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Enabling Parrhesia 1

ENABLING PARRHESIA: AN EXPLORATION OF THE CONSTRAINTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY ON MARGINALIZED CULTURAL GROUPS

Robert L. Heugel

Illinois State University


On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Attempting to affirm global devotion to preventing the

repetition of the atrocities of World War I, the preamble of the of the declaration declares, “the

advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom

from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people” (United

Nations, 2006). Unfortunately, this aspiration remains a seemingly unattainable proclamation.

As the transition from modernity continues, skepticism towards conventional rights discourse has

become more prevalent (Shestack, 1998). The recognition that the assumed provisionary

capabilities of rights discourse may have victimized the diverse potential of humanity has

become a prominent topic of critical thought (Savic, 1999). Specifically, the explicated purpose

of statist declarations to identify undeniable human rights has required the critical perspective to

explore what is deniable (Owen, 2001; The Belgrade Circle, 1999; Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin,

1995). Among other issues, the most prominent critical thinkers have considered this question.

Under this lens, the distinction between “freedom of speech and belief” and “freedom from fear”

in the preamble to the Declaration of Human Rights reflects the inability of statist provisions for

rights.

As Foucault (2001) demonstrates, the freest of speech is speech that occurs without fear:

parrhesia. Yet, parrhessia differs greatly from the conceptualization of free speech offered by

human rights discourse (Foucault, 2001). As the UN Declaration demonstrates, statist

identifications of freedom of expression are believed to be separate from freedom of fear.

Critical thinkers have shown that nothing could be further from the truth (Ashcroft, Griffiths,

Tiffin, 2002; Said, 2001; Foucault, 2001; Habermas, 1998; Levinas, 1998; Spivak, 1998;

Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 1995; Habermas, 1987). The possibilities of freedom of expression


are dependent upon the freedom from fear. Intercultural communication scholars have a

responsibility to consider these efforts because the intersections of intercultural communication

correspondingly merge differing levels of fearful speech (Bhabha, 1994). Consequently, this

paper seeks to review the critical perspective towards human rights in order to better understand

how our fundamental humanity may be actualized through parrhesia among intercultural groups

and individuals. To achieve this goal, a review of human rights critiques and applicable critical

perspectives will be undertook to allow for suggested directions for the field of intercultural

communication.

Critiques of Human Rights

While accepted in mainstream political rhetoric as the ends of the modern state, the

criticisms of human rights are varied and numerous (O’Neill, 2005; Peerenboom, 2005; Zhou,

2005; Langlois, 2004; Magnarella, 2004; Weissman, 2004; Bove, 2002; Xu, 2001; Ibhawoh,

2000; Wessner, 1999; Pollis, 1996). The ability to review the many opposing contentions

towards human rights is beyond the scope of this paper, but Orend’s (2002) synthesis of the

criticisms of human rights yielded five major questions about the validity of human rights:

“1. Do human rights exist?

2. Are human rights justified?

3. Are human rights affordable?

4. Are human rights universal?

5. Are human rights beneficial?” (p.155).

While not the most expansive discussion of human rights, consideration of these issues is

required of any thorough discussion of human rights.


First, the ability of human rights to transcend social constructionist advocacy remains in

doubt (Orend, 2002). Locke’s (1990) advocacy of inalienable human rights, upon which most

modern ideology about rights is based, requires the social construction of human rights to be

adamantly accepted by government and citizenries. However, Stammers (1999) advocates this

necessity jeopardizes the capabilities of human rights effectiveness because the inability to force

acceptance of social constructs is always present. Consequently, governments continue to ignore

human rights or alter interpretations, challenging rights discourse to provide its intended ends.

Next, human rights lack accepted justification as a standard of ethical negotiation (Orend,

2002). Generally, the classic argument against the cosmopolitan nature of human rights is

accusations of Eurocentrism (Mignolo, 2000). However, as Spivak (2004) demonstrates human

rights are often attempts to justify current actions amid a tattered past whereby human rights

advocacy is better described as “an alibi for interventions of various sorts” (p.524). Ultimately,

this view, which will be expanded in greater detail as a postcolonial perspective, contends that

the justifications of human rights remains questionable amid the possibilities of ulterior motives.

Pragmatically, Orend (2002) also argues that the criticism of human rights is often rooted

in the ability, or unwillingness, of statist entities to devote resources to a widespread

procurement of human rights. The persistence of rights violations globally is clearly indicative

of waning desires of global superpowers to invest resources into preventing rights violations

(Manby, 2004; Dommen, 2002). However, this issue is problematic because it demonstrates that

the promoted universality of human rights can be neglected if the price of enforcement is too

great.

While the economic negotiation of human rights reveals that the universality of human

rights is possibly deniable, human rights remain absent from several state agendas because of the


lack of universal acceptance (Orend, 2002). This quandary of universality exists mainly as an

extension of the debate between universal and cultural relativist views of ethics (Perry, 1997).

Several authors have demonstrated the inability of cultural beliefs to adequately translate

European concepts of human rights (Zhou, 2005; Allain, 2002; Quijano, 2000). However, the

primary problem with institutionalizing a universal view of rights is that other cultural primary

values are then usurped by European decisions of what is of primary importance (Freeman,

M.D.A., 2004). Essentially, this conflict emerges from one view that advocates a philosophical

basis of governmental (European) and opposing views that predominantly devote priority of state

actions to religious and secular considerations (Freeman, M.D.A., 2004).

Finally, the benefits of human rights have been questioned (Orend, 2002). Amid

persistent human rights violations, the supporting rhetoric of human rights seems increasingly

baseless. The ultimate goal of acknowledging human rights was to promote a vision of

fundamental humanity that would transcend all cultural views (Orend, 2002). The failure of the

human rights position has left many wondering if possible alternatives would be more beneficial

(Evans, 2005; Stammer, 1999; Otto, 1996).

The Foundations of Fearful Speech

The discussion of human rights is extremely extensive. While attempting to be inclusive,

this paper must ultimately consider which views best explore the relationship between human

rights deficiencies and intercultural communication. Consequently, this papers blends several

positions, but relies predominantly on the postcolonial perspective and Foucault’s analysis of

parrhesia.


An Overview of Postcolonialism

Participating in this discussion, the validity of human rights discourse has become a

consideration of postcolonialism (Muzaffar, 1999). The colonial perspective has identified the

devastation the colonial era implicated upon inhabited nations, but the social constructs of this

era also continue to dominate the colonial subject (Shome & Hegde, 2002). While the

controlling nature of colonial human rights seems mitigated when compared to the occupation of

European powers, Muzaffar (1999) contends that Western dominance of rights talk persists “in

ways which are which are more subtle and sophisticated but no less destructive and devastating”

(p.26). Postcolonialism has been extremely insightful in revealing the “subtle” manner in which

rights discourse constitutes a colonial source of dominance. Specifically, because of the

emphasis on the right to freedom of expression, postcolonialism warrants unique consideration in

a discussion of the implications of human rights in a communication context.

However, to fully understand this discussion, a brief explanation of postcolonial thought

is required. To begin, postcolonialism has no firmly accepted definition, resulting in academic

debate (Shome, R, 1998; Kavoori, 1990). However, Shome and Hedge’s (2002) description

provides an broad, inclusive definition: “postcolonial studies, broadly defined, is an

interdisciplinary field of inquiry committed to theorizing the problematics of colonization and

decolonization” (p.250). Inherently, this issue causes a departure from traditional research in

pursuit of more controversial issues that dominate culture (Hall, 1992). Predominantly, this

ideology results from the nature of postcolonialism, rooted chiefly in historical events, not

academic evolutions. Thus, human rights, as a Eurocentric creation, are considered to be an

extension of colonial control from this perspective (Carey, 2002; Slaugther, 1997). Further, the

historical basis of postcolonialism encourages consideration of issues, such as human rights,


within the context of colonial abuses of cultures (Carey, 2002; Slaugther, 1997). Thus,

postcolonialism, while expanding as a critical perspective, predominantly analyzes “the practices

and discourses administered by colonial agencies and their impact on indigenous societies after

independence” (Zompetti, 1997, p.163)

While challenging colonial structures, alternatively understood as the political

conceptualizations of modernity, such as human rights, postcolonialism differs from

postmodernism greatly. Instead of forwarding the decline of the subject, postcolonialism argues

that the subject is simply dominated by colonial structures (Shome, R. & Hegde, R., 2002).

Thus, if the influence of colonialism can be diminished, autonomous cultural and individual

development may occur. Thus, postcolonialism seems to argue that a rejection of modernity

does not necessarily constitute a rejection of the Subject. Instead, if provided with corrected

circumstances, autonomous the development of the individual and independent cultures may

occur. However, this does not mean that postmodern perspectives, such as Foucault’s analysis of

parrhesia, cannot compliment or justify the postcolonial perspective by critiquing modernity as

the most prominent of postcolonial scholars have demonstrated (Bhabha, 1994; Spivak, 1988;

Said, 2001, 1993, 1978). The difference exists in the direction that each perspective chooses to

take after modernism.

Provided with an overview of postcolonial views on rights discourse, it is now possible to

begin examining the basis of fear in speech by synthesizing three prominent thinkers: Foucault,

Bhabha, and Spivak.

Michel Foucault

Again, Foucault (2001) defines parrhesia as the ultimate freedom of expression – fearless

speech. Thus, providing a human right to free expression requires the elimination of factors that


would institute limiting fear in expressing individuals. Several thinkers have argued for the

origin of this dominating fear.

In Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison, Foucault (1995) criticizes modernity

for transcending the institution of the prison from a physical form of control to an internal form

of social control within each individual. This view is realized by the demonstration that the

patterns of control found in the institutions of discipline and punishment directly mirror

modernity methods of ensuring social order, which is justified as a mutual respect for the

inalienable rights of the Other to promote protection of the rights of the Self (Foucault, 1995).

Foucault’s (1995) analysis of the implementation of control yielded “three great methods –

establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, and regulate the cycles of repetition” (p.149).

These methods transcended social control to imprisonment of the individual, which Foucault

(1995) termed the “carceral” (p.293).

The systematization of the “carceral” began, according to Foucault (1995), with the

prison colony of Mettray, when a child of Mettray said, “as he lay dying: ‘What a pity I left the

colony so soon’” (p.293). Foucault’s (1995) contention is intended to demonstrate how the

colony became equated with security, despite being a limitation against free will. Applied to

human rights, despite the perceived ability to provide security of rights, the state, or “the

colony”, become a prison of modern thought that limits our potential of action.

The structures and constructs of modernity, such as human rights, act as prisons, but

Foucault (1972) contended that the most prevalent manners of control existed in more subtle

forms, chiefly discourse. Discourse differs from the previous identified “great methods” because

of the lack of a “very rigorous conceptual structure, but they have a very precise function”

(Foucault, 1972, p.21). Discourse acts as a more fluid prison of control through “the notion of


influence, which provides a support…transmission and communication; which refers to an

apparently causal process (but with neither rigorous delimitation not theoretical definition) the

phenomena of resemblance or repetition” (p.21). Basically, Foucault (1972) argues that through

influence and replication discourse manages act as a prison of expression and other freedom.

This background allows for better understanding of Foucault (2001) analysis of parrhesia.

Expression remains fearful because of the prisons of modernity: institutionalized and

discoursive. For parrhesia to occur, it is important to speak without the confines of these cells.

While not known as a structuralist, Foucault’s absence of fear relying upon both the abolition of

institutionalized influence and freedom from discoursive influence is similar to postcolonial

critiques of the persistent colonial methods of control, which also criticize both colonial structure

and discourse (Bhabha, 1994; Spivak, 1988, 1980; Said, 2001, 1993, 1978).

Again, postcolonialism has expanded by exploring colonial structures apparent in aspects

of society (Shome & Hegde, 2002), but the analysis of colonies following independence remains

the original focus of this critical perspective because of the more apparent and observable

problems of modernity and hegemonic abuse (Zompetti, 1997). Consequently, the consideration

of the validity of human rights claims to freedom of expression can best be considered in these

contexts. Among an array of postcolonial thinkers, Bhabha (1994) and Spivak (2004) are most

helpful in this discussion because of their postcolonial approaches.

Homi Bhabha

Homi Bhabha (1994) in The Location of Culture considers the issues of structure and

discourse found in Foucault’s (2001, 1995, 1972) position. Yet, Bhabha seeks to “rename the

postmodern from the position of the post-colonial” (p.175). As a post-structrualist, Bhabha

critics the structure of modernity.


Mirroring the contentions of Gramsci (1971), Bhabha proceeds to “intervene in those

ideological discourses of modernity that attempt to give a hegemonic ‘normativity’ to the uneven

development and the differential, often disadvantaged, histories of nations, races, communities,

peoples” (p.171). Seemingly, rights procurement of freedoms of expression would provide a

means to defy these “ideological discourses of modernity”. In some situations, this exercise has

undeniably occurred; however, Bhabha (1994) emphasizes that these efforts mainly target as

Habermas (1987) describes “the causes of social pathologies, which in the model of a division

within a macro-subject are still clustered around antagonism” (p.348). Unfortunately, these rigid

divisions under this confrontational pressure, provided by freedom of expression, “break up into

widely scattered historical contingencies” (Habermas, 1987, p.348).

Habermas’ influence on Bhabha cannot be ignored. Habermas (1999) argues that this

new challenge correlates with “the doctrine of rights [handing] on the baton to a systems theory

that rids itself by methodological fiats of all normative considerations” (p.51). In this manner,

the functionalist nature of human rights fails because of its inability to conquer the fragments of

antagonism. Habermas (1999) noted transition from the doctrine of human rights also created

shifts in the hegemonic portrayals of ethical and moral issues. While a teleological ethics had

before been inclusive of questions of morality and ethics, with ethics assuming a “new,

subjective sense” (Habermas, 1999, p.58). Basically, when one realizes that human rights have

been ineffective in creating parrhesia, they try and enact their claims to freedom of expression

outside of the political realm targeting the social fragments that create fearful speech. However,

as Bhabha (1994), Foucault (2001, 1995, 1972), and Habermas have shown, the complexities of

these hegemonic fragments cannot be addressed by modernity’s human rights claims. This

creates an abandonment of human rights, causing a shift from a teleological position to greater


subjective ethical position where individuals confront social fragments without rights as chinked

armor.

Bhabha (1994) contends that only through the postcolonial perspective, which

encourages testimony from those outside of the dominant hegemony of the colonial, can this

confrontation be successful. This however is distinct from an exercise of freedom of expression.

This is an exercise of freedom from fear, parrhesia. Because discursive controls of colonialism

retain dominance through “dependence on the concept of ‘fixity’ in the ideological construction

of otherness” (Bhabha, 1994, p.66), exercises of expression risk becoming exercises of mimicry.

Bhabha (1994) argues that mimicry, or pursuits of the Other in colonial structures to act in

manners consistent with what is accepted through “the process of translation” (p.33), are among

the most culturally destructive impacts of colonialism. Consequently, our starting question of

what is deniable, or outside of the guarantees of rights, now becomes extremely important.

The definition of the Other, through colonial discourse, defines what is acceptable and

unacceptable (Bhabha, 1994). Human rights guarantees of freedom of expression cannot

possibly confront this realm of control. The political “provision” of a voice for expression is

futile against hegemonic structures that ensure that this voice will never be heard. In actuality,

expressions of dissent against hegemony only reaffirm the Otherness in a colonial society. This

ultimately, confines the freedom of expression to dialectics of acceptable and unacceptable.

Bhabha (1994) shows that modernity’s rights approach is ineffective in these contexts. Freedom

of expression may exist, but without freedom from fear, or colonial structures, the right of free

speech is arbitrary. Under these conditions, cultures are destroyed. The necessity to

communicate cultural norms and histories are traded for a prison of acceptance to avoid the

position of the Other.


Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Further, extending the critique of human rights, Spivak (2004) argues that “Human rights

have gained a status independent of political interests…[We] doubt that habitualization or

institutionalization at the state level have proceeded sufficiently to render pressure from societal

actors futile” (p.525). The conflict of interest provided by dominant hegemonic voices, found in

statist provisions, and the discursive control of colonial positions create what Spivak (2004) calls

a “restricted utopianism” (p.525) in her critique of Richard Rorty (1993). Thus, the current

options of escape from hegemony are founded in colonial provisions as well. This is extremely

problematic and imprisoning.

Spivak (2004) also contends that human rights not only remain as skeptical extension of

the state, but often allow for justification for repetition of colonialism. Spivak (2004) contends

that “the idea of human rights…[carries] within itself the agenda of social Darwinism – the fittest

must shoulder the burden of righting the wrongs of the unfit – and the possibility of an alibi”

(p.524). Because of this burden, human rights have become part of Eurocentric beliefs that

corrections need to be made in other cultures. Unfortunately, the intervention on the behalf of

human rights is often only a more accepted justification for intervention providing “an alibi for

economic, military, and political intervention” (p.524). Spivak (1988) and Bhabha (1994) argue

that these types of intervention are equable to institutionalized colonialism. Therefore, not only

do human rights fail to provide their promises of freedom of expression, but also, human rights

provide a vehicle for further colonialism and hegemonic imprisonment.

Pathways to Parrhesia

With a postcolonial portrayal of Foucault’s (1972) “prison”, we are forced to consider

solutions to promote a more unrestricted expression of the colonial subject, free from fear.


Bhabha’s (1994) description of this effort to aid in the transition of culture from Otherness is

extremely effective in defining this effort:

“Culture becomes as much an uncomfortable, disturbing practice of survival and

supplementary – between art and politics, past and present, the public and the private – as

its resplendent being is a moment of pleasure, enlightenment or liberation. It is from

such narrative positions that the postcolonial prerogative seeks to affirm and extend a

new collaborative dimension” (p.175).

Unfortunately, the liberating enthusiasm of Bhabha (1994) is often a rarity among the persistence

of fear. Spivak’s (2004) consideration of human rights and expression argues for alternative

efforts to right discourse that may help to promote Bhabha’s (1994) vision of postcolonial

efforts.

Pedagogical Considerations

Spivak (2004) contends that our best efforts should be invested into “education in the

humanities [which attempt] to be an uncoercive rearrangement of desires” (p.525). This

perspective has been advocated for some time, but Spivak (2004) frames its importance by

arguing that the need for “uncoercive” expression remains the focus of postcolonialism. To

achieve this goal, educational efforts should focus on “the usually silent victims of pervasive

rather than singular and spectacular human rights violations…the rural poor” (p.528). This

initiative would likely promote concerns of whiteness, whereby muting of the dominant race or

class, occurs (Lipari, 2004). However, Spivak (1990) contends that this simply repositions the

dominant voice as a listener, compelled to understand the voice of the Other, not dominate or

compete with it.


Thus, invoking the suggestions of Spivak (2004, 1990), the imperative of intercultural

communication has become two-fold. First, intercultural communication should pursue

pedagogical routes that encourage providing an uncoersive voice for the Other, or as Spivak

(2004) prefers “the pedagogy of the subaltern…by subaltern [she means] those removed from

lines of social mobility” (p.531). In this manner, postcolonialism has expanded again beyond the

subject previously confined to a colony to any marginalized individual victimized by the

structures of hegemony. This can only be accomplished if pedagogical shifts are made

intercultural communication curriculum. While intercultural communication has less critical

origins and remains attentive towards the measurement of specific constructs as a means for

evaluating cultural influences upon communication, these efforts do little to promote a more

appropriate and egalitarian communicative world. By incorporating “the pedagogy of the

subaltern” into more mainstream curriculum, we can provide mediums for the subaltern

individual and provide the dominant voice with means to educate without being coercive.

Additionally, “the pedagogy of the subaltern” should accompany a “pedagogy of the

dominant”, whereby those in a dominant position should be taught to become more effective

listeners of the Other. Fortunately, intercultural communication has already taken strides in this

area by accepting ethnography as a means of understanding. However, this type of curriculum

remains predominantly in graduate-level courses. If a change is to occur, again, Spivak’s (2004)

stress of education of the rural poor must be considered. Thus, this pedagogical approach must,

minimally, find a home in more mainstream undergraduate courses that encourage behaviors of

expression among subaltern students and listening among dominant groups. If these classes wish

to make a more substantive change, they must find a more mainstream home.


This initiative is likely to be met with a challenge from more traditional perspectives that

continue to support a more conservative communication curriculum for students. This debate is

not new to anyone in the field of communication. But, the exclusion of critical perspectives into

separate classes or closing lectures of classes only reaffirms the position of the Other. If the

hope of the colonial subject exists in these critical endeavors, the isolation of their mediums of

communication only reflects the isolation of their cultural position. They are again forced into

the dialectic of mimcry (take the other classes) or the Other (the critical perspective). Both

should be incorporated into any communication background.

Additionally, the insight into intercultural communication and Spivak’s (2004) advocacy

of uncoercive humanities education demonstrates the need for increased interdisciplinary efforts.

The rigidity of division among disciplines only further confines the options of the Other. As

countless years of debate have shown, communication cannot be confined to a single discipline.

Attempts to define what is acceptable as in critical communication will be counterproductive to

the enabling perspective by restricting the parrhesia of advocates’ voices.

Critical Advocacy in Intercultural Communication

Finally, the effort to encourage parrhesia of the subaltern parallels the two emphasized

pedagogical approaches provided, but additionally, criticism of colonial hegemony should have a

greater focus in intercultural communication. The efforts of rhetorical postcolonial critics

demonstrate the division of cultural groups (Alhassan, 2005; Hungwe, 2005; Cramer, 2003;

Kraidy, 2002; Shome & Hegde, 2002; Anderson, 2001; Hasian Jr., 2000; Bradford, 1999;

Shome, 1998; Lee, Wang, Chung, & Hertel, 1995). But, the critical perspetive must be more

diversified in intercultural communication to fully understand the influence of colonialism. With

some exceptions, the criticism of dominant hegemonies remains a rhetorical task. While this


paper has also stressed the discursive elements of dominance, this does not mean that discourse

can only be explored rhetorically. If the impacts of discourse are as vast as argued, intercultural

communication should be able to see the implications on culture articulated by Bhabha (1994),

Spivak (2004), and other postcolonial critics.

This perspective encourages an extension of analysis about the findings of studies.

Instead, of isolating cultural dimensions to four or five major areas (Hofstede, 2001),

intercultural communication scholars should uses these dimensions to evaluate the degree to

which our prisons confine us. A critical perspective could also successfully accompany theories

of facework. Some efforts have been made to explore the relationship between social hierarchy

and face; these initiatives have yielded limited results (Oetzel, Ting-Tooney, Masumoto,

Yokochi, Xiaohui, Takai, & Wilcox, 2001). Increased development of these projects should be

encouraged, but the analysis of the results should not shy from advocating a critical position.

Critical interpretations of common intercultural communication theory and future applications

need to be developed beyond the rhetorical perspective. One example of these efforts exists in

Orbe (1994) pursuit of the subaltern perspective. His analysis of African-American male

communication functions to provide a voice for the subaltern and takes a critical position. At the

same time, information about the procedural manner in which African-American males

communicate is still obtained.

Conclusion

Foucault’s (2001, 1995, 1972) analytical strength resides in his choice to analyze the

persistence of our prison in all forms. For this reason, he refused to accept the “postmodernist”

label (Barratt, 2004). The freedom’s confinements cannot be discussed in restricted divided

categories. As Foucault and others have shown, the elements of control pervade a multitude of


arenas. It is important that intercultural communication scholars pursue information revealing

these elements with greater tenacity. These are the types of efforts that can contribute to a world

of truly free expression. Parrhesia remains outside of the grasp of declarations about human

rights.

However, for this to occur, the transition from modernity must manifest itself in

intercultural communication. The acceptance of human rights is affirmed by intercultural

communication scholars’ choices to objectively analyze communicative process of cultural

groups. By deeming human rights to be capable of providing an outlet and means of defiance,

the subtleties of control remain intact. Human rights have been demonstrated to have a number

of flaws, and freedom of expression has consistently lacked freedom from fear. Consequently,

the field intercultural communication should not accept human rights as a means for fearless

speech; investigation into how communication between cultures manages to remain controlled

by hegemonic forces must be conducted.

Foucault (2001, 1995, 1972) analysis of how the prison of modernity has manifested

itself into discourse has mandated that the field of communication explore the mediums of social

dominance. These issues have been investigated greatly by rhetorical scholars, but intercultural

communication scholars must be more active in this conversation. Because of the specific focus

on communication between groups, studies into cultural communication cannot help but address

these issues. Only by exploring these issues can parrhesia be enabled.


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