthita-ni cidacinmisra-n. i sarva-n. i bhu-ta-ni madı-ya-ni sarva-n. ibhu-ta-nı-tyupadha-ra-ya. madı-yaprakr.tidvayayon. ı-ni hi ta-ni madı-ya-ny eva. tatha-



prakr.tidvayayonitvena kr.tsnasya jagatah. . tayor dvayor api madyon. itvena madı-yat-vena ca kr.tsnasya jagato cham eva prabhavah. aham eva pralayo ‘ham eva ca ses.ı-tyupadha-raya. tayos cidacitsamas.t.ibhu-tayoh. prakr.tipurus.ayor api paramapurus.ayo-n. itvam srutismr.tisiddham (RBhGBh 7.6).

64 maha-navyakte lı-yate avayktamaks.are lı-yate aks.aram tamasi lı-yate tamah. paredeve ekı-bhavati (Sub Up 2).

65 He is the primordial being sacrificed by the gods to create the universe. Laterpurus.a is identified with Vis.n.u.

66 Olivelle 1998 translation.67 tena dravyasvaru-pasya nityatva-t aja-mitya-der avirodhah. . ukta-rther smr.tim uda-harati

vis.n. oriti (TC 7.6).68 VP 1.2.13 ff.69 pradha-nam purus.am ca-pi pravisya-tmecchaya- harih.

ks.obhaya-ma-sa sampra-pte sargaka-le vyaya-vyayau(VP 1.2.29).

70 VP 1.2.24 ab: vis.n.oh. svaru-pa-t parato hi te’ nye ru-pe pradha-nam. purus.as ca vipra.71 sva-bhimata-rthe sphut.a-rtham vacanam uda-harati prakr.tir iti (TC 7.6).72 vis.n.oh. svaru-pa-tparatodite dve ru-pe pradha-nam. purus.as ca vipra (VP 1.2.24 ab).

Critical edition reads:vis.n.oh. svaru-pa-tparato bi te’nye …prakr.itir ya- maya- khya-ta- vyakta-vyaktasvaru-pin. ı-.purus.as ca-pyubha-vetau lı-yete parama-tmani.parama-tma- ca sarves.a-ma-dha-rah. paramesvarah. .vis.n.ur na-mna- sa vedes.u veda-ntes.u ca gı-yate.(VP 6.4.39–40) (RBhGBh 7.6).

73 sarvaih. sabdaih. tasyaiva-bhidha-nam iti tattatsa-ma-na-dhikaran.yena a-ha raso’ hamiti caturbhih.

74 prakr.tipurus.ayoh. parama-tmani layo na-ma ks.ı-re nı-rasyeva vibha-ga-narhasam. sle-s.avises.ah. (TC 7.6).

75 For a history of the use of these two terms in the upanis.ads, see Zaehner 1969: 333–35.76 ks.etrajñam. ca-pi ma-m. viddhi sarva ks.etres.u bha-rata

ks.etraks.etrajñayor jña-nam. yattajjña-nam. matam. mama(BhG 13.2); 13.3 in Sadhale 1935.

77 saptame adhya-ye dve prakr.tı- su-cite ı-svarasya trigun.a-tmika- as.t.adha- bhinna- apara-

samsa-rahetutva-t, para- ca anya- jı-vabhu-ta- ks.etrajñalaks.an. a- ı-svara-tmika-; ya-bhya-mprakr.tibhya-m ı-svaro jagadutpattisthitilayahetutvam pratipadyate. tatra ks.etraks.e-trajñalaks.an. aprakr.tidvayaniru-pan.adva-ren.a tadvata ı-svarasya tattvanirdha-ran.a-r-tham ks.etra-dhya-ya a-rabhyate (SBhGBh13.0).

78 tatra evam sati ks.etrajñasya ı-svarasya eva sato cvidya-kr.topa-dhibhedatah. samsa-r-itvam iva bhavati, yatha- deha-dya-tmatvam a-tmanah. (SBhGBh 13.2); 13.3 in Sadhale1935.

79 purus.o jı-vah. ksetrjño bhokta- iti parya-yah. (SBhGBh 13.20); 13.21 in Sahale 1935.80 ks.etraks.etrajñayor vis.ayavis.ayin.or bhinnasvabha-vayoh. itaretarataddharma-dhya--

salaks.an. ah. samyogah. ks.etraks.etrajñasvaru-paviveka-bha-vanibandhanah. , rajju-suktika-dı-na-m tadvivekajña-na-bha-va-d adhya-ropitasarparajata-disamyogavat. so’yamadhya-sasvaru-pah. ks.etraks.etrajñayoh. samyogo mithya-jña-nalaks.an.ah. (SBhGBh13.26); 13.27 in Sadhale 1935.

81 r.s.ibhirbahudha- gı-tam. chandobhirvividhaih. pr.thak brahmasu- trapadaiscaiva hetu-madbhirviniscitaih. (BhG 13.4); 13.5 in Sadhale 1935.

82 Ra-ma-nuja takes the phrase brahmasu-trapadaiscaiva to mean in the ‘“BrahmaSu-tras as well.” Although an alternate translation could be “also in the aphoristicverses concerning Brahman.” Regardless of whether this verse is specificallyreferring to the Brahma Su-tras or the upanis.ads, it does affect our reading here(Zaehner 1969: 335).



83 Though San.kara has cited other scriptural passages in 13.2 in his discussion onthe field and the field-knower, those passages are in support of the knowledgeover ignorance and the benefits thereof. San.kara cites Kat.ha Up 2.4, 2.2, 2.5; TaittA-ran. 3.12; Svet Up 3.8; Taitt Up 2.4, 2.7; Mun. Up 3.2.9; Br. Up 1.4.10; Svet Up

6.20. He also cites smr.ti passages such as MBh 12.240.6; BhG 5.15, 5.19, and13.28 etc. Ra-ma-nuja in his commentary on BhG 13.2 also utilizes sruti to prove thatthe individual self is not identical to Brahman. However, in the context of this dis-cussion, he also mentions the distinction between the field and the field-knower andcites support from sruti.

84 Chapter 4, fn 94.85 TC 13.4.86 tadidam. ks.etraks.trajñaya-tha-tmyam. r.is.ibhih. para-sara-dibhih. bahudha- bahupraka-ram.

gı-tam—aham. tvam. ca tatha-nye ca bhu-tairuhya-m. pa-rthivagun. aprava-hapatito bhu-tavargo’pi ya-tyayam.karmavasya- gun.a- hy ete sattva-dya-h. pr.thivı-pateavidya-sañcitam. karma tacca-ses.es.u jantus.u.a-tma- suddho’ks.arah. sa-nto nirgun. ah. prakr.teh. parah.pravr.dddhyapacayau na-sya ekasya-khilajantus.u.(VP 2.13.65–67) (RBhGBh 13.4); 13.5 in Sadhale 1935.

87 VP 2.13.67 cd is note quoted by Ra-ma-nuja.88 aviviktadeha-tmasvaru-pasya ra-jño va-hyava-hakatvoktipratiks.epa-rtham va-kyam

aham tvam ca iti (TC 13.4); 13.5 in Sadhale 1935.89 In critical edition VP 2.13.98 ab reads: tvam. kimetacchirah. kim. nu srastava tatho-

daram.90 pin. d. ah. pr.thagyatah. pum. sah. sirah.pa-n.ya-dilaksan. ah.

tatho’hamiti kutraita-m. sam. jña-m. ra-jankaromyaham.(VP 2.13.85).kim. tvametacchirah. kim. nu siras tava tathodaramkimupa-da-dikam. tvam. vai tavaitattkim. mahı-pate.samasta-vayavebhyastvam. pr.thag bhu-pa vyavasthitah.ko’hamityeva nipun. o bhu-tva- cintyam. pa-rthiva.(RBhGBh 13.4); 13.5 in Sadhale 1935.

91 evam. vivikatayor dvayoh. va-sudeva-tmakatvam. ca-huh. : indriya-n. i mano buddhissattvam. tejobalam. dhr.tih. . va-sudeva-tmaka-nya-huh. ks.etram ks.etrajñameva ca(RBhGBh 13.4); 13.5 in Sadhale 1935.

92 This upanis.ad addresses the nature of the self (a-tman) in the different ways mentionedsuch as food, mind and so on (Olivelle 1998: 300–303).

93 The numbering of the su-tras differs from one Veda-nta commentary to the next.The corresponding su-tra numbers in San.kara’s version are Br Su- 1.1.12–19.

94 Clooney 1994: 150.95 Clooney 1994: 151–53.96 chandobhir vividhaih. pr.thak pr.thagvidhais chandobhis ca r.gyajus sa-ma-tharvab-

hih. deha-tmanoh. svaru-pam. pr.thaggı-tam—tasma-dva- etasma-d a-tmana a-ka- sah.sambhu-tah. a-ka-sa-d va-yuh. va-yoragnih. agnera-pah. adbhyah. pr.thivı- pr.thivya-

aus.adhayah. aus.adhı-bhyo’annam anna-t purus.ah. sa va- es.a purus.o’annarasamayah.(Taitt Up 2.5) iti sarı-rasvaru-pam abhidha-ya tasma-d antaram. pra-n. amayam.tasma-c ca antaram. manomayam abhidha-ya tasma-dvaitasma-n manomaya-danyo‘ntara a-tma- vijña-namayah. (Taitt Up 2.4) iti ks.etrajñasvaru-pam abhidha-yatasma-d va- etasma-d vijña-namaya-t anyo’ntara a-tma-nandamayah. (Taitt Up 2.5) itiks.etrajñasya-pi antara-tmataya- a-nandamayah. parama-tma- a-bhihitah. (RBhGBh13.4); 13.5 in Sadhale 1935. My own translation of the Taitt Up passages.

97 Clooney 1994: 154.



98 Br Su- 2.3.1, 18, and 40 are also cited to support the true nature of the field, field-knower, and Brahman. Their contribution is to underscore the nature of indivi-dual selves and matter as modes of Brahman, although this is adequately coveredby the VP and MBh citations.

99 Halbfass 1995: 78–85 and Alston 1980: Vol. II: 60–69.100 Ram-Prasad 2013: 13.101 Alston 1980: Vol. II: 69.102 tribhir gun.amayair bha-vair ebhih. sarvamidam jagat

mohitam na-bhija-na-ti ma-m ebhyah. paramavyayam(BhG 7.13).

103 SBhGBh 7.13.104 daivı- hi es.a- gun. amayı- mama ma-ya- duratyaya-

ma-meva ye prapadyante ma-ya-meta-m taranti te(BhG 7.14).

105 SBhGBh 7.14.106 Ram-Prasad 2013: 13, 14.107 mama es.a- gun. amayı- sattvarajastamomayı- ma-ya- yasma-d daivı- devena krid. a--

pravr.ttena maya- eva nirmita- tasma-t sarvair duratyaya- duratikrama-. asya- ma-ya--sabdava-cyatvam a-surara-ks.asa-stra-dı-na-m iva vicitraka-ryakaratvena yatha- ca tatobhagavata- tasya raksa-rtham cakramuttamam. a-jaga-ma sama-jñaptam jva-la-ma-lisudarsanam tena ma-ya-sahasram, tacchambarasya-suga-mina-. ba-lasya raksata-

dehamekaika-n.ksena su-ditam (VP 1.19.19–20) itya-dau (RBhGBh 7.14).108 satyes.u eva a-surara-ks.asa-stra-dis.u ma-ya-sabdaprayogo na mithya-tvanibandhana

itybha-vah. … mithya-bhu-tasya sastrasya nis.u-danı-yatva-bha-va-d (TC 7.14).109 ato ma-ya- sabdo na mithya-rthava-cı-. aindraja-lika-dis.r api kenacin mantraus.adha--

dina- mithya-rthavis.aya-ya-h. pa-rama-rthikya- eva buddheh. utpa-dakatvena ma-ya-vı- tiprayogah. . tatha- mantraus.adha-dir. eva ca tatra ma-ya- sarvaprayoges.u anugatasyaekasya eva sabda-rthatva-t. tatra mithya-rthes.u ma-ya- sabdaprayogo ma-ya-ka-ryabud-dhivis.ayatvena aupaca-rikah. ‘mañca-h. krosanti’ itivat (RBhGBh 7.14).

110 Sampatkumaran 1985: 187.111 es.a- gun. amayı- pa-rama-rthikı- bhagavanma-ya- eva ma-ya-m tu prakr.tim vidya-nma-yi-

nam tu mahesvaram (Sve Up 4.10) itya-dis.u abhidhı-yate. asya-h. ka-ryam bhaga-vatsvaru-patirodha-nam svasvaru-pabhogyatvabuddhis ca ato bhagavanma-yaya-

mohitam sarvam jagad bhagavantam anavadhika-tisaya-nandasvaru-pam na abhi-ja-na-ti (RBhGBh 7.14).

112 ma-ya-vimocanopa-yam a-ha—ma-m eva iti. mámeva satyasamkalpam para-maka-run. ikam ana-locitavises.a-ses.alokasaran.yam ye saran.am prapadyante ta eta-mmadı-ya-m gun.amayı-m ma-ya-m taranti. ma-ya-m utsr.jya ma-m eva upa-sata ityarthah.(RBhGBh 7.14).

113 caturvidha- bhajante ma-m jana-h. sukr.tino’rjunaa-rto jijña-surartha-rthı- jña-nı- ca bharatars.abha(BhG 7.16).

114 a-rta a-rtiparigr.hı-tas taskaravya-ghraroga-dina- abhibhu-ta a-pannah. . jijña-sur bhaga-vattattvam jña-tum icchati yah. … jña-nı- vis.n. os tattvavit (SBhGBh 7.16).He who desires to know the truth about the Lord is the seeker of knowledge. Aknower knows the true nature of Vis.n.u.

115 sa ca jña-nı- mamava-sudevasya a-tma- eva iti mama atyartham priyah. (SBhGBh 7.17).116 a-sthitah. a-rod.hum pravr.ttah. sah. jña-nı- hi yasma-d ‘aham eva bhagava-n va-sudevo

na anyo csmi’ iti (SBhGBh 7.18).117 jijña-sur prakr.tiviyukta-tmasvaru-pa-va-tpı-cchuh. jña-nam eva asya svaru-pam iti jij-

ña-sur iti uktam. jña-nı- ca itas tv anya-m prakr.tim vidhi me para-m (BhG 7.5)itya-dina- abhihitabhagavacches.ataikarasa-tmasvaru-pavit prakr.tiviyuktakevala-tmaniaparyavasyan bhagavantam prepsuh. bhagavantam paramapra-pyam manva-nah. .(RBhGBh 7.16).



118 priyo hi jña-nino’tyartham aham sa ca mama priyah. (BhG 7.17cd).119 Ra-ma-nuja seems to be referring here to three aspirants although previously he

has mentioned four.120 tes.a-m jña-nı- visis.yate, kutah. nityayukta ekabhaktir iti ca. tasya hi madekapra--

pyasya maya- yogo nityah. . itarayos tu ya-vatsva-bhilas.itapra-pti maya- yogah. . tatha-

jña-nino mayi ekasmin eva bhaktih. itaratayos; tu sva-bhilas.ite tatsa-dhanatvenamayi ca (RBhGBh 7.17).

121 kiñ ca priyo hi jña-nino’tyartham aham atra-rthasa-bdo abhidheyvavacanah. ; jña-ni-no‘ham yatha- priyah. tatha- maya- sarvjñena sarvasaktina- api abhidha-tum nasakyate ityarthah. ; priyatvasya iyatta-rahitatva-t (RBhGBh 7.17).

122 See Soifer 1991 and Hacker 1959 on more on this narrative.123 yatha- jña-nina-m agresarasya prahla-dasya—

sa tv a-saktamatih. kr.s.n. e damsyama-no mahoragaih.na viveda-tmano ga-tram tatsmr.tya-hla-dasamsthitah.(VP 1.17.39).iti sah. api tatha- eva mama priyah. (RBhGBh 7.17).

124 Biardeau 1975: 44.125 RBhGBh 9.29.126 Hacker 1959: 594.127 Soifer 1991: 98.128 VS #108.



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Index

Adjunct (upa-dhi) 67, 72, 81, 95, 103, 137Advaita: concealment 22–24; nature of

Brahman 67–68, 72, 82; unreality(mithya-) 93, 97, 130, 135; ignorance96–100; reality 114; causality asunreal 84, 114–16; realization ofBrahman 120–23, 138–39; ma-ya- 124,127, 135–37; avidya- 129–30

A-lva-rs, 6, 12. fn 3

Asat 93–94, 96–98, 104, 114–19, 141;see also non-existence

A�tman: effects of karma on 20–24; srution essential nature 15–18; Vis.n.uPura-n.a on essential nature 18–21;as attribute of Visn.u 27–36, 38;see also purusa and individual self

Auspicious object (Subha- sraya) 52, 55,121–23, 141; Treatise on theauspicious object of meditation(Subha-srayaprakaran. a) 73, 81

Avata-ra (incarnation) 47–48, 140; asdivine form (vigraha) 75–76

Avidya- 68, 81, 89, 92–94, 96–100, 102,104, 142; as concealment in Advaita22–24, 129–31; see also karma

Avises.an.aka-ran.a sruti support 26–30;Vis.n.u Pura-n.a support 30–31; see alsoBrahman

Bhakti (devotion) 138–40, 142–43Bhagava-n 74, 138Bharata 88, 131–32Brahman: originative causality 25–39; as

the cause as a whole(avises.an.aka-ran.a) 26–30, 54; causalityas essential nature of Brahman(brahmasvaru-pavises.a) 31–39, 55;qualities of essential nature 39, 41–42,53; nature of Brahman 67–80, 68;

sruti on nature of Brahman 69–72;Bhagavadgı-ta- on Brahman’s nature72–74; Vis.n.u Pura-n.a on the nature ofBrahman 74–80; manifest andunmanifest as Brahman’s essentialnature 75, 78, 83; Advaita onBrahmans’s nature 82; Brahman asillusiosnist (ma-ya-vin) 95; Nature(prakr.ti) of Kr.s.n. a 123–29, 134

Brahmasvaru-pavises.a 31–39, 55;see also Brahman

Causal State of Brahman (ka-ran.a-vastha-)25, 26, 31, 54, 76; doctrine ofcausality (satka-ryava-da) 26, 69, 114,116; causality as unreal 114–16

Co-ordinate Predication(sa-ma-na-dhikaran.ya) 57 fn 31, 68,79–80, 82–83, 140

Corroboration/amplification(upabr.m. han.a,upabr.m. hita) definition 3;17, 54, 83

Disposition (bha-vana) 73, 90Divine Form (divyaru-pa) 39–54, 77;sruti on divine form 43–46; smr.ti ondivine form 46–54; connection toincarnation 47–48

Dual characteristics (ubhayalin.ga,ubhayalin.gatva) 68–70, 72, 75, 103

Effected State of Brahman (ka-rya-vastha-)25, 26, 31, 54, 76

Essential nature (svaru-pa) of Brahman39, 41, 42, 53, 67–80; of individualself 54, 81, 83–85; of matter 116–19

Existence (being, sat, asti, satya) 69, 93–94,97, 98, 104, 114–19, 135; as theimperishable (avina-sa) 116–19


Form (vigraha) 42, 45, 48, 76

Ignorance: concealment in Advaita22–24; as avidya- 81, 89, 93–94, 97–99,102, 104, 142; as ajña-na 90, 91;see also avidya-, karma

Individual Self 78–81, 83, 88, 92,126–29, 141–42; as ks.etrajña 124,129–30, 132–33, 142; as jı-va 124–25,129; as distinct from Brahman 131–34;plurality 85–89; liberated self distinctfrom Brahman 89–93; realization ofindividual self 120–23; as mode ofBrahman 35; contraction ofattributive consciousness 22–24, 86;see also a-tman and purusa

Interpretive Community 2, 104 fn 8Inter-textual 2, 14

Jı-va 14, 95, 124–25, 129; see alsoindividual self

Karma 20–24, 104; as ajña-na 90, 91; asavidya- 92; effects of 121–23; see alsoavidya-

Kesidhvaja and Kha-n.d. ikya 10, 19Ks.etra 124, 129–30, 132, 142; see also

matterKs.etrajña 21–24, 83, 92; 124, 129–30,

132–33, 142; see also purusa

Liberation see moksaLı-la- (sport) 68, 77, 122; created realm

as manifestation of sport (lı-la-vibhu-ti)46, 76

Ma-ya- 95–96, 116, 124, 127–28, 136,142; Vis.n.u’s ma-ya- 124, 134–35, 137,142–43

Manifestation (vibhu-ti) 42, 76, 80;supreme glorious manifestation(anantamaha-vibhu-ti) 76; gloriousmanifestation (maha-vibhu-ti) 82;dual manifestation (ubhayavibhu-ti)45–46, 51; manifestation of realmof sport (lı-la-vibhu-ti) and eternalmanifestation (nityavibhu-ti)46, 76

Matter 27–35, 37, 38, 70, 78–80, 82,94–96, 99, 101, 122–29, 131–32,135–38, 141–42; as ks.etra 124,129–30, 132, 134; as svaru-pa of

Brahman 75, 78, 83; as Vis.n.u’s ma-ya-

124; see also prakr.tiMode, mode-possessor 35, 128, 140Moks.a 134–40

Non-existence (non-being, asat, asatya,na-sti) 94, 96–98, 104, 114–19, 141;as the perishable (vina- sa) 116–19

Pradha-na 49, 79, 127–28Prahla-da 95, 136–37, 139–40, 142–43Prakr.ti 27–35, 37–38, 70, 78–80, 82,94–96, 122–29, 131–32, 135–38,141–42; as ma-ya- 99, 137; as mode(praka-ra) 101; Va-sudeva as self of 134

Purus.a 27–36, 38, 78–80, 88, 126–29,141–42; Vis.n.u as 43–44, 50, 126;Va-sudeva as self of 134

Sakti (power): karma as power of Vis.n.u23, 81–82, 92, 104; three powers ofVis.n.u 48, 81

Sabdaprama-n.a (scripture as validmeans of knowledge) definition 1–2;see also corroboration

Sa-m. khya 114, 120San. kara see AdvaitaSat 69, 93–94, 97–98, 104, 114–19, 135;see also existence

Scriptural Harmony (samanvaya)69–72, 83, 85, 91–93

Ses.a (servant) 73, 126, 138Ses.in (master) 73, 126, 138; self asattribute of Visn.u 16–18

Ses.a-Ses.in 73, 126Soul-body Paradigm (sarı-ra-sarı-ribha-va) 68, 69–70, 73, 92, 98–99,101–4, 132

Svaru-pa see essential nature: ofBrahman 39, 41–42, 53; unmanifestand manifest as svarupa of Brahman75, 78, 83; connection to divineform 39–42, 45, 50–51, 55; srution Brahman’s 69–72

Universal form (visvaru-pa) 39, 48, 49

Vis.n.u Pura-n.a: provenance,commentaries 5–10; importancein Srı-vais.n. avism 6

Yoga 114, 120

156 Index

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