RJEA Vol3 No1 March2003

Romanian Journal of European Affairseste editat de c`tre Institutul European din Romånia

Blv. Regina Elisabeta 7-9, Bucure[ti 70348, RomåniaTel. 314.2696, 314.2697; Fax 314.2666E-mail: [email protected], http://www.ier.ro

Aceast` publica]ie este finan]at` de programul Phare alUniunii Europene (RO 0006 18.03.02)

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Romanian Journal of European Affairsis published by the European Institute of Romania

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This publication is funded by the Phare programme ofthe European Union (RO 0006 18.03.02)

RomanianJournalofEuropeanAffairs

EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF ROMANIA

vol. 3, no. 1, March 2003

DirectorNicolae Idu

Redactor {ef / Editor-in-ChiefOana Mocanu

Redactori / Associate EditorsIrina RåmniceanuElisabeta AndronacheGilda Truic`Iulia Zamfirescu

Consiliul editorial / Editorial Board

Farhad Analoui - profesor, Managementul international al resurselor umane, Universitatea din Bradford /Reader, International Human Resource Management, Director Professional & Development Services Committee,

DPPC, University of Bradford

Daniel D`ianu - profesor, Academia de Studii Economice, Bucure[ti; fost ministru de Finan]e / Professor,Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest; former Minister of Finance

Eugen Dijm`rescu - consilier al Primului Ministru al României; fost Ministru al Economiei [i Finan]elor /

Advisor to the Prime Minister of Romania; former Minister of Economy and Finance

Nicolae Idu - director general al Institutului European din România / Director General of the EuropeanInstitute of Romania

Andras Inotai - profesor, director al Institutului de Economie Mondial`, Budapesta / Professor, Director ofthe Institute for World Economy, Budapest, Hungary

Mugur Is`rescu - Guvernator al B`ncii Na]ionale a României / Governor of the National Bank of Romania

Alan Mayhew - profesor, Sussex University / Professor, Sussex University

Costea Munteanu - profesor, Academia de Studii Economice, Bucure[ti / Professor, Academy of EconomicStudies, Bucharest

Jacques Pelkmans - cercet`tor al Centrului pentru Studii Politice Europene, Bruxelles / Senior ResearchFellow of the Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Andrei Ple[u - rector al Colegiului Noua Europ`, Bucure[ti; fost Ministru de Externe, fost Ministru al Culturii/ Rector of New Europe College, Bucharest; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Minister of Culture

Cristian Popa - Viceguvernator al B`ncii Na]ionale a României / Vice Governor of the National Bank ofRomania

Tudorel Postolache - membru al Academiei Române; Ambasador al României în Marele Ducat alLuxemburgului / member of the Romanian Academy, Ambassador of Romania to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

Helen Wallace - profesor, director al Centrului pentru Studii Avansate Robert Schuman, European UniversityInstitute, Floren]a / Professor, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European UniversityInstitute, Florence

CUPRINS/CONTENTS

TOWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF 5THE UNION. OPTIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR REFORM

Wouter Coussens

Ben Crum

UNELE ASPECTE PRIVIND APLICAREA LEGISLA}IEI 39

DE PROTEC}IE A CONCUREN}EI |N ROMÅNIAGheorghe Oprescu

CONSOLIDAREA MONETAR~ MONDIAL~ {I PROBLEME 56ALE TRANZI}EI ROMÅNIEI LA MONEDA REGIONAL~ Marin Fråncu

ROMANIA AND THE EU COMMON FOREIGN AND 68SECURITY POLICYDaniel C`lin

INCREASING WOMEN SENIOR MANAGERS 76EFFECTIVENESS: EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIADr. Farhad Analoui

Romanian Journal of European Affairs vol. 3, no. 1, 2003

Introduction: In search of Unionleadership

As European cooperation took off in the1950s, it focused on concrete economic tasks. Itdid not require a strong central ”government”.Over the years, however, the nature of Europeanintegration has changed considerably. Theestablishment of the European Union by theMaastricht Treaty in 1992 complemented theformer European Communities with two pillars of”real politics”: a Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in the field ofJustice and Home Affairs (JHA). The creation ofan Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) hasbeen another landmark. At this moment theUnion is about to take another historical step:after several earlier rounds of enlargement, it willend the East-West divide of Europe by accepting adozen or more new member states.

Yet, while European cooperation has evolvedtowards a truly political Union covering the entirecontinent, its institutional structure has

Romanian Journal of European Affairs

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vol. 3, no. 1, 2003

Rien ne se crée sans les hommes. Rien ne dure sans les institutions.(J. Monnet)

ABSTRACT: The success of the Convention on the future of the EU will to a great extent dependupon its answers to the institutional questions. Among these questions, the issue of EU leadershipplays a crucial role. In this paper, three challenges for the re-organisation of leadership in the Unionare identified:

• Union leadership has to be more effective;• Leadership in the Union should contribute to the democratic character of the Union;• Leadership reform should not fundamentally distort the Union’s institutional balance.In view of these three challenges, the authors consider the two main strands of debate that touch

upon the issue of leadership in the EU: first, the debate on the election of the Commission Presidentand, secondly, the different proposals for reforming the Council Presidency.

TOWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNIONOPTIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR REFORM1

Wouter Coussens*

Ben Crum**

1 This paper is the result of collaboration between the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Belgian RoyalInstitute for International Relations (KIIB - IRRI). It is published as part of the Working Paper series of the European PolicyInstitutes Network (EPIN) of which both institutes are members. This article was published in the EPIN Working Paperno.3, January 2003. In the present issue of the Romanian Journal of European Affairs only the first part of the originalarticle is published while the other part will be included in the next issue of our journal.* Wouter Coussens is a Researcher at the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations (KIIB-IRRI).** Ben Crum is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) enjoying the support of a Marie CurieFellowship of the European Community under contract number HPMF-CT-2002-01706.

undergone far less change. From the Treaty ofRome onwards, the European architecture hasbeen built upon a remarkably stable institutionaltriangle: the (European) Council is the supremepolitical body, the Commission prepareslegislation and coordinates its implementation,and the European Parliament monitors theCommission’s performance and is involved in thelegislative process. These fundamentals havehardly been touched.

By now, many signs indicate a pressing needto reconsider the institutions that serve theUnion. Ten years after Maastricht, the need forEuropean action in the areas of CFSP and JHA hasbecome ever more urgent, but so far the tangibleachievements in these fields fall short of theambitions expressed. Moreover, the completionof EMU requires stronger economic governance(Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001). At the same time,enlargement from the current 15 to 25 and moremember states is bound to magnify diversitywithin the Union that can only be handled if there is a corresponding increase in coordinatingpowers. Since previous attempts at tackling thesechallenges have failed, the European Council hasconvened a Convention on the Future of the EU”to consider the key issues arising for the Union’sfuture development and try to identify thevarious possible responses” (European Council,2001).

In this paper, we address one issue that isbound to play a key role in the eventualinstitutional framework that the Convention willhave to develop: Union leadership. As statedabove, there was little need for leadership withinthe Union architecture at its origins. In the firstsection below, we outline how leadership taskshave come to be allocated among the institutionsin a rather ad hoc manner. This discussion shows

that a structural re-organisation of leadership isrequired. Drawing upon the analysis, we submitthat any solution to Union leadership will need tobe assessed in the light of three basic criteria:efficacy, democracy and the preservation of theinstitutional balance.

The core sections of this paper approach thequestion of leadership from two angles. First, werevisit the longstanding debate on thedemocratisation of the selection of theCommission President. Secondly, we turn to themore recent debate on a permanent president forthe European Council. In each case, the variousproposals are systematically analysed in the lightof the criteria introduced. In the concludingsection, the two debates are brought together, aswe seek to identify a way of reorganising Unionleadership that increases effectiveness, enhancesdemocracy and preserves the institutionalbalance.

1. Union leadership: Past and prospects

1.1 Current leadership positions in the EUExecutive power in the Union is shared

between the (European) Council and theCommission. As a corollary, executive leadershipin the Union is divided between the presidenciesof both institutions. More recently, the Presidencyof the Council has been complemented by thecreation of a High Representative of the CFSP,who assists the Council Presidency in the externalrepresentation of the Union. An analysis of a moreeffective and accountable leadership of the Unionhas to start from a reconsideration of these threefunctions.

Wouter Coussens / Ben Crum

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The Commission PresidentThe European Commission is the most

permanent embodiment of European politicalcooperation. The role of the Commission in theEuropean political process has beencharacterised as being ”rather more, and ratherless” than ”the civil service of the EU” (Nugent,1999: 85). The Commission is ”more” to theextent that it plays a prominent role as theagenda-setter in the legislative process and acts asthe ”guardian of the treaties”. Furthermore, itplays a major administrative and regulatory roleand manages the budget. The Commission isconsiderably ”less” than a full-blown executive asits powers have been strictly circumscribed andapply only in a limited number of political fields.

Notwithstanding the collegial nature of theCommission, the position of CommissionPresident has acquired considerable significance(Nugent, 1999: 106-7). Formally acting as aprimus inter pares, the Commission Presidentdrafts the general policy programme of theCommission, represents the Commission vis-à-visthe other institutions and to the public andoversees the workings of the Directorates-General through the Secretariat-General. He/shealso chairs the weekly meetings of the College,and exercises the deciding vote in the event of atie in the College.

The powers of the Commission Presidenthave been revised in the Nice Treaty. The new Art.217 formalises previous practice in providing thatthe President can freely allocate and reshuffle theresponsibilities of the other Commissioners.2

Moreover, the Treaty provides that theCommission President can dismiss anyCommissioner after obtaining the approval of theCollege.3 Finally, the Treaty now also foresees thatthe Council and the President nominee appointthe other Commissioners on the basis ofproposals from each member state.

In the end, the powers of the CommissionPresident find their limits with the remit given tothe Commission. The member governments haveso far carefully limited the Commission’sauthority in the common foreign and securitypolicy, defence, economic policy, and police andcriminal affairs. Instead the member states havepreferred to scatter executive powers in thesefields among the Council Presidency, the CouncilSecretariat, the High Representative andspecialised agencies. As a result, the CommissionPresident has been excluded from some of themost prominent European policies.

The Council PresidencyThe Council is in many respects the

bottleneck of the Union. Bringing together thegovernments of the member states, the Councilcommands the process by which Europeanpowers are allocated and exercised. The Councilhas both executive and legislative powers. It is theplace where intergovernmental policies (CFSP,ESDP and cooperation in police and criminalmatters) are decided and national policies arecoordinated. Moreover, no legislative act can passwithout the consent of the Council. And also afterlegislation has been passed, the Council retains a

TOWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION

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2 See Declaration no. 32 attached to the Amsterdam Treaty and Art. 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commissionadopted on 16 September 1999.3 Though this may appear as a strengthening of the powers of the Commission President, it can be argued that it actuallyconstitutes a weakening, because under current practice a Commission member will resign if requested to do so byhis/her President, without requiring the approval of a majority in the College (F. Dehousse, 2001).

firm control on the executive process, throughthe national implementation of this legislation orby overseeing the implementation by theCommission through the committees it hasinstalled (”comitology“) (Joerges and Vos, 1999).

To look after its tasks in the various policydomains, the Council has evolved into a complexstructure encapsulating various ministerialformations and numerous administrativecommittees. While at one time legislative activitywas distributed across more than 20 ministerialCouncil formations, the Seville European Councilin 2002 set their number at nine. The GeneralAffairs Council is supposed to play a centralcoordinating role among these variousformations. In practice, however, it has oftenfailed to do so, and as a consequence ever moretasks have been put before the European Council.

The European Council serves as the platformfor the heads of state and government of theEuropean Union, on an informal basis from 1975onwards and since 1986 on the basis of varioustreaty provisions. It provides the European Unionwith strategic guidelines and political impetus. Inaddition, the European Council gets involved inpolicy decisions when the respective Councilformations fail to reach agreement or when theTreaties explicitly require it to act. The EuropeanCouncil has, moreover, taken an important role inforeign and defence policy (de Schoutheete andWallace, 2002).

The „leadership“ of the (European) Council isassumed by the Presidency. The basicresponsibility of the Presidency is theorganisation and chairing of Council meetings(and its subordinate bodies) during the time ofoffice. While this may be considered a mereprocedural responsibility, the Presidency actuallyenjoys considerable powers by controlling the

timing and the content of these meetings.Moreover, the Presidency is also responsible forrepresenting the Council vis-à-vis the otherEuropean institutions and for representing theUnion vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

Each member state holds the Presidency ofthe (European) Council in turn for six months. Arotating Presidency is a well known device ininternational treaty organisations. It prevents theemergence of a strong permanent centre thatmay come to dominate the autonomy of theconstituting members and ensures the basicequality of all members. At the same time, holdingthe Presidency may serve to stir up thecommitment to the European project in eachmember state in turn.

The burden of the Presidency has increasedsignificantly over time. In particular, theemergence of CFSP has put extra responsibilitiesupon the Presidency. Pressures on theorganisation of the Presidency will rise evenfurther after the next round of enlargement.Given the limited resources and experience of thecountries joining, doubts have been raisedwhether their administrations are properlyequipped to take on the Presidency. What is more,if the rotating scheme would be maintained, thiswould imply that any state would hold thePresidency only once in every 12 years.

The High RepresentativeAs it emerged that the external

representation of the Union requiredconsiderably more involvement than could beexpected from the member government holdingthe Presidency, the Treaty of Amsterdam beefedup the role of the Secretary-General of theCouncil by introducing the function of HighRepresentative (HR) of the CFSP. The HR assists


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the Presidency in its external representation role.He/she also contributes to the formulation,drawing-up and implementation of politicaldecisions by the Council. The HR is moreoverresponsible for the several CFSP committees andagencies. Finally, he/she can, at the request of thePresidency, act on behalf of the Council andconduct political dialogues with third parties. In1999, Javier Solana was appointed as the first HRfor a period of five years.

Formally, the function of the HR is anadministrative rather than a political function: theHR has no official powers of his/her own andlimited means. Moreover, the HR’s powers onlyconcern the CFSP; the other external policies arebeing dealt with by the Commission under theaegis of the Commissioner responsible forexternal relations (Relex). In practice, however,the HR is much more than an EU ambassador andthe political nature of the function is hard to deny.This is partly the personal achievement of JavierSolana, who has been extraordinarily agile inmaking the most of his role within a web of often-conflicting pressures.

Indeed, the HR has to tread a thin linebetween acting on his own initiative and waitingfor a specific mandate from the Council.Moreover, though formally under no obligation tothe supranational institutions of the Commissionand Parliament, he/she has to take care not tooffend them and in particular to ensure that hisactions do not conflict with those of the RelexCommissioner. In the end, however, the HR is firstand foremost accountable to the Council. Thisparticular relationship is the key difficulty that anymove towards closer integration of the functionsof the HR and the Relex Commissioner will needto overcome.

1.2 Reforming EU leadership: A triplechallenge

The foregoing review of the current state ofleadership in the Union reveals it to beproblematic on several accounts. Above all it isclear that the current organisation fails to delivereffective leadership, while the need for it hassteadily increased. However, any reconsiderationof leadership in the Union has to take account ofother values beyond efficacy. For a start anyreform to improve efficacy needs to be matchedby adequate measures to ensure democraticaccountability. Finally we want to draw specialattention to the fact that reorganisations of EUleadership need to pay respect to the precariousinstitutional balance that is maintained in theUnion between, on the one hand, the idea of ageneral European interest and, on the other, thediversity of national interests. Hence, reformingEU leadership faces a triple challenge: it shouldbe rendered more efficacious and moredemocratic, whilst respecting the Union’sinstitutional balance.

EfficacyThe review of leadership in the EU reveals

that the demand for it has steadily increased, asever more executive tasks have been taken up atthe European level. These also include, moreover,truly ”governmental” tasks, such asmacroeconomic management, foreign anddefence policy and police matters.

Nevertheless, the present demand for EUleadership is not matched by an adequate supply.The current organisation of leadership tasks hascome about in a rather ad-hoc fashion.Leadership tasks have been scattered arounddifferent positions and bodies, which complicatescoordination among them. In turn, this hampers


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the visibility and accountability of leadershippositions in the EU. This especially holds for theUnion’s external presence, and leaves the EU apolitical dwarf on the world stage, despite itseconomic weight.

Hence the first challenge for the organisationof future EU leadership is to increase its efficacy.Leadership reform in the Union can contribute toa better overall running of the political processeswithin the Union. Most notably, effectiveleadership within the complex Union architectureshould strengthen coordination powers acrossthe institutional divides that currently exist. Thisis not only a matter of the formal attribution ofpowers; it also requires the position of leadershipto be actually able to command support from thevarious Union institutions. In this context onealso has to give due consideration to the questionwhether the organisation of leadership within theUnion can be shaped in such a way as to ensurethat the position(s) involved will attract the best-qualified people. Further, the lack of externalpresence is often pointed to as an importantindicator of the deficiencies of Union leadership.A major test for leadership of the Union is thuswhether international actors will recognise that itprovides them with an equal and credibleinterlocutor.

DemocracyFor some time now, observers have

harboured serious misgivings about thedemocratic character of the European Union (cf.Weiler et al., 1995; Lodge, 1997; Dehousse, 1995;Moravcsik, 2002). The weak connection betweenEurope’s citizens and its institutions is a directreflection of the fact that, wherever power isexercised in the Union, citizens do not feel theyhave much of an impact on it. Any strengthening

of European leadership will thus need to becomplemented by adequate mechanisms fordemocratic accountability.

Indeed, there is a clear pressure to have anystrengthening of leadership in the Unioncombined with effective mechanisms of electoralchoice through which the public can effectivelyinfluence the choice between one or anothercandidate(s).

To instil democratic accountability into theUnion, however, will require more than the mereextension of the European Parliament’s powers.For the moment, the democratic legitimacy of theParliament remains disputed as long as its seatsare contested in ”second-order elections” withlow turnouts, various national voting rules andvoting behaviour reflecting mainly the nationalpolitical situation (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Schmittand Thomassen, 1999). And even though theEuropean Parliament has been able to increase itsfunctional efficiency over time, its representativefunction remains underdeveloped as theexpression of ideological differences issuppressed by its tendencies towardstechnocratic reasoning and decision-making byconsensus (Magnette, 2001a).

Moreover, any assessment of the democraticpotential of reforms of Union leadership shouldlook beyond the electoral mechanisms to thebroader context in which citizens engage withand appreciate the Union. Public appeal andengagement may in the end be more importantdemocratic factors than the actual electoralprocedure. Leadership reform might alsocontribute to the Union becoming moretransparent and comprehensible (Magnette,2001b). Furthermore, European leadershipshould be organised in ways that foster theemergence of European parties and the necessary


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organisational and media infrastructure throughwhich they can interact. Offering Europeancitizens electoral choice may be instrumental increating such a European public sphere, as theresulting politicisation of and competition forUnion leadership will raise the salience of the EUin national political debates (Risse, 2002).

Institutional balanceThese two groups of considerations –

effectiveness and democracy – represent thedichotomy that pervades all literature ondemocratic institutional engineering (Dahl, 1994;Sartori, 1994; Scharpf, 1999). In the specificcontext of the European Union, we add a thirdperspective that is crucial to the distinct nature ofthe Union as a political system: the preservationof the Union’s institutional balance. The Union isno longer a normal international organisation butneither is it a sovereign political system. It derivesits powers (as well as the legitimacy to exercisethem) from two sources: the governments ofeach member state represented in the Counciland the citizens of these states as represented bythe European Parliament (Dehousse, 1995).

Any attempt to reform Union leadership willhave to respect the precarious political balancebetween on the one hand the idea of a generalEuropean interest and on the other the diversityof national interests (Prechal, 1998; Lenaerts andVerhoeven, 2002). As Convention PresidentGiscard d’Estaing (2002) puts it: ”If power isconcentrated around the Council, the generalEuropean interest will no longer be taken intoaccount, and the equality of citizens will besacrificed to the equality of states. If a similarconcentration of power takes place around thetruly communitarian institutions – excluding theCouncil - it would be the interests of the member

states that would no longer be able to expressthemselves and (…) the equality of states, smallor big, will no longer be recognised besides theequal representation of citizens”.

One implication of this is that leadershipselection in the Union cannot simply be subject tomajority rule, because in a majoritarian (”fused”)model the executive is able to dominate thelegislature by commanding a secure majority in it(”dictatorship of the executive”) (Hix, 2002b). Asa consequence, certain member states might bepermanently excluded from power, as they wouldonly be represented in the minority. Rather thanfusing legislative and executive powers,leadership in the Union should be subject to asystem of checks and balances resembling themodel of ”divided government”.

Thus, any reform of leadership in the Unionwill have to ensure that the relations with theintergovernmental and with the supranationalinstitutions are properly looked after. With regardto the Council, structural guarantees are requiredto make certain that Union leadership will not bepermanently alienated from any one memberstate. On the other hand, the EuropeanParliament ought not to be monopolised by theexecutive, but should instead continue to play itsindependent role as ”controlling parliament”(Dann, 2002).


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In short, we submit that any reorganisation ofleadership in the EU needs to be assessed fromthree fundamental perspectives: efficacy,democracy and the institutional balance (a fulldescription of this framework is given in theannex). These three dimensions are neitherlogically exclusive nor fully comprehensive. Thereare some obvious respects in which they impingeupon each other. However, each of them catchesa distinct line of argument for reorganisingleadership in the Union. Any proposal for reformdeserving of attention will need to demonstratetangible benefits along at least one of thesedimensions. At the same time, it should notimpose severe costs on the other dimensions.

2. (S)electing the CommissionPresident

As the Commission has acquired ever morepolitical prominence, there has been anincreasing concern to subject its powers topolitical controls. Certainly from Jacques Delorsonwards, the post of Commission President hadbeen recognised as a (potentially) very powerfulone. As a result, the appointment of theCommission President has come to receive evermore attention. In the European Council, thenomination of the Commission President hasbeen the subject of heated debate.

At the same time, there has been increasingpressure to subject the selection of theCommission to democratic control. In nationaldemocratic systems, elections generallydetermine who is to hold executive office.Executives who fail to deliver are prone to bethrown out at the next elections. While theCommission has to some extent developed into aEuropean executive, its composition is only in themost indirect way linked to the Europeancitizenry. Since the European Parliament playsonly a secondary role in the selection procedure,European elections do not have direct influence.National elections, on the other hand, areinstrumental in determining the composition ofthe European Council, but their impact remainsrather indirect and tangential as onlygovernmental parties are represented and theirdecision is conditional upon the agreement ofothers. All in all, the selection of the Commissionis at no point genuinely subject to electoralchoice.

Given this shortcoming, proposals to electthe Commission President by the citizens(directly or indirectly) have been gaining ground.It is important to underline that the election ofthe Commission President does not amount tothe election of the entire Commission. It is thuspossible to elect the Commission President,


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Table 1. Three dimensions for evaluation

Efficacy of office Democracy Institutional balance- Coordinating powers - Comprehensibility - Harmonious institutional balance- Embeddedness - Openness - Relations with intergovernmental - (External) visibility - Electoral choice institutions- Selection by merit - Public appeal - Relations with supranational

- European political and institutionspublic sphere

whilst sticking to the current provisions fordesignating the other Commissioners.

Democratising the appointment of theCommission President is bound to haverepercussions on the whole institutional system.A more democratic selection procedure canincrease the accountability and legitimacy of theCommission, as a whole as well as the decision-making procedures in which it is involved. It canalso have substantial effects on the publicperception of and the public involvement withthe Union. What is more, the resultingpoliticisation of the position of the CommissionPresident is likely to impact upon the roles of theCommission as a whole. In particular it may wellaffect the much-cherished political independenceof the Commission (Franck, 2002). Finally, therelationship between the President and the rest ofthe Commission is likely to be affected.

The Laeken Declaration (European Council,2001) enumerates three ways of appointing theCommission President: by a qualified majority inthe European Council, by the EuropeanParliament or through direct election by thecitizens. Two other ways also merit consideration:election by the national parliaments or by aCongress of Parliamentarians.

2.1 The situation under the Treaty ofAmsterdam

Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the CommissionPresident was chosen unanimously by thenational governments. The Maastricht Treatymade a first step towards a more democraticsystem: it granted the European Parliament theformal right to be consulted on the choice of the

President.4 The European Parliament took thisprovision to mean that it was entitled to approveor reject the nominee for president. Surprisingly,at the first occasion in 1994 this ratheropportunistic interpretation was approved by thePresident-in-office of the Council (Germany). TheParliament’s interpretation was formalised by theAmsterdam Treaty, which explicitly gives theEuropean Parliament the final approving vote onthe European Council’s choice for CommissionPresident. The other Commission Members arethen nominated by the national governments bycommon accord with the nominee for President.Finally, the entire College is subject to a vote ofapproval by the European Parliament.

DemocracyThe consensus at the time was that the

Amsterdam Treaty had pushed the EU furthertowards a parliamentary model of executiveselection (Crombez, 1997; Nentwich and Falkner,1997). Through the election of a legislature (theEuropean Parliament), the EU citizens would also indirectly select the executive, i.e. theCommission and its President.

However, this expectation was not fully borneout in practice. The presidential candidatenominated by the European Council is unlikelyever to be rejected by the European Parliament,as the European Council is able to impose itschoice in the European Parliament vote (Hix,1997; Gabel and Hix, 2002). The governingparties that are part of the European Councilpress their MEPs to support the candidatenominated by the European Council, because anegative European Parliament vote would be seen


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4 Still, the 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration had already granted the European Parliament bureau a consultative role inthe choice of the Commission President.

as an embarrassment. The national parties areable to impose their choice on their MEPs,because they control MEP candidate selection.The coalition of MEPs stemming from nationalparties in the European Council plus those MEPswith the same political colour as the presidentialcandidate is almost always going to beat thecoalition of those parties that are not in theEuropean Council and have different policypreferences.

Thus, voters’ choices in the EuropeanParliament elections have an only limited impacton who becomes Commission President. Thesame holds for the composition of the entirecollege, which tends to reflect more thecomposition of the Council than that of theEuropean Parliament.5

In turn, the marginal impact of the EuropeanParliament (EP) elections has reduced theirpublic appeal. For the time being, EP electionsremain to be fought as a re-run of the nationalgeneral election (Reif and Schmitt, 1980): they arenot fought on the competing agendas and byoffice-holders of Europe-wide parties, but onnational issues and by national parties. Hence, thecurrent system fails to exploit the public appeal ofthe President’s appointment and does not leadthe way to a European public-political sphere.

In the end, the selection of the CommissionPresident remains under the firm control of theEuropean Council. The actual decision-makingprocess within the European Council continuesto take place behind closed doors and remainslargely opaque to the general public.

Institutional balanceThe current voting procedure in the

European Council – consensus – guarantees thatthe preferences of every member state are takeninto account. Thus, the mandate of theCommission President derives clearly from all themember states.

Nevertheless, a good working relationshipbetween the Commission and the EuropeanCouncil is not automatically ensured, alsobecause the political composition of theEuropean Council changes during the term of theCommission President. Moreover, once in officethe Commission President is not reallyaccountable to the body that actually appointshim/her. While the European Council and theCouncil are well placed to make or break aCommission, they do not enjoy formal powers tosanction it.

The European Parliament does enjoy theformal power to force the Commission to resignas a body. However, the exercise of this power issubject to exceptionally strict conditions, as isillustrated by the fact that none of the sevenmotions of censure ever submitted has carried(Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2002). Notably in theone case that the (Santer) Commission did resign,it did so on its own initiative before the EuropeanParliament was able to mobilise its formal powers.The exercise of the censure by the EuropeanParliament is further complicated by the fact thatif it succeeds, it has only rather limited means tocontrol what Commission will be nominated in itsstead.

One might argue that the high obstacleserected against the Commission being forced to


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5 This is exemplified by the composition of the Prodi Commission: only 5 of the 20 members of the college are close tothe PPE, despite the fact that the PPE had become the largest group after the European Parliament elections. On theother hand, 10 of them are close to the PSE, the socialists being indeed the dominant fraction in the Council at the time.

resign serve to protect its independence. Thequestion arises, however, whether this situationremains appropriate in the light of the (political)responsibilities the Commission has taken on orwhether more effective controls (by both Counciland European Parliament) are required.

EfficacyThe main problem of the consensual

appointment of the Commission President is thatit opens the door for capture by one memberstate (Hix, 2002a: 11). The 1994 Corfu EuropeanCouncil serves as a good example. At thisoccasion, the UK vetoed the candidacy of BelgianPM Dehaene and Germany vetoed the candidacyof Dutch PM Lubbers. It was only at a nextmeeting that the European Council agreed on thenomination of Jacques Santer.

Thus, the consensus rule complicates thedecision procedure within the European Council.In particular, it has the consequence that theeventual nominee may well be selected on themerit of not provoking a veto of any of the headsof state, rather than for being the best-qualifiedperson for the job. Eventually, this way ofproceeding reflects badly upon the nominee aswell as on the European Council itself.

2.2 The Treaty of Nice: Election by amajority in the European Council

In the Nice Treaty (to enter into force on 1February 2003), the EU governments have agreedto choose the Commission President by qualifiedmajority voting (qmv) rather than by unanimity.As in the current situation, the EuropeanParliament then has to approve the nominee.

EfficacyThe rationale behind the change at Nice is to

improve the efficacy of the selection procedure.The nomination of a Commission President willno longer be compromised by the capture by onemember state. At the same time, this reformreduces the possibility of making the choice ofthe Commission President part of a package deal.The new provisions make it possible that severalheads of state propose a candidate. As a moreopen process of competition will ensue, themerits of the candidates are more likely to be adecisive factor. Above all, however, with the newvoting system of Nice and the increase to 25member states, the selection procedure is boundto become rather more complex.

While the move to qmv may thus have clearadvantages, its implications in practice should notbe overestimated. In many spheres in which the


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The current situation leaves much to be desired in terms of democracy. As the selectionprocess takes place under the firm control of the European Council, the impact of the electorateis marginal at best. What is more, the selection process is marked by opacity. The provisions on theselection and resignation of the Commission and its President protect the independence of theCommission. The question arises, however, whether the current responsibilities of theCommission do not require more effective controls. The efficacy of this selection procedure ishampered by the requirement of consensus in the European Council. As a consequence theeventual nominee may be selected mainly on the merit of not provoking a veto of any of the headsof state, rather than for being the best-qualified person for the job.

(European) Council can decide by qmv, actualdecision-making still takes place in the shadow ofa putative consensus (Golub, 1999). If there is avehement opposition by any (major) memberstate, it is unlikely that the majority will persist ona nomination.

DemocracyThe move from unanimity to qmv also has

implications in terms of democracy. On thenegative side, qmv makes it possible that wholeelectorates are cut off from the selection of theCommission President. Furthermore, thenomination will still be decided behind closeddoors.

On the positive side, the move to qmv maywell benefit the legitimacy of the decision in theCouncil. If member states indeed propose variouscandidates, there is likely to be a broad andsubstantial debate in the European Council ontheir merits and programmes. These debates mayeven spill over into the public sphere.

Most notably from the perspective ofdemocracy, the move to qmv in the EuropeanCouncil may allow the European Parliament to puta much stronger mark on the selection process.Member states that have found themselves in theminority in the European Council will no longerpress their MEPs for a positive vote. As a result,whereas the nominee was unlikely ever to berejected by the European Parliament under theunanimity provisions (Hix, 1997), moving to qmvin the European Council significantly increases

the chances that the European Parliament canactually veto a candidate.6 Thus it becomes farmore likely that voters’ preferences expressed inthe EP elections will actually come to bear uponthe selection process.

Institutional balanceIf the European Parliament can make itself

more felt in the selection procedure, its role inthe Union architecture will be muchstrengthened. It will increase its grip over theCommission, while at the same time contributingto the legitimacy the Commission enjoys. What ismore, European party groups, especially thelarger ones, may turn this power into a campaignissue in the EP elections by featuring a candidatefor the Commission Presidency or opposing thePresident in office.

As for the Council, decision-making by qmvcreates the risk that the competition between thecandidates may turn into a competition betweenmember states. If the President would indeed benominated against the will of some memberstates, this might well have a negative impact onhis or her relationship with the (European)Council. Thus, regardless of whether the EP’spowers turn out to be increased, the Niceprovisions lead to a politicisation of theappointment of the President, since it will bemore difficult for ”intergovernmental” memberstates to refuse an integrationist candidate, or forleft-wing member states to refuse a right-wingcandidate, and vice versa.


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6 Consider for instance the Santer vote: of the 94 MEPs whose national party supported Santer and whose EuropeanParliament party group opposed Santer, 47 voted with the national party. If the European Council is divided as a result ofqmv, the national governing parties that are in the minority in the European Council will no longer press their MEPs fora positive vote. Hence, a larger number would vote with their European Parliament party group. If for instance in 1994the Spanish Social Democrats would have been in a minority position in the European Council against the nominationof Santer, a negative vote of their 17 MEPs would have sufficed to shift the European Parliament majority against him.

A central issue here is whether being electedby a qualified majority will in the end make thePresident more or less dependent on the Council.Some have argued that the Commission Presidentmay well come to depend on a structural majorityin the Council. Decision-making within theCouncil would then come to be characterised bya new government-opposition dynamic. In the”governing” majority would be those memberstates that backed the Commission President andwould probably also support his/her legislativeinitiatives. In the ”opposing” minority would bethe member states that were on the losing side inthe appointment of the President and could alsobe on the losing side on most legislative issues(Hix, 2002a).

These predictions are probably overstated,however. In practice, coalitions among themember states shift according to the subjectmatter, with each member state having its ownspecific preferences on each topic. Moreover,given the role of the European Parliament in thelegislative process (dual legislative) and theappointment procedure (investiture vote), ageneralised government-opposition dynamicappears rather unlikely.

2.3 Election by the EuropeanParliament

While the involvement of the EuropeanParliament in the selection procedure for theCommission President has gradually increased, itsrole remains secondary to that of the EuropeanCouncil. With a view towards democratising theselection procedure, it has been suggested thatthis division of roles might be reversed, makingthe European Parliament the prime actor in theselection procedure (Jospin, 2001; Convention,2002/177; Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, 2002). Concretely, after theEuropean elections, the European Parliamentwould elect the Commission President.

If the European Parliament is to elect theCommission President, the nomination ofcandidates becomes a key issue. Obviously theboldest option would be that the Europeanpolitical parties indicate their candidate forPresident in the European elections (Jospin,2001). These candidates might even compete asfigureheads of their party’s transnational list(Barnier, 2001). A less far-reaching alternativewould be that the European Council drafts a listof candidates,7 from which the newly composedEuropean Parliament would be required tochoose a Commission President after the


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The new Nice provisions facilitate a more effective selection procedure, although the actualimpact may be relatively modest. More notably, however, they are likely to increase the power ofthe European Parliament in the selection procedure and thereby also the involvement of theelectorate. Furthermore, qmv inevitably leads to a more politicised nomination vote in theEuropean Council. While the changes will probably lead to a slight politicisation of the position ofthe Commission, the effects of these changes can be controlled by the checks member states exertupon each other and the role of the European Parliament.

7 Another possibility is a dual list, drawn up by the Council and the European Parliament (Lenaerts & Verhoeven 2002).

European elections.8 Finally, it is also possible tohave the national parliaments designate a numberof candidates. This would amount to a sort of”primary” at the national level (Attina, 1999).

This model carries the risks that the contestfor the Commission President will only take placein the (bigger) member as they are crucial to theeventual outcome and are, hence, also probablythe homeland of the most likely candidates. Thus,(smaller) member states might be alienated fromthe process. However, this danger can be wardedoff by inserting a requirement that any candidatebe able to demonstrate support from among atleast two-thirds of the national delegations in theEuropean Parliament (cf. Hix, 2002a).

DemocracyHaving the European Parliament elect the

Commission President will have profound effectson European democracy. Above all, the choices ofEuropean citizens in EP elections will come tohave much more weight. This could boost theparticipation rate in EP elections. Since mostEuropeans are well acquainted with this way ofelecting the executive, this proposal will alsocontribute to their understanding of theEuropean political system. Moreover, by its verynature, the selection process will take place inpublic. In turn, this option is bound to enhancethe public appeal of the Commission President.The debate on the merits of the candidates wouldprobably combine with a much wider debate onprogrammatic issues, as the euro-parties will

present their election programmes at the sametime. All this could in turn foster the emergenceof a European political constituency.

Of course, in the medium run, EP electionsare unlikely to fully ward off the shadow ofnational politics. National parties will still have anincentive to use the elections in their widerpursuit of national government office. Voterscould still use these elections to signal theirnational concerns to the governing parties byvoting for opposition or protest parties. Still, inthe long run, the European dimension of EPelections is likely to be strengthened. (See Hix,2002a, for a sceptical assessment of this view.)

Giving the European Parliament the primacyin the nomination process may still fail to transferthe effective power of appointment, as parties innational government might still be tempted toimpose their wishes on their MEPs. Hence,additional measures may be needed to ensurethat EP party groups exercise a genuine choiceover the candidates. In particular, the bondbetween domestic parties and MEPs should beloosened. This could be done by transferring thelegal responsibility for selecting candidates in EPelections to other bodies, such as EP partygroups, and/or regional party organisations.

This proposal will further strengthen the roleof EP party groups. It stimulates them to organisearound blocs each seeking to mobilise a majorityfor its own candidate (Franck, 2002). At the sametime, the heterogeneity of Europe is unlikely tobe fully absorbed in two major political blocs,


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8 The EPP (2002) proposes to stick to the Nice provisions, whilst foreseeing that the European Council nominates thepresidential candidate ”in the light of the European Parliament elections”. This would probably amount to a genuineelection by the European Parliament, since the Nice provisions (presumably) make it possible that the EuropeanParliament refuses a candidate nominated by the European Council. Still, it is a somewhat awkward compromise, whichdoes not really give the European Council its own say in the appointment of the President. It is also doubtful whetherthe public would fully comprehend this process.

especially not as long as there remains a strongproportional element in the electoral procedures.Thus, the largest party in the EuropeanParliament will not necessarily be able to secureits candidate for Commission President, as thefinal outcome will depend on the coalitions thatcan be formed.

Institutional balanceThe position of the European Parliament vis-

à-vis the Commission in this model deservescareful attention. On the positive side, one mayargue that it is logical to boost the role of theEuropean Parliament in the appointment of theCommission President, as it is the only institutionthat can effectively sanction the Commission(Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2002). On the negativeside, however, there is the risk that this modelmay in fact reduce the powers of the EuropeanParliament vis-à-vis the Commission, relegating itto a mere rubber-stamping body (cf. Hix, 2002b).Experience with national parliamentary systemshas taught us that executives selected by aparliamentary majority may well turn this majorityinto its will-less servant. If the Commissionbecomes an emanation of a parliamentarymajority, the European Parliament risks losing its”critical distance”, which now enables it toeffectively exercise its supervisory role.

To counter this, some have proposed therequirement that the Commission President mustbe elected by a super-majority in the EuropeanParliament (Lamoureux et al., 2002). But thisoption opens up the possibility of a deadlock incase the two biggest groups are unable to agreeon a candidate. Such a situation would turn theselection of the Commission President again intoan easy prey for dirty and opaque horse-tradingbetween the political families.

In any case, it remains to be seen whether theCommission would really be able to bring aboutsuch a ”dictatorship of the executive”. This risk ismitigated by the fact that the executive wouldhave to rely on a coalition of party groups that,given the under-development of European party-groups, are unlikely to be fully controllable all thetime. Moreover, the election of the CommissionPresident by the European Parliament does notamount to the election of the whole Commissionby the European Parliament. One might well leavethe power to nominate the other Commissionersto the member states. Furthermore, experience sofar has shown that MEPs tend to interpretparliamentary mechanisms in such a way as tomake them compatible with the non-majoritarianfeatures of the EU. Technocratic and judicialscrutiny tends to superimpose ideologicaldifferences (Magnette, 2001a). Finally, the centralrole of the Council in the Union’s decision-makingprocess should be underlined. Since the Councilis part of the executive and part of the legislature,a fully ”fused-majorities” model is unlikely.

This brings us to the implications this modelhas for the Council. As the member states losetheir control of the selection process, there is therisk that certain member governments becomealienated from the Commission President,especially if he/she maintains a very closerelationship with a parliamentary group in whichcertain states are less well represented. If thegroup of alienated member governments wouldturn out to be sufficiently large, the danger ofinter-institutional deadlock looms.

To ensure a good working relationshipbetween the Commission President and theCouncil as a whole, various measures can beenvisaged. First, it appears desirable that, afterthe EP elections, the Commission President is


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also approved by a qualified majority in theEuropean Council. Further, member statesopposing the President chosen may be satisfiedthrough a balanced overall composition of theCommission itself, which they can assure throughtheir right of nomination. More far-reachingpossibilities are even conceivable. The Councilcan, for instance, be granted the right to censurethe Commission (Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, 2002; Dehousse, 1995).9 One riskof this, however, is that the Commission membersfall victim to inter-state feuds. For that reason,individual accountability of the Commissionersvis-à-vis the Council is not desirable, but acollective accountability or, alternatively, focusingthe accountability relationship on the position ofthe Commission President alone, may bepossible. A further option is to give the Councilthe power to dissolve the European Parliament ifthe latter censures the Commission.

All in all, one can envisage several institutionalmeasures to ensure a good working relationshipbetween the Council and the Commission.Indeed, whatever flanking measures are adopted,care has to be taken that they do not overshootthis objective by actually compromising theposition of the Commission and tilting theinstitutional balance again to the side of themember states.

EfficacyThere is some reason for concern with this

model about how the changed relationship withthe Council may affect the coordinating powers ofthe President. In terms of his remit, theCommission President gains little from a furtherstrengthening of his bonds with the EuropeanParliament. On the other hand, the loosening ofties with the (European) Council might lead to areduction of the trust member states are willingto put in the Commission. Member states may bereluctant to delegate powers to an office that theyare not sure they can control. If member stateswill become more guarded in their relations withthe Commission President, his/her capacity tocoordinate across the institutions is likely to bereduced.

There is reason to believe that this model willwork towards the selection of candidates of highquality. European party groups will have a biginterest in nominating well qualified candidates.MEPs can, moreover, be regarded as an expertconstituency at the heart of the Union’s decision-making process (Laver et al., 1995).


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9 Note that the Treaty already provides the possibility for the Council to ask the European Court of Justice to retire aCommissioner if (s)he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his/her duties or if (s)he has beenguilty of serious misconduct (Art. 213 TEC).

Election of the Commission President by the European Parliament will have profounddemocratising effects. Its impact on the institutional balance requires attention both on the side ofthe European Parliament and of the Council. Whenever genuine dangers are apparent, however,flanking measures can be adopted to thwart them. Preserving a balanced relationship with theCouncil is also a precondition for this option to be efficacious.

2.4 Election by the nationalparliaments

Beyond the options of having theCommission President elected either by theEuropean Council or by the European Parliament,a third option may be to delegate the election tonational parliaments. It has been argued that thisoption meets various needs at the same time(Hix, 2002a):

- it offers a democratic procedure for electingthe Commission President;

- it circumvents the playing off of theEuropean Council and the European Parliament;and

- it secures a substantial role for nationalparliaments in the European political process.

The election of the Commission President bythe national parliaments would be organised as anElectoral College. Each national parliament wouldhave a certain number of ”electoral college votes”equal to its country’s representation in theEuropean Parliament (thereby allowing someover-representation of smaller member states).These votes could then be allocated to thedifferent presidential candidates in proportion totheir share in the ballot of each parliament. Thecandidate obtaining the absolute majority of thevotes (if necessary after two ballots) would beappointed Commission President.

A major advantage of this model is that it canbe structured to ensure a transnational outcomeof the election. Each candidate for the post ofCommission President would be required tosecure at least a certain level of support inmost/all national parliaments. Thus it wouldensure that the Commission President wouldenjoy the support of party groups throughout allmember states, instead of coming under thedirector of a limited number of member states.

Another notable feature of this option is thatit might leave member states the freedom tomove to a system in which their share in theelectoral college is determined through directelections by the people rather than by thenational parliaments (Hix, 2002a). If eventually allmember states would make this move, the systemwould be transformed into a direct election of theCommission President (see section 2.6).

DemocracyThis proposal derives its strength from the

fact that it draws upon the national parliaments,”the main democratic and sovereign bodies inEurope’s representative democracies” (Hix,2002a). The proposal can also draw upon thenational public infrastructure to foster debatesabout what the EU should be doing. At the sametime, it would bring out the truly Europeandimension of the election, since candidateswould have to campaign throughout the EU. As aconsequence, the proposal would probably gosome way towards strengthening the role of Euro-parties, but not to the same extent as in theprevious proposal.

Admittedly, this option involves somewhatmore complex arithmetic than some of the otheroptions (Hoffmann, 2002: 9). Still, thesecomplexities do not appear prohibitive in the caseof the election of the US President. What mattersis that, contrary to the current selection by theEuropean Council, the election takes placeopenly in a way that is controllable to the public.

A limitation of this model, however, is thatwhile it does involve the national parliaments, itdoes not offer much reason to expect thisinvolvement to spill over to the electorate.Especially when the national election and theelection of the Commission President may well be


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quite far apart in time, the choice of the newCommission President is unlikely to feature highamong the issues at stake in the nationalelections. In that way, this option institutionalisesthe second-order national character of theinvestiture procedure, as the election for theinstitutions deciding the investiture procedure(i.e. the national Parliaments) are a-fortiorinational-centred. Moreover, rather than sparkingoff a truly European political debate, election bynational parliaments is more likely to stir updifferent national debates that will be centredaround national issues (e.g. the Euro in the UK)and dominated by national party politics(Hoffmann, 2002).

Hence, though the idea of involving nationalparliaments does have a definite appeal, it haslimited democratic credentials as it will not bringabout much involvement of the citizenry. Nor canthis option be expected to contribute towards thestructural formation of a European political andpublic sphere. On the contrary, it reaffirms theprimacy of national public spheres.

Institutional balanceAs this option secures a substantial role for

national parliaments within the Unionarchitecture, it may well serve to rally a strongerengagement of national parliaments with theEuropean project. Moreover, the appointment bynational parliaments provides the EU executivewith a distinct base of democratic legitimacy. Inthat way, the ”fusion” of the executive and thelegislative is avoided.

Quite likely, the candidate gaining themajority of support from the national parliamentswill be able to enjoy considerable support in theEuropean Council, as the composition of thelatter reflects the composition of national

parliaments. This does not, however, make thisoption equivalent to selection by (the majority of)the European Council (contra Hoffmann, 2002:11-12). Any successful candidate for CommissionPresident will probably require the support of atleast some opposition parties in nationalparliaments as well some small governing partieswith a political colour that is not present in theEuropean Council (e.g. the Greens). In any case,the fact that any successful candidate is likely toenjoy considerable support in the EuropeanCouncil is noteworthy, in that it provides animportant source of inter-institutional stability.

Much more reason for concern comes fromthe relationship between the CommissionPresident thus chosen and the EuropeanParliament. Since the legitimacy of the Presidentwould derive from the national parliaments,he/she would be much less dependent on thesupport of the European Parliament. On thepositive side, it could be argued that thisguarantees the independence of both theCommission and the European Parliament. Onthe negative side, as the European Parliament’spowers to influence the appointment of theCommission President are reduced, it may bemore inclined to veto legislative proposals or tothreaten to invoke censure. Moreover, the risk ofinstitutional deadlock looms, as the majority inthe European Parliament will not necessarily bethe same as the aggregated majority in thenational parliaments (and thus the Council). Thusoverall this option seems to strengthen the role ofthe Council in the appointment of theCommission President, to the detriment of therole of the European Parliament.


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EfficacyIf the Commission President were elected

according to this method, he or she would cometo claim an independent position with a distinctbasis of legitimacy. Notably, however, there wouldbe few mechanisms of accountability to constrainthis independence. Already the election of theCommission President itself would not providefor accountability, as the composition of theelecting body would not be determined by theperformance of the President in office. Moreover,in between elections, his/her actions would onlyto a limited extent be subject to scrutiny(Hoffmann, 2002). Given their position in themulti-level system, national parliaments lack theresources and access needed to effectivelymonitor the European level (Dann, 2002). Andeven if they would command these resources,they would still lack the means to sanction theCommission President.

Hence, the President thus chosen might wellskirt the Council and the European Parliament,invoking his/her accountability to the nationalparliaments, which would however be unlikely tojoin powers effectively. This politicalindependence is all too likely to turn against theCommission President. Powers are likely to bewithheld on grounds that the position isinsufficiently embedded in the Union architecture.

2.5 Election by a Congress ofParliamentarians

Another option that has been gaining interestlately is to delegate the task of electing theCommission President to a Congress ofParliamentarians. This Congress would be a newlyestablished European institution bringingtogether national parliamentarians from allmember states with an equal number of Membersof the European Parliament.10 As the Congresswould be a new institution, its composition andworking procedures would have to be decided upfront.

Conceivably, the Congress might elect theCommission President by simple majority.However, to ensure that the successful candidateenjoys broad support, more demanding votingrules could be adopted. One might, for instance,require the winning candidate to enjoy thesupport of a majority among the EPrepresentatives as well as among a majority of themember state representatives, or even of themajority in a majority of national parliaments.

DemocracyAt first sight, the idea of a Congress is

appealing. It would be the representatives of theEuropean citizens, in their capacity as bothnational citizens and European citizens, who


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The option of having the Commission President elected by the national parliaments scoresbadly on all three accounts. It falls short in terms of democracy as it fails to involve the electorateand reaffirms the primacy of national public spheres. While it may work out well with the membergovernments in the Council, it troubles the relationship between the Commission and theEuropean Parliament. In the end, however, in the absence of accountability mechanisms, one maywell wonder whether the Council and the European Parliament will actually be willing to entrustthe Commission President thus chosen with any substantial powers.

10 Some French proposals suggest, however, a division of 2/3 national MPs and 1/3 MEPs.

would elect the President of the Commission.11

Thus, one might hope that election by a Congresswould combine the best of both former options(election by the European Parliament and bynational parliaments).

A Congress is likely to stimulate thedevelopment of links between national partiesand European party groups and will thuscontribute to the development of a Europeanpolitical sphere. It would bring the election of theCommission President out into the open. Also, aCongress may well acquire a strong symbolicappeal across the European public spheres.

In practice, however, it appears more likelythat the Congress will above all combine some ofthe problems attached to the former options. Theidea of a Congress does little to involve theelectorate directly. The fact that the EP electionswill only partially determine who shall becomeCommission President will only have a slighteffect on their public appeal. At the same time,the choice of the Commission President isunlikely to become a major issue in nationalelections amidst the national issues that arenormally at stake.

Moreover, the fact that the Congress does nothave an established place within the Unionarchitecture is bound to leave it somewhat of afremdkörper in the eyes of the public. Indeed,rather than exemplifying European democraticpractice, this new and incidental institution mightwell be captured by established political forcesbehind the scenes (national governments, party-groups).

Institutional balanceGiven the composition of the Congress, this

option does not seem to favour either the Councilor the European Parliament to the detriment ofthe other. As with the election by nationalparliaments, it is rather likely that the majority bywhich the Commission President has been electedwill be of a similar political persuasion as themajority in the Council. At the same time, workingrelations with the European Parliament will besomewhat better than in the former option, asMEPs will have been part of the Congress.

Having an equal number of national MPs andMEPs is obviously crucial in this respect. However,much will also depend on the political colour ofthe members that represent the EuropeanParliament and the national parliaments in theCongress. If the rules of designation of Congressmembers are such that only the dominantpolitical tendencies in both constituents are beingrepresented in the Congress, then divergencebetween the Congress and the EuropeanParliament is more likely to emerge.

EfficacyWhile the Commission President elected by a

Congress may be able to establish effectiveworking relations with the European Parliamentand the Council, the question of accountabilityremains troublesome. If the Congress is toreassure on this score, it should be given thenecessary powers (information, questions, andcensure). Still, it will only be able to exercise themon the rare occasions when it does congregate. Inbetween elections, it would fall to the EuropeanParliament to scrutinise the Commission.However, there is an obvious tension between the


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11 We owe this interpretation to Prof. Dr. Koen Lenaerts.

role of the Congress and that of the EuropeanParliament. Any extension of the powers theCongress enjoys in holding the Commissionaccountable would undermine the powers of theEuropean Parliament in the same domain. Thisproblem is not resolved by the fact that asubstantial part of the Congress would beconstituted by MEPs. Overall, a Congress wouldadd a significant number of complications to analready ”Byzantine” system.

2.6 Direct electionIn the final option, the Commission President

would be directly elected by EU citizens in an EU-wide contest without any parliamentarymediation (Fischer, 2000b; Verhofstadt, 2000).Thus, the EU would be transformed into a(partial12) presidential system.

Various voting procedures can be consideredto organise such a direct election. The leadingconsideration should be that any candidatechosen will need to command wide supportacross the Union in order to preclude the threatof a permanent alienation of certain minoritiesand/or member states from executive power (cf.Laver et al., 1995). Thus a candidate should notbe able to win by gathering support in a limitednumber of member states only.

A first way to ensure broad supportthroughout the Union is to require any winner to

collect an absolute majority of the votes cast. If ina first round no candidate would succeed ingathering such a majority, a second round may beorganised along the lines of the French electoralsystem with a run-off between the two mostsuccessful candidates.

Alternatively (or additionally), votes from thevarious member states can be assigned weights,for instance according to each member state’sshare in the European Parliament. Hence, votes

cast by electors from smaller member stateswould weigh more than votes cast by electorsfrom bigger member states. This could ensurethat the preferences of the voters in smallermember states are also taken into account. Anobjection against this solution, however, is that itruns rather blatantly against the ”one man–onevote” principle.

A third alternative is an electoral-college typeof arrangement, modelled on the US presidentialelections but with virtual rather than genuineelectors (Laver et al., 1995). In this system voterswould determine the allocation of ”presidentialmandates”. To favour smaller member states, eachmember state could have a number ofpresidential mandates (roughly) equal to itsrepresentation in the European Parliament.Furthermore, contrary to the practice of mostAmerican states, the distribution of presidential


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12 Partial, because part of the executive powers in the Union would still lie in the hands of the Council and the EuropeanCouncil.

The democratic credentials of having the Commission President elected by a Congress ofParliamentarians appear eventually rather spurious. Compared to the alternative of election bynational parliaments, the establishment of a Congress would better preserve the institutionalbalance. Still, the option creates a potential tension between the Congress and the EuropeanParliament and leaves clear problems of Commission accountability that may well impede itsefficacy.

mandates per member state should not beawarded on a winner-takes-all basis, but rather ona proportional basis. The candidate who wouldthen receive the majority of presidential mandateswould become Commission President. The mainadvantage of this method is that it makes itpossible to take into account the populationweights of the member states, whilst highlightingthe number of mandates the various candidateswin in each member state rather than blatantlyaccording different weights to ”raw” votes.

Further guarantees to ensure that theeventual winner will indeed draw upon a widebasis of support may be derived from theorganisation of the nomination procedure. Eachcandidate might, for instance, have todemonstrate the support of a certain percentageof MPs in a certain number of Parliaments (Laveret al., 1995). This would guarantee that onesection of the elite in every member state wouldbe accountable to their electorates for the actionsof the winning candidate.

By combining these various provisions,candidates can be prevented from ”huntingwhere the largest ducks nest”.

DemocracyDirect election of the Commission President

has obvious democratic merits. It directly involvesthe European citizens in the selection of theexecutive and its basic design stands out in termsof simplicity and transparency (although this mayvary depending on the finer details of the electionprocedure). Potentially, the public appeal of thisoption is high. Voters in some member states arealso already acquainted with direct presidentialelections (France, Ireland, Finland, and Austria).

However, one may dispute whether Europe’svoters are ready and interested to vote in such an

election. Moreover, language barriers may make itdifficult for the nominees to get their messageacross. With an immature electorate, this kind ofelection might end up as a ”Eurovision contest”with voters preferring the candidate of the samenationality or the one of a ”friend” country.

Still, we should not underestimate theelectorate. Once this option is introduced, onemight expect the public to pick up on it and toacquire a concrete sense of what it is voting for.Thus, the visibility and accountability of theCommission President would be muchstrengthened. At the same time, one wouldexpect electoral turn-outs to reach levelscomparable to those of national elections, as thismethod makes it very clear to the citizens thattheir vote matters. (Hix, 2002b, is sceptical.)

A crucial element for this option to workwould be the evolution of a European politicalsystem with truly transnational party groups.Close collaboration between the nationalmember organisations of the European partygroups in a broad campaign, based upon acommon manifesto, would be essential forwinning the election. In turn, it would be muchharder for national parties to turn the EPelections into a mid-term ”beauty contest” fornational governments. The election campaignwould engage European public opinion aroundunequivocally European issues.

Institutional balanceFor this option to succeed, proper working

arrangements need to be put in place betweenthe Commission President and the two legislativebodies, the Council and the European Parliament.As regards the relationship with the EuropeanParliament, the Commission President wouldnaturally be linked to one or more party groups.


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Still, these relations would be considerablyweaker than if they would have elected him orher. Indeed, the President will be less constrainedby party affiliation, and may be able to rely onvarying coalitions.

Relations with the Council and the EuropeanCouncil might well be more complex. Of alloptions reviewed, a directly elected Presidentmay pose the strongest challenge to the primacyof the member states in the Union architecture.Quite likely, there would be some membergovernments of the same political persuasion asthe Commission President, but there would be noguarantee that he or she would be able to rely ona majority of them. In the end, much woulddepend on personal skills whether the Councilwould be willing to accept the CommissionPresident as a useful partner or rather take a moreenvious stance towards this newcomer.

All in all, a directly elected CommissionPresident is bound to put a lot of pressure on theinstitutional balance. It leaves the risk ofinstitutional deadlock, so familiar from the French(”cohabitation”) and US system (cf. Sartori, 1994;Linz, 1990; Duverger, 1980). To avoid this risk,release mechanisms may need to be put intoplace so that either legislative chamber would beable to force the Commission President to resign.Conversely, one might also consider giving theCommission President the power to call for new

EP elections. However, the use of such releasemechanisms is bound to have its costs in terms ofpolitical stability.

EfficacyPotentially this option invests the Commission

President with a lot of power. Being directlyelected by all European people, he or she willacquire an exceptionally strong mandate. Thepopular investiture will boost his/her authority vis-à-vis national leaders and the other EU institutionsas well as abroad. Moreover, this option providesfor a direct link of accountability, as the voterswould now be able to ”throw out the scoundrels”.

In turn, however, this puts the President ofthe Commission under a lot of political pressure.Whether she or he can deliver will depend heavilyon the willingness of member states to actuallyentrust the President with substantial powers andto develop a productive working relationship withthat individual. Indeed, if the high expectations ofthe electorate fail to be met, a backlash may occurin terms of public credibility and overalllegitimacy of the system. Experience in nationalpolitical systems has taught us that a presidentialsystem is unlikely to bring political stability to apolity still lacking in social stability (Linz, 1990).Hence, it is essential that the democraticlegitimacy entrusted to this office is matched bythe actual powers it commands.


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Direct election of the Commission President is appealing for a number of democraticconsiderations. One may dispute, however, whether the European electorate is actually ready forit. The radical character of this proposal is bound to put a lot of pressure on the institutionalbalance, the implications of which are hard to predict. The Commission President, Council andEuropean Parliament would have to redefine their working relationships. These will also determinewhether this option can actually be made to work effectively. If the Council and the EuropeanParliament failed to cooperate constructively with the Commission President, it would be likelythat the Union’s credentials would be undermined.

2.7 Preliminary conclusions on theselection of the Commission President

The first notable finding of this chapter is thatthe selection procedure of the CommissionPresident as revised by the Treaty of Nice goes along way towards satisfying the three criteria ofdemocracy, efficacy and institutional balance. Themove away from consensus to qualified majorityvoting allows a whole new political dynamic tounfold within the European Council, and booststhe role the European Parliament can play in theappointment procedure. Even under Nice, therewill therefore be a more politicised appointmentof the Commission President. Thus, the Niceprocedures may in the end differ in little butformal proceedings from the election of theCommission President by the EuropeanParliament.

Still, a move towards election by theEuropean Parliament remains preferable from theperspective of democracy, because it would makethe process more comprehensible and increasesthe likelihood that European party groups willactually free themselves from the control ofnational party organisations. As a result, the EPelections would become the core event for theappointment of the Commission President. Theimplementation of this option needs to becomplemented by flanking measures that wouldensure the full and equal involvement of theCouncil in the Union’s political process. Withsuch measures in place and given the

heterogeneous nature of the Union, there is littlereason to fear the Commission developing into adominating executive, as some (Laver et al., 1995;Hix, 2002a) have argued.

Direct election of the Commission Presidentby the electorate would be an even more radicalstep towards democratisation. However, thedemocratic gains of this procedure need to bequalified given the as yet only nascent Europeanpublic space and the necessity to calibrate suchan election. Also the turn to a Presidentialpolitical system that this reform would implywould severely shake up the institutional balance,exposing the Union on the one hand to the risk oftoo strong a Commission President and, on theother, to a structural deadlock between theCommission, Council and European Parliament.

Finally, two options involving the nationalparliaments were considered. In the first of these,the national parliaments would actually act as anelectoral college. This option was found to beproblematic on all accounts: it offered fewdemocratic merits, distorted the institutionalbalance and was unlikely to contribute to greaterUnion efficacy. Election by a Congress ofParliamentarians did slightly better, but the gainsfor the Union of the involvement of nationalparliamentarians in a Congress were foundnevertheless to be slight while raisingconsiderable complications in the balancebetween the Commission, Council and EuropeanParliament.


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Table 2. Six options for selecting the Commission President

Amsterdam Nice EP election National parliaments Congress Direct electionEfficacy - + + - ± ±Democracy - ± + - - +Institutional ± ± ± ± ± ±balance

Whichever way the Commission President isselected, it is bound to have implications for thenature of the Commission. In section 1 we notedthat the scope and the nature of theCommission’s tasks have expanded over time. Asa consequence, the image of the Commission as atechnocratic, impartial broker simply can nolonger be maintained (Lenaerts and Verhoeven,2002: Part 2; Føllesdal, 2003). The Commissionhas become politicised over time and if it is toretain any political prominence in the future EU itwill be politicised even more.

At the same time, recognising theCommission as a political body does notnecessary imply that it has to relinquish its role asguardian of the general European interest.Governmental institutions in national democraticsystems are also expected to pursue the generalinterest rather than merely the interests of theelectoral majority. Checks and balances can helpto secure this orientation towards the generalinterest. Parliaments, especially when made up ofdifferent chambers, actually act as a buffer bychecking executive action. Constitutions serve todelineate the remit of government and courtsmay act as their custodians.

Regardless of the selection procedurechosen, we need to assess the position of thePresident of the Commission in the wider contextin which his/her powers are subject tocountervailing measures. On the one hand, thepowers of the President within the Commissionshould be strengthened, so as to enable thePresident to exercise genuine leadership. As theselection process bestows more legitimacy on theCommission President, her or his powers in thenomination and resignation of Commissioners

should increase. On the other hand, the politicising effect

from the election of the Commission Presidentshould be countered by a balanced compositionof the Commission, in terms of party affiliationand nationality. Thus, while the composition ofthe College of Commissioners should be theprime responsibility of the President, this powermight be subject to certain minimumrequirements regarding geographical anddemographic diversity and fair rotation13 and,possibly, to approval by the European Council andthe European Parliament. Moreover, some of thequasi-judicial functions may be delegated toindependent agencies (Majone, 1996). Thus, theCommission should continue to be able toperform its conciliatory role in the legislativeprocess.

Still, the Commission’s powers currently findtheir limits in the fields of cooperation thatremain firmly in the hands of the member states.Whether a democratised Commission Presidentwill actually be in a position to give effectiveleadership to the Union thus depends on theoverall organisation of executive leadership in theUnion. With this caveat in mind, we next turn tothe future of the Council Presidency as well.


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13 Cf. Art. 4 of Protocol A. to the Treaty of Nice concerning the composition of the Commission after enlargement.

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Annex

The Normative Framework in FullIn this annex each of the three dimensions – efficacy, democracy and institutional balance – is

elaborated and dissected in a number of more specific aspects. Together these aspects provide us withthe normative framework with which the various proposals to reorganise leadership in the Union areevaluated.

Efficacy of officeArguing for the reorganisation of leadership in the Union requires first and foremost that one

expects it to contribute to a better functioning of the Union overall. The easiest way to demonstrate theissues at stake here is to draw upon the current situation (cf. section 1.1). The most strikingcharacteristic of current leadership in the Union is that it is divided. Division of the leadership task isnot a bad thing in itself and within the Union there may be pertinent reasons justifying it. Still, withinthe complex Union architecture, effective leadership requires well functioning coordinating powers. Tobe effective, leadership in the Union needs to contribute to the coordination of the political process bycommanding powers that reach across the institutional divides that currently exist.

Effective leadership is not merely an issue of accumulating powers, however. Any formal exercise ofpower may well run hollow if it lacks authority due to ineffective lines of communication andaccountability. The organisation of leadership needs to ensure that it is in a position to commandsupport from the various Union institutions. Thus, a second aspect of the efficacy of leadership in theUnion is a modicum of (internal) accountability, i.e. some degree of embeddedness within the Unionarchitecture.

The support that Union leadership can gather from inside the Union will also need to becomplemented by the recognition it receives from outside the Union. Indeed, the lack of externalpresence is often referred to as the major indicator of a lack of leadership in the Union. A major test forleadership of the Union is thus whether international actors – most concretely, the US President – willrecognise that it provides them with an equal and credible partner.

Finally, whatever the formal powers and provisions made to organise leadership, its effectiveness willto a large extent depend on the people who are selected to take up the task(s). Hence, the futureorganisation of leadership within the Union will have to be shaped in such a way as to ensure thatindeed the position(s) involved attract the best-qualified people. In the end a major aspect in shapingthe efficacy of Union leadership will be the extent to which it fosters selection by merit.

Effective Union leadership is thus more than just a matter of powers. It also depends on itsembeddedness in the Union architecture, its external presence and the merits of the people it attracts.All four aspects need to be taken into account when evaluating possible ways to organise Unionleadership in the future.


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DemocracyThe democratic character of the European Union is seriously questioned on many fronts. There is

a wide range of diagnoses of the presumed ”democratic deficit” as well as a wide range of possiblesolutions (cf. Weiler et al., 1995; Lodge, 1997; Dehousse, 1995; Moravcsik, 2002). The reorganisation ofUnion leadership need not be a necessary ingredient of any solution. Still, quite a number of proposalsto reform Union leadership suggest that it may contribute to democratising the Union, or at least toincreasing the engagement of citizens with the Union. To analyse the democratic potential of reforms ofUnion leadership properly, we do not look simply at electoral mechanisms but assess them in thecontext of a broader conception of democracy involving the appreciation of and the engagement withthe Union by the citizens.

A first way in which leadership reform may contribute to the democratic perception of the Union isby making it more transparent, or more specifically more comprehensible. A prime obstacle to popularengagement with the Union is the perceived complexity of its workings. Citizens are confronted with arange of institutions whose powers are all conditional upon each other and whose interaction variesfrom one issue to another. A proper attribution of leadership within the Union might make aconsiderable contribution towards alleviating this problem. People in positions of leadership may serveas reference points for the public, instilling a sense of control, confidence and accountability. Thus,institutional clarity may foster participation (Magnette, 2001b).

Besides being comprehensible, transparency also refers to the very way in which leadershipresponsibilities are assigned. Decision-making in the Union is generally regarded as opaque. In manycases, it is impossible to reconstruct how decisions are actually taken. This applies in particular to theintergovernmental settings of the Council and the European Council, where informal proceedings oftenprevail over formal decision-making rules (cf. Golub, 1999). Thus, democratising leadership in theUnion also requires the very assignment of tasks and the selection of candidates to be characterised byopenness. Openness requires not only that decision-making takes place in public; it also requires thepublic to be able to understand (and reconstruct) how the decisions have come to be reached.

It is only after the first two democratic preconditions – establishing a comprehensible and opensystem – are met that we come to the actual engagement of citizens in the process. For sure, thedemocratic norm within any political system is that citizens should be able to exercise direct influenceon the choice of the people in power. In modern democratic systems, electoral mechanisms provide forthe most direct means by which all citizens can exercise their influence equally. Deviations from thedemocratic norm must be justified with good reasons, and even if they can be justified, the means mayneed to be sought to ensure that the electoral will is taken into account. The weak connection betweenEurope’s citizens and its institutions is a direct reflection of the weakness of the electoral mechanismsto which they are subject. Wherever power is exercised in the Union, citizens do not feel theirpreferences have much of an impact on it. Hence, there is a clear pressure to have any strengthening ofleadership in the Union combined with effective mechanisms of electoral choice through which thepublic can effectively influence the selection of one candidate over another.

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that Union democracy is merely a matter of offering


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electoral choice. Falling turn-outs in elections all over Europe demonstrate this fact and indeed theelections for the European Parliament may well provide one of the strongest cases. Elections onlyseriously contribute to democracy if they have sufficient public appeal. Indeed public appeal andengagement and the power they exert through the public space may in the end be more importantdemocratic factors than the actual electoral procedure. Public appeal itself is again influenced by a widerange of factors. One of the most important of these factors is probably the powers ascribed to the officefor which elections take place. A second factor is the extent to which the public perceives that it enjoysa meaningful choice or whether it rather feels that the system has largely prejudiced its choices. Thissecond factor is of much relevance when it comes to Union leadership, as there are strong national andsupranational interests in retaining control of the selection process.

Public appeal may be triggered on an incidental basis and it may dissipate as swiftly as it has comeabout. In the context of the European Union, we have to take account of the more structural conditionsbeneficial for democracy. Many observers have pointed out that attempts to democratise the EuropeanUnion suffer in the end from the structural absence of a European public sphere (Grimm, 1995).European politics is bound to stay out of touch with the citizens of Europe as long as there is notransnational public sphere to serve as a permanent mediator between them. To the extent that reformof the Union’s leadership is argued to have democratic merit, we thus also have to assess the extent towhich the process fosters the emergence of a European political and public sphere. Concretely,European leadership may be organised in such a way as to foster the emergence of European partiesand the necessary organisational and media infrastructure in which they can interact with each other.Offering the European citizens electoral choice may be instrumental in creating a European publicsphere, as the resulting politicisation of and competition for Union leadership will raise the salience ofthe EU in national political debates (Risse, 2002).

Thus we propose to take a broad perspective on the democratic dimension. We recognise the keyrole electoral choice may play. At the same time, however, we take aspects such as comprehensibility andopenness to be of equal importance. Similarly, we submit that any full appreciation of the democraticimpact of leadership reforms will need to take public appeal and the emergence of a European politicaland public sphere into account.

Institutional balanceThis dimension concerns the specific institutional balance that needs to be observed in the Union

(cf. Prechal, 1998; Lenarts and Verhoeven, 2002). The Union is no longer a normal internationalorganisation but nor is it an autonomous, sovereign political system. It derives its powers (as well as thelegitimacy to exercise them) from two sources: from the governments of each of the member states asrepresented in the Council, as well as from the citizens of these states as represented by the EuropeanParliament. As a consequence of this, any re-organisation of Union leadership has to find a fine balancebetween those two sources of power.

As it is not the EU’s vocation to become a centralised superstate replacing the member states, theUnion will only be able to consolidate its own authority if it shows sufficient respect for the national


37

states (Dehousse, 1995). One implication of this is that Union decision-making cannot be simply subjectto majority rule. The Union cannot afford to permanently antagonise a majority versus a minority ofmember states (or functional interests). Consensual decision-making thus has to ensure that minorityrights are protected against the majority rule. However, a mere consensus rule is problematic, since thispermits a single state that benefits from the status-quo to block any kind of policy change that wouldfurther the general interest (Scharpf, 1988).

Hence, in the EU, there needs to be a balance between majority rule and consensus-rule resemblingthe model of ”divided government” rather than that of fused powers (Hix, 2002b). This system of”separated institutions sharing powers” (Neustadt, 1990) enables the legislature to check the executive,given the independent selection of the executive and the legislature. Indeed as long as the EU remainscharacterised by a dual executive and a dual legislature, it is unlikely ever to resemble a full majoritariansystem.

The institutional balance in the Union is reflected in the fact that Union legislation takes placethrough a thoroughly checked process with oversized majorities in the institution representing thestates (Council) and the institution representing the citizens (European Parliament). In the decision-making process, it is up to the Commission to mediate between the two institutions and to draw themto the general interest of the Union through its control over the drafting of legislative proposals.

The need to respect the institutional balance requires any re-organisation of Union leadership tofind a fine balance between the need to effectively pursue the common interest and the need to dulyrespect the interests and liberties of the different actors involved. It follows from what has just been saidthat leadership selection in the Union cannot be simply the subject of majority rule. In a majoritarian(”fused”) model, the executive is able to dominate the legislature by commanding a secure majority init (”dictatorship of the executive”) (Hix, 2002b). As a consequence certain member states might bepermanently excluded from power as they would be only represented in the minority.

Rather than fusing legislative and executive powers, leadership in the Union should rather besubject to a system of checks and balances resembling the model of ”divided government”. Such checkscan be built into the functioning of the institutional triangle. The role of the Council is crucial in thisrespect, as it is part of the legislature but also a part of the executive. Structural guarantees are requiredto ensure that Union leadership will not be permanently alienated from any one member state. At thesame time the European Parliament ought not to be monopolised by the executive, but should insteadcontinue to play its role as ”controlling parliament” (Dann, 2002). Finally, as far as the Commission isconcerned, its distinct and independent role should be preserved as much as possible.

Thus, any reform of leadership in the Union will have to ensure that the relations with theintergovernmental and with the supranational institutions are properly looked after. Moreover, therelationship between intergovernmental and supranational institutions should also be well balanced,with neither structurally dominating the other. In particular, any re-organisation will need to takeaccount of the risk that intergovernmental and supranational institutions end up in a political deadlockin which European decision-making is immobilised by the two kinds of institutions vetoing each other’sproposals.


38

39

România \ncearc` - de mai mult timp - sìni]ieze procesele de dereglementare (\n sensulretragerii statului \n fa]a mecanismelor pie]ei) [iliberalizare economic` (\n sensul admiteriiconcuren]ei). Aceasta vrea s` spun` c`, lucru \nc`de dorit, statul va pune accent - \n procesul dealocare a resurselor - pe mecanismeleconcuren]iale ale pie]ei, a c`ror stimulareconstituie unul din principalele obiective ale Legiiconcuren]ei. Mai mult, \n contextul procesuluiactual de globalizare economic`, importan]alegisla]iei \n domeniul concuren]ei este subliniat`[i de faptul c` - \n deceniul trecut - peste 30 de ]`riau introdus reglement`ri noi sau le-au modificatsubstan]ial pe cele existente.

Este adev`rat \ns` c` acceptarea manifest`riifor]elor concuren]iale \n economie esteperceput` de c`tre numeroase persoane - \nRomânia, la fel ca [i \n alte ]`ri aflate \n tranzi]ie -ca fiind dùn`toare, atât din punct de vederesocial, cât [i economic. Apari]ia concuren]eiinterna]ionale - fie ea chiar [i numai din ]`rile

\nvecinate, vezi cazul produselor importate dinUngaria - este perceput` ca fiind cauza dezastrului\n care se g`sesc firmele autohtone.

O analiz` matur` va ar`ta \ns` c` procesul deliberalizare economic` este dùn`tor firmelorineficiente, dar salutar de cele mai multe oripentru societate \n asamblul sù.

Pentru a nu c`dea \ns` \n cealalt` extrem`, s`men]ion`m c`, totu[i, mecanismele pie]ei nufunc]ioneaz` \ntotdeauna eficient. Firmele aflate\n pozi]ie de monopol sau chiar pe pie]e de tipoligopol vor avea de cele mai multe ori la\ndemân` mijloacele necesare pentru a diminuarolul procesului concuren]ial. Aceasta fie prinrealizarea unor \n]elegeri de a nu se concuraunele cu altele (pentru a reu[i s` creasc` pre]urile[i s` diminueze cantitatea produs`), fie prinimpunerea unor reglement`ri care s`-i exclud` pepoten]ialii concuren]i, fie prin alte mijloace. Toateacestea conduc la \ncetinirea cre[terii economice,inhibarea dezvolt`rii sectorului privat [i acapacit`]ii economiei de a atrage investi]ii strìne.


ABSTRACT. Romania is trying for some time to launch the deregulation and liberalizationprocesses, absolutely necesssary for economic development. Unfortunately, many persons in Romaniaconsider competition as a harmful force, the cause of the hardships faced by indigenous firms.

Our analysis will show that competition is indeed harmful not to all but only to inefficient firms. The role assigned to competition policy is to cure market failures. These failures may spring

from two sources: business activity and government regulation. The former cause of monopoly andinefficiency is dealt with by legislation, the latter by lobbying decision-makers.

UNELE ASPECTE PRIVIND APLICAREA LEGISLA}IEI DE PROTEC}IE ACONCUREN}EI |N ROMÅNIA1

Gheorghe Oprescu*

1 Articolul de fa]` se bazeaz` pe un studiu mai larg, în curs de apari]ie într-un volum sub egida Centrului de PoliticiEconomice.* Gheorghe Oprescu este Profesor universitar doctor în cadrul Universit`]ii Politehnice Bucure[ti.

vol. 3, no. 1, 2003

Politica \n domeniul concuren]ei are, deaceea, rolul de a corecta aceste e[ecuri alemecanismelor de pia]`, prin cre[terea \ncrederii\n utilizarea acestora [i prin sprijinirea procesuluide liberalizare.

E[ecurile men]ionate mai sus \[i pot aveaoriginea \n dou` cauze: fie \n activitatea sectoruluide afaceri, fie \n cea a autorit`]ilor dereglementare (guvern, Parlament, alte institu]iipublice etc.). Din aceast` perspectiv`, primacauz` este atacat` cu ajutorul legisla]iei \ndomeniul protec]iei concuren]ei, \n vreme ce adoua se \ncearc` a fi solu]ionat` prin eforturi deinfluen]are (lobby) a factorilor de decizie,eforturi ce \mbrac` forma promov`rii principiilorconcuren]iale.

Legisla]ia \n domeniul concuren]ei interziceanumite tipuri de comportamente ale firmelor [i\ncearc` s` promoveze anumite obiective - atâtsociale, cât [i economice - cum ar fi eficien]a,dezvoltarea sectorului privat, progresul tehnic,utilizarea complet` a resurselor etc.

Efortul de influen]are a factorilor de decizie[i de promovare a principiilor concuren]iale\mbrac`, de cele mai multe ori, o form`institu]ionalizat` de evaluare a impactuluiconcuren]ial al diverselor legi, hot`râri sau altoracte emise de autorit`]ile statului. Este vorba aici,\n cazul României, de cele dou` laturi aleactivita]ii autorit`]ii de concuren]` (ConsiliulConcuren]ei), adic` - pe de o parte - aplicarea legiiprin procedurile de investiga]ie [i, respectiv, deluare a deciziilor (art.27 lit.a din Legeaconcuren]ei nr.21/1996) [i – pe de alt` parte - deavizare a proiectelor de hot`râri ale Guvernului [ide propunere a modific`rii actelor normative care

au impact anticoncuren]ial (art.27, lit.j). Dup`cum se poate observa, \n vreme ce constrângerileimpuse comportamentului sectorului de afacerisunt obligatorii, cele referitoare la influen]areafactorilor de decizie sunt, mai degrab`,consultative: „avizeaz`“, „propune“ etc2.

1. Legisla]ia concuren]ei [i mediuleconomic na]ional

De regul`, legisla]ia concuren]ei din unele ]`risau grupuri de ]`ri dezvoltate - UniuneaEuropean`, S.U.A., Germania - constituie modelulde inspira]ie pentru ]`rile \n curs de dezvoltare.Cu toate acestea, rareori se \ntâmpl` ca legileadoptate \n acest domeniu s` reprezinte doar ocopiere mecanic` a reglement`rilor existente \nalt` parte. Diferen]ele existente \ntre ]`ri, \n ceeace prive[te eficien]a mecanismelor de pia]`,gradul de maturizare a institu]iilor sau deimplementare a legii fac ca \ntre reglement`rileadoptate \n acest domeniu de diferite ]`ri s`existe deosebiri semnificative. Astfel, deciziileluate \ntr-un caz sau altul de autorit`]ile deconcuren]` se justific` doar dac` vor conduce la ocre[tere a eficien]ei sau a bun`st`rii sectoruluiprivat \n compara]ie cu ceea ce ar fi realizatmecanismele pie]ei \nse[i. |n termenii cei maigenerali, legisla]ia de protec]ie a concuren]eipoate fi interpretat` ca un mecanism ce sepresupune a fi aplicat asupra unui alt mecanism(pia]a) numai dac` aduce o \mbun`t`]irefunc]ion`rii acestuia din urm`.

Deosebirile fa]` de legisla]ia ]`rilor dezvoltate,care sunt vizibile [i \n România, au \ns` [i o alt`cauz`. Astfel, ]`rile \n tranzi]ie se g`sesc \n

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2 L`s`m pe seama juri[tilor un aspect înc` disputat [i anume l`murirea tipului de aviz la care face referire legea în leg`tur`cu proiectele de hot`râri ale Guvernului. Cu alte cuvinte, dac` acesta este un aviz facultativ, consultativ sau conform.

UNELE ASPECTE PRIVIND APLICAREA LEGISLA}IEI DE PROTEC}IE A CONCUREN}EI |N ROMÅNIA

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mijlocul unui proces rapid de modific`rieconomice [i institu]ionale, proces care nu sereg`se[te \n economiile stabile [i mature. Deaceea, elaborarea legisla]iei de protec]ie aconcuren]ei [i proiectarea mecanismelor sale deimplementare trebuie s` ]in` cont de acestemodific`ri. |n plus, ]`rile \n tranzi]ie trebuie s`creeze un cadru favorabil ini]iativei private, dar\ntr-un mediu economic obi[nuit cu controlul[i interven]ia direct` a statului. Acesta estemotivul pentru care legisla]ia de protec]ie aconcuren]ei \n aceste ]`ri se bazeaz`, \n principal,pe no]iunea de „pozi]ie dominant`“, no]iune maipu]in folosit` \n prezent \n ]`rile dezvoltate, cumar fi cele din Uniunea European` sau StateleUnite. |n acestea din urm`, legisla]ia de protec]iea concuren]ei are \n centrul s`u conceptul de„putere de pia]`“.

Sigur c`, pe de alt` parte, unele din prevederisunt valabile [i trebuie aplicate la fel \n toate ]`rile.Este cazul, spre exemplu, al interzicerii\n]elegerilor de pre] \ntre concuren]ii direc]i. |nacela[i timp \ns`, cadrul legal \n ]`rile \n tranzi]ieare un pronun]at caracter dinamic, ceea ce\nseamn` c` el trebuie s` permit` [i s` facilitezeajustarea la mediul economic aflat \ntr-o continu`schimbare.

2. Legisla]ia concuren]ei: modul deaplicare

La modul cel mai general, modul deimplementare a legisla]iei de protec]ie aconcuren]ei \n România este unul centralizat [ibazat pe notificare prealabil` [i autorizare(inclusiv \n cazul \n]elegerilor care se \ncadreaz`\ntr-una din except`rile pe categorii). |n acestsistem, autoritatea administrativ` joac` rolulprincipal, \n vreme ce implicarea justi]iei \n

revederea deciziilor de \nc`lcare a legii [irespectare a procedurilor este una moderat`. |ntr-un context \n care sistemul judiciar a avut preapu]in de-a face cu legisla]ia de protec]ie aconcuren]ei, exist` riscul unei aplic`ri incoerentea acesteia.

|nc` de la \nceput, trebuie subliniat faptul c`,\n România, legisla]ia de protec]ie a concuren]eieste aplicat` \ntr-un mediu economic total diferitfa]` de ]`rile cu experien]` \n acest domeniu. {ianume, este aplicat` \ntr-un mediu economic \ncare statul este omniprezent, atât \n calitatea sa deautoritate public`, cât [i ca agent economic.Majoritatea cazurilor analizate de autorit`]ile deconcuren]` de la \nfiin]area lor [i pân` \n prezentau implicat statul, prin diver[ii s`i reprezentan]i –inclusiv autorit`]i centrale sau locale: hot`râriluate de guvern, ordine ale diferi]ilor mini[trii,decizii ale autorit`]ilor locale, comportamenteprin care diferite autorit`]i publice - \n special dela nivel local, dar nu numai - ac]ionau similar unoragen]i economici, regii sau societ`]i cu capital destat etc. Chiar \n ipoteza c` to]i ace[tia s-aumanifestat cu bun` inten]ie, \n speran]a saucredin]a c` [tiu ceea ce-i trebuie economieiromâne[ti, este u[or de \n]eles c` \ntr-un astfel demediu autoritatea de concuren]` se g`se[te \ntr-opozi]ie extrem de delicat` [i c` deciziile sale,inclusiv cele cu vicii, trebuie \n]elese ca atare. Nucredem c` este nici o exagerare, dac` afirm`mc` – \n afara unor fuziuni sau achizi]ii \n uneleramuri, cum ar fi industria cimentului sau ceaa berii - \n toate celelalte cazuri importanteanalizate de autorit`]ile de concuren]` dinRomânia statul – \n ambele sale ipostaze - a fost prezent \ntr-o m`sur` mai degrab` maredecât mic`.

Pentru a-[i atinge eficien]a dorit`, legisla]ia \ndomeniul concuren]ei trebuie aplicat` \n situa]iile

când rezultatele sale sunt superioare celor care arfi ob]inute de c`tre mecanismele de pia]`. Dinaceast` perspectiv`, rezult` c` modul deimplementare depinde de eficien]a [i de gradulde consolidare a institu]iilor pie]ei libere.

|n ]`rile \n tranzi]ie [i, implicit, \n România,acestea prezint` substan]iale r`mâneri \n urm` \ncompara]ie cu ]`rile dezvoltate. Din aceast`cauz`, nu de pu]ine ori, modul de implementarepoate fi unul agresiv – ostentativ, cum ar fi, spreexemplu, impunerea unor mecanisme decontrol al pre]urilor, ca mod de solu]ionare aunor practici anticoncuren]iale.

|n acest punct, trebuie subliniat c` autorit`]ilede protec]ie a concuren]ei din România s-au ferit,\n general, s` apeleze la astfel de instrumente.Spunem \n general, deoarece apari]ia, spreexemplu, \n Ordonan]a de urgen]` 36/2001, acategoriei „nisipuri [i pietri[uri“ ([i chiar amedicamentelor de import) \n lista produselor alec`ror pre]uri sunt controlate de c`tre stat este atâtde surprinz`toare, \ncât lipsa de reac]ie aautorit`]ilor de concuren]` ridic` mari semne de\ntrebare, cu atât mai mult cu cât aceste categoriide produse nu pot fi \ncadrate \n nici una dintresitua]iile care, \n conformitate cu Legeaconcuren]ei, pot justifica m`suri temporare decontrol al pre]urilor: monopol natural, activitateeconomic` supus` de lege unui regim special(nimeni nu poate defini ce \nseamn` acest lucru[i, de aceea, nu putem evalua dac`medicamentele, de exemplu, pot fi incluse aici),sector sau pia]` unde concuren]a este exclus` sausubstan]ial restrâns` prin efectul unei legi saudatorit` existen]ei unei pozi]ii de monopol,situa]ie de criz`, dezechilibru major \ntre cerere [iofert` sau disfunc]ionalitate evident` a pie]ei.Acestea sunt toate situa]iile \n care guvernulpoate interveni [i determina modul de stabilire a

pre]urilor, cu precizarea c`, cu excep]ia primelordou` cazuri, are nevoie de avizul ConsiliuluiConcuren]ei.

|n plus, trebuie s` recunoa[tem c` legisla]ia \nvigoare ofer` autorit`]ii de concuren]` [i alteinstrumente (de nesesizat pentru cinevanefamiliarizat cu modul de aplicare din România)prin care aceasta poate interveni \n mod directasupra modului de stabilire a pre]urilor ([i\ncerc`rile de a o face au fost numeroase \n ultimiicinci ani): \n mod concret, aceasta se poate\ntâmpla sub forma condi]iilor impuse fie uneifirme g`sit` vinovat` de vreuna din \nc`lc`rilelegisla]iei de protec]ie a concuren]ei, fie unorfirme aflate \n momentul autoriz`rii unorconcentr`ri economice.

Un exemplu privind un mod ceva maiparticular de \n]elegere se refer` la modul deabordare a \n]elegerilor pe vertical`. Cum legearomâneasc` a concuren]ei nu face nici odeosebire explicit` \ntre acestea [i \n]elegerile peorizontal`, ar rezulta c` autorit`]ile de concuren]`trebuie s` le trateze \n mod identic. Cu toateacestea, teoria [i practica interna]ional` \ndomeniu au ar`tat c` - de cele mai multe ori -\n]elegerile pe vertical` au un efect mai degrab`pro-concuren]ial [i nu anti-concuren]ial. Cutoate acestea, \n România, pentru a ob]ine oexceptare pe categorii (\n cazurile de distribu]ieexclusiv`, cump`rare exclusiv`, acorduri defranciz`, know-how etc.), firmele implicatetrebuie s` solicite acest lucru ConsiliuluiConcuren]ei. |n Uniunea European`, except`rilede acest gen sunt automate, f`r` a mai existaobligativitatea notific`rii. Mai mult, ComisiaEuropean` a implementat de curând o politic`total nou` \n privin]a restric]iilor verticale,prin introducerea unui regulament foartepermisiv care s` scoat` automat de sub

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inciden]a art. 85 din Tratatul de la Roma toate\n]elegerile verticale ce au ca obiect bunuri [iservicii intermediare sau finale (EuropeanCommission, 1998). Din aceast` perspectiv`, estelogic [i de anticipat c` [i \n România modul deabordare a \n]elegerilor pe vertical` va fisubstan]ial revizuit pe m`sura dezvolt`rii [ieficientiz`rii mecanismelor de pia]`.

|n concluzie, autorit`]ile de concuren]` dinRomânia dispun de puteri substan]iale, atât dinpunct de vedere formal (al actelor normative carereglementeaz` domeniul), cât [i informal (casingurele institu]ii unde se pot g`si cuno[tin]elenecesare aplic`rii legii). Din aceast` perspectiv`,utilizarea corect` [i transparent` a acestor putericap`t` o importan]` covâr[itoare, atât pentrusustenabilitatea [i credibilitatea pe termen lung ainstitu]iilor respective, cât [i din punct de vedereal efectelor pe care comportamentul lor \l poateavea asupra economiei \n ansamblu. Cu altecuvinte, \n locul unei aplic`ri incorecte saual abuzului de aceste puteri3, ar fi mai bine caele s` nu fie exercitate, chiar \n condi]iile\n care p`r]ile afectate au posibilitatea apelului\n justi]ie4.

3. Legisla]ia concuren]ei [iprivatizarea

La modul cel mai general, procesul deprivatizare - [i \n special cel de mari dimensiuni,desf`[urat \n ]`rile foste comuniste - intr` subinciden]a legisla]iei de protec]ie a concuren]ei. |ncazul României, forma pe care o \mbrac`majoritatea actelor de privatizare este cea deconcentrare economic`, a[a cum este ea definit`\n art. 11 din Legea concuren]ei nr. 21/1996, cuconsecin]a prev`zut` \n art. 16 alin. (1) referitoarela obliga]ia notific`rii c`tre Consiliul Concuren]eia oric`rei astfel de opera]iuni.

Justificarea acestei prevederi rezid` \n aceeac` procesul de privatizare poate avea ca efectmodificarea structurii pie]elor [i, poate, chiar aeficien]ei acestora.

Totu[i, \ntre o opera]iune de concentrareeconomic` izolat` [i una realizat` \n cadrul unuiproces de privatizare exist`, din start, unelediferen]e substan]iale. Astfel, \nlocuireapropriet`]ii de stat cu cea privat` [i, implicit,modificarea \ntregului sistem de stimulente [iinterese conduce - prin ea \ns`[i - la cre[tereaeficien]ei tehnice [i productive a firmelorimplicate. |n plus, privatizarea nu urm`re[te\ntotdeauna obiective legate de eficien]`, ci poateavea \n vedere [i alte scopuri, cum ar fi evitareafalimentului, men]inerea locurilor de munc` etc.

3 Spre exemplu, referitor la o decizie a Consiliului Concuren]ei de anulare a unei privatiz`ri efectuate de fostul F.P.S. (cazulProdomus), Curtea de Apel Bucure[ti men]iona în sentin]a civil` nr. 1660/2000: …Consiliul Concuren]ei „a înc`lcatdispozi]iile art. 125 alin. 1 din Constitu]ie…[…] …nesocote[te sistemul unitar al dreptului român…“. Într-un alt caz (Phoenixmed), Curtea Suprem` de Justi]ie de data aceasta (Decizia nr. 2719/1999) spune: „…instan]atrebuie s` poat` verifica modul cum s-a ajuns la aceast` concluzie de c`tre Plenul Consiliului Concuren]ei, simplaexprimare de tipul „dixit“ nefiind suficient` pentru a opera cenzura judec`toreasc`. De aceea, Curtea consider` c` s-agre[it de Plenul Consiliului Concuren]ei atunci când nu a pus în discu]ie p`r]ilor probele administrate, aceast` atitudinedovedind […] faptul c` s-a produs un abuz administrativ“ (sublinierile autorului).4 Aceasta deoarece lipsa de familiarizare cu problematica protec]iei concuren]ei face s` nu existe certitudinea c` diferitecomplete de judecat` vor da acelea[i solu]ii în cazuri similare.

Practica interna]ional` \n domeniu arat` c`,de regul`, controlul concentr`rilor se aplic` \nspecial atunci când firmele implicate suntconcuren]i direc]i. Rare sunt cazurile cândautorit`]ile de concuren]` au interzis o fuziunesau o achizi]ie desf`[urat` \ntre firme care eraudoar concuren]i poten]iali. Concentr`rile de tipconglomerat5 - cazul cel mai des \ntâlnit \nprocesul de privatizare din România - pot ridica \nschimb unele probleme din punctul de vedere alconcuren]ei; aceasta atunci când o firm`participant` este - \n acela[i timp - unul dintrepu]inii concuren]i poten]iali pe pia]a celeilaltefirme implicate6.

Experien]a de pân` acum arat` c`, \n cazul]`rilor \n tranzi]ie, aten]ia autorit`]ilor deconcuren]` s-a focalizat mai degrab` asupraconcuren]ilor existen]i decât a celor poten]iali.Spre exemplu, sir Leon Brittan, fostul comisar peprobleme de concuren]`, spunea \n 1990:

„Datorit` mecanismelor economiei decomand`, mari companii („combinate“) auajuns \n situa]ia de a domina pie]ele dinGermania r`s`ritean`. Ca regul` general`,aceste combinate sunt practic monopoluri \nsectoarele \n care opereaz`, fie ele industrialesau de servicii. |n Republica Federal` exist`, deasemenea, mari companii. |n unele ramuri,aceste firme sunt dominante nu numai pepia]a german`, ci [i pe cea comunitar`. |nultima vreme suntem martorii unui val depropuneri de leg`turi \ntre firmele dominantede pe cele dou` maluri ale Elbei. Acestea includaranjamentele pe care le inten]ioneaz`Lufthansa [i Interflug […]. Autorit`]ile de

concuren]` trebuie s` ia \n considerarepericolul ce poate s` apar` atunci când uncombinat \[i une[te for]ele cu firmacorespondent` din Germania Federal`.|mpreun` ele pot domina pia]a germanùnificat`, ceea ce nu ar mai fi cazul dac` ofirm` italian` sau francez`, spre exemplu, ar fiimplicat`. De aceea, \n interesul concuren]ei,trebuie s` \ncuraj`m firme din celelalte Statemembre s` investeasc` \n Germania“. (Sir LeonBrittan 1990).

|n parantez` fie spus, Bundeskartellamt(Biroul federal care administreaz` legisla]iaantitrust \n Germania) s-a opus achizi]ion`riifirmei est-germane Interflug de c`tre Lufthansa,preferând \n schimb oferta lui British Airways(H. W. Sinn 1990). |n mod similar, \n Slovacia,legea aplic` standarde mult mai pu]in severefuziunilor sau privatiz`rilor implicând firmestrìne. Aceasta nu reflect` altceva decât deciziade a \ncuraja investi]iile strìne (efectuate chiar dec`tre concuren]i poten]iali) ca mijloc principal derestructurare a economiei.

Uneori, ofertele de privatizare nu atrag decâtuna (a se vedea, de exemplu, situa]iile de la AROCâmpulung, Banca Agricol`, Romtelecom) sau,\n orice caz, pu]ine firme interesate \n a cump`ra.Alteori, se \ntâmpl` ca nimeni s` nu \[i manifesteinteresul (vezi Sem`n`toarea, Roman, Tractoruletc.). Aceasta limiteaz` \n mod evidentalternativele existente pentru privatizarea uneifirme [i \nt`resc puterea de negociere apoten]ialilor investitori. |n consecin]`, ace[tiareclam` acordarea unor avantaje de diferite feluri,

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5 Între dou` firme aflate pe pie]e diferite.6 La baza acestui ra]ionament st` teoria „limit`rii pre]ului“, teorie care pune în eviden]` faptul c` amenin]area unor intr`ripoten]iale într-o ramur` ac]ioneaz` în sensul limit`rii cre[terii pre]urilor [i a disciplin`rii comportamentului firmelor dejaexistente.

din partea statului (spre exemplu, Renault \ncazul Uzinei Dacia Pite[ti sau LNM Ispat la SidexGala]i). Aceste avantaje au \n vedere, \n esen]`,fie unele facilit`]i fiscale (\n special, ree[alonareasau [tergerea unor datorii, anularea unorpenalit`]i sau major`ri de \ntârziere), fie m`suriprotec]ioniste \n favoarea pie]ei interne (deexemplu, tarife vamale ridicate la import). De[i ositua]ie des \ntâlnit`, practica de pân` \n prezentrelev` faptul c` autorit`]ile de concuren]` au fostconsultate \n astfel de cazuri [i au reu[it sìmpun` o limitare a duratei tratamentuluipreferen]ial la perioada necesar` pentru aefectua un program de investi]ii (cazulPoloniei).

Discu]ia de pân` \n prezent pune \n eviden]`tensiunile care apar \ntre necesitatea uneiprivatiz`ri rapide [i cea a p`str`rii unui mediuconcuren]ial \n perioada de tranzi]ie. Cu altecuvinte, din considerente bugetare, guvernulpoate fi tentat s` realizeze privatiz`ri cu poten]ialeefecte anticoncuren]iale; cu cât puterea de pia]` aunei firme este mai mare, cu atât [i valoarea saeste mai mare. De aceea, nu rareori oferta ceamai bun` \n cazul unor licita]ii provine de laconcuren]ii direc]i ai firmei ce este scoas` laprivatizare, urmând ca ace[tia s`-[i recuperezediferen]a pl`tit` \n plus prin impunerea ulterioarà unor pre]uri mai mari (Oprescu [i Rohlck 1999).

|n mod evident, banii \ncasa]i de c`tre guvernpot acoperi (cel pu]in) o parte a pierderilorimpuse societ`]ii prin acceptarea realiz`rii unuimonopol. Acesta este \ns` un argument valabildoar dintr-o perspectiv` pe termen scurt. Petermen lung, eficien]a aloc`rii resurselor esteafectat` semnificativ; de aceea, autorit`]ile de

concuren]` trebuie s` urm`reasc` asigurarea uneiconcuren]e \ntre firmele privatizate.

România, Polonia, Slovacia [i Bulgaria auintrodus controlul reglement`rilor de protec]ie aconcuren]ei asupra procesului de privatizare. Dinp`cate, sunt pu]ine datele referitoare la modulcum s-au aplicat aceste reglement`ri. Unexemplu poate sugera \ns` un r`spuns suficientde apropiat, probabil, de realitate. Astfel, \nPolonia, \ntr-o perioad` de doi ani, OficiulAntimonopol a respins doar dou` din cele 1500de privatiz`ri pe care le-a avut de analizat. Dintreacestea, 60 au fost autoriz`ri cu condi]ii, \n sensulart. 52 alin.2 lit.c din Legea româneasc`.

Cehia \n schimb a urmat o alt` cale. Deprincipiu, orice concentrare realizat` \ntreconcuren]i trebuie s` ob]in` aprobareaMinisterului Concuren]ei Economice. Totu[i,aceast` prevedere nu se aplic` decât dup`trecerea a 12 luni \n cazul unei achizi]ii acontrolului asupra unei firme, realizat` prinFondul Na]ional al Propriet`]ii din Cehia7. Cu altecuvinte, procesul de privatizare a fost scos desub controlul autorit`]ilor de concuren]`.Logica unei astfel de abord`ri este u[or de \n]elesdac` analiz`m principiile esen]iale care au fostavute \n vedere \n desf`[urarea procesului deprivatizare: (i) cu cât acesta se desf`[oar` mairepede, cu atât mai rapid va reveni [i economia la starea de cre[tere economic`; cu alte cuvinte, principala prioritate este viteza; (ii)restructurarea firmelor trebuie realizat` de c`trenoii proprietari [i nu de c`tre stat [i (iii) pre]ul nueste o prioritate; rolul sù este doar acela decriteriu obiectiv de departajare \ntre mai mul]iofertan]i.


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7 Fondul Na]ional al Propriet`]ii a constituit institu]ia care a realizat vânzarea efectiv` [i transferul propriet`]ii de stat înCehia. Pe lâng` acesta, Ministerul Privatiz`rii a fost institu]ia care aproba proiectele de privatizare [i ac]iona ca organizatorla nivel central al întregului proces.

Literatura de specialitate men]ioneaz` [i alte]`ri care - \n cadrul procesului de privatizare - aul`sat pe planul al doilea preocuparea pentruasigurarea unui mediu concuren]ial: Argentina,Filipine, Mexic, Venezuela etc.

Argumentele \n favoarea unei astfel deabord`ri provin din avantajele pe care privatizareale aduce \n mod automat:

• \mbun`t`]irea substan]ial` a performan]elorfirmelor \n cauz`;

• o dat` cu oprirea subven]ion`rii de c`trestat, privatizarea devine strategia dominant` derealizare a ocup`rii mâinii de lucru;

• performan]ele net superioare ob]inute dec`tre firmele ai c`ror proprietari sunt al]ii decâtsalaria]ii sau managerii lor (argument care punesub semnul \ntreb`rii eficien]a metodelor de tipMEBO8); mai mult, firmele controlate de c`tresalaria]i nu difer` - ca performan]e - de cele aflate\n proprietatea statului;

• proprietarii priva]i realizeaz` o restructuraremai eficient` decât statul;

• nu \n ultimul rând, sumele de bani aduse labuget.

Argumentele contra se bazeaz` pe faptul c`numai concuren]a este cea care determin` ofirm` privat` s` transfere asupra cump`r`torilor [iconsumatorilor o parte din beneficiile ob]inuteprin cre[terea eficien]ei sale tehnice, realizândastfel o \mbun`t`]ire [i a eficien]ei alocative.Solu]ia de fond a acestei dileme privatizare -protec]ia concuren]ei poate veni numai dinsuccesul unor politici de atragere a investi]iilorstr`ine. Cre[terea concuren]ei pe aceast` caleeste de natur` a diminua poten]ialele efectenegative ale unor ac]iuni de privatizare. Pierderile

de eficien]` determinate de apari]ia unor firme cuputere de pia]` vor fi cu atât mai mici cu câtsistemul institu]ional [i pia]a de capital vorpermite investi]iilor private s` r`spund` \n modrapid semnalelor transmise de pia]` (pre]uri [iprofituri, \n primul rând).

Tocmai \n acest context, ini]ierea, de exemplu,a unei investi]ii directe \n România a concernuluigerman Continental nu face altceva decât s`confirme ra]ionamentul Consiliului Concuren]eiatunci când a luat \n considerare calitateaconcuren]ei poten]iale, pe pia]a anvelopelor, \ncontextul aprob`rii unei concentr`ri efectuate deproduc`torul existent la momentul acela pe pia]`,grupul Tofan.

Pe de alt` parte, amân`rile sau jum`t`]ile dem`sur` \n desf`[urarea procesului de reform`,lipsa de transparen]` [i de credibilitate nu voravea drept rezultat decât men]inerea sauapari]ia unor monopoluri, indiferent - amspune- de activitatea autorit`]ilor de protec]ie aconcuren]ei.

Practica international` \n domeniu arat` c`,de regul`, controlul concentr`rilor se aplic` cu oaten]ie sporit` atunci când firmele implicate suntconcuren]i direc]i pe o anumit` pia]`. Mai mult,rare au fost cazurile când autorit`]ile deconcuren]` au interzis o fuziune sau o achizi]iedesf`surat` \ntre firme care erau doar concuren]ipoten]iali. Apelând inevitabil la unele simplific`ri,tabelul urm`tor \ncearc` s` sintetizeze cazurile cepot interveni \n cadrul procesului deprivatizare [i s` analizeze posibila reac]ie aautorit`]ilor de concuren]`:

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8 Management - Employee Buy - Outs.

Cazurile D, E [i F (de[i F este mai pu]in\ntâlnit, cu excep]ia notabil` a fondurilor deinvesti]ii, care \ns` necesit` o analiz` [i o discu]ieaparte – care nu a fost efectuat` pân` \n prezent -\n contextul art. 12 din Legea concuren]ei)cuprind \n fapt procesul de investi]ii strìne (dar,nu \n totalitate, acesta putând s` se manifeste \ntr-o oarecare m`sur` [i \n cazurile A, B [i C),prin cump`rarea unor firme române[ti de stat dec`tre firme din alte ]`ri (care nu sunt prezente pepia]a româneasc`). Este greu de presupus càceste cazuri vor ridica vreun semn de \ntrebaredin punctul de vedere al protec]iei concuren]ei;\n fond, \n astfel de situa]ii, structura pie]elor nusufer` nici un fel de modificare. Singurul aspectcare ar putea fi analizat \n unele situa]ii ar fi acelacând o astfel de operatiune duce la„…consolidarea unei pozi]ii dominante“ (art. 13din Legea Concuren]ei), prin puterea financiar` [ide alt` natur` a firmei achizitoare. Analiza trebuief`cut`, a fost f`cut` (vezi cazurile Lafarge-Romcim, REBU (Oprescu 1998a; Miu 1999), OTE-Romtelecom (Georgescu [i F`g`r`[anu 1999),desi acesta din urm` are unele particularit`]i fa]`de celelalte, prin aceea c` – la momentul vânz`rii– beneficia de statutul unui monopol legal) [i vafi f`cut` (probabil, spre exemplu, \n cazul Sidex).

|n concluzie, de[i, conform legii, astfel deopera]iuni trebuie s` ob]in` autorizareaConsiliului Concuren]ei, este totu[i greu decrezut c` acesta va avea ceva de obiectat.

Paradoxal sau nu, privatizarea princump`rarea de c`tre firme concurente române[ti(deci existente pe pia]`) poate ridica mult maimulte semne de \ntrebare (\n special, situa]ia Adin tabel). La fel, cazul când o firm` strìn` care aintrat deja pe pia]a româneasc` dore[te s`-[isporeasc` – prin noi achizi]ii – cota de pia]` decare dispune (spre exemplu, industria berii etc.).Abordarea Consiliului Concuren]ei va fi, \n astfelde cazuri, \ntrucâtva diferit`. S` nu uit`m c` unadin cele dou` opera]iuni de concentrare respinsepân` \n prezent a fost \n cazul cump`r`rii de c`treo firm` româneasc` a unei alte firme române[ti9.Aceast` abordare ar putea fi interpretat` ca fiindsimilar` celei a Bundeskartellamt, \n Germania, \ncazul Interflug, men]ionat mai \nainte, dac` altedecizii [i manifest`ri ale autorit`]ilor deconcuren]` nu ar dovedi contrariul.

Cazul B din tabel este de natur` a crea maipu]ine \ngrijor`ri din punctul de vedere alprotec]iei concuren]ei, dar nu trebuie neglijat,mai ales atunci când concentr`rile pe vertical` potafecta accesul concuren]ilor la sursele de materii


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9 Cazul Eurotrading-Azomure[, cealalt` concentrare respins` fiind Tubman International - Petrotub.

Atât firma care cump`r`, cât[i cea care este cump`rat` seg`sesc deja pe pia]aromâneasc`

Firma care cump`r` nuse afl` \nc` pe pia]aromâneasc`

Concentrare pe orizontal` A DConcentrare pe vertical` B EConcentrare de tip conglomerat C F

prime, \n amonte10 sau la re]elele de distribu]ie,\n aval; este cazul \ncerc`rii e[uate a Coca-Cola dea prelua grupul francez Orangina, acesta din urm`fiind distribuitorul principal \n Fran]a al rivaluluiPepsi-Cola.

|n fine, cazul C include, de regul`, cump`rareade c`tre firme private române[ti a unor firme destat din alte sectoare de activitate. Pu]in probabilca aceste situa]ii s` aib` vreun impact asupraconcuren]ei existente pe pie]ele respective. Elepot fi mai degrab` pro-concuren]iale, mai ales \ncazul când, f`r` privatizare, firmele de stat vizate[i-ar \nceta activitatea.

Spuneam c`, \n general, exist` o anumit`tensiune \ntre dorin]a de a accelera procesul deprivatizare [i necesitatea de a crea [i prezerva unmediu concuren]ial normal [i c` solu]ia de fonda acestei probleme o reprezint` succesul unorpolitici de atragere a investi]iilor str`ine (cazurileD, E [i F), menite ca prin cre[terea pe aceast` calea concuren]ei s` se diminueze poten]ialele efectenegative ale unor ac]iuni de privatizare.

Ca o parantez`, nu putem s` nu men]ion`msuccesul unor astfel de politici \n ]`rile vecine, \nunul dintre sectoarele vitale pentru credibilitatea[i buna desf`surare a reformei economice [ianume sectorul bancar; \n Ungaria, acesta a fostprivatizat, c`tre b`nci str`ine, \n propor]ie de100%, \n Polonia – 80%, \n vreme ce \n Româniaprocesul se afl` \nc` \n faze \nc` relativ pu]inavansate. |ntârzierea privatiz`rii acestui sector afost – dup` p`rerea noastr` – f`cut` cu inten]iepe de o parte [i a adus mari deservicii procesuluide reform`, dar [i b`ncilor \nsele, pe de alt` parte.Scopul acestei \ntârzieri a constat \n aceea c`statul a dorit s`-[i men]in` posibilitatea de

protejare a sectorului industrial ineficient. |nprimii ani ai tranzi]iei, aceast` protec]ie s-adesf`surat prin bugetul de stat; acest lucru nu amai fost posibil, pe scar` larg`, o dat` cuinterven]ia organismelor financiare interna]ionale[i a fost de aceea transferat asupra b`ncilor destat, prin obligarea acestora de a credita\ntreprinderile industriale. Acest fapt a permisamânarea procesului de restructurare, atingereaunor obiective sociale pe termen scurt(men]inerea la un anumit nivel – mediocru,totu[i – a salariilor, evitarea unor rate \nalte ale[omajului), ob]inerea unei anumite cre[terieconomice (nesustenabil` [i pe care am califica-odrept o „cre[tere pauperizant`“ - utilizând pu]inabuziv aceast` no]iune binecunoscut` \n literaturade specialitate - ]inând cont de efectele ulterioareale sale), dar cu costuri uria[e, materializate \nacumularea creditelor neperformante, fapt care adus la momente de criz` ale sistemului bancarromânesc (cazul BANCOREX este ilustrareaperfect`). Cu alte cuvinte, statul (careprezentant al unor anumite interese politice)este vinovatul principal pentru situa]ia princare au trecut unele b`nci de stat, beneficiarii– pe termen scurt – au fost salaria]ii din unele\ntreprinderi de stat, iar costurile au fost pl`titede \ntreaga societate româneasc`.

Tensiunea men]ionat` se manifest` prin aceeac`, fie datorit` dorin]ei de a vinde mai scump, fiedimpotriv` datorit` necesit`]ii de a vinde pur [isimplu, statul se vede pus \n situa]ia de a acceptaacordarea unor facilit`]i cump`r`torilor.

Când spunem „necesitatea de a vinde“ nereferim, \n primul rând, la faptul deja demonstratatât teoretic, cât [i practic c` o dat` cu

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10 Este necesar`, de exemplu, ob]inerea unei imagini exacte a achizi]iilor ulterioare efectuate de Lafarge Romcim, carese pot încadra - eventual - în aceast` categorie.

privatizarea se produce [i o \mbun`t`]ire aperforman]elor firmelor \n cauz`, dar [i la cazulcând privatizarea este singura cale desupravie]uire a unor firme, ]inând cont c`subven]ionarea acestora de c`tre stat se va oprioricum mai devreme sau mai târziu. |n momentulcând statul \nsu[i va \ntâmpina dificult`]i \n a-[ionora propriile obliga]ii (dificult`]i generate deacumularea unor deficite bugetare [i ale balan]eide pl`]i), el nu va mai putea sprijini sectorulineficient al firmelor de stat. |n acest moment,singura speran]` a unor astfel de firme r`mâneprivatizarea; acesta este sensul a ceea ce spuneammai sus c`, o dat` cu oprirea subven]ion`rii de c`tre stat, privatizarea devine strategiadominant` de realizare a ocup`rii mâinii delucru (deci interesele de a privatiza ar trebui s`coincid` cu interesele sindicatelor [i, \n general,ale salaria]ilor).

|n sens larg, facilit`]ile men]ionate pot fi demai multe feluri [i, din aceast` perspectiv`, potnecesita o tratare diferen]iat`:

a) Vânzarea unei firme asa cum este, f`r`divizarea sa sau f`r` externalizarea unoranumite activit`]i. |n unele situatii, s-ar putea cainvestitorul poten]ial s` nu accepte o divizare afirmei ]int`, divizare ce ar putea fi justificat` dinmotive de conservare a unui mediu concuren]ial.|n Polonia, spre exemplu, acum câ]iva ani, uninvestitor francez s-a ar`tat interesat decump`rarea firmei Hortex – o firm` ce dispuneade mai multe fabrici de produse alimentare – darnumai \n \ntregime, neacceptând s` renun]e lanici una dintre ele. Poate fi cazul aici – f`r` a\nsemna c` aceasta a fost [i realitatea - [i aachizi]ion`rii de c`tre societatea francez` Lafarge România a S.C. Romcim S.A ., din a c`reistructur` f`ceau parte patru fabrici de ciment,

respectiv Medgidia, Hoghiz, T\rgu Jiu [i Ale[d (ase vedea o analiz` calitativ` \n T`nase [i Iv`nu[1999). |n astfel de situa]ii, statul se afl` \ntr-o pozitie cel pu]in delicat`: a-[i manifestapreocuparea de asigurare a unui mediuconcure]ial de-abia \n momentul privatiz`rii,f`r` ca pân` atunci s` fi \ntreprins ceva, arreprezenta o op]iune cel pu]in ciudat`, ce arputea fi \mbr`]i[at`, mai degrab`, deadversarii procesului de privatizare \n general.Lucrurile ar sta cu totul altfel dac` statul(guvernul) [i-ar fi manifestat preocupareapentru politicile \n domeniul concuren]ei [ipân` atunci; \n acest caz, comportamentul s`uar beneficia de coeren]`, iar credibilitatea nu i-ar fi \n nici un fel afectat`. |n cazul uneiprivatiz`ri cu poten]iale efecte anticompetitive,sumele de bani \ncasate de c`tre stat reu[esc, \ntr-o m`sur` mai mare sau mai mic`, s` contracarezeprejudiciile \nregistrate; cu toate acestea,aprobarea unor astfel de privatiz`ri este de natur`a avea efecte pe termen lung, prin practirea unor pre]uri mai mari [i prin diminuareaeficien]ei alocative.

b) Divizarea firmelor mari, prin separareacomponentelor eficiente de cele ineficiente. Demulte ori, investitorii sunt interesa]i numai deanumite p`rti ale unei companii. |n astfel decazuri, statul trebuie ca, \nainte de privatizare, s`\ndep`rteze componentele ineficiente, prindiviz`ri sau externaliz`ri ale anumitor activit`ti.Din punctul de vedere al autorit`]ilor deconcuren]` este greu de crezut c` astfel deopera]iuni vor ridica vreodat` semne de \ntrebare.Totu[i, ca metod` de cre[tere a concuren]ei,eliminarea oric`ror bariere comerciale sau de alt`natur` este de preferat fragment`rii firmelorexistente (Fischer [i Gelb 1991).


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c) Protec]ia temporar` a pie]ei interne.Uneori investitorii (dar, \n numeroase cazuri, [ifirme interne mai mult sau mai pu]in eficiente)solicit` implementarea unor m`suri, cum ar fi,spre exemplu, cre[terea taxelor vamale sau – ceeace este acela[i lucru – men]inerea lor la nivelurirelativ ridicate. Exist` [i metode mai „rafinate“care pot avea \n vedere, spre exemplu, impunereaunor condi]ii exagerate de calitate, sanitare etc. \ncalea importurilor sau a necesit`]ii ob]inerii unorlicen]e, avize cât mai numeroase \n caleaexporturilor, \n special de materii prime. Toateacestea constituie exemple a ceea ce estecunoscut sub denumirea de bariere la intrarea peo anumit` pia]`.

Din exemplele prezentate, se poate observac`, \n majoritatea cazurilor, cel care creeaz` toateaceste bariere este statul. |ntr-o \ncercare prost\n]eleas` de a proteja consumatorii (sau, maicinic, chiar unii produc`tori existen]i pe pia]`),statul impune diferite condi]ii ce trebuie\ndeplinite pentru a putea intra pe pia]`. Astfel debariere, de[i ini]ial proiectate ca „temporare“,deseori dureaz` mult mai mult decât s-a anun]atla \nceput, datorit` abilit`]ii celor favoriza]i(produc`tori, sindicate) de a face presiuni asupraguvernului pentru prelungirea lor (Van Siclen1992)11. |n majoritatea cazurilor, oriceeventuale beneficii ce ar fi putut decurge \nfavoarea consumatorilor din ac]iunile\ntreprinse de autorit`]ile de concuren]` suntanulate de costurile derivate din nivelul deconcuren]` mai redus rezultant. {i, \n plus,presiunile de a adopta astfel de m`suriprotec]ioniste sunt mult mai mari \n ]`rile mici [i\n cele \n care mentalit`]ile legate de fostul sistem

centralist de organizare a economiei persist` \nc`,România fiind una dintre acestea.

Un exemplu sugestiv din acest punct devedere \l constituie campania declan[at` la unmoment dat de anumite grupuri de interese\mpotriva liberaliz`rii exportului de mas`lemnoas`, m`sur` ce a intrat \n vigoare la 1ianuarie 1998. Pân` la acea dat`, exportul de mas`lemnoas` era interzis, iar pre]ul acesteia pe pia]aintern` era stabilit de c`tre stat (evident, laniveluri mult sub nivelul pre]ului de echilibru). |nconsecin]`, ramurile din aval, cum ar fi deexemplu, industria mobilei, erau practicsubven]ionate; ele beneficiau de pre]uri mici alemateriilor prime pe care le foloseau, dar puteaus`-[i vând` produsele la export la pre]uriinterna]ionale sau pu]in sub acestea. Impresia decompetitivitate a industriei române[ti de mobil`s-a datorat, \n mare m`sur`, [i acestei situa]iianormale. Prin Tratatul de asociere \ns`, Românias-a obligat ca – la 5 ani dup` semnarea acestuia –s` purcead` la liberalizarea exporturilor de mas`lemnoas`, lucru care s-a [i \ntâmplat. O dat` cuapari]ia oportunit`]ii exportului, \n mod firesc,pre]ul lemnului a fost scos de sub controlulstatului. Rezultatul a fost cel anticipat, adic` ocre[tere a pre]urilor spre nivelurile reale (adic`cele normale pentru o resurs` rar` [i care trebuieprotejat`, cum este lemnul), fapt ce a atrasnemul]umirea [i a declan[at un lobby puternicdin partea produc`torilor de mobil` [i nu numai.La momentul respectiv, procesul de liberalizarenu a putut fi obstruc]ionat, un rol oarecarejucându-l aici [i Consiliul Concuren]ei. Darobiceiurile gre[ite dispar greu, a[a c` – o dat` cuapari]ia Ordonan]ei de urgen]` 36/2001, care a

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11 A se vedea [i Stigler (1971), referitor la stimulentele unor grupuri economice de a utiliza procesele politice pentru aob]ine reglement`ri favorabile lor.

modificat lista pre]urilor al c`ror nivel sestabile[te \nc` de c`tre stat – presiunile exercitatede anumite grupuri de interese au avut succes(cel pu]in par]ial), pre]ul de \ncepere a licita]iilorpentru cump`rarea de lemn intrând din nou subcontrolul statului. Inten]ia este limpede, de[imodul de realizare dovede[te o ne\ncredere sau one\n]elegere a modului de func]ionare amecanismelor pie]ei.

|ntr-o accep]iune mai larg`, politicilecomerciale restrictive – de genul celormen]ionate mai sus – au darul de a protejastructuri concentrate de pia]` [i, pe cale deconsecin]`, pre]uri mai mari. Solu]ia normal` la oastfel de situa]ie ar constitui-o procesul deliberalizare [i de promovare a concuren]ei. Lalimit`, \ntr-o lume ipotetic` cu comer] liber [i unmediu comercial uniform \n toate t`rile, gradul deconcentrare a pie]elor ar deveni acela[i peste tot.

d) Ob]inerea unor facilit`]i de natur`fiscal`. Este vorba aici de scutirea, reducerea,amânarea pl`]ii sau ree[alonarea impozitului peprofit, a accizelor, taxei pe valoarea adùgat`,contribu]iei la asigur`rile sociale, a altor datoriietc. Astfel de facilit`]i s-au practicat [i se vor maipractica [i \n continuare, \n principal, din dorin]aatragerii capitalului strìn; autorit`]ile deconcuren]` ar avea un rol de jucat, cel pu]in, \nlimitarea unor astfel de facilit`]i la durata necesarèxecu]iei programului de investitii convenit.

4. Legisla]ia concuren]ei [i o fals`dilem`: monopolul de stat vs.monopolul privat

Aspectele de mai sus, specifice unor economii\n care proprietatea de stat este \nc`predominant`, constituie un motiv \n plus pentruca autorit`]ile de concuren]` s` considere cumult` bun`voin]` chiar [i privatiz`rile \n care „unmonopol de stat este transformat \ntr-unmonopol privat“, ]inând cont de schimb`rile pecare acest fapt \l produce \n sistemul destimulente [i \n modul \n care este realizat`conducerea corporativ` a monopolului respectiv.

|n cultura noilor autorit`]i de concuren]`, dar[i a multor oameni politici, exist` adânc\nr`d`cinat` convingerea c` un monopol privateste mai dùn`tor decât un monopol de stat.Aceasta nu este \ns` decât rezultatul unei\n]elegeri par]iale a acestui enun]. |n anumitecondi]ii, \ntr-adev`r, un monopol privat poate fimai dùn`tor (din punctul de vedere al societ`]ii)decât unul de stat; la fel de bine \ns`, \n acelea[icondi]ii sau \n altele, un monopol de stat poate fimai dùn`tor decât un monopol privat. Acestecondi]ii se refer`, \n principal, la modul dereglementare a monopolului respectiv (sau, maidegrab`, la lipsa acesteia), indiferent care ar fiforma de proprietate asupra lui (Oprescu 1998b).Cu alte cuvinte, sintagma de mai sus atrageaten]ia asupra necesit`]ii reglement`rii unuimonopol. Reglementarea monopolurilor este oparte component` a reglement`rii de c`treautorit`]i (guvern) a diferitelor sectoare deactivitate sau a diferitelor aspecte ale vie]ii socialesau economice (protec]ia mediului, ocrotireas`n`t`]ii, protec]ia consumatorilor, protec]iaconcuren]ei etc.).

Termenul de „reglementare“ necesit` \ns` oaten]ie aparte. Etimologic, cuvântul vine de la


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„regul`/reguli“. Aceasta \nseamn` c` no]iunea dereglementare se refer` la stabilirea unor reguli, \ncadrul c`rora s` se desf`[oare activitatea unuimonopol. Mergând mai \n detaliu, astfel de regulisunt necesare mai ales \n cazul monopolurilornaturale (sau al celor legale — \n sensul de„drept stabilit prin lege“), deoarece \n cazulmonopolurilor formate prin fuziuni [i achizi]iipolitica de protec]ie a concuren]ei ofer` dejainstrumentele necesare, fie pentru a nu se ajungela o astfel de situa]ie, fie de a o rezolva prinmetode specifice economiei de pia]` (deexemplu, crearea condi]iilor [i \ncurajarea intr`riialtor firme \n ramura respectiv`).

Ceea ce se \n]elege \ns` prin „reglementareade c`tre stat“ \n ]`rile cu economie de pia]` este\ns` un lucru cu totul diferit de accep]iunea (\nc`majoritar`) \ntr-o economie \n tranzi]ie ([i nereferim aici \n primul rând la România), conformc`reia reglementare \nseamn` interven]iadiscre]ionar` a statului. Este aici \n fond,cunoscuta problem` teoretic` a regulilor vs.m`suri discre]ionare. Reglementare \nseamn`stabilirea unor reguli clare, transparente,credibile, greu de modificat [i, \n plus,obligatorii atât pentru cel care constituiesubiectul reglement`rii, dar – mai ales - [ipentru cel care reglementeaz`. No]iunea dereglementare – a[a cum este ea folosit` \nliteratura de specialitate – nu are nimic de-a facecu interven]ia statului, \n func]ie de bunul plac alunuia sau altuia dintre func]ionarii afla]i,\ntâmpl`tor sau nu, dar \n mod sigur temporar, \npozi]ia de a o putea face.

Interven]ia discre]ionar` [i pericolele acesteiasunt explicate de dou` teorii distincte, de[i

suficient de apropiate una de cealalt`: teoriacaptur`rii [i teoria grupurilor de interese.

Teoria captur`rii sus]ine c` – de multe ori -firmele \nsele doresc s` fie reglementate de c`trestat, deoarece mai devreme sau mai târziu, printr-o metod` sau alta (amenin]are, mit`, convingere)ele vor reu[i s`-l „captureze“ pe reglementator,care va face astfel ceea ce va dori firmareglementat`; \n acest caz, activitatea dereglementare nu face altceva decât s` protejezefirma respectiv` de amenin]area concuren]ei12.

O generalizare a acestei teorii porne[te de laconstatarea c` diferitele grupuri de interese suntafectate \n mod diferit de activitatea dereglementare. De aceea, ele se vor concura, \nscopul de a influen]a legisla]ia \n domeniu. Ceicare vor fi cel mai bine organiza]i [i care vordispune de cei mai mul]i bani, vor [i reu[i s` \[ipromoveze propriile interese, fie prin intermediullegisla]iei, fie prin acela al reglementatorilor(institu]ia \n sine sau angaja]ii acesteia). |n aceast`teorie a grupurilor de interese, firmele,consumatorii sau alte astfel de grupuri pot s`„captureze“ o autoritate de reglementare [i s` ofoloseasc` \n interesul propriu, dar \n detrimentulcelorlal]i.

Din acest punct de vedere, trebuie s`con[tientiz`m faptul c` – \n România, darprobabil [i \n alte ]`ri aflate \n tranzi]ie –monopolurile de stat nu au fost reglementate (\n\n]elesul normal al termenului). |n teoriafactorilor de produc]ie, atunci când se vorbe[tede veniturile acestora, se face distinc]ia dintrepl`]ile de transfer [i renta economic`. Astfel,pl`]ile de transfer sunt definite ca pl`]ile necesarepentru a men]ine un factor de produc]ie \n starea

Gheorghe Oprescu

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12 De[i nu se refer` la un sector „reglementat“, un exemplu în acest sens îl poate constitui respingerea repetat`, f`r` oanaliz` care s` ajung` în plenul Consiliului Concuren]ei, a sesiz`rilor firmei Coca Cola vizând sprijinul de diferite feluriob]inut din partea statului de concurentul s`u direct pe pia]a româneasc`, European Drinks.

sa de func]ionare actual`, iar renta economicèste orice plat` peste nivelul pl`]ilor de transfer.

F`când o analogie, putem spune c` ceea cepân` acum s-a dorit a fi reglementareamonopolurilor nu a fost decât o ac]iune deextragere – \n favoarea a diferite grupuri, adiferite persoane sau a diferite alte sectoare - arentei economice din sectorul aflat sub „control“.Ca un am`nunt, astfel se [i explic` nivelulsubstan]ial mai mare al salariilor din fostele regiiautonome, adic` – \n cea mai mare parte - asectoarelor aflate sub „control“.

Referindu-ne la România, ceva s-a f`cut totu[i:este vorba de controlul pre]urilor, control al c`ruiunic criteriu a fost \ns` temperarea infla]iei [iprotec]ia – pe termen scurt \ns` – a popula]iei;cu alte cuvinte, controlul pre]urilor a fost folositca instrument de protec]ie social`, \n scopulredistribuirii veniturilor \n societate [i nu \nscopul eficien]ei economice sau – altfel formulat– al corect`rii ineficien]elor generate de pie]e cuconcuren]` imperfect`.

Acest tip de control al pre]urilor ilustreaz` dinp`cate ac]iunea de extragere a rentei din acestesectoare. Spuneam c` protec]ia popula]iei a fostdoar pe termen scurt, deoarece practicarea unorpre]uri false, la niveluri mult mai joase decât ar fitrebuit nu putea continua la infinit. Pe de o parte,ele au contribuit la decapitalizarea sectoarelorrespective, acestea ajungând \n situa]ia de a numai avea resursele necesare nici m`car pentrumen]inerea la nivelul actual – mediocru – defunc]ionare [i calitate a serviciilor.

Pe de alt` parte, deschiderea pie]elor –fenomen din fa]a c`ruia nimeni nu se va putea dala o parte – le face s` se afle \n pericolul de a nuputea face fa]` concuren]ei interna]ionale, cuinevitabilul sfâr[it care ar fi dispari]ia de pe pia]`.Este cazul aici, spre exemplu, al Romtelecomului,

c`ruia i s-a acordat un termen de gra]ie pentru a\ncerca s` devin` competitiv, dar care va avea de\nfruntat – \ncepând cu 1 ianuarie 2003 –concuren]a firmelor strìne pe pia]a româneasc`.Consecin]a principal` a unei astfel de politiciconst` \n necesitatea ca – \n astfel de domenii –pre]urile [i tarifele s` creasc` semnificativ \ntermeni reali; [i asta doar pentru a supravie]ui.Pentru a putea vorbi \ns` de o \mbun`t`]ire acalit`]ii serviciilor, sumele necesare nu suntdisponibile decât prin aportul unor investi]iistrìne, indiferent de forma sub care se vorconcretiza (privatizare, concesionare etc.). Dinp`cate, problema accept`rii investi]iilor strìne \nsectoarele de utilit`]i sau de infrastructur` este oproblem` extrem de sensibil` [i de controversat`din punct de vedere politic; furibunda campaniedeclan[at` de privatizarea Romtelecomului estecea mai bun` dovad` \n acest sens.


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BIBLIOGRAFIE

• Brittan, Leon (1990), Competition Policyin a Unified Germany - The EuropeanDimension, 20th Report on Competition Policy.

• Butacu, Cristina [i Miu Angelo (1998),Legea concuren]ei comentat`: analizadispozi]iilor art. 5 din Legea concuren]ei nr.21/1996, \n Profil: Concuren]a, anul I, nr. 2,octombrie-decembrie, p. 25.

• European Commission (1998),Communication of the Commission on theapplication of the EC competition rules tovertical restraints, October, Competition PolicyNewsletter, no.3.

• Fischer, Stanley [i Gelb, Alan (1991), TheProcess of Socialist Economic Transformation,Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (Fall 1991),p. 91.

• Georgescu, Daniela [i Butacu, Cristina(1998), Legea concuren]ei comentat`, \n Profil:Concuren]a, anul 1, nr. 1, iulie-septembrie, p. 17.

• Georgescu, Daniela [i F`g`r`[anu, Irina(1999), Studiu de caz: Concentrare economic`(cazul Romtelecom), \n Profil: Concuren]a, anulII, nr. 1, 1999, p. 13

• Goran, Gelu (1998), Controlulconcentr`rilor. Except`ri [i alte opera]iuni ce nusunt supuse controlului Consiliului Concuren]ei,\n Profil: Concuren]a, anul I, nr. 2, octombrie-decembrie, p. 20.

• Korah, Valentine (1997), An IntroductoryGuide to EC Competition Law and Practice, HartPublishing, 1997, p. 67.

• Miu, Angelo (1999), Din activitateainterna]ional` a Consiliului Concuren]ei, \nProfil: Concuren]a, anul II, nr. 1, martie, p. 49.

• Oprescu, Gheorghe (1998a), Uneleaspecte economice privind cazul REBU, \n Profil:Concuren]a, anul I, nr.1, iulie-septembrie, p. 7.

• Oprescu, Gheorghe (1998b), Despremonopoluri [i monopoluri naturale, \n Profil:Concuren]a, anul I, nr. 2, octombrie-decembrie,p. 34.

• Oprescu, Gheorghe [i Rohlck, Eric(1999), Competition Policy in TransitionEconomies: The Case of Romania, CompetitionPolicy Newsletter, no. 3 October, p. 62.

• Oprescu, Gheorghe (2001), TheModernisation of EC Competition Law: The Caseof an Associated Country, European CompetitionLaw Annual 2000: The Modernisation of ECAntitrust Policy (Claus Dieter Ehlerman, IsabelaAtanasiu, eds.), Hart Publishing, Oxford, PortlandOregon, p. 387.

• Pittman, Russell (1992), Some CriticialProvisions in the Antimonopoly Laws of Centraland Eastern Europe, The International Lawyer26, p. 485-583.

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• Pittman, Russell (1997), CompetitionLaw in Central and Eastern Europe: Five YearsLater, Economic Analysis Group DiscussionPaper, U.S. Department of Justice, AntitrustDivision.

• Rohlck, Eric (1999), Navigând prinlumea juridic` a \n]elegerilor verticale, \n Profil:Concuren]a, anul II, nr. 1, martie, p. 32.

• Sinn, H. W. (1991), MacroeconomicAspects of German Unification, Working paper3596, National Bureau of Economic Research,Cambridge, Mass.

• Stigler, George J. (1971), The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics2 (Spring 1971), p. 3.

• T`nase, Daniela [i Iv`nu[, Georgeta(1999), Studiu de caz: pia]a cimentului, \n Profil:Concuren]a, anul II, nr. 1, martie, p. 19.

• Van Siclen, Sally J. (1992), A PracticalAnalysis of the Economics of Demonopolization,Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper, U.S.Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, p. 5.

• Vasile, Drago[ (1999), Considera]iiprivind refuzul de a trata, \n Profil: Concuren]a,anul II, nr. 1, martie, p. 23.


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Orice moned` na]ional`, cu un grad mare devulnerabilitate, genereaz` costuri suplimentarepentru to]i participan]ii de pe pia]a intern` a ]`riirespective. Câ]iva factori, printre care liberalizareapie]elor interne [i a fluxurilor externe de capital,dar mai ales intensificarea comer]ului cu serviciifinanciare la scar` global`, au m`rit presiuneaconsolid`rii monetare. Ea a determinat ]`rile cumoned` relativ vulnerabil` sau foarte vulnerabil`s` foloseasc`, pe pia]a intern`, monedele str`inemai stabile, cel mai adesea moneda dominant` alumii - dolarul american - sau moneda dominant`a regiunii, într-o propor]ie mai mare decât ar fiîndrept`]it-o comer]ul lor exterior.

Consolidarea monetar` înseamn` unificareastandardelor monetare oficiale, în lume sau într-o regiune a lumii, într-o gam` mai restrâns`de monede na]ionale sau de standarde monetare

oficiale. Aceast` consolidare poate avea loc [i într-o singur` ]ar` – cu sistem bi-monetar sau cucursuri multiple de schimb valutar.

Folosirea, pe plan intern, a mai multorstandarde monetare este o reac]ie normal` deprotejare a popula]iei [i a agen]ilor economicicontra vulnerabilit`]ii monedelor na]ionale. Esteadev`rat, ea trebuie bine reglementat` pentru anu induce distorsiuni [i mai mari prin folosireaputerii dominante sau de monopol pe pia]` etc., îndetrimentul popula]iei [i al tuturor celorlal]i actorifor]a]i s` înceap` orice tranzac]ie cu sau s` treac`prin moneda na]ional`. Când o tranzac]ie trebuies` treac` prin mai multe standarde monetare, peplan intern, ea se încarc` de costuri suplimentare.Este o reac]ie repetat` în fiecare ]ar` cu moned`volatil` [i la scar` mondial` ar fi mult mai pu]incostisitor s` fie folosite mai pu]ine monede.

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ABSTRACT. As the pressure of the currency consolidation increased in the years 1990, the worldbecame aware that the world currency system, with 178 separate national currencies, became toocostly, both for the domestic economies and for the world economy. The high costs and greatvulnerability of the national currencies determined the financial and economic business of smallopen economies to move into the major currencies of the world. The euro is the first great successof a regional currency with a large potential in the international finance. Romania needs toovercome many problems to get through the stages required for the euro adoption. They range fromthe problem of standardising the macro and micro economic policies and adjusting the businesscycle in line with the business cycle of the euro zone to the problem of putting on track the role andthe functions of the national central bank according to the Eurosystem standards, of the preparingto join to the Exchange Rate Mechanism II and to meat the convergence criteria. Romania mustvery seriously get prepared in a shorter period of time for the advantage of adopting the euro andalso for losing inter alia its national monetary policy and capital markets.

CONSOLIDAREA MONETAR~ MONDIAL~ {I PROBLEME ALETRANZI}EI ROMÅNIEI LA MONEDA REGIONAL~

Marin Fråncu*


* Marin Frâncu este cercet`tor principal [i coordonator de programe la Institutul de Economie Mondial`, Bucure[ti, Romånia.

vol. 3, no. 1, 2003

De mai bine de jum`tate de secol exist`propunerea unei monede mondiale unice, f`cut`de John Maynard Keynes. Din punct de vedereteoretic, în actualul proces de consolidaremonetar` mondial` [i regional`, se confrunt` ogam` bine conturat` de concepte, mergând de lasus]inerea cursurilor valutare flexibile pentru unnum`r destul de mare de monede, pån` la creareaa câte o moned` regional` în principalele zoneeconomice ale lumii, la restrângerea num`ruluimonedelor, pe plan mondial, la trei monede -dolarul american, moneda euro [i yenul - pân` lao moned` mondial` unic`.

Consolidarea monetar` mondial` poate fi unproces extrem de complex [i de îndelungat.Moneda euro este primul succes real alconsolid`rii monetare regionale. Pân` acum,noua moned` nu a pus în pericol pozi]iileinterna]ionale ale dolarului. De altfel,organismele Eurosistemului au declarat c` nu auîn inten]ie a[a ceva. Euro este a doua moned` alumii [i [i-a înt`rit puternic pozi]ia regional`dincolo de grani]ele zonei monetare [i ale UniuniiEuropene, mai ales în ]`rile candidate, implicit înRomânia, [i mai departe, în Rusia [i Asia Central`,în ]`rile mediteraneene din Orientul Mijlociu [iAfrica de Nord [i, mai la sud, în Africa Central` [ide Vest, unde a mo[tenit rolul francului CFA.

România se preg`te[te [i ea intens pentrutranzi]ia la noua moned` regional`. Adoptareaunei monede regionale are mari avantaje, îndiminuarea costurilor tuturor categoriilor detranzac]ii, în reducerea vulnerabilit`]ii monetare,în eliminarea unor perturba]ii de care sufer` toatesectoarele, dar cel mai adesea pie]ele monetare,de capital [i alte pie]e financiare, distorsiuni care conduc la supra-dimensionarea rezervelorvalutare ale ]`rii [. a. m. d. Ea are [i costuri foartemari [i, pentru România, reclam`, într-un timp

extrem de scurt, mari eforturi de preg`tire carenu trebuie l`sate numai pe seama b`ncii centrale.Printre costuri, dac` men]ion`m doar pierdereadrepturilor senioriale, de emitere a monedei,pierderea par]ial` a controlului politiciimacroeconomice [i microeconomice, pierdereatotal` a controlului politicii monetare - care vorreveni b`ncii centrale regionale [i, respectiv,organismelor UE - lista este total incomplet`. Laeforturi, s` men]ion`m doar c`, toate institu]iileguvernamentale din România ar trebui s` seobi[nuiasc`, de pe acum, s` nu-[i mai rezolveproblemele prin iluzie - producând infla]ie - îndefavoarea popula]iei, ci prin stabilitateapoliticilor s`n`toase, prin stabilitatea cre[teriieconomice potrivit prevederilor Pactului deStabilitate [i Cre[tere al UE. România trebuieputernic ajutat` de partenerii s`i europeni [i deinstitu]iile financiare interna]ionale, deoarece eatrebuie s` g`seasc` solu]ii la dificult`]i de tipulcercului vicios [i nu o poate face singur`. Deexemplu, adoptarea noii monede regionalelipse[te mecanismele economice interne de opolitic` monetar` na]ional`. Ele vor ie[i mai greudintr-o eventual` criz`, în m`sura în care le-opermite politica monetar` regional`, care s-arputea s` li se potriveasc` sau nu. Aceastapresupune, printre altele, armonizarea, pân`atunci, a ciclului economic al României, la carecontribuie, bineîn]eles, [i cursul efectiv al leului [icursul real al leului fa]` de euro, de acum.

Deja multe dintre costuri sunt prefigurate decele trei stadii pe care trebuie s` le parcurg`România pân` la uniunea economic` [i monetar`.Cert este c` dup` intrarea în UE [i chiar maidevreme, România va fi obligat` s` aplice numai politici s`n`toase, coordonate deorganismele UE [i întocmite dup` reguli [istandarde interna]ionale convenite, [i chiar dup`

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formulare comune, inclusiv de urm`rire [i deraportare a rezultatelor. Printre altele, ele vor cùta eliminarea deficitului bugetar petermen mediu [i vor evita deficitele bugetareexcesive pe termen scurt, iar în sistemul financiarvor asigura independen]a deplin` a politicii b`ncii na]ionale ale c`rei func]ii de supervizare [i control se vor înt`ri în defavoarea politicii monetare care va reveni institu]iilorEurosistemului, vor prevedea restric]ii încreditarea institu]iilor guvernamentale [. a.

1. Presiunea costurilor suplimentareÎn sistemul financiar mondial, exist` dificult`]i

[i costuri suplimentare, în bun` parte [i pentru c`sunt prea multe monede na]ionale. Majoritateasunt monede cu un grad mare de vulnerabilitate,printre care se afl` [i leul românesc. Cum apareun nou stat, cât de mic, are grij` s`-[i emit`,imediat, moned` proprie. În ]`rile în curs dedezvoltare, din cauza vulnerabilit`]ii monedelorna]ionale, s-au creat stadii intermediare înconcuren]a pe pia]a monetar` [i financiarìntern`, generate de folosirea – de regul`,oficializat` – a mai mult de un standard monetar.Acest fenomen spore[te riscurile stabilit`]iipre]urilor, ale sectorului financiar sau aleeconomiei, în ansamblu.

}`rile mici, mai ales cele cu economiedeschis` spre exterior, dar [i toate ]`rile în curs dedezvoltare, care au nevoie de serviciile re]eleifinanciare globale, folosesc tot mai des monedelestrìne pe pia]a lor intern` [i în tranzac]iile lorexterne. Presiunea pentru consolidare monetarèste o modalitate de adaptare a sistemuluifinanciar mondial la noile realit`]i comerciale:globalizare sporit` a afacerilor comerciale [i apie]elor financiare; crearea unei re]ele financiare

globale care nu mai se suprapune peste profilulre]elei globale comerciale; intensificarealiberaliz`rii [i a accesului la pie]ele mondiale subinfluen]a protocoalelor Organiza]iei Mondiale aComer]ului; eliminarea unor restric]ii interne în sectorul serviciilor financiare [i avansultehnologiei comunica]iilor, inclusiv utilizareare]elelor globale de computere. România este [iea prins` în acest proces.

Când o tranzac]ie comercial` sau financiar`trece prin dou` sau mai multe standardemonetare – adic`, atunci când sunt implicate maimulte monede sau cursuri de schimb – ea are unparcurs mai îndelungat [i suport` costurisuplimentare. Din cauza infla]iei [i a deprecieriicontinue a leului, în România, întâlnim mai multestandarde monetare, unele neoficializate expres,dar nici sanc]ionate de lege . Ni se expun motiva]iioficiale c` ni[te pre]uri în lei cresc pentru c`trebuie s` ]in` pasul cu cursul dolarului, c` pre]ulbenzinei cre[te pentru c` are în el accize în euro;mai auzim c` ni[te companii de telecomunica]ii [ide televiziune prin cablu î[i fixeaz` tarifele îndolari sau euro [i doar factureaz` în lei; unministru ne anun]` costul noilor locuin]e în dolaripe metru p`trat; auzim c` o companie factureaz`în dolari, alta în euro, alta în franci elve]ieni; chiar[i unii medici î[i fixeaz` „tariful” în euro sau dolari,la fel [i unii poli]i[ti sau magistra]i [.a.m.d. Nupare, dar cotarea în valut` sau folosirea valutei caatare este o tendin]` pozitiv`, de protejare apopula]iei [i a economiei contra vulnerabilit`]iileului. Din p`cate, în România, acest proces s-aderulat, mult timp [i înc` se deruleaz`, haotic, cuo legisla]ie incoerent` [i f`r` o îndrumareinstitu]ional` profesionist`.

Marin Fråncu

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2. Vremea cånd pia]a impuneasingur` monedele bune

Cum a ajuns lumea aici? În materie deconcuren]` monetar`, era o vreme cândmonedele bune nu întâmpinau nici o grani]`statal` [i nimeni nu putea for]a popula]ia sàccepte monede proaste. Apari]ia b`ncilorcentrale a facilitat punerea în circula]ie a unor noiforme de bani [i de bancnote oficiale la un curs deschimb, de regul`, supraevaluat. Cu timpul, multe]`ri au înt`rit puterea de monopol a autorit`]ilorde a emite bani, în ideea unei mai bune protej`ria monedei na]ionale. S` reamintim c`, în esen]`,prin emiterea unei bancnote, cel care intr` înposesia ei îl crediteaz` pe emitent cucontravaloarea bancnotei. Pentru a avea obancnot`, o persoan` trebuie s` dea o marf`, s`presteze un serviciu etc., iar cel care a emis,ini]ial, bancnota nu trebuie s` dea nimic, ci, prinautoritatea lui de constrângere – chiar dac` nuscrie a[a ceva pe bucata de hârtie pe care onumim bancnot` – el, adic` statul, prin institu]iilesale cu putere coercitiv` se angajeaz` s` aib` grij`ca bancnota respectiv` s` poat` fi schimbatòricând [i oriunde, în teritoriul aflat sub jurisdic]iasa, pe orice marf`.

Pentru a asigura aceast` exclusivitate, nunumai bancnotele în circula]ie, dar toate celelalteopera]iuni b`ne[ti, calcularea taxelor [iimpozitelor [i înregistr`rile valorice etc. trebuia s`fie exprimate în moneda na]ional`. M`surisuplimentare au fost luate prin controlul valutar.]inând întreaga economie na]ional` în capcanamonedei locale, guvernele au devenit tot maiimprudente în extinderea masei monetare,

creând infla]ie [i abuzând de dreptul desenioritate – dreptul de a emite moned`, cuavantajele explicate mai devreme – [i tot maipu]in exigente cu calitatea extinderii sistemuluifinanciar [i a serviciilor prestate de acesta. Dup`1989, România nu a fost în stare s` evite aceea[igre[eal` f`cut` de decenii de ]`rile cu economiede pia]`. La scar` mondial`, mai multe monede,au însemnat mai multe monede proaste [i unsistem financiar mondial mai greoi.

3. Mai pu]ine monede.Barierele în calea concuren]ei strìne s-au

erodat în ultimul sfert de secol. Monedelena]ionale au fost expuse tot mai mult concuren]eimonedelor strìne [i luptei pentru supravie]uire.Obstacolele au c`zut mai întâi în ]`rile dezvoltate[i apoi în ]`rile în curs de dezvoltare, pe m`sur` ceele [i-au accentuat integrarea în comer]ulinterna]ional [i în fluxurile de investi]ii strìne [iau acordat acela[i tratament na]ional [i strìnilor,cu tot mai pu]ine sau f`r` nici o derogare. S-audeschis, astfel, u[ile prin care multe achizi]ii saualte categorii de tranzac]ii au putut s` fieexprimate în valute strìne, atât de c`tre reziden]iilocali, cât [i de c`tre strìni.

Problematica consolid`rii monetarebeneficiaz`, printre altele, de o dezbatere dereferin]` dintre doi vesti]i economi[ti, laurea]i aipremiului Nobel, profesorii Milton Friedman [iRobert Mundell, publicat`, în mai 2001, sub titlulsugestiv „O lume, o singur` moned`?”1. În aceast`dezbatere, Milton Friedman, un adept, de multtimp, al cursurilor flexibile de schimb valutar, [i-a

1 Friedman, M. [i Mundell R. A. One World, One Money?, Policy Options – Options Politiques 22(4) p. 1o-30 May 2001Canada ; vezi [i Mundell R.A. Exchange Rate Arangements in Central and Eastern Europe în Eastern Enlargements: The Sooner, The Better? editori S. Arndt, H. Handler [i D. Salvatore 2000, Viena, Austrian Ministry for Economic Affairsand Labour p. 158-165.

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sus]inut opozi]ia fa]` de încerc`rile de a crea osingur` moned` mondial`. Robert Mundell, pe dealt` parte, s-a declarat în favoarea unei monedemondiale unice fa]` de care monedele na]ionalear urma s` aib` un curs fix, dar ar continua s`coexiste; aceast` moned` global` ar urma s` fie omedie ponderat` între dolarul american, euro [iyenul japonez, care [i ele ar fi înglobate în nouamoned` mondial`. Consiliului Guvernatorilor alFMI ar urma s` îi revin` responsabilitatea cre`rii [ia managementului monedei mondiale. Ideea luiMundell este foarte apropiat` de propunerea uneimonede mondiale unice, numit` „bancor”,avansat` de celebrul economist John MaynardKeynes, la conferin]a de la Bretton Woods, din1944, dar care n-a fost acceptat` atunci. Între celedou` pozi]ii, au ap`rut, în lumea de azi, câtevapropuneri bine argumentate, printre care se afl`propunerea de creare a câte unei monede înfiecare regiune mare a lumii [i propunerea derestrângere a num`rului de monede, în lume, latrei – dolarul american, euro [i yenul japonez.

Prin propunerea pentru câte o moned` pefiecare regiune2, monedele na]ionale ar urma s`fie înglobate în câte un bloc regional cu care auleg`turi mai strânse, comerciale [i de investi]iistrìne, f`cându-le, astfel, mai sustenabile, dinpunct de vedere economic [i politic. Monedelena]ionale ar fuziona într-o moned` regional`pentru a câ[tiga avantajul economiilor la scar` [io credibilitate de pia]` dat` de o banc` central`regional` independent`, eliberat` de oriceinterferen]` politic` pe termen scurt. Acestemonede regionale ale lumii n-ar avea cursuri fixeîntre ele, ci ar flota una fa]` de alta.

Sunt multe argumente, de costuri, destabilitate economic` etc., pentru care nu estebine, nici pentru multe ]`ri în curs de dezvoltare,nici pentru sistemul financiar mondial, ca toate]`rile mici ale lumii s`-[i men]in` monedelena]ionale. În lume, exist` un num`r prea mare, de178 monede na]ionale. Nici unul din mariieconomi[ti ai lumii nu contest` c` pentru a-[ip`stra suveranitatea o ]ar` trebuie neap`rat sàib` moneda ei na]ional`, tot a[a cum nu trebuieneap`rat s` aib` propria companie na]ional` deavia]ie sau de transporturi maritime. Chiar mareleavocat al cursurilor flexibile, Milton Friedmanspunea, în contextul c`r]ii sale din 1973, Moneyand Economic Development, c`, pentru ]`rilemici, „Cea mai bun` politic` ar fi s` se fereasc`de veniturile provenite din crearea de bani, s`-[i uneasc` moneda cu cea a unei ]`ridezvoltate, mare [i relativ stabil`, cu care arerela]ii economice strânse [i s` nu impun` nicio barier` în calea mi[c`rii banilor, a pre]urilorsau a dobânzilor. O astfel de politic` i-ar ceres` nu aib` o banc` central` proprie.”

4. Moneda euro sl`be[te presiuneaasupra dolarului american.

Domina]ia dolarului s-a accentuat în anii1990, mânat` de globalizare [i de convergen]apie]elor financiare [i de capital. Cre[terea pozi]ieidolarului nu putea suplini deficien]ele sistemuluifinanciar global, pe de o parte, iar banca centralà SUA – sistemul federal de rezerve – nu agrea undolar [i mai dominant, din cauza efectelorsecundare negative asupra managementuluimonetar [i asupra competitivit`]ii comer]ului

2 Vezi Furstenberg, G. von One Region, One Money: Implication of Regional Currency Consolidation for FinancialServices 25th annual lecture of the Geneva Association, International Association for Study of Insurance Economics,Washington D.C. 29 September 2001.

exterior al SUA. Aceasta a creat o presiunesuplimentar` pentru gr`birea apari]iei monedeieuro. Trebuie s` reamintim c`, regimul cursurilorfixe - înfiin]at în 1944, prin acordul de la BrettonWoods - a c`zut în 1971, în parte, [i pentru c`dolarul american a subminat sistemul.

Ca urmare a crizelor financiare din anii 1990,din Asia de Sud Est, Rusia, Turcia, America Latinètc., ]`rile cel mai afectate au cùtat s` seîndep`rteze – de[i temporar – de cursurileflexibile de schimb, adoptând diferite altemecanisme valutare: curs cu flotare controlat`,curs cu leg`tur` fix` glisant` sau consiliimonetare, majoritatea presupunând un anumitnivel de referin]` fa]` de dolarul american. Uneleau dat rezultate bune, altele, nu – cum a fostconsiliul monetar în Argentina.

Cursurile flexibile de schimb nufunc]ioneaz`, întotdeauna, bine în ]`rile mici: ele tind s` le accentueze efectele negative ale[ocurilor economice externe, în loc s` le protejezecontra lor, a[a cum spune teoria c` ar trebui.Printre cauzele discrepan]ei dintre teorie [ipractic`, se afl` sl`biciunile sistemului financiar al]`rilor în curs de dezvoltare [i ale sistemuluifinanciar global dovedite de modul de manifestarea crizelor [i de lipsa de uniformitate în reac]iilecorective luate ulterior de guvernele respective [ide organismele interna]ionale specializate.

Consolidarea efectiv` a 12 monede na]ionale[i înlocuirea lor cu o moned` unic` în zona eurofurnizeaz` cel mai clar exemplu de func]ionare aprocesului de consolidare monetar` regional` [ipoate constitui o experien]` util` sau un modelpentru alte blocuri regionale.

Pe m`sur` ce euro î[i înt`re[te pozi]ia demoned` regional`, el intr` în competi]ie cudolarul pentru a-i completa pozi]ia global`, maiales c` alte monede regionale întârzie s` apar`.

De altfel, o moned` regional` puternic`, precumeuro, poate func]iona cu succes [i ca monedìnterna]ional` în anumite tranzac]ii comerciale.De exemplu, datorit` importan]ei pie]eieuropene a reasigur`rilor, o propor]ie sporit` dinreasigur`rile interna]ionale, din alte zone alelumii, vor tinde s` fie exprimate în euro.

5. Euro are un mare viitorinterna]ional

Moneda euro este a doua valut` utilizat` întranzac]iile interna]ionale ale ]`rilor lumii, dup`dolarul american [i înaintea yenului japonez.Eurosistemul nu vrea, îns`, s` for]eze, prin deciziide politic` monetar`, cre[terea, în vreun fel, aacestui rol, ci dimensionarea pozi]iei monedeieuro în lume este l`sat` în voia for]elor pie]eimondiale. De altfel, extinderea liberaliz`rii [i aglobaliz`rii pie]elor financiare limiteaz` foartemult orice fel de foloase directe ar putea fi createpe aceast` cale. În mod transparent, Eurosistemula declarat c` nu are ca obiectiv direct de politicìnterna]ionalizarea expres` a monedei euro.

Indirect, îns`, politicile publice europene potinfluen]a pozi]ia viitoare a monedei euro pe pia]amondial`, deoarece participan]ii la tranzac]iileexterne vor ]ine cont de aceste politici, atuncicând î[i vor exprima crean]ele, î[i vor repartizaportofoliile de active pe diferite monede sau î[ivor factura comer]ul exterior. De exemplu,orientarea UE c`tre politicile de stabilitate [ieforturile de a promova o pia]` financiar` unicèficient` [i complet integrat` pentru activele [ipasivele exprimate în euro, dac` vor fi încununatede succes, pot face moneda euro mult maiatractiv` pentru debitorii [i investitoriiinterna]ionali, sporind, în consecin]`, rolul ei dedepozitare a averii lumii.


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Euro [i-a înt`rit pozi]ia în lume ca moned` definan]are. Ponderea emisiunilor interna]ionale deinstrumente monetare exprimate în euro a sporitsubstan]ial începând de la sfâr[itul anului 1999, caurmare a cre[terii lichidit`]ilor, adus` de creareapie]ei monetare integrate a zonei euro. În medie,ponderea instrumentelor monetare exprimate învechile monede mo[tenite de euro era de numai8,5% în perioada 1994-1998 (dolarul american77% [i yenul japonez 4,5%), dar ponderea celorexprimate în euro în perioada ianuarie 1999- iunie2001 sporise, în medie, la 24% (dolarul american60% [i yenul japonez 3%), preluând o parte dinpozi]iile dolarului [i yenului. O cre[tere similar` aponderii a avut loc [i la emisiunile de bonuri [i deobliga]iuni exprimate în euro. Ponderea medie avechilor monede mo[tenite de euro în emisiunilede obliga]iuni f`cute de nereziden]ii zonei eurofusese de 18% - în urma yenului japonez - înperioada 1994-1998 (dolarul american 42% [iyenul japonez 25%). În perioada ianuarie 1999-iunie 2001, ponderea monedei euro în emisiunilede obliga]iuni a crescut la 31%, destul de aproapede dolar [i înaintea yenului (dolarul 36% [i yenul18%).

Ca moned` de investi]ii str`ine, euro ocup` opozi]ie de dou` ori mai slab` decât dolarul [i dedou` ori mai puternic` decât yenul. Pondereaestimat` a titlurilor de valori exprimate în euro,aflate în portofoliile marilor administratori globalide active financiare, a fost la sfâr[itul luniiseptembrie 2001 de 28% (dolarul 49% [i yenul16%). În acela[i timp, de]inerile str`ine de ac]iunide capital în zona euro reprezentau 25% dintotalul mondial (SUA 50% [i Japonia 10%).

În privin]a utiliz`rii monedei euro ca vehiculmonetar pe pia]a valutar`, ultima anchet` trienal`întreprins` de BIS (Banca ReglementelorInterna]ionale) arat` c` în luna aprilie 2001, europarticipa la 38% din tranzac]iile valutare net-net3

(dolarul 90% [i yenul 23%). De[i la nivel global,euro nu joac` un rol comparabil cu cel al dolaruluiamerican, la nivel regional, euro mo[tene[te unrol important de la monedele pe care le-a înlocuit(în deosebi, de la marca german`), mai ales în]`rile central [i est europene .

În ceea ce prive[te utiliz`rile oficiale alemonedei euro, în stabilirea cursului oficial deschimb, peste 50 de ]`ri din afara zonei euro auun regim oficial de curs valutar cu o ancor` în careeste implicat` moneda euro. Ca valut` oficial` derezerv`, la sfâr[itul anului 2000, euro reprezentadestul de pu]in, doar 12,7%, din rezervelevalutare mondiale, fa]` de 68,2% dolarul american[i 5,3% yenul japonez. Acest nivel este comparabilcu cel ocupat de monedele europene pe care le-aînlocuit (în principal, de marca german`, franculfrancez [i guldenul olandez) înainte deintroducerea monedei euro. Cu alte cuvinte, euronu a declan[at înc` nici un fel de fug` de dolarulamerican a rezervelor valutare interna]ionale ale]`rilor lumii. Cu toate acestea, utilizarea dolaruluiamerican [i a monedei euro în rezervele valutareoficiale [i în stabilirea cursului oficial de schimbdifer` mult de la o zon` geografic` la alta. ÎnEuropa Central` [i de Est, de exemplu,majoritatea ]`rilor dau monedei euro o ponderede peste 60%, atât în rezervele valutare, cât [i înstabilirea cursului oficial de schimb.

3 Deoarece în fiecare tranzac]ie valutar` sunt implicate câte dou` valute, însumarea procentelor totalizeaz` 200%, în locde 100%; cifrele se refer` la valoarea net-net, adic` valoarea ajustat` pentru înregistr`ri duble locale [i trans-frontaliere.


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6. Romånia trebuie s`-[ipreg`teasc` tranzi]ia la monedaregional`

Cât timp ]ine o moned` na]ional` fragil`, o]ar` în curs de dezvoltare sufer` c` to]iproduc`torii [i consumatorii interni trebuie sàctiveze într-un sistem foarte fragil [i cucapabilit`]i foarte limitate [i c` manageriieconomici [i financiari trebuie s` apeleze la politicispeciale pentru a minimaliza efectele adverse.

Pia]a de capital este prima care sufer` deefectele negative. Din cauza incertitudinilormonetare, titlurile de valori exprimate în moned`local` nu pot atrage investitorii strìni [i când ofac, o fac contra unei prime mari de risc. Totodat`,investitorii interni vor constata c` pie]ele strìnede capital, cu monede mai stabile, sunt mult maiatractive.

De asemenea, [ocurile economice [i atacurilespeculative asupra unei monede na]ionale fragileau un efect destabilizator mai mare [i din cauz` c`pia]a are un grad mic de capitalizare, iar rezervele valutare ale ]`rii sunt relativ mici; supra-dimensionarea lor ar crea mari costurisuplimentare. Exist` leg`turi strânse între cursulde schimb [i pia]a de capital, nu numai prininterdependen]a economic` [i comercial`, ci [iprin încrederea de pia]`.

În sens invers, prin abandonarea monedeina]ionale o ]ar` în curs de dezvoltare – caRomânia – î[i pierde pia]a de capital proprie.Moneda regional` conduce, inevitabil, la o pia]`regional` de capital. Firmele locale vor trebui s` sesupun` unor condi]ii de cotare mult mai severe,cu avantajul posibilit`]ii ob]inerii unei finan]`riincomparabil mai mari, dar pentru parametri maibuni [i performan]e mult mai ridicate.

O pia]` de capital, cu risc mare [i capitalizaresc`zut`, dintr-o ]ar` cu moned` na]ional` volatil`,

va afecta negativ eficien]a [i competitivitateafirmelor locale deoarece ea le spore[te costurilede capital [i le limiteaz` capitalul pe care îl potridica de pe pia]`. În plus, reglement`rile le oblig`s` emit`, pe pia]a intern`, ac]iuni [i obliga]iuninumai în moned` na]ional`. La fel, firmele deservicii financiare vor fi nevoite s`-[i investeasc`banii într-o gam` îngust` de titluri de valori [i,astfel, fondurile economisite de popula]ie [iîncredin]ate lor spre administrare vor alc`tuiportofolii mai pu]in diversificate [i cu randamentmai sc`zut decât dac` ar fi investite pe pie]eregionale sau interna]ionale mai mari.

Cât timp î[i men]ine moneda na]ional`, o ]ar`în curs de dezvoltare ar trebui s` permit` firmelorfinanciare [i anumitor firme nefinanciare s`vând`, iar consumatorilor s` cumpere anumitebunuri [i servicii în moned` strìn`, dar în strict`conformitate cu politica economic` [i comercial`pe termen lung a ]`rii. În România, permisiuneafolosirii monedelor strìne a avut mult timp [iînc` are, din p`cate, un caracter incoerent, nudenot` c` face parte dintr-o politic` pe termenlung [i abuzeaz` de ea firme care vor s`-[iînt`reasc` puterea de monopol în defavoareaveniturilor popula]iei care este pl`tit` în moned`na]ional`. În plus, la intern, ea ar fi trebuitorientat`, de mai mult timp, numai c`tremoneda regional` euro, pentru a u[uraarmonizarea ciclului economic al României cucel al zonei euro spre care ne îndrept`m.

Problema nu trebuie privit` numai încontextul european al integr`rii României. Fiecare]ar` în curs de dezvoltare ar trebui s`-[i estimezecu acurate]e beneficiile nete ale intr`rii într-ouniune monetar`, s` urmeze un ghid profesionistde parcurgere a acestei tranzi]ii, elaborat de FMIsau de alt organism specializat – cum este cazulcu Banca Central` European` în zona euro – s`-[i

identifice bine partenerii [i itinerarul spreuniunea monetar`.

Mai întâi, din cauza marilor costuri asociateabandon`rii monedei na]ionale [i preg`tiriiintr`rii într-o uniune monetar`. În al doilea rând,este nevoie de o îndrumare clar` asupraparcursului tranzi]iei din partea partenerilor deuniune pentru a nu avea surpriza unor costurineprev`zute sau a unor externalit`]i negativec`rora o ]ar` candidat`, l`sat` singur`, nu le poateface fa]` pe termen scurt. }ara în tranzi]iemonetar` este confruntat` cu preg`tirea solu]iilorpentru unele dificult`]i de tipul cercului vicios4.

La nivel mondial, ]`rile în curs de dezvoltarear trebui încurajate prin acordurile multilateralepentru a-[i construi infrastructura financiar`necesar` integr`rii la scar` interna]ional` –respectiv, regional` – [i dezvoltarea re]eleifinanciare globale [i în interesul ]`rilor mici.Sprijinul institu]ional mondial, în func]ie deconfigura]ia consolid`rii monetare mondiale, arputea veni din partea b`ncilor centrale din ]`rile cu monedele dominante – din SUA, zonaeuro [i Japonia – de la institu]iile financiareinterna]ionale – ca FMI, Banca Mondial`, b`nciregionale etc. – de la G-7 (Grupul celor 7), de laComitetul Interna]ional Monetar [i Financiar –coordonat de FMI – sau de la Fondul deStabilitate Financiar` - coordonat de BIS (BancaReglementelor Interna]ionale).

Trebuie convenite multe proceduri tehnice,printre care cooperarea în crearea sistemului desupervizare, modul de includere în sistemele depl`]i [i de decont`ri [i de calificare pentrusprijinirea cu lichidit`]i, modul de împ`r]ire adrepturilor senioriale dup` adoptarea monedei

unice la nivel regional, respectiv, la nivel mondial[i altele. Riscurile create de bi-monetarism [i desubstituirea monetar` – dolarizarea oficial`(Panama, de exemplu) sau neoficial` [i consiliulmonetar (Argentina, de exemplu) – pentru o ]ar`în curs de dezvoltare [i modul cum astfel deriscuri pot fi evitate prin uniuni cu moned` unic`sau multi-monetare ar trebui, de asemenea, s`fac` parte din Evalu`rile de Stabilitate a SistemuluiFinanciar pe care le întreprinde FMI împreun` cu]`rile membre începând din 1999.

Dac` nu se va acorda un sprijin oficialcompetent, în folosul reciproc al tuturor ]`rilormari [i mici [i nu se va avansa pe calea cre`riicadrului institu]ional [i regulator interna]ional,pentru a u[ura tranzi]ia c`tre mai pu]ine monedeîn lume, pie]ele vor g`si, singure, o cale s` o fac`[i pe plan mondial – cum au g`sit [i în România [iîn alte ]`ri s`race înainte de a g`si c`i de sporire acre[terii economice – dar mult mai lent, cucosturi mult mai mari, mai ales pentru ]`rile mici[i cu pericolul unor crize de-stabilizatoare la nivelglobal.

6.1. Diversitate strategic` [i uniicandida]i mai gr`bi]i decåt al]ii

În ultimii ani, ]`rile cu acces la UE au practicatun spectru diversificat de strategii monetare [i decurs valutar. În vreme ce statele baltice [i Bulgariaau un curs cu leg`tur` fix` sau au introdusconsiliul monetar, iar România î[i p`streaz`cursul cu flotare controlat`, celelalte ]`ri central[i est europene au trecut la cursuri mai flexibilepentru concentrarea mai bun` a eforturilor sprediminuarea infla]iei interne, în parte, prin strategiide apreciere a monedei na]ionale.

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4 Vezi [i Frâncu M. Avantajele integr`rii financiare mondiale [i problematica adapt`rii României la eforturilezonei euro de încadrare a cursului valutar în indicatorii economici fundamentali, Institutul de Economie Mondial`,Bucure[ti, 2002.


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În ciuda acestei diversit`]i, toate ]`rile cuacces la UE s-au apropiat de moneda euro. Ea adevenit principala moned` de fixare a leg`turiisau a flot`rii controlate [i reprezint` cea maifolosit` valut` în sistemele de pl`]i [i tranzac]iiexterne ale ]`rilor candidate cu moned` maiflexibil`. Lituania [i-a reluat leg`tura fix` amonedei na]ionale, trecând de la dolar la euro, pe2 februarie 2002.

De asemenea, atât Ungaria cât [i Cipru auoptat pentru un curs-umbr` al mecanismuluiERM II - Exchange Rate Mechanism II (al doileamecanism de curs valutar) - cu o band` defluctuare de ± 15% [i pentru ancorareaa[tept`rilor de curs valutar la calitatea de membrual ERM II, înc` din faza de pre-accedere. Calitateade membru al ERM II este într-adev`r cerut` deTratatul UE, pentru adoptarea monedei euro, darnu în faza de pre-accedere la UE, ci dup` aceea.

6.2. F`r` prescrip]ii uniceÎn privin]a strategiei monetare [i de curs

valutar, Eurosistemul nu prescrie vreo strategieunic` pentru ]`rile candidate, de[i arat` c` ointensificare a orient`rii c`tre moneda euro s-arînscrie pe linia viitoarei integr`ri economice [imonetare. Totu[i adoptarea unilateral` a monedeieuro ca moned` oficial`, adic` oficializareasubstitu]iei monetare sau „euroizarea” esteincompatibil` cu ra]iunea [i cadrul multilateralpromovat de EMU - Economic and MonetaryUnion (Uniunea Economic` [i Monetar`).

Urm`rind accesul în UE, intrarea în ERM II nutrebuie v`zut` ca o „camer` de a[teptare” pentruadoptarea monedei euro, ci ca un cadru depolitic` monetar` în care economia ]`rilorcandidate s` poat` realiza progrese semnificativeîn convergen]a real` [i nominal` cu ]`rile UE [i s`se preg`teasc` pentru exigen]ele uniunii

monetare. Tot în aceea[i idee, consiliile monetarebazate pe euro trebuie judecate în func]ie decazul fiec`rei ]`ri în parte.

6.3. Liberalizarea mi[c`rilor de capitalCa parte a aquis-ului comunitar, toate ]`rile cu

acces la UE, s-au angajat s` fac` deplin`liberalizarea mi[c`rilor de capital pân` la dataaccederii în UE dac` nu au convenit, la negocieri,o perioad` de tranzi]ie c`tre acest stadiu.

Trebuie [tiut, îns`, c` o perioad` de tranzi]ieîntârzie [i limiteaz` avansarea ]`rii în mai toatedirec]iile integr`rii financiare în uniuneaeconomic` [i monetar` [i chiar în UE. Pân` acum,doar câteva ]`ri au cerut un regim de tranzi]ie [iacesta legat de domenii cu o importan]` foartemic` pentru politica monetar` - de exemplu,domeniul achizi]iilor de propriet`]i funciare.

6.4. Cele trei stadii de intrare \nuniunea monetar` european`

Introducerea monedei euro sub form` denumerar, la 1 ianuarie 2002, a dat un nou impulsintegr`rii europene. Oamenii s-au convins [i maimult de avantajele folosirii unor valori comune. S-a intensificat, astfel, un curent de integrareeuropean` de jos în sus, de la cet`]eni c`treguvernan]i. Dac` sunt bine informa]i asupraprogramelor [i stadiilor viitoare pe care trebuie s`le parcurg`, eforturile oamenilor au o mai mareeficacitate, ideile lor au o mai mare aderen]` laobiectivele prev`zute.

Euro a devenit o bancnot` utilizat` dincolo degrani]ele zonei euro, mai ales în Europa Central`[i de Est [i chiar mai departe. Acesta este doar unpas spre o uniune mult mai larg`, spre o cre[terea influen]ei mondiale a Europei.

Primirea de noi membri în UniuneaEuropean` (UE) este analizat` de institu]iile

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acesteia caz cu caz. Progresul procesului depreg`tire cerut de exigen]ele organismelor UE nueste acela[i în toate cazurile, însemnând c`programarea [i traseul accederii noilor membrisunt diferite de la ]ar` la ]ar`. Indiferent de intrarealor în UE, viitorii membri vor deveni [i membri aiEMU - Economic and Monetary Union (UniuneaEconomic` [i Monetar`). Ob]inerea acestei calit`]iduble nu se face simultan. România ar urma sìntre în UE în 2007 [i în EMU în 2009 sau 2010.

Acum, în EMU sunt 12 ]`ri. Câte vor fi înviitorul apropiat? Succesul monedei euro vaatrage, nu dup` mult timp, intrarea celor trei ]`rimembre UE r`mase în afara zonei euro. Sondajeledin toamna anului 2002 arat` c` popula]iaDanemarcei [i Suediei a devenit favorabilàdopt`rii monedei euro. Regatul Unit va urmadup` ele pentru c` [i acolo procentul popula]ieiîn favoarea EMU este în cre[tere. De asemenea,procesul de l`rgire al UE implic`, în urm`toarele18 luni, pân` la doi ani, intrarea a 10 noi membri:Republica Ceh`, Estonia, Ungaria, Letonia,Lituania, Polonia, Slovenia, Slovacia, Cipru [iMalta. R`mân pentru mai târziu trei ]`ri, Bulgaria[i România care au primit statutul de acces [iTurcia a c`rei cerere se afl` înc` în discu]ie. De ladata intr`rii în UE, noii membri se vor angaja înaplicarea numai de politici economice s`n`toasecoordonate de organismele UE [i întocmite dup`regulile [i standardele interna]ionale convenite [ichiar dup` formulare comune, evitând deficitepublice excesive [i cu asigurarea uneiindependen]e depline a b`ncilor lor centrale ac`ror func]ie de supervizare [i control va spori.

6.5. O succesiune de condi]iiÎnainte de a intra în EMU, orice ]ar` trebuie s`

intre în UE. Dup` îndeplinirea acestei condi]iiesen]iale, noii membri trebuie s` realizezecriteriile cerute pentru EMU trecând prin treistadii succesive.

1. Stadiul întâi stipuleaz` c`, potrivitcriteriilor de la Copenhaga, ]ara solicitant` trebuies` dovedeasc` încheierea tranzi]iei la economiade pia]` [i abilitatea economiei ei de a face fa]`concuren]ei de pe pia]a unic` european`.

2. Stadiul al doilea stipuleaz` c` ]ara trebuies` fi îndeplinit condi]iile de sporire a coordon`riieconomice [i monetare necesare intr`rii în cel deal treilea stadiu al EMU.

3. În stadiul al treilea, ]ara trebuie s`îndeplineasc` criteriile de convergen]` din Tratatulde la Maastricht care îi d` dreptul s` intre în EMU[i s` adopte moneda comun`, euro, ca moneda eiproprie. În sintez`, aceste criterii îi cer s` aib` orat` sc`zut` de infla]ie (2%), rate stabile dedobând` pe termen lung, s`-[i controleze deficitulbugetar [i datoria public` [i s` aib` un curs stabilde schimb fa]` de euro. Mai trebuie s` garantezeindependen]a b`ncii centrale na]ionale (bcn) [i, înparalel, s` impun` restric]ii asupra creditelor datede bcn autorit`]ilor publice, în deosebi în privin]ascont`rii titlurilor publice de debit.

6.6. Sub presiunea timpuluiAceste trei stadii sunt o reluare a traseului

parcurs de toate statele membre ale zonei euro [isunt cuprinse în Raportul Delors din aprilie 1989.Raportul prevedea trei stadii de înfiin]are a EMU,începând cu consolidarea pie]ei unice - stadiulîntâi, 1990-1993 - continuând cu sporirea treptatà coordon`rii economice [i monetare - stadiul aldoilea, 1994-1998 - [i culminând cu instituireaB`ncii Centrale Europene [i punerea în circula]ie

a monedei euro sub form` de numerar (bancnote[i monede metalice) - stadiul al treilea, 1999-2002.Toate stadiile s-au îndeplinit cu succes [i la timp.

România trebuie s` str`bat` într-un timpfoarte scurt, de 2-4 ani, aceste trei stadii detransform`ri calitative [i cantitative parcurse în 10ani de primele 11 ]`ri cu economie de pia]`deplin func]ional`, membre ale UE, care au intratîn zona euro. România nu trebuie s` se team` deperioada scurt` sau de nivelul calitativ [i cantitativla care va ajunge dup` aceste transform`risistemice, dar trebuie s` le preg`teasc` foarteserios [i cu mult mai mult` îndr`zneal` decât pân`acum. Este insatisf`c`tor, de exemplu, cât de multtimp ne ia reducerea infla]iei, cel pu]in la nivelulcelorlal]i candida]i. Pentru intrarea în uniuneaeconomic` [i monetar`, unul dintre criteriile deconvergen]` cere o perioad` obligatorie desta]ionare prealabil` de 2 ani în cel de al doileamecanism valutar (ERM II). Men]inerea cursuluileului într-o band` de fluctuare de ± 2% cumtrebuie s` fac` acum Danemarca, de exemplu, nueste o treab` u[oar` nici pentru marca danez`, cuatåt mai pu]in pentru leul românesc. Unele ]`ricandidate, precum Ungaria sau Cipru,programate pentru UE în 2004, caut` s` seobi[nuiasc` de pe acum cu rigorile stabilit`]iicursului monedei na]ionale într-o band` de ±15%fa]` de euro, în condi]iile în care infla]ia loractual` nu dep`[e[te 6% pe an. Nimeni nu le-aimpus aceast` condi]ie înc` din faza de pre-aderare. Motiva]ia unei astfel de încerc`ri ar puteafi, în parte, testarea gradului de armonizare alciclului lor economic cu ciclul zonei euro.

Dac` ciclul economic nu este armonizat cu cel al zonei euro, ]`rile lipsite de o politic` monetar` proprie [i cu o politic`macroeconomic` supus` rigorilor comunitare voravea o capacitate foarte limitat` de ie[ire dintr-o

eventual` criz`. În acela[i context, nici accelerarearelativ` a cre[terii economice, pentru recuperareadecalajului de venit fa]` de ]`rile membre UE numai poate fi stimulat`. România a avut destul timppentru a-[i accelera cre[terea relativ`, prin politicimonetare, fiscale, de venituri etc. speciale, la nivelmicro [i macroeconomic, dar nu l-a folosit cumtrebuie. Acum s-a apropiat tot mai mult denormele [i standardele de întocmire a politiciloreconomice ale UE [i trebuie s` le respecteîntocmai. Tot atât de complexe sunt [i sarcinileRomâniei legate de celelalte componente aleparcurgerii celor trei stadii.

În preg`tirea acestor trei stadii, România nutrebuie s` uite c` ele nu constituie sfâr[itul, nicim`car al integr`rii economice [i monetare.Potrivit Tratatului de la Maastricht, înfiin]area EMU(împreun` cu pia]a unic` [i politicile comune) nueste un obiectiv în sine, ci un instrument pentruobiectivele fundamentale, pe mai departe, aleComunit`]ii Europene care includ „o dezvoltaresustenabil`, echilibrat` [i armonioas` aactivit`]ii economice, un înalt nivel deocupare a for]ei de munc`, … o cre[tereeconomic` sustenabil` [i ne-infla]ionist`, unînalt grad al competitivit`]ii [i al convergen]eiperforman]elor economice” (articolul 2 alTratatului).


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IntroductionIn the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11th

September 2002, the debate over the role of theEuropean Union (EU) on the international scenebecame more and more relevant. However, itseems that these events did not influence toomuch on the pragmatic side of the CommonForeign and Security Policy (CFSP) / EuropeanSecurity and Defense Policy (ESDP). In thiscontext, it is worth asking about the role of thecandidate countries within these processes. Theemphasis within this paper will be on the stancesadopted by Romania and the actions undertakenby our country with a view to support thesuccessful implementation of this new and boldpolicy of the Union, i.e. ESDP, taking stock of theexperience in the field of CFSP.

1. Romania and CFSPThe accession negotiations with Romania

were officially launched on 15 February 2000.Among the five chapters opened, there were alsochapter 26 (external relations) and chapter 27(CFSP). The negotiations on both chapters were

provisionally closed during the AccessionConference Romania – EU on 14 June 2000.

In its position paper, Romania declared to beready to accept the acquis under chapter 26 andto implement it by 2007. Romania’s statement wasthat at the date of accession it would ensure thatall its agreements and treaties (in particular trade,economic and technical cooperation andinvestment accords) comply with the obligationsof membership. The EU welcomed Romania’sstatement to encourage the development ofeconomic relations between the EU and theRepublic of Moldova, in the framework of theCommon Commercial Policy, after Romania’saccession. The conclusion was that this chapterdid not require further negotiations.

In the same context, Romania declared toaccept the existing acquis in the CFSP area anddid not require any transitional period orderogation. The necessary structures for itsimplementation are in place, while Romania’sforeign and security policy is based on the sameprinciple and has the same orientation as thepolicy pursued by the EU. Romania will be readyto apply the existing acquis at the moment of

ROMANIA AND THE EU COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Daniel C`lin*


* Expert in European integration and regional cooperation, Ministry of National Defense of Romania

vol. 3, no. 1, 2003

ABSTRACT. Within this article, the author tries to sum up the most salient steps undertaken byRomania on the way to the EU, with respect to an area of particular importance for the Union, i.e.CFSP. After a presentation on its actions in CFSP area, one reviews in short the stances adopted byRomania towards the new child of EU policies, i.e. ESDP, as well as towards the Romanianinvolvement / participation in military crisis management. In the end, the European security policyand the enlargement of both the EU and NATO are assessed in the light of the coming IGC andagainst the background of the 9/11 events.


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accession. Due to the peculiarities of the CFSPacquis, the screening process earmarked fourdifferent domestic aspects to be tackled in orderto fully comply with EU standards: the system ofrestrictive measures towards the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia (FRY) during the Milosevic regime;Afghanistan; the embargo on arms and militaryequipment against Ethiopia and Eritrea; and thevisa restriction regime for persons involved in themilitary junta in Burma/Myanmar. Romaniaaligned itself with all the demarches, commonpositions and joint actions in the abovementioned four areas for which it was invited todo so. Bucharest also declared to be ready toexamine the further development of the acquisand to inform on a regular basis the AccessionConference and the Association Council on the progress made in its adoption andimplementation.

In 2002, Romania ratified the Rome Statuteestablishing the International Criminal Court(ICC). However, the European Commissionmentioned within the 2002 Regular Report thatthe decision to sign a bilateral agreement with theUSA on the non-surrender of each others’nationals to the ICC did not comply with theguiding principles laid down by the Council on 30September 2002.

Relations with neighbouring countries are innormal parameters. The relations with FRY havetaken a normal path now. As for those withHungary, the bilateral difficulties created by theStatus Law (promoted last year by the HungarianGovernment in order to offer a special status toHungarian minorities in such neighbouringcountries as Romania and Slovakia) wereovercome by the signature of a memorandumbetween the two respective prime ministers. Inaddition, there are ongoing negotiations with

Ukraine on the “Treaty on the State borderregime” and the “Agreement on delimitation themaritime zones between Romania and Ukraine”as well as with Bulgaria on a similar Agreement. Inspite of the Romanian proposals, there has beenno response so far from the Ukrainian side. Therewere no new developments in the negotiationswith Bulgaria in 2001 either.

In the future, Romania will continue todevelop an active policy of good-neighbourliness– making use inter alia of the problem-solvingpotential of bi - or trilateral cooperationframeworks, with the goal of delivering stability tothe region. Last year the Romanian Chairmanshipof OSCE, together with the main internationalactors in Skopje (especially the EU and NATO),was deeply involved in the management of thecrisis in Macedonia and the conclusion of a soundsettlement along the principles laid down in theOhrid Agreements.

At the EU summits in Laeken (December2001) and Göteborg (June 2002), as well as in the 2002 Regular Report of the EuropeanCommission (October 2002), Romania was notmentioned among the „first wave” countriesexpected to be able to take part in the EuropeanParliament elections in 2004 as EU members.However, these decisions were in line with therealistic objective set up by the RomanianGovernment, i.e. to open negotiations on allchapters in 2002 and to conclude them by theend of 2003 – beginning of 2004, with the aim tobe in a position to join the Union by 2007.

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2. Romania and ESDPAlthough Romania has had the highest level

of popular support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration among the candidates (80%for the EU and 85 % for NATO, according to thelatest opinion polls), ESDP did not draw muchpublic attention when it was launched. This couldbe explained through a lack of information andthrough the fact that NATO enlargement was (andstill is) much more fashionable. However, at thepolitical level, ESDP was dealt with as animportant development in the process of the EUasserting its identity on the international scene.

The European and Euro-Atlantic integrationprocesses are essential national objectives ofRomanian foreign policy. Consequently,Bucharest considers the political and militaryintegration into the EU and NATO ascomplementary processes, contributing to themodernisation of Romanian society. Yet theopposition parties (especially the extreme rightparty, “Greater Romania”) consider this dual-track approach as counterproductive and againstthe national interest.

Romania has welcomed the decisionsadopted by the European Councils in Cologneand Helsinki. It has expressed its willingness andstrong interest in actively participating in thearrangements for cooperation with thirdcountries and becoming a fully-fledgedparticipant in ESDP once it joins the EU. At thesame time, Romania has been againstunnecessary duplications with NATO, decouplingof Euro-Atlantic security and structures, anddiscrimination towards European allies involvedin the development of ESDP. In Romania’s view,much as the EU and NATO should act ascomplementary organisations in the field of crisismanagement, they should remain different in

nature, at least in the medium term. NATOremains the cornerstone of European securityand the fundament of collective defense in theEuro-Atlantic area. The development andimplementation of ESDP should build on theprinciples approved at the North-Atlantic Councilin Berlin (1996) and Washington (1999). Theprocess of development and implementation ofESDP should aim at strengthening the EuropeanSecurity and Defense Identity (ESDI) withinNATO and preserving the transatlantic link as apre-requisite for effective security architecture.The development of cooperation between the EUand NATO has to be fully consistent with theprinciple of autonomous decision-makingcapacity. The creation of the European RapidReaction Force (ERRF) has to be put in place inaccordance with the concept of „separable, butnot separate” forces.

At the operational level, ESDP should draw onthe experience acquired within the Partnership forPeace (PfP) and the development of an evaluationmechanism should build on the achievements ofits Planning and Review Process (PARP).

Initially, Romania insisted on the transfer ofthe WEU acquis to the EU’s ESDP. It soon becameapparent, however, that ESDP was designedespecially for the EU member states and that thethird countries should be happy with beingassociated to this process. Yet the Romanianperception of the Feira and Nice deliberations wasthat the EU paid more attention to the 15 + 6format than to the 15 + 15 one. That is whyRomania will promote a non-discriminatoryapproach towards all the 15 countries virtuallyassociated to ESDP, starting with Union’s militaryexercises’ policy.

3. Romania and military crisismanagement

At the Military Capabilities CommitmentConference in Brussels (November 2000),Romania made its offer of additional forces for theERRF. That offer was in line with the forces madeavailable for WEU and consisted of land andmaritime forces (about 1000 military personneland four vessels). During the CapabilitiesImprovement Conference in Brussels (November2001), Romania has made a significantly increasednew offer in order to enhance its contribution tothe achievement of the Helsinki Headline Goal-plus. The new offer included also forces withsome experience in Peace Support Operations(PSO). All these forces are ready to meet theinteroperability requirements for the execution ofEU-led missions. The Supreme Council ofNational Defense decided that these forces be thesame as those made available for NATO-led PSO.This approach was based on the financial andlogistical capabilities requested for training andsustaining such forces in a theatre of operations,and on the criteria set by the EU bodies. The offerencompasses:

• Land forces: 5 infantry battalions and 1infantry company, 1 paratroopers unit, 1mountain troops unit, 1 military police unit, 1engineer unit, 1 clearing unit, 1 reconnaissanceunit, 1 transport unit;

• Maritime forces: 6 maritime and rivervessels (out of which 2 rescue tugs, 1 minesweeper and a frigate);

• Air forces: 4 MIG-21 Lancer combataircrafts and 1 C-130 B carrier.

The Romanian offer amounts to approx. 3,700military personnel, probably the most important

one from all the candidate countries (bar Turkey)All these forces meet the EU requirements (readyto be deployed in full within 30 days, sustainablefor 1 year and available from 2001). Moreover, atthe CIC, Romania announced its readiness tocontribute with 75 police officers to the EuropeanPolice Headline Goal.

Meanwhile, the Romanian MoD has planned amore compact, more performing, and moreefficient and flexible structure of forces,compatible with NATO standards, to beoperational by the end of 2003. It will include112,000 military personnel and 28,000 civilians.However, in the perspective of the coming PragueSummit1, it is very likely for these figures tochange in a radical way. In the planning blueprint,Romania’s basic security and defense interestswere considered, joining NATO being a wish, notan end in itself. As a Membership Action Plan(MAP) country, the process of reforming andrestructuring the Romanian armed forces benefitsfrom politically agreed financial support, so thatthe defense budget will be maintained at a level of at least 2 % of GDP. As compared to 1.9 % in2001, it will be around 2.4 % in 2002, with asimultaneous growth of GDP and defenseexpenditure. The goal is to reach NATO standardsconcerning the budgetary allocation: 40%personnel expenses, 35-40% equipmentacquisition, 20-25% operation and maintenance.

Since 1991 Bucharest has been activelyinvolved in a large number of PSO, thus gaining asignificant experience in the field: 9 UNoperations, 3 NATO-led peace support operationsand 4 missions under the OSCE umbrella. Theyinclude Angola (UNAVEM III and MONUA);Albania (ALBA); Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR, SFOR


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1 This article was written before the Prague summit.

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I and II); Kosovo (KFOR); Afghanistan (ISAF);Iraq–Kuwait (UNIKOM); Congo (MONUC);Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE); and OSCE missions inGeorgia, FYROM and Kosovo. More than 9,000Romanian military personnel have already beeninvolved. Presently, Romania’s main efforts aredirected to its participation in SFOR (around 120military personnel), KFOR (around 220 militarypersonnel), ISAF (51 military personnel and a C-130 B carrier) and Enduring Freedom (411military personnel). Recently (October 2002), theRomanian President approved the country ’sparticipation in the EU-led Police Mission (EUPM)in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to begin in 2003.

Currently, Romania is also taking part in thefollowing regional politico-military cooperationinitiatives: Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE)/South-Eastern EuropeBrigade (SEEBRIG); Black Sea Naval Co-operationTask Group (BL ACKSEAFOR); Romanian-Hungarian Joint Peacekeeping Battalion;Multinational Engineer Battalion betweenHungary, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine (TisaBattalion); and Multinational Stand-by ForcesHigh Readiness Brigade for UN Operations(SHIRBRIG). Furthermore, negotiations aretaking place for the establishing of the CentralEuropean Nations Cooperation in Peace Support(CENCOOP). Romania approaches the regionalcooperation as a prerequisite for the futureEuropean and Euro-Atlantic integration.

4. Romania and defenseprocurement

Romania considers that Europeancooperation in the field of defense industry isplaying an essential role in improving the EUmilitary capabilities. Bucharest is also keen onparticipating in Western European ArmamentsGroup (WEAG): negotiations are on in order toconcluding a memorandum of understandingbetween Romania and WEAG.

Romania’s current and projected inventory ofCFE-accountable equipment is below theestablished ceilings. Actually, during theCommunist regime Romania had an importantand well-developed defense industry sector.Romanian arms exports were directed to variousconflict areas in the world. After 1989, thetraditional arms export markets were lost onceand for all and the domestic demand, too, shrankbecause of the lack of resources. As aconsequence, the defense industry hasundertaken a major process of restructuring. Atthe beginning of the 1990s there wereapproximately 130,000 employees in the sector:presently they amount to only 60,000 (accordingto some sources, the real figure is 45,000). Therestructuring process was limited to downsizingpersonnel and various compensatory measures.Since 2001, the Ministry of Industry andResources along with the MoD have managed theprocess/sector. According to the official sources,in 2002 further 26,500 employees may have to belaid off, while recovery programmes and otherprotection measures are envisaged. Thegovernment committed itself not to close any ofthe existing defense factories but either toconvert them to civilian production ortransformed them into modern militaryequipment producers.

In the past, several scandals exploded indefense procurement policy. Probably, the mostfamous one is related to the privatisation of IARBrasov, once pride of the Romanian defenseindustry. According to the initial contract, theacquisition by Romania of 96 attack helicopters(close to the figure allowed by CFE Treaty and at acost far exceeding the defense budget) was acondition set by Bell Helicopters for taking overthe firm. One of the arguments used by theformer government to support the takeover wasbased on the fact that it would have enhancedRomania’s chances of NATO membership. In theend, after a long and controversial public debate,the government had to give up on its position.Meanwhile, there have been negotiations with theEuropean group Eurocopter, but nothingconcrete has happened so far.

According to the declared priorities and tothe financial resources allocated for the defensesector, the restructuring process of the armedforces was to be undertaken in two stages. In thefirst stage (2000-2003), the process includesresizing the armed forces and establishing thenew force structure; the professionalisation of the personnel; the modernisation andstandardisation of training practices. During thisstage, only acquisition programmes whosefunding is ensured will be implemented, all the others will be rescheduled. Still, while the new structures are put in place, the partial modernisation of certain operationalcomponents will be carried on. In the secondstage (2004-2007), the achievement of theplanned operational capability will continue andmajor procurement programmes aimed at themodernisation of the Romania forces withsupport equipment and protection of the combatequipment typical of the 21st century battlefield

will be concluded. In other words, no majorprocurement programme will begin before 2004.

5. Romania and Europeansecurity policy

Romania’s view of the role of an enlarged EUis to have a Union with a more coherent anddefined vision towards the main internationalactors, i.e. the US, Russia, and China. In the medium term, CFSP should function on an intergovernmental basis, especially as a consequence of the development andimplementation of ESDP. The EuropeanCommission, however, should be ever moreinvolved in this field. The EU is a regional power,but in many areas it acts as a global one. InBucharest’s eyes, the place of Europe in theinternational system could be defined as follows:the most faithful allied of the US, Russia’s anchorwithin the community of democratic and freesocieties, and a powerful global actor in the fieldof trade and finance (via the euro). In the longerterm, the emergence of ESDP could constitutethe necessary incentive in order to transform theEU in a global actor and to fully assert its identityon the international scene. The Union shouldstick to its traditional way in promoting its values,i.e. through preventive actions. The EU seems tobenefit from the advantage that there is nodominant country inside it. On the contrary, theMember States, especially the small and mediumones, should focus on the areas of foreign policywhere they have experience and interests. Withenlargement, these CFSP features are set tobecome stronger.

Geographically, for Romania, the priorities ofCFSP should be the Balkans, the CIS and Russia,and probably the Caucasus. Romania deems


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Daniel C`lin

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necessary to pay more attention, during the nextIntergovernmental Conference (IGC), to thedefinition of the geographical limits of the EU.This would contribute to the definition of astrategic approach to its eastern neighbours, i.e.the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

In the foreseeable future, the constructiveabstention clause represents for the EU perhapsthe only possible way to function on a normalbasis in an intergovernmental area such asCFSP/ESDP. As for the application of enhancedcooperation to CFSP/ESDP, Romania supportedthe idea from the beginning and suggested to usethe ESDP concept as an avant-garde ofenlargement (there were proposals to extend theAssociation Agreement to the defense sector).The QMV procedure, by contrast, should not beused as a means to ignore or marginalize smalland medium-size countries. Finally, given theprogress made and to be made in the CFSP/ESDP,Bucharest will probably support theestablishment of a Council of Ministers ofDefense on the model of the General Affairs andExternal Relations Council.

Romania is in favour of the review of theTreaties and backs the idea of a EuropeanConstitution or a Constitutional Treaty on theUnion. The role of the European Parliamentshould become more important and it shouldalso be given some authority over defenseexpenditure as related to art.17 TEU-typeoperations. A Committee of National Parliaments,on the model of the Economic and SocialCommittee and the Committee of the Regions,could also be set up. There would be two possibleoptions: a minimal one, with the Committeehaving only a consultative role (thus solving alsothe problem of the future of the WEUParliamentary Assembly); and a maximal one,

with it receiving some competencies and a rightof co-decision with the present EuropeanParliament.

The future of the EU-NATO relationshipdepends, in a decisive way, on the finalisation ofthe arrangements allowing the Union access toNATO assets and capabilities. Romania supportsthe efforts of the EU in this domain as well as theprospect of harmonising the two organisations’exercise policy, along the pattern of past WEU-NATO relations. The efforts of the EU in the fieldof ESDP should not lead to the creation of aEuropean Army, at least in the short and mediumterm.

6. Romania and enlargement afterSeptember 11

After the tragic events of September 2001,Romania became aware that security is indivisibleand that ignoring aggression may mean invitingaggression. For the first time since the end of theCold War, the whole world was united against acommon enemy: terrorism. As a consequence,Romania has immediately declared itself a defacto NATO member and acted accordingly. Aconcrete step was to offer NATO forces freeaccess to all land, maritime and air facilitiesidentified in this context. Furthermore, Romaniaannounced its contribution to ISAF and EnduringFreedom.

Although the initial general reaction was oneof shock and solidarity with the US, few weekslater Romania found itself still immersed in itseconomic and social problems. It also becameobvious that the country is not seen as a potentialtarget for similar attacks. Yet Bucharest considersthat the impact of September 11 has been directlyfelt by South-Eastern Europe as a region. First,

because it still is an area with a very high conflictpotential. Second, because terrorists have beenactive within its borders. Third, because a shift inpolitical attention away from here might haveunpredictable consequences, at a time whenunfinished business still requires the involvementof the international community. And fourth,because further disintegration in this regioncould have a disruptive effect on the necessarycoordination efforts of the anti-terroristcampaign. That is why the US decision to stick toits commitments in the Balkans was well receivedin Romania.

Under the new circumstances, somecountries of South-Eastern Europe decided tolaunch a new initiative on „Counterproliferation,Border Security and Counterterrorism”. Romaniaintends to play an active role in it. By assumingthe chairmanship of SEDM CoordinationCommittee (SEDM-CC) and Political-MilitarySteering Committee (PMSC)/MPFSEE in 2001 andof SEEGROUP, as well as the Co-Presidency of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern EuropeWorking Table III in 2002, Bucharest brings its contribution to the coordination processamong the various cooperation initiatives in the region. In this endeavour, it will most certainly take stock of the experience gainedwhile chairing the OSCE in 2001.

Finally, Romania does not see an immediatelinkage between the enlargement of the EU, thatof NATO and the present security situation.Although the NATO-Russia relationship took anew and positive path and put the Baltic Statesaltogether in a better position than before,Romania has important assets and there are verygood chances for it to be invited to join NATO.

Final remarks

According to its own assessment as well as inline with the EU official documents, in the area ofCFSP Romania has been able to take on theobligations of membership since the beginning ofthe negotiating process. Negotiations on chapter26 – CFSP and 27 – External Relations have beenprovisionally closed short after they were open.

Acting as a stability factor and securityprovider in a troubled area, i.e. South-EasternEurope, Romania has demonstrated the good willto stick to its commitments and implementedsuccessfully the provisions of “regionalownership” concept.

The 9/11 events gave Romania theopportunity to prove its appetite for Europeanand Euro-Atlantic integration; the actions taken inline with the EU Plan of Action of September 2001as well as its involvement in ISAF and EnduringFreedom have demonstrated that Romania was acredible and reliable partner.


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76

IntroductionDuring the past two decades there has been a

dramatic increase in the number of women whoare pursuing managerial and professional careers(Davidson and Cooper, 1993). The role of womenin society is radically changing in most countries.Women have recently begun to join the ranks ofmanagers, especially in top-level management, inlarge numbers in different countries (Cramptonand Mishra, 1999).

According to Mary Mahoney, president ofCendant Corp’s Howard Johnson International,there has never been a better time than now forwomen to rise through the ranks (Worcester,1999). Simultaneously, there has been a growingconcern about the increased effectiveness ofmanagers (Margerison, 1983; Kakabadse et al,1987, Analoui, 1990), senior managers (male andfemale) (Kanter, 1977; Nicholson, 1996; Analoui,1997), officials and executives in the public sector

INCREASING WOMEN SENIOR MANAGERS EFFECTIVENESS:EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIA

Dr. Farhad Analoui*


ABSTRACT. In the wider context of increased participation of women to managerial positions,the issue of effectiveness at work has become equally important for female managers. Therefore itis important to identify the factors, which can determine an increase in their managerialeffectiveness. This article looks at the factors conducive to managerial effectiveness inorganizations, as perceived by women senior managers in Romania. The research was carried outthrough questionnaires and semi-structured interviews applied to a sample group of 35 Romanianwomen managers at various levels, in both public and private institutions. The empirical resultswere then analysed with theoretic instruments. The main conclusion of the research was that, forRomanian female managers, work effectiveness is determined primarily by the managerial skillsand knowledge acquired by women. These in turn are connected with the years of accumulatedwork experience, seniority, and education, especially if it is centred on managerial education.

* Dr. Farhad Analoui is a Reader in International Human Resource Management, at the Centre for InternationalDevelopment, Bradford University. He currently acts as associate advisor to British Council and DfJD, Director of theProfessional Development Services and chairs the research cluster in management.

vol. 3, no. 1, 2003

Human Resource Management

Starting with the present issue, the Romanian Journal of European Affairs may includearticles that go beyond the scope of European integration topics but are, nevertheless,intrinsically connected to them.

(Willcocks, 1992; Analoui, 1993). A quarter of acentury ago the job market offered few careertracks to women. Things look different today, withover half of college graduates being women. Setthat against the fact that our total skilled andeducated labour force has decreased in the pastdecade (Wilson, 1991; Wellington, 1999). Onemajor aspects of developing the careers ofwomen senior managers is increasing theireffectiveness at work. In this paper some of themajor issues surrounding women seniormanagers in Romanian organisations areexamined. This study was intended to articulateand empirically investigate the relationshipbetween Romanian women senior managers’ age,work experiences, categories of managerial skillsand their effectiveness at work. First, the relevantliterature on women and management is brieflyreviewed. Then, in the second section theconceptual framework of the study, includingresearch methods, sampling and hypotheses, isillustrated. Third, the data from 35 Romanianwomen senior managers are analysed and therelation between variables is statisticallyinvestigated. Finally, relevant conclusions havebeen drawn.

1. Women And ManagementWhile the number of workingwomen has

increased dramatically in recent years, there are anumber of different views that have been assertedto explain why women are not seen in largenumbers in executive positions (HansaredSociety Commission, 1990; Crampton and Mishra,1999). The person-centred view puts the blamefor limited corporate progression of women onfactors that are internal to the female gender. Thismeans that certain traits and behaviours exhibited

by women are not seen as being conducive totheir being promoted (Gregory, 1990). Otherreasons for fewer women in upper managementthat cannot be overlooked are corporatediscrimination, corporate inequities in rewardsand advancement opportunities and theexistence of good “old boys” networks that ignoreand discourage women from seeking topmanagement positions (Crampton and Mishra,1999). Discrimination can occur in the form oforganisational structures, policies, informalnetworks and cultures that are so maledominated that they become barriers for womento rise in the organisation (Jackson and Horsh,1989; Kram, 1988; Collinson et al 1990; Amos-Wilson, 1998;). Another obstacle, typically uniqueto the female gender that hinders a woman’supward mobility in the work force is thecombining of a family and a career and thebehavioural expectations placed on women. Fromthe organisation’s perspective, women managerswith children were less committed than thosewho were childless and women felt that theseattitudes harmed their careers (Stoner andHartman, 1990). Still, many industry watchersview women’s newfound success in top financejobs with a wary eye. There are still too fewfemale voices being heard at the executive level.Therefore it is not surprising to see that womensenior managers, like their male counter-parts,should view their effectiveness at work as adeterminant factor for their overall success andcareer development.

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2. Managerial EffectivenessThe result of new researches (Jean-Marie,

1999) show that high performance organisationsare consistently outperforming their competitorson a number of human resource factors,including the level of teamwork and opennessbetween co-workers, the training anddevelopment opportunities they offer toemployees and the degree of pro-activity in HRplanning. Developing this capability begins withthe realisation that effective human resourcemanagement underpins the competitiveness oforganisations (Analoui, 1998; Jean-Marie 1999;Forbes and Milliken, 1999).

What is effectiveness? Which factors areinvolved in increasing the effectiveness ofmanagers? In response to these questionsdefinitions of managerial effectiveness oftenprovide a starting point. Though expected toclarify, their diversity may point to the presence ofconfusion rather than creating an understanding,as they should. This however, is not unique to thetopic of managerial effectiveness (Analoui, 2002;Langford, 1979).

The dictionary definition refers toeffectiveness in terms of “results andconsequences, bringing about effects in relationto purpose and giving validity to particularactivities” (Brodie and Bennett, 1979, p.14).Reddin (1970) also views effectiveness as beingthe extent to which the manager achieves theoutput requirements of the job, by what he or sheachieves, rather than by what he or she does.Thus, effectiveness from the stance of managerial“output” seems to be a function of threeinterrelated factors: behaviour, task andcircumstances (Analoui, 1998). Moreover, fromthis point of view, the conversion of input tooutput in a given system would prescribe

congruence or “fit” between managerial “input”and “output”. This however, may not necessarilybe true.

There is also another cluster of theorists andwriters on effectiveness who subscribe to thepresence of multiple contingencies, both internaland external to the organisations as influentialfactors that affect the degree of the managers’effectiveness (Child, 1977; Analoui, 1998).

There is also another group of theorists andresearchers whose work could be viewed underthe banner of an “alternative perspective”; theyplace the individual managers, the social actors inthe centre of analysis (Silverman, 1993; Maanen,1979). This view is in contrast with the views ofthose writers who subscribe to the underlyingassumption of positivism and therefore they donot tend to view the organisation andmanagement as “part of an objective and concretereality” (Willcocks, 1992). The social actionapproach is therefore based on the premise ofinterpretative paradigm (Burrel and Morgan,1979; Silverman, 1993), which places emphasis onpluralism and goes as far as suggesting that theform and content of managerial work is shaped bypolitical forces within the organisation (Willmott,1984). In line with the social action theorists,Mintzberg (1973) and Stewart (1982) cautiouslystate that, managers themselves shape the natureand design of their jobs, as a result of the“demands”, “constraints” and “choices” theyexperience while carrying out their jobs.

Drucker (1974; 1988) is a firm believer thateffective skills such as use of time, focus onoutward contribution, building strengths,concentrating on priorities and systematicdecision-making could be taught. There areindeed a host of management writers andtheorists, such as Willmott (1984); Kakabadse et

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al (1987); Jones (1988); Drucker (1988); Peters(1989) and Analoui, (1998), who support the viewthat the acquisition of the right managerial skillswill contribute to the effectiveness of managers.The views of major works in the literatureconcerning managerial skills and effectivenesscould be summarised as:

• Managers are aware of their owneffectiveness

• Managers can learn from their ownexperiences and the experiences of others withwhom they interact.

• Managers can become more effective bythe acquisition of managerial skills, which enablethem to deal with the task in hand, people, andsituational demands and constraints.

• Managers’ perception of the range ofskills which they require to realise their increasedeffectiveness reveals aspects of their job believedto play a significant part in their effectiveness.

• The range of skills which managersperceive as necessary for their increasedeffectiveness includes those which willconsequently enable them to overcome thedemands, constraints, choices and situation atwork (Analoui, 1997).

3. Conceptual Framework For TheStudy And Hypotheses

The researcher’s interest in investigating thelinks between demographic characteristics ofwomen senior managers, their perceptions andattitudes, and organisational effectivenessprovided the basis for the generation ofhypothesis. However, to learn more about theintricacies of the process, the direct and indirectrelationships among the variables are also

compared. More specifically, behavioural decisiontheory is used to suggest that, executives’cognitive orientations are reflected in:

• Their age and work experiences, • Their educational and theory

background, and • Their perceptions of managerial

effectiveness.

Hypotheses are proposed which suggest thatthe women senior managers’ experience,educational background and perceptions, directlyand indirectly influence their effectiveness atwork.

Women Senior Managers’ ExperienceChild (1974) proposed that older senior

managers are more committed to the status quothan are younger senior managers. Age is highlycorrelated with total work experience,organisational tenure and industry tenure. Thiscorrelation makes it extremely difficult todetermine whether the relationship between ageand the effectiveness of senior managers is due tocohort history, organisational experience orindustry-specific experiences which are distinctpatterns of manager attention and behaviour thatemerge over time.

Hypothesis 1. Younger female seniormanagers are more effective than olderfemale senior managers in developing theircareer. More specifically, there is a negativerelation between the age of women seniormanagers and their effectiveness at work.


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Women Senior Managers’ EducationEducation may be considered as an indicator

of one’s knowledge and skill base (Hambrick andMason, 1984). A senior manager who has onetype of formal education can be expected to havedeveloped different problem solving skills andmental models with which to evaluate situationsthan a senior manager with a different type offormal education (Tayler and Steensma, 1998). Itcan be argued therefore, that women seniormanagers with formal education in managementwill have more understanding of managerialeffectiveness. Hitt and Tyler (1991) contendedthat an executive’s educational background isrelated to what information they focus on and useduring their work. Hence it is argued that, there isa relation between the educational background ofwomen managers and their orientation towardeffectiveness at work.

Hypothesis 2. Organisations whose femalesenior managers have undergone formalmanagement training are more involved indeveloping organisational effectiveness thanthose whose female senior managers havenot.

Categories Of Managerial Skills Katz’s taxonomy of managerial skills was

probably the first major classification of the skillsthat were thought to be required by all managers(1974). In his classical article “skills of an effectiveadministrator”, which was first published in theHarvard Business Review in 1974, Katz showedconcern for the sets of skills that managersneeded for their increased effectiveness. Lately,managerial skills have been conceptualised interms of basic observable inter-related categoriesthat are termed; task, people-related and self and

career development sets (Analoui, 1993; 1997). Inthese studies it has been hypothesised that thereis a relation between the nature of managerialskills and the effectiveness of the seniormanagers. Applied to women senior managers, itis suggested that women like men in seniorpositions are more interested in people-relatedskills and self and career development rather thantask-related skills.

Hypothesis 3. Women senior managers inorder to increase their effectiveness at workare expected to place more emphasis onpeople related skills and self and careerdevelopment skills rather than task-relatedskills.

4. MethodsThe research contains an empirical analysis of

the women senior managers’ perceptions andattitudes on effectiveness. The unit of analysis isobject or “case” according to which variables,summaries and commentaries are organised.Commonly used units of analysis are individuals;households; firms; regions; patients and courtcases. In this research the women seniormanagers are defined as units of analysis who areworking for Romanian public and privateorganisations. The data in this study are gatheredusing two specially designed interview (Gilbert,1993) instruments. First a self-administratedquestionnaire was used in a random sample ofwomen in senior positions, then a series of face toface semi-structured interviews were conducted(10 out of 35) to generate data and information ofa qualitative nature which otherwise would havebeen missed or neglected.

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Sample CharacteristicsA survey instrument was used to collect the

data required for the study. The sampling frameconsisted of women senior managers (N=35)from a total of 13 organisations in Romania. Thesampling frame that was established bycombining senior managers with degrees fromtwo types of organisations including private(N=6, 17.1%) and public sector (N=29, 82.9%)which varied in size and industry affiliation.Figure 1 illustrates the combination oforganisations that are involved in this research.These organisations ranged from Telecom, theMinistry of Agriculture and the RestructuringAgency, to the Foundation for InternationalManagement (FIMAN), Railways and the Ministryof Education and Ministry of Finance. Access tosuch a wide range of organisations acted as asafeguard against contamination of the datawhich primarily could have been caused by thestrong influence of “organisational cultures” ifthe study had been carried out in only one or twosites. In this way an overview of the perception ofthe female senior managers, their need and theireffectiveness at work was taken. It also had theadvantages of having a fairly varied and maybecomprehensive selection of constraints,demands and difficulties which women seniormanagers thought were impeding their progressand effectiveness at work. The age range ofrespondents varied with the youngest at 28 andthe oldest at 49 years old. Majority ofrespondents were 36-40 (N=11, 31.4%) years oldand the minority of them were 46-50 (N=5,14.3%) years old.

Senior managers’ work experience, variedfrom less than five years up to twenty-five yearsand over. This was due to the differences in agerather than any other organisational factor. As a

rule, graduates in Romania begin their careeralmost immediately after the completion of theiruniversity study. This suggests that all the womensenior managers involved in the survey securedemployment immediately after completion oftheir graduate education. They changedemployment thereafter every few years. As it hasbeen shown in Figure 2, only six of respondents(N=6, 17.1%) reported that they only hadbetween five and nine years work experiences.Respectively, eight of the senior managers (N=8,22.9%) had ten up to fourteen years of workexperiences. Indeed majority of respondents(N=14, 40%) reported that they had fifteen tonineteen years of work experiences in theorganisations. Finally, seven of the responsesreported that they possess 20–24 years workexperience. The women senior managers, whohave been chosen as the sample in this study,have held managerial positions within theirorganisations (See Table 1).

The sample consisted of female seniormanagers in Romanian organisations with topmanagement position (N=6, 17.1%), middlemanagement position (N=8, 22.9%), lowermanagement position (N=12, 34.3%), experts(N=7, 20%) and finally consultants (N=2, 5.7%).For comparison of positions of female seniormanagers within their organisations and theiryears of experiences see Figure 2. The dataanalysis shows that educated women in Romaniahave a great deal of participation in managerialpositions in their organisations.

All senior managers were educated with atleast a first degree and a few with masters andhigher degrees. On the whole, the majorityseemed to believe that earning a first degree froma university provided the foundation foroperating as a senior manager and clearly had an


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effect on the effectiveness of the managersinvolved. The majority of female senior managersgraduated with a first degree in Economics(N=13, 37.1%), while a minority of them had afirst degree in Maths and Computer Sciences(N=4, 11.4%). Respectively, eleven of therespondents reported that they had universitydegrees in Engineering (N=11, 31.4%), and finallyseven of the women senior managers (N=7, 20%)had university degrees in Management. Moreover,all of the respondents reported that they hadparticipated in some training programmes, suchas part-time or special courses, in management.

5. DiscussionThe empirical data presented in this study

support the contention that Romanian femalesenior managers’ experiences and perceptionsinfluence the way they view and assess managerialeffectiveness. Age, educational background andmanagerial work experiences were all directlyrelated to women senior managers’ assessment ofeffectiveness in the organisations. In contrast withthe previous studies, which were carried out inAsia and Africa (Analoui, 1997), which coveredmainly male senior managers, this study containsonly female senior managers in Romania. Thiswas reported to be due to the availability ofeducation for women during the “old times”.

The concept of “career development”, notsurprisingly, was felt as strongly amongst femalesenior managers as it was amongst their malecounterparts.

Women Senior Managers’ ExperiencesIt was hypothesised that, younger female

senior managers are more effective than olderfemale senior managers in developing their

career. In other words, there is a negative relationbetween the age of the Romanian women seniormanagers and their effectiveness at work. In a twoway Chi-square test with data from 35 womensenior managers (see Table 2), there was not astatistically significant relationship between theage of female senior managers and theireffectiveness at work (Pearson Chi-square c2 =16.862: df = 8: p>0.05). It can be concluded thatthere is no significant association between thevariables, age of respondents and theireffectiveness at work as shown by the p-value(more than 0.05) for chi-square. Therefore, theNull hypothesis is accepted and the alternativehypothesis (Hypothesis No.1) is rejected.

The cross tabulation (contingency) table ofthe two variables displays the nature of therelationship between the age of respondents andtheir effectiveness at work (See Appendix 1).

It could therefore be ascertained that agecannot affect managerial effectiveness. Othervariables such as respondents’ years ofexperience, seniority, education, etc. are involved.The most intriguing issue raised was that of the senior managers’ awareness that theireffectiveness in their work was partly determinedby the motivation to work and partly by theircompetence, knowledge and skills. Also 22.9% ofthe women senior managers had between 10–14and fourteen senior managers (N=14, 40.0%) had15 to 19 years of work experiences. The managersin this category, in terms of seniority, ranged fromtop to low level managers and were not as keen tochange career as the managers in the firstcategory. However, they placed much emphasison work experience and management training asthe main factors toward improving theireffectiveness at work.

As the work experiences of the respondents

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increased there seemed to be present a tendencyamongst the women senior managers towardseeing effectiveness not solely in terms ofimproved performance and attainment of goals.On the contrary, they saw effectiveness as a partof the overall picture of the organisation’scapability to “get things done” and moreimportantly in relation to others, colleagues,peers and the like.

Female Senior Managers’ EducationalBackground

All female senior managers were educatedwith at least a first degree and a few had mastersand higher. Also the majority of respondents said that they had attended some short courses in management as well. To those who are not familiar with Eastern Europe and thecentralised economic background it may come as a surprise to see so many managers with an engineering and/or non-managementeducational background. Indeed, 31.4% ofparticipants reported that they had graduatedegrees, in Engineering. Only 20% ofrespondents confirmed that they had a higherdegree in management studies. Although, 37.1%of the female senior manager participants in the study had graduate degrees increasedeffectiveness was seen as requiring access to “newknowledge”, which is taught in western countries.When the same participants were asked if theywould consider taking an MBA or similaradvanced management programme as a mean ofimproving their performance and effectiveness atwork, their response differed according to theirage and seniority in the organisation.

As discussed earlier, previous studies (Hittand Tyler, 1991) show that an executive’seducational background, such as Management,

Chemistry or Engineering, is related to whatinformation they focus on and use during theirwork. Hence, there is a relation between theeducational background of women seniormanagers and their orientation towardseffectiveness at work. This concept has beenhypothesised in Hypotheses 2. Organisationswhose women senior managers have undergoneformal management training are more involved indeveloping organisational effectiveness thanthose female senior managers have not had sucheducational background. Based on data analysisthe cross-tabulation (contingency) shown in Table2, related variables consisted of respondents’educational background in management andrespondents’ orientation toward managerialeffectiveness in their organisations, illustrates thestrong association between the variables (SeeAppendix 2).

In supporting these theses the result of Chi-square test (see Table 3) from 35 Romanianwomen senior managers displays a significantassociation between the variables, managementeducation and managerial effectiveness, as shownby the p-value (less than 0.05) for Chi-square. Alsothe contingency coefficient (nominal-by-nominal)value for the variables is 0.460 with 0.007significance.

In other words, a two way c2 test with datafrom 35 senior managers, there was a statisticallysignificant relationship between managementeducation and effectiveness at work (Pearson Chi-square c2 = 9.850: df = 2: p<0.05). It can beconcluded that there is significant associationbetween the variables and managementeducational background of respondents and theireffectiveness at work as shown by the p-value(less than 0.05) for chi-square. Therefore, the Nullhypothesis is rejected and the alternative


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hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 2) is accepted. The recent economic changes in Romania

have meant that more opportunities have beenmade available to those who wish to pursue amanagerial and administrative career or interests,but still the opportunities are few and farbetween. Women senior managers were aware ofthe inadequacy of their educational backgroundand that they had the need for more experience,preferably through management training, fortheir increased effectiveness. This againsupported the thesis that female senior managersare indeed aware of factors that can contribute totheir improved performance.

6. Managerial SkillsMoving to the third section of the conceptual

framework of the study which indicates thefemale senior managers’ priorities and concernfor managerial skills. Women senior managerswere asked to suggest between 3 and 5managerial skills, in order of priority to them,which in their view were essential for ensuringincreased effectiveness. A total of 35 differentdescriptions of managerial skills were providedwhich entailed almost all aspects of management.

These skills depending on the priorityassigned to them by the senior participants werethen tabulated and categorised into 3 major skillcategories; task-related, people-related, and selfand analytical skills. Further data analysis (SeeTable 4) showed that from amongst a total of 35abilities, skills and attributes which were reportedto be essential for managerial effectiveness, thetask and self and analytical categorised receivedthe most attention in that order. It has beendiscussed that, senior managers in different levelsof managerial hierarchy need different managerial

skills. However, they place more emphasis onone, two or a combination of managerial skills inorder to increase their effectiveness at work. As ithas been hypothesised that (Hypotheses No. 3),female senior managers in Romania are moreinterested in people and self-development ratherthan task related skills. However, Romanianfemale senior managers in order to “increase theireffectiveness” at work, ought to place moreemphasis on people-related skills rather than self-management and task-related managerial skills.Further data analysis showed that there is nosignificant relationship between priorities ofmanagerial skills and managerial effectiveness atwork.

On the whole, it can be concluded thatfemale senior managers in Romania, placed nearlyequal stress on the importance of being able todeal with both the task and self and analytical(developmental) aspects of the job.

7. ConclusionThe topic of effectiveness at work is difficult,

if not impossible to measure. At a personal leveleffectiveness may be different things to differentpeople in different organisations. This studysuggests that one of the most important factors ofmanagerial effectiveness is the managerial skillsand knowledge of the managers. Langford (1979),Drucker (1989), and Analoui (1997) placeemphasis on the ability to manage. However, it isevident from this study that to gain a betterunderstanding of the subject there is a need toplace the individual manager in the centre of theanalysis. In this way not only the perception of thesenior managers concerning their definition ofmanagerial effectiveness was explored, but alsothe need for becoming effective was identified.

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Based on the study, the conclusion reached isthat effectiveness should be defined in terms of a function of awareness, self and otherorganisationally shared value, preferences,constraints, demands and choices and the abilityto get the necessary jobs done. It is evident thatwomen managers, because of their positionwithin the organisations, gain a greater degree ofawareness of the organisations’ objectives,activities, and relationship within its environment.In short, effectiveness is partly determined by theawareness and realisation of the need, skills andknowledge to satisfy the socially agreed upon and maintained standards for organisationaleffectiveness.

Interestingly, there seems to be no significantassociation between the variable, age ofrespondents and their effectiveness at work. Inother words, age cannot affect managerialeffectiveness. There is however, a correlationbetween the respondent’s age and the years ofaccumulated work experience. Other variablessuch as respondents’ years of experience,seniority and education are also involved.

There was also a statistically significantrelationship between management education andeffectiveness at work. And finally, on the whole, itcan be concluded that female senior managers inRomania, placed nearly equal stress on theimportance of being able to deal with both thetask and self and analytical aspects of the job.


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Respondents And EffectivenessAt Work

low moderate high TotalAge of 46 - 50 Count 1 4 5Respondents % within Age of Respondents 20.0% 80.0% 100.0%

% within respondents and 7.7% 33.3% 14.3%effectiveness at work% of Total 2.9% 11.4% 14.3%

41 - 45 Count 1 2 3 6% within Age of Respondents 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 100.0%% within respondents and 10.0% 15.4% 25.0% 17.1%effectiveness at work% of Total 2.9% 5.7% 8.6% 17.1%



26 - 30 Count 5 1 6% within Age of Respondents 83.3% 16.7% 100.0%% within respondents and 50.0% 7.7% 17.1%effectiveness at work% of Total 14.3% 2.9% 17.1%

Total Count 10 13 12 35% within Age of Respondents 28.6% 37.1% 34.3% 100.0%% within respondents and 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%effectiveness at work% of Total 28.6% 37.1% 34.3% 100.0%

Appendix 1: Cross Tabulation Of Age Of Respondents And Effectiveness At Work

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respondents effectivenessat work

low moderate high TotalManagement training no Count 8 4 2 14background of responses % within management 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% 100.0%

training backgroundof responses% within respondents 80.0% 30.8% 16.7% 40.0%effectiveness at work% of Total 22.9% 11.4% 5.7% 40.0%

Management training yes Count 2 9 10 21background of responses % within management 9.5% 42.9% 47.6% 100.0%

training backgroundof responses% within respondents 20.0% 69.2% 83.3% 60.0%effectiveness at work% of Total 2.9% 11.4% 14.3%

Total Count 10 13 12 35% within management 28.6% 37.1% 34.3% 100.0%training backgroundof responses% within respondents 100% 100% 100% 100%effectiveness at work% of Total 28.6% 37.1% 34.3% 100.0%

Appendix 2: Cross Tabulation Of Management Training And Managerial Effectiveness


91

Figure 1: Organisations of Female Senior Managers (Respondents)

< 5 - 9

Oct - 14

15 - 19

20 - 24<

Figure 2: Respondents’ Years Of Work Experiences Work Experiences

Source: Sumary of data analysis

Source: Data analysis

Dr. Farhad Analoui

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0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Figure 2: Respondents’ Managerial Position Within Their Organisations

TopManagement

MidleManagement

LowerManagement

Expert Consultant


5 or below - 9 10 - 14 years 15 - 19 years 20 - 24 oryears more years

Count % Count % Count % Count %Top Years of workMangement experienece of 1 16.7 3 50.0 1 16.7 1 16.7

respondents’Midle Years of workMangement experienece of 0 0 1 12.5 4 50.0 3 37.5

respondents’Lower Years of workMangement experienece of 2 16.7 1 8.3 6 50.0 3 25.0

respondents’Expert Years of work

experienece of 3 42.9 2 28.6 2 28.6 0 0respondents’

Consultant Years of workexperienece of 0 0 1 50.0 1 50.0 0 0respondents’

Table 1: Ditribution of respondents’ position within their organisations and years of workexperience (cross tabulation)


93

Value DF Significance

PearsonChi-Square 16.862 8 0.032Likelihood Ratio 17.772 8 0.023Linear - by - LinearAssociation 12.272 1 0.000No. of valid Cases 35

Table 2: Chi-Square χ2 Test: Age Of Respondents And Effectiveness At Work

Value DF Significance

PearsonChi-Square 9.850 2 0.007Likelihood Ratio 10.241 2 0.006Linear - by - Linear 8.552 1 0.003AssociationNo. of valid Cases 35

Table 3: Chi-Square χ2 Test: Management Education By Managerial Effectiveness



Dr. Farhad Analoui

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Three categories of managerialskills

task related self and people Groupskills analytical rlated Total

skills skillsrespondents moderate Count 5 6 2 13effectiveness Table % 14.3% 17.1% 5.7% 37.1%at work

high Count 9 2 1 12Table % 25.7% 5.7% 2.9% 34.3%

low Count 5 4 1 10Table % 14.3% 11.4% 2.9% 28.6%

Group Total Count 19 12 4 35Table % 54.3% 34.3% 11.4% 100.0%

Table 4: Cross Tabulation Of Managerial Skills And Effectiveness At Work


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RJEA Vol3 No1 March2003

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