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Even if Aadhaar numbers were proof of identity, which it is not, its use tomake money transfers make financial transfers un-auditable, propagatemoney laundering and financial fraud. There is no justification forintroducing an unverified and un-audited number to allow payments andsettlements

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is empowered by the Payment and Settlement SystemsAct, 2007 to regulate various payment systems in the country. About 59 organisations areauthorised by the RBI under this Act for setting up and operating payment systems inIndia. In its vision document 2012-15 the RBI states its mission is “to ensure payment andsettlement systems in the country are safe, efficient, interoperable, authorised, accessible,inclusive and compliant with international standards”. In compliance with international

Moneylife » Life » UID/Aadhaar » How Aadhaar linkage can destroy banks

How Aadhaar linkage can destroybanks

DR ANUPAM SARAPH | 11/09/2014 01:09 PM |

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standards, therefore, all key systems should be secure (that is, have access controls, beequipped with adequate safeguards to prevent external intrusions, and provide audittrails), reliable, scalable and able to handle volume under stress conditions.

A payment can be effected through electronic funds transfers and includes point of saletransfers, ATM transactions, direct deposits or withdrawal of funds, transfers initiated bytelephone, internet and, card payment.

When you use your banks online banking to transfer money from your account to arecipient you use a system called National Electronic Funds Transfer or NEFT. NEFT isRBI’s own electronic money transfer system. Your money is transferred to the recipient'saccount in the hourly schedules to settle the payables and receivables from each bank thatresult from all the NEFT transactions in the hour. In case, your transfer fails, your moneyis back in your account. If you make larger transfers, say Rs2 lakh and above, then youwill have to use RBI’s Real Time Gross Settlement or RTGS system to make the transfer.In this case the gross amount is moved from your account to the recipient accountdirectly. In case the transaction fails your money is reversed back to you.

You need to be logged into your bank account to initiate an NEFT or RTGS transfer. Onlya valid bank account can receive funds making electronic transfers the bank. The transfersleave a permanent audit trail that inhibits money laundering.

NPCI’s electronic money transfer system

The National Payments Corp of India or NPCI, a section 25 company, also runs its ownpayment system. The Aadhaar-Enabled Payment System or AEPS, as it is called,facilitates the deposit of money to and withdrawal of money from Aadhaar-Enabled BankAccounts (AEBA). AEBA accounts are bank accounts where an Aadhaar number ismapped to the bank account. This is done by a process called as “seeding” an Aadhaarnumber to a bank account with designated banks.

After receiving the Aadhaar number from the customer, the bank uploads such numbers’into a “NPCI mapper” or a repository of Aadhaar numbers used for the purpose of routingtransactions to the destination banks. The NPCI mapper contains Aadhaar number alongwith an Institution Identification Number or IIN, a unique 6-digit number issued by NPCIto the participating bank. If you or anyone else change the bank account associated withyour Aadhaar number only the current banks’ IIN will be associated with the Aadhaarnumber.

Now you are all set to make deposits, withdraw money and even make money transfers

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Prabhakar V Hegde 1 year ago

Has this been brought to the attention of the PMO? It need to be done now. Thisgovernment has an open mind, I aam sure he will do the needfull.

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Financial Inclusion?

Banks can appoint a “Business Correspondent” to provide access to basic banking servicesusing a micro-ATM. These include the ability to take deposits, dispense cash forwithdrawals, process funds transfers, or answer balance inquiries. The BankingCorrespondent is the “last-mile” to replace the village money lender. The BankingCorrespondent only collects money or hands it out from his own account with a parentbank. The Banking Correspondent may issue a receipt for the transaction. There is nopassbook for AEBA. There are only receipts of transactions. The parent bank has nothingto do with payments to or from individual accounts. It only settles payable and receivableto the Banking Correspondent.

The UIDAI explains that “The resident would be allowed the option to either open a newbank account or link an existing bank account to Aadhaar at the time of enrolment. Also,the person can always approach the bank concerned for linking the existing bank accountto Aadhaar”. Such accounts are not subject to the requirements of the Anti-MoneyLaundering Rules. The banks have been pushed to open AEBA accounts repeatedly by theRBI. Through its circular no 17015/14/2012/FI dated 06 February 2014 the UIDAIenabled the process of opening new bank accounts through micro ATMs or linkage ofexisting bank accounts with Aadhaar.

Rupay Cards

The Rupay card, a pre-paid debit card, was launched as the Dhan Aadhaar card inDecember 2011. It has been co-branded with different financial institutions with differingoperational requirements and fees . Some of these cards are branded as pre-paid cashcards and do not require a bank account. Since all Rupay cards would require the ABPS itis no surprise that all banks were pushed to enable biometrics and Aadhaar to enable theRupay. When there was some resistance to burden all account holders with this newinfrastructure pin-based Rupay have been introduced.

From the limited information available on the specifics the Pradhan Mantri Jan DhanYojana launched on 28 August 2014 promises an Aadhaar Enabled Bank Account (AEBA),a Rupay Debit Card and the Accident Insurance cover most banks were offering with theRupay Debit card.

It is therefore surprising to learn that that 2.5 crore accounts have been opened without

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sites to know more about fake Aadhaar cards and how these are 'officially' given:You can go with fake documents or say you have none to your enrolment agencyand just get a card made. Here is a sting that shows how this is done in Delhi(http://www.cobrapost.com/index.php/news-....You may also like to read the following tip of the iceberg:# http://daily.bhaskar.com/news/RAJ-JPR-sh...# http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/City/...# http://uidai.gov.in/parliament-questions... also how money transfers are enablingmoney parking, laundering and tax evasion: moneylife.in/article/how-aa… Whilethe RBI is raising the same concern it is suggesting a solution that will onlyamplify fraud See: bit.ly/1AWKDYL!

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Sudhir Jatar 1 year ago

I shall ask questions, which everyone would understand:# Why does any one at all need to substitute IFSC numbers issued by RBI with IINnumbers issued by NPCI (a private company) & account numbers with UIDnumbers?# The above indicates lack of confidence in RBI; why this lack of confidence?# What is the way ISACA would audit transactions on ABPS and what would theycertify?


Sandeep 1 year ago in reply to Sudhir Jatar

IIN is code for a Bank like SBI and IFSC is a code given to specify branch of Banklike local branch of SBI. Batch files are sent at bank level and not at single branchlevel. Also NPCI is under the wings of RBI only. ISaCA is international auditagency so just google it, there is tons of info about it.


Sudhir Jatar 1 year ago in reply to Sudhir Jatar

I viewed on Times Now that a Khalistani was in possession of TWO Aadhaar cardswith two different bank accounts!!No further comments!


M S Prabhakar 1 year ago in reply to Sudhir Jatar

Ha, ha, ha! I just saw the report http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NXDDOSRMh...

Aadhaar is truly becoming the joke of our nation. I have a solution. If thegovernment can't understand the technicalities of Aadhaar's pitfalls (neither couldthey understand schemes of Saradha, Sahara and Lehman Bros.) and leave it tosome minions to defend, it would be wise of them to consider adding a disclaimer:

"Aadhaar Enabled Payment Systems (AEPS) are subject to biometric risks. Pleaseread your palm (especially, fate line) or consult a palmist before enrolment."


Sandeep 1 year ago in reply to M S Prabhakar

You should appreciate the point that with Aadhaar in place, future of this guy issealed for life and you can track this person's criminal history by CCTNS oncethose two Aadhaar card are verified in the system. That's where UID is differentfrom paper IDs. He also had two passports which cannot be verified anywhere.




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misled completely.

The risks of Aadhar-enbaled Payment System (AEPS)

The AEPS is based on the following premises.

1. An existing account number and IFSC codethat uniquely identifies a branch of any bankare not sufficient to do a legitimatetransaction.2. An account not linked with an Aadhaarnumber lacks the KYC or may be a fakeaccount.3. An account linked with an Aadhaar numberis genuine and cannot be a fake one.4. Auditability of Aadhaar number to Aadhaar number bank transfer is identical to anaccount number to account number transfer.5. The costs of ABPS are less than the costs of NEFT or RTGS.

The RBI should close down RTGS and NEFT if assumption 1 is true. It is completelyunclear why a third party number should be associated with a genuine accountfor identifying the account or the branch.

If assumption 2 holds and accounts not linked with Aadhaar are fake ones, or lack KYC,the RBI should be closed down for having enabled such accounts and money transferswithin and between them in India. It is surprising that the Government of India doesnot trust these accounts when it comes to transferring any benefits when itsIncome Tax department has used them all along to assess income and even makerefund payments.

Let us examine assumption 3. When the Aadhaar number is merely a 12-digitnumber assigned to demographic and biometric data submitted by privateparties; it cannot be a proof of identity, address or even existence. There hasbeen no verification or audit of the Aadhaar database and therefore it is very conceivablethat, as was the case of Satyam, huge number of non-existent persons is assigned anAadhaar number. There is no basis to regard any bank accounts linked to an Aadhaarnumber as belonging to genuine or even existing individuals.

Let us examine assumption 4. It is impossible to change the beneficiary in an accountnumber to account number transfer. It is however possible to re-associate an accountassociated with an Aadhaar number. In fact it is possible to create differentaccounts and is link them to the same Aadhaar number at different times.

If you have the demographic and biometric details of various real persons, as you would, ifyou were an Aadhaar enrolment agency, it would not be impossible to create an accountlinked with their Aadhaar numbers without their knowledge. If you were a financialinstitution enrolling people it would not be impossible to open multiple accounts indifferent branches and link the same Aadhaar number with them at different times.

Why would one do that? Different accounts can “park” money at different timesor even become conduits for laundering money. Considering that the RBIsuspended the requirements of anti-money laundering rules to Aadhaarbased bank accounts and enabled the opening of such accounts in theabsence of a branch or an audit infrastructure makes this very plausible.Such accounts can also become conduits to claim undeserved benefits fromGovernment that would never be traced once released. This is a recipe forembezzling government treasury with no complaints, no audit trail and no

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his biometric indicators?No further comments.(for those who believe Cursory seeing is believing!)


Sudhir Jatar 1 year ago in reply to Bal krishna Gupta

That is precisely the point. I am happy that you have grasped the essence.


sohan modak 1 year ago

I don't think any one is against a national Id card. The problem is that Aadhar isbased on bad software, enrollment methodologies, execution and lack of audit. Assimple as that. Nonauditability = fraud potential. PERIOD.


Bal krishna Gupta 1 year ago in reply to sohan modak

Are Voter cards, Bank accounts, passports audited?If so the CAs will become over busy and over rich!


Sandeep 1 year ago in reply to sohan modak

Constructive criticism is always good for any system/society. So any changes thatyou would like to propose for Aadhaar software, enrollment methodologies,execution and audit that can make it better?


Bal krishna Gupta 1 year ago in reply to Sandeep

Their role is only to criticise a system which will reduce misdirected subsidies byat least 80%.


Sudhir Jatar 1 year ago

Mr. Sandeep, Mr. Ananthram and Bal Krishna Gupta perhaps you need to make adisclosure of your affiliations as you are trolling the website and making baselessstatements in defence of Aadhaar that is not even the subject of the article. Youhave even got personal, which shows that you do not have adequate reasoning toput across.It is strange that you are willing to ignore the ruin of a banking system if theassumptions behind the Aaadhaar Based Payment System are as highlighted bythe author.You are advised to reread the article particularly the 5 specific assumptions injustifying Aadhaar Based Payment Systems reproduced here in case you have anopen mind:

"The risks of Aadhar-enbaled Payment System (AEPS)The AEPS is based on the following premises.1. An existing account number and IFSC code that uniquely identifies a branch ofany bank are not sufficient to do a legitimate transaction.2. An account not linked with an Aadhaar number lacks the KYC or may be a fakeaccount.3. An account linked with an Aadhaar number is genuine and cannot be a fake one.4. Auditability of Aadhaar number to Aadhaar number bank transfer is identical toan account number to account number transfer.5. The costs of ABPS are less than the costs of NEFT or RTGS.

The RBI should close down the time-tested RTGS and NEFT if assumption 1 istrue. It is completely unclear why a third party number should be associated with a


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number to account number transfer. Since the NPCI maintains no log of the previousaccount numbers associated with an Aadhaar number it makes such transfers completelyunauditable.

Let us examine the 5th assumption that transactions on ABPS cost less than otherpayment systems. In making such a claim the NPCI does not do an actual end-to-end costcomparison with any alternatives. The costs of ABPS that NPCI ignores are thecost of the Aadhaar infrastructure and maintenance. It ignores the costs offraud and leakage. It ignores the cost of the infrastructure of micro ATMsand having banks switch to enabling their accounts for Aadhaar. These costswould ultimately be passed on to the customer.

Even if Aadhaar numbers were proof of identity, which it is not, its use tomake financial transfers, is the best way to make financial transfersunauditable, propagate money laundering and financial fraud. There is norational justification for introducing an unverified and unaudited number to allowpayments and settlements.

The way ahead

There is no doubt that the future may hold several disruptive business models forpayments and settlements many of which may be enabled by technology. Whileencouraging innovation, it is the role of the regulator to ensure that these do not bringruin to the nation’s financial system.

In an NYU paper titled ‘The Precautionary Principle: Fragility and Black Swans fromPolicy Actions’, Nassim Taleb argues that taking risks is necessary for the functioning andadvancement of society. However, all risks are not equal. Taking into account thestructure of randomness in a given system can have a dramatic effect on which kinds ofactions are, or are not, justified.

With the help of probability theory, Taleb asserts that when impacts are not localized andnon spreading, interdependence increases propagating impacts resulting in irreversibleand widespread damage and the probability of devastation, ultimately to the point ofcertainty. The interdependence of the NPCI, IBA, RBI, UIDAI and the various governmentdepartments are engineered for what Taleb characterizes as “ruin”.

By enabling ABPS and Aadhaar linkages with bank accounts, the RBI has enabled fraudpropagation across the entire banking industry that will result in widespread andirreversible damage. It is evident that the RBI has failed to protect the nation’s bankingsystem from an increased probability of devastation.

In the interest of financial prudence the RBI governor, the IBA and the various banksmust invoke the precautionary principle and immediately suspend all linkage of Aadhaarto any financial instrument. The RBI governor ought to declare a financialemergency and freeze all Aadhaar linked bank accounts and reverse thesetransactions.

The PMO must revisit the UPA projects that have been allowed to be carriedforward. Given the multiple institutions involved, it would be fitting to set up an inquirycommission that will include voices that have raised caution in the interest of the nationand have a mandate to minimize the damage to the country and suggest the way ahead. Inthe meanwhile, it would only be prudent to suspend all linkages to the Aadhaar number.

The Supreme Court of India has several pending public interest litigations (PILs) onAadhaar linkages and it would prudent to have a special court to issue a stay on allAadhaar linkages till the cases are heard and at the same time hear the PILs expeditiouslygiven the extent of financial ruin that Aadhaar can bring to India.

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transfers within and between them in India. It is surprising that the Governmentof India does not trust these accounts when it comes to transferring any benefitswhen its Income Tax department has used them all along to assess income andeven make refund payments. In fact, these systems are put in place so that there istransparency and to curb corruption in IT Department.

Let us examine assumption 3. When the Aadhaar number is merely a 12-digitnumber assigned to demographic and biometric data submitted by private parties;it cannot be a proof of identity, address or even existence. There has been noverification or audit of the Aadhaar database and therefore it is very conceivablethat, as was the case of Satyam, huge number of non-existent persons is assignedan Aadhaar number. There is no basis to regard any bank accounts linked to anAadhaar number as belonging to genuine or even existing individuals. By properaudit, we mean audit carried out in terms of the guidelines issues by the variousregulatory or other authorities e.g. Association of CAs for financial audits.

Let us examine assumption 4. It is impossible to change the beneficiary in anaccount number to account number transfer. It is however possible to re-associatean account associated with an Aadhaar number. In fact it is possible to createdifferent accounts and link them to the same Aadhaar number at different times.

If you have the demographic and biometric details of various real persons, as youwould, if you were an Aadhaar enrolment agency, it would not be impossible tocreate an account linked with their Aadhaar numbers without their knowledge.This has actually happened and widely reported in cases in Mumbai and Chennai.If you were a financial institution enrolling people it would not be impossible toopen multiple accounts in different branches and link the same Aadhaar numberwith them at different times.

Why would one do that? Different accounts can “park” money at different times oreven become conduits for laundering money. Considering that the RBI hassuspended the requirements of anti-money laundering rules to Aadhaar basedbank accounts and enabled the opening of such accounts in the absence of abranch or an audit infrastructure, makes this very plausible. Such accounts canalso become conduits to claim undeserved benefits from Government that wouldnever be traced once released. This is a recipe for embezzling government treasurywith no complaints, no audit trail and no punishment.

Clearly Aadhaar number to Aadhaar number bank transfer is not identical to anaccount number to account number transfer. Since the NPCI maintains no log ofthe previous account numbers associated with an Aadhaar number it makes suchtransfers completely un-auditable.

Let us examine the 5th assumption that transactions on ABPS cost less than otherpayment systems. In making such a claim the NPCI does not do an actualend-to-end cost comparison with any alternatives. The costs of ABPS that NPCIignores are the cost of the Aadhaar infrastructure and maintenance. It ignores thecosts of fraud and leakage. It ignores the cost of the infrastructure of micro ATMsand having banks switch to enabling their accounts for Aadhaar. These costswould ultimately be passed on to the customer.

Even if Aadhaar numbers were proof of identity, which it is not, its use to makefinancial transfers, is the best way to make financial transfers unauditable,propagate money laundering and financial fraud. There is no rational justificationfor introducing an unverified and unaudited number to allow payments andsettlements.”

It will be useful to hear if you have any arguments to justify these assumptions andthe consequences of the failure of the banking system that follow rather than thehot air you have been emitting and making personal remarks, which expose yourignorance.


international exposure I do understand the basics of need of Uniquenessidentifier(i.e.UID/NPR) for a country as populous as India where fake/ghost/duplicate and middlemen beneficiary are looting the govt. system.

Every development oriented country(USA, Canada, UK, Australia, NZ etc.) youname it have some sort of uniqueness identifier to channelize the governmentbenefits to common citizens.

My simple question to you/author is "A single UID can point to how many peoplein a government database if you combine the demographics"?

Also would you/author please share the source of AEPS premises quoted above orare they just made up by author?


Anand 1 year ago in reply to Sudhir Jatar

Dear Mr Jatar

I think your arguments as are the arguments in this piece is making some basiclogical flaws For Example:.......................2. An account not linked with an Aadhaar number lacks the KYC or may be a fakeaccount.

From this you jump to

If assumption 2 holds and accounts not linked with Aadhaar are fake ones, or lackKYC, the RBI should be closed down for having enabled such accounts and moneytransfers within and between them in India................................

Basically, you are jumping from Some = All, which is logical fallacy. Existence ofBenami Accounts proves that KYC have failed.

Second, Chartered Accountants are not competent to do IT Audit, What you aresuggesting and I have reasons to suspect, Chartered Accountants wants to corner apiece of cake that is not theirs. And I suspect......

Before, I am in no way whatsoever related to Aadhar Scheme but instead I knowquite a few things about IT Audit.

Even if System Audit is required, it can and should be done by IT people.Chartered Accountants cant even do financial audit properly :)


Anand 1 year ago in reply to Anand

Before should read as Before you Ask...a little mix in para as well.

Apologies.

The main points stand though.


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prudent banker lose sleep, we may not have any prudent bankers left anymore. It isevident that our policy makers have neither the time nor inclination to apply themselvesto the implications of their actions nor to seek counsel to protect the nation and its assets.Embroiling the unbanked into this mess is no financial inclusion - it is a debt warrant.

Some important Dates

Date Particulars

Dec-08 Incorporation of National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI)

28-Jan-09 Planning Commission of India Notifies the UIDAI with mandate to create a UID.

Apr-09 Certificate of Commencement of Business issued to National Payments Corporation

of India (NPCI)

14-Dec-09 NPCI takes over ATM switching service to banks in India through National Financial

Switch from Institute of Development and Research in Banking Technology (IDRBT)

Apr-2010 UIDAI whitepaper: From Exclusion to Inclusion with Micropayments

13-Dec-11 The Standing Committee on Finance and urged the government to reconsider and

review the UID scheme and also the proposals contained in the Bill in all its

ramifications.

27-Jan-11 RBI Notification RBI/2010-11/389 DBOD.AML.No. 77 /14.01.001/2010-11 making

anti-money laundering rules applicable for bank accounts opened with Aadhaar.

28-Sep-11 RBI Notification 12/207DBOD.AML RBI/2011. BC. No. 36/14.01.001/2011-12 relaxing

anti-money laundering rules for bank accounts opened with Aadhaar.

Dec-2011 Dhan Aadhaar Yojana launched

17-May-12 RBI Notification RBI/2011-12/566 DBOD. No. BL. BC. 105/22.01.009/2011-12 on

financial inclusion and banking correspondents.

12-Mar-13 RBI Circular RBI / 2012-13 / 436 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 89 on revised

guidelines for money transfer schemes.

1-Jul-13 RBI Master Circular RBI/2013-14/1 Master Circular No.1 /2013-14 on money transfer

service scheme.

1-Jul-13 RBI Notification RBI/ 2013-14/31 UBD.BPD. (PCB).MC.No.16 /12.05.001/2013-14

specifying obligations of the banks under the prevention of money laundering act of

2002.

6-Feb-14 UIDAI Notification 17015/14/2012/FI enabling opening new accounts through micro

ATMs

28-Aug-14 Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana launched

(Dr Anupam Saraph is a Professor, Future Designer, former governance and IT advisor toGoa Chief Minister Manohar Parrikar and the World Economic Forum)

of arguments and have to resort to replicating the arguments of the author of theoriginal article!

It appears you have not either had the time to peruse or the ability to comprehendthe arguments that have been put up all this while. All contrarian arguments aretherefore hot air and why not - they need to be understood first!

Firstly there are no 'Riskless' systems in existence. All that can be done is to tryand reduce the risks in any system to an acceptable level. Additionally the riskshave to be balanced against the returns.In the case of Govt benefits disbursal the risks of NOT having a system (which iscurrent state wherein leakage is costing the country billions)far outweighs the riskof having a system like Aadhar which off course can be improved upon based onactual learning on the ground.Secondly the cost of each day of delay in implementation is also horrendous andthus the argument is for not delaying any further.

Thirdly the argument that Dr Saraph's article is more researched and well foundedto the extent that Aadhar needs to be scrapped essentially derides the competencyof institutions like RBI besides off course the PM and all policy making bodies.The underlying charge that all these institutions beside being incompetent are alsobent upon harming the national interests is also simply ridiculous.


Bal krishna Gupta 1 year ago in reply to Sudhir Jatar

My credentials are in public domain. http://in.linkedin.com/in/baalkeeI am an IITK graduate and have served a leading PSU Bank for 36 years. I have nodirect/indirect; oblique/hidden link with anybody interest in the business ofAadhar at any micro/macro level.

As there are 100s of millions of non Aadhar Bank accounts also and will remainand would be used for financial transactions of bigger magnitude, NEFT andRTGS need not be and should not be closed down.2. The transfers thru AAdhar based accounts will be only for Subsidies or by themarginal labourers who maintain accounts at banks at their place of work as wellas at native places, for frauds to take place staff at both places should also colludewith them that too for petty gains as the amounts transferred would be only a fewthousand rupees.

3. Even now people have facility of transferring money anywhere through mobilephones or ATM Debit cards.

4. How money laundering would increase overnight is not understood.

5. As the scheme runs the experience gained and problems faced can be tackledand due precautions can be built viz maximum annual limit per Adhar Card orAadhar Linked bank Account.

6. Money launderers dont do chindi transactions. They follow hawala/angadiya orcourier routes to do their "business"

7. Please stop beating around the bush and come to the brass tacks.

8. Nilikeni came to the board much later. What axe he was to grind in tUIDAI Idont know or answer as I dont know the gentlemamn oither than the news abouthim in the public domain. 9.As far as finding fault is concerned, their areshortcomings in the Voter machines too, Voter cards and rations cards are alsoissued in wrong names. But such cases are not the reasons that VCs or ration cardsystem should be ignored.

Why is the "Dr", "Professor" silent and not answering the criticism?


Bal krishna Gupta 1 year ago in reply to Bal krishna Gupta

The naysayers wanted disclosures and after disclosures they have started new setsof comments.Bura jo dekhan main chala....




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2 3 4 5 6 7 8

to defend Aadhar as is done by Anantharaman. Oh, Modi, who was againstAadhar, is now convinced otherwise and how can he make a mistake ? This is thekind of argument that produces no-brainers. Of course, Geeks have a vestedinterest in defending Aadhar that has been a huge baked (oops, cooked) bread andbutter for them. Their trishuls (computers) cannot make mistakes nor can theirprogramming be faulty, viz based on incomplete parameters! Wake up call is againdue, come what Modi and his cohorts think. Nilekani's fraud is being owned byModi?




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