Rob Halstead Head of Risk Management, Crossrail

Risk and Assurance on Crossrail

What is Crossrail?

Risk Management Challenges

Risk and Assurance

Conclusions

Risk and Assurance on Crossrail

What is Crossrail?

A new railway for London and the south east

Over 100 km from east to west

24 trains per hour in each direction

More than 200 million passenger journey per annum

Adds 10% to London’s rail capacity

£14.8bn funding

38 stations served

9 new stations built

42 km new tunnels

8 million cubic metres of spoil

4300+ Parliamentary

commitments

Europe’s largest infrastructure project

14,000 employed

Why Crossrail?

24 trains per hour

200 million journeys per year

£42bn+ benefits

What is Crossrail?

Risk Management Challenges

Risk and Assurance

Conclusions

Risk and Assurance on Crossrail

Managing the project

Risk Management Challenges

Tunnelling

Integrating the Railway

Managing Europe’s Largest Construction Project

The Crossrail Route

Tier 1 Contractors and others…

Industry Partners

Delivery Partners

Transcend PDP

An industry wide project

Sponsors

Construction on staggering scale

Paddington Bond Street Tottenham Court Road Farringdon Liverpool Street

Whitechapel Canary Wharf Woolwich Custom House

Programme Management

140 main works contracts

40 worksites

10,000 suppliers

1 million activity schedule

Extended to Reading

27 station upgrades

2 major structures

61km of track

179 switches & crossings

150 km OLE

Signalling upgrade

Network Rail surface works

Risk Management at Crossrail

“Managing risk and uncertainty is critical

to the successful delivery of Crossrail”

Andrew Wolstenholme OBE

Chief Executive of Crossrail Limited

Drivers of Risk Management

Delivery

Avoid nasty surprises

Identify opportunities to improve

Head off issues before they impact

Commercial

Ensure that commercial exposure of the organisation is understood and managed

Inform allocation of risk between parties through contracts

Engineering

Monitor the mitigation of risk through design

Ensure that works are delivered safely and that output is fit for purpose

Finance

Understand true exposure to risk and uncertainty

Support investment decisions through assessment of risk impacts

Risk

Support Delivery : Provide Assurance : Inform Decision Making

RISK MANAGEMENT:

Risk Hierarchy

Risk Governance Risk Reporting

Crossrail

Limited Board

Executive

Committee

Risk Sub-

Committee

Programme

Risk Panel

Delivery

Reviews

Audit

Committee

1) Report

2) Escalate

3) Aggregate

Contractor Risks

Project Risks

Strategic Risks

Programme Risks

Sector Risks

Keeping it simple

Identify Assess Respond

Prioritise by assessing ‘Probability’ and ‘Impact’ Terminate

Transfer

Treat

Tolerate

Uncertainty that matters Risk is:

Risk Management is:

Tunnelling

Running Tunnels

Running Tunnels

- Paddington to Stratford and

North Kent

- Bored Tunnels 7m diameter

- 30 - 40m depth

- 42km long

- 8 Tunnel Boring Machines

(TBMs)

Station Tunnels

Stations Tunnels

- Platform tunnels, circulation

areas, cross passages

- Sprayed Concrete Lining

(SCL)

- 16km tunnelling

Key Questions

How do we make sure that the tunnels are safe?

How do we deal with ground conditions and underground obstructions?

How do we avoid damage to buildings and services?

Tunnelling

Tunnelling

Risk Mitigations

Enabling works – diverting and

protecting utilities

Ground treatment

Monitoring

Risk management

(AIB Code of practice for risk

management in underground

construction)

People, process, culture

Tottenham Court Road

Liverpool Street

Tunnelling progress to date

Running tunnels:

Station tunnels:

43km 99% complete

17km 78% complete

Railway Integration

Station Fit Out

Under Platform Services Area

Station Structure

Track Systems

Traction Power & Overhead Line

Equipment

Emergency Walkway

Gravity Drainage

HV Power

LV Power

Tunnel Lighting

Communications& Control

Radio Systems

Signalling

Pla

tfo

rm D

oo

rs

Tunnel Ventilation

Pumped Drainage

Pump

Smoke Extract

Fire DetectionStation

Ventilation

Station Lighting Signage

Passenger Information

CCTV

PA / VA

Hel

p P

oin

t

Fire Main Station Cable Management

System

Station Systems

Automatic Fare Collection

Lifts & Escalators

Station Management

System

Station Heating, Cooling and Air

Conditioning

Route Wide Railway Infrastructure

Route Control Centre

Back Up Control Facility

Bulk Supply Points

Auto Trans-former Sites

Depots & Stabling

Rolling Stock

Paddington

Railway and Tunnel Systems

Railway Systems

Rolling Stock

200m long trains

1,500 seated and standing passengers per train at peak times

Regenerates energy during braking (major savings in energy and CO2 emissions)

Railway Integration Components

Systems Integration

Railway Integration – Central Section

Railway Integration – end to end

Operator, Maintainer, Infrastructure

Manager Readiness

Testing and Commissioning

Handover

Technical Assurance

8323 Railway fails to perform as intended / required by Sponsors Critical non performances by key players means Railway fails to perform as intended / required by Sponsors

Howard Smith

6151 Failure to integrate railway [with NR]

Chris Sexton

7851 An integrated railway is not delivered delaying Railway opening

Chris Sexton

6153 Delayed acceptance of stations and

railway systems by IM and other key

stakeholders

Chris Sexton

6827 Insufficient resilience of the railway in

operational service.

Programme Level

Provisionof technical assurance evidence to

satisfy IMs

Management of handover

872 Failure to manage Standards Baseline (Rail

Systems)

Failure to execute Trial Operations successfully

Project Level

Failure to capture Operations and Maintenance

requirements in procured works

Failure to integrate CTOC or other TOCs

1809 The railway is not delivered for technical reasons (Stages 1 - 5)“1. Failure to integrate the system”

Simon Wright

Strategic Level

6923 Operators and Infrastructure Managers may not be ready to take the railway into operation

resulting in delay to the railway opening.

Howard Smith

11497 The railway service cannot be operated effectively

at opening because of other rail operator/ regulator issues

Howard Smith

Failure to deliver Requirements

Failure to exploit “smart stations” / Digital Railway

opportunities

Operational integration with NR

Management of technical interfaces between

systems and contracts

Integration with Rolling Stock

Failure to integrate with LUL

Failure to execute or integrate the test and commissioning plan

Failure to manage the governance /

relationships with other parties

Failure to manage Railway Safety risk

transfer and mitigation with Operators

5980 (RI) Failure to implement the

Signalling System effectively

Chris Sexton> Development of the

fringe with NR signalling

> Complexity of integrating ATO/ATP

> Provision of a signalling system compatible with the Crossrail train in the

Heathrow Tunnel

> Integration into a single Driver DMI

> Development required to chosen signalling

system to integrate with NR control centres

> Signalling principles require further

unforeseen development

6826 Failure to meet Operators requirements

(Operational, Maintenance, Safety, Performance)

Jeremy Bates

883 Unable to obtain safety

approval for the railway

7984 Comments/Objection by ORR on the Construction

and Commissioning Rulebook

principles

11739 The testing and commissioning strategy may not be effectively

aligned with the planned permanent and

temporary power provision

12561 Operational Readiness – being ready to put the output

from Crossrail delivery and the RSD into full operational

serviceHoward Smith

Currently owned by J Bates – would need to be re-assigned and

promoted to Programme Risk

Promote to Strategic Level and assign to Simon Wright or Andrew

Wolstenholme

Promote to Strategic Level

Currently a Programme Risk

TBD The railway service cannot be operated

effectively because regulator fails to approve Crossrail

Simon Wright

2611, 8395 RCC building

6957 Changes to NR demarcation at PML

Lack of integration with NR’s test and commissioning plan

Lack of integration with NR’s test and commissioning plan

1000, 872, 13286

6135 On Network Works interface with Network Rail projects

Matt White

14090 NR Interfacing project to develop and deliver ETCS

may encounter technical, operational and schedule

challenges

1994 Continuing evolution of NR signalling

7622 Network Rail/TOC projects conflict with CRL programme commissioning requirements

5981 Provision of an ATP system (ETCS) in the Heathrow Tunnels

14090 NR Interfacing project to develop and deliver ETCS may encounter technical, operational and schedule challenges

GW works integration

South East Section works integration

Eastern works integration

Systems works integration

7489 Platform heights on GE routes are above standard and CRL may not be able to satisfy level-boarding gauge clearance requirements.

8115 – Constraints of legacy surface station platforms may give rise to an inability to install transmission systems for Driver Only Operated CCTV

10296 Lack of interface control between D&B for station fit-out, MEP, architectural and systemwide.

5900 Floating slab track interaction with rolling stock.

10471 PSD Entrapment

13159 Integration of PED and PES design solution

13159 Integration of PED and PES design solution

8516 Definition and coordination of interfaces: Civils to Systemwide

7490, 6822 Insufficient time for rolling stock testing

6305 Insufficient resources for commissioning

9728 Signalling Integration / Commissioning issues at interface with national network

7622 Commissioning of railway systems at the interfaces with the national network.

7982 Delays to station (systemwide) systems testing

11739 The testing and commissioning strategy may not be effectively aligned with the planned permanent and temporary power provision

11473 Inadequacy of temp power supply

1994 Signalling project delays

7829 CIS not integrated with NR On Network Stations

2829, 5381 Western works – integration

9098 Network Rail delivery / interfaces at OOC

10826 Stage 2: Infrastructure (including Depot, Heathrow ETCS, Paddington platform works) and integration with GW signalling is not available

10725 Platform heights on GW routes are above standard and CRL may not be able to satisfy level-boarding gauge clearance requirements.

5758 NR interface at Plumstead

14024 ICDs may be incomplete, or out-of-date, leading to scope gaps delaying programme

2024 IMs lose confidence in the CRL Technical Authority and set up their own independent assurance system

7459, 5090 Lack of clear safety assurance documentation from Crossrail to IM.

4547 Inefficient submission and review procedures

7981 RIR CSM does not deliver sufficient safety justification evidence to provide safety assurance

5957 Crossrail 3D design model may not be kept updated

11039 Late mobilisation of IM resources

CRL fails to provide adequate evidence as part of handover process

CRL fails to provide adequate evidence as part of handover process

6990 Failure to fulfil PDA Requirements in relation to Handover

6286 Failure to provide adequate test & commissioning evidence

Failure to demonstrate achievement of Substantial Completion Criteria as defined in PDA to Sponsors.

Failure to demonstrate achievement of Substantial Completion Criteria as defined in PDA to Sponsors.

10471 Potential entrapment issue

8115 DOO CCTV

7489, 10725 Level boarding, stepping distances & Gauge clearance – NR stations

7985 Impact of energisation on neighbouring systems - EMC

2002 Integrated Station Management Systems at LU interchange stations (Stations Ops Rooms)

CRL CIS not integrated with existing LU CIS

CRL CIS not integrated with existing LU CIS

9548 Maintenance support services, spares and specialist plant not procured on time.

Track access / maintenance assumptions not aligned to 95% PPM

Track access / maintenance assumptions not aligned to 95% PPM

Remote condition Monitoring strategy

Remote condition Monitoring strategy

3049, 6297, 1032, 10391 LUL / CRL relationships

RfL Relationship risk?RfL Relationship risk?

13395 Lack of clarity of Urban Realm/OSD design and delivery

1008 Mismatch between RfL/LU requirements and CRL design

1146 Customer Service is not perceived as being world class.

10544 Timetable not produced in time

1061 Performance Modelling inadequate (PPM target not achieved)

6471 Sponsors, TfL, IPs: Late or unexpected changes in requirements

integration with NR control centresintegration with NR control centres

10021 Train Operators do not accept NR Network Change

9290 Insufficient driver resources to support staged opening of Crossrail

9624 Timing and performance of Rolling Stock and Depot could delay opening of Crossrail

1156 Overrun on Trial Operations

Lack of Operational Readiness (including Trial Operations and Staff Training & Familiarisation)

Lack of Operational Readiness (including Trial Operations and Staff Training & Familiarisation)

13253 Transition to OperationsMartin Buck 11941 Trial operations are insufficient

to demonstrate agreed objectives.

13253 Transition into operations

Management of Asset information

11838 Lack of clarity over the approach to specification,

handover and use of Crossrail Asset Information could delay

asset acceptanceChris Sexton

Currently a Programme Risk

2033 Delivery of design (and its design assumptions) is not accepted by IMs (NR, RfL and LUL)

Maintenance plan is incorrectMaintenance plan is incorrect

RAM outputs not aligned with maintenance assumptions

RAM outputs not aligned with maintenance assumptions

Signalling contingenciesSignalling contingencies

Insufficient timetable flexibility / recovery time

Insufficient timetable flexibility / recovery time

Power / Comms resiliencePower / Comms resilience

7622 Commissioning of railway systems at the interfaces with the national network.

Paddington OSDPaddington OSD

8089 HS2 interface

Matt White

5960 HS2 interchange station at Old Oak Common causes change/delay

5960 External interfaces adversely impact the ability to deliver and subsequently the operation of the railway.

(HS2, BAA, Ilford, OOC)Howard Smith

CRL Regulatory Approval

8093 There is a risk that the NoBo and DeBo identify further non compliances which require derogations and the developement of NNTRs

10739 Rail Regulator – failure to gain regulatory consents by NR

CRL submissions to ORR not managedCRL submissions to ORR not managed

RfL Regulatory Approval

RfL submissions to ORR not managedRfL submissions to ORR not managed

Interfaces with other operators e.g. Freight, First Great

Western, Abellio Greater Anglia, Heathrow Express, DLR

Promote from project to strategic

14395 Ilford speed restrictions14395 Ilford speed restrictions

Demote from strategic to programme

5981 Provision of ATP system in Heathrow Tunnel

Header here max 30 characters2014 Effort…

Rolling Stock Programme

Stations Programme

Systemwide Programme

ONW Programme

Installation – Phase 2.1 Commissioning – Phase 2.2-2.3

NR/Railway Systems

Integration

Railway/Tunnel M&E

Systems Integration

Station Systems/LU

Systems Integration

Railway/Station Systems

Integration

System Integration – Phase 3

Station Comms – Precom

& Com

NR Systems – Precom &

Com

Railway Systems –

Precom & Com

Tunnel M&E Systems –

Precom & Com

Station Systems – Precom

& Com

LU Systems – Precom &

Com

NR Systems – Install &

Static Tests

Railway Systems – Install

& Static Tests

Tunnel M&E Systems –

Install & Static Tests

Station Comms – Install &

Static Tests

Station Systems – Install &

Static Tests

LU Systems – Install &

Static Tests

NR/Station Comms

Systems Integration

Station Comms Integration

Tunnel M&E/Station

Systems Integration

Tunnel M&E Systems

Integration

Railway/Station Comms

Systems Integration

Railway Systems

Integration

NR Systems Integration

Station Comms/Station

Systems Integration

Dynamic Testing – Phase 4 Trial Running – Phase 5

Dynamic Testing Trial Running

Station Systems

Integration

Station Comms/LU

Systems Integration

Integration Test

Complete - Milestones

Rolling Stock FitoutRolling Stock Proving GE

& GW

Rolling Stock/NR Systems

Integration (GE/GW)

Rolling Stock/Railway

Systems Integration (TT)

Area of greatest

T&C/ Integration

risk

Immediate area

of focus

Key Questions

How can we coordinate testing, commissioning

and handover activities across the Central Section?

How can we integrate Central and Outer sections?

How can we provide high levels of service from day

one?

Phased opening

2018 2017 2016 2012

1

2013

2

2014

3

2015

4 5 6

Q1

Stage 5

2019

Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Stage 4 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 1

7 8 9 10

Stage 1: Liverpool St (mainline) to Shenfield (May 2017)

Stage 3: Paddington (Crossrail platforms) to Abbey Wood (Dec 2018)

Stage 2: Heathrow to Paddington (mainline platforms) (May 2018)

Stage 4: Paddington (Crossrail platforms) to Shenfield (May 2019)

Stage 5: Full through service (Dec 2019)

Systems Engineering

This phase of the works brings a new set of challenges

Interfaces

Organisations

Collaborative working

Programme Management

Assurance

Risk Management is changing to support the work:

Definition of common goals and RACI for Risks

Bringing teams together through facilitation and joint working

Focus on schedule and interdependencies

What is Crossrail?

Risk Management Challenges

Risk and Assurance

Conclusions

Risk and Assurance on Crossrail

Crossrail’s Programme Assurance Strategy describes an Assurance Chain linking Sponsors, Crossrail Limited and its Supply Chain

Ass

ura

nce

Req

uir

eme

nts

Assu

rance Evid

ence

Project Sponsors

Infrastructure Managers

Regulators

Tier 1 Contractors Industry Partners

Tier 2 Contractors

Crossrail

Delivery

Independent Assurance

Robust Reporting

Assured Delivery

Crossrail: ‘Three Lines of Defence’

1st Line: Delivery Teams Embedded risk management and controls

3rd Line: Independent Assurance Independent challenge and assurance Internal Audit, External Audit, Sponsors Rep CIAG (Crossrail Integrated Assurance Group)

2nd Line: Oversight Functions Set policy and procedure and provide functional oversight Quality, Finance, Controls, Technical, Risk Management

Cro

ssra

il Li

mit

ed B

oar

d, E

xCo

m a

nd

Au

dit

Co

mm

itee

Risk Management Assurance

Report to Joint Sponsor Team

Aggregate risk information against COST and SCHEDULE forecasts (QRA)

Inform Audit Plan with high risk areas

Engage with Sponsors Representative

Work with Insurance (Joint Code of Practice for Tunnelling Projects)

Embed risk management into the organisation: set Policy, Plan and Procedure

We measure and monitor that it is happening (ARM Metrics) and that it is working (Key Risks)

We extend this to our supply chain and measure using performance assurance

Report to ExComm

Report to Audit Cttee

Report to Board

2nd Line: Oversight Functions Set policy and procedure and provide functional oversight Quality, Finance, Controls, Technical, Risk Management

What is Crossrail?

Risk Management Challenges

Risk and Assurance

Conclusions

Risk and Assurance on Crossrail

Conclusions

Risk management is a key part of our overall assurance framework

It is built on good engagement with Delivery

Provides assurance that Crossrail is delivering the right outputs

on time and to budget

Informs key decisions

Crossrail is still on target to open in December 2018

Rob Halstead Head of Risk Management, Crossrail

Risk and Assurance on Crossrail