Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Analysis in Distribution Networks

Workshop Thursday, 3 June 2010 Hungarian

Energy Office

Peter Albertsson, Sweden

Continuity of supply I

1930s

• Locally produced

• Intermittent supply

• Light

• Radios

No problem with long

interruptions

Continuity of supply II1960s

• National grid

• Thunderstorm black-outs

• Light, Radio, TV

• Pumps, elevators etc.

• Preserving food

Frequent hour-long

interruptions

Continuity of supply III2010s

• International grid

• Weather black-outs

• Information

• Heat, water, food

• Machinery

• Life support

Interruptions unwanted!

Hurricane Gudrun ISaturday January 8 2005

> 0 C

> 43 m/s winds hit the coast

> 30 m/s over land

730,000 powerless by

midnight

380,000 after one day

230,000 after three days

130,000 after one week

60,000 after three weeks

Hurricane Gudrun IIGetting rid of fallen trees

Temporarily repairing the

lines

5000 men from Sweden,

another 300 electricians

from neighboring

countries

Military, volunteers

DSOs knew what to do – but

had not enough men!

Hurricane Gudrun III60,000 powerless after

three weeks

Power back to all except

some summer houses

after forty days

Restore grids

permanently: cables

instead of overhead

lines (still going on)

Gudrun IV: After the stormAmendments to the Law

• Reimbursements from 12

h

• Risk- and vulnerability

assessment

• Action plan

• Information to customers

And from 1 January 2011:

• No outage > 24 h

Ever increasing need forbetter continuity of supply

Systematic search for grid

weaknesses

• Risk and

Vulnerability

assessment (RVA)• Asset management

(future possibility)

Risk assessment: no noveltyRisk analysis of

technological systems

IEC 60300-3-9 (1995)

• Preliminary Hazard

Analysis

• Fault- / event-trees

• FMEA

Risk assessment: the latest

A little more general

Of less specific use for us

I would still recommend

IEC 60300-3-9

General Risk matrix

Risk is

The combination of the frequency, or probability

of occurrence and the consequence of a

specified hazardous event

(IEC 60-300-3-9:1995)Consequence

ProbabilityFrequency

Consequence

ProbabilityFrequency

Swedish specific Risk matrix

The most common black-out reasons:

- Weather (wind, snow, thunderstorms)

- Failing equipment (ageing)- Construction (digging)

Note the difference between risk andperceived risk in upper right corner!The owner of the substation is not

thecompany who is dependent of it and

didthis risk assessment.

Technology related viewDifferent approaches:

1. Lines – the grid itself

2. Stations – components

3. Complexity – grid

redundancy

4. Organisation

Preliminary Hazard Analysis• Systematic brainstorm

technique

• Experience needed

• Teamwork – the more

different competences the

better

• Good overview – no details

• Initial screening

• Pitfall: solution orientation

SE Lessons learnt I: Legislation• Output regulation

(result oriented)

• Established method(E.g. IEC standard)

• Documentation

• Reports to EI(including confidentiality)

Regulation EI-FS 2010:3Scope:

Distribution, Transmission < 220

kV

Topics:

Introduction and definitions

Analysis: what to do and achieve,

suggested methods from

standards,

how to visualize (e.g. risk matrix),

advise on documentation.

Regulation EI-FS 2010:3Topics (continued):

Action plans (scheduled)

Vulnerability based criteria:

• Number of customers

• Non delivered power (MW)

• Non delivered energy

(kWh)

• Time to get up and running

• (Society vulnerability)

SE Lessons learnt II: Implementation• Co-operate

• Meet

• Educate

• Listen

• Acknowledge

• Share good practices

• Share good examples

Regulation EI-FS 2010:3DSO’s annual report

Which method for the risk analysis (with source)?

Which way to visualize, assess and rank risks?

How many risks (in four groups) – identified and to action plan?

Circumstances giving problems to “no outages longer than 24 h”?

How many actions shall be taken?

Are the actions on time?

SE Lessons learnt III: Future supervision• Checking that the RVA is

done

• Monitoring the data of interruptions / continuity of supply

• Bad performance leads to

1. Contact

2. Visit

3. Checking what was done

4. Demands

Asset management: PAS 55:2008Management system

Managing physical assets

to maintain or reinvest

right

Compare:

ISO 14000 for environment

ISO 9000 for quality

Network companies are certified by 3rd party

Asset management ISO standard

BSI has invited

40 delegates plan to come

End of April cancelled

(ash)

15 – 18 June, London

Beginning of preliminary

work

Acknowledgements and thanks• IEC / BSI / IAM / ISO

• Lines: Öresund Safety

• Stations: Fortum

• Complexity: Grontmij

• Organisation: SEAB,Staffanstorp, Skåne

• Preliminary Hazard analysis: Boden Energi Elnät

• UK: Ofgem

Thanks for your attention Köszönöm

Tack för uppmärksamheten

Danke schönMange takk

KitosGracias

EucharistoTodah Rabah

Hungarian views courtesy Erik Blomqvist