Romania and the Six Day War
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Romania and the Six Day WarCezar StanciuPublished online: 02 Jun 2014.
To cite this article: Cezar Stanciu (2014) Romania and the Six Day War, Middle Eastern Studies,50:5, 775-795, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2014.913575
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Romania and the Six Day War
CEZAR STANCIU*
When the Soviet Union (USSR) and its satellites decided to break off diplomatic ties
with Israel in June 1967, following the Israeli attack on Egypt and Syria, Romania
refused to do the same. Unlike other party leaders in Eastern Europe, NicolaeCeausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), did not
endorse the Soviet position, according to which Israel had been guilty of ‘aggression’,
and chose to pursue a different policy towards the crisis in the Middle East. Such a
course gained Ceausescu much popularity at home and abroad and has often been
depicted by historiography in positive terms, as proof of his independent foreign
policy. By that time, Romania had already established itself as a ‘rebellious’ satellite,
stubbornly opposing various Soviet initiatives, and Ceausescu played an important
role in promoting these policies after the death of his predecessor, GheorgheGheorghiu-Dej, in March 1965.
In spite of the fact that Romania’s refusal to break off diplomatic ties with Israel fol-
lowing the Six Day War has been mentioned in almost all works on Ceausescu’s for-
eign policy, there is virtually no study devoted particularly to this issue. This article
aims to analyse Romania’s decision based on previously unpublished documents from
the PCR archives, retracing the decision-making process at high levels of the party lead-
ership, employing methods of both narrative political history and comparative analysis.
Romania’s position regarding the Six Day War will be investigated in the generalcontext of Romanian�Soviet relations, dominated, at the time, by Ceausescu’s
determined pursuit of increased independence in the Soviet bloc and his neutrality in
the Sino-Soviet dispute. The analysis follows both state (governmental) and party
levels, given the fact that communist single-party regimes did not differentiate
between state and party leadership. This article will provide a comprehensive answer
to the motives which justified this decision, drawing on primary sources that have
not been previously investigated by researchers.
Leonid Brezhnev and Nicolae Ceausescu both assumed power in their countries only
a few months apart. At that time � October 1964 for Brezhnev and March 1965 for
Ceausescu � Romanian�Soviet relations were very poor, due to disagreements that
emerged between the previous two leaders after 1962. When Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev launched his reform programme aimed at economic specialization
*Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, University Valahia. Address: Lt. Stancu Ion,no. 35, Targoviste DB, Romania. Email: [email protected]
� 2014 Taylor & Francis
Middle Eastern Studies, 2014
Vol. 50, No. 5, 775�795, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2014.913575
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within the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA), Gheorghiu-Dej strongly
opposed it and took advantage of the emerging Sino-Soviet split to assert his inde-
pendence in the bloc.1 In April 1964, the Romanians published an elaborate declara-
tion stating their neutrality in Moscow’s dispute with China and their refusal to
accept a leading role in the world communist movement.2
This represented just one more complication for Moscow, added to the already
existing divergences with China, Albania or even Yugoslavia. When Leonid
Brezhnev took leadership in the autumn of 1964, he was determined to restore
Moscow’s prestige and control over world communism, but Romania continued to
oppose Moscow’s plans, even though the leadership changed in Bucharest too.3 In
order to increase its stability in power, PCR leaders engaged in a national communist
programme and searched for alternative partners in the West, so as to reduce their
dependence on the Soviet Union and their vulnerability regarding Moscow.4 In thefield of foreign policy, Romania wasted no time in affirming its independent stand
on various international issues, joining the chorus of small states, especially the non-
aligned, in claiming their right to have a say in a world dominated by the two super-
powers of the Cold War.5
Nicolae Ceausescu paid special attention to the Chinese connection, cultivating a
‘special’ relationship with China that had been initiated by his predecessor, amidst
his differences with Khrushchev. According to English historian Dennis Deletant,
the Sino-Soviet dispute was essential in permitting the Romanians to assert theirindependence.6 In June 1966, while a Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) summit
was being prepared in Bucharest, Ceausescu welcomed Chinese premier Zhou Enlai
as his official guest, raising terrible concern in Moscow regarding the PCR’s loyalty.
A few weeks before that, Ceausescu had denounced Moscow’s policies towards PCR
in the Comintern era, claiming his party’s right to make its own decisions, without
interference from abroad.7 Although Romania never joined or supported the
Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union, its refusal to condemn the Chinese, as all
the other communist leaders under Soviet control did, was obviously a form ofdefiance directed against Moscow.
The ‘special’ relation with China was a guarantee of the PCR’s freedom of choice
and also a message to the Soviets that Bucharest rejected interference from abroad
when it came to its own decisions. This is also why Romania � and Ceausescu espe-
cially � developed another ‘special’ relation at the time, with Yugoslavia. Ceausescu
and Tito met very often both before and after the Soviet-led intervention in Czecho-
slovakia, discussing various ways to counter Soviet hegemony in world communism.
For example, both Ceausescu and Tito opposed another Soviet plan aiming to orga-nize an international conference of communist parties. The purpose of such a confer-
ence was to unite world communism around Moscow and help isolate China, but
Ceausescu did not agree to it.8 Brezhnev was well aware of this, and often asked
Ceausescu for reassurances but never went any further, probably for reasons that are
not of concern to the present study.
As for the Middle East, Ceausescu did not have any special interest. Romania did
have relatively good commercial relations there but its political interests were rather
limited. That was not the case with the Soviets. After Stalin’s death, Nikita Khrush-chev reoriented the Soviet foreign policy towards the third world countries, where
various movements of national liberation claimed a revolutionary and
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‘anti-imperialistic’ character. Moscow’s support for such movements increased over
the years and � as far as its African and Middle Eastern policies were concerned �Egypt grew progressively more important. President Gamal Abdel Nasser considered
himself a unifying leader of the Arab world and his rhetoric had a rather strong ‘anti-
imperialistic’ and anti-western tone. The Soviet Union offered substantial support toNasser, hoping to use him in order to counter the American and western presence in
the region and increase Soviet influence in exchange.
Still, Moscow’s direct interests in the Middle East were also rather limited. Yacov
Ro’i argued that Soviet policies in the region were mostly determined by Cold War
calculations and the economics of Soviet�American relations. Arab states, Ro’i
stated, were good allies for Moscow as long as they were ‘anti-imperialistic’. 9 In the
years preceding the war, both Egypt and Syria leaned closer and closer to the Soviet
Union. After the Ba’th assumed power in Syria � and especially after the officers’coup in 1966 � Syria received increased support from the Soviets, who were afraid of
a Chinese infiltration, given the fact that the Sino-Soviet disputes were worsening.10
Moreover, Egypt needed increasing Soviet assistance due to its involvement in the
Yemen war. Nasser did not receive much support from the United States for his war
in Yemen but his need for food and military supplies intensified, which is why he
grew more and more dependent on Moscow.11
Aiming to safeguard its positions and limit western influence, Moscow did provide
that support, continuing after Khrushchev’s dismissal from power. In May 1966,Brezhnev sent Premier A. Kosygin and Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to
Cairo, symbolically renewing Soviet commitment to support in the ‘struggle against
imperialism’. On that occasion, Nasser did point out that he expected both moral
and material support in the following period.12 Moscow kept its promises and con-
tinued to offer assistance and even increased its contribution. In a study of Soviet
and American policies towards the third world, Odd Arne Westad argued that it was
the support that Egypt and Syria received from the Soviet Union which led Nasser
to believe that he could increase pressure on Israel, later in 1967.13
This does not mean that the Soviet Union aimed for a war in the region. Most his-
torians agree that neither the Americans, nor the Soviets, were interested in an
Arab�Israeli war and, in spite of miscalculations which may have precipitated the
escalation of hostilities, both superpowers tried to avoid it. Still, it cannot be ignored
that the famous Soviet report addressed to Nasser on 13 May 1967 concerning an
imminent Israeli attack on Syria had to have played an important role in the deci-
sion-making process in Cairo.14 Most probably the Soviets did not make correct esti-
mates regarding the impact of such a report on Nasser. The Egyptians closed theAqaba Gulf only ten days later, even though they were fully aware of the impact
such a decision would have on Israel. The crisis was precipitated by closing the Gulf
and also by Nasser’s decision to request the withdrawal of United Nations Emer-
gency Force (UNEF) troops from the Sinai Peninsula.15
The UNEF troops had been stationed in the Sinai Peninsula since 1956, when
Israel attacked Egypt over Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The
UNEF’s presence there was regarded as a factor of stability and a guarantee of
peace. Many argued that U Thant’s decision to accept Nasser’s request for the with-drawal of UNEF troops had been a mistake.16 U Thant was secretary general of the
United Nations at the time and could have requested advice from the Security
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Council, postponing the decision, but instead he chose to withdraw the troops imme-
diately, at Egypt’s request.
The Soviets were only witnesses to these decisions. As Brezhnev later stated,
Nasser did not consult Moscow prior to engaging in such radical measures. In a
recent study, Roland Popp demonstrated that speculations about a Soviet masterplan aimed at initiating a new conflict while the Americans were trapped in Vietnam
are not valid. Popp argued that the Soviet policy in the region was characterized by
caution and � moreover � that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) knew very
well that Moscow wanted to avoid conflict.17 The Soviet Union failed to restrain
Nasser, although it had the means to do so, but the United States also failed to
restrain Israel.18 But the Soviet policy in the Middle East was conditioned by another
factor which sometimes led Moscow to go beyond reasonable limits in supporting the
Arabs: China.At the time, China was trying hard to compete with the Soviet Union in supporting�
and therefore spreading its influence in � the third world. Fearing a possible joint
Soviet�American dominance in the world, obviously to China’s detriment, Chinese
foreign policy tried to approach the so-called ‘middle area’, represented by third
world countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.19 This policy had a rather limited
success but it nevertheless caused concern in Moscow, as China was noisily denounc-
ing Moscow’s ‘great power chauvinism’ and its cooperation with the United States,
described by Chinese propaganda as a ‘betrayal’ of the revolutionary cause. Chinaoffered support to almost all revolutionary movements that were not supported by
the Soviets and even tried to create factions within those movements that did receive
Soviet assistance. Author David Shin emphasized that China regarded Africa as very
important for its global struggle against western imperialism and Soviet hegemony.20
In this respect, Egypt had a privileged place in Chinese foreign policy. In 1956,
Egypt was the first African country to recognize Red China and from then on bilat-
eral relations continued to improve, in spite of temporary setbacks. Although Nasser
persecuted communists in Egypt and tried to preserve good relations with the USSRas well, he did support the Chinese cause when it came to the United Nations dispute
with Taiwan. In time, China’s embassy in Cairo became a principal factor in promot-
ing Chinese policies in Africa.21 As for the dispute with Israel, China stood firmly on
Egypt’s side, including in the Six Day War.
Romania’s relations in the Middle East have been generally conditioned by Cold
War factors. After Stalin’s death, as Khrushchev tried to implement a more coherent
policy towards third world countries, Romania took advantage of this to improve its
economic relations in the region. Especially after Romanian�Soviet divergencesappeared in the early 1960s, the Romanians tried hard to identify alternative eco-
nomic partners, outside the CMEA. The developing Romanian industry required
new and reliable sources of raw materials and technology, but markets, as well.22
From this point of view, Arab countries in Africa and the Middle East were conve-
nient partners, due to their status as developing nations.
Considering the volume of trade, Egypt was Romania’s most important economic
partner in the region. In 1964 a Trade Agreement was concluded providing for a con-
siderable enlargement of bilateral trade and also for Romania’s assistance in buildingand equipping several industrial factories in Egypt. Soon after, Romanian premier
Ion Gheorghe Maurer paid an official visit to Cairo, exploring further opportunities
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for cooperation with Egypt. A Mixed Governmental Economic Commission was
established on that occasion.23 It is worth mentioning that Romania’s trade in the
Indian Ocean passed through the Suez Canal.
On the other hand, Israel had a much smaller share in Romania’s foreign trade,
but was just as interesting for the Romanians in regard to trade opportunities, espe-cially given its higher level of development. A Romanian governmental delegation
visited Israel in March 1967, negotiating an Agreement of Economic and Technical-
Scientific Cooperation, providing for bilateral projects in various fields of industry.24
After 1948, Romania did support the Arab cause in the conflict with Israel, but solely
at the level of rhetoric and propaganda and did not generate much upset in Roma-
nian�Israeli relations. As a Soviet satellite and as a country with limited political
options, Romania was not expected to do much else, anyway.
As its divergences with Moscow became public, Romania tried to distance itselffrom Soviet positions in world affairs, but as far as the Middle East was concerned
there was no opportunity to do that until 1967. Romanian foreign policy aimed at
affirming an independent position, defending the interests of small states in world
affairs and, in spite of close relations with China, did not subscribe to Chinese posi-
tions on matters of international relations. What Romania did have in common with
China was their common contestation of the Soviet Union as the centre of world
communism, a struggle carried out by different means but aimed at limiting Soviet
influence and hegemony.
When Israeli strikes first hit Egyptian targets on 5 June 1967, both the Soviet Union
and the United States understood that they had to stand behind their allies, Egypt
and Israel, as displeased as they might have been with such a turn of events. Still, the
military outcome of events could not had been very clear in the first days of the
armed conflict, which is why political reactions were delayed for a few days, as both
superpowers were waiting to see what happened on the battlefield. But that did not
matter much for the Romanians since they did not have a direct stake in the events,which is why Ceausescu was very quick to react.
The developments in the Middle East were discussed the same day, on 5 June 1967,
in the Permanent Presidium of the party and a decision was made to take an active
stand on the issue. The party leadership charged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
summon diplomatic representatives of both Israel and the United Arab Republic
and to ask for an immediate ceasefire between the two parties. Deputy minister
George Macovescu met the diplomats the same day, sometime in the afternoon, and
addressed an official appeal from the Romanian government to cease all hostilities.25
The appeal was published the next day in the party newspaper Scınteia and contained
a non-partisan argumentation referring to the interests of world peace.26 There was
no blame on Israel in particular and the text did not engage in any specific condem-
nation of either side.
This equidistant approach was the basic feature of the appeal as compared with
Moscow’s position. There is no documentary proof that Moscow advised its satellites
in any way at such an early date, but the Soviet position in favour of the Arabs was
not a secret to anyone. Taking such a quick and active stand � as futile as it mayhave been � was Ceausescu’s way of asserting his freedom of manoeuvre. The appeal
relied on an argument of principle when claiming that the war represented a threat to
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world peace and the conflict had to be resolved by peaceful means, through negotia-
tion, in the spirit of respect for the interests of all nations involved. As a small nation,
Romania could only rely on the rule of law to insure its security since it lacked the
means to safeguard its interests with arms. This approach went beyond the bipolar
organization of world affairs: Romania did not perceive its interests on the basis ofEast�West dichotomies, but on a national basis.
Furthermore, as future events were to confirm, the neutral stance adopted by the
Romanian government in that context had its purpose. After Nasser had made the
decision to close the Tiran straits and only few days before the war broke out, Ceau-
sescu discussed the developments in the Middle East with Santiago Carillo, leader of
the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and was very critical of Soviet policies in the
region. Ceausescu told Carillo that he found the Arab aim of liquidating Israel irra-
tional and disagreed with both the Soviets and the Chinese when it came to theunlimited support they were giving the Arabs. This last statement is conclusive con-
cerning Ceausescu’s balancing between the Soviet Union and China and the way he
used the Sino-Soviet split to promote his own interests.27 The discussions between
Ceausescu and Carillo, which took place at the end of May 1967, can help prove that
Romania’s position on the Six Day War issue was not fortuitous, but it reflected a
substantiated and previously considered position.
After the UN Security Council had requested all parties involved to cease the hos-
tilities, the Soviet leader requested the party leaders from Warsaw Pact countries togather in Moscow for consultations regarding the situation in the Middle East.
Brezhnev needed as much political support as possible, in view of Egypt’s impending
catastrophic defeat. Moscow had often asked its satellites to rally around its deci-
sions and this was no exception. All party leaders were summoned by telephone call
on 8 June 1967 for a meeting that was scheduled for the next day.28 Everything indi-
cated a spirit of emergency. Ceausescu consulted the Permanent Presidium before
and then agreed to participate. This consultation was, obviously, formal, but it was
probably his way of making sure that the entire party leadership was on his side priorto making major decisions.
The meeting convened the next day, but, at the Soviets’ request, there was no
stenographic account of it. The Romanians did manage to put together a transcript
of the discussions and, since the document was not intended to be made public, there
is not much reason to question its reliability.29 According to the Romanian tran-
script, Brezhnev told the other communist leaders that Moscow was surprised by
Nasser’s decision to request the withdrawal of UNEF troops and also by his decision
to close the straits. On none of these had Nasser consulted the Soviets. The top prior-ity, as described by Brezhnev, was not to allow any weakening of socialist positions
in the Middle East. The dilemma resulting from this was how to increase solidarity
with the Arab peoples given the fact that the Arabs were blaming their defeat on the
insufficient support provided by the socialist countries.30
All those participating took the floor to express their agreement with Brezhnev.
Polish leader W»adis»aw Gomu»ka pointed out that the Israeli attack had been, in his
opinion, coordinated with the Americans in order to consolidate imperialist eco-
nomic interests. Walter Ulbricht from East Germany concluded that the war wasnothing less than a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) action and coordi-
nation was needed among socialist countries in order to counter the threat.31 It was
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obvious that all satellites were willing to support the Soviet position. Ceausescu was
the only exception.
From the beginning he refrained from expressing any kind of support or solidarity
with the Soviets, emphasizing the fact that Arab slogans in favour of the liquidation
of Israel had been dangerous and caused negative reactions all over the world. Fur-thermore, he engaged in nuanced attacks against Brezhnev, insisting on two issues:
why had the matter not been discussed before the war broke out and why has the
Egyptian army failed so quickly and catastrophically?32 The first question expressed
Ceausescu’s reluctance to support Soviet policies unless consulted in advance. His
predecessor Gheorghiu-Dej had raised that question with Nikita Khrushchev in the
context of the Cuban Missile Crisis.33 The second question was even sharper in its
meaning because it involved a failure on the part of the Soviet Union in what con-
cerned military and intelligence capabilities. He often returned to these questionsduring discussions.
Ceausescu concluded by stating that the solution to the Middle East could not be
military, but must be diplomatic.34 Shortly before that, Brezhnev had emphasized
the scale of Soviet military assistance to the Arabs. The Soviet leader did not forget
to mention China, partly blaming Nasser’s irresponsible behaviour on Chinese insti-
gation.35 The Soviets presented the meeting with the proposal for a Declaration
which labelled Israel as ‘aggressor’ and also suggested that the participating countries
break off diplomatic relations with Israel, as a sign of protest. The Declarationcaused another clash between Brezhnev and Ceausescu, as the latter refused to agree
to it.
Ceausescu explained to Brezhnev that he disagreed with the project because it only
blamed Israel for the war while in his opinion both sides should have been blamed for
the conflict. Brezhnev disagreed with this and Ceausescu was confronted with full-
scale opposition from all the other participants. Each of the others took the floor to
oppose Ceausescu, and that determined him to refuse to sign the Declaration blam-
ing Israel. Instead, Ceausescu proposed to have a short Communiqu�e about themeeting published, separately from the Declaration to which the others agreed. That
was in the end the solution adopted.36
During a break in the meeting, Brezhnev and Ceausescu had a separate conversa-
tion in which the Soviet leader insisted that he had solid information that the Ameri-
cans were in no way involved in the conflict, in spite of such claims from Nasser.
Brezhnev told Ceausescu:
Now he [Nasser] says that the Americans and the English intervened, sending
airplanes to offer cover for Israel. It is not true. We know this for a fact. Our
ships in the Mediterranean are side by side with the American ships. We observe
each other. No American plane flew to offer protection to Israel.37
Ceausescu also had a private conversation with Tito of Yugoslavia, who partici-
pated at the meeting as well. Tito rarely joined such Soviet initiatives but this time he
had a good reason, as relations between himself and Nasser of Egypt were ratherclose. Tito and Nasser were two of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement and
maintained close relations over the years. Also, unlike Ceausescu, Tito was very con-
cerned because of the increased military presence in the Mediterranean. In the context
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of the Middle East situation, both the Soviets and the Americans intensified their
presence in the region, causing concern to Yugoslavia, itself a Mediterranean country.
Tito and Ceausescu had developed good relations in the previous years, based on
their common interest in combating Soviet hegemony in world communism and
asserting party autonomy regarding Moscow. Their geographic vicinity helpedpolitical relations, as Romania and Yugoslavia were deeply involved in a costly
project to build an electric plant on the Danube. In relation to the Soviet Union,
they often shared similar opinions, especially when it came to opposition. Since
Ceausescu came to power in 1965, this was the first time the two were in conflict. In
their discussion, Ceausescu told Tito that he could not agree with the Soviet point
of view that Israel be declared ‘aggressor’, because the Arabs had their responsibility
too. Tito explained to Ceausescu that he understood that, but he could not return
home with anything less than a condemnation of Israel as aggressor. A short frag-ment of their conversation could be conclusive in regard to their difference of
positions:
Tito: Obviously, the imperialists organized this thing. Israel was the instrument;
Israel attacked. I have known Nasser for 15 years. He didn’t want this war. I
told him when we met that he was not right in asking for the liquidation of
Israel, but he wouldn’t listen [. . .].
Ceausescu: Comrade Tito, do you want me to tell you something honestly? We
have information indicating that he was pushed into this war.
Tito: Hell knows!38
The participants signed a Declaration accusing Israel of aggression and chose to
break off diplomatic ties with that state. Officially, the decision was justified by the fact
that Israel continued its operations in Syria after the UN Security Council hadrequested the countries involved to halt military operations.39 Romania did not sign the
Declaration and, in the following period, maintained normal diplomatic relations with
Israel. Ceausescu was fully aware of the risks involved in his opposition to Moscow
and searched for party back-up. A Plenary meeting of the Central Committee (CC) of
the PCR was convoked the next day. Ceausescu presented a report on the meeting
which had taken place in Moscow, and shared his personal impressions.40
His basic conclusion was that Brezhnev tried to exculpate himself from any
responsibility concerning the war in the Middle East. Also, Ceausescu noticed howinsistent Brezhnev was in emphasizing that the Americans did not get directly
involved in the conflict, as if he was trying to divert anti-American criticism. He told
the Central Committee that Brezhnev thought it necessary to maintain and even
increase support for the Arabs, so as to avoid losing important political positions in
the area.41 When it came to his opinions, Ceausescu stressed that the military and
intelligence factors had not been discussed, even though they were most important.
Moreover, he added, the Arabs � and Nasser in particular � had made numerous
mistakes, alienating the world from their cause.42 Ceausescu implied that the Sovietswere to be blamed for encouraging Nasser in his mistakes.
Ceausescu kept returning to the failure of military and intelligence factors espe-
cially because it was Moscow who provided military assistance. As he was trying to
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assert his independence in the communist bloc, Ceausescu was interested in exploit-
ing any Soviet weakness to his advantage. The weaker the Soviet position was, the
stronger was Ceausescu’s and the safer was his struggle for independence. He noticed
Brezhnev’s attempt at exculpation, and he perceived it as an Achilles’ heel and took
advantage of it.The meeting adopted a Declaration, parallel to the one adopted in Moscow,
emphasizing Romania’s right to defend its own separate positions. The Romanian
Declaration contained a few key points which are very important for understanding
Ceausescu’s position. One of them was that the use of force cannot solve issues of
international relations.43 This phrase � although general in character � was aimed
at Moscow, which provided the Arabs with arms, somehow encouraging the idea
that force can help solve issues. A second aim was principled: as a small state, Roma-
nia had often fought against the use of force in international relations, since law andregulations were its only guarantee for security. The meaning of security, in this
respect, was obviously not related to the Cold War bipolar confrontation.
Another key point of the Declaration was its condemnation of American imperial-
ism and its solidarity with the struggle of the Arab peoples. It may very easily seem a
contradiction, but it was more of a strategic manoeuvre. Such phrases were always
inserted in official documents which expressed opposition to Moscow as an insurance
against criticism. The fact remained that, behind this rhetoric, Romania did not take
any measure directed against Israel and remained the only Warsaw Pact country notto break off diplomatic relations with Israel. Under these circumstances, phrases
expressing solidarity with the Arabs could not have been more than propaganda.
Differences between action and rhetoric were often used as safe strategies for com-
bating Soviet domination.
In other words, the conclusion of the Declaration was that Ceausescu did maintain
his position, but in a cautious manner. On the other hand, considering the expression
of support for the Arabs as a contradiction would completely ignore the basic prem-
ise of Romania’s position. As further evidence will prove, Romania’s position wasnot dictated by sympathy or enmity either for the Israelis or for the Arabs, but only
by its necessity to take advantage of the Soviet weakness in order to assert its inde-
pendence. What dictated Romania’s position on the Six Day War was only the ratio-
nale of its relations with Moscow.
Two days after the Plenary of the Central Committee, Ceausescu decided to do more
in order to publicize Romania’s position. The Soviet announcement regarding the
breaking of relations between the USSR (and other Warsaw Pact countries)prompted intense debates among journalists and diplomats in Bucharest and that
might have been one of the reasons Ceausescu decided to continue Romania’s
strategy. There were also debates regarding Israel’s reluctance to withdraw from the
occupied territories.
After the Plenary, the war in the Middle East was discussed again, in the Perma-
nent Presidium of the party, on 11 June 1967 and the next day a larger body was con-
voked, the Executive Committee of PCR. Ceausescu told the participants that, in his
view, Romania had not done everything it could to clarify its position and helppromote the peaceful resolution of the conflict.44 Once embarked on this road,
Ceausescu was probably aiming to take full advantage of the situation.
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He asked the Executive Committee to approve a new diplomatic initiative with the
purpose of promoting the content of the CC Declaration from 10 June 1967.
The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of compiling a diplomatic
note to be handed to the Egyptian and Israeli ambassadors in Bucharest in which the
Romanian government would reiterate the principles presented in the CC Declara-tion and also warn of the risks to world peace from this war. Ceausescu’s argument
was that the cessation of hostilities did not mean the end of the conflict, not even in
the short term. In his opinion, there was a major risk of a new outbreak of war gener-
ated by the unconditional support the Arabs were receiving from abroad.45 He was
obviously referring to the Soviet decision to break diplomatic relations with Israel.
That decision, Ceausescu stated, encouraged Arab nationalism. Also, he reiterated
his previous idea that if the Arabs had not been supported in the past and if they had
been advised wisely, the war might have been avoided.As for Israel, Ceausescu also pointed out that its refusal to withdraw from the
occupied territories augmented the risks. Israel, he stressed, had to be warned of
these risks and pressured to withdraw. Still, the note that was going to be
addressed to the Israeli ambassador should not adopt a threatening tone and must
not in any way suggest a potential break of relations, he added. This, Ceausescu
concluded, would only encourage the other side.46 After the meeting, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs compiled the note and Foreign Minister Corneliu M�anescu sum-
moned the representatives of Egypt and Israel, but also those of the United States,United Kingdom and France.47 Romania was aiming for full visibility with its
initiative.
M.F. Hamad, the ambassador of the United Arab Republic in Bucharest, com-
plained to Corneliu M�anescu that according to his information Romania permitted
a group of Jewish volunteers to leave for Israel, to join the fight. If this were true,
Hamad added, his government would consider it an unfriendly gesture. M�anescufirmly denied the accusation.48 After he had been presented with the note, Hamad
engaged in criticism of the Americans, in his opinion, who were to blame for the war.The United States orchestrated the entire attack on Egypt and Syria, he claimed,
using Israel as a tool, and offered air cover for the Israelis during the operations. It
was the same idea that Brezhnev had denied two days before. Corneliu M�anescuinsisted on those parts of the note and CC Declaration which expressed solidarity
with the Arabs but did not forget to mention that liquidating Israel could not be a
solution for the Arabs’ problems.49
During the same afternoon, Corneliu M�anescu met the Israeli ambassador and
emphasized his government’s concern in reference to public statements made by vari-ous Israeli officials according to which Israel would consider keeping the occupied
territories. The solution to the conflict had to be acceptable for both parties involved,
M�anescu stressed.50 The Israeli ambassador returned the next day, on 13 June 1967,
with an official answer from his government. Romania’s position had certainly
caught the attention of governmental circles in Tel Aviv, since the ambassador
repeated that Israel was thankful for Romania’s ‘wise’ position concerning the
war.51 Furthermore, he offered assurances that his country was not interested in ter-
ritorial annexations but only concerned to ensure its access to international waters.In this respect, he told Corneliu M�anescu that his government was asking Romania
to help bring the Arabs to the negotiating table. At the end of their second meeting,
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the ambassador pointed out to M�anescu that, apart from what was being said, Israel
was not in the hands of the imperialists and was not anybody’s tool.52
On 12 June 1967, Corneliu M�anescu also presented the note to the American
ambassador, Richard Davis. This time, M�anescu insisted that, in Romania’s view,
all states must refrain from interferences in the domestic affairs of the Middle Eastand must encourage a negotiated solution. He also mentioned his government’s con-
cern about rumours that Israel might be considering annexing the occupied territo-
ries and emphasized the importance of Israeli withdrawal in order to create a climate
favourable for negotiations. Richard Davis underlined that his own government held
similar views and promised to transmit the note to Washington immediately.53 The
Americans were probably very pleased with Romania’s attitude, not only for defying
the Soviets, but also for the implicit support it granted to Israel.
These favourable impressions were confirmed days later, when Romanian PremierI.Gh. Maurer travelled to New York in order to take part in the extraordinary ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly, devoted to the situation in the Middle East.
Shortly after the famous ‘Glasboro summit’, Maurer had a meeting with President
Lyndon Johnson, discussing international and bilateral relations. Lyndon Johnson
expressed his appreciation for the Romanian position and hopes that Romanians
too would contribute to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In a document
addressed to President Johnson before his meeting with Maurer, the State Depart-
ment characterized Romania in most favourable terms:
Romania has steered a middle course which differs sharply from the anti-Israeli
positions of the other Communist countries. Bucharest has not accused Israel of
aggression nor broken relations with Israel [. . .]. We are gratified that the Roma-
nian Government has called upon the parties involved to resolve their differen-
ces on the basis of their respective interests.54
Increasing his foreign support and international prestige was essential for
Ceausescu in his fight for autonomy and independence from the Soviet Union. It
was not only political support, but also economic, that Ceausescu was counting on
to receive from the West. At the time, Romania was making great efforts to obtain
‘Most Favoured Nation’ status from the United States. Reorienting the country’s
trade policy towards the West had been, since Gheorghiu-Dej’s late years, one of the
most important instruments in combating Soviet influence and domination. But a
western-oriented trade policy did not exclude other non-western partners, such asdeveloping countries, especially the non-aligned.
Later on, commercial relations with third world countries proved to be a very
important outlet for Romania’s economy. In the immediate aftermath of the war,
Ceausescu’s position managed to improve Romania’s relations not only with the
United States, but also with Iran. Nasser’s policies in the Arab world did not arouse
much enthusiasm in Iran, a country that, above everything, remained a monarchy.
Egypt’s involvement in the Yemen war and also Nasser’s efforts to unite the Arabs
in one state raised much suspicion in Teheran, where his policies were perceived asexpansionist. Fearing a ‘Nasserist’ expansion in the region and calculating that the
Americans would not intervene due to their involvement in Vietnam, Iran decided to
approach the Soviets in order to gain support.55
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Author Ami Gluska raised a hypothetical question recently regarding a potential
‘Iranian’ rationale for Moscow’s warning addressed to Nasser in May 1967. Gluska
asked whether or not Moscow was trying to convince Nasser that Israel was a threat
so as to have him withdraw from Yemen and serve Iran’s interests that way. This
would certainly not deny other motivations and explanations that had been investi-gated previously, but would only add one more reason for the Soviet initiative.
Gluska noticed that the Soviet warning to Nasser, in May 1967, referred to a ridicu-
lously high number of Israeli divisions which the author categorized as ‘blatantly
false information’.56
Irrespective of this, it was evident that Iran’s interests did not coincide with
Egypt’s and that was perceptible in Romanian�Iranian relations, as well. Iran
noticed Romania’s decision not to support Nasser in the war and tried to approach
the Romanians in the following period. The first post-war contact occurred on14 June 1967, when the Iranian ambassador in Bucharest, Soltan Hossein Vakili
Sanandaji, was received by Ceausescu in an audience. The Iranian ambassador
wished to express his government’s appreciation for Romania’s position in the Six
Day War and also to address an invitation to Ceausescu for a visit to Iran.57
The ambassador told Ceausescu that his government considered Romania’s posi-
tion as ‘realistic’ and observed with satisfaction the similitude between the Romanian
and Iranian positions. Furthermore, he added, his government could not accept
threats of liquidation directed against any state and considered that responsibilityfor everything that happened belonged solely to the United Arab Republic. Iran was
of the opinion that Nasser ultimately caused the crisis when he decided to close the
straits, which had been unacceptable to Israel.58 Ceausescu did not make any com-
mitments to the ambassador; he just repeated the basic features of the CC Declara-
tion and postponed his answer concerning a visit to Iran.59 Ceausescu certainly
understood that, given the nature of Iranian�Egyptian relations, his visit to Teheran
shortly after the war would have implied support for anti-Nasser positions. His
refusal suggests that he was not interested in transmitting such signals, but preferredto maintain a neutral stance.
A neutral stance did not prevent Ceausescu from welcoming the Iranian minister
of foreign affairs in Bucharest, Ardeshir Zahedi, in August that year. Zahedi
explained to Ceausescu that his country did not have good relations with Egypt
only because Egypt’s foreign policy was aimed at imperialist domination over other
Arab countries, something that Iran could not accept. In his opinion, when Nasser
closed the straits, that left Israel with no option other than war.60 Ceausescu did not
engage in comments concerning Egypt’s foreign policy, but only repeated what hadbeen said before, that Romania would not accept the liquidation of any state in the
world.
Instead, Ceausescu focused on issues of development and cooperation. Romania’s
primary interest in the Middle East region was basically commercial and most of its
relations in the region began with economic cooperation. Ceausescu told Zahedi
that, from his perspective, a country’s independence was strictly related to its eco-
nomic and social development, which was why international cooperation was impor-
tant as a factor in overcoming underdevelopment. He also insisted that small statesshould claim their right to have a say in international relations.61 Ceausescu’s visit to
Iran was brought up again, but no decision was made at that point.
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The way Ceausescu handled Romania’s relations with Iran at that point is illumi-
nating for his foreign policy and his position in the Six Day War. He managed to por-
tray Romania as an independent and neutral factor but carefully avoided taking
sides. Even though Romania’s relations with the United States improved � and
Ceausescu was in need of that � still, almost all public documents continued todenounce American imperialism. That represented an implicit insurance for the
Soviets that Romania was not going to betray its Warsaw Pact status, but instead it
chose to pursue autonomy of decision from the inside. This reveals that Romania’s
position regarding the Six Day War was not related to its direct interests in the region,
but was only a manifestation of a larger and elaborate doctrine of foreign policy. In
order to understand that position, another factor has to be added to the analysis: China.
China, the Soviet Union and Romania were all countries with a single-party systemand all parties derived their claimed legitimacy from the ideology of Marxist-Lenin-
ism. In such a situation, relations at party level and ideological argumentations often
came before state relations or at least augmented them. Romania’s opposition to the
Soviet Union had been ideologically justified, and so was China’s. Ever since the
foundation of the Comintern, communists worldwide had indulged in the idea that
their movement was international and, as long as Stalin was alive, international com-
munism had been under Moscow’s control. Khrushchev’s mistakes in foreign policy
drove many parties away from the Soviet Union � China was only the most impor-tant case. Leonid Brezhnev’s plan was to restore Moscow’s control over world com-
munism. In order to achieve that, Brezhnev employed great efforts to reunite the
communist parties of the world in an international conference with the purpose of
rallying these parties against China.
At party and ideology level, this was the context of Ceausescu’s resistance to
Moscow. Romania’s relationship with China was very important not because the
Romanians assimilated the Chinese anti-Soviet argumentation, but because it helped
demonstrate their non-submission to Moscow’s leadership. Ideology too helped con-solidate their non-submission by providing exactly the kind of justification to which
Moscow could not react. Ceausescu did not assimilate Chinese criticism of the Soviet
Union, but implicitly confirmed it, as he refused to act against it. His confirmation
also derived from the fact that he not only refused to accept any attack on China,
but even fought hard to maintain good relations with it. The Six Day War was a
complicated problem. While the Soviet Union and its satellites decided to blame
Israel for everything, Ceausescu’s ‘special’ position emerged from this very difference.
But, on the other hand, China too had blamed Israel and � in this respect � was incontradistinction to the Romanians.
As mentioned previously, China supported the Arab world, and especially Nasser,
in its ‘anti-imperialist’ struggle. As tensions were growing in the Middle East,
Chinese policy-makers did not hesitate to show their committed support for the
Arab cause and denounced Israel as an instrument of ‘imperialist’ aggression � and
much more so when the war broke out. On the second day of military operations,
the Chinese government issued a statement condemning the ‘Israeli aggression’ and
accusing Israel of being nothing more than a ‘product of US and British imperialistpolicy of aggression’. The statement accused the United States of having instigated
and supported the attack and also accused ‘the Soviet revisionist clique’ of ‘conniving
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at the aggression committed by Israel’.62 It was to become a feature of Chinese dis-
course on the Six Day War to blame the Soviet Union for conspiring against the
Arabs along with Israel and the United States.
The Chinese competed with Moscow for influence in the third world and this is
why their propaganda often accused the Soviets of having betrayed the cause of therevolution in favour of cooperation with the imperialists.63 It did so in the case of the
Vietnam War, as well. In his classic analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Alfred D.
Low emphasized how China was much noisier in blaming the Israelis for their
‘aggression’ as compared with the USSR.64 Both in the case of the Six Day War and
the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union favoured a negotiated settlement and China
took advantage of this to ‘denounce’ it as betrayal. In a more recent study, Elizabeth
Wishnick noted how concerned Moscow was by this ‘irrational’ and dangerous pol-
icy pursued by the Chinese.65 As for the Romanians, their challenge was to maintaingood relations with the Chinese, in spite of existing divergences, without rallying to
either side, the Soviets or the Chinese.
Romanian Premier I.Gh. Maurer visited China in July 1967 with a message from
American President Lyndon Johnson. When in New York a few weeks before,
President Johnson had asked Maurer to transmit his willingness to engage in unof-
ficial negotiations, but Maurer had other things on his agenda, as well. His visit to
China was the first opportunity for the Romanians to discuss the developments in
the Middle East and compare their positions and arguments, given the fact thatthey were so different.
During his conversations with Zhou Enlai, Maurer presented his party’s position
more clearly than what usually appeared in the press or public statements. Maurer
told Zhou Enlai that, from the Romanian point of view, there had been two major
mistakes. The first mistake belonged to the Soviets. Their evaluation of the situation
had been erroneous, in spite of the input of a large number of councillors, and
concerned both the over-estimation of Egypt’s military capacity and an under-
estimation of Israel’s. The second mistake belonged to the Egyptians, who shouldnot have closed the straits, and should not have aimed to destroy Israel. The Soviet
policy in the Middle East was simply ‘dangerous’ said Maurer.66
Zhou Enlai told Maurer that he preferred the word ‘treacherous’ in reference to
the Soviet policies. He appeared to be surprised when told by Maurer about the num-
ber of Soviet advisers in Egypt and claimed to have been unaware of it. Surely, he
concluded, their presence there must have been the cause of the failure.67 Maurer
informed the Chinese that the Romanian leadership was not familiar with the degree
of Soviet involvement in the Middle East and only found out about it at the meetingin Moscow. The two disagreed in regard to the American involvement in the opera-
tions. Zhou Enlai appeared to be convinced that the Americans took an active part
in the military operations, by offering air cover for Israel or more. Maurer assured
him � as Brezhnev tried to assure communist leaders gathered in Moscow on 9 June
1967 � that the Americans had not been directly involved.68
Furthermore, Zhou Enlai was also convinced that the Americans had orchestrated
the entire attack and that Israel was nothing more than an instrument. As for the
Soviets, the Chinese Premier was certain that they had betrayed the Arabs in favourof an arrangement with the Americans simply because Moscow did not have the
courage to take its support to the limits.69 The fact that the Chinese were indeed
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afraid of Soviet�American world domination was stressed by Zhang Baijia in a
recent study on Chinese�American relations and the idea surfaced in almost all
records of Romanian�Chinese meetings as well.70 Romania, on the other hand, was
not willing to take such support to the limits, either. As Liu Yong argued, internal
Chinese documents categorized the Romanians as ‘revisionists’ too, but ChairmanMao thought that they deserved support for their anti-Soviet stance.71
In spite of differences of opinion, two things are clear from the transcript of
Maurer’s talks with Zhou Enlai: firstly, neither side was willing to change its posi-
tion, although that did not prevent them from having good relations, and secondly,
what united them was indeed the anti-Soviet stance, irrespective of its substance.
Maurer and Zhou Enlai agreed that both parties considered the Soviet policy in the
Middle East wrong, but for different reasons. Nevertheless, Maurer resumed
Romania’s position on the Six Day War as a refusal to vouch for Soviet policies:
I need to show that we did not sign the declaration in Moscow because we did
not want to offer cover, in this way, for a policy that was done in a certain man-
ner. Obviously, the declaration contained a large number of issues which should
not have been approached that way but the declaration’s aim was mainly to
express the solidarity of all Socialist countries that are members of the Warsaw
Pact with the policy carried out by the Soviet Union in this region.72
Zhou Enlai remarked positively on Romania’s refusal to vouch for Soviet policies,
but he did express his surprise to that Tito of Yugoslavia, above all, vouched for
those policies.73 The Chinese did not think highly of the Yugoslavs and blamed Tito
for ‘revisionism’ as well, but Romanians had better relations with Yugoslavia. Still,
Maurer’s visit to China was an important step for Ceausescu because it confirmed
his ‘special’ relations with China, in spite of the fact that differences concerning the
Six Day War were not the major challenge in Sino-Romanian relations. Once again,he managed to dispute Moscow’s domination without disturbing the delicate balance
of the PCR’s neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split.
But the PCR’s position concerning Moscow’s policies in the Middle East involved
another component just as controversial: relations with the Israeli Communist Party.
The Israeli communists had always been divided into two groups, Jews and Arabs;
however, the differences were not only ethnic, but referred to the very existence of
the state of Israel. Starting from the mid-1950s, Moscow chose to support the Arabs
in their conflict with Israel, which placed the Israeli Communist Party (MAKI) in avery delicate position. Especially after 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev denounced
Stalin’s cult of personality, more and more Arabs from MAKI raised their voices to
condemn the recognition of Israel by the Soviet Union as a ‘Stalinist mistake’. The
Jewish members of the party opposed such a view.74
Two factions thus developed, one led by Meir Vilner and Toufiq Toubi, representing
the Arab point of view, and another led by Moshe Sneh and Shmuel Mikunis, represent-
ing the Jewish point of view. The Arab states managed to convince numerous communist
leaders to condemn the creation of the state of Israel, but men like Sneh and Mikunisalways distanced themselves from such positions.75 The rupture occurred in 1965, when
the party split into two different parties. Given the nature of its policies, Moscow sup-
ported the Vilner faction and his party from the beginning, but Sneh and Mikunis still
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hoped to convince Moscow to moderate the Arabs.76 When the war broke out, MAKI,
led by Sneh and Mikunis, chose to support the Israeli government, unlike the Vilner
group. This attracted great criticism of MAKI, from both Moscow and the many other
communist parties, except, of course, from the PCR.
The Romanians did not make a radical decision to recognize or support just one ofthe two parties, but they chose to maintain good relations with MAKI while consid-
ering the Vilner group just a faction. Such a position was, once again, in collision
with Moscow’s policies, but was nevertheless consistent with Romanian policies at
the state level. Personally, Ceausescu seemed much more receptive of Mikunis’ ideas,
as he told Santiago Carillo during their meeting in May 1967. Ceausescu explained
to Carillo that the PCR leadership had received two letters, one from the Syrian
Communist Party asking for help against Israel, and one from MAKI, signed by
Shmuel Mikunis, in which MAKI made an appeal against war. Ceausescu toldCarillo in late May 1967 that events in the Middle East region were not very clear to
him, but he found Mikunis’ point of view much more balanced.77
Earlier that month, Romania’s minister in Tel Aviv, V. Georgescu, had a conver-
sation with Shmuel Mikunis and reported to Bucharest about it. Mikunis told
Georgescu that, in his view, Moscow’s position regarding MAKI was nothing
more than a reflection of Soviet policies towards Israel. The Soviets were willing to
sacrifice the Israeli communists for the sake of keeping the friendship of the Arabs.
Moreover, Mikunis said, the Soviets encouraged Vilner’s faction and asked othercommunist parties to do the same.78 This, of course, went against Ceausescu’s
understanding of inter-party relations. He denounced such interference himself,
when it came to the PCR, which may have influenced the decision-making process
in early June 1967.
Shortly after the war ended, Mikunis returned to Georgescu, complaining about
Moscow’s position on the events. Mikunis was disgusted and asked rhetorically why
Moscow categorized Israel as a ‘pro-imperialist’ country and Nasser as ‘anti-imperi-
alist’, even though it was widely known that Nasser had massacred many Egyptiancommunists. Moscow, said Mikunis, asked MAKI to do everything possible to pre-
vent the Israeli government from entering a war against the Arab peoples but did
nothing to convince Nasser to open the straits.79 Furthermore, Mikunis had another
rhetorical question that Ceausescu himself raised on several occasions: why would
Moscow break off relations with Israel for the reason of a claimed ‘aggression’ and
not do the same with the United States, a country that was clearly an ‘aggressor’
when it came to the Vietnam War.80
The Soviet position, concluded Mikunis, was circumstantial; it was not dictated bythe principles of Marxist-Leninism, but by the USSR’s political interests as a state.81
That was precisely the Romanian point of view in relation to Moscow’s position in
world communism. In a Plenary of the Central Committee of the PCR that took
place in March 1967, shortly after Ceausescu’s return from a visit to Moscow, one of
the speakers, Stefan Voicu, grandiloquently declared:
I have all the love and admiration for the Soviet Union, but there has to be anend to this idea that everything that corresponds to the Soviet Union’s interests,
as a state, not as a socialist country, but as a state, is assimilated with the global
interests of international socialism.82
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A year earlier, Ceausescu himself had delivered a similar speech, at the PCR’s for-
tieth anniversary.83 Neither of the two speeches had anything to do with the situation
in the Middle East, which demonstrates that such positions had existed long before.
In fact, they represented the ideological substance of Romania’s policy of autonomy
in the communist bloc and may explain the sympathy the PCR and Ceausescu per-sonally manifested for Mikunis and his cause. Ceausescu remained faithful to his
opinions: later on, at the beginning of 1968, when Moscow was busy trying to orga-
nize a world conference of communist parties, he again stood up for MAKI and for
Mikunis, who had not been invited to the conference. In a discussion with Alvaro
Cunhal, leader of the Portuguese Communist Party, Ceausescu expressed his discon-
tent at the fact that only Vilner’s faction received an invitation to the conference. On
what basis, he asked rhetorically, had Moscow decided that Vilner, and not Mikunis,
was a real communist and deserved to participate in such a conference.84
The analysis of recently declassified documents from the archives of the former
Romanian Communist Party demonstrates that Romania’s position regarding the
Six Day War was not circumstantial or hazardous, but the product of a very well-
elaborated foreign policy. At the time, the Romanian communists were aiming to
assert their independence in the Soviet bloc, their freedom to make their own deci-
sions, without interferences from the USSR. In order to achieve that, the PCR took
advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and proclaimed its neutrality in the name of equal-ity among communist parties.
Nicolae Ceausescu and his party were interested to affirm Romania’s specific inter-
ests as a small state, in a world dominated by the two Cold War superpowers. As a
Soviet satellite, Romania’s policy of affirmation was directed against the Soviet
Union and its hegemony. Therefore, Ceausescu and his party refused to emulate
Soviet initiatives in the field of foreign policy, unlike most Soviet satellites, and pre-
ferred a rebellious stand, justified not by Cold War confrontations, but Romania’s
specific interests. At the party level, the Romanians did the same, fighting againstMoscow’s attempts to regain its lost position as the centre of world communism.
In these circumstances, Romania’s position regarding the Six Day War was implic-
itly a product of Romanian�Soviet relations. At both party and state level, the
Romanians had nothing much to lose from obeying Soviet ‘instructions’ and break-
ing diplomatic relations with Israel. But doing that, as Premier Maurer told Zhou
Enlai, would have implied vouching for Soviet policies that were implemented
without consulting Romania. The refusal to vouch for those policies had a principled
cause referring to the rejection of subordination. This is proved by the fact thatRomania not only refused to break diplomatic relations with Israel, but also
maintained good relations with MAKI, a party that had been practically
‘excommunicated’ by Moscow.
It would not be far-fetched to claim that, otherwise, Ceausescu was convinced of
the just character of his position and that his arguments were sincere. But, beyond
that, the analysis of archival sources demonstrates that his opposition to the Soviet
position and its argumentation often referred to mistakes made by Moscow in rela-
tion to Egypt. On numerous occasions he suggested that Moscow’s policy was incor-rect in offering unlimited support to the Arabs and raised questions concerning the
effectiveness of Soviet military and intelligence capacities. It is this author’s
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conclusion that Romania’s position regarding the Six Day War was determined by
the country’s policy of contesting the primacy of the Soviet Union and asserting its
right to make independent decisions in foreign policy, according to specific Roma-
nian interests. In the long run, this helped improve Ceausescu’s visibility and prestige
in international affairs and helped foster a ‘special’ relationship between Romaniaand Israel that was going to survive for many decades to come.
Notes
This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS-
UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-1056.
1. D. Turnock, Aspects of Independent Romania’s Economic History With Particular Reference to
Transition for EU Accession (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p.32.
2. V. Tism�aneanu, Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), p.420. For the original text of the Declaration,
see: Declaratie cu privire la pozitia Partidului Muncitoresc Roman ın problemele misc�arii comuniste si
muncitoresti internationale adoptat�a de Plenara l�argit�a a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964 (Bucuresti:
Editura Politic�a, 1964), pp.55�6.
3. M.J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 2003), p.17. On Ceausescu’s accession to power, see R. Forrest,
‘Nicolae Ceausescu, The “Great Genius of the Carpathians”’, in B.J. Fischer (ed.), Balkan Strong-
men: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue
University Press, 2007), pp.319�36.
4. D. Petrescu, ‘Building the Nation, Instrumentalizing Nationalism: Revisiting Romanian National-
Communism, 1956�1989’, Nationalities Papers, Vol.37, No.4 (2009), p.532.
5. R. de Nevers, Comrades No More: The Seeds of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2003), pp.240�41; A. Romano, From D�etente in Europe to European D�etente: How the
West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), pp.29�30.
6. D. Deletant, ‘Taunting the Bear: Romania and the Warsaw Pact 1963�89’, Cold War History, Vol.4
(2007), p.496.
7. N. Ceausescu, Romania pe drumul des�avarsirii constructiei socialiste. Rapoarte, cuvant�ari, articole.
Iulie 1965�Septembrie 1966 (Bucuresti: Editura Politic�a, 1968), p.357.8. L. Yong, Sino-Romanian Relations 1950s�1960s (Bucuresti: Institutul National pentru Studiul
Totalitarismului, 2006), p.264.
9. Y. Ro’i, ‘Soviet Policy toward the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow’s Relations with Egypt
and Syria’, in Y. Ro’i and B. Morozov (eds.), The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 3.
10. R. Ginat, ‘The Soviet Union: The Roots of War and a Reassessment of Historiography’, in W.R.
Louis and A. Shlaim (eds.), The 1967 Arab�Israeli War: Origins and Consequences (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.200.
11. Ibid., p.201.
12. O.I. Natufe, Soviet Policy in Africa: From Lenin to Brezhnev (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2011), p.285.
13. O.A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.198.
14. Avner Cohen, ‘Israel and the Bomb’, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p.264.
15. R.B. Parker, ‘The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored’, Middle East Journal, Vol.46, No.2
(1992), pp.180�82.
16. I.W. Zartman, ‘The United Nations Response’, in R.B Parker (ed.), The Six Day War: A Retrospec-
tive (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), p.82.
17. R. Popp, ‘Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War’, Middle East Journal, Vol.60, No.2 (2006),
pp.289�90.
18. Ginat, ‘The Soviet Union: The Roots of War’, p.212.
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19. Z. Baijia, ‘The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States,
1954�1970’, in R.S. Ross and J. Changbin (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War: US�China Diplomacy,
1954�1973 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p.62.
20. D.H. Shin, ‘Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World’, in R. Rotberg
(ed.), China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2008), p.157.
21. D.H. Shin and J. Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2012), pp.229�30.
22. C. Stanciu, ‘Romania’s Policy in the Middle East 1950�1970. Challenges and Opportunities’, Vala-
hian Journal of Historical Studies, No.15 (2011), pp.82�3.
23. ‘Not�a privind prima sesiune a comisiei economice guvernamentale mixte romano-RAU’ [Note
Regarding the First Session of the Mixed Romanian�Egyptian Governmental Economic Commis-
sion], National Historical Archives of Romania (ANIC), fund CC al PCR � sectia Cancelarie,
dossier No.15/1966, p.41.
24. ‘Raport privind deplasarea ın Israel a delegatiei ıns�arcinat�a cu discutarea unor probleme de cooper-
are economic�a si tehnico-stiintific�a’ [Report Regarding the Visit to Israel Paid by the Delegation in
Charge of Discussing Issues of Economic and Technical-Scientific Cooperation], ANIC, fund CC al
PCR � sectia Cancelarie, dossier No.48/1967, p.118.
25. Protocol no. 31 al sedintei Prezidiului Permanent al CC al PCR din ziua de 5 iunie 1967 [Protocol
No.31 of the Meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the CC of PCR which took place on 5 June
1967], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Cancelarie, dossier no. 81/1967, p.2.
26. ‘Apelul Guvernului Republicii Socialiste Romania pentru ıncetarea ostilit�aților ın Orientul Apropiat’
[The Appeal of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania for the Cessation of Hostilities
in the Near East], Scınteia, 6 June 1967.
27. Stenograma convorbirilor dintre tovar�asul Nicolae Ceausescu, secretar general al CC al PCR, șitovar�asul Santiago Carillo, secretar general al Partidului Comunist din Spania [Record of the Talks
between Cmd. Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the CC of PCR and Cmd. Santiago Carillo,
Secretary General of PCE], ANIC, fund CC al PCR� sectia Relatii Externe, dossier No.38/1967, p.75.
28. Stanciu, ‘Romania’s Policy in the Middle East’, p.84.
29. Note de la ıntalnirea conduc�atorilor partidelor comuniste și muncitorești și a guvernelor socialiste,
Moscova, 9 iunie 1967 [Notes from the Meeting of the Leaders of Communist and Workers’ Parties
and of Socialist Governments, Moscow, 9 June 1967], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.43/1967.
30. Ibid., pp.5�10.
31. Ibid., pp.19�23.
32. Ibid., pp.15�17.
33. S. Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962�1967
(Washington DC: WoodrowWilson Center Press, 2009), p.86.
34. Note de la ıntalnirea conduc�atorilor. . ., pp.16�17.
35. Ibid., p.26.
36. Ibid., pp.29�31.
37. Ibid., p.33.
38. Ibid., pp.35�6.
39. Y. Govrin, Israeli�Soviet Relations, 1953�1967: From Confrontation to Disruption (London: Frank
Cass, 1998), p.320.
40. Stenograma ședinței Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman din ziua de 10 iunie 1967
[Record of the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party which took
place on 10 June 1967], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Cancelarie, dossier No.88/1967.
41. Ibid., pp.5�8.
42. Ibid., pp.11�12.
43. ‘Declarația Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman și a guvernului Republicii Socialiste
Romania cu privire la situația din Orientul Apropiat’ [Declaration of the Central Committee of the
Romanian Communist Party and of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania Regard-
ing the Situation in the Near East], Scınteia, 11 June 1967, p.1.
44. Stenograma ședinței Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 12 iunie 1967 [Record of the
Meeting of the Executive Committee of CC of PCR which took place on 12 June 1967], ANIC, fund
CC al PCR � sectia Cancelarie, dossier No.90/1967.
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45. Ibid., p.6.
46. Ibid., p.7.
47. ‘Primiri la ministrul de externe al Romaniei’, Scınteia, 12 June 1967, p.4.
48. Not�a de audienț�a 17/00308 [Note of Audience 17/00308], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.114/1967, pp.8�9.
49. Ibid., pp.11�12.
50. Not�a de audienț�a 17/00304 [Note of Audience 17/00304], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.114/1967, pp.22�4.
51. Not�a de audienț�a 17/00307 [Note of Audience 17/00307], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.114/1967, p.17.
52. Ibid., pp.18�19.
53. Not�a de audienț�a 17/00306 [Note of Audience 17/00306], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.114/1967, pp.14�15.
54. D. Preda, ‘Foreign Policy of the United States and Romania. New Evidences, 1963�1969’, Totalitari-
anism Archives, Nos.1�2 (2002), p.263.
55. A. Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War. Government, Armed Forces and
Defence Policy, 1963�1967 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p.115.
56. Ibid., p.115.
57. Not�a de convorbire [Memorandum of Conversation], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.46/1967, p.4.
58. Ibid., pp.2�3.
59. Ibid., p.4.
60. Stenograma primirii de c�atre tovar�asul Nicolae Ceausescu, secretar general al CC al PCR, ın ziua de
18 august 1967, la Eforie Nord, a ministrului afacerilor externe al Iranului, Ardeshir Zahedi [Record
of the Meeting which Took Place between Cmd. Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the CC of
PCR and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Ardeshir Zahedi, on 18 August 1967, in Eforie
Nord], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii Externe, dossier No.62/1967, p.8.
61. Ibid., pp.21�2.
62. ‘Firm Support for the Arab People’s Fight Against US�Israeli Aggression’, Pekin Review, No.24
(1967), p.8.
63. Q. Zhai, ‘Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965�1968: New Evidence from Chinese Sources’,
Cold War International History Project Working Paper, No.18 (June 1997), p.17.
64. A.D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute. An Analysis of the Polemics (London: Associated University
Press, 1976), pp.241.3.
65. E. Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy, from Brezhnev to Yeltsin
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p.31.
66. Stenograma discuțiilor avute cu ocazia vizitei delegației de partid și guvernamentale a Republicii
Socialiste Romania ın Republica Popular�a Chinez�a [Record of the Discussions Held on the Occasion
of the Visit Paid by a Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the People’s Republic of
China], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Reșații Externe, dossier No.49/1967.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Z. Baijia, ‘The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States,
1954�1970’, in Ross and Changbin (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War: US�China Diplomacy,
1954�1973, p.59.
71. Yong, Sino-Romanian Relations, pp.165�6.
72. Stenogram�a discuțiilor . . . Chinez�a, p.52.73. Ibid.
74. P. Ginossar, ‘From Zionism to Communism and Back: The Case of Moshe Sneh (1948�1967)’, in J.
Frankel (ed.), Dark Times, Dire Decisions: Jews and Communism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), p.251.
75. Ibid., p.253.
76. I. Rabinovich and J. Reinhart, Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Reading on Society, Politics
and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England,
2008), p.596.
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77. Stenogram�a Ceausescu. . . Carillo, pp.74�5.
78. Informare cu privire la convorbirea avut�a cu tov. S. Mikunis, secretar general al PC din Israel [Infor-
mation Concerning the Conversation Held with Cmd. S. Mikunis, Secretary General of the Israeli
CP], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii Externe, dossier No.114/1967, pp.2�3.
79. Not�a de convorbire [Memorandum of Conversation], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.114/1967, pp.36�7.
80. Ibid., p.39.
81. Ibid., p.40.
82. Stenograma sedintei Plenare a CC al PCR din zilele de 27�28 martie 1967 [Record of the Plenary
Meeting of the CC of PCR Which Took Place on 27�28 March 1967], ANIC, fund CC al PCR �sectia Cancelarie, dossier No.43/1967, p.103.
83. Ceausescu, Romania pe drumul des�avarsirii constructiei socialiste, p.357.84. Stenograma primirii de c�atre tovar�asul Nicolae Ceausescu, secretar general al CC al PCR, a
tovar�asului Alvaro Cunhal, secretar general al CC al PC Portughez [Record of the Meeting between
Cmd. Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the CC of PCR of Cmd. Alvaro Cunhal, Secretary
General of the CC of Portuguese Communist Party], ANIC, fund CC al PCR � sectia Relatii
Externe, dossier No.11/1968, p.19.
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