Rosenthal on Ibn Al-Arabi
Transcript of Rosenthal on Ibn Al-Arabi
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IBN 'ARABI BETWEEN"PHILOSOPHY" AND "MYSTICISM"
"Sufism and Philosophy are neighbors and visit each other"
fa-inna at-tasawwuf wa-t-tafalsuf yatajdwardniwa-yatazdwardni*
by
Franz Rosenthal
Hamden,Conn.
It needs hardly any comment that the terms "philosophy" and "mysticism"
requiredefinition in order to realize the differencebetween them (and between
mysticism and religion). There are no doubt many who would deny the
existence of suitable clearcut distinctions. In Islam, "philosophy" can be
considered as equivalent to what Muslims themselves designated with a
loanword from the Greek,falsafah. The curious modern term "mysticism"has
no such direct identifying connection between Arabic and a second language.
In Arabic, tasawwufwas the label for a diverse and, eventually, all-pervasivereligious and societal movement that touched intellectuals and the social elite
as well as the masses. It is not always absolutely clear why an individual was
considered a faylasuf or a sufi, or into which category he might fall accordingto our understanding of philosophy and mysticism.
Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240) represented, by general agreement, a Sufi approachto the universe in his thought and attitude. He himself would not have denied
it, but such a broad classification would have been unacceptable to him
without further modification. He thought of himself as a special kind of SufT,
and others tended to follow this view of himself. "Sufism," without further
* AbuiHayyanat-Tawhidi,al-Basd'irwa-dh-dhakha'ir,d. Ibrahimal-Kaylani,III, 1, 277
(Damascus1364ff.).Thefollowingpageswereoriginallypreparedor a colloquium n PhilosophyandMysticism
organizedby Giles Constableand IsadoreTwerskyand held at DumbartonOaks(Washington,D.C.)on November13-15,1983.My participationn thecolloquium aveme theopportunityo
spend many monthsjust readingagain throughthe colossalaeuvreof Ibn 'Arabiand beingfascinated y it, evenif thepoetryof thelanguageandthedepthof its ideasoftenappear o defywhat we like to thinkof as rationality.Myexpositionhere s meantto be purelydescriptive, ot
interpretativer historical.Theinnumerable bviousparallelso earlierMuslim houghtare notexpressly oted.The vastamountof recent esearch n Ibn'Arabi s thesubject f anilluminatingsurveyby J.W.Morris, n JAOS, 106(1986),539-51and 733-56.I regret missedIbn 'Arabi'swork on logic, al-Bulghahj l-hikmah, or which see E. Meyer, in A. Zimmermanned.),Aristotelischesrbe,125-40 Berlin1986).
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qualification, was not enough to characterize his particular position satisfacto-
rily. For him, the "men of God" fall into three classes. In the first place, there
were practical ascetics of the highest moral character called 'ubbdd"worship-pers." They are representedon the literary scene by men such as al-Muhasibi.
In the second, next higher category, there were people who were equivalent to
the first group in all respects, but in addition they were concerned only with
God, and they achieved states and stations, secrets, revelations (kushufj) and
miracles, as well as futiwah status. They are called Sufis, and they also claim
leadership of all the people of God and think of themselves as something
special. And the thirdcategory, finally, encompasses those called Malamiyah.2
They observe all religious obligations mostpunctiliously,
but in noway
do
they distance themselves from the common pedple. They tend toward blamingthemselves and being blamed by others, yet, they are in perfect accord with
God's lordship, and they possess that perfect divine and human wisdom
(hikmah)that consists in assigning to each phenomenon its proper place.3 The
Prophet and Abu Bakr belonged into this third and highest category, as did
quite a few of older as well as contemporary mystics.4 Ibn 'Arabi does not
indicate into which category he placed himself. It might be assumed that he
claimed to belong to all three of them, but, as far as I can see, he does not
expressly claim to belong to the third. In other contexts, he speaks of himselfas belonging to the Sufis of true insight (muhaqqiqlas-Siufryah).sThe Sufi who
combines true insight (muhaqqiq)-in this particular case, insight into the
mysteries of letters-with loving concern ranks higher than ordinary Sufis.6
Ibn 'Arabi assumed the existence of two kinds of Sufis, those who are
truthful possessors of the truth, and those who make such a claim without
having any real understanding.7 Indeterminate numbers of Sufis exhibit the
highest standards of ethical behavior (makarimal-akhlaq), and it is said that
I The terms corresponding in a way to something like divine inspiration were many in Ibn'Arabi's vocabulary, among them kashf, tajalli, fath, wahb,etc.
2 Ibn 'Arabi considers Malamiyah preferableto Malamatiyah, see Fut., II, 16, 1. 15 (ch. 73).The Futiuht al-Makkryahare quoted here as Fut. according to the edition Cairo 1329, except
for the introduction and chapters 1-71 (= I, 665, 1.7, of the Cairine text), for which the first ninevolumes of the edition of 'Uthman Yahya (Cairo 1392/1972-) were available. Yahya's edition isreferred to as "Fut. Y."
3 See below, n. 57, and Fut., II, 16, 11.15 ff. (ch. 73), speaking of the Malamiyah: "They are thelords and imams of the people of the path of God, Muhammad being one of them. They are the
sages (hukama')who have put matters in theirproper places and made them right (ahkamuha)andremoved them from improper places...
4 Fut., III, 34ff. (ch. 309).5 Kitabal-Azal, 8, 11.1f. (Hyderabad 1948).6 Fut. Y, I, 325 (ch. 2). See also below, nn. 31 and 32.7 According to al-Amr al-muhkamal-marbutfit md yalzam ahl tarTqAlldh min ash-shurut,
printedat the end of the undated (1968?) Cairo edition of Dhakhd'iral-a'ldq (Sharh Tarjumdn l-
ashwdq), 264.
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
"themore ethicalan individuals, the more of a Sfif he is."8 In Ibn'Arabi's
basic threefoldrankingof all knowledge ('ulum),Sufism,which is meant
although he word s notused,appearsas "theknowledgeof states"attainablethrough"taste"in the middlebetweenintellectualknowledgewhich yieldsresults hatarepartlysound andpartly ncorrect,andthe highestknowledge,the knowledgeof the secrets,whichhas ties to boththeknowledgeof intellectand the knowledgeof states.9
There could be Sufis also amongthe Ash'ariteswho took an intermediate
position with respectto the gnosis of God throughreason.10As did the
ancients(here referring o the philosophers)and the Mutakallimun, ome
Sufis, too, did that expressly forbidden thing, namely, thinking about
(tafakkur)he essenceof God. Amongthem is Ibn 'Arabi'svenerated xem-
plar,al-Ghazzall.11n anotherplace,Ibn'Arabispeaksof "intelligentndivid-
uals and logical thinkers (al-'uqald' wa-ahl al-qiyds)," among them al-Ghaz-
zalI,as beinghis "colleaguesashdb)."12He evengoes so faras to pairSufiswho have no correct nsightwithphilosophers f similarstanding.13
Im sum, it is justified,of course,to speakof Ibn 'Arabi as a Sufi, but he
tried to breakout of the shapelessmold of Sufism,whichby his time had
indeed become an almost all-inclusive erm. This no doubt influencedhis
attitude toward philosophyand presumablymakes it unrepresentative fSufismas a whole, at least before the wide spreadof Ibn 'Arabi's nfluence.
Ibn 'Arabi consideredhimself in possessionof various forms of personaldivinerevelation, hus,as a special,highertypeof Siufi.
Of course,he did not think of himselfas afaylasuf,nor did he use theword
falsafah in the titles of his works or for describinghis own views.14
Throughoutthe centuries,his opponentscould not find enough terms of
opprobriumor him,yet, none of them,it seems,went so far as to smearhim
with the appellationoffaylasuf.l1It is curious hat modernscholarship tates
8 Fut., II, 17, 11.If. (ch. 73).9 Fut.Y, I, 139f.10 Dhakha'ir al-a'ldq, 236.1
Fut., IV, 106,11. 12-14 (ch. 473). Cf. also Fut., III, 233,11. 21 f. (ch. 352). See below, p. 8.12 Kitdbal-Jalalah, 7, 1. 11 (Hyderabad 1948).13 Dhakhd'iral-a'l7q, 28, where other examples of inferior kinds of Sufism are given.14 It seems that none of the very few titles mentioned by 'Uthman Yahya as possibly
containing the wordfalsafah did so originally, cf. Osman Yahia, Histoire et classificationde l'euvred'lbn 'ArabTDamascus 1964), 308, no. 281 (referringto al-I'ldmbi-ishdrdtahl al-ilhdm,publishedHyderabad 1948), and 362, no. 415. Falsafat al-akhldq, listed by Yahia, 198, no. 124, printed in
Cairo 1332, was not available to me. It has been recognized as a work by Yahya b. 'Adi, cf., forinstance, G. Endress, The Worksof YahyaIbn 'Adi, 83 f. (Wiesbaden 1977). For another Ethics,see below, n. 112.
15 The debate pro and con Ibn 'Arabi has produced a large literature, most of it not yetavailable in print. It may well be that statements such as this one, based upon the absence of
evidence, will turn out to be wrong.
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that he was referred to as Ibn Afladtn"Son of Plato," presumably to indicate
high praise. The origin of the epithet is not known to me. It seems to be
unusual terminology. The number of honorifics as well as infamificsapplied toIbn 'Arabi by his admirers and detractors was legion, but even if it should turn
out that someone used "Son of Plato," it certainly was not one of the
designations commonly applied to him.16He himself was proudly content with
proclaiming himself a "reviver" and "Muhammad," and the one and concrete
essence of his time:
It may be mentioned here that some of Ibn 'Arabi's works, though printed, were not available,and others I failed to peruse. The works still unpublished include important texts. Moreover, the
question of authenticity often intrudes. I have paid little attention to it here.I have tried, however, to clarify the situation with respectto a unique text contained in the Yale
manuscriptL-64 (Catalogue Nemoy, no. 1129). It is described as containing Ibn 'Arabi's Jadhwatal-istild' and consists of a collection of statements by old Suifs. Since the work contains chapterson Sifism and tafakkur, it is of some potential interest in our context. Yahia, Histoire et
classification,260, no. 159, has expressed doubt about Ibn 'Arabi's authorship, since the work is
obviously different in style and spirit from his other works. It is indeed unusual for Ibn 'Arabi not
to inject his personality into a text of this size (but compare his Muhidarat al-abrir, below, p. 17).The first eight folios and the title-page containing the author's name and the title of the work
are in a hand later than the rest of the manuscript.At the end, the scribe mentions that he copiedthe text in a (!) SumaysatTRibat in Damascus as a "tadhkirahli-sdhibihi, the shaykh, imam,
scholar, and ascetic Najib(?)-ad-din Jamal at-ta'ifah, Thaghr (?, hardly Maqarr/Mafarr) al-ghuraba' al-AbharL."Li-sdhibihfmay mean for his colleague/master/friend, as he refers to him
again in the formulas of blessing. Conceivably, it might indicate al-Abhari as the author of thework. It depends on whether the autograph at the end (Catalogue Nemoy, plate VI) is indeed bythe hand of Ibn 'Arabi, which I have so far been unable to check by comparison with other
autographs.The only AbharT t this time located by me is Hujjat-ad-dln-al-haqlqi'Abd-al-Muhsin
(Muhassin) b. Abi l-'Amid al-Abhari as-Sufi (556-624/1161-1227 in Egypt), who traveled widely,cf. Ibn al-'Imad, Shadhardt,V, 114 (Cairo 1359-51). He could very well have been the author of a
work of this type.Ibn 'Arabi's al-Jadhwahal-muqtabasah(Yahia, Histoire et classification, 259, no. 158) can
hardlybe connected with the Jadhwat al-istilt'. The writer of the title-page of the Yale manuscriptis unlikely to have made up the latter peculiar title, but he could easily have added Ibn 'Arabi as
the name of the author.
16 This was claimed by M. Asin Palacios, "El mistico Murciano Abenarabl," in Boletin de la
Real Academiade la Historia (Madrid), 87 (1925), 99. Asin Palacios was followed by H. Corbin,
L'Imagination creatrice dans le Soufisme d'lbn 'Arabi, 18 (Paris 1958), English trans. by R.
Manheim, 21 (Princeton 1969. BollingenSeries 91). Corbin repeated himself in MultipleAverroes,325 (Paris 1978. Actes du Colloque Internationalorganise a l'occasion du 8501 anniversairede la
naissanced'Averroes,Paris ... 1976). In his preface to R.W. J. Austin's translation of Ibn 'Arabi's
Fisuis, The Bezels of Wisdom,xiii (New York-Ramsey-Toronto 1980), T. Burckhardt says that inhis day (!), Ibn 'Arabi was given the surname of Son of Plato. His own translation of the Fusus, La
Sagesse des Prophetes, 7 (Paris 1955), which had appeared before Corbin's works, had no suchreference.
No source is given by any of these scholars. If there is one, it may have been one of thenumerouscommentaries on Ibn 'Arabi's works and, in particular,the Fusus, most of which are notavailable to me. We can hardly assume that there is here a mixup with as-Suhrawardial-maqtul.The hereticalphilosopherswho called Pharaoh the "Coptic Plato" used a more appropriatephraseto express themselves, see Ibn Taymiyah, Naqd al-mantiq,ed. M. Hamid al-Fiql, 131 (Cairo 1370/1951).
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Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd"Mysticism"
I am the Muh(y)i. haveno kunyah ndno nisbah eferringo a place.I amal-'Arabi,al-Hatimi,Muhammad.17
Even though Ibn 'Arabi was not expressly describedas a "philosopher," it istrue that his writings, or at least some of them, were attacked as tasawwufal-
faldsifah, meaning philosophical mysticism rather than mystic philosophy.18
And although Ibn Khaldun did not mention Ibn 'Arabi by name when he
characterized a view of the revelationists (ashab at-tajalll) as "a strange view
of philosophical import," he might very well have had him in mind or included
him in such a group.19Modern scholarship has tried to defend the thesis that it is possible to find a
system of mystic philosophy or philosophical mysticism20 in Ibn 'Arabi's
work. A.E. Affifi's introduction to Ibn 'Arabi published in 1939 was entitled
The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-Ibnul 'Arabi.In the beginning of his
preface, however, he issued a slight disclaimer: "... Mystics have no philo-
sophical system or fixed doctrines ... Mysticism is essentially an eclectic
subject... but Ibnul 'Arabi is an exception to the rule. He has a definite
philosophical doctrine of pantheism, the bearing of which is shown in every
part of his system. There is also a formal dialectic which dominates the whole
of his thought." There are obvious problems with this statement, the principal
one being the term "pantheism." It may conceal antiphilosophy and rejectionof the very idea of "system."
In the earliest of his many works on Ibn 'Arabi, M. Asin Palacios wished to
characterize Ibn 'Arabi's cosmology as an "emanational pantheism"
composed of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements unsuccessfully harmo-
nized with Islam, and he spoke of the thought of Ibn 'Arabi as a systematic
and harmonious syncretism formed by the juxtaposition of all sorts of
philosophical elements and dominated by Alexandrian Neoplatonism.21
Today, it seems still unavoidable to associate Ibn 'Arabi with some vague
mystic Neoplatonism or the like22 as if this were a philosophical system ofsome sort or other. H.S. Nyberg, who wrote what is probably still the most
sensible comprehensive study of Ibn 'Arabi, based himself on Ibn 'Arabi's
17 DTwan,4 (Biulq 1271).A final short i is requiredn Muhyiby the meter.Seealso below,n. 187.
18 Cf. Ibn Hajar, Lisan al-Mizan, V, 312 (Hyderabad 1329-31); Inba' VII, 329.19 Cf. Ibn Khaldun, Shifa' as-sd'il, ed. M. Ibn Tfawt at-Tanji, 58, 11.11f. (Istanbul 1957).20 With regard o "philosophicalmysticism," f., for instance,D.R. Blumenthal n post-
MaimonideanYemeniauthors.Blumenthalonsiders hemas representativesf a special"philo-
sophicalmysticism,"eehis contributiono G. Nahon and C. Touati(eds.), Hommage GeorgesVajda, 91-308 Louvain1980).
21 M. Asin Palacios,"Mohidin,"n Homenaje d Menendezy Pelayo, II, 238, 254 (Madrid1899).
22 As was donemostrecently,orinstance,byM.CruzHernandez,Historiadelpensamientoen
el mundoisldmico, II, 221 ff. (Madrid 1981).
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most "philosophical" works and considered the formation of a system as
something in constant flux in Ibn 'Arabi's head.23 He also spoke of "theo-
sophy," which, whatever may be meant by it, is certainly not philosophy. Tomy mind, "monism" remains a fairly satisfactory term as far as it goes, or
better perhaps, "monistic gnosticism."
Looking at the problem of Ibn 'Arabi's "system" from inside Islam, SeyyedHossein Nasr got closer to the truth of the matter. He made short shrift of
what he calls the "accusations" raised against Ibn 'Arabi of being a pantheist,
panentheist, existential monist, or follower of natural mysticism. "All of these
accusations," Nasr says, "are false, however, because they mistake the meta-
physical doctrines of Ibn 'Arabi for philosophy and do not take into conside-
ration the fact that the way of gnosis is not separate from grace and
sanctity."24 Nasr is not alone in our time in practicing this sort of agnosticismwith respect to a "philosophical system" of Ibn 'Arabi. L. Gardet, for
instance, contended that in Ibn 'Arabi's case, there can be no question of "a
philosophy that has integrated mystic resonances and experiences. It is a case
of wisdom gnosis (gnose sapientiale) which commands a spiritual experience
that in its very texture is accessible only through recourse to a certain
experience." 5
Much in all these statements depends on a particular definition undunderstandingof "philosophy" in order to make sense. It may also be noted
that discussions of Ibn 'Arabi's "philosophy" such as that of Affifi read more
like discussions of works on Kalam, and there is the general and more
fundamental problem of when metaphysics ceases to be part of philosophy.On his part, Ibn 'Arabi, in speaking of the "method (uslib)" of his
Futuhdt,26probably had no fixed system in mind, certainly no system that was
in the least "philosophical." We can deduce his view of "method (tarTq)"n
mysticism as compared to philosophy from his numerous statements on the
comparative value of revelation and inspiration as against intellectual/mental
speculation (nazar, tafakkur). We shall discuss some of them later. Here, it
may again suffice to invoke a few verses of his D Twin:
The sciences of taste have no method
Specified by proofs for the intellects,
23 H.S. Nyberg, KleinereSchriftendes Ibn al-'ArabT,156f. (Leiden 1919).24
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Three Muslim Sages. Avicenna-SuhrawardT-IbnArabf, 104 (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1964). Cf. also his article "Rabiteh-ye bayn tasawwuf wa-falsafeh dar farhang-eIran," in Iran Nimeh, 1 (1982), 46-56. For the fallacy inherent in all such labels, see now also
Morris, in JAOS, 106 (1986), 544.25 L. Gardet, "Experienceet gnose chez Ibn 'Arabi," in al-Kitdbat-TadhkarT.Muhyl-d-dinIbn
'Arabi,271 (Cairo 1389/1969).Presentationsof the "philosophy" of Ibn 'Arabi will appearin the future as they did in the past,
cf., for instance, R. Landau, in The Muslim World,47 (1957), 46-61, 146-60.26 See his Fihris,ed. Kurkis 'Awwad, in Revuede l'AcademieArabe de Damas, 29 (1954), 530.
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
Except working according to the data of the religious law
And holding to a worldly law (ndmuzs) ccompanied by acceptance.
As well as the concern of a stern and proud speaker of truth
Providing better guidance (proof) for a weak being than anything else does.27
As we would expect, Ibn 'Arabi is not particularly given to referring to
philosophy and philosophers directly. Yet, his works contain a few statements
explicitly mentioning falsafah and faylasiuf. He also occasionally quotes
persons and opinions which he himself acknowledged as having formed part of
"philosophy." This material will be discussed here. It constitues the most
important basis for understanding his attitude toward philosophy and its
relation to his mysticism.
Arabic scholars nowadays are increasingly engaged in attempts to clarifyIbn 'Arabi's indebtedness to philosophy from his own statements,28 Such
efforts, in fact, go back to as early as the sixteenth century. In a crudely
systematic fashion, some significant passages were collected and discussed bythe learned and prolific ash-Sha'ranl (ca. 1495-1565), principally in his Kitab
al- YawdqTtwa-l-jawdhiri bayan 'aqd'idal-akabir, which served as a stimulus
for the incipient study of Ibn 'Arabi in Europe near the end of the nineteenth
century. Ash-Sha'rani's quotations of passages from Ibn 'Arabi were not
always completelyliteral. He was concerned with
accurately renderingthe drift
of the passages, and that he did. Moreover, it is most difficult to quote Ibn
'Arab! literally and at the same time with the required economy, since his
torrent of consciousness flows so wildly that it cannot easily be dammed up
into quotable segments. A small example of how reliance upon an ash-
Sha'rani quotation could give a seriously misleading impression occurs in one
of his lesser treatises, in which he defends Ibn 'Arabi against the accusation of
sharing the heretical belief of philosophers in the eternity (qidam) of the
world.29 Introducing one of his proof texts as coming from chapter 293 of the
Futiuht, he speaks of the "God-forsaken philosophers (al-faldsifah khadhala-humAllah)" as if Ibn 'Arabi himself had used the phrase. He did not, and as a
matter of fact is quite unlikely to have used strong curses directed against the
philosophers, even where he disapproved of their views.
27 Diwdn, 78. For the meaning of ndmtus, f. the text quoted below, pp. 25f. and n. 134. The
"speaker of truth" in the third verse is no doubt meant by Ibn 'Arabi to be himself.28
Cf., for instance, Mahmud Qasim, Mawqif Ibn 'Arab[min al-'aql wa-l-ma'rifahas-Sufiyah,
15f. (Jdmi'at Ummdurmdnal-IsldmTyah,Mu.hidardt al-mawsim ath-thaqdfi ath-thalith li-l-'amal-jami'T1968-69), or the slightly more detailed study by Muhammad Ghalldb, "al-Ma'rifah 'ind
Muhyi-d-dmnbn 'ArabL,"n al-Kitdbat-Tadhkdrf(above, n. 25), 181-206.29 Cf. ash-Sha'ranl, al-Qawl al-mubmni r-radd 'aid MuhyF-d-dTn, s. Yale L-266 (Catalogue
Nemoy, no. 1161), fol. 12a. The other subject treated in the work is a defense of Ibn 'Arabi againstthe accusation of belief in hulul. See again below, n. 70.
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Among the passages in which Ibn 'Arabi speaks explicitly about philosophyand how it compares to mystical concerns is one in the Kitdb al-Isfdr 'an
natd'ijal-asfdr.There he divides the "travelers,"that is, individuals engaged inthe search for metaphysical knowledge, into two groups. He characterizesthe
one group as those "traveling in God with their thoughts (afkdr) and
intellects. They inevitably stray from the road, because they think that the only
guide they can accept to guide them is their own thinking. They are the
philosophers and those who follow a corresponding course. The other groupof those engaged in travel are the messengers and prophets and chosen saints,such as the truly insightful (muhaqqiqun)Sufis like Sahl at-Tustari, Abu Yazid
al-Bistami, Farqad as-Sabakhi,30al-Junayd, and al-Hasan al-Basri as well as
other famous men of this kind down to our own time."31 (This statement is
followed by an interesting explanation of why mystic revelation is more
frequent and quicker in recent times than it had been in the old days.)In the Futuhdt where Ibn 'Arabi refers back to the passage of the Isfdr, the
express reference to the philosophers is not repeated. The distinction between
the two types of travelers is described as one between "those who travel bymeans of thought in the intelligibilia and the experiences (i'tibdrat),and those
who travel by means of actions, the hard laborers."32 It is basically the same
thing. The distinction made here is fundamental for Ibn 'Arabi's attitude andstated by him many times. "The philosophers" are on one side, and "those
who follow a corresponding course," meaning the Mu'tazilites and Mutakalli-
mun in general, are on the other. He concedes that there are also some Sufis
like them who use reasoning with respect to metaphysical matters. At the end,
they are totally unsuccessful in their search for gnosis and the knowledge of
God. Different from the mentioned groups are all truly spiritual seekers,
including the most elevated elite among human beings. By direct, divinely
given revelation and inspiration, they achieve the only true understanding of
God and the world.Ibn 'Arabi describes the purpose of the Futuhdt as "not being concerned
with the results of proofs derived from thought, but having as its subject the
results of divine revelation (kashf)."33Or, put somewhat differently: "We are
not those who would report any statements of the sages (hukamda)34 r the
30 For Farqad, cf. as-Sam'ani, Ansdb, VII, 55f. (Hyderabad 1962-82, under as-Sabakhi). He
alone among the famous Siifis mentioned here is not listed in all the common referenceworks.
31 Kitdbal-Isfdr, 7 f. (Hyderabad 1948).32
Fut., II, 382, 11.24f. (ch. 190). "Hard laborers" translates ashlb al-yaamalat (not taammu-ldt!) "sturdy, hard working camels." The difference between them and those exalted personalitiesmentioned in the Kitdbal-Isfdr is presumably that the former constitute the more general run of
Sufis as against the special muhaqqiqun.33 Fut., II, 389,11. 6f. (ch. 196).34 On the sages, cf. below, pp. 14f.
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
statementsof others(likethem).In our book (the Futuhdt) s wellas all our
other books, we set down only the results of revelationand dictates of the
Truth."35"Ourbook," he sayselsewhere,"is not meant to presentrelation-ships establishedby speculative hought,but its subject s the inspirational,
revelatory sciences (al-'ulum al-wahblyah al-kashfiyah)."36 The well-known
intellectualproofshaveno placein the Futuhdt."The workis builtupon the
religious aw and upon the resultsof revelationand directwitness(shuhud),"
something hat reason s unableto attain.37Note hereagainthe inclusionofthe religious aw. It remainsof fundamentalmportance or Ibn 'Arab! n allhis thought.Thereare numerous imilarexpressions f the same idea.Repeti-tious as theymay appearon the surface, hey alwaysexhibitsomeindividual
featuresdependingmainlyon the contextin whichtheyoccur.Thinking f-k-r)constitutesa "veil." 8 Yet, Ibn'Arabi s keenlyawareof its
great mportance, venthough t is a human,not a divine,attribute. ts role is
indicatedby the many positivereferences o it in the Qur'an:
Thinking is a state, of which I am not unaware,For God has established it(s position) in verses and siirahs.
Thought is a natural epithet (na't). It has
Control only over human beings.39
A recurrent hemein Ibn 'Arabi's work is the many limitations mposedupon thought.Thepowerof thought al-quwah l-mufakkirah)oes not suffice
to achievea perceptionof the essence of God.40However,Ibn 'Arab!also
constantlystresses he theme thatthinkinghas its definiteuses,provided hat
thoughtand inferentialreasoning(istidldl)are sound and that the thinkers
(nuzzar) re not led to doubtsby proofswhich seem to be proofsbut, in fact,are not.41Theintellect s an instrument ivenby God to man.He hasplaced tin man's rationalsoul for moralpurposes,and it should thereforealwaysbe
35 Fut., II, 432, 11.8 f. (ch. 198,fasl 14).36 Fut., II, 355, 11.5 f. (ch. 291).37 Fut., IV, 19, 11.2f. (ch. 414).38 Fut., II, 85, 1. 7 (ch. 73, su'al 67); II, 523, 11.8f. (ch. 226). Cf. also Kitdb at-Tardjim, 12
(Hyderabad 1948): "The veils preventing the perception of the knowledge of the Truth are great,the greatest among them being knowledge... Heraclius (the Byzantine Emperor) possessed
knowledge of Prophecy but had no belief, so his knowledge was of no use to him. The Jews knewthat Muhammad was truly the Messenger of God... Cf. also Kitabat-TarEjim,57. A very different
situation is presupposed in the description of "knowledge" as a veil in Mawaqi' an-nujam(see
below, n. 184).The ignorant speak of knowledge in this way. Ibn 'Arabi explains that knowledge isindeed a great veil. But it is a veil that veils the hearts (and thus protects them) from ignorance.39 Fut., II, 229 f. (ch. 144 beg.). As Ibn 'Arabi explains, "natural" is used here in the sense of
"not divine."40 Fut., II, 319, 11.16f. (ch. 177).41 Dhakha'ir al-a'ldq, 169f., 173.
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used.42But it must also alwaysbe kept in mind that its shortcomingsare
numerousand obvious, and what good are the argumentsof reasonwhen
what it builds s demolishedby revelationkashJ)43? evelationhasa clearcutadvantageover it:
O my people! The results of the sciences of revelation (kashf)
Enjoy superiorityover the science of the hearts.
For the intellect cannot roam
In the arena of witnessings and absences.
How many mistakes and shortfalls are there in thinking!But how much correct insight (nazar) does the discerning eye have!
Were it not for the eye, no clear guide would
Show itself to the intellect in a man of heart.44
Ibn 'Arab! sees the clearestproof of that superiorityn the disagreementthathe is convinced s endemicamongphilosophers ndtheir lk.He attemptsto explain the origin of their different views in these terms: "... the sciences of
the intellect derived from thinking contain an element of changeability,because hey follow the temper mizdj)of the thinkingand intelligentndivi-
dual. He considersonly sensible matterswhich may have existencein his
imaginationand accordinglyare his evidence.The result is that theories
(maqalah)withrespect o one and the samethingdifferor one and the sameinvestigator nazir)differswith respectto the same thing at different imes,because of differences n temper and mixture and combinationsin their
developmentnash'ah).Thus theirstatements ifferwithrespect o one and the
samethingand withrespect o the basicprinciplesuponwhichtheyconstruct
their details. In contrast, the directly inspiredand legislativeknowledge
possessesone and the same taste(tain), even if the perceptionsof this taste
(matd'im)differ ..."45 In other words, the mystical experience called "taste"
providesunchangingbasicprinciples f metaphysical nowledge,whereas he
intellectualuest ormetaphysicalnowledge-whose xistences understandablebecausethe intellect s a divinegift in man, which,however,can go only a
limiteddistancebasedas it is on physicalmeansof cognition-is ledastraybyits concernwithwidelychangeable etailsanda neglectof thebasicprinciples.
42 Fut., II, 319, 11.13f. (ch. 177); III, 436, 1. 7 (ch. 371,fasl 3). For the right kind of 'aql, see
Fut., III, 250 (ch. 355).43 Fut., III, 31, 1.25 (ch. 308 beg.), in a poem that starts significantly:
I wonder about someone who says, Be! to non-existence
When what is addressed was not there.Cf., further, for instance, Fut., II, 174,11.22f. (ch. 90 end); II, 183, 1. 22 (ch. 99); III, 420,1. 18
(ch. 371); IV, 112, 11.15 and 17 (ch. 477 beg.).44
Fut., II, 628, 11. 23-26 (ch. 285). Both "witnessings" and "absences" refer to direct
metaphysical contact. They are not contrasting terms, as the English translation seems to imply.45 Fut., Y, V, 147 f. (ch. 68). Cf. also V, 204 (ch. 68 end).
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Ibn'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd "Mysticism"
Intellectuals, herefore,constantlyfalter in their assumptions:"Whentheyfollowup the evidence dalll)withthoroughness ndsuccess, heresult s that
they obtain knowledgeof what they wantedproved(madlul).But then, atsome other time, or when a memberof anothergroup-be it a Mu'tazilite,
Ash'arite,Brahman,or philosopher-comes up with something o contradict
or impugn he earlierproofwhichtheyhad fullyaccepted, heir first(view)is
seen as erroneous and not thoroughly proved ..."46
Scholarswho enjoydirectrevelation kashf)find divineguidancethroughthe Qur'an(furqdn).This makes them aware of all the differencesand the
amountof truthanduntruth n the intellectual peculationaboutGod. Thus,
throughdirect nspiration, heyare able to worshipGod both as commanded
by Islamandessentially.However,"thespeculativecholars 'ulama' n-nazar)are distributedover many differentgroups.Each of them has its own idea
about God accordingto the results obtained from speculatingon their
particular videnceconcerning he knowledgeof God. Thus their doctrines
concerningGod differgreatly."47Yet, no matterhow muchtheydifferfrom
each other, they do maintain coherencewithin their particulargroup. The
Ash'ariteargumentaboutknowledgeof God's essence s true,but it's truth s
doubtedby the Mu'tazilah, nd vice versa.Inspiteof it, although heir eading
scholars have differences,they retain their respectiveidentities as eitherAsh'arites r Mu'tazilites. Likewise,"bn 'Arabicontinues,"thephilosophersdo not ceaseto differ n theirdoctrinesaboutGod and theirnecessarybeliefs.
Still,eachgroupis unitedby one and the samepositionand by one and the
same denomination.They differwith respectto the basic principlesof their
commonschool (madhhab), ivingno considerations o the details." On the
otherhand,the prophetsandcomparable xaltedhumanbeingsas well as all
those individualswho possessrevelation kashf)havenever been observed o
differwithrespect o the basicprinciples, ndtheyneverhad doubts aboutthe
belief in God.48 In short, "the way of kashf and shuhid bears no discus-sion."49That of philosophycannot do without t.
Accordingto Ibn 'Arabi'sfirmconviction,there could be only one truth
about the divine.He would have considered t absurd o concede,as modern
historiansof religionare inclinedto do, that directexperienceof the divine
could leadto differing pinionsand beliefs.Butif Ibn 'Arabiwasconvincedof
the unassailability f his position, why then,we may ask, did he bother with
the views of philosophersand other wrongheaded hinkers?The obvious
answer,whichalsoapplies
o the entirerevelation-versus-reasonebate, s that
46 Fut., II, 645,11. f. (ch. 289).47 Fut., III, 402, 11. f. (ch.369,wasl 20).48 Fut., III, 82, 11.15ff. (ch. 322).49 Kitab al-Fana' wa-l-mushahadah,8, 1. 8 (Hyderabad 948).
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his claims faced strong opposition and had to be defended and proved, and
this required attempting to demolish those other views. Ibn 'Arabi's own
answer is contained in a remarkablepassage from the long introduction of theFutu.hdt. Exhorting the student who is concerned with the knowledge that
conforms to the Prophetical knowledge inherited from the prophets, the true
metaphysical knowledge, he tells him: "Don't let yourself be turned off, when
you come across a problem that was mentioned by a philosopher or a
Mutakallim or a speculative scholar in any discipline of knowledge, to such an
extent that you would say about the person who mentions it and who is a
truly insightful (muhaqqiq)Sufi that he is a philosopher, just because the
philosopher (al-faylasJf)50 mentioned that very problem and discussed and
believed it. (And don't say) that (the Sufi who discusses it) derived it from (the
philosophers), or that he has no religion, because the philosopher who had no
religion (and was no Muslim) stated it (earlier).Don't do that, friend!It would
be an inconsequential argument. For not all the philosopher's knowledge is
untrue, and that particularproblem may just involve some truth he possesses.This is particularly so when it concerns the wise sayings (hikam) and moral
uprightness5 which (the philosophers) have written about. We must set down
the philosopher's statement with respect to that specific problem and
acknowledge it to be true. For the Prophet, or a companion (of the Prophet),or Malik, or ash-Shafi'i, or Sufyan ath-Thawri has (also) stated it. If you
(attack a truly insightful Sufi by) saying that he heard it from the
philosopher (in oral instruction) or read it in the books of the philosophers, it
could be you lie and show ignorance. The lie would be your saying "he heard
or read it," since you did not observe that directly. The ignorance would be
your failing to make a distinction between truth and untruth with regard to
that problem. Your statement that the philosopher has no religion does not
mean that everything he possesses (in the way of knowledge) is untrue. Every
intelligent person would perceive that right away."52All the elements of Ibn 'Arabi's attitude toward philosophy are to be found
here. The intellect has its proper, if limited, role to play. Ethics as taught by
the philosophers is by and large not objectionable. Metaphysics as expounded
by the philosophers and the speculative theologians-Ibn 'Arabi frequently
refers to the Ash'arites by name, not quite as frequently to the Mu'tazilites,
with often little clearcut distinction between the two and the Ash'arites being
50 With the definite article. The reference may be to Aristotle, but this is not a necessary
assumption.51 Lit., "freedom from desires and psychological trickiness (maka'id)."52 Fut. Y, I, 145f. See now E. Meyer, "Ibn 'Arabi begegnet Ibn Rusd," in Zeitschrift fir
Geschichteder Arabisch-lslamischenWissenschaften,3 (1986), 291ff.
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ahead of theothersas faras the plausibility f theirviewsis concerned-53 is
on the whole incorrectand unacceptablebut includesoccasionalpromising
leads. Religion,which means Islam,even if religionin this passageis usedwithout the definite article, provides the true and binding guidelinesfor
everything.The undeniableact that the philosophersived beforethecomingof Islamandthus werenot Muslimsdoesnot disqualify hemperse; however,where theirviewscannot be reconciledwith those of Islam,they cannot be
acceptedas true.It alladdsupto a noteworthydisplayof broadmindedness,f
not tolerance.54 olerances quiteuncharacteristicf the monotheisticmystic.Ibn 'Arabiwasa staunch,evenfanatic,supporter f Muslimbeliefs, raditions,and practices.Here, however,we findhim professing he need for a kind of
intellectual bjectivitywhichreflects he longtraditionof philosophy n Islam.It appearsto agree well with Ibn 'Arabi's personalityas a determinedly
independenthinker,hardlya "liberal,"but a dedicated ntellectual.
Thequestionraisedby thequotedpassagewhether"thephilosopher"ould
refer to Aristotle requiresa brief discussionof Ibn 'Arabi's view of the
relationshipof hikmah"wisdom"and hakim"sage"to philosophy.55 n his
mind, words such as fikr or nazar evoked all sorts of human,non-inspired
endeavor; hey preferably oncern Kalam ratherthan philosophy,although
the potentialdistinction s not alwaysclearcut.Hikmahand hakim,wordsfirmlygroundedn theQur'an,wereexpectedly erymuch usedby him,andin
different onnotations.Theyalso servedhim,of course,as quasi-synonyms f
falsafahandfaylasif. To him, too, hikmahbasicallysignalsa higherform of
knowing.The differencentendedbetween"wisdom" nd"knowledge"s hard
to pin down at times in his view of the world. For instance, the divine
apparition ncounteredby him at the Ka'bahtellshim: "I am the knowledge
(al-'ilm), the known (al-ma'lum),and the knower (al-'alim)-I am al-hikmah,
al-muhkam,and al-haktm."56
53 Fora positiveevaluation f a contemporaryMutakallim/Ash'arite,f. Fut.,IV,22,11. 2 f.
(ch. 416). For the purportedweaningof a contemporaryMu'tazilite rom his theoryof the
creationof humanactions,cf. Fut.,II, 182,11. ff. (ch.98); IV, 179,11.12ff.(ch. 534).54 Onthestrength f thepassagesquotedhere,whichhe knewthroughash-Sha'rani, yberg
concludedthat Ibn 'Arabi had nothingagainst philosophersand Mu'taziliteswhenever heyoffered ometruth,cf. Kleinere chriften,1, n. 3.
55 'Uqala' is occasionallyused by Ibn 'Arabi with reference o faldsifahbut is of little
importancen his work.SeeFut.,II,619,1.8 (ch.282):al-'uqald'minl-faldsifah. f. alsobelow,p.26. For "hukamd' f the alasifah," ee below,n. 65.
Qudamd' ancients"s also not absent, see, for instance,above,p. 3, 1. 10. The 'Uqlatal-
mustawfizin Nyberg,Kleinere chriften, 6) refers o "the ancientphilosophersal-qudamd'l-faldsifah)," ut,accordingo the criticalapparatus f theedition,al-faldsifahs missing romone
manuscript,ndonlyqudamd'ppearsn the continuation f thepassage.56 Fut.Y, I, 219,1.6 (ch. 1).Cf. also below,n. 80.Hukamd' ppearsn one manuscripts a variantreading or aldsifah n Fut.Y, III,219,1.3
(ch.28).
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Hikmah s definedby Ibn'Arabias God'ssystemof ordering he worldand
everythingn it. Hikmah n this sense,however, s also applicable o human
sages and may well be comparedto philosophy.With a number of slightvariations, bn'Arabirepeats his definitionover andoveragain.Thedividingline betweendivineand humanhikmah ppearsblurred,f not non-existent,n
many passagesof his writings,and is so also in realityas conceivedby him.57
The common equation of hikmah with falsafah, and hakim withfaylasuf, is
alsoverymuchalivein his works.Oncehe expressly tatesthatbyhukama'he
meant the faldsifah.58 In his at-TadbTrdt l-ildhiyah, he refers to al-hakTmas
the authorof the SecretumSecretorum;n his Fihris,he supplies he nameof
Aristotle.59Hakim standsindubitably or philosopherwhereverIbn 'Arabi
uses the word in connection with the sciences (even at times including
metaphysics): Inrelation o whatwe havementioned,"he informsus, "there
is much difference etweenspeculative ages(hukamd)who do not belongto
ourway (tariq).For the MutakallimquaMutakallimhas nothingto do with
the scienceof (physics).Thisis in contrast o the hakTm. his wordstandsfor
the combinationof metaphysics,physics,propaedeutics riyddt),and logic,and thereare only those four orders of sciences."60All of them, of course,
belong to what was taken to be "philosophy." In fact, Ibn 'Arabi
acknowledged hat "most of the speculativesciencesand practical61 raftswere nventedby thesouls of sageswithpureandstrongminds andthoughts,
although,needless o say, real wisdom(haqiqatal-hikmah)omes as a gift of
God fromsupernaturalorces(al-'ilmal-ladunnt).62
Still, it must alwaysbe kept in mind that ordinarily, bn 'Araby eserved
hikmah/hakTmor a higherorder of consciousness.The Malamiyah,as we
57 Fut., II, 471, 1.26 (ch. 198, asl 42). For the varietyof expressions f this idea, cf., for
instance, at-Tadbirat al-ildhiyah, 194, 11.12f.; Kitdb al-jaldl wa-l-jamdl, 13, 11.11f. (Hyderabad
1948);DTwan, 8, 1.20;Fut.,I, 665,1.1; II, 16,1.16;II, 230,11. 3f. (ch. 144);II, 269,1.16(ch.166beg.);II,332,1.22(ch.178); I, 668,1.21(ch.193); II, 168,11. f. (ch.342);III,210,1.22(ch.349end);III, 455,1.7 (ch.372end);III,455,1.26 (ch. 373);IV.258,1.10;IV,324,1.13(ch.558
end).Seealsoabove,n. 3.58 Fut., III, 456, 1.7 (ch. 373).59 Fihris,528(above,n. 26).60 Fut.Y, IV, 161(ch.47),and343(ch.60). Seealso below,p. 22.Ibn'Arabialsocomplainedhat therewerehukama'whojustthought hattheywerehukamd'
(Fut.,III,508,11.10f. [ch.381])and thattherewere hinkersnuzzdr)who(just)claimedwisdom,cf. Kitdbal-Fana'wa-l-mushdhadah,, 1. 2. In general, cholarswerefew,andignorance f what
matters eallymeantwasprevalent,f. Fut.,II, 185,1.3 (ch. 101)-a complaint ommonlyheard.Seealso below,n. 184.
61 Readal-'amallyah.62 Risalahfi n-nafs wa-r-ruh,ed.M. AsinPalacios,"Lapsicologia egunMohidinAbenarabi,"
in Actes du XIV"CongresInternationaldes Orientalisles (Alger 1905), Troisiemepartie, 163 and 165
(reprintedn Nendeln1968).
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
haveseen,wereacclaimedas truesages.63Thesagesrankedbetweenprophetsandmessengers.64 he expression"greathukamd' f thefaldsifah"65denotes
no doubta specialgroupof philosophers,hose whopossessed heirparticularshareof trueknowledge. t is characteristicf Ibn 'Arabi'scautiousapproachto the equation of hikmahwith falsafah. He felt that such caution was
necessary n orderto avoid givingthe wrongimpression hat he was identi-
fyingwithobjectionablemetaphysical iews foundin philosophy.This becomesclearin anotherfamous and muchquoted passagefromthe
Futuihdt-tomy knowledge he only one in the entire workin whicha Greek
philosopher s cited by name.66Ibn 'Arabi's discussionhere startsfrom the
usualassumptionhat boththinking fikr)and taste(dhawq) ave theirdefinite
placein the processof gainingexperience i'tibdr).The peopleof the path ofGod acceptthis to be so. It is deniedonly by scholarswhose exclusive oncern
is with materialphenomena designated s ahlar-rusum)nd who usespecula-tionand inferential easoningbut haveno tasteof mystical tates. "Itis rare,"Ibn 'Arabicontinues,"that one of themdoes have a taste of mysticalstates.
Among the sages (hukama'),one of those was the divine (ildhT)Plato. His
psychologicaldisposition s foundto be the sameas that associatedwith the
peopleof revelationand existence kashf/wujfud).Some Muslimsdislike him.
Theydo so
onlybecause
theyconnect him with
falsafah.Their attitude is
causedby ignoranceof the meaningof the word alsafah.The hukamd' rein
truth the knowers of God and of everything ... Hikmah is the knowledge of
prophethood.Faylasif means 'lover of wisdom' becausesophiain Greek is
wisdomor, according o anotheropinion (!), 'love.'67Thusfalsafah means
'love of wisdom.'Every ntelligent ndividualoves wisdom.However,peoplewho think, whetherthey are philosophers,Mu'tazilites,Ash'arites,or anyotherkindof thinker,arewrong'with espect o metaphysical uestionsmore
often than they are right.The philosopherswere assumed o be deservingof
63 Seeabove,n. 2.64 Cf. also Fut., III,234,1.12(ch. 352).65 Fut., III, 37,11.7f. (ch. 309),also Fut., II, 677,1. 8 (ch. 295), and hukamd'al-falasifahin Fut.,
II,469,1.23 (ch. 198, asl 38).Inthelastpassage,however, bn 'Arabidistanceshimself romthe
"philosopherages"andtheirview on theoriginof the world.66 Theonlyother Greeknamementionedn the Futuhdts Galen,cf. Fut.,III, 113,1.6 (ch.
330).67 Ibn'Arabiwas interestedn languageand traveledn countriesof manydifferentongues.
On threeoccasions,he mentions heword for "God" n various anguages:Fut.,II, 360,11. -11(ch. 178);II, 683,11. 9-31(ch. 297);andIII, 300,11.17f. (ch.361),andhe even refers o several
wordsfor "horse,"apparentlyn at-Tanazzuldtl-Mawsiliyah. ee Asin Palacios,"El mistico
Murciano,"n Boletin above,n. 16),88 (1926),583 . However, he remark n theetymologyof
"philosopher"s strictly raditional. t standsto reason hat wa-qllas a distortionof isa-fTl(i)"and phil(e)."
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blamejust becauseof theirdesignationas philosophers.Their mistakeswith
respect o mattersmetaphysicalwereresponsibleor theircontradictingevela-
tions receivedby the messengers, ince in their thinking, they appliedthewrong deasconcerninghe basicprinciple nd correct ignificancef prophecyand messengership nd therebybecameconfused.Had they, upon fallingin
love with wisdom,soughtit fromGod, and not by means of thinking, heywould have been rightthroughout.Muslim thinkersother than the philoso-
phers,such as the Mu'tazilites ndAsh'arites,ivedafter thecomingof Islam.
By then,Islam hadgainedcontroloverthem,andtheynow started o defend
it in accordancewith theirunderstanding f it. They are basicallyright(intheirviews).Theyarewrong only in some details of interpretationwhich,in
the light of theirthinkingand the intellectual videncethey possessed,they
applied o certainstatementsby the Lawgiver boutGod's truth.Understood
literally, hose statements eem absurdand not provableby reason.In their
view, they therefore constituted unbelief (kufr) ... This, then, is wisdom, and
the peopleof God, such as messengers nd saints,arethe truesages."68
Again,Ibn 'Arabidisplaysa certain oleranceof rationalism ndphilosophyand an understandingor theeffortsof those whothought hattheycouldrelyon philosophicalreasoning.It was not uncommonin Islam to excuse the
Greek philosophers-and thus to a certain degree philosophy itself-onaccountof theirhavinglived before the comingof Islam and consequently
havingbeenunableto know the full truth.Ibn 'Arab!definitelyaccepted his
line of defense.He wasready o admitthat thephilosophers, othancientand
recent,possesseda good deal of true insight, if not the full truth,even in
metaphysical uestionswhereeven Muslim heologianswereapt to misunder-
stand andmisinterprethe full truth that couldeasilyhave been theirs.When
Ibn 'Arabireferred o philosophersof his own time, he used no derogatory
epithets,69 lthoughhe was chagrinedby theirnegativeattitude toward his
own visionaryapproachwhichthey did not hesitateto brand as a kind ofmadness hawas).70n one of his poems,he even wentso faras to claimthat
bothAristotleandal-Ash'ariwould haveagreedwithhimand that all he did
was to rectify heirprinciples ndarguments.71n general, t can be said that
he possesseda historicalunderstandingf the importance f philosophy.His
attitude toward its representativesmay be described as condescendingly
68 Fut., II, 523 (ch. 226).9 See above, p. 7.
70 Fut., II, 591 bottom (ch. 275). The passage was quoted already by M. Schreinerfrom ash-Sha'rani,see his "Beitragezur Geschichte der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam," in ZDMG, 52
(1898), 527, n. 1, reprintedin his GesammelteSchriften,ed. M. Perlmann, 428, n. 1 (Hildesheim-Ziirich-New York 1983). Ash-Sha'rani expands the quotation at the end with an attack upon the
philosophers as being ignorant.71 Diwan, 466, 11.17ff.
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Ibn'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd "Mysticism"
compassionate, s wasproper or someonewho believed hat he was divinelychosen and privyto the one true knowledge.This then can be said to have
beenIbn'Arabi'sattitude owardphilosophyandphilosophers s expressednhis own statements.
His numerousfurther references o philosophers, heir works, and theirviewsseemto confirmthis impression. t comes as no surprise hat a worksuchas the collectionof significant ayings,whichhe publishedunderthe titleof Muhddaratl-abrdr,s muchless reticentwith respect o the use of namesthan the Fut.uhit. The Muhadarah often quotes wise sayings (hikam) and
attributes hem to suchfamousnamesas Hippocrates,Aristotle,his pupil,the
greatAlexander,and even Pythagoras,Socrates,and Plato. Some of these
sayings are repeatedin the Futiuhdtwithout attribution.72 t may not beaccidental hat the celebratedMuslimsgenerallyknown as philosophersarenot mentionedbynameeven in theMuhddarah.hebeginningof thepoemonthe soul by Ibn Sina is presented implyas belongingto "the poem famous
amongscholars,"with no explicitreference o its authorship.73IbnBajjah,who is knownto us principally s a philosopher,s mentionedn
theFututhdtn a story nvolvinghimand IbnZuhr.Thestory'sonlyconcern swiththeirrespective xpertisen botanyandpharmacology, ut in the tellingof it there is a whiffof Ibn
Bajjahas a
philosopher.bn
Bajjahsupposedlyimagined hat he knew moreabout plantsthan Ibn Zuhr.This, in fact, wasnot the case. He wasbetterthan Ibn Zuhr n physics(al-'ilmat-tabT'7).74ForIbn 'Arabi,such "physics"was a part of falsafah. On anotheroccasion,he
comparesthe shuyukh, he Sufi masters,who are not lawgiversbut the
guardiansof the religious aw as well as the guardiansof humanheartsand
morals, to physiciansas contrasted with physicists.The physicianknowsabout "nature"only in as far as it governsthe humanbody, whereas the
physicistknows it outright,even if he is not a physician.75
Whenspeakingof al-Batalyawsi,bn 'Arabiwouldhardlyhavethoughtofhim as a philosopher,althoughhe refers to his only known philosophicalwork.76And his contacts with a greatcontemporary,Fakhr-ad-din r-Razi,
72 Seebelow,n. 125.73 Muhadarat l-abrar, , 362 (Cairo 1972).A footnoteof the editorrefersto Ibn Sina's
authorship.74 Fut., II, 442, 1. 30 - 443, 1. 2 (ch. 198,fasl 21), trans.M. Asin Palacios,"Avempace
botanico,"n al-Andalus, (1940),257f. IbnBajjah's rave n Feswasnear thatof Ibn'Arabi'sgrandfather,ee IbnAbi Usaybi'ah, Uyunal-anbd',I, 63, 11. 9f. (Cairo-K6nigsberg882-84).
75 Fut.,II, 365,11. -5 (ch. 181).Theuse of tabT'ahn theplural n connectionwithmedicineoften refers o the fourhumors,but this is hardlymeanthere.76 Fut.Y, III, 195 ch.25end).Aspointedoutbytheeditor, hereferences to al-Batalyawsi's
Hada'iq,n particularhefourthchapter. n hisintroductiono theeditionandtranslation f thework(in al-Andalus, [1940],cf. ObrasEscogidas,I-III,496 [Madrid1948]),M. AsinPalaciossaysthat but fortheHada'iq, l-BatalyawsTouldbeclassified sa philologist ndinno wayas a
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wereclearlywith ar-Razias a Mutakallim.77 bn Rushd's astingfamerests
upon his philosophicalwork, but young Ibn 'Arabi's encounterswith him
were,as far as we know,strictlyon the mystical evel. Ibn'Arabi'sreportonthoseencountershas the aura of an edifying,as well as tantalizing,mysticalanecdote. t is hardto take thereportat face value. Ibn 'Arabimayhave built
uponan actual occurrencebut was carriedaway by his fertile magination.78We have no indication hat he studied hephilosophicalworksof IbnRushd,but it wouldseema safe assumption hat he had at least someknowledgeof
them.79
Ibn 'Arabi'sactualacquaintancewith technicalphilosophicalwritingscan-
not be reliablydocumented. t is no longeracceptable, s it wasin thetimeof
M. Schreiner,o referto the Liberde causisor the Theologyof Aristotleandthus intimate hat Ibn 'Arabihad read themwhen he spokeof the PureGood
or the identityof knowledge,the knower,and the known.80All this was
generalknowledgen his timesharedby all intellectuals.bn 'Arabiconstantly
repeatedhis view on the threeaspectsof knowledge.He madepracticallyno
use of the term "PureGood," but it is clear that he was aware of it. It is
behindhis incidentaldescription f non-existence s pureevil,81or that of the
truthas "pure ight"andof the absurd muhadl)s "puredarkness."82He may
philosopher.Heshows,however, onsiderablehilosophicalnterest lso in hiscommentarynal-
Ma'arriseebelow,nn. 92and 170).Cf.now E. Torero, in al-Qantara, (1984),15-31.77 Cf. the referencesn Fut.Y, III,54f. (ch. 17),andIV, 118(ch. 46),as well as theepistleon
ethicsandfutuwah ddressedo ar-Razi Fut.Y, IV, 55 . [ch. 2]). Seealso the discussion n the
knowledge f God written or him(Hyderabad 948),below,n. 98.78 Fut. Y, II, 372 . (ch. 15).Recent ranslationsppearn H. Corbin,L'Imaginationreatrice,
34-36,Englishrans.,41-43(above,n. 16);R.J.W.Austin,StifisofAndalusia,3f. (London1971);and E. Meyer, op. cit. (above,n. 52), 281ff. The famousepisodeis generallyreferred o in
connectionwithbothmen, cf., for instance,EP2, .v. Ibnal-'ArabTs wellas s.v. Ibn Rushd.79
Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften, 24, quoting Ibn 'Arabi's Autobibliographyand apparently
emendinghis reading"IbnSabil"to "IbnRushd,"statesthat Ibn 'ArabistudiedIbn Rushd's
juridicalworks.However, heeditionof theAutobibliographyy 'Abd-ar-Rahmfn adawin al-
Andalus,0(1955),116,reads"IbnShibl"and makesnoconnectionwithIbnRushd, nspiteof the
seemingly losesimilarity f the forms.Evenmorestranges the fact thatthe titleof thejuridicalworkmentioned yNybergdoesnotagreewiththeindicationsn Badawi's dition.The dentity f
the individual,f it is not IbnRushd orhisgrandfather?),emainso beestablished.80 Cf. M. Schreiner, op. cit. (above, n. 70), 526; GesammelteSchriften, 427. The references
Schreinerad forthe PureGoodandforknowledge,tc., were,respectively,ut.,III,315,1.9 (ch.
364),andFut.Y, II,82(ch.2,fasl 3) [seealsoabove,n. 56].Forsimilar ll too facile dentifications
of "sources,"eealso below,n. 96.81 Fut. Y, I, 212, 1.14,continued on 1. 17 to 213, 1. 3: "One of the travelersof the Truth said to
usin a lengthy tatementn connectionwith a stop(mundzalah)n darkness ndlight: Thegoodis in existence,and theevil in non-existence.'We(however?) now that the Truthhas absolute
existencewithoutrestrictiontaqyTd). e is the puregood thatcontainsno evil. His opposite s
absolutenon-existencewhich s thepureevil thatcontainsno good.Thisis themeaningof their
statementhat'non-existences pureevil.'"82 Fut.,III, 274,11. 8f. (ch. 360).
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
verywell have read those works,if they were accessible o him and he had
beenlookingfor them,but unless he indicates hat much,proof that he did
wouldrequirehe
unambiguousdentification f
accuratequotations.No suchidentification f passagesfromphilosophicalworks suchas the Theologyor
the Liberde causishas, to my knowledge,as yet beenmade.83
Ibn 'Arabi tells us that he once saw a book with the title al-MadTnahl-
fddilah n someone'spossession n Marchena.He noticed in it the statement:
"We mustspeculateon how to posita god in the world,"usingilah,andnot
Allah.Immediately, e returned he book to its owner n disgust,and he never
againcame across it.84 No such statement s to be foundin al-Farabi'sArd'
ahl al-madTnahl-fadilah,where "The First" is referred o. Nor, for that
matter,does either lahor Allahoccuranywheren that work(or, it seems, nal-Farabi'spoliticalFusuil).Unless it can be proved hatsomeoneelse was the
author Ibn 'Arabi had in mind, thus eliminatingal-FarabT,t might be
assumedthat he was incensedby al-FarabT'smission of any reference o
God, andhe distorted his factin his restlessmagination.Had he returned o
al-MadTnahl-fddilahaterin his life, he mightnot have been so averse o al-
Farabi'swork.At any rate,the quoted passagedoes not tell us much about
the extent of Ibn 'Arabi's acquaintancewith the availablephilosophical-
political iterature.
The one "philosophical"workquoted by Ibn 'Arabiis indeed a workon
politics. It is the Secretumsecretorum,which formed the basis of his
at-TadbTrdtl-ildhTyah.e considered t a genuineworkof Aristotleaddressed
to King Alexander.85More will be said about it below, p. 25. Ibn 'Arabi
appearsto have regretted ater that he interruptedhis purelymetaphysical
pursuitsby spendingtime on the writing of the TadbTratnd occupyinghimselfwith man andman'sworldlyaffairs, venthoughhespiritualizedhem.
He felt that it was wrongfor himto neglectthe discussionof largerconcerns
such as the figureof the Mahdi and the Seal of the Saints,and he tried tomake up for it in his Kitab 'Anqd'mughrib i (ma'rifat) khatm al-awliyd' wa-
shams al-maghrib.86The Secretum secretorum, incidentally, also fueled Ibn
83 Exact identifications of possible sources of Ibn 'Arabi are hard to come by. A good exampleis the discussion of his relationship with Ibn Masarrahby R. Arnaldez, see El2, III, 871 f., s.v. Ibn
Masarra. Nyberg's contention that Ibn 'Arabi had the Rasd'il Ikhwdnas-safa' as his direct source
for the cosmic scheme of God, the first intellect, etc., plausible as it is, is also hard to prove, see
KleinereSchriften, 145.84
Fut., III, 178,1. 11
(ch. 344).For "came across
it,"another
possible but less likelytranslation would be "studied it."85 See above, n. 59.86 This is stated in the introduction of the work. In my translation of Ibn Khaldiin's
Muqaddimah,II, 189, n. 960, I doubted, probably incorrectly, the existence of the editions of the
work, but they have remained inaccessible to me.
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'Arabi's keen interest in other magical subjects such as letter magic and
physiognomy; presumably, he did additional reading in monographs on the
latter subject.87Another supposed direct quotation of a philosophical title remainsdoubtful.
We are hampered again by that vagueness generally preferred by Ibn 'Arabi
when speaking about philosophy. In the introduction of the Futuhdt,he refers
to differences among the physicists, the scholars who defined the buildingblocks of the world, with respect to a fifth existent (mawjud),the basis and
origin (asl) of the four elements (arkdn). This fifth element, he says, was
mentioned by al-hakrmf l-ustuqussdt.88The preposition fThere is ambiguous.
According to Asin Palacios, it introduced the title of a book.89 In the context,
this is possible, for Ibn 'Arabi goes on to explain that he learned about the
matter from a medical student who read "it" (the book?) to him and asked
him to comment on it from his specific mystical revelatory (kashf) point of
view. The theory of the existence of a fifth soma or fifth ousia90 was
commonly ascribed to Aristotle, who himself never mentions it explicitly,91
and no Aristotelian peri stoicheion could have been intended here (unless, in
sheer desperation, we assume the meaning of "letters" for stoicheia and
assume that Ibn 'Arabi had in mind Kitdb al-Huruf "Book of letters" as the
Arabic title of the Metaphysics,an assumption that would not be much to hiscredit). In the Muslim world, the fifth element was usually referred to as the
fifth nature (tabFlah).92The differences of the philosophers with respect to the
number and the kind and hierarchyof the elements were known and recognizedas being of ancient origin.93 Since Ibn 'Arabi's informant was a student of
medicine, one might think of a physician who wrote a Kitdbal-Ustuqussit, and
the name of Ishaq b. Sulayman al-Isra'ili (Isaac Judaeus) comes to mind, but
at least what is preserved and known of his work happens to disregard the
theory of the fifth nature.94 All in all, it appears to be more likely that the
87 Cf. the discussion offirdsah in Fut., II, 235-41 (ch. 148).88 Fut. Y, I, 250.89 Cf. M. Asin Palacios, "El mistico Murciano," in Boletin (above, n. 16), 87 (1925), 161f.90 For soma, cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita, I, 3, 22, and II, 20,11; Plotinus, Enneads, II, 1, 2.
The Arabic translation of Placita, II, 20, 11, has 'unsur or soma, cf. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus: Die
Vorsokratiker n arabischerUberlieferung,156 f. (Wiesbaden 1980). For ousia,cf. the commentaries
on the Physics by Simplicius, ed. H. Diels, 1165,11.21 ff. (Berlin 1895. Commentaria n Aristotelem
Graeca 10), and Philoponus, ed. H. Vitelli (Berlin 1887. Comm. .., 16).91 Aristotle, De cae!o 270b21-22, speaks of the four elements and the ether in the uppermost
region. Ibn 'Arabi also refers to sphere and ether, see below, n. 95. Cf. Daiber, 106f.
92 Cf., for instance, Rasa'il Ikhwdnas-safd', II, 39 f. (Cairo 1347/1928); al-Baqillani, TamhTd,ed. R. J. McCarthy, 45 (Beirut 1957);al-Batalyawsi, Sharh al-mukhtdrmin LuzumfydtAbT-'Ala'
ed. Hamid 'Abd-al-MajTd,I, 189 (Cairo 1970). Cf. also Paul Kraus, Jabir Ibn Hayydn, II, 152f.
(Cairo 1942-43. Memoires de l'Institutd'Egypte 44-45).93 See below, n. 96.94 Cf. Salomon Fried's edition of the Hebrew text (Drohobycz 1900)and Jacob Guttmann, Die
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
prepositionJ does not introduce he title of a book but rather ndicates he
subjectunderdiscussionby theSage, namely, heelements. t shouldbe noted
that Ibn 'Arabi showed himselfsurprisedat learningsomething hat was nodoubtgeneralknowledgen hisenvironment, nd he musthave beenawareof
its familiarity ndtriviality; issurprisemighthave beenfeignedandprompted
by his tendency o dramatize.
Later on in the Futiauht,bn 'Arabi returns to the concept of the fifth
nature.He now considers t self-evident nd does not attribute t to anyone n
particular:"We would not have knownat all that there is the natureof the
sphereswhich is a fifth nature,had we no previousknowledgeof the five
mothers. When we noticed that the spheresoutside (?) these natures were
subject o rules(hukm)not inherentn thesemothers,we realized he existenceof a fifth nature rom theatmospheric'ulwlyah)motion thatis in theether,as
well as the terrestrialsuflTyah) otion thatis in thewaterand the soil."95He
againreturnedo thesubjectof thefourelements arkdn) f thephysicalworld
in a passage n whichhe distinguishesbetweensix different heoriesheld byvariousschools. He maintains hatin his opinion ('indana),hecorrectviewis
thatof a fifthbasicprinciplesasl) to be called"nature abT'ah)"orming he
basis of the four elements(arkin).96It is not clear whetherIbn 'Arabi's
informationcame from the same sourcein all thesepassages.
However this
may be, it seemsmost unlikelythat he had in mind a specificphilosophicalwork we could lay our hands on.
The situation is not much differentwith respectto all of Ibn 'Arabl's
statementson philosophical opics.All the acceptedpartsof philosophywere
alivein hiseducationalbackground. t was almost nevitable or himto touch
on them.97Theambiguityof his attitudewithregard o them as wellas other
fieldsof worldly earnings wellexpressedn theepistlewhichhe addressedo
Fakhr-ad-dinr-Razi:"The ntelligentndividualmuststudyall thosesciences
that serveto perfecthis essenceand move alongwith him whereverhe goes.The only science(that servesperfectionand moves along with him) is the
philosophischenLehren des Isaak Ben Salomon Israeli (Miinster 1911. Beitrdgezur Geschichteder
Philosophiedes Mittelalters 10,4). See also A. Altmann and S.M. Stern, Isaac Israeli, 47 f. (Oxford
University Press 1958); A. Altmann, "Isaac Israeli's 'Chapter on the Elements,"' in Journal ofJewish Studies, 7 (1956), 31-57.
9s Fut. Y, II, 86 (ch. 2, fasl 3). On "mothers" and "pillars," see below, n. 138.96 Fut. Y, II, 309 f. (ch. 11). Greek names to go with the prime element were supplied by M.
Asin Palacios, "Mohidin," in Homenaje (above, n. 21), II, 252, on the basis of Fut., II, 677, 1. 23
(ch. 295), and Muhammad Ghallab, in al-Kitib at-Tadhkdar above, n. 28), 190 f. On the "fifthnature" in Islam, see also, briefly, S. Pines, Beitrige zur islamischenAtomenlehre,43, n. 1 (Berlin
1936).97 Cf. the summary statement by M. Asin Palacios, "Mohidin," in Homenaje, II, 254:
"Nuestro mistico habla de todo: de fisica y de l6gica, de metafisica y de religi6n, de astronomia yde moral, sin order ni concierto..." (!) See below, p. 34.
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knowledgeof God obtained as a gift and derived from direct witness
(mushdhadah).or instance,medicine s neededonly in the world of sickness
or disease. Whenyou move on to a world in whichthere is no sicknessordisease, whom could you cure with medical knowledge?The intelligentindividualshould make no effort to learn about it (?), even if he were to
obtain it by way of a (divine)gift as the medicine of the prophets (wasobtainedby themas a divinegift).The sameappliesto geometry handasah).It is needed n the worldof measurement.Whenyou moveon, you leave it in
its world,and the soul continueson unburdenedwith anything.The same
appliesto the occupationwith everysciencewhich the soul leaves when it
moves on to the worldbeyond.Therefore,an intelligent ndividualmust not
seizeany knowledge xceptwhatis absolutelyneeded.Rather,he must make
an effort to achieve what moves on with him when he moves on. This, in
particular,s two sciences,the knowledgeof God and the knowledgeof the
homesteads mawdtin) f the other world."98The sages,he adds elsewhere,wereignorantof the scienceshe himselfhadbrought.99
The philosophicalcanon of logic, mathematics,physics,and metaphysicswas acknowledgedby Ibn 'Arabi,but he viewed all of it as subordinate o
metaphysicsand consideredas bliss only the knowledgeof God, and not
arithmetic, eometry,or astronomy.100 echnical ermshave theirspecialandnecessary ole to play in everyscience; Sufism, oo, has its specialterms.'01Theterminology f a sciencehas to be learned rom ts seasonedpractitioners.This s trueforphilology,102rammar, eometry, rithmetic,hemathematicalsciences ta'7llm), Kalam,andphilosophy.However, he truenovice(al-murld
as-sddiq)among the people of God needs no instruction n the technical
terminologyof his scienceto beginwith. He knows it throughdirect nspira-tion.'03
AlthoughIbn 'Arabi'sentire workhas epistemologyat its core, logic and
logiciansare not oftenmentioned xpressly. t is importantor him to stress nso manywords that the knowledgeof God and the Qur'an, imitless ields of
knowledge hat theyare,"do not follow a logicalcanon(qdnunmantiqT)ndare not governed by a scale (mTzdn)."4 Everything has a mlzdn, and "the
98 Risalah ila l-imdmar-Razt, 6 (Hyderabad 1948). Cf. also Fut. Y, III, 83, 11.11 f. (ch. 19).99 Diwdn, 97, 1.20.100 Fut., IV, 11.11f. (ch. 533).101 Fut., II, 636, 11.21 ff. (ch. 287). This passage presents a slightly different list of sciences
including grammar, arithmetic,geometry, medicine, Kalam, and jurisprudence,but not philology(see n. 102).
102 Mantiqi, used next to nahwi also in Fut. Y, II, 58, 11.7f. (ch. 2, fasl 2), appears to be
intended here by Ibn 'Arabi in this sense and does not refer to logicians.103 Fut. Y, IV, 276 (ch. 54).104 Fut., III, 200f. (ch. 348).
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Ibn'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd"Mysticism"
scale of the meanings in the hand of the intellect is called logic, and there are
two plates to the scale, called premises."105 Somewhere in the Futuhat, it may
be added, Ibn 'Arabi includes an example of wrong premises yielding a correctconclusion, such as "Every man is a stone-every stone is an animal--ergo,
every man is an animal, which, of course, is correct."106
The ten categories are included among the things that for all times to the
Day of Resurrection apply to "every order in the world of lights and
darknesses, subtle and coarse (matters), simple and composite (matters),
substances, accidents, times, places, relations, qualities, quantities, positions,
activa, and passiva." 107 However, the ten categories-in this instance referred
to by their proper designation of maqult-do not subsume the essence of
truth.108And, since accordingto the fundamentalQur'anicstatementpondered
by Ibn 'Arabi innumerable times: "There is nothing like Him (42:11),"no positive but only true negative statements can be made about God, the first
eight categories, those of "how, where, when, position, relation, accident,
substance, and how much, do not apply. Of the ten there remain only truly
realized activity (fi7 muhaqqaq) and a concretely substantial agent (fa'il
mu'ayyan) or, in other words, visible activity (fi'l zdhir) in an unknowable
agent (fd'il majhul) whose influence (athar) is seen but whose predicate
(khabar)is not recognized, whose concrete substance ('ayn) is not known, andwhose mode of being (kawn)remains unknown."109 In sum, we may fairly say
that Aristotelian logic was unquestionably accepted by Ibn 'Arabi up to the
point where his metaphysical presuppositions take over.
Ethics was even more firmly acknowledged by Ibn 'Arab! to be an unobjec-
tionable part of philosophy.110 Metaphysical concerns do not intrude here to
any noteworthy degree, apart from the often stressed fact that proper morals
are the hallmark of Sufism.111In a general way, and often with his customary
vagueness, he fully subscribes to theories about parts of the soul inherited
from Greek philosophy."2 The rational soul, as, he says, it is called by the
sages and for which the Qur'an and the Sufis have different but equivalent
105 Fut., III, 6, 11. 16f. (ch. 300).106 Fut., III, 353, 11.9f. (ch. 367).107 Fut.,II, 304,11. 4-18 ch.177).Cf.alsoNyberg,Kleinere chriften,3f., inconnectionwith
inshd'ad-dawd'ir.108 Or "theTruth,"Fut., II, 319,1. 25 (ch. 177 nearend).109Fut.,II, 211,11. 9-33(ch. 127).Cf. also below,p. 31.110
Cf. above,n. 51."1 Cf. above,n. 8.112 If the Risalatal-Akhldq,isted by Yahia, Histoireet Classification,93, no. 745, is
representedy the workof this titlepublishedn Damascus,n. y., whichappears o be differentfromtheFalsafatal-akhldqiscussed bove,n. 14,it would be the besttestimonyo Ibn'Arabi'straditional pproacho ethics n thisrespect.
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designations,113was created for the purpose of making it possible for man to
oppose natural desires threatening to take over control of the soul."4 It is
also the right instrument for deriving the proper pleasure from the beauty ofman and nature through sense perception."5 In contrast to the corporealanimal soul, the rational soul means happiness in both this and the other
world. 16
Popular ethics as represented by wise sayings was ubiquitous in medieval
thought and could hardly have been absent from Ibn 'Arabi's work. Favorite
topics of practical ethics such as the usefulness of silence appear in the long
concluding chapter of the Futihat dedicated to "exhortations in the form of
wise sayings (wasayd min manthur al-hikam wa-maysural-kalim)," ' 7 as, for
instance, "Nothing deserves imprisonment more than the tongue."'18 Ibn
'Arabi remembershaving heard the four statements on silence ascribed to the
four kings of the world, the rulers of, respectively, Persia, India, China, and
Byzantium. This happened in Fes when he was in his early thirties. He reportsthe saying in this form: "Four kings made four statements as if shot from one
bow. Kisra said: 'I am better able to rejectwhat I did not say than what I did.'
The king of India said: 'When I make a statement, it owns me, although I
owned it (before).' Qaysar, the king of the Rum, said: 'I have no regretsabout
what I did not say, but I had regrets about what I did say.' And the king ofChina said: 'The consequences of what was said were more severe than regretabout what was not said.'"119
Attributions are rare,120even general ones such as "one of the sages." For
the latter, see, for instance, the saying quoted in the Muhadarah:"One of the
sages said: 'Don't talk about what you don't know, lest you be considered
ignorant of what you do know!'""12 The Platonic "I know that I don't
113 Risalahfi ma'rifatan-nafs wa-r-ruh,
ed. AsinPalacios,
"Lapsicologia,"
153(above,
n.62).114
Fut., II, 319, 11.13f. (ch. 177 near end).115 Fut. Y, 61,11.5 f. (ch. 65). Ibn 'Arabi also follows traditional lines on the comparativelyfew
occasions he discusses pleasure and pain.116 Fut., III, 262 bottom (ch. 358). A hymn in praise of the rational soul, in the first person,
appears in DTwan,37 f.117 See Fut., IV, 549, 11.23ff.118 Fut., IV, 450 bottom.119 Fut., IV, 549, 11.25-29. The remark of the Byzantine emperor is ascribed to Simonides in
Plutarch, de garrulitate 515A. For various forms of the saying of the four (three) kings, cf., for
instance, al-Bayhaqi, Mahdsin, ed. F. Schwally, 424 f. (Giessen 1902), indicating the historian al-
Haytham b. 'Adl as his source = Pseudo-Jahiz, Mahdsin, 21 (Beirut [1955]); al-Washsha',
Muwashshd,ed. R. E. Briinnow, 10(Leiden 1886);al-Mubashshir, Mukhtdral-hikam,ed. 'Abd-ar-Rahman Badawi, 299 (Madrid 1958) = F. Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, 126
(London 1975); Ibn Hamdun, Tadhkirah,75 f. (Cairo 1345/1927); al-Ibshlhl, Mustatraf, I, 101f.,ch. 13 (Bulaq 1268).
120 See above, for instance, n. 66, and below, n. 125.121 Muhddaratal-abrar, I, 480 (Cairo 1972).
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
know"appears n suchforms as a reference o the fourfolddefinitionof the
sage, which includes: "The man who knows but does not know that he
knows."'22It is also integratedn the discussionn the form:"A thingis notignorant(j-h-l)of its self but does not recognize '-r-f)that it recognizes ts
self." 123
Politics,another mportantpartof philosophyandethics, s alsorepresentedin Ibn 'Arabiby wise sayings."A sagewrote to Alexander,"we readin the
chapteron exhortationsn the Futuhat,"Know that time affectseverything,
replacest, wears t out, and kills whathas beendone,except orwhat is firmlyanchoredn theheartsof men. Thereforedeposein theirheartsan everlastinglove which will preservefor you a good memory,the generosityof youractivities,and the nobilityof youraccomplishments."24 Politicalcontrol ofothersbeginswith control of oneself,a favoritetopic of ethicaland politicalwisdom literature.Plato said: "He who begins with himself and controls
himself(sdsahd)achievescontrol(siydsah)of people,"and Aristotleadvised
theaspiringpolitician o "improve ourself oryourownsake,andpeoplewill
follow you." 25
Ibn 'Arabi's acquaintance with the Secretum secretorum126brought him
into contact with a fiirstenspiegel ossessingall the ingredientsnecessary o
fascinatemedievalman. TheSecretummixedrealpolitikwithscience,supersti-tion, and magic. It also elaboratedon the theme of man as a microcosm,which embodied a way of looking at the world that was considereda
characteristic art of philosophyand firmlybelievedin by Ibn 'Arabi. In
additionto the Secretum,works on politicalutopias mayalso havecontribu-
ted to his imaginative econstruction f the "trueearth(ardal-haqTqah),"n
enormous dealland with a fantasticadministrativeetupandlocatedbetween
the earth and Paradisebut superior ven to the latter.127
An importantdistinctionof a political-philosophicalharacterconstantly
made by Ibn 'Arabi is the one between the divinereligious aw on the onehand, and what he calls "wisdompolitics(siydsahhikmTyah)"nd "wisdom
laws (nawdmlshikmlyah)"on the other. In his view, the laws of good
governmentwere provided by God in two forms: "One of them, called
wisdompolitics,is implantedby nature n the soulsof greatmen,who then
122 Fut., III, 22, 11.12f. (ch. 305).123 Fut., II, 84, 1. 11 (ch. 73, su'al 65).124
Fut., IV, 551, 11.8-10.125 Muhadaratal-abrar, II, 320 (in the edition Cairo 1282). The sayings of the Muhadarah
reappearin Fut., IV, 540,11.16ff., together with other sayings on politics, but without attributions,see above, n. 72.
126 See above, p. 19.127 Fut. Y, II, 257ff. (ch. 8).
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established norms and laid down laws by means of a (special) power theyfound in their souls. (They provided them for) each city, location, and clime
according to the requirements of the temper of each region and their (!)natures, because of their knowledge of the gift given by wisdom. Property,
lives, families, relations (arhdm), and pedigrees were thus preserved intact.
They called them nawdmfs. The word means "reasons for the good," because
in customary technical usage, an-ndmiuss what brings the good, while al-jdsus
"spy" is employed for evil.'28 These are the wisdom laws set down by
intelligent individuals ('uqala') under divine inspiration (ilhdm),of which theywere not conscious, for the purpose (of establishing and preserving) well-
being, order, and a cohesive structure (irtibdt) in places where people had no
revealed (munazzal) religious law (shar'). Moreover, these lawgivers had no
knowledge of the fact that those matters are something that brings (them and
other human beings) near to God. They do not lead to Paradise or Hell nor
anything else concerned with the other world. They did not know that there
was another world and a sensible (mahsus)resurrection after death in natural
bodies... Therefore, their laws (nawamTs)and rules for the public interest
(masalih) were based upon a perpetuation of well-being (salah) in this
world..." Those men then proceeded to speculate about God and the soul,
until a messenger arose among them with a divine revelation concerning allthose matters.'29
Secular laws based upon philosophical speculation continued to exist, but
for Ibn 'Arab1, they were surpassed and superseded by the divine law. In
contrast to the religious law of the prophets which is proven to come from
God, the conventional law (an-ndmuisal-wad'T)required by wisdom has no
such proof. The Exalted Truth takes it from His name(s) al-bdtinal-haklm130
and places it into the hearts of the sages of the moment (hukamd'al-waqt)131
without their being conscious of it. They add that thrust (?) to their specula-
tion, not knowing that it is from God specifically ('aid t-ta yTn),but they seethat the basic principle is from God; so they establish it as law for their
contemporary followers, since they had a prophet whose prophethood was
proven. If they execute on their part the norms of that law (ndmus)and do not
transgress but observe it, God rewards them according to their dealings with
Him in this world and the other world, as does the established religious law...
God declares the words of the giver of the wisdom law (ndmus hikmT) o be
128 Cf. Majd-ad-dinIbn al-Athir, an-Nihayah igharlb al-hadith,I, 191; IV, 188 (Cairo 1322),
quoted in Listn al- 'Arab,VIII, 130(Bulaq 1300-8);Ibn Sayyid-an-nas, 'Uyunal-athar,I, 90 (Cairo
1356).129 Fut. Y, V, 97ff. (ch. 66).130 Al-bdtin here refers to one of the names of God.131 Of divine llumination.
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true, as He declares the giver of the religious legal law (ndmusshar'l hukmT).As to his reward in this world, there is no doubt about it. It is no secret that it
serves the (continued) existence of the public interest with regards to family,property, and goods (?).132 The same is the case as regards the other world,even if the person in charge of (sahib) the wisdom law does not concern
himself with it, as is the case with the law (ndmus)of the divine order (al-hukm
al-ildhi). In the other world, we have 'what no eye has seen and no ear has
heard nor has it occurred to any human being,' 133 and it comes to us with no
previous knowledge of it. The same results in the other world for the activityof the law (ndmus)required by wisdom for the one who originated it for the
sake of the public interest (maslahah) ..."134
Politics as a branch of philosophy was thus recognized by Ibn 'Arabi as avalid concern. What is more, he tolerated the study of it. Being a product of
intellectual speculation, it was, however, naturally inferior to the divinelyrevealed religious law. While sage lawgivers saw in it a prelude to metaphysical
understanding, it fell far short of the truth, and understandably so, because
the boundaries of the human knowledge of metaphysical truth were clarifiable
only by mystical revelation.
Ibn 'Arabi subscribed to the basic data of the scientific knowledge of
mathematics and medicine which were thegeneral property
of the educated of
his time. Infrequently as he cites such data, he shows originality only in
applying them to his metaphysical preconceptions, at times in a somewhat
bizarre manner. His views on physics also depended on scientific assumptions
developed on the basis of ancient philosophy. Specific attributions by name to
scholars or the sages are again infrequent, nor are the statements reported as
starting points for his discussion anything more than vague paraphrases.Numbers speculation, it may be added, is called Pythagorean, as usual.'35
He refers to some medical opinions. Thus he mentions in passing the
efficaciousness of drugs native to the patient's own country,'36 and states thatit is advisable for women during intercourse to look at pictures of the greatancient sages.137
132'Arad,not 'ird"(family) honor."
133Accordingo a hadfthrelatedo I Cor.2:9),see A.J.Wensinck ndothers,Concordancet
Indices de la traditionmusulmane,I, 47a, 183a (Leiden 1936-69).134 Fut., II, 117, 11.25ff. (ch. 73, suil 125). Further references to ndmus hikmi (hukml?)or
wad'Tr siydsahhikmlyahccur,forinstance,n Fut.,I, 608,1.1 (= Fut.Y, IX, 132,ch. 71);II,170,11. 6f. (ch.90);II,260,1.3 (ch. 160);III, 153,11. 7ff. (ch.338);III,231,1.21 (ch.351);III,480,1. 17(ch. 373).
13S Kitdbal-Mim wa-l-wawwa-n-nin, 8 (Hyderabad 948).References y Ibn'Arabi o musicare not entirely acking,buttheyareinfrequent.
136 In the name of Hippocrates, see Muhl.darat al-abrar, II, 309-11, ch. on hubb al-watan
(Cairo1282).Cf., for instance,Abu Sulayman s-Sijistani, iwdn,ed. D.M. Dunlop,75, 11. f.(TheHague1979); d. 'Abd-ar-Rahmanadawi,209,1. 3 (Teheran1974).
137 Fut., II, 378, 11.13-15 (ch. 187).
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His reflections on the material cosmos start from theories about the
elements, often designated as mothers (ummahdt)and pillars (arkdn)'38-both
terms used by, among others, the Ikhwan as-safa', especially arkdn,which alsooccurs in the Secretum secretorum-, and they are pervaded by other terms
and ideas common in Muslim theological and philosophical literature. We
have already seen how Ibn 'Arab! dealt with the fifth element.'39 He appearsto have found an overarchingelement more appealing to him in the concept of
hayild "hyle, primordial matter."140 We cannot be absolutely certain whether
he was aware of the Greek provenience of hayiuld;he probably was because of
the strange form of the word and its philosophical origins. On the disputed
problem of matter and form, he stated that "the sages call (every thing that
accepts forms in its essence) hayul." l141 "The universal hayiul accepts everyform."142 It is to be equated with the substance of the "primaryhabd'," the
speck of dust which together with 'amd' "cloud" constitutes the code words
for the transitional stage between God and the material worlds in Ibn 'Arabi's
mystical terminology.'43 The "hylic substance (al-jawharal-hayuldnT),"which
includes the elements, is the inferior equivalent in nature to the "divine breath
(an-nafasal-ildhl)" that has accepted the forms of the universe.'44 Among the
beginnings (sadr) peculiar to each thing in the vast interval between God and
man, "the beginning of time (zamdn)is the time of the acceptance of form bythe hayula."14s
Time as well as space and motion have remained fundamental problems of
physics ever since Aristotle gave them a prominent place in the discussion. For
Ibn 'Arabi, "formal substance, accident, time, and place are the moth~ersof
existence." 146 He wrote extensively on time, space, and motion, and, in
particular, on time.'47 Time played a much larger role in his thought than
space.'48 He came back to time over and over again in his works. It clearly
138 See above, n. 95.139 Above, p. 20.140 Cf. L. Gardet's informative article "hayula" in El2.141 Fut., II, 432, 11.6 f. (ch. 198,fasl 14). The continuation of the statement has been discussed
above (n. 35). Cf. Rasd'il Ikhwdnas-safd', II, 4.142 Fut., III, 195,1. 26 (ch. 347). Cf., further, the schematic presentationsof hayula in Fut., III,
421 ff. (ch. 371), and Insha' ad-dawc'ir, in Nyberg, KleinereSchriften,24 f.
143 Fut., II, 647 f. (ch. 289). Cf. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah,trans. Rosenthal, III, 88.144 Fusis al-hikam,ed. Abu l-'Ala' al-'Afifi, 144, 1. 1 (Beirut, n. y.).145 Fut., II, 652, 1.30 (ch. 291).146 Fut., III, 404, 1. 22 (ch. 369, wasl 21).147
The three monographs on time, space, and motion mentioned in Autobibliography,ed.Badawi, 125(above, n. 79), and Fihris, in RAAD, 30 (1955), 53 f. (above, n. 26), are apparentlynot
preserved. They may have covered the same ground with respect to these subjects as does the
Futuhdt.Cf. the quotations in Fut. Y, II, 320, 1. 9 (ch. 11); VII, 261, 11.8f. (ch. 69), and Yahia,
Histoire et Classification,285, 354, 530f.148
This, of course, does not count waqt as moment of divine illumination.
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was a most basic concept for him, and his attitude toward time requires a
larger treatment than can be given to it here. Philosophical conceptions of
time intrude even into his discussion of the prayer times149 and are mentionedin connection with the pilgrimage.150The difficult notions of past, present,and future engaged him very much, especially, as we would expect, the present
moment, the now (waqt), so important in mysticism.'15 It should be under-
stood, however, that the mystical moment of illumination does not concern us
here, but it is time (zamdn) as a physical phenomenon, although the two
cannot always be separated from one another and certainly were not always
strictly kept apart in mystical thought.Ibn 'Arabi's definitions of "time" are consistent but vary slightly from case
to case. As defined by the hukamd',he says, time "is an imagined duration
segmented by the motions of the spheres (muddahmutawahhamahtaqta'uhaharakdtal-afldk)."152 Using the Aristotelian terminology of counting/numberin connection with time he speaks of "time that is numbered by the motions of
the spheres."153 The question prominently raised by Aristotle (Physics
216b31) whether time was an existent or non-existent dominates Ibn 'Arabi's
reflections. Time has no substantive existence,154but belongs to the corporeal
possibilia.155 It is a relationship, imagined to have existence but non-exis-
tent,'56or a
relationshipin the mind that has neither existence nor non-
existence.'57 One of the Futuhdt's chapters dedicated to "time" starts with
149 Fut. Y, VI, 54 (ch. 69), on w,aqtand zaman.150 Fut., I, 677, 11.11f. (ch. 72).151 Fut., I, 554,11.27 f. (= Fut. Y, VIII, 238f., ch. 70); III, 189,11.33ff. (ch. 346); III, 547 (ch.
238, on waqt).152 Fut. Y, IV, 336, 1. 2 (ch. 59), continuing with definitions by the Mutakallimun and the
"Arabs." The connection of time with the imagination does not appear in Aristotle in this manner,
but it comes up in commentaries on Physics 219b2, cf. the old glosses published by 'Abd-ar-Rahman Badawiin his edition of the Arabic translationof the Physics,423 (Cairo 1384-85/1964-65).
153 Fut., II, 4, 11. 16f. (ch. 73), cf. also II, 456 bottom (ch. 198), In the Kitab at-Tarajim, 12
(Hyderabad 1948), the argument runs as follows: "He who says that time is the motion of the
sphere (has to be countered by the observation that) there were things when there was no sphere.He who says that time is the connection between two matters by means of "when" (has to be
countered by the observation that) time has never ceased accompanying things." The Arabictranslation of Physics 223b21f. (ed. Badawi, 479) uses kurah instead of falak.
154 Fut. Y, VI, 61, 1. 10 (ch. 69); VII, 261,1. 9 (ch. 69), speaking of waqt. Time (dahr)"has no
concrete substance (ayn), but it is something intellected by the intellect," cf. Fut., II, 652, 1. 17
(ch. 291 beg.). Cf. also Fut., II, 606 (ch. 278).155
Fut., II, 55, 1.3 (ch. 73, su'aI 22).156 Fut. Y, IV, 335 (ch. 59); Fut., II, 4,1. 18 (ch. 73). Cf. also Fut., II, 458 (11.1f. (ch. 198, fasl
31).157 Fut., II, 64, 11.5 f. (ch. 316). In connection with the material existence or non-existence of
time, referencemay be also made to St. Augustine's view of time as a mental state, see R. Sorabji,Time, Creation and the Continuum,29ff. (Ithaca, New York, 1983).
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verses exalting time's basic power and stressing its imaginary nature and its
lack of any perceivable material form:
If the result of time is thoroughly understood, it becomes thoroughly understandable: It isknown as the result of imaginings.
Its influence shows that its power is like nature. Substance from (nature) as well as from
it(self) is non-existent in it.
Through it, things take on substance, while itself it has no substance that would allow it todetermine it(self).
The mind is unable to perceive its forms. Therefore we say that time (dahr) is something
imagined.But for abstract immateriality(tanazzuh)God would not have named His158existence for
it. It is revered in the heart.
If you are fair, (you will recognize that) its origin is from eternity. It is determined as
possessing the character of eternity (azalT).Like the void, it is an extension without limit (on either side) in something incorporeal
provided with corporeality through imagining.'59
In the Sufi spirit, Ibn 'Arabi succinctly describes time as "the ruler(sultan),"
adopting, it seems, an old saying without explaining it.l60 The knowledge of
time ('ilm az-zaman) also belongs to the highest type of inspired knowledge
(al-ma'arif al-mawhufbah)or the spirituality of night and day.161 Time, he
contends, is comparable to eternity (azal) in that it is imaginary and has no
existence, just as eternity is a negative description (wasf salbl) and has no
existence.161a ime, he states further, "is for what is created (muhdath)whateternity (azal) is for what is uncreated (qadTm)."62 Time thus is inseparablefrom metaphysics,'62and in the view of Ibn 'Arabi, this applies also to all the
basic data of physics, since there is no definite boundary between the material
world and the metaphysical structure.
The views on metaphysical questions ascribed expressly to the philosophers
by Ibn 'Arabi are of special interest in our context, since it is here that his
attitude toward philosophy most closely interlocks with his mysticism. Direct
attributions are again rare and held intentionally vague. Expressing his
158Hardly "its," but God as dahr.See F. Rosenthal, "Sweeter than Hope," 10 (Leiden 1983).
159 Fut. Y, IV, 330f.160 Istilah as-Sufiyah, 9 (Hyderabad 1948). For the secular meaning of the remark,which sees
the ruler as the determining influence on conditions (cf. F. Rosenthal, "Sweeterthan Hope," 41),see Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyiun l-akhbdr,I, 5 (reprintCairo 1963-64):"When Ziyad (b. Ablhi) heard aman slander the time(s), he said: "If he knew what time (az-zamdn) s, I would have punished him.Time is the sultan."'
161 Kitab al-Isfdr, 32, 1. 6 (Hyderabad 1948).161a Fut.Y, VI,61, 1.10(ch. 69).162
Fut., II, 4, 1. 19 (ch. 73). For Ibn 'Arabi's understandingof azal in relation to time, cf.,further, his Kitab al-Azal (Hyderabad 1948).
162a S. Pines points out that Abiu -Barakat al-Baghdadi deals with place in connection with
physics, but with time (to which most of Pines' investigation is devoted) only in connection with
metaphysics, see his Nouvelles Etudes sur Awhad al-zamdn Abu-l-Barakdtal-Baghdadi, 21 (Paris1955).
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disagreementwith an interpretationf time andspace,he refers o a statement
of al-hakTm:FromtheOne(al-wihid)comesforthonlyone (wahid)."63This
is supposedlydirectedagainstAristotelianism;t may have something o dowith Ibn Rushd's commentson the oneness of the given mattermade in
connectionwithMetaphysics1016b3-5.'64bn'Arab!no doubtvaguelyhad in
mind the unendingdiscussionof the question f, and how, multiplicity ould
result from"the one."
A pointof agreementwas theexistenceof God to whichmostphilosophersand thinkerssubscribed. t was consideredgenerallypermissibleo raise the
questionof theexistence hal)of God, butit wasconsideredmpropernot only
by the philosopher-sages165ut also by "thegroup"to raisethe questionof
His what,how, andwhy."Thegroup(at-ta'ifah)" ppears o referhere to theMuslimtheologians.66
Thephilosophers reusuallymentionedwhereIbn'Arabiwishesto register
disapprovalof theirviews. This is the case wherehe states that al-faylasufdeniesdivineknowledgeof theparticularsn thesensibleworld.'67Becauseoftheirmental imitations,philosopherand Mu'tazilitealikedeny any visionof
God,168and the philosophersare also deniers of (divine) actions.169A
tentative,and immediately etracted, elationships establishedby Ibn 'Arabibetweenhis viewof the
imaginednature
(mutakhayyal)f the entiresensible
world and the general outlook of the Sophists (as-Sufista'l'ah). In the context
of his interpretationf Qur'an8:17, he maintains hatneither hephilosopher(al-faylasuf) nor those who use rational proofs (adillat al-'uqul) believe that,nor do peoplewho clingto externaldata(ashabaz-.zhir)."Onlythe Sophistscome close to thisintuitivensight mashhad).However," bn 'Arabiconcludes,"the distinctionbetween us and them is that they say that all that has no
163 Fut. Y, IV, 155, 1. 10 (ch. 47); Fut., II, 458, 11.19f. (ch. 198,./asI 31). The reference to al-
hakrmoccurs only in the second passage. In citing the first passage, M. Asin Palacios commentsthat the reference is to the Muslim Aristotelians preferringthis view to that of the Neoplatonists of
Alexandria, see his "Mohidin," in Homenaje (above, n. 21), II, 231, n. 1. Cf. also E. Meyer. in
Oriens, 27-28 (1981), 247, n. 42. Professors Richard Frank and Dominic O'Meara refer me as a
possible parallel to arithmetic theories of the unit remaining unchangeable, as expressed byJamblich, Theologoumnenarithmeticae,ed. de Falco, pp. 1 f.
164 Cf. M. Bouyges' edition of Ibn Rushd's Commentaryon the Metaphysics, II, 540, 1. 17
(Beirut 1938-52).165 See above, n. 56.166 Fut. Y, III, 218f. (ch. 28). According to Fur., III, 12, 11.29-32 (ch. 302), agreement also
existed between the sages and a group of "our colleagues" who mairntained hat the spirits were
permanently affected by their connection with the bodies as water might be in tainted vessels.167 Fut., III, 536, 11.16f. (ch. 387).168 Fut., III, 401,1. 20 (ch. 369, wtasl 20): III, 465, 1. 1 (ch. 374). The mental limitations of the
sages also lead to failure with respect to the problem of the divine attributes, cf. Ftt.. III, 495.11.28ff. (ch. 379).
169 Fut. Y, II, 389, 1. 17 (ch. 16).
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reality (haqTqah).'70We do not say that. We say that it is reality, thus
disagreeing with all the groups but agreeing with God and His Messenger by
virtue of intuitive insight given us by Him."17
Prophecy obviously exists, but it is naturally something that philosophers
do not understand. Ibn 'Arabi therefore feels compelled to exhort his readers
to "leave aside the rules (ahkdm)of philosophical books."172 In this context,
he contrasts the philosophers with the Ash'arites, as he does again in verses
which express his own understanding of the reason why the ultimate goal of
any true human endeavor, the knowledge of God, cannot be reached through
philosophical thought. Indeed, he concludes that the famous Qur'anic word
ummr"illiterate"applied to the Prophet indicates the absence and superfluous-
ness of thinking:The knowledge through 173 God provides ornate embellishment.
The knowledge through thinking leads to doubt (tashbTh) nd error.
The knowledge through thinking is summary generalization and mistakes.
The knowledge through God is verification and specification.174
The knowledge through thinking is abstract labels (a'ladn).
The knowledge through God provides states and saintliness (?).175
Don't be led astray by specious statements!
For what they prove is ignorance and diversion/causalization (ta'l7).176
The philosopher holds that God can be denied throughThe result of his causality. That is atheism.'77
170 The common description of the Sophists speaks of them as "those who declare the realities
(pl.) false (yubtilunal-haqd'iq),"cf., for instance, Ibn Hazm, al-Fisalfil-milal, I, 8 (Cairo 1317-21);
al-Batalyawsi, Sharh, I, 220 f. (above, n. 92). The formulation was no doubt familiarto Ibn 'Arabi.
With his customary independence, he changed it slightly.171 Fut., III, 525, 11.26-29 (ch. 384).172 Fut., II, 595, 1. 32 (ch. 276). The referenceto "books" is not gratuitous. Ibn 'Arabi claims
that his knowledge is based on revelations (tajalliyat) and does not derive from books, see, for
instance, Kitdbal-Masa'il, 6 bottom (Hyderabad 1948). He faults scholars concerned with the
material world ('ulama'ar-rusum) or habitually deriving their knowledge "from books and orallyfrom men of their own kind," cf. Fut. Y, IV, 267, 11.9 f. (ch. 54).
173 The preposition bi- in this connection would ordinarilyyield the meaning of "knowledge of
God," but the context shows that it must be translated as "by means of, (obtained) through."
Words conveying a double meaning by making them mean something they would not normally
mean abound in these verses.174 Cf. Fut., III, 456, 1. 7 (ch. 373) [see above, n. 58]: "(The philosophers) do not know
specification in generalization (at-tafsll fi l-ijml)." See also above, p. 11. The gnosis of God,
however, is generalized (ijmdlTyah) nd allows of no specification, cf. Dhakha'iral-a'laq, 174.
175 TahwTl-tabdTlormally means "change and alteration," but the deviation from normal
usage, as indicated in the translation, appears to be intended.
176 Diversion/entertainment and causal explanation would be the normal meaningsof
ta7Tl,but, as the following verse shows, Ibn 'Arab!wants it to refer to his view of divine causality. Note
his playing with the double meaning of 'illahas disease and cause in his chapter on 'illah n Fut., II,
490ff. (ch. 297).177 God cannot be conceived as cause, as is done by the philosophers, since this would in
realitymean a denial of God. A better translation might be "through assuminghim to be a cause."
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Al-Ash'ari holds (that God is) a multiple concrete substance.
That is knowledge, but it involves anthropomorphism (tamthl1).178
It would be possible to go on and investigate everything Ibn 'Arabi sayspage by page, line by line, and find that there always is a close connection with
ideas "philosophical" in origin. This is so even if nothing is said about
philosophy, wisdom, or thinking and even where philosophy, wisdom, and
thinking appear to be rejected explicitly or implicitly through competingnotions that are contradictory to them. Philosophy, whether in the Muslim or
the classical meaning of the term, constitutes the frame of reference for Ibn
'Arabi's view of the world. The religious and historical traditions of Islam, its
religious law and jurisprudence were untouchables but they had to be fitted
into that frame-rather, the frame had to be cut to fit them. A constant
problem for us, and for Ibn 'Arabi himself, had he been worried about it, is
separating philosophy as such from philosophy embedded in Kalam. In fact,this cannot be done. An exceptional example is provided by that constantly
repeated theme song of the Futuhdtas well as Ibn 'Arabi's works and thoughtin general: "He who recognizes his soul/himself recognizes his Lord." Ibn
'Arab! cites the statement in its basic form and in quite a few minor variations.
C.A. Nallino was of the opinion that it was impossible to ascertain its
provenience in the thought of Ibn 'Arabi. It could have come from Neoplato-nism or reached Islam through patristic writings.179 In this case, it can be
stated unequivocally that the Church Fathers were responsible for the coiningand the ultimate spread of the statement in its Islamic form familiar to Ibn
'Arabi.180Usually, we cannot be so sure.
A comprehensive assessment of Ibn 'Arabi's scintillating personality and
thought seems almost impossible. On the basis of the facts assembled in this
paper, a few general remarkssuggest themselves. Although we have very little
God is neithercause nor caused but the creator of the causes (Fut. Y, II, 223, 11. f. [ch. 6]) and thecause (!) of the existence of the world (Fut. Y, IV, 171, 1. 7 [ch. 48]). The theologians may speak of
God as the Cause of causes (Fut., III, 212, 1. 2 [ch. 350]). However, essentially He does not accept
'illTyah,cf. Fut. Y, I, 195; Kitab at-Tajalliydt, 31, also Risalah adyu'awwal ilayh, 13, 1. 1.
(Hyderabad 1948). Fusus,220 (above, n. 144), refers to ashdbal-'illah who make the Truth a causefor the existence of the world. If it is this passage to which T. Izutsu refers, his slightly disparagingremarks about "the philosophers who blindly follow Greek philosophy" do not reflect Ibn
'Arabi's expressed view, see Izutsu, A ComparativeStudy of the Key Philosophical Concepts in
Sufism and Taoism, I, 195 (Minatoku, Tokyo 1966). Cf. also M. Schreiner, (above, n. 70), 525;GesammelteSchriften,426, or A.E. Affifi, TheMystical Philosophyof MuhyidDin-Ibnul'Arabi,27f.
178 Fut., II, 644 (ch. 289 beg.).179
C.A. Nallino, Raccolta dei scritti, II, 339 f. (Rome 1940).180 Cf. F. Rosenthal, "On the knowledge of Plato's philosophy in the Islamic world," inIslamic Culture,15 (1941), 397 [addendumto Islamic Culture,14 (1940), 410, n. 4]. A. Altmann, inhis comprehensive study of "The Delphic maxim in Medieval Islam and Judaism," does not
specifically deal with Ibn 'Arabi, see Altmann (ed.), Biblical and Other Studies, 196-232 (Cam-bridge, Mass., 1963).
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Franz Rosenthal
in the formof evidence o go on, hemayverywellhave readtheworks abeled
"philosophical"n hisenvironment.1 Hecertainlywasacquaintedwith some
of the worksof thespeculative heologians.
He mentionstheir namesrather
frequently,f only a selected ewamongthem,but he is also as hesitant o be
specificwhen he refers to their works,as he is in the case of the philoso-
phers.182What is moreimportant,he wasacquaintedwith all the philosophi-cal thoughtand ways of lookingat the world that had merged nto Muslim
civilization.If he used a bit of everythinghaphazardly,t was not mindless
eclecticism n hispartbut the naturalwayto proceed or a thinker teeped n
the vastculture hatwas his heritage.Next to nothingis known about Ibn 'Arabi'searly development. t seems
likely that he early on acquiredhis mysticalconvictionthat directdivine"revelation,"with whateverArabic termhe mightcall it, was available o a
chosenfew. Throughsuch"revelation," ndnothingelse,manmightbe able
to gain the only worthwhileknowledge,consistingof metaphysicalnsightsand preferably tyled the knowledgeof God. Ibn 'Arabi becamemore and
more convincedthat he was the chosen recipientof such revelationwhich
helpedhim to collectand set down his thoughts.183His way of communica-
ting his insightsto those in this world-which was full of the ignorantand
non-comprehending184-wasree
flowingmeditation. t centered, n the first
place, on words and phrasesof the Qur'an. Then it took for its texts
commonly accepted terms and propositionsof earliermystics and other
appealingstatementscurrent n his culturalbackground.Finally,his most
eccentricand striking procedurewas to reflecton words which he chose
because heystruckhis fancy,andto meditateon themwith a ferventntensityand constantoutpouringof surprising erbalassociationswhich continue to
astonishand impresseven today'sreader.He nevercompromised,however,withrespect o his basicbeliefs.Apartfromthismysticandlargelyunsystema-
tic bend, he saw the metaphysicalworld in terms that were ultimatelyphilosophical.The greatproblemsof time, space,and motionoccupiedhim
constantly.Themetaphysicalworldwas to be seen andunderstood s philoso-
phy saw and understood he physicalworld-only he wouldhave put it the
other way round. The true order of the world resulted from assigning
everythingts properstation.That was"wisdom,"mysticalanddivineas well
as philosophical,withultimatelyno distinctionbetween he two.185Mystical
181 Seeabove,pp. 19ff.
182 Note, in particular,bn'ArabY'sncidental bservationn Fut.III, 398,11.10f. (ch. 369,wasl18) hatresponsibilityorsome nformationscribedo al-Baqillaniestsuponthetransmitter
(wa-l-'uhdah 'all an-ndqil).183 An example,amongothers,may be foundin Mawdqi' n-nujim. n the absenceof the
printed ext,I usedthemodemmanuscriptYale ar.480,p. 76.184 P. 29 of the mentionedmanuscriptf Mawdqi'an-nujim.Seealsoabove,nn. 38 and 60.185 See above, p. 13.
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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"
revelationwas thus logically transformed nto a long series of "sciences
('ulum),'186 mysticalpropositionson the one hand, and philosophicaland
epistemologicalproblemson the other. This breakupof knowledgeinto
innumerable ndividualpieces, incidentally,constituted a victory for the
ancientaphoristicalwayof thinkingover the systematicmethodof expositioninherentn "philosophy."bn'Arabiexhibitsa palpablehesitationwithregardto decidingwhether"knowledge 'ilm)"or "gnosis (ma'rifah)" nd "wisdom
(hikmah)"was moreimportant n the schemeof things.In spiteof protesta-tions to thecontraryon his part,the balancealwaysappears o be in favor of
"knowledge."This marks the final stage of a mysticismwhich, in order to
surviventhesurroundingntellectuallimate,hadbecomewedded o philosophy.
By the timeof Ibn 'Arabi,thatprocess,which had startedearlyin Islamichistory, had been completed.Ibn 'Arabi'sgreat immediatemodel was al-
GhazzalT. s is clearfrom the overallplanof theFutuhatwhichstartsout with
a thoroughdiscussionof the meaningof the principalMuslim ritualobliga-tions, he aspiredto replacingal-Ghazzal's revival of Islam with his own
renewal of it in a purer,mystical language.187More determined han al-
GhazzalT o accord absolute preeminence o a monomaniacmysticismto
whicheverythinghad to be subordinated, e succeededn becoming he hero
of an extremistmysticismnever really to be surpassedin its kind and
effectiveness.Al-GhazzalT emainedthe guiding light of a more moderatecenter. This madehim eventuallya morepowerfuland influentialhistorical
force.
Even more than othermysticsand intellectuals, bn 'Arabishowedhimself
fond of the combinationof contraries or thepurposeof drawingattention o
his ideas. Knowledgeis at the same time ignorance,188being might be
conceived as non-being,189 ight guidanceimpliesboth bringingnear and
keepingaway,190reedom s slavery,191t would seem to be fair to describe
him in this manner.Theattemptmadehereto let hisown statements peakforthemselves and to see him as he might have seen himself leads to his
characterizations bothbroadminded ndintolerant,bothliberaland conser-
vative, both extremely earnedand narrowlyfocused, both extraordinarily
originalandtotallytraditional,both a thinkerandbeyondthinking-in short,both a philosopherand a mystic.
186 Cf., in particular, the long lists of such 'ulum at the end of chapters in the Futuhat,
beginning with ch. 293.187 See also above, n. 17.188 For instance, Fut., I, 728, 11.18f. (ch. 72).189
Fut., III, 362 (ch. 369).190
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