Richard Nixon Presidential LibraryWhite House Special Files CollectionFolder List

Box Number Folder Number Document Date Document Type Document Description

32 40 nd Report Continuation of Thomas and Wolmans report The Presidency and Policy Formulation The Johnson Task Forces 12 pgs

32 40 12041968 Memo From Haldeman to Harlow re Task Force Reports 2 pgs

Tuesday August 05 2008 Page 1 of 1

-27shy

progrm authorized bgti Congress in 1965 was the majol rccomraendamiddotiion

of the 1964 -lood Gas1 force and J the model cities progrlm enac~ed

in 1966 was he major proposal of the 1965 Jlood tush force One

of the mljor innovat~ve programs authorized in the E1emellcary and

Secondary EduoatiOl1 Act of 1965 Tic1e III clearly originaied

1wi th the 1964 Gardner task f01 ce 18 and ll most of Jcno ecorumendashy

tions of the 1966 Early Childhood task force were adopted a1though

a t lower fw1ding levels chan those the taslt force IGcoromended 0

Not all task force reports h01vever~ a~tomatically became part

of the President~s legislative programQ For example o only a few

lecommendations of the 1967 Friday task force I principally the

Networks for Knowledge and the pacnership for Learning and Earning

Pjoposals appeared in President Johnsonlls 1968 education message or

the Administration t s 1968educacion bills The mated impact of the

Frid8Y tesk foroe eport oan be expained in pert by its foctls

on long~Zallge lE-l the than immediate problems and by the con-

straints ~hich the Vietnam iar imposed on the poLitical and

budcecary sictlpoundlilonso The 1966 Ylvis8kex task fo~cce also had

litcle dicect impact on policy because its recommendaiions

iere Ittoo radical l eno because its predecessors had been quite

pl~ocluctive in terms of legiS1~tive-accorapiiShments As one

Whice HOllSS scaff member remarked

The Ylviseker repm t hed lltle polic~l imp8ct paLgttly because il IJaS the third in a rOll and the firE ttmiddotC) had set policy ActtlalJy ii served as s basls fol J~he KernerCommission xepori in i110( it changed che frame~wrk from urbanism to xac1sm --But

-27shy

progrm authorized bgti Congress in 1965 was the majol rccomraendamiddotiion

of the 1964 -lood Gas1 force and J the model cities progrlm enac~ed

in 1966 was he major proposal of the 1965 Jlood tush force One

of the mljor innovat~ve programs authorized in the E1emellcary and

Secondary EduoatiOl1 Act of 1965 Tic1e III clearly originaied

1wi th the 1964 Gardner task f01 ce 18 and ll most of Jcno ecorumendashy

tions of the 1966 Early Childhood task force were adopted a1though

a t lower fw1ding levels chan those the taslt force IGcoromended 0

Not all task force reports h01vever~ a~tomatically became part

of the President~s legislative programQ For example o only a few

lecommendations of the 1967 Friday task force I principally the

Networks for Knowledge and the pacnership for Learning and Earning

Pjoposals appeared in President Johnsonlls 1968 education message or

the Administration t s 1968educacion bills The mated impact of the

Frid8Y tesk foroe eport oan be expained in pert by its foctls

on long~Zallge lE-l the than immediate problems and by the con-

straints ~hich the Vietnam iar imposed on the poLitical and

budcecary sictlpoundlilonso The 1966 Ylvis8kex task fo~cce also had

litcle dicect impact on policy because its recommendaiions

iere Ittoo radical l eno because its predecessors had been quite

pl~ocluctive in terms of legiS1~tive-accorapiiShments As one

Whice HOllSS scaff member remarked

The Ylviseker repm t hed lltle polic~l imp8ct paLgttly because il IJaS the third in a rOll and the firE ttmiddotC) had set policy ActtlalJy ii served as s basls fol J~he KernerCommission xepori in i110( it changed che frame~wrk from urbanism to xac1sm --But

-28shy

I fl-cllldG~ that oiJseV3cion iS Hostly hii1asighio He cUdn ~ c see he report as tGrlibly irnpolliall~ irhen it came i41o

rask force reporcs cen also have a major impaCi hrough

eaDlinistra th-e actions as Nell as through incorporaJeion ill the

Presidenc as legislative pcoglam For exsmple e lche 1966 Early

Childhood task fOlce recommended changes in FE-derGl Nelfaco rcgushy

lations lhich were subsequently adopted by the agencies lnvolved

In addition(l the possibility of task fOICS recommendations beshy

coming Adminismiddotirecioll policy is Elimaneed if a key tosk force ~

parilclpant becomes ~ mel1Jber of the Administration 1his2 of

cOlUse occuled in the Cases of John GSrdner Who became Secreshy

talY of nmJ and Robert t~ood who served as Undersecretary of HUD

As one agel1CY offie1al observed middot

Because they irote the cepo~ctsmiddot they are more lHe1y to take up che cudgels fOj middotihe task fo~~~CG proposQls than someone ell~e would be Jhai they Call ej get t1llongh legjslatiol1~ they ai8 likely -0 push for ihrough ac3IDinistrsive cll2l1ges

Through the employ-men of secret Jhi te House task forces

the Jonosoll Administiration developed 8 substantially al-Cered

p~t(ern of policy formtLla tion and legisl8civcproeram develop

ex-perts CO identify problems and issues and generate new ideas

and apploaches coupled Wiih the frequent use of iniej

agency cask forces J~otemper he recommendations of the oumiddott

siders wi~h pragmatiC consideratioj1s were Ihe basic changes Through

them the Adminlstlation sought co eA1Jand the process of policy

I

develop illOSC new policy proposals The changes may COYlEIii iveEl

anothor phase in tho illsti tutionalizotion of middot the Presidency 19 but~

they were not so highly routinize~ that they became permanent White

Rouse l~outilles Givan che still highly personalized naGLlre of the

Presidency it is by no means certain tha processes lithin the

frameilJork of pl~esidential activity that involve policy focmulashy

tior can bo quickly and indelibly institutionalized v Rather~

institutionalization is a continuous and grodual process

Jhile manifesting dis-tinctly identifiable pstterns the opera

tions of the task forces were highly flexible and adaptable topresishy

7 dentiul lequirements Thei~e are sigas hOHerer chai the

flexibility ai1d adaptability of he task forces 0 ai leas in I

hous~l1g 8ndeduoation had j)e~ui1 to decline as iheir opera _

I ~ tending to become elaborate instruments of incrementol adjustshy

ment rathe-c -Chan catalytic agGlltS middot of change The problem is

-chai a leadership tecllllique-alld that is what the task foce

dt-cti te After all) the scope for oeative policy leadership is

limiied by circumstantial factors and even the most effeccive

tcchniqll6s can work successfllllyonly part of the time

I~ also appears co us that although the task fOlces ~lele

h b 20an impoctant Qrgpoundpound9~l innovaCiollt v e su SallC~Ve LnnovaCLons

in policy for which theyhave been responsible aramiddotconsiderably

less J~han their advocates in the Johnson Adminis~ration

have claimed As a Budget Bureau official ~cknowledged

task forces fail as il1novaiors bullbullbullAll they do is

bull

-30shy

lerll erGative 0 I It does seem thai chc -casle fo~ces lihich had

the grco test iii~18dla to im~)act on 18gI_81 [~ i011 reconnended p1Orrams appropriately political rather than

Ihic11 could more be cheracterizcd as blo11ectual breakthroughs 0

For example ~ the lCll i supplement Ldea had been circulating 101

sevGca l years ~ the HHFA was experimenting wi th majo1 elcmenGs

of the model cities approach before the task force proposed ito at least

andthcee of the five Dllbstantive titles of the Elementary and

SecondalY Education Act including 11e all-important Title I

prmridill5 for 7l13ssive aid co djsadvEllltaged childrell were pri

marlly the products of other forces in the education policy

system

FlUthelIDore to the extent the i task forces VIere lUade rep-t t

jgtesents cive through -cheir lllembership~ tendencios coward ilmovashy

-Cion rozy have been miiigated~ This appears likely since conshy

sensus Nas the fundamental middotdecision-making rule middotand final ag1ee

ment cenderl to leplesont compl~omise rampchel -chan cicative thinkil1g~

As one high-l~ai1king official in the Executive Office admiiied~

it is true that with so many intereS is involved the result is

in aome sense the lowestcommol1 denominatolol

HONever~ because tasl~ fOTces may not have beell quite as in

novative (in the sense that no one had tho1lght of their

recommendations before) as their p~opouents claimed does not i

mean that essentially the same courses of action would have

bull

been fol1otfGd h2d ih0Y no been uS0d 0 The ld011S Ilfhich iihey

embodjed in p2GsidentLal policies 110r in mos i cases WGr0 thcy

supporced by the bm09ucmiddotacy ~Jitho1it outside task foxces jt

is nO i lihely that the supplementary educational cclltC S end

regional education laboracor-ies 01 ene Tent supple~el1is and

model cities prog-c8ms would have been pushed by che Administrashy

tion ana aucnorized by CongJoss at the timc and form Ghat they

llere 0 But more important than the immediace legislative conshy

sequences are the long-rsnge effects of ihe task force pcocess

They prOl-lde a means of main~ail1ine a steady input of ideas

new to the thoug~middotc processes of high le-l1ol policy~make(s

Unfortunately the consequences of this phenOIilei10n callilOi be

measuled~ but its significance 5s manifest

l ~ On balanceo t Lie believe chac che cask force opecaiion was a

significa11~ con-cributioll to presidential policy leadership 0 11any

Johnson Adrninistracive officials tgtrho seTved in the Exe~utive Office I

of the Plesidel1C 1Tietl the task force OpBlatjonas So major in t stltutlonal contrlbutiono Whether it will survive is an open

qucstiOl1o Nuch depends on fUlure Prestdenisj their personalities

their attituc~es c01lTard the necessity for policy i1ll10vaiiol1 and

the ~xteYlt to which they employ secrecy and surprise as elements

of their leadership styl~s The tasle force operation was peculiarly0

sl)i ted CO the leadexship scyle of Lyndon B Johnson I~ 11tted

-30shy

lerll erGative 0 I It does seem thai chc -casle fo~ces lihich had

the grco test iii~18dla to im~)act on 18gI_81 [~ i011 reconnended p1Orrams appropriately political rather than

Ihic11 could more be cheracterizcd as blo11ectual breakthroughs 0

For example ~ the lCll i supplement Ldea had been circulating 101

sevGca l years ~ the HHFA was experimenting wi th majo1 elcmenGs

of the model cities approach before the task force proposed ito at least

andthcee of the five Dllbstantive titles of the Elementary and

SecondalY Education Act including 11e all-important Title I

prmridill5 for 7l13ssive aid co djsadvEllltaged childrell were pri

marlly the products of other forces in the education policy

system

FlUthelIDore to the extent the i task forces VIere lUade rep-t t

jgtesents cive through -cheir lllembership~ tendencios coward ilmovashy

-Cion rozy have been miiigated~ This appears likely since conshy

sensus Nas the fundamental middotdecision-making rule middotand final ag1ee

ment cenderl to leplesont compl~omise rampchel -chan cicative thinkil1g~

As one high-l~ai1king official in the Executive Office admiiied~

it is true that with so many intereS is involved the result is

in aome sense the lowestcommol1 denominatolol

HONever~ because tasl~ fOTces may not have beell quite as in

novative (in the sense that no one had tho1lght of their

recommendations before) as their p~opouents claimed does not i

mean that essentially the same courses of action would have

bull

been fol1otfGd h2d ih0Y no been uS0d 0 The ld011S Ilfhich iihey

embodjed in p2GsidentLal policies 110r in mos i cases WGr0 thcy

supporced by the bm09ucmiddotacy ~Jitho1it outside task foxces jt

is nO i lihely that the supplementary educational cclltC S end

regional education laboracor-ies 01 ene Tent supple~el1is and

model cities prog-c8ms would have been pushed by che Administrashy

tion ana aucnorized by CongJoss at the timc and form Ghat they

llere 0 But more important than the immediace legislative conshy

sequences are the long-rsnge effects of ihe task force pcocess

They prOl-lde a means of main~ail1ine a steady input of ideas

new to the thoug~middotc processes of high le-l1ol policy~make(s

Unfortunately the consequences of this phenOIilei10n callilOi be

measuled~ but its significance 5s manifest

l ~ On balanceo t Lie believe chac che cask force opecaiion was a

significa11~ con-cributioll to presidential policy leadership 0 11any

Johnson Adrninistracive officials tgtrho seTved in the Exe~utive Office I

of the Plesidel1C 1Tietl the task force OpBlatjonas So major in t stltutlonal contrlbutiono Whether it will survive is an open

qucstiOl1o Nuch depends on fUlure Prestdenisj their personalities

their attituc~es c01lTard the necessity for policy i1ll10vaiiol1 and

the ~xteYlt to which they employ secrecy and surprise as elements

of their leadership styl~s The tasle force operation was peculiarly0

sl)i ted CO the leadexship scyle of Lyndon B Johnson I~ 11tted

been fol1otfGd h2d ih0Y no been uS0d 0 The ld011S Ilfhich iihey

embodjed in p2GsidentLal policies 110r in mos i cases WGr0 thcy

supporced by the bm09ucmiddotacy ~Jitho1it outside task foxces jt

is nO i lihely that the supplementary educational cclltC S end

regional education laboracor-ies 01 ene Tent supple~el1is and

model cities prog-c8ms would have been pushed by che Administrashy

tion ana aucnorized by CongJoss at the timc and form Ghat they

llere 0 But more important than the immediace legislative conshy

sequences are the long-rsnge effects of ihe task force pcocess

They prOl-lde a means of main~ail1ine a steady input of ideas

new to the thoug~middotc processes of high le-l1ol policy~make(s

Unfortunately the consequences of this phenOIilei10n callilOi be

measuled~ but its significance 5s manifest

l ~ On balanceo t Lie believe chac che cask force opecaiion was a

significa11~ con-cributioll to presidential policy leadership 0 11any

Johnson Adrninistracive officials tgtrho seTved in the Exe~utive Office I

of the Plesidel1C 1Tietl the task force OpBlatjonas So major in t stltutlonal contrlbutiono Whether it will survive is an open

qucstiOl1o Nuch depends on fUlure Prestdenisj their personalities

their attituc~es c01lTard the necessity for policy i1ll10vaiiol1 and

the ~xteYlt to which they employ secrecy and surprise as elements

of their leadership styl~s The tasle force operation was peculiarly0

sl)i ted CO the leadexship scyle of Lyndon B Johnson I~ 11tted

-]2shy

nicely with his often ~epeated emphasis on the need for a partne rshy

ship Det11CCn the public and p livate sec -COjs ~ his life-lone inoStlnct- - -------------=-----~-- for decj_sion-walting on the basis of COnSGnSL1S ~ and h ~s pceocculgtstshy

tiol) wi t1 secrecy 21 Viewed in al10ther 1-Tay 1 was a good example

of what Theodore Lowi has oalled 11 interes ( group liberelism~ II a

phenomenon 1hich Lowi feels has come illcreasingly -o charac-cclize

American politics in (he 19601s 22 Ii1tecest group libeTalism is a-philosophy lJhich specifies tl1a t leading societal incerests should

all be represented in the interior processes of policy formulation

Future Presidents are likely to utilize those features of the

most useful for purposes of broad policy planning In this con

text he could employ them to idei1-cify problems o pinpoint issues

and suggest alternative solutions co themo It is likely that these ~

shytask forces iltJovld develop some new ideas independently but more ~

importantly they would function to collate and bring -co -he atten ~

tion of the President and other to~olicy-makers iLUlovative and ~

eTeative -chinking done elseithere On ih~er hand such a Plesi-Q

dent could not expect them regularly to develo~he specifics of

Ploposed legi81at~ion He could mOle appropriatel~ sign Cha

function to interagency task 101Ce8 working in conjuncti with

policy planners in the departments and agencies

would also find that outside task forces are more suitable -chan

r I

I shy

-JJshypublic com~ sions ~)r lf)ohlng out and acquiljng fresh idoas

oolancillS of 8ocieto interests as comlllissions~ by ihcir very

ltatLu~e IDlls be Cerre ondingly howevei~ commissiollS are more

approp1ia~e Zordevelopinga conSenS11S behind asec of policy

--re-cOmmendCtionsJ-~-----------~------------------___

In determining ~ihethe~ to employ Ol)tsldetask fOlces in middotche

processes of policy focmulation Ghe President Who is 1n ien) 011

il1llovation must Ssses the costs fllld gains a830c1a~ced ~lich their 1 use In addi tiOll to being a mosi promising means of geZlerat~ing

new ideas~outslde task fotces will affow h1mama~imu~ range of

options which can be kept open ove a long perlod of time li1h a

minimum ofenergyrequired CO defend his ohoices Theplincipal --- ------shy

costs are the iesentme~is 1lhich the task f01ces engender in the - __ -- - -shy

bUleauoac~ anclamOllg powerful clientele groups 0 These cosis can

be reduced somewhat by balancing intenests in saleccing task force

membe-s thus renilering them sOlllet-jhac more like public commissions

and by leliallCe on inteiagellcy task forces to re~ieil outside task

force lecommendatiollS and to take the l~ad in developing speCific

legislative pzooposals To ihe extent that the PreSident takes

these counter-measures hO~JeverJ he risl~s losingsome of the po

iential gains to be delived from che US0 of outSide task forces bull I

Unfoxt~unately our illfomaciol1is 110~ sufficien~and measuring

instruments lack the precision to permit a more defini iva assessshy

menmiddotc of such cos GS and gains Whatevel~ ihe goals of future Presishy

dents it isca~tiainlY expected JGhat they 1111 examine carefully J

~nd t~1at HOllll3 elements ofmiddot the casle foxce operociOll will become

permanently insti tUcionalized

- _ ---==--=--=--=======----~--~-------~~-

I

liJ1Z oh~ained OU1 d8i9 Ll1 che course of conduc cjng more compi0shyl1ensi ve studJcs of i118 Federal policyma k lng processes in the aceas of hCY1Sillg ~md education lIle selected thOSG areas b8cevse~ ao TiI~jor

sectors of Pcesidcnt C s Johrlson~ s Gro8t Society slJbstanmiddotiia l rc(us~ iri b u iivo pollcleG have 1x~en enac ced ilJi Gh ~ll thom since 1965 g (ThO

distjnction bet)Jecn regulatolY distrihtltive and ledistril)[)thr e policies is Theoclore J Q L01It ~ s See lI AmltJj~cCln BIJlTI0sS ~ poundgtuo110 Policy c CaseSivdics and Policlcul TheolY II fo7ld l~oU C iC8 16 (L96L~) 0 RecJismiddotGributive policles hav0 b-co~d i~oacmiddotGwpcmiddotocCucmiddote conshysideTablc conflict and cel1sion Gnd C9n result in altered relamiddotctonshyships bet~Jeen the llesidency the bureaucracy end clientele 8ltgtoUPS

A COillpcrison oJ om li1li~al fjnciings suggesi~cd fu~ctheX examshyination of the prooess of fOYillulatinG the Presidcntslegi81a-tive pxogjem allci of PIesidenc Johnson e s use of task forces 0

Our -c0spondents fOJgt this phase middotof the studygt included f~ve

memb~ns of the ~hi te House staff ~ seven Bureau ot the Budget of ficials and 32 departmenmiddot1 and agenoy offioials and task force palticipanis

2The best description of this process and its developmel1c co the point of almost total dependence on agency submission of propossls by the eaclyyeels of che Eisei1l1oNer Administration i3 Richard E Neustadt~ tiThe pcesid0TIcy and Legislation Planning the Presidellmiddotis ProBTaill~ ArrG~lC9n Poli tieD1 SCiCi)C0 Rev-ioN ~ ~9 (1955) pp 98010180

_~In~~I( middot~__ gtC-~-- I ~ laquorr~ _ ___bulljOImiddot---~-

See also Neustadt s jprhe Presjdei1cy and Legislation The Gl~ow ih of Central Cleal~ancep~1 rojdol) ~middotS (195L) pp 6LH-670

The classicscudies of t h e Pj7esidency ha ve- not eXDftlined in allY cle-c8il the process of p2csidential policyforlliu16dion See for excmp1e Edwcl-dmiddot S COr~1i117 ~Z~i2~Qlpound~n~l_QpoundflS~lrU~r~s ll-tih ~~d NeN York New York Univer8icy Press~ 1957) Chapter VII and EoPendeltol1 RelrinB~ rre~~~B~1~1_~~secth1E (NmJ Yorl~ Fa~~ra-c allltl Rineharts Ii1c 191fO) 0 H01leVer more jecenmiddotc institu cional analyses have begun middotco do SOo See JosephE~ Kallenbach Tl10 Ame1Jca nChi0f Execu-ejie(N0w York ImiddotIarpexandRow~ 1966) pp-)Lji=-j4-Lr-and--LouiSW-Koellig 1l1~ C1efJE~llBYpound (Neil York Harcoult Bcace and ltJorld o 1964) pp Ibb-18]0

~CH_- - 3See J ~ipecl Fleemal1 t tl TheBuceauclacyinPressurePoJ5ticstt

1h~_~1~~(O~~h~~~~~1_2~gS1ampLltf-J~Sli~ipound~~~p~sect2912LsectSi~~~~Volo J191~5o)pp ~1-19 bull c

- shyLj

Arthul ltJ Ma8s z II In Accod with th8 Progi2~ of cho r ceslclGl1i (I

jn Cerl J o Friedrichgt eeL E~E]t~~f9J~poundpound~ Vol L (1953) pp 79- 93 Haas stated tim) the P~esident needed staff in adeli tion to the Bureau of the Budget lito meBc the aneed for posicive originashytion a (11e centec of broad objectives and policies so0 bullbull

tha t adeqpoundumiddotc2 ~ leadership and diree tion 0 are given to t11e developshyment of LitiE program

5Quoted in hliJliam E Leuchtenberg tiThe Genesis of the GleaC Society1t rhe)~el9rte April 21 1966 PP_ 36-39_

r middot1

liJ1Z oh~ained OU1 d8i9 Ll1 che course of conduc cjng more compi0shyl1ensi ve studJcs of i118 Federal policyma k lng processes in the aceas of hCY1Sillg ~md education lIle selected thOSG areas b8cevse~ ao TiI~jor

sectors of Pcesidcnt C s Johrlson~ s Gro8t Society slJbstanmiddotiia l rc(us~ iri b u iivo pollcleG have 1x~en enac ced ilJi Gh ~ll thom since 1965 g (ThO

distjnction bet)Jecn regulatolY distrihtltive and ledistril)[)thr e policies is Theoclore J Q L01It ~ s See lI AmltJj~cCln BIJlTI0sS ~ poundgtuo110 Policy c CaseSivdics and Policlcul TheolY II fo7ld l~oU C iC8 16 (L96L~) 0 RecJismiddotGributive policles hav0 b-co~d i~oacmiddotGwpcmiddotocCucmiddote conshysideTablc conflict and cel1sion Gnd C9n result in altered relamiddotctonshyships bet~Jeen the llesidency the bureaucracy end clientele 8ltgtoUPS

A COillpcrison oJ om li1li~al fjnciings suggesi~cd fu~ctheX examshyination of the prooess of fOYillulatinG the Presidcntslegi81a-tive pxogjem allci of PIesidenc Johnson e s use of task forces 0

Our -c0spondents fOJgt this phase middotof the studygt included f~ve

memb~ns of the ~hi te House staff ~ seven Bureau ot the Budget of ficials and 32 departmenmiddot1 and agenoy offioials and task force palticipanis

2The best description of this process and its developmel1c co the point of almost total dependence on agency submission of propossls by the eaclyyeels of che Eisei1l1oNer Administration i3 Richard E Neustadt~ tiThe pcesid0TIcy and Legislation Planning the Presidellmiddotis ProBTaill~ ArrG~lC9n Poli tieD1 SCiCi)C0 Rev-ioN ~ ~9 (1955) pp 98010180

_~In~~I( middot~__ gtC-~-- I ~ laquorr~ _ ___bulljOImiddot---~-

See also Neustadt s jprhe Presjdei1cy and Legislation The Gl~ow ih of Central Cleal~ancep~1 rojdol) ~middotS (195L) pp 6LH-670

The classicscudies of t h e Pj7esidency ha ve- not eXDftlined in allY cle-c8il the process of p2csidential policyforlliu16dion See for excmp1e Edwcl-dmiddot S COr~1i117 ~Z~i2~Qlpound~n~l_QpoundflS~lrU~r~s ll-tih ~~d NeN York New York Univer8icy Press~ 1957) Chapter VII and EoPendeltol1 RelrinB~ rre~~~B~1~1_~~secth1E (NmJ Yorl~ Fa~~ra-c allltl Rineharts Ii1c 191fO) 0 H01leVer more jecenmiddotc institu cional analyses have begun middotco do SOo See JosephE~ Kallenbach Tl10 Ame1Jca nChi0f Execu-ejie(N0w York ImiddotIarpexandRow~ 1966) pp-)Lji=-j4-Lr-and--LouiSW-Koellig 1l1~ C1efJE~llBYpound (Neil York Harcoult Bcace and ltJorld o 1964) pp Ibb-18]0

~CH_- - 3See J ~ipecl Fleemal1 t tl TheBuceauclacyinPressurePoJ5ticstt

1h~_~1~~(O~~h~~~~~1_2~gS1ampLltf-J~Sli~ipound~~~p~sect2912LsectSi~~~~Volo J191~5o)pp ~1-19 bull c

- shyLj

Arthul ltJ Ma8s z II In Accod with th8 Progi2~ of cho r ceslclGl1i (I

jn Cerl J o Friedrichgt eeL E~E]t~~f9J~poundpound~ Vol L (1953) pp 79- 93 Haas stated tim) the P~esident needed staff in adeli tion to the Bureau of the Budget lito meBc the aneed for posicive originashytion a (11e centec of broad objectives and policies so0 bullbull

tha t adeqpoundumiddotc2 ~ leadership and diree tion 0 are given to t11e developshyment of LitiE program

5Quoted in hliJliam E Leuchtenberg tiThe Genesis of the GleaC Society1t rhe)~el9rte April 21 1966 PP_ 36-39_

r middot1

bull bull

J6

6S00 h~tbur 1]0 Schlcsingec ~Il(q A ~ hour8y)d Dars Johil Po l59~)1]~~~~L~~1~ Ttn~~_ E~~~~ (iJe-vl York -]oavjcett-~roirC[Libl-a53Y719o(j pp 14d-f9i- rexts of the l~eporis appear in NmlT Flontles of ~hG Kennedy Adrnin~sjjratiorl (hlashingtor---Publlo111 -o( __-- A1 ___bullbull_ __ _ ~~ ~ ~ ~~

ff~ll~ ~rcss 19b1 J ~

7POl 8jo) accounc of (118 establishment of the car fOiC J3 ~n 1964 ana their role in developing ~helGgislativ0 pTogram of the Grea Sociecy- see ~ E Leucl1teubc~middot( OJ)o ___ __ Ctt6o _w

degA Sh~TP differentiation of the functions of policy-planning

and l egislat ive liaison has occured ori the White House staff vlith che polic ~1~planncrs enjoying glGDCGr influ~nce and status

11See ll10rfrS Eo Cronin r flTho Pr0sjdency and Eclucation 1 Ph1- Delta Kanp8l F0brlory 1968 pp 295-299 -~ shy

_ ___ 9

o iouis 1) oGi1i5~ s pccdiction~ made in 196L~ ac the OUcSG1i of che

Johnson PcesideY)cYe chat the lJjhUe HOl)se staff toauld playa reshyduced 9nd the oJcl-line departments a gC89ter ~cole in policyshyfOl~iuJ[Ltion has not oloved correct The reverse has occvred~ GD cit_ UP 182-18jo -~- - shy

10ThiS deScTiptiol1 is based on our incerriews See also the description of the preparation of the 1968 State of the Union Ilcss38e in tFol8L11atins Presidential Program is Long Process 0 tt

Con~1GS8jOr8l (1varterJs tleekJyen Report lgt January 26 ~ 1968 --~ lt ~ - - bullbull bull----------~~-~-~---pp ~ llllll~

11See Elizahe ih Blel1ne~ DreN t ItOn Giving OnsesGLf a Hotfoot Govell~l~lflt by Commission~1I At18l1tiCr Vo) 221 IvDgtT 1968~ ppo 45shy49 I~her barbed though highly perceptive artic1e~ she lists sevcT21 uSeS of pnblic commi~sioilS incltlding to postpone aC-ciOll

ye i be jnstlfied in inSisting chat you are at Iloz-k 011 the p1oblemi J~o aCG GS a 11ghcnlng rod ~ dr8Hing poliiicaJ heat away from th~

ihi te HOL1se and to imi8stigate 1a- GO JesiQTUJnors and convince the puolic of the irD1idity of e palticulal set of facC8 o

A highly pltlcecl official on che ~Jhite House s iaff cOlillilented tha t thele1 s a hell of a ~o~c of tj~t1ch to some of the things in Dcewls accicle Hot-leVel in some campses we do expect ne and

important ch~ngs to come OUC of pltblic oommissions II

I

-

~ ~

-~c ~ (~JJJv bCgtl~middotjO clc C~JtJle prOCefgtS 0[ pol~c~T fOJmvLashygt~~~~ ~ l1X)~lt1~ ~~lJ GOm8[Jal~ UlJS ~ClLlctUcecl 1l0t hJpV~i1~ in rw 3i V~l CS8 JF-y be nCl ofien is dcp8)dcnc on ideosynGjD-c1c peisoilal ~n0 s 5 tn8ci onal vElxi2bleo chene is amp gtea t CE-)mlyccioll for tl)8 polit1cGl 9l1a)ysmiddot( 0 linpOSe fl mOl8 j9tioi1al o1c1(c on the potC8TTlS of thE Gov8rn~2nt8J process thtl1 111ClY b8 cillpiric8Jly j us i i t icd SeG )DlleS fl 3urns 1 P~(8 r~ i-lt1enti)1 Gov8xnm811-c (J30-con HOUrlcon lEffliD Co ~ 1966) p~ILir~middotmiddotlilciJEimiddotmiddotcile31Ee hi~~lly C01evl COi1shy

lilont of ArthtE No Sch1881nccr~ SrOl rosed 011 h~8 eJCpeCieljces in the Wi1i to I-iOii38 dl12i1g tile Kerrnedy Aclministco-c5CiA 11 EothLllg tn my recent exr~iience h~G been lllOC ch8stGn~llg lba~(l the atcempt -Co penetrate into the process of decision~ r shudder a little when I c1h11~ hON conficleaI~ly I heTC ~gtnmiddot)J~i2eo decis~oilS 111 cho 8gCS of Jacson sud Hooscre lt tctcod ~llfl1e11ces assignEd motjves) eV31uotcd 1ole alJoca ted responsib11Llics end ~ in shoc-c ~ trl1W)ri8d D di~shydishCmiddotirelled and illl1rk~r 81TOLU1jon 5l1to a tidy and ord8red CC811Sshyactiolo The sad fact is thac in tG8i1Y cases 1 ihe basjC eV~ldence iol h8 hisCocial1 t s cecmiddotonstruction of the Jea1Jy hard cases does noc exisc--ancl tho evidence that it does is often incomplete nisleacling 01 eJrOi1GoUs II Fcom liThe HisJcorlan and HiscolY II

FCTcilaquol1 Affaics Vol 41 (April 1963) pp 491497_____ I-r-4J~I c-~ ~middot

11~B IlJeUC di PesideTItial P01le1 (Ne1lT YOlk John Hiley amp 0 J I w l~ -IoN4~~~~___

Sons 1960 E~~~sectj~

15Dle~1 criticlzes che be-lancing middotof ill ieresis on plibliC COlJshy

missions Oi1 the ground -crJflG ji tends to immoblljze thc1llo Omiddot) cit ~ p 47 Bell is morc sym9Dthe middotcic totJald the representeiiol-il-- shyaspeccs of c0ll1111sslons op cttq p 7

~-~- shyl0lhese meetjngs ~ which 1)su8Jly lasced fOJ one or Cwo days t

tlere held on a monthly or bimonthly besis

17S(c D - re~v ~ Qn~ll Q

18The le NBS a cOTIside~8bIe 0 iffe~(eTIce of opiYlon eeO~3 0111

Lespondej1ts 2eemiddotTdiag the jmpact of t11e Garuner task force Oi1 the E1Gmejlmiddotia~y Bnd Secondary Education l~cto Those indi iidu91s who cmmncm-c8d f)oro the p0TGpe~tLve of the blJreaucracy--USOE-HEW-shyasseTced middoti~hl3i aside from Jjtlc IrI~ the GEtsl 1oc8 f11Dctjoned oilly to clysGoJlze ideas -Chat had been Cilculatjng foZ some time 8l1d to legimiddottjllJze policy plel1n1ng lt1one elseiii1ere in the eclllcashyclonal policy--makillg s~rstem On the Oiher hand observers in ihe Executive Office of the President claimed chst Title IV and to 8 considel8ole extel1~~ Title It mJed chair eziscence GO the cesI-~ force HhilG J t is not possible to meaSllce the amolmt of

variance in po1icy for l7hicl1 the tasl~ force accotmted) i -c seems cleei thai ic was a variable of cOl1sic1ej~8ble sLgnificance See Ste-ohcn 1( BaDey and Edith K rlosher ESEA ~lhc Office of ECluC2shy

1t - -rl(--~--r-tlll_-_---~~r-shy ) -cijol Aclministers _ a __ aTrl bull SyracL1sc S~xacu8e Univelsiiy Plesso___bull~ __ J 968

~__~-

pp 39 42 On the difflcul-cy of tracing the origll1s of neVJ policies see

AdaiTI Yarmo1h1sky~ middotIdeasillto Prooramso 7 The P11blic~Interest No2---tWII ___

(1966) pp 70-77 gt

middot

38shy

0 11 Cf ~ Lssiec- G SGljt)illsn1~ PTcGiciellcicl L8Ddersh1p Ihe

ImGr Cicc18 cnd ILlst ~l_ l1c1 ol1alizt iollgt II J Otu1tl21 of gtol it icsVol 18 (1956L pp 410-126 ---~---- shy

2 vlhe pro-JcrJ of defming i(lllOvati0l1 is 8 familiar one Nh~l_ch

d08 aot led t tseJf to any e8Sy 801trcion 0 As N8 itiC~i iG policy in110vaiwn includes the concepclon ot ideas as Hell as ejving sub smiddotsnC0 2l1Q form middotCo middotholl1 ct ~ V1001 Pl Thompson BLlxeaUCX9CY and Innova tio11 A6millisCJ8 tive Sc~(mcc QL1ajCeTl~ Vol 30 (jL1118 ~ 1965) pp I2middot0-middotmiddoti110mpson(Jemiddotfinesrm~0vamiddotion as the genshye~atioDacc0ptancel and implementation of new ldea8~ products or serviceso

21See RONJelo Evcms 8nd Robert Novak ~ LY-Il()on B J OhnS011

~b~l~Esectrpoundlsect1poundQtJ~E~ (New Yorlc NeloJ Am81icanLrbrarY7T9~6)

22T J LOllIi liThe Public Philosophy Interesc-Gloup Libolalism t II American Poljticsl Science Revimtf Vol 61 (1967) pp bull 5~24~ - w~_ - -_-shy

1c

I

_ _ ~f__

tEO ANDUA

D cern e1 4 1968

TO BRYCE ARLO V

FRO BOB HALDEMAN

RE T ASK FORCE REPORTS

Ba ed on the eneral discus ion at this mornin meeting I wo I tr ugly sugge t that e go ahead with plans for each task force or group of ta k force bull to be prepared to have it progres report me ting here at th Pierr Hotel We should tart with the fir t one as e001l aa possible after Dece-nber 10th

In e c individual case I would suggest that tb task force Bub t

it rep rt in writing to yo r review committee or to the President a your review co itt anJ that the utire group plan to meet

here at the Pierre p ron n tely four days after the written report i in The first part of the meeting would b with the full revi l com nittee concerned cabinet offie l as well as concerned m mb rs of Congress Thi would be a privat bull clos d meeting but t e fact t t it wa b iog held would be announced The chairman of th ta k force would then come u stairs me t briefly with the Presishydent d th n e cart the President down to the group meeting where he N would b ve an opportunity briefly to thank th 1l16 abelS of the ro lp for their fin wo k and possibly to di eu s a partic lar point or two of the report Nith them

pre would be per tted to corne in at tbi ti -net for pictures only ng t S 8 io th chairnan of th tal _ force 910ul b de

v Ie to the preS8 to answer questions re ardin t general content of the report

It auld be under too bull of course tb t th ta k force continu with i wor perhap wit orne modification of memb rehip and that it would be used as D Burns umiddot sted to review question a they aria in the particuI r fi Id

Hop fully th e e io would il ch duled at rly frequent intervale r thre a y fron Dec mbe lOt tb au h Dec ber Oth

h lpful if as y of the r ports a 08 ibl would in rior to Christ s ~ith e d to Nls sch dul it ho Id be n ted

that frol th 21 at on e will be involv d in tb we din d Christrn vacati n

-2shy

Then hortly after the fir t of tb year the b lance of the reports co lld handle i t am fa hiun Perha around January ] Oth with th hope t t all the ~ork would be in by that time the dinner for a t k forcel nd the cabinet officer could be held at the Plaz as s gg sted

It i om to be difficult to t this rocess in motion nd keep it poin unle 8 we get s rt d uickly and I think that if the plan outlined hove is not on yo ant to follo rI we should et an alternative plan d veloped ri lIt ~ay t something started

-2shy

Then hortly after the fir t of tb year the b lance of the reports co lld handle i t am fa hiun Perha around January ] Oth with th hope t t all the ~ork would be in by that time the dinner for a t k forcel nd the cabinet officer could be held at the Plaz as s gg sted

It i om to be difficult to t this rocess in motion nd keep it poin unle 8 we get s rt d uickly and I think that if the plan outlined hove is not on yo ant to follo rI we should et an alternative plan d veloped ri lIt ~ay t something started