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Rising Revisionist Powers? Theorising Foreign Policy Strategies through the Rubric of

Revisionism

Paper for the XXIInd

World Congress of Political Science, IPSA/AISP

Madrid, 8–12 July, 2012

Congress Theme: International Relations

Matthew Stephen

stephen@transnationalstudies.eu

Abstract

What do rising powers want from global governance? A changing distribution of power brings the

preferences and aspirations of rising powers to the centre of international politics. If rising power

preferences and outlooks differ radically from the existing framework of global governance,

delegitimation and contestation are likely to occur. Traditional approaches to rising powers revolve

around the concepts of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ states. But a major problem exists in current

discussions of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ states by failing to clearly distinguish between a state’s

preferences regarding the distribution of benefits under the contemporary order, and a state’s

preferences regarding the institutional structure of the order itself. Furthermore, it is unclear whether

revisionism is supposed to refer to a strategy, a preference, or a pattern of behaviour.

To address this problem, this article formulates a conceptual typology for the analysis of states’

preferences regarding institutions of global governance. It argues that rising power preferences should

be empirically adduced by analysing their behaviour, and that revisionism constitutes only one

category to describe rising power contestation. Revisionism is located within a typology of state

preferences regarding global governance. The typology provides a more systematic and explicit way

of conceptualising a state’s orientation towards global governance, which grows increasingly

necessary as world politics enters a phase of multipolarisation through the rise of new powers.

Work in Progress. Please do not cite or circulate.

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Introduction

Rising powers bring the question of revisionism back onto the IR agenda. Long associated

with classical realism, revisionism has been picked up again recently not just by ‘neoclassical

realists’ but also constructivist theorists seeking to understand the reconfiguration of ideas and

institutions accompanying global power shifts (Buzan 2010; Chan 2004; Hurd 2007; Johnston

2003; Rynning and Ringsmose 2008; Schweller 1994, 2011; Schweller and Pu 2011). This

increased interest stems from the common assumption, contra hegemonic stability theory, that

the impact of rising states on world order is not pre-determined, but depends on the kinds of

states that rise. Further, it is a perspective at odds with both modern offensive realists, for

whom all states are necessarily revisionist (Mearsheimer 1990; Mearsheimer 2001), and

modern defensive realists, for whom all states are necessarily conservative status quo powers

(Waltz 2000). In other words, power and purpose do not necessarily co-vary (Ruggie 1982).

Although new powers from the South have assumed a greater systemic importance in global

governance, whether this causes changes in global governance arrangements will depend on

the social purpose and foreign policy orientation of rising powers (Schweller 2011).

The future therefore hinges on the outlooks of rising powers – to what extent they will opt for

a status quo orientation, or choose to revise the existing system. But how can a status quo

state be distinguished from a revisionist one, and how can this be measured? How can we

conceive of the variety of orientations it is possible for a rising power to adopt? To begin to

answer these questions we need first an adequate conceptual grasp of the possible foreign

policy orientations of rising powers in global order.

A major problem exists in current discussions of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ states by failing

to distinguish clearly between a state’s preferences regarding the distribution of benefits under

the contemporary order, and a state’s preferences regarding the institutional structure of the

order itself. This manifests in some wildly diverse ways to ‘measure’ revisionism, ranging

from counting the number of international organisations of which a state is a member (Chan

2004), to analysing where state leaders choose to travel (Kastner and Saunders 2012). To

approach this problem, this study opts for an analytical approach based on a conceptual

typology. The paper does not call for a return to classical realism (see Rynning and

Ringsmose 2008), but seeks to redevelop the notion of revisionism as part of a broader

typology of state orientations in world order. This enables better descriptions of the extent to

which rising powers aspire to changes within global governance.

Firstly, the paper begins by reviewing the classical approaches to revisionism, and identifies a

fundamental ambiguity in existing literature on what precisely revisionism refers to.

Secondly, revisionism is therefore defined as a state preference, which is only observable

through behavioural indicators. Thirdly, the paper then reformulates revisionism as an ideal

type in a broader field of state foreign policy orientations, which distinguishes between

distributional and positional conflict, on the one hand, and institutional and normative

conflict, on the other. The last section of the paper illustrates the analytical utility of the

framework in application it to some of the recent rising power debate, and concludes that

many claims of rising power ‘revisionism’ might be better described as rising power

‘competitiveness’.

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Classical Paths to Revisionism

Revisionism is caught, like all social science concepts, in a recursive interaction between the

social and scientific constitution of concepts, i.e. the double hermeneutic (Giddens 1987). It

has a tended to be associated with emotional signifiers of ‘threat’, and reproducing the use of

this term here could be taken to imply complicity with an emergent academic and practical

discourse that identifies rising states as threats and challenges to the dominance of established

powers. This need not be assumed. As Carr and others have pointed out, an existing ‘status

quo’ need not be natural or normatively desirable, and a policy attached to the status quo

constitutes its own set of interests with normative implications (Carr 1946, 105; Buzan 1983,

176-9).1 By the same token, revisionism can be seen as a legitimate and potentially

progressive and emancipatory force against an unjust status quo.2

Classical realism is the point of departure for any discussion of the orientations of rising

powers.3 Most often, revisionism in classical realism is defined either as a deliberate strategy

or a preference that a state can adopt with regard to the existing distribution of power.

Revisionism is conceived as referring to a position on a spectrum, which describes a range of

orientations from the status quo at one end, to a hard ‘revisionist’ or ‘revolutionary’ approach

at the other.

For example, E.H. Carr’s analysis of the systemic break-down of the early twentieth century

portrayed an international order divided between satisfied and dissatisfied powers (Carr

1946/2001). Dissatisfied powers tried to use their military, economic, and ideological power

to alter the distribution of material and normative goods of the international system in their

favour, while satisfied powers sought to defend the status quo (Carr 1946, 102-45). Although

military power occupies an explanatory primacy (Ibid., 109), ‘power over opinion’ was not

dismissed (Ibid., 132-45). Because norms have a functional relation to the exercise of power,

Carr argued that dissatisfied powers will also naturally form opposition to the normative

orders established by dominant powers - the “sentimental and dishonest platitudinising of

satisfied Powers.”4

Similarly, Morgenthau saw all states as inherently power-seeking, but noted that this essential

uniformity could give rise to three different types of foreign policy: a conservative (defensive)

policy of the status quo, a policy of imperialism aiming to expand and increase power, and a

policy of prestige designed to demonstrate power to others (Morgenthau 1948).5 The policy of

the status quo “aims at the maintenance of the distribution of power as it exists at a particular

moment in history,” while an imperialist foreign policy was aimed at upsetting the existing

1 “It is profoundly misleading to represent the struggle between satisfied and dissatisfied Powers as a struggle

between morality on one side and power on the other. It is a clash in which, whatever the moral issue, power

politics are equally predominant on both sides” (Carr 1946, 105). 2 Carr’s formulation of this point was as follows (1946, 76): “the alleged community of interest in the

maintenance of peace, whose ambiguous character has already been discussed, is capitalized in the same way

by a dominant nation or group of nations just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace,

which guarantees its own security and predominance, and denounces class-war, which might threaten them, so

international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant Powers.” See also Buzan (1983, 176-7). 3 A more comprehensive review of classical realism and the role of revisionism can be found in Rynning and

Ringsmose (2008, 21-5). 4 In Carr there appears to be an empirical coincidence of ‘rising’ with ‘dissatisfied’ powers.

5 The policy of prestige was for Morgenthau less an end in itself than an instrument for the achievement of the

other two strategies (1948, 21). It remains unclear how this distinction can be maintained, if according to

Morgenthau’s classical realist assumptions, all states are inherently power-seeking and therefore imperialist

(Chan 2004).

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balance of power (Morgenthau 1948, 46).6 Comparable distinctions exist in Arnold Wolfers’

references to ‘self-preservation’ (status-quo) and ‘self-extension’ (revisionist) states (1962,

91-2 and 125-6). This variation occurred because the ‘national interest’ is always a subjective

and therefore independent aspect of state behaviour.7 The works of Kissinger and Aron

display a similar concern for the preferences and foreign policies of major and rising powers

as a distinct analytical and causal category. For Kissinger an international system could be

‘legitimate’ or ‘revolutionary’ depending on whether the great powers agree on the basic

organising principles of international politics,8 and Aron spoke of ‘heterogeneous’ and

‘homogenous’ international systems (Aron 2003, 147-9).

Common to each of these approaches is the view that state behaviour and the stability of

international orders is not determined solely by structure (‘third image’) factors: as the

‘national interest’ is subjective, the chosen foreign policies (‘second image’) of major and

rising states has decisive implications for the form of the international system. In particular,

this hinges on the question of whether rising powers are ‘status quo’ or ‘revisionist’ states.

The traditional dimension of behaviour associated with revisionism is the use of military

force. Neoclassical iterations have focused on this dimension. In this vein, Schweller defines a

revisionist state as one that will “employ military force to change the status quo and to extend

their values” (Schweller 1994, 105), a definition seconded by Mearsheimer (2007, 73).

Military conflict is also important to Johnston’s approach (2003), which uses Gilpin’s original

discussion of ‘systems change’ (1981, 41) to form the basis of a unit-level concept of the

revisionist state. For Johnston, the two most fundamental aspects of revisionism relate to the

distribution of material power: a preference for a ‘radical’ redistribution of power (in the

current context, a preference for multipolarity against US dominance), and a recourse to

military power as a means to achieve it.

These approaches share the realist perspective on force as the ultima ratio of international

politics, and territory and population as crucial resources to this end. This stems from

realism’s traditional conceptualisation of power. But if power is understood in a broader

fashion, in the tradition of classical authors such as Carr, broader interpretations of the

concepts of revisionism and the status quo can arise.

Contemporary Paths to Revisionism

As Johnston has argued (2003, 10), it is astonishing how little effort has been expended on

clearly defining and explicating the concept of revisionism, given its centrality to classical

realism. Similarly, Chan (2004, 208) notes that “relatively little work has been done to clarify

and measure national satisfaction/dissatisfaction”, despite the importance of the concept as a

foundation for international relations theories.

In terms of a widening of the concept of revisionism, Johnston at least concedes that a less

‘fundamental’ aspects of revisionism concerns the “formal and informal rules of the major

6 In some ways, this prefigures the ‘offensive’ versus ‘defensive’ realist debate.

7 Also a third category, ‘self-abnegation’ (Wolfers 1962, 93-94), could be read as a premonition of the sort of

sovereignty-ceding going on in the European Union or the ethical foreign policies supposedly operating inside

liberal security communities. 8 Echoing an English School concern with the basic institutions of international society, Kissinger spoke of “the

nature of workable arrangements” and “the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy”, constituting an

“existing structure” in which diplomacy is possible (Kissinger 1957, 1-2).

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institutions in the international system” (Johnston 2003, 11).9 This consists in trying to change

the rules ‘in ways that defeat the original purposes of the institution’; participating in

institutions but breaking the rules; or simply not participating in international institutions at

all (Johnston 2003, 11). Similarly, Chan argues that a revisionist state should be seen as one

that does not observe basic international institutions such as keeping promises, observing

diplomatic traditions and rules of war, and recognising sovereignty (Chan 2004, 216).

Revisionism therefore consists in engaging in competition over the ‘ordering principles’ of

the international system, in contrast to merely being dissatisfied with a state’s position within

the international system (Ibid., 212).10

Significant progress towards a more comprehensive as well as more specific conceptualisation

of a state’s orientation towards the institutions of international society can be found in the

work of Barry Buzan (Buzan 1983; 2010). Describing his subject as the objectives that a state

pursues (1983, 181), Buzan argues that revisionism can be contrasted with two other

positions: status quo and detached (Buzan 2010, 16). A ‘detached’ power is indifferent to

international society, while a status quo state “is happy with both its status/rank and with the

institutions of international society, which it accepts on an ideational level” (Buzan 2010, 17).

These categories are paralleled in Legro’s (2005, 9-10) identification of ‘separatism’ and

‘integration’ as types of state orientations regarding an international society (Bull 1977), or

“the dominant rules, institutions, and norms that characterize the international system” (Legro

2005, 10). Revisionism can then be interpreted as “states that reject the dominant norms of

interaction in a given international society and believe that active involvement in overturning

that order serves national interests” (Legro 2005, 9).

By contrast, Buzan differentiates three types of revisionist state (Buzan 1983, 181-6; 2010,

17-8), because he distinguishes between “whether a country is happy with its status or rank in

international society, and second, whether it accepts or contests the institutions that compose

international society” (Buzan 2010, 17). A ‘revolutionary-revisionist’ state “rejects on

ideational grounds the primary institutions of international society” and seeks “to overthrow

both the status order and the form of international society” (Buzan 2010, 17). Middle

positions are represented by ‘orthodox-revisionist’ states which do not contest the substance

of international society but seek a better place within it,11

and ‘reformist-revisionist’12

states

which “accepts some of the institutions of international society for a mixture of calculated and

instrumental reasons. But it resists, and wants to reform, others, and possibly also wants to

change its status” (2010, 18). For Buzan, contemporary China is a good example of a

reformist-revolutionary power (2010, 18).

The primary institutions of international society are seen as the social institutions which

constitute the actors of international relations (predominantly states), and define their

appropriate behaviour. Examples include the institutions of sovereignty, non-intervention,

territoriality, nationalism, international law, diplomacy, etc. These primary institutions are

“composed of principles, norms and rules that underpin deep and durable practices”, in

contrast to secondary institutions such as regimes and international organisations, “which are

9 Johnston does not clarify the manner in which these criteria relate in terms of necessary or sufficient

conditions, but a preference for multipolarity through war is said to be the most ‘fundamental’ and therefore

probably a necessary condition (2003, 10-11). 10

Chan then operationalises this in terms of the number of inter-governmental organisations of which a state is a

member. 11

“The important thing about it is that it constitutes only a struggle over power within the prevailing framework

of ideas and relations.” (Buzan 1983, 181). 12

In his earlier work Buzan referred to ‘radical revisionism’ (1983, 184).

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recent, instrumental, mainly state-designed expressions of the underlying social structure of

modern international relations” (Buzan 2010, 6-7).

These various approaches to the notion of revisionism are summarised in the table below.

Table 1. Existing Approaches to Revisionism and Status Quo

Key Feature

Author Dimension Orientation

Revisionist Status quo

Prim

acy

of u

se o

f for

ce

Organski and Kugler

Use of military power

Deploy Reject

Johnston

Use of military power

Central to Foreign Policy Ruled out*

Power-redistribution

Radically redistribute Isolationism*

International institutions

Do not participate, break rules Participate*, comply*

Gilpin

Power-distribution

Radically redistribute, through war if necessary Maintain unipolarity, through war if necessary

regimes Spoiling, Private goods Supporting, public goods

Prestige Redistribute Maintain prestige

Pre

fere

nce

for

mul

tipol

arity

Schweller

‘Jackal’ ‘Wolf’ ‘Lion’ ‘Lamb’

Territorial and Ideological goals

unlimited self-extension

limited self-extension self-preservation

self-abnegation

Behaviour

risk-acceptant aggression

‘aggressive’ bandwagoning

balancing or buckpassing

appeasement, wave-of-the-future bandwagoning

Orie

ntat

ion

to in

tern

atio

nal n

orm

s an

d in

stitu

tions

Chan

basic international norms

Break Uphold

Hurrell

Rules of international order

Challenge / overthrow Maintain*

Legro

international society

reject, overturn integrate, accept

Buzan

Revolutionary- Revisionst

Reformist-Revisionst

Orthodox Revisionist

Status Quo

Status

overthrow ‘possibly wants to change’

unhappy happy

international society

reject on ideational grounds

accepts some, resists or reforms others

happy happy

* field not addressed explicitly by author

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As table 1 indicates, existing approaches are rather diverse. Three major problems can be

identified in existing approaches to the concept of revisionism. Firstly, the approaches differ

in terms of their specific indicators, leading to vastly different methods for identifying

revisionist states. These range from the use of force in pursuit of aims, to (lack of)

membership in international organisations.

Secondly, and more fundamentally, it is not just indicators but also the referent object of the

concept that is unclear. There is a lack of clarity as what exactly it means to describe a state as

‘revisionist’ or ‘status quo’ – whether it refers to a preference, strategy, or pattern of

behaviour. This raises the problem of a common concept being used for vastly different things

(polysemy). Do revisionism and its antonyms refer to preferences (goals) (Carr 1946; Chan

2004), strategies (Narlikar 2010), interests (Gilpin 2002, 239), a foreign policy (Morgenthau

1948), or an impact on the international system (Gilpin 1981, Schweller 2011)?13

Finally, many accounts of revisionism have limited conceptual horizons by virtue of a focus

on purely material factors or on strictly formal international institutions, while often failing to

clearly distinguish between a state’s preferences regarding the distribution of benefits under

the contemporary order, and a state’s preferences regarding the institutional structure of the

order itself. As Buzan recognises, conceiving of revisionism along a unidimensional spectrum

is inadequate to the task of distinguishing a state’s satisfaction with its position in an order

from its satisfaction with the order itself. This risks both conceptual fuzziness as well as

misleading empirical conclusions. Yet we should also consider the “enduring structures and

processes of global life that enable and constrain the ability of actors to shape their fate and

their futures” (Barnett and Duvall 2005a, 3). This can provide greater analytical depth but also

new explanatory potential. In this way a state’s approach to world order can be analysed as its

role in a configuration of different power relations, inclusive of aspects of world order often

neglected in discussions of rising powers.14

This paper therefore takes up the task of embedding revisionism in a broader

conceptualisation of state orientations that takes into account different forms of power in

international politics, and which includes material as well as normative and identity

dimensions.

Reconceptualising Revisionism: Preferences, Performances, and Public Transcripts

Referent Object

The first task for an adequate conceptualisation of a state’s orientation in global governance is

to clarify the referent object. The classic conundrum for IR scholars is distinguishing states’

goals (preferences) from the specific policies (behaviour) states adopt, in the light of

environmental and strategic constraints. Much existing literature fails precisely to delineate

whether rising powers are expected to be revisionist or status quo powers because of their

inherent preferences or merely for strategic, tactical reasons in light of existing constraints of

13

Johnston (2003, 11, note 20) at least explicitly notes that his indicators mix preferences with behaviour,

although his concept of revisionism itself refers to a supposed preference. 14

While realist assumptions allow a state to pursue a ‘grand strategy’ in relation to their rivals, the fungibility

issue reinforces the possibility that configurations of revisionism and status quo orientations will be highly

context or ‘issue-area’ dependent. Thus it is important for the concept of revisionism to apply not just to a

state’s generalised foreign policy but to specific issue areas of global governance.

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their place in the global order. The literature on rising powers is therefore often still unclear

on exactly what is being analysed.

This is for good reason. The conundrum of distinguishing between means and ends has a long

pedigree. Arnold Wolfers admitted that all analyses of international politics have to

distinguish to some degree between goals and means, even though it is impossible to

definitively separate the two. “All means can be said to constitute intermediary or proximate

goals, and few goals if any can be considered ultimate, in the sense of being sought as ends in

themselves” (Wolfers 1962, 67).15

Any attempt to empirically investigate an agent’s

preferences or strategies therefore risks conflating action that is compelled by environmental

factors with genuine preferences (Wolfers 1962, 13).

Similarly, the classical realists often rejected the study of motivations as explanations for

actions, not just because they are hard to observe empirically, but because subjects often have

an interest to misrepresent them (Carr 2008, 139; see Parent and Baron 2011, 200-1).

Furthermore, ‘true preferences’ may literally be unknown even to the subject themself,16

implying an ontologically irreducible subject when subjects themselves are constituted within

environmental constraints. Even at the individual level, the study of human psychology since

Freud has cast doubt on the ontological status of ‘true preferences’ (Carr 2008, 139).17

Nonetheless, the separation of actors’ preferences from their strategic behaviour is crucial in

assigning causal significance to unit-level factors (interests) compared to systemic factors

(changes in the international system) (Frieden 1999, 39-40). But “any attempt to infer a

government’s preferences from its actions runs the risk that these actions reflect both

preferences and the environment” (Frieden 1999, 60). In other words, “how can we estimate

the impact of power relations on action when the exercise of power is nearly constant?” (Scott

1990, 25).

One approach is to deduce a state’s preferences, that is, to assign preferences to actors based

on theoretical assumptions.18

In practice, this involves imputing a state’s ‘objective’ interests.

This is the approach of structural theories of rising powers, as when Gilpin (1981) deduces

that rising powers will prefer to replace existing international regimes, because they serve the

interests of the dominant state. The problem with this approach is that deducing states’

preferences results in propositions that are deductively true. They are not open to empirical

evaluation, because any observed departures from expected behaviour can be explained away

as a result of strategic constraints.

Furthermore, although it may be possible to formulate convincing deductions of states’

interests based on a rational actor assumption in the utility-driven domain of economics, it is

increasingly difficult to come to firm hypotheses about actors’ true preferences the further one

wonders from the domain of the economic marketplace (Zürn 1997, 298-300). While it may

be a practical impossibility to discern a state’s ‘true preferences’ from observed behaviour, it

15

Wolfers continues that to really try to distinguish the two would involve plunging into “the dark labyrinth of

human motives”, citing with approval Morgenthau’s classic statement on ‘the most illusive of psychological

data’ (Wolfers 1962, 67; citing Morgenthau 1948, 6). 16

Deliberate use of gender-neutral langauge: singular they. 17

Scott also acknowledges that “There is no ‘true’ transcript in the sense of a transcript that is entirely

unconstrained.” (1985, 326, note 45). 18

Aside from examining preferences through observation, Frieden advances two methods for assigning a state’s

preferences: assumption and deduction. It is hard to see a clear distinction between the two approaches, when,

like deduction, assuming preferences also has to rely on some sort of generalised proposition about the

properties of actors and the situation in which they find themselves. See also Wolfers 1962, 12-14.

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may be equally difficult to assign it deductively. Even a strong defender of the deductive

approach can admit that sometimes observation may still be the best research strategy for

discerning an actor’s preferences (Frieden 1999, 60).

Another way of approaching this problem is empirical, and focuses on interpreting empirical

findings to account for the role of power in conditioning public discourses and behaviour. The

idea here is to try to sift through the evidence to try to uncover hidden preferences by taking

strategic constraints into account. In dealing with the thorny issue of state preferences and

behaviour we only have access to the ‘public transcript’ of publicly visible interactions

between dominant and rising states. The ‘public transcript’ describes the outwardly displayed

behaviour and made by social actors in conditions of high power asymmetry, which are

unlikely to accurately portray genuinely held preferences or beliefs (Scott 1990, 1-4).19

The

public transcript, because of the distorting effect of power on discourse, would probably

indicate a degree of consent or hegemony of dominant values that are possibly not genuinely

held – ultimately little more than a performance.

Scott advanced an empirical solution to this problem. For Scott, subordinate social groups

also partake in a ‘hidden transcript’ of discourse away from powerful actors, reflecting an

‘infrapolitics’ of resistance to the powerful through foot-dragging, evasion, and off-stage

symbolic sanctions such as gossip and character assassination (Scott 1985). Although direct

access to the hidden transcript is an impossibility, the ‘hidden transcript’ is revealed in

disguised form by subordinated groups in the form of “those offstage speeches, gestures, and

practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript” (Scott 1990,

4-5). Without access to hidden transcripts, “we are obliged to search for noninnocent

meanings [in public statements] using our cultural knowledge – much in the way an

experienced censor might!” (Scott 1990, 26).20

However, although it is fruitful to be aware of extant power asymmetries which constrain

states from revealing their true preferences, rising powers in contemporary international

politics occupy an environment far less oppressive than the cases Scott described (Schweller

and Pu 2011), such as the institutionalised power asymmetries of slavery, serfdom, and caste

subordination (Scott 1985, 1990). Although clearly not completely free, the public statements

of rising powers can be expected to be much closer to their inner convictions, because the less

menacing the power, the thinner the mask required of them (paraphrasing Scott 199, 3).

Furthermore, as they rise, rising powers can increasingly afford “the luxury of negative

reciprocity: trading a slap for a slap, an insult for an insult” (Scott 1990, xii). Instead of

reflecting “the public performance required of those subject to elaborate and systematic forms

of social subordination”, rising power behaviour is rather constrained simply by the everyday

requirements of etiquette and politeness that forms the “acting that comes of civility” in

international society (Scott 1990, 1-2).

Given these considerations, it is reasonable to investigate rising power preferences by

empirically examining their public diplomacy. Indeed, in the peculiar sub-culture of the

hyper-codified and formalised language of official diplomacy, every attempt is made to

reinforce the appearance of de jure equality of sovereigns, represented in elaborate rituals

concerning official visits, anthems, flags, table arrangements, and so on. The diplomatic

19

I thank Johannes Becke for advocating the relevance of James Scott’s work. See also Schweller and Pu (2011,

47-52). 20

Scott elaborates: “At the very least, an assessment of power relations read directly off the public transcript

between the powerful and the weak may portray a deference and consent that are possibly only a tactic” (Scott

1990, 3).

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primacy on ‘politeness’ gives ample scope for political signalling and contestation to occur

through the public transcript – especially when a failure to observe the rules of politeness can

be taken as an act of insubordination or an imperial snub.21

The empirical material for examining the hidden transcript of a rising powers as a collective

actor “are necessarily embedded in public discourses – in symbols, speeches by officials, and

even in institutional rules and procedures” (Legro 2005, 183), even though the researcher

must be carefully aware of the possibility of being purposefully misled by official statements

with a clear interest in manipulating perceptions. Interpreting a states’ behaviour and rhetoric

as a combination of a public and hidden transcript requires “multisource analysis in rhetoric,

past pronouncements, institutional procedures, private discussions, and active behaviour as a

check against strategic disinformation” (Legro 2005, 184).

The implication of these considerations is that rising powers’ behaviour is a suitable basis on

which to interpret their underlying preferences, in other words preferences as they are

performed in light of the environmental context.22

The question therefore becomes in what

way states perform their status quo or revisionist orientations within the global governance

order. This revolves around cataloguing state behaviour and statements in analytically useful

ways, as indicators of a state’s behaviourally-defined orientation, which will inevitably reflect

preferences as well as ‘strategic behaviour’ (Frieden 1999) and the ‘public transcript’ (Scott

1990) of official comportment. For this purpose, what claims states make and the interests

they profess in public settings is analytically interesting (cf. Chan 2004, 216; Narlikar 2010,

2-3). This stems not only from an approach that defines revisionist or status quo orientations

behaviourally, but also because official communications gives an indication of what

preferences rising powers find strategically useful to say, and which may contain within them

a sanitised and palatable version of underlying aspirations (Scott 1990, 19). But this still

requires the concepts sufficient to the task. Elaborating these through a system of ideal types

is the task to which we now turn.

Rising Power Preferences in Global Governance: A Typological Approach

To describe a state as revisionist or status quo cannot just refer to the properties of a state

(agent), but implies a link to the degree of change implied for the broader social field

(structure). Although they are clearly concepts to describe a state unit, they only gather

meaning with reference to the global or international society in which the state is embedded.23

It therefore provides the ‘missing link’ between structural theories of world politics and

theories of foreign policy, a link which goes back to the ambitions of the classical realists and

is currently expounded in ‘neoclassical realism’ (Rynning and Ringsmose 2008). It is

therefore plausible to begin our discussion in terms of the contestation of power relations

constituting the world order. This is sympathetic to the view that the forms and workings of

power are important to account for how world orders are produced and transformed (Barnett

21

In fact, the discrepancy between the inner feelings and the ‘public transcript’ is central to the traditional idea of

prestige and status in international politics, which can be conceived as the ‘public discourse of domination’

(Scott 1989). The degree to which a state has to ‘hold its tongue’, to demonstrate its deference to an established

order and its political authority, indicates the prestige attached to a dominant power and its favoured norms. 22

There is an analogue here to the distinction between an individual’s political preferences as they are produced

by attitudinal surveys, and studying political preferences as they are performed in the public sphere. 23

This is clearest in the case of the word ‘status quo’, which is a synonym for the existing order, as well as a

quality pertaining to a state.

11

and Duvall 2005, 2).24

I begin by distinguishing between two analytically distinct forms of

social interaction in global governance.

Everyday Global Governance: Distributional and Positional Conflicts

By and large, everyday global governance takes place within the existing institutional

frameworks of international politics. States pursue their aims with regard to the absolute and

relative distribution of material and normative resources, and form alliances and groups with

which to pursue these goals. The basic means by which states and other actors can influence

outcomes in this dimension is the exercise of ‘relational’ (Krasner 1985), ‘compulsory’

(Barnett and Duvall 2005), or ‘behavioural’ (Gill and Law 1989) power. This form of power

“works through behavioural relations or interactions, which, in turn, affect the ability of

others to control the circumstances of their existence” (Barnett and Duvall 2005a, 9). The

operative mechanism for state orientations in this dimension concerns whether an agent can

get another agent to do something they would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957, 202-3).

The clashing interests and ideas of actors in relational terms give rise to ‘everyday global

governance’. Conflicts tend to be over outcomes, resources, and relative positions within a

given institutional domain. Traditional research in this domain usually identifies contending

interests, the ensuing clash of preferences, and the prevailing outcome (Guzzini 1993, 448).

The exercise of power in this dimension favours states with strong armies, financial resources,

and market power, and operates through mechanisms such as the use of threats or promises,

bargaining, the (non)use of force, bribery, and the strategic interactions and resource pooling

inherent in coalition and alliance formation (and thus directs attention to rising and great

powers [Barnett and Duvall 2005, 14; Mearsheimer 1994]). This form of power in global

governance can be leveraged though shifts in the direct relationships amongst pre-constituted

agents.25

Different states behave differently in their exercise of relational power. Some analyses of

states behaviour in terms of relational power focus on whether states focus more on absolute

gains, which gives rise to greater scope for the emergence of what is often called

‘cooperation’, or whether they focus more on relative gains, which forecloses the space for

cooperation considerably as the gains of one actor are considered by definition a loss for the

other. Sometimes considered a paradigmatic deal-breaker (Grieco 1988),26

it is possible to

treat this division not as one between competing theories but as two conceivable ideal-types

into which state behaviour can be classified.27

24

Alternatively, a world order itself can be analysed as a specific configuration of power relations, constituting

an ‘historical structure’ (Cox 1996). 25

Relational power and distributive outcomes plays a critical role in the realist conception of world order: the

balance of power refers to a distribution of compulsory power. Great Powers are distinguished precisely for

their preponderance in the field of material compulsory power, with any institutional frameworks of global

governance strictly subordinated to this anarchy of relational power. The basis of Waltz’s theory of

international politics is to assume the key actors as preconstituted entities, in which relational power plays the

decisive role. 26

Grieco argues that the crucial difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism pivots on the

question of relative versus absolute gains. For Mearsheimer, “Because one state’s gain in power is another

state’s loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other” (2001, 34), whereas

Keohane maintained that under conditions of interdependence even great powers have mutual interests in

cooperation (1984). 27

Alternatively, Wendt suggests that these competing conceptions of state behaviour can be seen as reflecting

different forms of states’ collective identification: “The neorealist claim that states define their interests in

12

States’ orientations with regard to distributional outcomes can therefore be conceived as

falling along a spectrum, whereby at one end states are predisposed towards cooperation and

mutual gains seeking, while at the other states are more likely to get drawn into conflicts and

focus on increasing gains at others’ expense.28

States then appear to be able to choose a policy

focusing on increasing their own position relative to the others, or acquiescing at relative

power imbalances in favour of absolute gains. Alternatively, it could be possible for states to

engage in both at the same time in different areas.

An important dimension of rising states’ orientation regarding compulsory power in a given

domain is whether they seek to pool their compulsory powers with or against the hegemon

and its allies. One strategy for rising powers is to exercise relational power in the form of

internal or external balancing against the hegemon or the leading coalition, while an

alternative, more conformist approach would be to bandwagon. Similarly, bloc coalitions with

a set membership, often united ideologically give a good indication of relational tensions.

This stands in contrast to pragmatic, issue-specific and short-term coalitions which indicate a

much more fluid and gains-driven strategy (Narlikar 2010).

Similarly, the way states pursue their aims in negotiations is another example of state

behaviour within a given institutional domain. Negotiation strategies can be classified across a

spectrum. At one end lies a strategy which is associated with a defensive and distributive

approach. These strategies are functional in order to make claims on others and to defend

against such claims, indicating that others’ goals are perceived as conflicting with one’s own

(Hurrell and Narlikar 2006, 422). On the other end, integrative strategies use tools such as

issue-linkage, information sharing, and exploring common solutions and indicate a perception

that the interests of parties to a negotiation “are not in fundamental conflict, and hence can be

integrated for mutual gain to some degree” (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006, 423; Narlikar 2010,

9).29

So the exercise of relational power within global governance can challenge distributional

and positional goods to varying extents.

This distributional dimension applies not only to material resources but also to

normative/ideational resources. These consist in intangibles such as status, prestige, and

legitimacy. Prestige or status constitutes a positional good (Hirsch 1977) in international

politics, meaning that it is only of benefit to the extent that others cannot share in them

(Larson and Shevchenko 2010). Rising powers can therefore be expected to engage in

strategies to enhance their prestige or status. Larson and Shevchenko (2010) apply this insight

explicitly to the case of rising powers, and find that in line with social identity theory,

strategies for attaining prestige in international politics can fall into two major categories:

social competition or social mobility. Social competition “aims to equal or outdo the dominant

group in the area on which its claim to superior status rests”, and implies a reliance on relational

power and a relative shift in the distribution of prestige (Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 11). In

contrast, social mobility entails “emulating the values and practices of the established powers to

terms of relative gains assumes that states tend toward the negative end of the identification continuum,

whereas the neoliberal claim that absolute gains predominate assumes that states tend toward the center (neither

positive nor negative identification)” (Wendt 1994, 386). This suggests a further ideal-type orientation: the

purely altruistic orientation, whereby a state seeks to maximise the gains of others. Given the empirical purpose

of the present framework, however, this orientation will be neglected here. 28

E.H. Carr observed that “Man in society reacts to his fellow men in two opposite ways. Sometimes he displays

egoism, or the will to assert himself at the expense of others. At other times he displays sociability, or the

desire to co-operate with others, to enter into reciprocal relations of good-will and friendship with them, and

even to subordinate himself to them” (Carr 1946, 95). 29

Narlikar refers to these, respectively, as ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ negotiation strategies.

13

attain integration into elite clubs” (Ibid., 19), indicating aspirations for cooptation into the

distribution of prestige on the terms of the dominant states. High distributional conflict in this

sense implies engaging in social competition over prestige resources while social mobility

reflects a less challenging approach.30

Conflicts over distributions and relative positions are the first manner in which we can

analyse the role of rising states in global governance.

Distributional and Positional Contestation

High Low

Balancing Bandwagoning

Counter-hegemonic blocs Pragmatic issue coalitions

Competitive Prestige Acquisition Prestige through elite integration

Relative Gains Absolute Gains

Global Governance Orders: Normative and Institutional Conflicts

Agents in global governance do not relate to others in a vacuum, but within the context of

historical social institutions. These institutions range from the specific rules and procedures

within international organisations, to the broader social conventions and regulative norms of

international society. In particular since the Second World War these social conventions have

been made increasingly explicit and codified, and global governance has seen a greatly

increased role for international organisations.

A fuller understanding of rising power orientations in global governance must take the full

breadth of international institutions into account. When a state seeks to change existing

institutions of global governance, we can speak of institutional status quo/revisionism. But the

extent to which a state seeks to alter existing institutions can vary dramatically, ranging from

articulation of an alternative world order to a preference for procedural changes within

existing international organisations.31

The notion of ‘institutional revisionism’ can therefore

be exercised both through the deployment of ‘institutional’ or ‘meta-’ power (Barnett and

Duvall 2005; Krasner 1985; Lukes 2005), which operates through shaping institutional

structures, as well as through ‘productive’ and ‘discursive’ power’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005;

Nabers 2010), which works to constitute social categories by shaping discourses.

Institutions defined as “relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative and procedural

norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including

states as well as nonstate entities), and their activities” (Duffield 2007, 8) can serve as a

30

The traditional realist interest in prestige could also be supplemented with further investigation of the role of

emotions in international relations. Although Larson and Shevchenko imply an anthropomorphised state-as-

individual as the unit for social identity theory (see also Wendt 1999; Wendt 2004), the role of states as

collectivities of people suggests the relevance of intergroup emotions theory and social psychology more

generally in analysing states as groups with emotions. See Sasley (2011). 31

Buzan’s approach (2010) similarly differentiates between a state’s satisfaction with prevailing social norms of

international society, and a state’s satisfaction with its own position within them. While this represents an

enormous advance over the previous interpretations of revisionism, for the purposes of this study it could suffer

from a ‘truncated measurement scale’ if contestation of ‘secondary institutions’ (such as international

organisations) is written-off as variations on a ‘status-quo’ orientation.

14

sufficiently broad definition for the objects of a state’s institutional demands in global

governance. In terms of a state’s orientation in global governance, revision of the institutional

framework will be based on “altering the ‘rules of the game’ and the agenda for social action,

as well as altering the distribution of material and symbolic rewards that are generated

through institutional (coordinated or collective) action” (Barnett and Duvall 2005b, 23).

International Organisations and Regimes: Polities, Procedures, Policies

One dimension of global governance concerns international ‘regimes’ and organisations, and

the forms of international political authority to which that they give rise. Regimes have been

defined as a collection of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures accepted by states in

particular functional or sectoral domains of international politics (Haggard and Simmons

1987; Krasner 1982, 186; Ruggie 1992, 572; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 759; Cox 1996,

508). A key feature of regimes is that they are deliberately designed. They correspond to what

Buzan calls the ‘secondary institutions’ of international society: “recent, instrumental, mainly

state-designed expressions of the underlying social structure of modern international

relations” (Buzan 2010, 6-7).

Formal international organisations are the most easily identifiable aspects of international

regimes, whose charters formalise the principles and norms of a given regime, and give rise to

specific rules and decision-making procedures. “The organizations’ decision-making

processes may then be used by member states for further norm and rule creation, for rule

enforcement and dispute settlement, for the provision of collective goods, and for supporting

operational activities” (Karns and Mingst 1990, 3). International organisation can exercise

political authority to the extent to which members recognise their competency to make

decisions or enforce rulings. “They embody or facilitate the creation of principles, norms, and

rules of behaviour with which states must align their policies if they wish to benefit from

reciprocity” (Karns and Mingst 1990, 4).

The design and operation of a regime may slant the playing field in favour of the most

powerful countries, especially since they are usually decisive in the creation of the regime

itself. Nonetheless disadvantaged countries remain within the regime because the costs of

exclusion would be even higher than their disadvantaged inclusion (Keohane 1984; Gruber

2005). There is still plenty of room for institutional conflict on the ‘Pareto frontier’ (Krasner

1991).

More specifically, contestation by states such as rising powers can be targeted at different

aspects of a regime and its institutions. To the extent to which states adopt an institutionally

‘revisionist’ stance in global governance institutions, a process of ‘politicisation’ will ensue,

whereby previously unpolitical matters are made political (Zürn 2011; de Wilde and Trenz

2012). If a state seeks to politicise the content of decisions within an institution, it contests the

policy. If the object of politicisation is the processes and procedures for making decisions,

contestation targets the ‘political process’ or procedures. If, lastly, the institution itself is

called into question, this results in the contestation of the polity.32

These different targets for

states’ revisionist/status quo orientations represent progressively more fundamental aspects of

international institutions, and goes beyond the distributional bargaining characteristic of

everyday global governance. Historically, major changes to the institutional framework of

32

Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) also consider politicisation of the broader political and normative

order a part of the ‘polity’, but I argue there are good analytical reasons to keep these issues separate.

15

global governance have occurred after systemic conflicts and transformations (Cox 1987;

Ikenberry 2001; Murphy 1994).

Institutional revisionist or status quo orientations can be conceived as an orientation of states

orthogonal to distribution and relational power, and similarly to. The notion of institutional

revisionism exists along a spectrum with contending ideal types located at either end. At one

end can be imagined a completely status quo power, content with the existing institutional

structure of world order. An orientation consistent with this position would be characterised

by full participation in relevant institutions, adhering to the existing purposes and procedures

of that institution, and following the rules. Little attempt would be made to create or get rid of

institutions, while attempts would be made to reinforce and defend the legitimacy of existing

institutions. At the other end is an institutionally revisionist power, which would often reject

existing institutions tout court by not participating in them, or attempting to abolish existing

institutions or seeking to create new ones. Similarly, revisionism implies breaking the spirit or

letter of the institution, altering their purposes and challenging their legitimacy.

Legitimacy Regimes and Regulative Norms

An emphasis on the intersubjective aspects of norms reminds us that “to an important extent,

institutions may exist in the minds of people and need not be written down anywhere”

(Duffield 2007, 8). Norms cannot be imposed in a straightforward manner but are inculcated

through persuasion, socialisation, and hegemonic imposition. The strength of a norm will

depend on what proportion of the relevant community accepts it, and the intensity with which

it is held (ranging from a contested norm to taken-for-granted norms) (Duffield, 2007: 9).

Evidence for norms can be found in communication and discourse as well as behaviour, but

some norms are so deeply ingrained as to be hard to detect explicitly (Finnemore, 1996: 23).

Behavioural patterns can indicate that an institution in the form of a norm exists, but it cannot

constitute the norm itself (which would be tautologically true). The extent to which a state

sees an institution or norm as legitimate can be operationalised as declarations of support,

ratification of relevant aspects of an institution, active participation, and alteration of existing

behaviour to accord with an institution.

Normative revisionism suggests that the social bases of legitimacy and authority can also

become the targets of rising states’ revisionist or status quo aspirations. This primarily takes

the form of the delegitimation of existing actors or institutions and the attempted legitimation

of a preferred alternative – giving rise to a contending dynamic of the politics of legitimation.

That the targets of the politics of legitimation can be other actors as well as the institutions

themselves (Reus-Smit 2007, 158-9) suggests that this can also be incorporated into a

typology distinguishing relational from institutional dimensions. This is a primarily discursive

process in which states or other actors make normative justifications, enacted through public

rhetoric in the ‘public transcript’ as well as hidden queues of winks and nods embedded in the

‘hidden transcript’. Emphasising that state orientations are always related to the social

environment, these depend heavily on existing patterns of social norms, mores, and

perceptions of appropriateness (Reus-Smit 2007, 163; see also Cox 1981; Finnemore 1996;

Hurd 2007; Reus-Smit 1999; Ruggie 1982, 1998).

States that choose to contest the established norms for the legitimacy of an international

regime and its institutions constitute another element of states’ institution orientations within

global governance.

16

Institutional Contestation

High Low

Intersubjectivity Contest normative order Internalise normative order

Contest Prestige Regimes Acquiesce to Prestige Regimes

International

Organisations

Delegitimate Polity Legitimate Polity

Contest Procedures Defend Procedures

Contest Rules and Policies Accept Rules and Policies

Types of Global Governance Orientations

Combining these two dimensions of a state’s preferences results in an attribute space of

orientations in global governance. A state’s location within the attribute space indicates the

manner in which it combines its exercise of relational and institutional power in global

governance. The row and column concepts describe a state’s behaviour and strategies within

relational and institutional fields of global governance issue areas. This is conceived as a

‘nominal scale’ in which each concept is given a high and low value. Following the advice of

Bailey (1994, 4), the basic requirement of classificatory schemes is that categories should be

mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.

Four ideal types can be identified: revisionist, competitive, satisfied, and concerned citizen.

Ideal types abstract from reality and freeze the motion of history to allow for a clearer

stipulation of differences and a better ability to compare and contrast (Cox 1987, 4). An ideal-

type is the clearest embodiment of a ‘maximal definition’ of a concept, by specifying all of

17

the possible properties associated with a concept (as opposed to the opposite approach of a

‘minimal strategy’ whereby only the minimum criteria that could justify a label are

elaborated) (Gerring and Barresi 2003). The value of ideal-types is the deliberate

“oversimplification of complex, actual situations” (Jackson 2011, 142), and can reveal a

state’s dispositions, in the sense of “propensities to behave in certain ways under certain

conditions” (Wendt 1998, 101). This sort of controlled comparison then allows for

“conceptualizing and describing new empirical developments” (Collier, Laporte, and

Seawright 2008, 163). The result of the application of a typology is the generation of facts, or

“particular ordering of reality in terms of theoretical interest” (Easton 1953, 53; as cited in

Jackson 2011, 145). Any real instance of a state orientation is likely to fall somewhere closer

to the centre of the diagram.

In contrast to traditional realist discussions of revisionist and status quo states, this approach

is bi-dimensional rather than uni-dimensional. The two-dimensional approach here makes

explicit the distinction between conflict based within an existing institutional framework, and

conflict over the institutional framework itself. A simple ‘spectrum’ approach does not clearly

distinguish between states improving their relative positions or engaging in relational power,

and states seeking to change the order itself through institutional power shifts. Further, the

approach presented here goes beyond a simple dichotomous approach, and rather conceives

behaviour along each dimension as an ordinal scale with high and low possible values.33

Furthermore, by identifying a power’s orientation to world order in a specific way, we can

draw on existing theoretical literature associated with such an orientation to build

explanations and expectations associated with each category.

An idealised satisfied power will seek complete cooptation and socialisation by the

established states within existing institutions, while focusing on absolute rather than relative

gains. Status quo orientations are indicated when a state bandwagons with the most powerful,

relies on persuasion and integrative approaches in international negotiations, has a pragmatic

stance on major issues, pursues prestige through integration in elite clubs, and does not worry

about distributional outcomes as long as everyone is better off.

In the existing scholarship on rising powers preferences, it is hard to find advocates for the

idealised status quo interpretation. This is because nearly all observers expect rising powers to

engage in distributional struggles with established states, leading to hard bargaining and

balancing against western dominance. This contrasts with the pattern observed in the cases of

post-war (Western) Germany and Japan, which qualify as the historical paradigmatic cases of

satisfied rising powers. Both countries renounced Great Power competition, accepted existing

normative and institutional orders, and sought integration into elite groups from established

states.

The two clusters of scholarship that come closest to conceiving contemporary rising powers in

status quo terms come from liberal as well as critical authors. Ikenberry has emphasised the

resilience of the existing ‘liberal’ international order and the extensive channels for rising

powers to be integrated and co-opted into the existing western-dominated system (Ikenberry

2005; Ikenberry 2006; Ikenberry and Wright 2008; Ikenberry 2001). This appears to be

exactly what is occurring in the case of India, Brazil and South Africa, according to Ian

33

Stephen Krasner distinguished between ‘relational’ and ‘institutional’ behaviour, but left these as

undifferentiated categories reflecting a ‘1 or 0’ value dichotomy (1985: 117). Here, the x and y axes depict

‘disputes of distribution of resources’ and ‘disputes over regime characteristics’, but rather than formulating a

hypothetical state strategy, the cells are occupied by lists of North-South disputes according to which aspects of

the regime come into dispute.

18

Taylor (Taylor 2009). This conclusion stems from Taylor’s equating the status quo with

economic neoliberalism, leading to the conclusion that because rising states accept and even

want to deepen neoliberalism as a way of wringing concessions from the developed North,

they have adopted a largely status quo inclined policy (see also Harris 2005; Palat 2008;

Pieterse and Rehbein 2008). Nonetheless, each of these authors sees contemporary rising

powers as challenging the established powers in a more fundamental distributive sense than

the countries defeated in the Second World War.

In contrast, a fully revisionist power will seek to mobilise against the established states, adopt

a distributive and hard bargaining mode in international forums, join counter-hegemonic

coalitions, try to change the rules of the game, and articulate alternative visions of world order

that delegitimise the existing order. The traditional notion of ‘spoiling’ international

institutions fits the revisionist category (Kindleberger 1981; Schweller 2011; Schweller and

Pu 2011; Stephen 2012), because it implies that rising powers target not only the distribution

of benefits of a world order but its institutional structure as well. Similarly, an approximation

of rising powers as in some way ‘revisionist’ comes from authors that argue that “competing

conceptions about the appropriate rules for an independent world economy are forming the

dominant fault lines between ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’ states” (Nel and Stephen 2010, 71).

While not a repeat of the revisionist New International Economic Order, the foreign economic

policies of the India, Brazil, and South Africa are seen as preferring not only to increase their

relative positions, but also to “challenge what they perceive to be iniquitous and illegitimate

institutions, practices, and rules of global governance” (Nel and Stephen 2010, 71-2). Other

observers of the ‘IBSA’ states detected a potentially counter-hegemonic ‘deeper structural

analysis’ and critique of existing global governance (Alden and Vieira 2005, 1090), while

China, Brazil and India can be seen as holding a “new vision for globalisation” (Harris 2005).

Meanwhile, studies of rising powers’ challenges to international institutions’ legitimacy (Zürn

and Stephen 2010) similarly indicate a concern for institutional and distributional conflict.

The typology also points in the direction of two other hypothetical orientations which do not

seem immediately obvious. A state with a competitive strategy is distinguished by acquiescing

to the prevailing institutional framework and procedures, but will defend or focus on

increasing its distributional advantages relative to other states. In contrast to the common

assumption that deep challenges to world order are associated with revisionist states bent on

transforming the global order, it is entirely possible that conflicts centring around the

distribution of gains from the system can lead to breakdowns in the norms and procedures

which regulate world order. Vasquez makes this point historically when he explains that

“states need only to be dissatisfied with each other and not with the way the system is being

ruled in order to have a major war” (Vasquez 1996, 41-2). A competitive power does not seek

to challenge or revise the institutional architecture or established rules and norms of

international society, but can engage in strenuous efforts to increase its relative standing. In

this sense even those states that sought to violently overturn the distribution of advantages in

global governance, such as Wilhelmine Germany, were not (as in conventional terminology)

‘revolutionary’ powers, but competitive powers, because they did not really seek to alter the

rules of the game or normative orders of international politics.

Contemporary rising powers have been interpreted in a similar light. For example, in his

article based on a review of the macroeconomic indicators of the rise of regional powers

(China, India, Brazil and South Africa), Robert Kappel argues that “China and other regional

powers will not seek to undermine the capitalist system and the ideas and principals of the

global liberal order, as some authors have argued, but instead will try to gain more leadership

within it” (Kappel 2011, 275). Adroit foreign policies which combine effective counter-

19

hegemonic coalitions and fostering soft power would allow the countries over the next few

decades to “shift global distribution and end Western domination” (Kappel 2011, 284).

Similarly, Hart and Jones see emerging powers as generally more focused on advancing their

own interests and balancing other emerging powers than on creating a new order (Hart and

Jones 2010, 85). The Southern ‘new influentials’ (Lima and Hirst 2006, 27) are therefore seen

primarily to “assume leadership roles in global governance” (Schirm 2009, 198).

It is important to highlight that many authors use the nomenclature of ‘revisionism’ to

describe states with essentially competitive preferences in global governance. ‘Balancing’ can

be defined as a distinct strategy of rising powers, which seeks to develop a counter-power to

the power of established states in global governance, but does not necessarily imply a shift in

the normative or institutional order. Nonetheless, some authors equate balancing with

revisionism because they see it as seeking to transform the polarity of the interstate system

(Schweller and Pu 2011, 46; Flemes 2007, 22; Flemes 2009). Similarly, Narlikar (2010) seeks

to classify the emerging powers of China, India and Brazil according to whether they are

status quo or revisionist, and concludes that India is the most revisionist of them all, but all of

her indicators focus on strategies of relational power and not to the institutional structure of

global governance. I argue, however, that balancing and negotiation strategy is better defined

as part of a competitive orientation of rising powers.

A final hypothesised orientation that the typology indicates is a concerned citizen orientation.

Here a state seeks to alter the institutional structure while focusing nonetheless on absolute

rather than relative gains and seeking cooperation with other states, and thus has some

commonality with notions of middlepowermanship (Cox 1989; Cooper, Higgot and Nossal

1993). Interpretations of major rising powers as ‘middle powers’ come closer to the

concerned citizen type, as when Jordaan argues that all middle powers, including ‘emerging’

middle powers such as Brazil and South Africa, seek to stabilise and legitimise world order,

“typically though multilateral and cooperative initiatives” (2003, 165).34

This conception of

middle powers would also conform to this type, where multilateral efforts in international

institutions provide a more promising strategy than altering the system through changing their

position relative to others.

Conclusion

The full implications of multipolarisation for world politics will be a product not only of the

rise of new powers but of the preferences and demands of rising powers. It has been argued

here that the foreign policy orientations of rising powers is a central component in

determining what kind of order is likely to emerge in the transition. It is therefore important to

develop adequate conceptual tools to be able to describe and understand the orientations of

new powers.

Stipulating its referent object as state preferences as revealed in their behaviour, the notion of

revisionism has served as a useful starting point for developing a much broader typology of

state orientations in global governance. Key here was a distinction between distributional

bargaining and the deployment of relational power, from conflicts over normative and

34

The concerned citizen category may be key to describing the preferences of some small states in global

governance. Small states tend to avoid confrontations where they will be overwhelmed by a deficiency in

relational power, but at the same time work to alter the institutional structure to conform more to their interests

or values. Small states have no realistic hope of ever becoming a Great Power, making their prime concern one

of absolute advantages, but with an obvious interest in a well-institutionalised international system.

20

institutional orders. Thus revisionism denotes states which pursue both a redistribution of

normative and material resources but also to the normative and institutional framework of

global governance. Importantly, the framework elaborated here does not assume that rising

powers will follow a revisionist course. Existing literature is divided on this question.

Conversely, there ought to be no assumption that a dominant state will be a satisfied power.

While the equation of a hegemon with a status quo orientation is often done by definitional

fiat (Kim 1996; Organski 1968), it is more compelling to keep the concepts separate and to

treat this as an empirical question (Chan 2004; Ikenberry and Wright 2008). It is entirely

possible that in response to the rise of new powers, established states adopt a competitive or

revisionist posture in order to maintain their positional advantages. At the same time, one

could detect an essential similarity in the outlooks of both rising and established powers. Only

empirical research guided by sufficient conceptual clarification can identify the preferences of

rising and established powers, the degree of divergence or convergence between them, and the

consequences for the emerging world order.

21

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