Richard of Conington

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RICHARD CROSS

Richard of Conington, Scotuss Coll ationes oxonienses, and the Ontological Status of

Impossibil ia

Scotuss Collatio oxoniensis17 is a curious text.1

It systematically defends a view that Scotushad presented and then taken great pains to reject near the beginning of theLecturaandOrdinatio. Not only does the collatiodefend the view that Scotus attacks: it also provides

responses to Scotuss arguments against the view. And more generally it is committed tophilosophical views that Scotus decisively rejects. For example, the text explicitly rejects

Scotuss understanding of the internal modal structure of essences2; it ascribes some kind ofpositive ontological status not merely to impossibiliabut to nihil(nothing)

3; and it relies on an

analogy to prime mattera notion that Scotus regards as contradictory4. In many ways, the textmoves more in the ambit of Henry of Ghent than of any other thinker.

The view the Scotus describes and rejects in theLecturaand Ordinatiothe view that isdefendedin the collatiois one apparently accepted by Scotuss fellow Franciscan, Richard of

Conington, an early defender of Henry of Ghent

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. In fact, the Collationes oxoniensesseem to beassociated with Conington in various ways. Stephen D. Dumont has shown that Collatiooxoniensis14 systematically responds to a view on the doctrine of the Trinity proposed, in

defence of Henry of Ghent, by Conington, in his Quodlibetal Questions6.Guido Alliney has

demonstrated that Collationes oxonienses18 to 23which notoriously reject Scotuss views onthe willshould be attributed to Conington7. The collationesare records of disputations held inthe Franciscan house at Oxford at a time when Scotus was apparently presentprobablysometime between 1305 and 1307so there seems to be good reason to believe that Coningtonwas a key disputant and that, in at least some of the collationes, Scotus was the opponent.

Indeed, as we shall see, the opponent in Collatio oxoniensis17 repeats Scotuss earlierarguments (in the Ordinatio) against Conington. So it seems reasonable to suppose that Collatio

oxoniensis17 is one such disputation. And if so, we should extend the sequence of collationes

University of Notre Dame, Department of Philosophy, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA.

[email protected] the numbering of the Collationes parisienesand Collationes oxonienses, see F. PELSTER, Handschriftliches

zur berlieferung des Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum undder Collationes des Duns Scotus, 2. DieCollationes Parisienses und Oxonienses,Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 44 (1931) 79-92.Collatio oxoniensis17 isprinted as Collatio35 in Scotus, Opera omnia, Ed. by L. WADDING, Lyons 1639, vol. 3, pp. 417b-420b.2As we shall see below.3Scotus disallows any status to impossibilia: see e.g. Scotus,Reportatio, Ed. by Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V.

Bychkov, Franciscan Institute, St Bonaventure, NY, 2004-2008, Lib. 1, d. 43, q. 1, n. 25, vol. 2, p. 528.4On this, see R. CROSS, The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision , Clarendon

Press, Oxford 1998, pp. 17-205

On this, see nn. 14 and 15 below. For Coningtons life and work, see V. DOUCET, Loeuvre scolastique deRichard de Conington, O.F.M.,Archivum franciscanum historicum, 29 (1936) 397-422. Briefly, Conington was

studying at Oxford in 1300, and lectured on the Sentencesin 1302-1303 (though these lectures are now sadly lost);

he became Master of Theology at Oxford in 1306, and was Provincial Master of the English Franciscans between

1310 and 1316. He died in 1330.6See S.D. DUMONT, William of Ware, Richard of Conington and the Collationes Oxoniensesof John Duns

Scotus, in L. HONNEFELDER,R. WOOD,M. DREYER(eds.),John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, Brill,

Leiden 1996, pp. 59-85 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 53).7See G. ALLINEY, The Treatise on the Human Will in the Collationes oxonienses Attributed to John DunsScotus,Medioevo, 30 (2005) 209-269.


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attributed to Conington to include not merely Collationes18 to 23, but also Collatio17 too. At

any rate, I treat the text as providing a defence of Coningtons view and, indeed, by far thefullest account we have of itand simply ascribe it to him in what follows. From a purelysubjective viewpoint (for what it is worth), I would add that the text exhibits little of the

meticulous attention to philosophical technique that is so conspicuous in Scotus. Key theories are

undermotivated; positions are not very fully worked out; there are confusions that it would behard to credit Scotus with; and (at least on anything other than a very charitable reading) theproposed solution to a central problem (reference to the impossible) amounts to little more than

to giving the issue a label. In what follows, I trace the development of the debate, starting from

the presentation in the Ordinatio. Before I do that, however, I will sketch briefly the context ofthe question (section 1), and the philosophical background necessary for understanding the issues

(section 2).

1. The Theological Context: The Image of the Trinity

The question under discussion in Collatio oxoniensis17 is the question of the way in which a

creature is an imagea vestigiumof the Trinity. More precisely, which feature of a creatureconstitutes the vestigium? The starting point is Augustine, according to whom each creature is insome way a representation of the divine Trinity. Each creature has unity, form, and order, and

Augustine takes these features to constitute a trace or footprint of the Trinitya vestigiumTrinitatis

8. When Scotus discusses this Augustinian passage in his Oxford Sentence

commentaries, he reports at length the views of an anonymous contemporary. Part of the view

relates the notion of the vestigium Trinitatisto a distinction Henry of Ghent makes between two

senses of thing (res): a wide sense of res as the thinkable(with the proposed spuriousetymology, that res derives from reor (I think), and a narrower sense of res as the

possible. Possible essences have what Henry labels ratitudo, a neologism formed from the

supine of reori.e. ratum, something thought ofthat is supposed by Henry to indicatesomething of which God has an idea, given that divine ideas encompass only possible essences

9.

The first sense of resincludes not merely allpossibilia, but impossible things too. Given all this,

the view that Scotus reports claims that the vestigium Trinitatisshould be identified as anessences ratitudo, and that this ratitudois essentially something relational, an essencesparticipation in God

10. This is precisely the question raised in Collatio oxoniensis17: Utrum

vestigium sit ratitudo?whether the vestigium Trinitatisshould be identified as an essencesratitudo. The view is rejected in the Ordinatio, but defended in the collatio.

8Augustine,De trinitate, Ed. by W.J. MOUNTAIN,CCSL, vol. 50, Turnholt, Brepols 1968, Lib. VI, c. 10, 12.9On this, see R. CROSSHenry of Ghent on the Reality of Non-existent PossiblesRevisited,Archiv frGeschichte der Philosophie, 92 (2010) 115-132. The term ratitudo seems to have been coined by Bonaventure:

see his Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, d. 25, dub. 3, in Bonaventure, Opera omnia, Collegium

Sancti Bonaventurae, Qaracchi, 1882-92, vol. 1, p. 446. On this, see J.A. AERTSEN, Transcendental Thought inHenry of Ghent, W. VANHAMEL(ed.),Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the

Occasion on the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293), Leuven University Press, Leuven 1996), pp. 1-18 (Ancient

and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Series 1, 15 ). For Henrys discussions, see Henry of GhentSumma quaestionum ordinariarum(SQ), Paris 1520, a. 21, q. 2, vol. 1, f. 124I-O; a. 28, q. 4, vol. 1, f. 167T-V; a.

34, q. 2, vol. 1, f. 212R-S; a. 75, q. 6, vol. 2, f. 312E; Quaestiones quodlibetales(Quod.), Paris 1518, III, q. 9, f.

61OI-P; V, q. 2, f. 154D; VI, q. 3, f. 221G; VII, qq. 1-2, fo. 258B: I have borrowed this list from S.F. BROWNand

S.D. DUMONT, Univocity of the Concept of Being, III, Mediaeval Studies, 51 (1989) 1-129 (p. 10, n. 13).10See Scotus, Ordinatio(Ord.), Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 304, in Scotus, Opera omnia,Ed. by C. BALI,Typis

polyglottis Vaticanis, Rome 1950-2013, vol. 3, pp. 185-186.


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We know from other sources that the view that ratitudois essentially something

relational was defended by Conington. He used the view to counter an attack made by Scotus on

Henrys theories about religious language. According to Henry, concepts signifying God andcreatures are analogous, with nothing univocal in common

11. Scotus objects: if they have nothing

univocal in common, how can a creature ever come to know anything of the divine nature12

?

Coningtons proposed solution is reported in an anonymous Scotistic question on the univocityof being edited by Stephen F. Brown and Stephen D. Dumont:

Conington, however, wanting to save Henry in a different way, replied in a different way to this argument,

by showing how, even though the concept of being is not common univocally to God and creature,

nevertheless the concept of a creature can cause proper knowledge of a concept about God. Which he states

in this way: ens ratumor being (ens) said from ratitudo(which is distinguished from being that is merely

thinkable (opinabile) or that is said from reor-reris, which is the same as opinor-opinaris), this ens ratum, I

say, causes in our intellect knowledge of itself to the extent that it is an ens ratum. But since to the extent

that it is an ens ratumit implies a relation to the first being from which it gains its being an ens ratum(as it

is related to it [viz. the first being] under the relation of formal exemplar cause), by conceiving an ens

ratumas an ens ratumit is not conceived under an absolute notion but under a relational one. Then they

[viz. Conington] further conclude: If in conceiving an ens ratumas ratumthere is not conceived anything

under an absolute notion but rather [something under a notion] that is relational [relating] to the firstbeing, then, since a relation in one extreme naturally causes in the intellect a concept of the other extreme,or a concept of the relation corresponding to it in the other extreme, in conceiving an ens ratumas ratum

there will be caused in our intellect a concept of the first being. And thus it will be possible to have,

through the concept of a creature, a concept proper to the first being, notwithstanding the fact that they

share no concept of being univocally13.

The idea is that real essences have ratitudoa relation to God as formal or exemplar cause andthat this distinguishes them from things that are merely thinkablefor example, impossibilia. Soif we understand a real essence, we will understand its ratitudo, and this will give us knowledge

of God under a certain conceptone derived from the creaturely essenceeven though thatconcept is not univocally common to God and creatures.

Given all this, it seems a reasonable inferenceand it is made both by Brown andDumont, on the one hand14, and the Vatican editors, on the other15that the view that thevestigium Trinitatisis identified as ratitudoshould be ascribed to Conington, and that Scotuss

11 See Henry, SQ, q. 21, a. 2, vol. 1, f. 124O.12Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2 nn. 35-36, vol. 3, pp. 21-24; Lib. 1, d. 8, p. 1, q. 2, nn. 51-55, vol. 4, pp.

173-177.13Conington tamen aliter volens salvare Gandavensem aliter repondet ad istam rationem, declarando quomodo non

obstante quod conceptus entis non sit communis univoce Deo et creaturae, nihilominus tamen conceptus creaturae

potest causare notitiam proprii conceptus de Deo. Quod declarat sic: ens ratum sive ens dictum a ratitudine quoddistinguitur contra ens tantum opinabile sive dictum a reor-reris, quod idem est quod opinor-opinaris tale, dico, ensratum causat in intellectu nostro notitiam de se in quantum est ens ratum. Cum autem in quantum est ens ratum dicat

respectum ad ens primum a quo habet quod sit ens ratum, ut refertur ad ipsum sub habitudine causae formalisexemplaris, concipiendo ens ratum ut ens ratum non concipitur sub ratione absoluta sed sub ratione respectiva.Tunc deducunt ultra: Si concipiendo ens ratum ut ratum non concipitur aliquid sub ratione absoluta sed respectivaad primum ens, cum relatio in uno extremo habeat causare in intellectu conceptum alterius extremi sive conceptum

relationis correspondentis sibi in altero extremo, concipiendo ens ratum ut ratum causabitur in intellectu nostro

conceptus entis primi. Et ita poterit haberi conceptus propius de ente primo per conceptum creaturae, non obstante

quod in nullo conceptu communi univoce communicant: Anonynous,De conceptibus transcendentibus, q. 1, ll.588-604 (ed. BROWNand DUMONT, Univocity of the Concept of Being, pp. 56-57).14BROWNand DUMONT,Univocity of the Concept of Being, pp. 11-12.15See the editorial comments in Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. 16, p. 312, n. T1.


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discussion in the Ordinatio(and the more compressed discussion in theLectura) represents a

summary of Coningtons view.

2. Philosophical Background: Henry of Ghent onResandEssentia(Thing and Essence)

The background to the distinction (proposed by Henry and adopted by Conington) betweendifferent senses of res is a concept that Avicenna bequeathed to the Western medievalphilosophers. According to Avicenna, a universal is what can be predicated of many; as such,

it includes neither its existence in a singular, nor its existence as a concept. Avicenna illustrates

this with an example that was famous in the later Middle Ages: horseness, the nature of horse:

In itself, [horseness] is nothing at all except horseness; for, in itself, it is neither many nor one, and exists

neither in sensible things nor in the soul, existing in none of these things either in potency or in act, such

that [these ways of existing] are included in the essence of horseness. Rather, in terms of itself, it is only

horseness. Rather, oneness is an attribute that conjoins with horseness, whereby horseness becomes one

because of this attribute. Similarly, in addition to this attribute, horseness has many other attributes that are

accidental to it. Thus, horsenesson the condition that, in its definition, it corresponds to many things becomes general16.

The idea is that horseness, as such, is simply the essential properties of horses; it exists in horses

provided that there are horses, and it exists in the soul, as a concept, provided that someone isthinking of it. Neither does horseness, as such, include any kind of unity or multiplicity.

Provided that there is one horse it is one, and provided that there is more than one horse it is

manyas many as there are horses.This is relevant because the things that have ratitudo, according to Henry, are precisely

Avicennian essences. But the Avicennian doctrine is rather problematic, because we seem here

to be able to refer to something (horseness in itself) that does not exist, and that is neither

potential nor actual. In his discussion of Avicennas three-fold consideration of the nature,Henry, holds that existing as a universalwith esse rationis, in the mindand as a particular

with esse existentiae, in extramental realityare extrinsic to the nature in itself. But, followingAlbert the Great, he goes on to assert nevertheless that the nature in itself has some kind of beingesse essentiae, somehow distinct from the esse naturaeor esse existentiaethat it has as realizedin things and from the esse rationisthat it has in the mind

17. He argues that the domain of things

with esse essentiaeencompasses all possible being, and he contrasts this domain with the merelythinkable. As he sees it, for a particular to have esse essentiaeis for it to be related to divine

formal causality; and for it to have esse existentiaeis for it to be related to divine efficient

causality18. And all of this ties in naturally with Henrys account of the different senses of

thing (res), discussed above, giving us the following division, in order of increasingrestriction:

Res(1), res a reor: including the merely thinkable. The merely thinkable lacks any kindof esse.

16Avicenna,Metaphysics, L. 5, c. 1, Ed. by S. van RIET, PeetersBrill, LouvainLeiden, 1977-1983, vol. 2, p. 228, l.32-p. 229, l. 40; translation in The Metaphysics of The Healing, Ed. by M.E. MARMURA, Brigham Young University

Press, Provo 2005, p. 149, slightly altered.17On this, see my Henry of Ghent on the Reality of Non-existent Possibles, pp. 121-126.18See Henry, Quod. 10, q. 9, in Henry, Opera omnia, Ed. by R. MACKENet al., Leuven University Press, Leuven

1979-, vol. 14, p. 151, l. 48-p. 152, l. 63; also Henry, Quod. 1, q. 9 vol. 5, p. 55, ll. 96-20.


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Res(2), res a ratitudine: including possible being, related to a divine idea or to God as

formal cause; and what is or has esse essentiae.

Esse existentiae: had by actually existing particulars.

Henry holds that the second sense of rescovers both possible essences (with esse essentiae) and

existent particulars with both esse essentiaeand esse existentiae.Now, Henry holds that there is a merely rational distinction between an essence and itsesse essentiae

19. But, as Conington sees, the conjunction of this claim with the view that esse

essentiaeconsists in a relation to divine formal causality generates a problem. If an essence is

just its participated esse, formally20

, then it seems that a creaturely essence is an ungrounded,free-floating, relation

21indeed, a relation that grounds a further relation (esse existentiae). And

it does not seem possible that there are such ungrounded relations. Conington discerns a second

difficulty in Henrys view, too: what should we say about the ontological status of things that arethings merely in the first sensethings that lack ratitudosince, it seems, we can refer to them?As he sees it, these two questions can both be answered in much the same way. The solution to

the first question occurs in both texts (Ordinatio, collatio); the second is found only in the later,

collatio, discussion. It is to all this that I now turn.

3. The Discussion in the Ordinatio

3.1. Coningtons Theory

Coningtonstheory develops an inchoate suggestion of Henrys that I have not thus fardiscussed. Henry argues that, since it is resin the second sensei.e. essencethat constitutessomething as real, we might think of essence as grounding the relation of esse existentiae. As

Henry sees it, we can refer to an essence as a something: essence constitutes an object as a

something, or gives it somethingnessaliquitas22.An essence, as aliquitas, grounds the actualexistence of a particular.

Conington uses the notion of aliquitas, but in a slightly different way. As he sees it, we

do not merely need something to ground esse existentiae; we need something to ground esse

essentiaetoo. And aliquitasis what performs this latter role. Thus, in answer to the questionabout the vestigium Trinitatis, Conington (as reported by Scotus) reasons that the vestigium

consists in the relation to God as formal causei.e. in ratitudoand that aliquitasis the groundof that relation:

It is said, according to Boethius,De hebdomadibus, that quo estand quod estare diverse, because that by

which (quo) something is is called its ratitudo, and that by which something is a that which is (quod est)

or a thing (quid) is called its aliquitas. With this understood, it is said that the vestigial relation ( respectus

vestigialis) in a creature is not grounded in the things ratitudobut merely in aliquitas, and is formally itsratitudo23.

19See e.g. Henry, Quod. 1, q. 9, vol. 5, p. 55, ll. 96-97.20Henry, Quod. 1, q. 9, vol. 1, p. 55, ll. 98-99.21Henry asserts that essences are non-relational at Quod. 9, q. 2, vol. 13, p. 21, ll. 48-52. But he gives no account of

how this is supposed to work.22See Henry, Quod. 11, q. 11, f. 466rO. The passage is pointed out by BROWNand DUMONT,Univocity of the

Concept of Being, p. 11, n. 40.23Dicitur secundum BoethiumDe hebdomadibusquod diversum est quo est et quod est, quia illud quo aliquid estdicitur ratitudo eius, quo autem ipsum est quod est vel quid dicitur aliquitas eius. Hoc intellecto, dicitur quod


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So aliquitasis the ground of an essencesrelation (to God as formal cause), and esse essentiaeisnot just a free-floating relation, as it seems to be in Henry.

But reflection on Avicennasview on common natures forces some further modificationsto Henrys viewtoo:

According to Avicenna,MetaphysicsV, humanity is merely humanity. Therefore the notion of humanityis not a res rata. Therefore it is necessary that humanity is an ens ratumby something else, outside of its

formal notion24.

To be an ens ratumor res ratais to bepossible: to have a relation to God as formal cause.Aliquitas(essence)groundsthis relation, and being possibleis thus not included in the notion of

essence as such. According to both Scotus and Henry, being possible is included in the notion of

an essence. So this interpretation of Avicenna distances Conington from Henry indeed,Conington adopts this view, as far as I can see, precisely to deal with the residual worry aboutfree-floating relations that seems to be implicit in Henrys opinion. Henrys view is not thatratitudosomehow inheres in an essence; rather, it is included in it, as it were. As Henry puts it,

an essence is just its participated esse: an essence is just its ratitudo. For Conington,contrariwise, an essence underliesits ratitudo.

3.2. Scotuss Objections

All this might suggest that Coningtons aliquitasis just Henrys res a reor, Henrys first sense ofresthough, as we shall see, Conington rejects this association in the collatio, and in doing sois able to offer some considerable refinement to his theory. Be this as it may, Scotus in theOrdinatiouses the identification of aliquitasand res a reorin a reductioagainst Coningtonsview. He makes the point using what we learn elsewhere (I quoted the relevant passage above) is

Coningtons modification of Henrys vocabulary:

In place of these terms, I choose clearer words: for res derived from reor I understand thinkable reality(realitatem opinabilem), which is common (according to [Richard]) to impossible things and non-

impossible things (figmentis et non figmentis); for res derived from ratitudo I understand, according to

his intention, quidditative reality, because he posits that a quidditative thing is ratumin virtue of its having

a divine exemplar (est exemplatum), which does not pertain to impossible things. Beyond this, there is

merely the reality of actual existence. Therefore we have these three things, in order: thinkable reality,

quidditative reality, and existent reality25.

respectus vestigialis in creatura non fundatur in ratitudine rei sed in aliquitate tantum, et est formaliter ratitudo eius:

Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 302, vol. 3, 1845; see too Scotus [Conington], Collationes oxonienses(Coll. ox.), 17, n. 1, vol. 3, p. 417b.24

Secundum Avicennam VMetaphysicae, humanitas est tantum humanitas: ergo ratio humanitatis non est resrata; ergo oportet quod aliquo alio extra rationem formalem humanitatis sit ens ratum: Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p.

2, q. un., n. 303, vol. 3, p. 185; see too Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox.q. 17, n. 10, vol. 3, p. 419b, quoted below.25Loco istorum verborum accipio verba planiora: pro re dicta a reriaccipio realitatem opinabilem, quaecommunis estsecundum ipsumfigmentis et non figmentis; pro re dicta a ratitudine accipio, secundumintentionem suam, realitatem quiditativam, quia ponit rem quidaitativam esse ratam per hoc quod est exemplata,

quod non convenit figmentis. Ultra ista non restat nisi realitas actualis exsistentiae. Habemus igitur tria, per ordinem:

realitatem opinabilem, quiditativam et exsistentiae: Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 310, vol. 3, pp. 188-

189. Henry himself uses [esse] secundum opinionem tantum at Quod. 7, qq. 1-2, ad 2, vol. 9, p. 27. But the usage

seems to be particularly associated with Conington.


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The various objections shared by both the Ordinatioand collatio. I basically give the objections

in their collatioforms since these are rather shorter and neater than the earlier, Ordinatio,

version, though I supplement from the Ordinatioas necessary.

Objection 1

Given this terminology, which Conington accepts, the first objection runs as follows:

Either this aliquitasis [merely] thinkable (opinabile)and then, since this is nothing, and a fiction,ratitudois founded in nothingor this aliquitasis a quidditative thing, and, since every such thing isratum, it follows that ratitudois grounded on ratitudo, and thus the same thing on itself, and thus there will

be a regress to infinity26.

The Ordinatioexplains why the merely thinkable is nothing: because it is common to

something and nothing27

. As Scotuss gloss on the language makes clear, ratitudois what wemight call a possibility-relation: a relation to divine exemplary causality in virtue of which the

possessor of the ratitudois possible. So we can put the objection in still more accessible

language, something like this. Either aliquitasis nothing, in which case an essences possibility-relation is grounded in nothing (and any composite including aliquitasis nothing); or itintrinsically includes a possibility-relation, and since anything including a possibility-relation is

intrinsically possible, its possibility-relation is grounded on itself.

Objection 2

Again, the collatiogives a much tighter version of a rather weak Ordinatioobjection. In theOrdinatioScotus tries to show that humanity must include its ratitudoby arguing that any

essence has a concept that is either (1) non-repugnant to esse, or (2) repugnant to esse, or (3)

includes esse. Since humanity cannot of itself include essesince it would then be Godorexclude essesince it could then not be instantiatedhumanity must of itself [be] non-repugnant to esse: and thus it includes possibility and therefore ratitudo28.

Conington would, I think, not unreasonably suppose that the question had been begged

against him, since that humanity is of itselfnon-repugnant to essethat its possibility and thusratitudois included in itis precisely what Scotus needs to show. But in the collatioweencounter a much more compelling version of what I take to be much the same objection. The

worry is this: if an essence does not include its ratitudo, can there be any distinction in modalcontent between an aliquitasand an essence? There ought to be, since some aliquitatesare

impossible, but no essence is impossible:

Either aliquitasdetermines esseto itself, so that esseis enclosed in its notion (intentione), and then it would

always be, and would be God; or it determines non-essein its notion, and then it cannot be brought about;

26Illa aliquitas aut est opinabile, et tunc, cum tale sit fictitium et nihil, ratitudo fundatur in nihil, et fictitio, aut

aliquitas est res quiditativa, et cum omnis talis sit res rata, sequitur quod ratitudo fundatur in ratitudine, et ita item in

se, et sic erit processus in infinitum: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox.17, n. 1 [obj. 1], vol. 3, p. 417a; see Scotus, Ord.

Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., nn. 311-313, vol. 3, pp. 189-90.27. . . cum illa sit communis alicui et nihilo: Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 311, vol. 3, p. 189.28Scotus, Ord. L. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 314, vol. 3, pp. 190-191.


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or it is indifferent to esseand non-esse. But every such thing is absolute, and thus has an exemplar, since it

is not a fiction. Therefore [ratitudois not distinct from aliquitas]29.

Anything that is is indifferent to esseand non-esse is absolute, because anything that is not

absolute is a relation, and, presumably, on Coningtons Henrician theory of relations, relationsare modes and thus, strictly speaking, do not fall under the scope of things that could be said to

have or not to have esse.

Objection 3

Again, I give this in the sharper collatioversion:

The Philosopher, inMetaphysicsIV, reduces those who claim that all appearances are true to this . . .

[impossibility], that all things are relational. But there is no difficulty in everything being relative

denominatively, since all things are either cause or caused. Therefore it is . . . [impossible] that all things

are essentially relational. Therefore a relation is not that in virtue of which things are ratae, as the first

position posits30.

The argument is from authority: if all appearances are true, then relativism is true31

. Clearly,Scotus is giving the text a very different spin from the reading suggested by its anti-Protagorean

context. His reasoning is not that relativism is false (though doubtless he believed it was), butthat it is false that all things are relational. Clearly, the objection runs, it is not false that all things

are related (e.g. causally); so, given the Aristotelian authority, thus interpreted, it must be false

that any essence isa relation, or includesa relation in its intension.

Objection 4

According to Conington, ratitudois that by which something is formally actual; from whichScotus infers (on Coningtons behalf) that ratitudois the basic power by means of which things

act. But, Scotus objects, Conington holds that nothing acts by means of a relation. From which itfollows that ratitudocannot be a relation, on pain of incoherence

32.

4. Coningtons Theory, and the Replies to Scotus, in the collatio

The collatiopresents these objections in one shape or another, and systematically replies to them.The key objection, as I suggested, is the first. I begin by giving the rather lean reply, since it

outlines the theory in barest form, and then, before considering the replies to the remaining

objections, present a sequence of passages that put a bit more flesh on the bones (as we shall see,

29

Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 1 [obj. 3], vol. 3, p. 417b.30Philosophus, IVMetaphysicae, reducit dicentes omnia apparentia esse vera ad hoc inconveniens, quod omnia

sunt ad aliquid. Sed omnia esse ad aliquid denominative non est inconveniens, cum omnia sint vel causa, vel

causatum. Ergo est inconveniens quod omnia sunt ad aliquid essentialiter. Ergo respectus non est illud quo res sunt

ratae, sicut ponit positio prima: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 1 [obj. 7] (Wadding, III, 417b); see Scotus,

Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 315 (Vatican, III, 191192); I take from the Ordinatioversion the claim that it isimpossiblefor all things to be relative.31See Aristotle,MetaphysicsIV, c. 6 (1011a19-20).32See Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 320, vol. 3, pp. 193-194); Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 1 [obj.

4], vol. 3, p. 417b.


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the reply to the objection provides the main focus for the theoretical developments to the notion

of aliquitasproposed in the collatio).

4.1. Reply to Objection 1

So, first, the rather lean reply:

To the first argument against [my view] (what is understood by aliquitas): I say that aliquitasdoes not

determine to itself the notion of being thinkable ( intentionem opinabilis)whether [the notion] of ratitudoor simply ratiobut determines to itself being signifiable by a name 33.

The idea is that aliquitasis not intrinsically thinkable in either of Henrys two senses (ratitudoorreorhere signified by ratio). What it is intrinsically is merely what can be signified.Aliquitasis just asignification. So a ratitudois not grounded on itself, but on an aliquitas, on asignification; and, incidentally, being ratumbeing thinkable in the broadest senseis likewisegrounded on aliquitason a signification. This reply, in effect, gives Coningtons viewin nuce.But, clearly, there is a lot more that could be said, and before considering replies to the other

objections, I try to complete the account of Coningtons theory.

4.2. Conington onaliquitas

According to the reply just given, an aliquitasis a signification, in itself distinct from, and

underlying, the thinkable. In distinguishing the signifiable from the thinkable, Conington makes

an important semantic assumption that he has perhaps derived from Scotus: namely, that we cansignify things that we cannot think:

Imposing a word is conventional (ad placitum): therefore we can impose a name on something that we

neither know nor understand to be something intelligible, but merely on something that we understand to be

signifiable. For example, no one understands nothing(nihil), but we can signify that nothing is, and we can

understand that it can be signified, even though it does not then follow, from the fact that it can beunderstood to be signifiable, that it is intelligible 34.

According to Conington, aliquitatesare significations, and even nihilis an aliquitas.Since the domain of aliquitasis maximally general, Conington takes it to include both

non-relational and relational items. So it is (of itself) neither non-relational nor relational. But it

is, he avers, somethingpositive:

Aliquitasis neither something absolute, nor a relation, but it is merely aliquitas. And aliquitaswhat canbe signified by a nameis either something positive or not. I say that it is something positive, but by this

33Ad primum in oppositum, quid intelligitur per aliquitatem: dico quod aliquitas non determinat sibi intentionem

opinabilis, nec ratitudinis, nec rationis, sed determinat sibi esse significabile per nomen: Scotus [Conington], Coll.

ox. 17, n. 11 [ad 1], vol. 3, p. 420a.34Imponere nomen est ad placitum: ideo possumus nomen imponere ei quod non cognoscimus, nec intelligimus, ut

quoddam intelligibile, sed ei quod intelligimus esse quoddam significabile. Exemplum: nullus intelligit nihil, et

tamen nihil esse significabile, licet non sequatur: tunc, est intelligibile significabile, ergo est intelligibile: Scotus

[Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 10, vol. 3, p. 419b.


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positive thing I understand neither absolute nor relational being, but only what can be signified by a

name35.

An aliquitasis a signification, and significations are positive things, not negations. In this sense,

again, even nihil, as a mere signification, is something positive36

. As Conington puts it elsewhere

in the question, Anything (omne) that can be signified by a name is something (aliquid) on

which we can impose a name37and all signs need significations. So anything with (or this is)an aliquitasis a positive item in the sense of being a signification. And anything that can be

signifiedincluding nihiland the impossibleis like this. Both nihiland the impossible arepositive significations, and in this sense each issomething(aliquid): each has or is an aliquitas.

So we learn from this that aliquitasgrounds a relation merely in the sense that it is something

positive, not in the sense that it is something non-relational: as we shall see in a moment, itbecomes (as it were) something non-relational only to the extent that it grounds a relation.

But claiming that ratitudois grounded on aliquitasseems to lay Conington vulnerable to

the first horn of the dilemma in Scotuss objection: Scotuss worry that, since aliquitasis nothingreal, a composite that includes aliquitaswill itself be nothing. Conington distinguishes twosenses of nihil: absolute non-being, and the equivocal non-being that belongs to what has

pure potentialityfor example, prime matter as the philosophers speak of matter, as in potencyto all forms

38. And, as should be clear from what has been said thus far, the set of aliquitates

includes both kinds of nihil. According to Conington, Man is composed from being and non-being, not absolutely, but from being and what is of itself equivocally non-being, with positive

entity which receives esse, like matter39

. As this makes clear, aliquitasand ratitudoform a real

extramental composite, just as in the case of matter with form. And just as with prime matter,aliquitasis in some sense utterly unformed (omnino informis)

40. A signification with ratitudo

with a relation to Gods formal causality is a possible essence. And if the kind ofcomposition that philosophers posit between prime matter and form is possible, then the kind of

composition that Conington posits herebetween potency and actis also possible. And thisexplains, incidentally, how something intrinsically neither relational nor non-relational can

ground a relation: matter in itself lacks being, but gains it from form: it has extramental being(esse) through something else, namely, through the being (esse) of the form

41; likewise, I take

35Aliquitas nec est aliquid absolutum, nec respectus, sed tantum aliquitas et significabile per nomen aliquitas, autest aliquid positivum, aut non. Dico quod positivum, sed per illud positivum non intelligo nec ens absolutum nec

respectum sed tantum significabile per nomen: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 11 [ad 2], vol. 3, p. 420a.36I warned that there were going to be philosophical problems in Coningtons view, andthis might be one. What isnot clear to me is whether Conington is committed to treating nihilas a nounsomething that, of course, wascommon in medieval parlance, but that might lead to deep confusion here (much like the one that Carnap found in

Heideggers Das Nichts nichtet: assuming that das Nichts namessomething). At any rate, Conington treats nihilas being a (positive) signification, which he clearly ought not do: properly construed, any sentence containing nihil

can be recast as a negation, and the signification of nihilis parasitic on the signification of perfectly intelligible

affirmations.37Omne significabile per nomen est esse aliquid cui possumus nomen imponere: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17,

n. 10, vol. 3, p. 419b.38Loquor sicut Philosophi loquuntur de materia, ut in potentia ad omnes formas: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17,

n. 5, vol. 3, p. 418b.39Homo componitur ex ente et non ente, non absolute, sed ex ente et non ente de se aequivoce, cum entitate

positiva, quae esse recipit, sicut materia prima: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 12 (Wadding, III, 420a).40Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox.17, n. 5, vol. 3, p. 418b.41[Habet ] esse extra per aliquid aliud scilicet per esse ipsius formae: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 12 [ad

3], vol. 3, p. 420b.


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it, aliquitassomehow gains its status as the non-relational ground of a relation precisely through

the relation itself. Perhaps the idea is that relations require foundationsrelations attractfoundations; hence once we have a relation, we have a foundation: namely, aliquitas

42.

The analogy has its limits, of course. Conington does not note, though he could have, that

the notion of pure potency requires capacity for receiving just any form whatsoevera capacity

that aliquitaspresumably lacks, whatever Conington may or may not have meant by claimingthat it is utterly unformed. Equally, significations differ in kind in a way that prime matter orpure potency surely cannot.

The analogy to matter helps us understand the way in which Conington interpretsAvicennas claims about common natures such as humanity and horseness and as I see it thisAvicennian material motivates Coningtons thoughts on the status of impossibilia. According toConington, Avicennian natures are nothing: A bare quiddity, without esse is nothingneither an ens rationis, nor something ratumand for this reason is merely something that canbe signified by a name

43. For something to be (merely) an ens rationisis for it to be (merely)

thinkable. Bare quiddities are not entia rationis, so it turns out that they underlie both their

possibility and their conceivability44

.Impossibiliaare thinkable: they are (merely) significations

that can be understood: mere intensions, we might say, with no relation to divine formalcausality.

A little earlier, Conington relates the point explicitly to Avicennas discussion, buildingon the rather brief account that Scotus reports in the Ordinatio:

Humanity is merely aliquitas. . . and aliquitasdetermines no esseto itself: it will be neither an ens rationis

in the intellect, nor an ens ratum. Whence Avicenna,MetaphysicsV: Horseness is just horseness, neither

one, nor many, neither actual nor in potency, neither in the intellect, nor outside [the intellect]: therefore

humanity, as such, is in no way a being, whether an ens rationisor [an ens] ratum, but merely determines

to itself consignifiability, namely that it is signifiable by a name. But it is not determined to itself that it is

intelligible: for to signify those things that are not but that can be is not to understand things other than

those that exist45.

42This is clearly not a strong position. Presumably what motivates the original claim that aliquitasis neitherrelational nor non-relationalis that we can signify relationspresumably, even impossible ones. But Henry woulddeny that relations are essences, or that they have relations to divine formal causality, since they are just modes. For

useful discussion, see M. HENNINGER,Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, pp.

52-8. For Henry, then, the question of a relationsrelation to Gods formal causality its ratitudowould neverarise in the first place.43Quidditas omnino nuda praeter esse nihil est, nec ens rationis, nec ratum, ideo tantum significabile per nomen:

Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 10, vol. 3, p. 419b.44Conington sometimes claims that matter without form is merely in the soul (Scotus, [Conington], Coll. ox. 17,

n. 5, vol. 3, p. 418b), or that it has of itself no essein an effect, but only in the soul (Scotus, [Conington], Coll. ox.

17, n. 12. vol. 3, p. 420a), or that with every form circumscribed matter is a being ( ens) in the intellect (Scotus,

[Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 14, vol. 3, p. 420b). But these claims are about matter as cognized; presumably, like analiquitas, it lacks any kind of being absent either existence in the mind or existence in reality.45Humanitas est aliquitas tantum . . . sic aliquitas nullum esse sibi determinat, nec erit in intellectu ens rationis, nec

esse ratum. Unde Avicenna, VMetaphysicae, Equinitas est tantum equinitas, nec una, nec multae, nec actu, necpotentia, nec in intellectu, nec extra: ideo humanitas ut sic nullo modo est ens, nec rationis, nec ratum, sed tantumdeterminat sibi consignificabilitatem, quod scilicet sit significabile per nomen. Et hoc non est determinatum sibi,

quod est intelligbile, Est enim significare quae non sunt et possunt esse; non autem est intelligere, nisi quae sunt:

Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 10, vol. 3, p. 419b. At the ellipsis I omit a clause that contradicts the rest of the

argument and must be a mistake. An analogous mistake occurs in the manuscript I checked too (see MS Oxford,

Magdalen College, 194, f. 92va), so Coningtons exact sense will have to await a critical edition.


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An essence does not include its ratitudo, its possibility-relation, since what an essence includes is

just a set of essential properties, and modal properties such as possibility are supposed to

supervene on these. So an essence underlies its ratitudo, its possibility-relation. What an essenceincludes is just signifiability: it is just a signification. The idea, I think, is that being signifiable is

the most general predicate, true of literally anything (aliquid); so an essence, since it is aliquid,

must include this. The reason that modal propertiessuperveneon essence as such, rather thanbeing somehow included in it, is that possibility is a relationto God; thus if essence includedpossibility, it would include a relation, and thus bea relation. And this is the rejected view

ascribed to Henrythat essences are free-floating relations.What we learn from the discussion of Avicennian essences is that part of Scotuss

disagreement with Conington stems from their views on the nature of possibility. For Conington,

as for Henry, possibility consists in a relation to a divine idea; for Scotus, contrariwise,

possibility is simply internal non-repugnance: the lack of internal incompossibility. As Scotus

puts it, essences are formally possible from themselves46

. In line with this, Scotus holds thatAvicennian essences intrinsically include their modal propertiesthe modal properties do notsupervene on them in any way. Accordingly, he offers a different interpretation of Avicennas

influential analysis:In [Avicennas] saying, horseness is just horseness, he does not exclude those things the of themselvesbelong to the notion of horseness (such as entitas rata), but he excludes those things which are passions of

being, such as one, act, and so onas is clear from what he says47.

This disagreement between Scotus and Conington goes to the heart of their divergent views on

the foundations of modality, and there is probably nothing much more to be said about it here.As we just saw, what distinguishes nihilfrom impossibiliais conceivability: impossibilia

are, and nihilis not, thinkable. So impossibiliaare (merely) thinkable significations. And, as I

suggested above, I think Conington supposes that an impossible object is a composite of a

signification and conceivability, but lacking ratitudoand thus possible or actual existence. At

one point, he presents an objection (Scotuss, presumably) to the view that humanity does notinclude conceivability by claiming that it includes definability, and that definability presupposesconceivability

48. The reply rejects the claim that humanity includes definability, since, if it did,

any knowable signification (Coningtonsexample is chimera) could be definedand (accordingto Conington) impossibiliacannot be defined

49. As we learn from the account of a reply to an

analogous objection given in the Ordinatio, Conington holds that definitions must include not

merely genus and difference (since impossibilia, according to him, can have genus anddifference), but also ratitudo

50. But the point is that humanity does not of itself include

conceivability: so it is a composite of a signification and conceivabilityand of course of

46Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 43, q. un., n. 6, vol. 6, p. 354. For discussion of this rather delicate point in Scotus, see R.

CROSS,Duns Scotus on God, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005, pp. 71-77 (Ashgate Studies in the History of PhilosophicalTheology). It is certainly true that Scotus makes the reality of possibles whatever that reality besomehowdependent on God. But he does not think that the formal features of the possible object should count as relational.47Dico quod per hoc quod dicit quod Equinitas est tantum equinitas, non exludit illa quae sunt per se de rationeequinitatis (cuiusmodi est entitas rata), sed exludit illa quae sunt poassiones entis, ut unum, actus, etc., sicut patet ibi

per litteram suam: Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 324, vol. 3, pp. 195.48Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 10. vol. 3, p. 419b: the objection is the second in a sequence of three against

Coningtons interpretation of Avicenna.49Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 10, vol. 3, p. 420a.50See Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., nn. 318-19, vol. 3, p. 193, reporting Coningtons view.


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ratitudotoo. By analogy, impossibiliaare knowable significations, and composites of

signification and conceivability.

So in place of Henrys tripartite division of thing and essence, then, we have a four-foldtaxonomy:

Significations: includingpossibilia, impossibilia, and the unknowable (e.g. nihil).Thinkable reality: includingpossibiliaand impossibilia.Quidditative reality: the possible; what has ratitudo, a relation to God as formal cause

51.

Existent reality: had by actually existing particulars.

I do not know whether Conington had formulated his theory in such detail by the time that

Scotus attacked it in the Ordinatio, but it is clear that Scotuss principal objection, both in theOrdinatioand in the collatio, supposes Conington to be working with Henrys three-foldscheme, not the four-fold scheme that Conington proposes in the collatio. And perhaps the mostsignificant difference from Henry and Scotus is the view that an Avicennian essence of itself is

merely a signification of a given type.

At any rate, Coningtons view gives us the two solutions to the problems that he discernsin Henrys position. One is thatpossibiliaare composites of aliquitasand ratitudo; the other isthat impossibiliaare mere significations (or, perhaps better, mere conceivable significations).

The claim that Avicennian essences are included among the things that have this kind of esseis

what leads to composition claim that Conington takes to solve the problem of free-floatingrelations that he identifies in Henrys view. The claim that impossibiliaare mere significations ismade palatable by the consideration that Avicennian essences themselves are mere significations.

There is a domain of mere significations (aliquitates), and given this, there seems to be a domainto which we can assign the significations of impossibiliaand inconceivable things: the domain of

things that can be nothing other than significations, so to speak. So we can give an account of the

signification of impossibiliathat is compatible with the general insight that that (all) signs need

significations.


Coningtons reply accepts that aliquitasis indifferent to esseand non-esse, but resists theinference to the conclusion that aliquitasis absolute. All it is is a signification. But the opponent

offers a counterobjection: if aliquitasdoes not determine esseto itself, then it is of itself nothing(nihil). And if it is nothing, then it cannot ground ratitudo, or receive esse: in short, if it is

nothing, it is impossible52

. Coningtons response is to distinguish different senses in whichsomething signifiable by a noun could be nothing:

51Note that, as we learn from a discussion elsewhere in Scotus, Henry and Conington disagree on the status of this

kind of reality or esse: esse essentiae. For Henry, what have esse essentiaeare simply the contents of divine ideas.

For Conington, in order for created objects to be known by God, they must have the being of quiddity ( esse . . .

quidditatis): Scotus,LecturaLib. 1, d. 36, q. un., n. 6, vol. 17, pp. 462-463. (The Vatican editors note that marginal

annotations in a MS of William of Nottinghams Sentencecommentary ascribe this argument specifically to Richardof Conington: see vol. 17, p. 462, apparatus F. ) The issue is slightly different from the focus of my discussion here,

which is the ontological status of essences as such, prior to their being known by God. But clearly, if William of

Nottinghams annotator is to be believed, Conington wants to push in a Meinongian direction on a number of fronts.52Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 12 [ad 3], vol. 3, p. 420a.


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For something signifiable by a noun to be nothing can be understood in two ways: either that what is

signifiablelet it beAdetermines to itself non-being (non esse) and nothing, and in this way a chimera isa non-being, and is signifiable by a noun that always determines to it [viz. the chimera] non-being. In the

other wayAis a non-being on the grounds that it neither determines being to itself nor determines non-

being to itself, but [determines to itself] possible being (possibile esse), indifferent to being and non-being.

Such a thing can receive being and a relation [to God], otherwise creation would be impossible, which is

against an article of the faith. So, what was objectively possible before creation, or truly nothing,

nevertheless does not determine to itself non-being, and thus the notion of that type of being which can be

brought about and be is always included in its definition (intentione)53.

For an item to be objectively possible is for the item to be such that a power can bring thatitem about. And note that nihil here is of course equivocal non-being, not absolute non-being.

What Conington is in effect proposing is a way of splitting aliquitasinto two basic categories: on

the one hand, significations and thinkable reality, and on the other quidditative reality. The idea

in the passage is that possibility or impossibility are entailed by the relevant concepts orsignifications without being intrinsically included in them. The signification humanityneither

includes nor excludes possibility; the signification chimeraexcludes possibility. Put another

way, the signification humanityneither includes nor excludes creatability; the signification

chimeraexcludes it.Does this undermine the view that, according to Conington, modal properties consist in

relations to divine ideas? I do not think so. After all, it looks as though there is something likethe following sequence: the internal structure of an aliquitasgrounds or explains the fact that it

has such-and-such a relation to a divine idea, or to divine formal causality; and this relation is

just what it is for the aliquitasto be possible (and its lack is what it is for the aliquitasto be

impossible). But Conington here affirms that a certain type of beingbeing able to be broughtaboutis included in the definition of humanity, which perhaps destabilizes the discussiona little.

The exchange provokes a further worry tooand it is a worry as much about Scotussmetaphysics as it is about Coningtons indeed, it is a worry about the whole tradition of

thinking about essences deriving from Avicenna. Conington speaks of humanityas somethingthat can receive being and a relation to God. This makes clear that aliquitasor signification is

an ontological category for Conington: an aliquitasor a signification can receive real status.But we might think that this confuses the contentof a signification with its ontological status.

That the content of a signification abstracts from existence (for example) tells us absolutely

nothing about its ontological status. The point is clearer with concepts: that the content of aconcept abstracts from existence tells us nothing about the ontological status of the concept. And

as for existence, so for possibility54

.

53Significabile per nomen esse nihil, potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod signifcabile quod est Adeterminet sibinon esse et nihil, et sic chimaera est non ens, et significabile per nomen quod determminat sibi semper non esse.

Alio modoAest non ens quia non determinat sibi esse, non tamen determinat sibi non esse, sed possibile esseindifferens ad esse et non esse. Tale potest recipere esse et respectum, aliter creatio erit impossibilis, quod est contra

articulum fidei. Unde quod ante crationem fuit possible obkiective, sive ver nihil, tamen non determinvit sibi no

esse, ita semper in intentione sua intelligitur esse tale, quod potest fieri, et esse: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n.

12 [ad 3], vol. 3, p. 420a.54Ockham argued that Scotuss theory of common natures is guilty of just such a confusion, incidentally. Accordingto Scotus, if a common nature includes numerical singularity (in its intension)if, as he puts it, if the nature ofstone is this stonethen every instance of that nature will be identical with every other instance whatever thenature of stone is in is this stone: Scotus, Ord. L. 2, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 3, vol. 7, p. 392. Ockham disambiguates: if

nature of stone has personal supposition (i.e. signifies an extramental particular), then the antecedent it true but


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The gist of the objection is that on Coningtons view creatures will be essentially relational something that the objection takes to be excluded on Aristotelian grounds. Now, it is true that

Coningtons view was often taken to mean that creatures are essentially relational55

; and thisreading is fair enough if we take a creature to be a composite of aliquitasand ratitudo. But it ismisleading if we take essence in its strictest sensealiquitassince the point of the theory isa creature includes its (non-relational) aliquitasor essence and its (relational) ratitudo. As

Conington puts it, a creature is . . . a relation (ad aliquid), and . . . it is something (aliquid)beyond a relation

56. And this, of course, is the whole point of Coningtons attempt to salvage

Henrys position a position that, Conington would hold, is indeed susceptible to this objection.


Finally, Conington simply denies that things act in virtue of ratitudo. Since essencealiquitas

contains all the essential features of a substance or accident, it contains their causal powers. So athing acts in virtue of its aliquitasits essence. What ratitudoadds to aliquitasis simply someform of esse. But it is not the case that a thing acts in virtue of its esse.Esseis uniform (I

assume: esse essentiaeis uniform, and esse existentiaeis uniform): so if things acted in virtue of

their esseit would follow (falsely) that all actions were uniform57

.

5. Concluding Remarks

Conington identifies a real lacunain Henrys position on essence(that an essence is merely afree-floating relation), and proposes a possible way of filling the gap (that the relation is

grounded on a signification). But the solution comes at something of a theological price. In

particular, it seems to place essencesand aliquitatesin generaloutside the domain of Godscausal activity: it seems to make them independent principles of reality, not in need of

principiation. This is different from both Henry (for whom esse essentiaeis always fullydependent on Gods intellectual activity) and Scotus (for whom esse essentiaeis never anythingother than a feature of created particulars).

58The closest analogue is perhaps to be found in

Aquinass reading of Avicenna (or, indeed, perhaps Avicenna himself in the passages quoted).For these thinkers, essence lacks any kind of esse(just as for Conington); but it is nevertheless

the inference invalid (since there are many stones and many stone natures, and nature of stone can refer to any of

them). If it has simple supposition (i.e. signifies a concept), then the antecedent is false, since a concept is never

identical with something extramental. See Ockham, Ordinatio, d. 2, q. 6, in Ockham, Opera theologica, Ed. by I.LALOR, et al., St Bonaventure University Press, St Bonaventure, NY, 1967-1986, vol. 2, p. 198, l. 9-p. 199, l. 6.55See e.g. John Baconthorpe, Quaestiones in quatuor libros sententiarum, Cremona, 1618, Lib. 2, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1,

vol. 1, p. 663a-b.56Creatura est . . . ad aliquid et . . . est aliquid praeter ad aliquid: Scotus [Conington], Coll. ox. 17, n. 14 [ad 7],

vol. 3, p. 420b. Note that the Wadding edition mistakenly has Creatura est . . . ad aliquid et . . . est ad aliquid

praeter ad aliquid: I have corrected this on the basis of MS Oxford, Magdalen College, 194, f. 92vb.57Scotus [Conington]. Coll. ox. 17, n. 13 [ad 4], vol. 3, p. 420a.58I discussed Henrys view in section 2 above; for Scotus, see e.g. Scotus, Ord. Lib. 1, d. 36, q. un., n. 13, vol. 6, p.276.


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invoked to do some explanatory workin particular, to explain kind-membership.59To theextent that explanatory power requires ontological commitment, Aquinas too must posit essences

antecedent to Gods causal activity. Doubtless Aquinas would deny this, and thus tend to adeflationary account of essences (and thus of the explanatory work they can do). Perhaps this

way out is open to Conington to. At any rate, whatever the ontological status of bare essences,

Aquinas would deny that impossibiliaare such things. But nevertheless I think it is fair enoughto think of Conington as a rather radical representative of this Avicennian tradition on essences.His own contribution is to think that essences are fundamentally positive significations. And, he

holds, they share this trait not merely with impossibiliabut also with nihil. And this, according to

Conington, is the ontological status of impossibilia.

59See Aquinas,De ente et essentia, c. 3, in Aquinas, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita , vol. 43, Rome,

1976, pp. 374-375.

Richard of Conington

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