Authority and Environment:Institutional Landscapes

in Rajasthan, IndiaPaul Robbins

Department of Geography, Ohio State University

To date, there have been few systematic assessments of the role of social institutions—rules, norms,and systems of authority and power—in creating and reconfiguring natural environments. In thedesert grass and shrub lands of Rajasthan, India, where multiple, contending institutions governvillage resources in a state of legal pluralism, the need for such research is pressing. Here, statepolitical interventions vie against traditional common and semiprivate rule arrangements for controlof valuable pasture and forest resources. This paper introduces an authority-centered theoreticalvocabulary for such an analysis and reviews research conducted during 1993–1994 comparing fourinstitutional forms to assess the role of institutions in configuring resource extraction decisions madeby producers and in creating distinct and distinguishable biotic conditions. The study resultsdemonstrate that responses to authority differ along axes of gender, caste, and class and so lead tovaried decisions by producers. Each institutional form gives rise to a statistically significant patternof annual and perennial herb distribution and of tree species occurrence. The location of enforce-ment, whether central or local, is shown to be less important than the breadth of authority formscontrolling the resource. The results hold implications for future work in cultural/political ecologyand for global change research. They also call into question any a priori assumptions of thesuperiority of either state of local resource management regimes. Key Words: institutions, Rajas-than, legal pluralism, desert grasslands, political ecology.

It is readily apparent that the management ofnatural resources is as much a matter of imag-ining, establishing, and transforming social

institutions as it is a question of controlling physi-cal systems. Rule systems, social and culturalnorms, and legal frameworks are increasinglyused as sites for intervention and platforms foraction in cases ranging from fish and tree stocksto carbon and chlorofluorocarbon emissions. Theenvironmental implications of variations in insti-tutional form and structures of authority remainsomewhat underexamined, however. Whileglobal-change research identifies institutions as“social driving forces” for land-use/cover change(Turner et al. 1995; Turner and Meyer 1991), andcomparative studies of regional environmentalchange suggest a strong explanatory role for insti-tutions (Kasperson et al. 1995), explicit linkagesbetween institutional form and environmentalconditions are sparse. It remains unclear howinstitutions matter in the environment, to whom,and under what conditions. For a wide range ofresearch linking society to environment, be it

sustainable development, land use/cover analysis,or cultural and political ecology, the questionremains: how do institutions influence environ-mental outcomes? Do they do so through univer-sal patterns of rational choice, or throughculturally specific norms? Do variations in theform of rules, authority, and power lead to differ-ent environmental consequences under similarland-use regimes? Are local systems of authorityinherently more sustainable than those sponsoredby a centralized state? Can institutional systemsappropriate for one place be transferred with suc-cess elsewhere? Put more simply, how do institu-tions work? To whose benefit? And howuniversally?

These questions are significant beyond therealm of theory. For producers and bureaucrats inthe desert region of Marwar in Rajasthan, north-western India (Figure 1), the answers strike di-rectly to the heart of daily practice. Here, thedegree to which institutions—the rules andauthority that regulate land use— are enforced,respected, resisted, or subverted is a commonly

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 88(3), 1998, pp. 410–435©1998 by Association of American GeographersPublished by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

Figure 1. The study area in Western Rajasthan, India.

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understood local explanation for the deteriora-tion of pastures and forests. Since the proportionof community lands represents anywhere be-tween thirty and seventy-five percent1 of thetotal, the problem is a crucial one for subsistenceproduction. Members of local communities areoften fiercely divided, however, over what rulesand traditions contribute to good pasture andforest. Farmers and herders debate whether central-state authorities can reclaim “degraded” land-scapes through bureaucratic control or whethergrasses and trees are best left in the hands of localcommunities with their own rules of access. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and devel-opment authorities argue whether communitieshave common environmental interests orwhether local politics are too divisive to assureenvironmental protection (Bahunga et al. 1994;Andersen 1995).

This study examines the direct links betweeninstitutional forms and their environmental ef-fects in Marwar in order to closely analyze thesequestions. Institutional form here refers not onlyto the normative rules that control the timing,spacing, and character of resource use (followingEmel and Roberts 1995), but also to the culturallyand politically situated authority systems thatmonitor and enforce these rules. The four re-source-management institutions most commonlyfound in the region—local state-managed pas-tures [gochers], semiprivate community fallowpastures, central-state Forest Department enclo-sures, and semisacred village forests [orans]—areeach rooted in historically unique conditions, andall are based in different forms of authority. Morethan simply forms of land tenure, these institu-tions each draw on variant mechanisms ofauthority and enforcement and are each embed-ded in unique systems of meaning. But theseinstitutions also represent a set of more generalmanagement types. Gochers are state-managedpastures, while fallows are community-managedones. Enclosures and orans are both forest landuses, but the former are state-managed while thelatter are community-managed. In this way, theseforms make a good test case for the general prob-lem of institutional form and effect. This paper,therefore, examines the case in Marwar as wellthe larger question of the efficacy of state versuslocal resource-management systems.

The paper is divided into four sections. Thefirst considers the current geographical vocabu-lary for institutional analysis and explores thepossibility of more rigorous research into institu-

tional and ecological interaction by emphasizingthe role of authority in local political ecology. Thesecond section introduces the Marwar region andthe political and economic history leading tocontemporary conditions of legal pluralism. Pro-ducer responses to these contemporary institu-tional systems at the village level are examined insection three, drawing attention to the role ofclass, caste, and gender in affecting producerresponses to rules. The fourth section shows theresults of a controlled ecological comparison offour institutional forms to underline the conclu-sion that the form of authority influences pro-ducer decisions and leads to regular anddistinguishable environmental patterns. Theconclusions of the study suggest that the locationof control of an institutional apparatus, whethercentral or local, is less fundamental to influencingenvironmental outcomes than the breadth andlegitimacy of social authority deployed in its en-forcement. These conclusions provide strongcues for ongoing research in diverse fields andpave the way for an “institutionally-centered”conceptualization of environmental and land-scape change. At present, the theoretical vocabu-lary at the disposal of geographers for such anapproach remains scattered in several schools andsubdisciplines. A synthesis of institutional theoryis a necessary prerequisite to a geographical in-quiry that would address these problems.

Institutions in Political Ecology

In defining and explaining “The Great Trans-formation” of the earth’s surface processes, Kateset al. (1990) recognize normative and legal regu-lators of behavior as a driving force in environ-mental change, but they do not address how theseinstitutions function or how they modify land-scapes.2 Conversely, political and legal geography(Blomley 1994; Clark 1990) embrace a criticalperspective on law, state, and community, butleave open the question of how social and politi-cal struggles affect natural landscapes. For geog-raphers trying to explain institutional andecological linkages, it is necessary to synthesizea wider field of research and to read from bodiesof theory that contribute separate lessons forthe study of authority, power, and environ-ment: rational common-property theory, politi-cal ecology, and interpretive anthropology.

Common-property theory grows from empiri-cal and theoretical responses to Hardin’s “tragedy

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of the commons” (Hardin 1968; Scott 1955) andposits a rational explanation for the evolution andsurvival of collective resource-management sys-tems around the world. This work has establishedthat sustainable resource use under shared man-agement is not only possible, but often necessaryfor resources ranging from water and land to airand information (Ostrom 1992, 1990; Berkes1989; Bromley 1992; McCay and Acheson 1987;Hanna et al. 1996). Its conclusions warn againstthe dismantling of locally adapted rule systems.This approach is a powerful one that valorizes thecomplex “social capital” and indigenous knowl-edge of producer communities by providing asocial and ecological explanation for the fate offishers, herders, and farmers. Beginning from anindividuated model of human social life, com-mon-property theory denies the simplicity of thetragedy of the commons and other economicmodels by establishing that self-interested agentscan act to mutual self-benefit through coordina-tion. For rational common-property theorists, in-stitutions are “the harmony of interests” leadingto “collective action in control of individual ac-tion” (Commons 1934:8).

Even so, many important questions remainunexplored in this work. Rational common-prop-erty theory collapses social, political, and culturalcohesion and division into the category of “socialcapital” (Ostrom 1990, following Coleman 1988)and, in so doing, elides difficult questions in localpolitical economy. Are all commoners equal, anddo they all have equal interest in the implemen-tation and protection of community propertyrights? How is the local flow of power regulatedor disrupted through common-property manage-ment? How are institutions situated within thelarger political economy? The silence on thesequestions mimics a larger historical discourse thatromanticizes local community as organic and pris-tine, with internal institutional mechanisms de-void of significant struggle and conflict. Suchconceptions of village society, in India and else-where, have been seriously questioned in post-colonial studies and critical approaches tohistoriography (Inden 1990).

Recent strands of common-property theory incultural and political ecology have gone a longway towards addressing these lacunae. FollowingBlaikie (1985) and Blaikie and Brookfield’s(1987) formulation of a political ecology thatexplicitly addresses the common-property ques-tion, extensive work in geography (Emel andMaddock 1986; Roberts and Emel 1992), politi-

cal science (Agrawal 1994; Thomson et al. 1992),development studies (Sargent and Bass 1992;Chambers et al. 1989; Raintree 1987), women’sstudies3 (Singh and Burra 1993), and anthropol-ogy (Park 1992; Netting 1976; Gururani forth-coming) have all sought to address the questionof “unequal commoners” (Netting 1997). In In-dia, a large body of work has drawn attention tothe decline of community resources and the un-equal burden experienced in the process by themost marginal communities: women, pastoralists,and the very poor (Jodha 1985, 1986; Brara 1987,1992; Gadgil and Guha 1995). The lessons fromall of this research show that institutions aredynamic and divisive. They are remade throughresistance and reinterpretation by individualagents and are lodged in a larger political econ-omy where the disempowered are often deprivedof crucial resources in the daily struggle overproperty rights.

From a different direction, interpretive andeconomic anthropology has also addressed theform and function of institutions, stressing theimportance of local notions of obligation andauthority rather than individuated rationalchoice. Typologies of preindustrial legal systems,examination of vernacular rules, and the study ofcultural economics all locate institutional formsand their logics within collective local culture(Newman, 1983; Geertz 1983; Sahlins 1976).

Common-property theory, political ecology,and interpretive anthropology thus provide theunderpinnings of an emergent research agendafor institutions and ecology. Focusing on collec-tive action, micropolitical economy (Li 1996),and environmental outcomes, this branch of re-search is distinctive in several respects. First, itbegins from the norms that govern the interactionof knowing agents within political and economiccontexts (Giddens 1984). This focus on rules,norms, and expectations acknowl-edges the ra-tional actions of common-property theory whileallowing for cultural forms, local logics, and theplays of power that are not easily collapsed into“satisficing” motives (Wilk 1996; Douglas 1986;Halperin 1994). Second, institutional ecology ex-plores the character and effects of authority, un-derstood as a relationship that assures bindingobligations (following Uphoff 1989), in all of itsvarious forms. In a world of rules, regulations,restrictions, and resistances, contemporary geog-raphy requires a more careful consideration of theoperation of authority in daily life (Sibley 1995).Third, this approach, following Rangan (1997a),

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distinguishes property from control, examiningmore closely the degree to which systems ofauthority control social action and access to re-sources. Thus the focus of institutional researchis less upon land tenure, for example, than uponthe social norms that enforce restrictions andobligations in land use. Finally, this approachtakes seriously the interactions between thesenormative systems and the ambient environ-ment, exploring the way rules have ecologicaleffects without assuming degradation as the soleand inevitable product of social pressure (Behnkeand Scoones 1993; Johnson and Lewis 1995).This is a branch of political ecological inquiry thatexplicitly interrogates the environmental effectsof individuals responding to one another, to thecommunity, and to the state.

This approach is already evident in a body ofemergent research concerned with authority andenvironment, representing the robust founda-tions of an institutional ecology (Evans 1993;Rangan 1997a, 1997b; McGranahan 1991;Geores 1996; Emel and Roberts 1995; Zimmerer1991). Even so, this direction of inquiry is onlynascent and has yet to amass a significant body ofecological data to demonstrate how variations ininstitutional form might lead to varying environ-mental outcomes. How does institutional formserve to preserve local resources? Do local andtraditional management systems result in richerspecies coverage and densities than central andmodern ones? Who is most affected by what formsof authority? The answers to these questions de-termine, to a great degree, the fate of forests andpastures in western Rajasthan. Here, the impor-tance of the resource base to desert producers, thelocal political divisions over access to resources,and the long history of diverse legal impositionsmake Marwar an ideal site for the study of insti-tutions and environment.

Western Rajasthan: Landscape,History, and the InstitutionalProblem

The region of Marwar, in the westernmostportion of Rajasthan, falls on the edge of the Tharor Indian Desert, as shown in Figure 1 (Lodrick1994). The Thar, like many deserts located in thesubtropical anticyclone, is marked by the scarcityand spatiotemporal variability of rainfall. Unlikemany other subtropical high-pressure deserts, the

region falls within the summer low-pressure zonethat drives unpredictable yearly monsoons. Thesemonsoons cross India to reach Rajasthan be-tween July and September, the growing season inthe region. While sometimes romantically char-acterized as “Marusthali,” or “the region ofdeath,” the area is rich in productive flora, andthe sandy soils, though low in organic carbon andhighly alkaline, are productive under good rain-fall (Bhalla 1992). Pearl millet or bajra (Pen-nisetum typhoideum) is the principal crop,dominant tree species include khejri (Prosopis cin-eraria), bordi (Ziziphus nummularia), and ker (Cap-paris decidua), and the pastures of the region aredominated by the perennial grasses sevan (Lasiurissindicus) and dhaman (Cenchrus spp.) (Bhandari1990; Whyte 1957). Under good rainfall, the areais as much garden as desert (Figure 2).

Agropastoralism, long-fallow dryland farming,and herding dominate in the region’s villages, andthe prevalence of livestock in households reflectsthe role of the region as the traditional animal-breeding center of northern India. The herdingof cattle and camels by specialized professionalgroups follows traditional practices (Köhler-Rollefson 1994; Agrawal 1993), though recentintensification of the pastoral economy follows aglobal trend towards larger herds concentrated infewer hands (Galaty and Johnson 1990).

Socially, the region follows the customary di-vision of the population into endogamous semi-professional groups, traditionally known as jati (orcaste). Although land reform, economic transi-tion, and democratic change in India have re-duced the professional differences between castegroups in recent years, pastoral specialist casteslike the raika and the sindhi continue to dominateherding, and village elites, the rajputs and brah-mins, retain much of their traditional status4

(Omvedt 1978). Groups with small and middle-sized land holdings make up the bulk of ruralhouseholds, while the remainder come from castegroups that continue to experience severe cul-tural and economic marginalization. Householdproduction follows a gendered division of labor,with women managing the collection of fuel andminor forest products and men dominating largestock herding and marketing (Figure 3).

Caste elites, pastoral specialists, and marginalproducers, whether men or women, all rely onvillage pastures and forests, and householdeconomies depend on the biotic resources avail-able in these lands. Ongoing struggles within elitecommunities, between elites and the most mar-

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ginal communities, and between men and womenmark daily village politics. When a vital area ofprotected forest is denuded, for example, it istypical for farmers to blame herders, landlords toblame outcastes, and women to blame men. Theinstitutions that manage these lands thereforeoccupy a political middle-ground between groupsdivided by class, caste, and gender. The centralityof these resources to village life and divisivenessof their management politics has resulted in thepromulgation of various management andauthority systems to govern these lands in theprecolonial, colonial, and postindependenceeras. Each successive legal system imposed overthe years has resulted in a mixing of institutionalforms, creating the conditions of legal pluralismunder which these lands are governed today.

An Institutional History of Marwar

While contemporary Rajasthan sits on the pe-riphery of India, in the time before partition, theregion was the central highway through whichcontesting civilizations and political systems trav-eled and fought. Successive periods of hegemony

Figure 2. Scrub forest in the village of Rasla during rainy season, 1994. Prominent trees include bordi (Ziziphusnummularia) and ker (Capparis decidua), while the carpeted understory predominantly consists of the grasses sevan(Lasiuris sindicus) and ghantiya (Dactylotenium sindicum).

Figure 3. Herder with small herd of sheep (approxi-mately forty animals) grazing fallow fields during thedry season. The animals are herded on a short migrationloop through nearby community lands.

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introduced new vocabularies of property and con-trol over forest and pasture. In each case, how-ever, older systems were not altogethereliminated, but were instead overlain by newforms. Village forests have origins in earliest sa-cred law while state forest enclosures are quiterecent, for example. The roots of contemporaryinstitutions, therefore, are distinguishable inmore remote layers of history.5

The earliest village institutional systems in Ra-jasthan, predating Muslim conquest in the thir-teenth and fourteenth centuries, took the form oftraditional codes and are difficult to characterize(Galanter 1989).6 Prominent features of theseearly codes include the demarcation of commu-nity lands, the definition of the role of communitycommittees, and the establishment of sacred oranlands. The distinction between common andnoncommon lands is evident from calls in San-skrit texts for large areas to be set aside for com-munity pasturage (Manu VIII:233–43, in Bühler1886). The specific rules for determining andpreserving boundaries around these spaces andenclosures are also stipulated in early law. Thevillage panchayat or committee also appeared atthis time. The term panchayat literally means “ameeting of five people,” and during this period,such groups served as local councils or courts todispense justice, settle conflicts, and arbitratedisputes on the use and abuse of communityresources (Altekar 1958). Village panchayatsmight be made up of elders from several castes,meeting to arbitrate intercaste disputes or othervillage-wide concerns. In either case, punish-ments usually involved fines or the threat ofexpulsion and ostracism from the community orvillage (Galanter 1989). Thus the structure ofauthority beneath these councils was a strong,normative one. The oran, a sacred forest andpasture, was also likely in place by this time. Theorigins of these orans are impossible to determine,but many of them date from long before Mughalconquests.7 The term oran derives from the San-skrit word for forest, araniya, and these lands werededicated to local gods, goddesses, or saints, andwere protected from destructive extraction, pri-vate cultivation, and encroachment.

It would be a mistake to romanticize the inter-nal harmony of these early codes. The hegemonyof elites was likely realized through these localinstitutions, and there is no reason to believe thatthese institutions functioned as homeostatic sys-tems (Inden 1990). Even so, by the time of thearrival of Muslim conquerors, village community

lands were well established and protected by flex-ible rule systems built into village-based systemsof authority.

The recurrent incursions by Muslim armies toRajasthan began in the eleventh century andcontinued through the fall of the Mughals in theeighteenth century (Thapar 1985; Sharma1966).8 During this period, land law was codified,tax systems were explicated, and the legal rightsof landlords were stipulated (Moreland 1929;Sharma 1977). This change from a loosely articu-lated legal code to a more specifically written andenforced one required the development of con-cepts designed to unify village law. Under a “feu-dal”9 political system, the Mughals implementeda hierarchical rent system managed by localHindu rajput elites. Taxation records with corre-sponding village maps laid out the division offorest, field, and pasture lands. New taxes, paidin cash, were levied for the use of communityproperty, including the use of grazing lands, for-ests, and well-water. The concept of the gocher, agrazing land held by the state for the qualified useof villagers, also emerged during this period. Atthe same time, the right of access to communitylands was lost altogether under the new codes, aslandlords began to collect and sell valuable re-sources under their control. Mughal rule, with itsemphasis on records and the spatial organizationof rents, served to formalize the loose structure ofearlier land law and to transfer control of grazinglands, forests, and water-sources from communityto central authority, simultaneously cementingthe power of local elites (Sharma 1977).

Many pre-Mughal institutional forms sur-vived, however. Muslim rulers instituted Islamiclaw in the capitals and administrative centers but,for the most part, left local legal matters underthe traditional jurisdiction of the panchayat(Galanter 1989). Orans survived as well. Recordskept in Persian/Arabic up to the time of Indianindependence in the 1950s show separate entriesfor village forests, pastures, and orans, reflectingthe ongoing importance and persistence of thesesacred lands through periods of Mughal and Brit-ish sovereignty.

By the time the Mughal empire collapsed in thebeginning of the eighteenth century, the BritishEast India company was already more than ahundred years old. Without directly administer-ing most of Rajasthan, the Company, and laterthe government of Great Britain, indirectly ruledall of the princely states, including Marwar (Jain1993; Spear 1986). While Mughal reforms had

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been in the interest of consolidating politicalcontrol, British reforms were designed to assuremonopoly over resources and trade (Bhat-tacharyya 1972). This would lead to a very differ-ent strategy in reform, as the British sought toimplement a normalized legal system with “mod-ern” ideas of ownership, evidence, and publicoffense. While colonial officials argued from themoral imperative of legal reform, much of theinstitutional change was driven by the demandsof British bankers and traders who had difficultyrecovering money or receiving contractually ob-ligated goods or services (Jain 1993). Throughtheir efforts, central courts were established, andlocal officials were pressed to circumvent tradi-tional legal authorities. In villages, the enforce-ment of this new legal code did a great deal toundermine the power and authority of villagepanchayats. Dispute settlement continues to bemanaged by local bodies to this day, however, andthe power of traditional law was likely not de-stroyed entirely during the reform period (Galan-ter 1989).

Tax and revenue systems were transformed aswell. Interested in enhanced revenue and un-aware of any implicit obligations by local rulers toassure access to pasture and forest resources, theBritish raised grazing and wood taxes appreciably.To maximize revenue, they put large areas ofcommunity pasture and forest into crops (Jain1992). Additionally, village forests came increas-ingly under the jurisdiction of state forest authori-ties beginning in 1884, and nearly a million cubicfeet of wood was annually extracted and sold fromvillage lands in Marwar by state authorities (Raj-putana Gazetteers 1908).

The net results of the institutional changesbrought by the British Raj to Rajasthan includeda decline in the power of local panchayat bodiesand a decrease in local villagers’ control over andaccess to community lands. Even so, panchayatauthority survived in the wake of these social andlegal changes, and even colonial representativeswho contributed to the hegemony of centralpower admitted to the pervasiveness of the “use-ful panchayats” during this period (Todd 1920:171). Orans and gocher lands outside of statecontrol were placed under increasing pressure,but they too persisted.

Following a brief period of “independent”statehood in the 1950s, the principalities of Ra-jasthan surrendered their sovereignty to the Re-public of India and to a program of legal reform.Directed from Delhi, the central foci of institu-

tional change were in land reform, growing fromdirect measures in the first and second five-yearplans, and the institution of the Panchayati Raj,enshrined as a guiding principle in the constitu-tion (Bjorkman and Chaturvedi 1994). Land re-form sought to eliminate the landlord classes, toincrease the access to land for marginal castegroups, and to reduce cultivator rents. In Marwar,large areas of “surplus” or uncultivated land wereturned over to marginal communities and openedup for cultivation (Khusro 1978). On paper, landreform in western Rajasthan was an unprece-dented effort to shift property institutions in favorof agricultural producers. As it was carried out,however, reform was only moderately successful.Generally, the power of landlords was reduced,but through loopholes in the law and by directcontrol over the local political apparatus, mostlandlord families were able to maintain much oftheir original holdings (Herring 1983; Gupta1994; Yugandhar and Datta 1995). On top of this,the partitioning and parceling of “waste” landsresulted in the loss of large tracts of traditionalpasture and forest. The final results of the land-reform movement were an increase in the securityof tenure for wealthier agricultural producers andthe enclosure of vast pasture and forest lands.

A second cornerstone effort during the firstyears after independence was the inauguration ofthe Panchayati Raj (kingdom of panchayats).Modeled on the traditional panchayat system, atleast in name, these new village bodies were to bepopularly elected and to implement developmentschemes throughout the rural area. Rajasthanwas to be the first site of this Gandhian experi-ment in local democratic government, built as aset of nested councils, with the smallest, the GramPanchayat, at the village level. The GramPanchayats were to govern village communityresources, create development plans, settle localconflicts, and tax villagers to manage communityproperty (Bjorkman and Chaturvedi 1994; Muk-herjee 1994).

As they evolved in practice during the 1950sand early 1960s, the Panchayati Raj and the GramPanchayats poorly reflected these plans. Ratherthan becoming a mechanism for local participa-tion, the Gram Panchayats usually became thevehicle for central planners to control local re-sources and decisions. Partisan tactics enteredPanchayat politics, and party regulars from Delhioften intervened directly in local elections(Bjorkman and Chaturvedi 1994). Reluctant totax, Gram Panchayats were unable to generate

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revenue and so to manage village resources(Jodha 1987). Over time, these governing bodieslost what little legitimacy they enjoyed and dwin-dled in power and action. Villagers turned theirback on the Panchayati Raj when it failed todeliver on its many promises, turning to tradi-tional panchayats as well as to the central state forconflict resolution.

The final period of institutional change beganin the early 1960s with the increasing activity ofthe Forest Department in the villages of westernRajasthan. Provisions in the Land Revenue Actof 1957 allowed for the acquisition of villagelands, which were fenced and put under govern-ment plantation supervision for five-year periods(Mathur and Mathur 1992). In some villages,traditional gocher land was sometimes acquired,while in others, orans were enclosed. Under For-est Department tenure, wood and fodder extrac-tion, grazing, and browsing continued to berestricted. The police-style enforcement of theresource base by forest guards (chokidars) is typi-cal of Forest Department management elsewherein India (Gadgil and Guha 1992). The actualrules followed in Rajasthani Forest Departmentlands are usually a compromise between state andlocal demands and needs. Cutting is uncommon,while grazing often continues. Some rules areenforced while others are ignored and subverted.Enclosures thus form another piece in a complexinstitutional puzzle.

The Contemporary Institutional Setting

Community land management in Marwar hasbecome a polyglot mix of traditional, colonial,

and postindependence vocabularies, and the re-sulting mix of rule systems for local forest andpasture resources has led to a splintering of con-trol. Some grasslands are ruled by official villagecouncils, others fall under less-formally articu-lated traditional authority. Some forests arefenced under the control of the Forest Depart-ment, while others come under the locally recog-nized authority of a local goddess or saint. Themultiplicity of traditions has resulted in a frac-tured and hybrid legal landscape best describedas a state of legal pluralism (Merry 1988; Silbey andSarat 1987; Kidder 1979). Specifically, four insti-tutions currently govern the community lands ofMarwar: Gram Panchayat gochers, semiprivatecommunity fallows, Forest Department enclo-sures, and the traditional oran.10 The first twogovern pasture resources while the latter twogovern forests. Gochers and enclosures are state-sponsored institutional mechanisms, orans andfallows are locally established and enforced. Eachrepresents a distinct form of control (Table 1).

Gram Panchayat gochers are pastures formallyrecognized through provisions in the RajasthanPanchayat Rules of 1955, where tree cutting isrestricted under the authority of the GramPanchayat.Theambiguityof therule,authority,andaccountability of Gram Panchayats discussed aboveis reflected in community responses to Panchayatrulings incommunity lands.Panchayatdecisionsarewell known, but often not well followed. In mostvillages, Gram Panchayats are dominated by villageelites, and more marginal community members andvillage women often subvert their authority by ig-noring the rules. The actual political power of theGram Panchayats is considerably constrained andcompliance is irregular.

Table 1. Institutional Types of Government for Communal Lands in Marwar, India

Type Land Authority Areal Rules & Enforcement PowerUse Coverage Restrictions

Gocher pasture state 119 tree cutting Gram political hegemonyPanchayat

Community pasture local 632 tree cutting owner physical/coercivefallow wet-season Panchayat/ cultural legitimacy

grazing elders social deference

Enclosure forest state 23 tree cutting Forest political hegemonylarge herd Department expert knowledgegrazing guards economic reward

(chokidars)

Oran forest local 219 tree cutting deity/pir physical/coerciveelders cultural legitimacyvillagers social deference

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Community fallow is private land available aspasture for the community. This includes largeareas of “long-fallow,” where land is set aside fromproduction for as many as ten years or more.Under this arrangement of rules, the land isclosed during the rainy season to maximize thedevelopment of perennial grasses, especiallysevan, which are harvested like crops for theprivate owners’ use. Violators risk direct reprisalsfrom the owner. The land is then thrown open tothe entire community for grazing. Barring othervillagers from grazing the land after harvest riskspunishment from traditional authorities or elders.The land is not opened at the owners pleasure,but rather under a socially enforced obligation.

Forest Department enclosures are fenced andguarded forest reserves under the control of acentral authority. During the period of control,usually five years, a number of mainly exogenousspecies are planted. These enclosures are guardedagainst cutting and grazing and the rules areenforced through fencing and patrolling by guards.The power of the Forest Department is limited bythe corruption of the forest guards, which reducesits authority, especially among more wealthy andpowerful communities. As a major employer,however, it enjoys the power to reward villagerswith jobs and to therefore control behaviors. Re-maining in good standing with Department offi-cials allows access to steady wages in planting andnursery tending. The Department’s expert poweris also significant since many villagers disallowtheir own environmental experience and defer toForest Department officials and their knowledge.

Orans represent the final form of institutionalcontrol of village lands in the region, although onlya fraction of their actual total area is recognized inofficial records, the rest falling into the category ofwasteland. Orans are characterized by strong regu-lations against tree cutting. Grasses may be grazedbut generally not cut and removed, and the loppingof tree leaves for fodder isgenerallyprohibited,whilebrowsing animals are allowed to eat from lowerbranches. It is, therefore, the act of cutting andremoving by humans that is restricted rather thanthe use of any particular resource. Enforcement ofand compliance to rules in an oran is a complexmatter. Many accounts emphasize the threat ofdivine retribution, and cautionary tales of divinepunishment by blinding and paralysis are common(Gold and Gujar 1989; Gadgil and Vartak 1975,1994). The lands usually also fall under the secularauthority of traditional village councils, elders, andthe community itself. Secular and violent warnings

against cutting rival those related to divine retri-bution, and traditional punishments for infrac-tion are known by all inhabitants. Mutuallyreinforcing divine and secular authority keeptrees standing in orans (Figure 4).

Clearly, a range of different forms of institu-tional control for pasture and forest existthroughout western Rajasthan, each growingfrom complex political and economic histories.Despite this range of management regimes, it islargely recognized that the community lands ofMarwar are in a state of “crisis” and “collapse”(Jodha 1985, 1986; Goldman 1991; Brara 1987).The degradation of village pasture and forest istaken as given by district officers and academics.Denuded community “waste” lands stand as atestament to heavy levels of extraction, and re-search from official sources continues to warn ofdesertification (Kumar and Bhandari 1993).

Yet conditions in these lands vary greatly. It isnot clear if there are any significant and predict-able differences between orans, gochers, Forest

Figure 4. Shrine on the edge of a village oran in theshade of a bordi tree (Ziziphus nummularia). The femalefigure of the cow (left) and the male lingam (stylizedphallus—right) are typically paired.

Authority and Environment 419

Department enclosures, or community fallows,either in terms of producer responses or environ-mental conditions. To explore whether local oranscreate better conditions for sustainable forest usethan the Forest Department, or whether the mod-ern Gram Panchayat allows for more stable pas-ture management than traditional fallowbargaining, it is necessary first to examine theworkings of local authority and the responses byvarious producer groups using qualitative meth-ods, then to quantitatively evaluate the environ-mental patterns that result.

The research, conducted in 1993–1994, in-volved the survey of institutional forms in twenty-eight villages throughout the study region. Ateach location de facto and de jure forest andpasture-management rule systems were recordedand observed. In three of these survey villages,extended field observation and interviews wereconducted among members of several caste com-munities, including pastoral sindhi and raika,land-holding rajputs, and more socially and politi-cally marginal bhil and meghwal households. Amore formal survey of forty-nine householdsstratified across these several communities wasconducted to evaluate production priorities,land-use strategies, and responses to authority. Inthese three study villages, a postmonsoon ecologi-cal survey was also conducted, as discussed below.

Producer Responses to Rulesand Authority

In Marwari villages, producers recognize spe-cific village-rule systems as zones of control, ter-ritories, or “legal spaces” (following Blomley1994). In most villages, all four of these previouslydescribed institutional forms may govern discretespaces alongside one another, although some con-trol considerably larger areas than others. Each isquite distinct, and, as shown in Table 1, the fourinstitutional types are distinguished by differentrestrictions, enforcement, and authority. Author-ity refers to the location of control and domain ofresponsibility, either the central state or localtradition. Restrictions refer to the specific rules inthe area of control, including rules against treecutting, harvesting of minor forest products suchas fruits and bark, extraction of fodder, especiallyperennial grasses, and grazing and browsing bylivestock from within and/or outside the localcommunity. Enforcement refers to the body,group, or individual who observes and enforces

restrictions (Ostrom 1990). Power represents theresources from which enforcement derives its ef-ficacy (Uphoff 1989; French and Raven 1959).These are the economic clout, social status, po-litical hegemony, physical coercive force, expert(information) power, social deference, and cul-tural legitimacy that define the relationships ofpower between resource users and enforcers andso determine the degree of control.11

The rules in place will be followed or ignoredby herders, wood collectors, and fodder-huntersbased on several simultaneous criteria: (1) theperception by the user of the legitimacy of theenforcing authority, (2) the stakes held by re-source users in the protection of the resource, and(3) the expectation of fair and equal enforcementand participation in the rules. In this way, thedegree of control is formed through a combina-tion of individual rational choice and collectivesocial force. Clearly, different positions of re-source users in the local political economy willcause variations in the response. Both individualstrategic behaviors and relations to authority sys-tems vary with class, caste, and gender. Thesebehaviors create extraction pressure; by tracingthe kinds of rules and authority in place and thenature of producer response, the likely ecologicaleffects of institutional form become clear.

Gochers and Ambiguous Perceptionsof Control

The controlling authorities of oran, gocher, andForest Department lands are not always unani-mously recognized. The household survey con-ducted in the study villages included thequestions, “Which lands in the village belong tothe village community?” and “Which lands in thevillage belong to the state?” (Table 2). Enclosuresare uniformly perceived to be under state controlin villages where Forest Department authority isestablished. Likewise, most respondents identi-fied oran lands as under the control of the villagecommunity. Gram Panchayat gocher grazing land,however, is ambiguously identified, reflecting theuncertainty over the management of these lands.Orans and enclosures have clear referent sourcesof authority, while gochers do not. This is realizedin irregular response to restrictions on fodderharvesting in Gram Panchayat gochers. Many pro-ducers respond to the ambiguity of enforcementthrough tree cutting and the removal of fodder.Grazing is heaviest here, especially during the

420 Robbins

rainy season when fallow fields are closed topublic use.

This village-wide ambiguity is reinforced by thegendered treatment of gocher land. Here the re-lationship of women to institutional authority isa function of two distinct features of village lifeand politics: the gendered division of labor andthe gendered access to decision-making and con-flict-resolving bodies. As in most agropastoralsocieties, use of community resources by womendiffers from that of men in that women are theproducers and processors of much of the collectedbiomass material. In all of the study villages,women were the primary collectors and proces-sors of fuel (including wood and cow dung), fer-tilizer (especially sheep and goat dung), and otherminor forest products (especially fruits and medi-cal barks and herbs). While most of these re-sources are distributed and used within thehousehold economy, many (especially dung andvarious fruits) are important market products.Women are also the handlers of small stock insome castes and so manage many animals ingrazing. These resources are collected from com-munity fallow lands and, more commonly, fromgochers and orans. Women in most study areas usegocher land liberally, coppicing trees and cuttingfuelwood in violation of the rules. In most vil-lages, this use is heavy, and most trees experiencetwo or three cuttings in a year. When asked, manywomen report that such use is permitted. Men inthe same households, however, insist thatPanchayat rules forbid the cutting of trees ingocher lands and that no such violations occur(Figure 5).

This differential and gendered impression ofGram Panchayat rules mirrors the status ofwomen in the Panchayat. In all but one of thesurvey villages, no women sat on the Gram

Panchayat at the time of the study, although seatsare reported to be reserved for women in all GramPanchayats in the next election. As predicted bycommon-property theory (Ostrom 1990), wherewomen have little or no representation on thedecision-making body that governs gochers, therules and edicts of that body hold little authorityover them. It is likely village women fully knowthe stated rules but deliberately ignore them asthey see the ruling enforcement body as havingno legitimate authority. The perceived capture ofthe institution by men and caste elites furtherlimits the control exerted in Gram Panchayatgochers. Higher levels of cutting results, as doesan increased sparseness in standing tree cover.Coupled with heavy grazing, only unpalatableannuals would be expected in village gochers.

Community Fallow and Mutual Coercion

Where resource users have similar stakes in theconservation of a resource, the implementationof rules for common use is easier. Even so, users

Figure 5. Women harvesting fodder from khejri tree(Prosopis cineraria) in a gocher adjacent to the village.

Table 2. Local Perceptions of Authority overVillage Lands

Type Statea Villageb

Gocher 40.8 44.9Enclosure 90.3 6.5Oran 19.4 67.7Otherc 8.1 6.1aPercentage who described these lands as belonging to thestate.bPercentage who described these lands as belonging to thevillage community.cOther mentioned categories: Stony ground, village tank, andschoolyard.

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in different socioeconomic positions often havedifferent responses to enforcement authority(Gupta 1986). Either an imbalance in interests ora differential response to enforcement authoritycan cause instability in a joint-user system. Theimportance of both the stakes of compliance andthe role of legitimate authority is reflected in theenforcement of rules in community fallows. Heregrazing rights are based both on the mutual inter-ests of land owners and grazers and on the powerof traditional community obligations. The land-holder benefits during the wet season from un-trammeled growth and during the dry season fromnitrogen inputs from animal wastes. The commu-nity benefits from important dry-season grazing.Coercive pressures keep the community off theland during the wet season, while social pressureskeep it open during the dry season.

When asked, most landholders said they werenot fully free to close their lands to the public attheir pleasure and that disagreements over open-ing and closing fallows were usually adjudicatedby the traditional panchayat whose decisions werefinal. Rational and individual choice alone can-not fully explain the structure of this arrange-ment. Utility maximizing behavior, socialpressure, and cultural norms form a complexequation in the strength of the normative system.Where land holdings have become most unbal-anced or where cultural legitimacy and socialdeference have dissolved, marginal caste commu-nities have on occasion been refused access tocommunity fallows in some of the region’s vil-lages. Encroachment by herders during the rainyseason and year-round enclosure have occasion-ally resulted. Generally, however, the fallow graz-ing system is held together through coercion andtraditional authority. Where such enforcementauthority is considered mutually legitimate, thereis little violation and fallows are heavily grazedand browsed only after the season of greatestgrowth. Under such conditions, species that de-pend relatively less on above-ground productionduring the rainy season can be predicted to thrive.This would include annual ephemerals that storereproductive energy in seed stocks and perennialephemerals with much of their storage organs inbelow-ground roots and rhizomes (Noy-Meir1973). These would form the expected coverwhere owner/community parity prevailed. Notethat even where the system was in good balance,tree cover would not be expected to be high, giventhe high rate of browsing by small stock.

Forest Department Enclosure Politics

Forest Department enclosures are used, andtherefore perceived, quite differently by variousvillage groups. The rules are rarely enforced aswritten but are negotiated through a set of caste-specific restrictions that are enforceable by thegroups involved. Powerful communities (rajputs)with large land holdings have little to lose in thetransfer of waste, oran, or gocher resources toForest Department enclosures. Herding castes(raika and sindhi), on the other hand, may loseimportant browse and graze land to enclosures.Generally, they oppose enclosures where suchhave been implemented, but they are rarely in aposition to resist.12 As a result, herders are themost blatant violators of fence lines. Members ofherding communities explain that small herds aretolerated with occasional bribes to forest guards.Herders do not, however, violate grazing restric-tions with large herds, nor do they fell trees inenclosures. So while herders have different inter-ests in enforcement and compliance, they have agood negotiating position relative to the enforc-ing authority. Consequently they comply, at leastin part, with the rules in place. Marginal castegroups, who lose much to enclosures, are poorlypositioned to resist and violate rules in the waytheir more powerful neighbors do. Any bribe, fine,or penalty leveled against a poorer family couldbe devastating. They too comply with the rules inplace.

Some members of more marginal groups, espe-cially women, explain that cooperation with theForest Department can be beneficial, since high-paying jobs in planting and maintenance often goto women if they are in good standing with thelocal forest authority. This is especially true oflower-caste women who are less restricted in theirmovements and work through the tradition ofpurdah, or seclusion, which keeps higher-castewomen in the home and less involved in theexternal economy. Women are increasingly wellintegrated into the regional economy, and theirhouseholds depend heavily on the income. Thereward power of the Forest Department acts ef-fectively towards the compliance of these poorestsectors of the community. This factor is some-times coupled with respect for the Department’sexpertise, which results in village women defer-ring to the authority of the forester’s “superior”knowledge. Forest Department enclosures oper-ate, therefore, through a monopoly of interests inthe village and through the deployment of a range

422 Robbins

of authority forms: coercive, economic, and ex-pert. This set of conditions creates a relativelystable institution despite a widespread sense ofthe “irrationality” of enclosure on the part ofvillagers.

Facing the differential incentives and re-sponses to authority in a class- and caste-dividedcommunity, the wide range of enforcementmechanisms creates broad-based compliance.The expected environmental result of this regimeis a pattern of light grazing in enclosures with littletree cutting or intense browsing. Along with man-agement efforts geared towards tree production,a pattern of shrub and tree cover with somewhatlower understory is expected.

Orans, Gender, and Authority

As noted previously, the male-oriented char-acter of Gram Panchayat authority, combinedwith gendered divisions of household labor, leadsto indifferent responses on the part of women ingochers. In the case of orans, the maintenance ofthe institutional system is a result of the percep-tion by women of the social authority governingthe land, and not simply a product of efficiencyin use and access. Women from all caste groupsare generally responsible for the collection ofsmall wood resources for fuel and the copping oftrees for goat and sheep fodder. Women’s deci-sions to cut trees are crucial in determining thelevel to which tree stocks are preserved in villagelands. The common long-distance treks to treestocks away from oran sources represent women’sdaily personal work and inconvenience for theprotection of orans, sometimes amounting to asmuch as a two-hour round-trip walk. Thesemisacred character of the oran is significant,and non-utility-maximizing goals (in the nar-rowly defined sense of rational choice) are clearlyat work. Equally, the traditional enforcementauthority cuts across caste lines, since womenfrom both marginal and more powerful caste com-munities respond similarly to oran restrictions inarea villages. The oran acts as a strong, shared,and naturalized icon in village life and works moreas a culturally bound institution than a rationallyformed one. In turn, responses to its enforcementauthority affect extraction; orans can therefore beexpected to experience far less tree cutting thangochers and to have different levels of understorydevelopment resulting from various resource-collection pressures.

On the other hand, where the collapse ofauthority has occurred or where illegitimateauthority is employed, women respond by violat-ing rules. In the unusual case where authority hascollapsed through infraction of the rules or theimposition of outside authority in the form of theForest Department, women may be driven to cutin areas previously under oran management. Thisfact underlines the point that the response toauthority, coupled with the different resourceneeds created through a gendered division oflabor, leads to extraction decisions. While womenare key players in the maintenance and preserva-tion of traditional resource institutions, no nec-essary or essential relationship between genderand resource preservation is evident. Women inRajasthan are on the “front line” in terms of theirinteraction with the resource base and their vul-nerability to degradation and destruction of eco-logical diversity and productivity (Agarwal1994). They maintain and protect many of thetraditional rules for resource preservation at per-sonal expense, but disregard others where theirpursuits in the productive and reproductivespheres of the economy are subject to male-domi-nated institutions and decision-making bodies.13

In sum, each of the region’s institutionalforms—gocher, oran, Forest Department enclo-sure, and community fallow—functions differ-ently and with varying degrees of control. As eachinstitutional form draws upon a different systemof enforcement, each receives different responsesfrom diverse producer groups. These take theform not only of abstract responses to power, butalso of very material manifestations: cutting downtrees, leading animals to pasture, digging upgrasses, and gathering fodder. For this reason,each institutional form leads to a use pattern thatdifferentiates these areas on the landscape. Thispattern can be established through controlledecological analysis.

Ecology of Institutional Landscapes

The above outlined producer responses torules and authority affect extractive pressuressuch that, even under identical land uses, varyinginstitutions result in differing landscapes. Theenforcement of restrictions against tree cuttingand seasonal grazing or the absence of such en-forcement results in different levels of groundcover, different degrees of tree distribution, anddifferent kinds of herbaceous species distribution.

Authority and Environment 423

While both orans and Forest Department enclo-sures govern forest land uses,14 they differ signifi-cantly in ecological characteristics and treefrequency. Similarly, while Gram Panchayatgochers and community fallows govern areas ofpastoral land use, the total cover and distributionof valuable perennial grass species varies. Theresulting variation in landscape outcomes may bedemonstrated through the analysis of a sample ofinstitutional landscapes in the study villages.

Methodology

Thirty-four sample sites were established in thethree study villages. These were stratified in eachvillage to include the four institutional types:community fallow defined as land managed underjoint private/common arrangements describedpreviously; gocher defined as all pasture land heldfor common grazing under Gram Panchayatauthority; oran lands that were recognized locallyas orans and not under the management of theGram Panchayat or the Forest Department; andenclosures of at least a three-year period underForest Department management. The areas weresampled in September and early October of 1994,a slightly above-average rainfall year, in the high-growth period following the rains. At each site,randomly located and directed 100-meter tran-sects were laid, and the interception of all herba-ceous species and bare ground along the transectwas measured in centimeters to determine pro-portional coverage. Ten quadrats were laid alongthe transect line to measure woody-species fre-quency (Shankarnarayan and Satyanarayan1964). The coverages recorded are treated asdependent variables in the analysis. The depend-ent variable total cover represents the percentage

of ground covered by herbaceous species. Thedependent variable perennial grass cover repre-sents the percentage of ground covered by per-ennial grasses, especially the important foddergrasses, Lasiuris sindicus and Cenchrus ciliaris.The dependent variable tree frequency repre-sents the percentage of 10-square-meter quad-rats within which tree species occurred.

At each location, a soil sample was taken andthe institutional type, number of animal units15

per hectare, and distance from the village centerwere recorded. Soil characteristics (pH, electricalconductivity, available organic carbon, and phos-phorous [P2O5]) were also recorded. The datawere coded for simple correlation and multipleregression. Animal units per hectare, distance tovillage, soil pH, electrical conductivity, organiccarbon, and phosphorous were entered as con-tinuous data and correlated against tree fre-quency, percentage perennial cover, andpercentage total cover. The four institutionaltypes (oran, fallow, gocher, and enclosure) werecoded as dummy variables, three of which wereentered into the full multiple-regression model.

The Ecological Model

The results of the correlation of the continuousecological variables against total cover, perennialgrass cover, and tree frequency are shown in Table3. Total ground cover best correlates with lowrelative alkalinity and low livestock density.Leaving aside consideration of institutional vari-ables, these results follow general expectations ofarid land productivity for the region (Roy 1990).The less alkaline soils are more productive, whileheavier grazing pressure results in sparser cover-age. Similarly, perennial grass coverage is also

Table 3. Correlation of Ecological Variables against Landscape Indicators

Variablea Total Coverb Perennial Grass Coverc Tree Frequencyd

Distance 0.11 0.28 –0.03Livestock density –0.32* –0.62*** –0.21pH –0.39** –0.31* –0.23Conductivity 0.14 0.1 –0.11Organic carbon 0.18 –0.12 –0.06Phosphorus 0.07 –0.19 0.06a*** for p<.01, ** for p<.05, *for p<.1bThe percentage of ground covered by live biotic material; includes annual and perennial herbs and grasses, shrubs, and low-lyingtree species.cThe percentage of ground covered by perennial grass species.dThe average percentage of 10-square-meter quadrats in which tree species occurred.

424 Robbins

correlated negatively with both alkalinity andgrazing pressure. The patterns in the data suggesta model that follows basic ecological premises forgrass and scrubland ecology (Bhimaya and Ahuja1969; Breymeyer and Van Dyne 1980). Conduc-tivity, organic carbon, phosphorus, and distanceto village center did not prove to be significantlyrelated to any of the dependent variables at the90-percent level. It is likely that the low range ofcarbon variation in the sample (from 0.1 and 0.7percent) reduced its significance in the model.

Beyond the traditional ecological parameters,institutional types appear significantly related toboth tree frequency and cover. Eliminating someof the less significant variables (conductivity,soil texture, organic carbon, and phosphorus)and adding the institutional dummy variables(excluding the dummy variable for gochers) to thefull model in multivariate regression for each ofthe three dependent variables, we can reveal theimportance of institutions along with grazingpressure, distance to village, and soil pH, asshown in Table 4.

Explaining Coverage and Tree Frequencywith Institutions

The dependent variable total cover rangedfrom a low 41.2 percent to an almost total cover-age of 99.7 percent. The significant independentvariables explaining the variation, with an R2 of.57, included institutional variables for the gocherintercept, community fallow, and enclosure,along with livestock density, indicating thatground cover may be fairly well explained byinstitutional factors as well as grazing pressure.

The harvesting of wild fodder species and sea-sonal grazing regimes produce good coverageeven under higher relative grazing pressure. Pre-dictably, enclosure tends to increase groundcover. Perennial grass coverage ranged from noneto 42.68 percent. Livestock density, communityfallow, and enclosure institutions all contributeto an R2 of .60. Again, the pressure of grazing onperennial grasses is demonstrated, but even underconditions of high relative pressure, the institu-tional regimes of fallow and enclosure signifi-cantly contribute to greater coverage of desirableperennial species (Figure 6). Tree frequencyranged from zero to 90 percent. The variablesoran, fallow, enclosure, and distance to villageexplained a large proportion of this variation (R2

of .79). The contribution of institutional variablesto explaining tree coverage is again notable. Theinverse relationship between distance to villageand tree frequency suggests that the felling oftrees, in violation of institutional norms, is con-ducted far from observation, at sites away fromthe village, resulting in a possible erosion of treecoverage on the periphery.

To determine whether institutional variationcontributed significantly to total variation in eachof the three dependent variables, a test of thegeneral linear hypothesis was run to compare thefull model, with institutional variables, against areduced model, excluding them. Here,

F=(SSreduced–SSfull)/(∆df)s2

where SSreduced is the sum squared error for thereduced model, SSfull is the sum squared error forthe full model, ∆df is the change in the degrees offreedom in the reduction, and s2 is mean square

Table 4. Multiple Regression for Predicting Coverage and Tree Frequency

Dependent Variable

Total Cover Perennial Grass Cover Tree Frequency

R2 0.57 0.6 0.79N 34 34 34Independent variable Betaa Beta BetaIntercept 1.42** 0.46 0.11Oran 0.05 0.07 0.42***Fallow 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.34***Enclosure 0.20** 0.14** 0.62***Livestock density –0.29** –0.04*** –0.01Distance 0.04 –0.01 –0.05*pH 0.09 –0.04 0.08a*** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10

Authority and Environment 425

error for the full model (Myers 1990). The resultsare shown in Table 5. In all three cases, theaddition of institutional variables is highly signifi-cant in increasing the explained variance of themodel, especially in explaining total cover andtree frequency. In sum, the model explains a greatdeal of landscape variation, especially when in-corporating the effect of institutions.

In all of the cover cases—total cover, perennialgrass cover, and tree frequency—the contributionof institutional variables to the explanation ofbiotic conditions is clear. Forest and pasture cov-erage can be explained, in part, by the systems ofauthority governing the land. Moreover, institu-tional variations under the same mode of land useshow significant differences.

Forest Lands

Forest Department enclosures and orans bothrepresent forest-land uses, yet they differ signifi-cantly in ecological characteristics. The totalground cover and frequency of tree appearancevary under state and local control. Table 6 showsthe Beta coefficient of the institutional formwhen the alternate institutional variable in itsland-use type is treated as the intercept norm inmultivariate regression for each dependent vari-able. Put simply, controlling for the continuousecological variables, these Betas show the relativedirection and significance of change in the land-cover variable when under the alternate institu-tion. In the case of Forest lands, ForestDepartment enclosures are relatively and signifi-cantly higher in total cover and tree frequencythan orans. This follows Kumar and Bhandari’s(1992, 1993) conclusions that in areas relieved ofheavy grazing and cutting pressure, desert landachieves good cover. Tree cover also contributesto undergrowth through improved soil, shade,and moisture conditions and so the mean coveris also high here (Agrawal et al. 1976; Ahuja

Figure 6. A highly productive community fallow dominated by the perennial sevan grass (Lasiurus sindicus). Theowner harvests fodder annually before the land is thrown open to grazing.

Table 5. General Linear Hypothesis forInstitutional Effect

Total Perennial TreeCoverage Coverage Frequency

Fa 7.33*** 3.46*** 29.71***

a***p<.01

426 Robbins

1980). Tree frequency and total cover, shown inTable 7, are lower in orans than in fully fenced andpatrolled enclosures, as predicted by studies in theregion that demonstrate the role of browsing inthe reduction of coverage of some tree and her-baceous species. While restrictions on tree cut-ting are strong in orans, differences in theenforcement structure of the Forest Departmentresults in more extensive tree cover.

The difference between oran and enclosureregimes is also evident in the common speciesfound in the sampled areas. Trees most commonlyfound in Forest Department enclosures includeexogenous plantation species like angrezi babul(Prosopis juliflora) and Acacia tortilis. In contrast,orans contained no exogenous species and wererefuges for the dwindling Bordi (Ziziphus nummu-laria) and Jal (Salvadora spp.) species in the region.Beyond graze and browse, orans are the predomi-nant source of fruits, gums, famine foods like treeseedpods, and medicinal herbs and bark. They arethe storehouses of many of the most importantvillage species. While the diversity of speciesfound in orans is generally lower than other areas,species are found here that are often entirelyabsent in other village landscapes. Jhil shrubs(Indigofera oblongifolia), with a number of house-hold uses, jal trees (Salvadora oleoides and persica),with valuable fruits, and bhangri herbs (Blepharissindica), with important medicinal properties,were among several species found exclusively invillage orans (Figure 7).

Lands controlled in state enclosures have ahigh tree frequency and a high total ground coverafter the monsoon rains because access to themis nearly impossible for producers. Control isstrong insofar as the trees are less frequently cutor harvested and, as a result, healthy ecologicalconditions prevail at the cost of minimal produc-tive value to the local population. In contrast,orans, while allowing for heavy usage, maintain ahigh tree frequency but a lower quantity ofground cover. Local institutions are effective inmaintaining the tree stock but pressures from thelivestock economy drive down the cover of graze.It is unclear what quantity of biomass is madeavailable from this arrangement, but orans makean important contribution to browsing resourcesfor nearly all village households (Robbins 1998).Significantly, perennial species make up morethan 35 percent of oran ground cover, and this iscrucial for livestock production during the dryseason. Governed under different types of author-ity, forest lands may be distinguished in quantityand quality of coverage.

Grazing Lands

The variation in landscapes of community fal-lows, under semicommon village authority, fromthat of gochers, under the authority of the offi-cial Gram Panchayat, is also shown in Table 6.In total cover, cover of perennial grasses, andtree frequency, fallow lands, though harvested for

Table 6. Comparison of Institutional Forms by Land-Use Type

Beta Shifta

Land Use Variable Intercept Variable Total Cover Perennial Grass Cover Tree Frequency

Forest Enclosure Oran 0.15*** 0.07 0.19***Pasture Fallow Gocher 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.34***aBeta for institutional variable where alternate variable is intercept. ***for p<.01

Table 7. Ground Cover and Tree Frequency under Varying Institutional Forms

Enclosure Orans Fallows Gochers

Total ground covera 75.24 59.50 76.77 51.09Perennial grass coverb 19.99 14.86 20.38 2.80Tree frequencyc 77.50 56.67 45.45 15.00aThe mean percentage of ground covered by live biotic material; includes annual and perennial herbs and grasses, shrubs, andlow-lying tree species.bThe mean percentage of ground covered by perennial grass species.cThe mean percentage of 10-square-meter quadrats in which tree species occur.

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fodder and subject to grazing and browsingthrough much of the year, show positive shifts ofgreat significance from gochers. Gram Panchayatgochers are uniformly low in tree frequency andground cover, especially that of perennial grassspecies, as shown in Table 7. Qualitative measuresof variation also reflect differences in the effectsof institutional control. The number and diversityof species is far higher under community fallowthan gocher. Gochers were dominated, even dur-ing the growing season, by annual herbs includingdhamasa (Fagonia spp.) and bui (Aerva persica) andby annual grasses including lamp (Aristida spp.).Community fallows were high in perennialgrass species including the important tuftedperennial sevan (Lasiuris sindicus) and the soil-holding ghantiya (Dactylotenium sindicum).

Community fallow lands are remarkable for theiraverage level of perennial cover; overall grass coveris higher than that found on enclosures where nograzing is permitted at all. The closure of fieldsduring the rainy season and subsequent cutting andgrazing during the winter results in good pasturage,

since this timing of extraction matches thegrowth pattern of most wild perennial grasses.The rainy season is a period of above-surfacegrowth protected from grazing. Cutting, grazing,browsing, and natural fertilizer deposition duringthe winter provide a natural counterpart to themowing, thatch removal, and soil turning of“modern” and “scientific” pasture management(Kanodia and Patil 1983; Savory 1988). Duringthis dry-season period, rhizomes and root stocksof perennial grasses remain protected beneath thesurface and, as a result, these areas form vaststands of cultivated grassland. Gochers, with theirambiguous and contested authority, are consis-tently overused. They constitute open lands suffer-ing from the tragedy of overuse, to paraphraseHardin (1968). Here, local state authority is bothtoo ambiguous and perceived as too effectively cap-tured by elites to provide reasonable restrictions,and so grass cover is sparse and tree cover negligible.As in the case of forest resources, varying systems ofauthority and levels of control dictate extractionpressure and affect biotic coverage.

Figure 7. Village oran after the monsoon. The area is dominated by ker (Capparis decidua on left) and bordi trees(Ziziphus nummularia on right). Notice the higher levels of perennial and annual grass productivity in the shade ofthe trees.

428 Robbins

Conclusions

To be sure, environmental conditions in Mar-war—ground cover, perennial grass cover, andtree frequency—are strongly affected by stockingdensities, soil quality, and other ecological vari-ables. This association is expected since thesevariables are “proximate” ones, with the mostimmediate and direct impacts on flora. Yet thesevariables alone cannot account for the pattern ofenvironmental conditions found in the region.Land-use regimes are profoundly and regularlyinfluenced by the norms of access, systems ofauthority, and relationships of power that governthem. Institutions direct pasture and forest landsto different floristic responses or signatures. Theway in which these institutions function, how-ever, denies the simplicity of models that dependsolely on the rationality of enforcement incen-tives. Nor do landscapes read directly from theform of the rules. Rather, each institutional typerelies on varying forms of authority and achievesdiffering degrees of control and compliance. Theactions of people are influenced greatly by theirpolitical and economic position, but the institu-tional context of authority and control directsproduction behaviors and alters the landscape.

This conclusion is traced more fully in Figure8, where each institution is shown to operatedifferently and to different effect. Communityfallows are locally managed pastures that drawupon the coercive power of the landowner andthe legitimacy and deference of the communityand its panchayat elders. The result is a form ofmutual coercion, a carefully timed extraction re-gime, and a dense coverage of perennial grasses.Compared with state-managed gocher pasturage,community fallow appears to be a relative successin terms of overall coverage and especially cover-age of valuable perennials. Suffering from an am-biguity in their form of authority and lacking amandate among the disempowered members ofthe community, gochers provide little real controland so result in unrestricted use and low coverageoverall. It would seem local and informal control,rather than state control, is more effective here.At the same time, however, state Forest Depart-ment enclosures function effectively by monopo-lizing the interests of various communities andenforcing enclosure through coercive, economic,and expert power. Through plantation and rela-tively light browsing pressure, tree frequency ishigher despite the absence of indigenous species.While the oran, ordered around traditionally le-

gitimate and deferential authority, is lodged in astrong and familiar set of cultural and religioussymbols, it is less effective in controlling the ex-traction and grazing pressure that reduce under-story coverage. Despite a higher cover ofindigenous and perennial species, the oran issomewhat less effective than the hard system offence-lines and guards deployed by the state.

These results at first seem at variance with oneanother, since the state is shown to be a successin the case of the enclosure and a failure in thecase of the gocher. This result is contradictory solong as the question of control is limited to aninterrogation of state versus nonstate authoritysystems. Contemporary social theoretical ac-counts of power suggest that this may not be thecentral axis of concern, however. Rather, poweris seen as “capillary,” acting in the daily enforce-ment of social and political practice, independentof the “sovereign” power of the state (Foucault1990; Fraser 1989). This approach shifts analysisaway from the somewhat irrelevant issue of stateand nonstate resource management to a morefundamental inquiry into the nature and effec-tiveness of social power deployed both throughstate and local systems of hegemony, domination,and control. In this regard, the successful institu-tions, community fallow, and Forest Departmentenclosure share certain key elements. Both com-bine and mobilize diverse resources of power,relying on coercive force, social legitimacy, politi-cal hegemony, economic clout, and expert power.These reflect Foucault’s (1990:92) “multiplicityof force relations” that register in the daily life ofthe diverse groups discussed here as they decideand strategically enact resource-use patterns.Weaker institutional forms may carry the sov-ereign mark of the state, as is the case of theGram Panchayat gocher, but fail the daily tests oflegitimacy.

Moreover, the strong institutional regimes actthrough the inclusive enforcement of poweracross diverse interests. On the one hand, thesuccessful local institution of community fallowuses nonstate mechanisms to control the powerof the landholder and allow access to resourcesfor even the most marginal. Similarly, a successfulstate system like the Forest Department enclosuremonopolizes the diverse interests of the commu-nity, providing jobs and other resources in com-pensation for lost subsistence inputs. On theother hand, unsuccessful state systems, like theGram Panchayat gocher, fail precisely for the rea-son that they are unable to realize collective

Authority and Environment 429

interests. Political exclusion leads to failed coop-eration and degradation in ecological conditions.The Gram Panchayat has lost the politicalauthority required to maintain gochers; the domi-nation by local elites and the exclusion of womenhas caused the decay of the resource base. Thisresult calls into question any a priori assumption

that either “state/sovereign” or “local/traditional”management is always the best and most appro-priate form of environmental management.16

Some questions remain, however, concerningthe criteria of evaluation for conservation successand failure. The tests used here specify and un-derline quantity of biotic cover. This test reflects

Figure 8. Institutions, control, and landscape conditions. In pasture and forest land uses, both state and localauthority systems direct landscape outcomes through varying resources of power and patterns of producer response.

430 Robbins

the priorities of most technical managers in theregion. Varying the criteria of success for theseinstitutional forms may lead to differing conclu-sions. Judging the quality of landscape coveragesin the region’s villages, assessed in terms of diver-sity and the protection of important subsistencespecies, might show the oran to be a successfulrelative to the monocultures of state Forest De-partment enclosures. This suggests the necessityfor interrogating the categories and priorities ofenvironmental management and leaves room forfuture work (Rangan 1995).

Finally, though these results point to a fewrelatively successful village and state systems inRajasthan, they in no way assure the future sur-vival of even the most robust of these institutions.As the previous survey of the region’s institu-tional history underlines, and as is also madeevident in other contexts (Schroeder 1997; Watts1989), forms of authority and control realized innorms, rules, and contract, are malleable andsubject to rapid political and economic change.Drawn increasingly into the global economy, the“cultural economy” of these institutional formswill continue to change (Pred and Watts 1992).While local communities continue to negotiatethe implementation of resource managementrules, they do so in the context of global forces.Reduction of fallow time, driven by increasedcash-cropping, will likely reduce access to com-munity fallows in the future. Village orans, wherethey do limit extraction and degradation, may fallto encroachment and the plow.

Even so, the implications of the study arebroad. The lessons from Rajasthan may well applyto similar resource management questions in de-veloped-world contexts. Here, the current focuson state versus nonstate forms of managementmight be tempered by a consideration of otheraxes of variation in institutional form. Inclusion,hegemony, and enforceable authority may bemore relevant to the fate of parks, grazing lands,and forests in North America than that of central-state versus local-community interests. Futurecomparative work should target other contexts(developed and market-oriented), where rules,communities, and interests are plural and whereuse and extraction play an important role inlandscape characteristics. Such work might fur-ther cement the notion that “institutional formmatters” (Emel and Roberts 1995:679) and en-able us to better understand the complex waysauthority is inscribed in the landscape.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the U.S. EducationFoundation in India for funding this research and theNational Science Foundation for support through doc-toral dissertation improvement grant (SBR-9304259).Thanks also go to the incomparable Komal Kothari atRupayan Sansthan in Jodhpur, India; S. M. Mohnot at theSchool of Desert Sciences, Jodhpur; and to B. L. Turnerfor thorougheditingthroughout.Special thanksgotoJodyEmel, Doug Johnson, Ilse Kohler-Rollefson, Stan Herwitz,andAnnGoldfortheir inspirationandinputandtoMarkeLogue and Jeff Isaacson for their efforts in the world ofstatistics. Appreciation also goes to the anonymous re-viewers for comments that led to significant improve-ments on previous versions of this paper.

Notes

1. The first, more conservative figure, is based upon1992 village records for a sample of twenty-ninevillages in the study area. The second figure isbased upon the proportion of “cultivable waste”recorded in 1994 for Jaisalmer district (Govern-ment of India 1994).

2. See also Arizpe (1996) and Feierman (1993) forexplorations of property, culture, and social insti-tutions in population and landscape research.

3. See also Ferguson (1984) and Iannello (1992) forfeminist considerations and critiques of institu-tional form.

4. Western, orientalist scholarship is often given toovervaluing caste as a category of social analysis(Srinivas 1994; Appadurai 1986). Even so, thepersistence of this form of categorization remainsa daily reality for the region’s residents.

5. See Chakravarty-Kaul (1996) for a thorough anddetailed study of institutional history in andaround Delhi and the Punjab.

6. Primary sources on this period generally take theform of Hindu religious texts, most prominently,“dharmic” legal texts, dharma-shastras, and theManu-smriti or Laws of Manu. Dharma is a termthat refers not only to “law” but to an idea of atotal preordained order that governs all obliga-tions and behaviors, human and nonhuman. Itrefers generally to righteousness, virtue, and duty(de Bary 1958). The Manu-smriti is a metrical lawbook outlining the “Institutes of the Sacred Law”proclaimed by Manu. The book is likely a recast-ing of a much older Dharma-sutra and is almostimpossible to date with any accuracy (Bühler1886). Manu as a text was probably not itself usedas a legal guidebook in village India during thisperiod (Maine 1883). It does, however, reflect therange of legal concepts (property, boundary, liabil-ity, etc.) which were a part of common villagevocabulary.

Authority and Environment 431

7. The roots and purposes of these original “sacredgroves” are much debated by historians and ecolo-gists. Some suggest they developed from cultsassociated with hunter-gatherer communities(Gadgil and Vartak 1994). These analyses havebeen restricted, however, to the small and scat-tered orans of Peninsular India, especially Ma-harastra. This thesis is not likely for the large anddiverse orans of Rajasthan.

8. The period with the most profound implicationsfor land law was the reign of Akbar, from1556–1605, beginning in western Rajasthan in1565 when the fort at Jodhpur was occupied byAkbar’s armies (Sharma 1977).

9. There has been significant debate concerning theaccuracy of this term, imported from Europeanhistory. The term is used here, conditionally, forlack of a better one (Inden 1990).

10. The typology is based upon a survey of 28 villages inthe study region. These were distributed across thearea to represent a range of small and large villagesat varying distances from main lines on communica-tion. At each village, categories, rules, and authoritysystems for community land management were as-sessed through survey, focus groups, and conversa-tion. Ongoing observation of use, encroachment,illicitextraction,andruleenforcement inthreestudyvillages provided further insight into the actual char-acter of these general types.

11. Institutions are not considered here to “possess”power, per se. Rather, they are aligned along axes ofsocial interaction across which power acts. Institu-tions do not dominate individuals; they occupy theplaces between individuals and groups in whichdomination occurs. See Weber (1978) and Foucault(1990) for a comparison of these perspectives.

12. These kinds of “I don’t want it, but you can’t haveit” politics are common in the region and ad-dressed in admirable detail by Agrawal (1994).

13. This pattern follows ecofeminist explanationsthat locate “women-nature” connections in thehistoric and socioeconomic circumstances of pa-triarchy and not in essential natural roles (Warren1990). See Gururani (forthcoming) for a relatedcase study.

14. Land use in orans and Forest Department enclo-sures differs insofar as the latter is not a commonlygrazed landscape. They are both maintained andevaluated for tree coverage, however, and clearlyfall into the same use category as used in globalchange research; land use involves both “themanner in which the biophysical attributes of theland are manipulated and the intent underlyingthat manipulation” (Turner et al. 1995).

15. An Animal Unit (AU) is set equal to one cow orcamel. A sheep or goat is equal to 0.15 AU(Chouhan 1988).

16. See Rangan (1997b) for a more comprehensivetheoretical critique of this bias in the criticaldevelopment literature.

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Correspondence: Department of Geography, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1361.

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