1

Revisiting Civil Society with Special Reference to Turkey

Immigration, Minorities and Multiculturalism In Democracies Conference

Ethnicity and Democratic Governance MCRI project October 25-27, 2007

Montreal, QC, Canada

Metin Heper and Senem Yildirim

Political Science Department

Bilkent University

Turkey

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Revisiting Civil Society with Special Reference to Turkey

The one assumption in the post-Soviet Union era, has been that in order for

a democratic system of government to flourish there was a need for the

development of civil society that would have limited the authority of the

state.1 Along the same lines, late Ernest Gellner has also come to the

conclusion that without civil society democracy is hardly feasible.2 Others

opposed this view. According to one student of civil society, there is no one-

to-one relationship between the fortunes of democracy and the presence of a

civil society.3 This latter view has been supported at least on the basis of one

country study – that on Spain. In that study, it has been shown that in Spain,

state elites, not civil socety, played a crucial role in the transtion to

democracy.4 Two other students of civil society have suggested that it is not

possible talk about a definitive link between civil society and democracy in

either causal direction.5

In studies on the transition to and consolidation of democracy, there is a

general tendency to adopt the first assumption – that civil society is a

prerequisite for the transition from an authoritarian system of government to

a democratic one. Consequently, in such studies the question which is

addressed is whether or not there is a vibrant civil society in a given

country. Generally, a civil society is considered vibrant in terms of levels of

organizational membership and frequency of activism on the part of civil

society.6

3

On the other hand, recent research has also shown that there is a

reluctance on the part of many citizens, at least in the case postcommunist

countries, for engaging in such activities.7 This brings us to the question of

under what types of circumstances a vibrant civil society would develop and

what would be its general characteristics. This is the basic problematic the

present article addresses itself.

There is an extant theoretical literature on the latter issue; however, often

studies of civil society are conducted without much regard to that literature.

The present article makes use the literature in question and takes Turkey as

as a case study. We study the Turkish case not necessarily for investigating

the trials and tribulations of the Turkish case in itself, but for demonstrating

the usefulness of studying civil society in a given country with a view tothe

model derived from the extant literature in question. Such an exercise may

lead one to arrive at picture of civil society in given country different from

the picture one would come with concerning that country, should one

continue to work with the models that so far have generally informed

studies on civil society. That exercise, consequently, would contribute to

formulating a more general theory of civil society. This is what, in the last

analysis, the present article attempts to contribute.

With these considerations in mind, first the prerequsites and impediments

vis-à-vis the flourishing of civil society as well as the most significant

characteristics of civil society as spelled out in the literature in question are

delineated. Secondly, the following pertinent questions are addressed in

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respect to Turkey: (1) to what degree there had been impediments to civil

society? (2) to what extent one came across the prerequisites of civil

society? and (3) consequently what have been the characteristics of present-

day civil society?

Not surprisingly, studies of civil society in Turkey have focused on

problems of democracy rather than that of civil society. In this context,

some students have been interested in the consolidation of democracy rather

than that of civil society and dwelt upon the question of how civil society

responds to various government policies and alternative policies civil

society itself should make concerning political, economic and related

issues.8 Others have pointed out that Turkey has had a too strong state and

that fact leaves little scope for the emergence of a politically efficacious

civil society.9 There seems to be one single study of civil society in Turkey

that comes closest to the perspective suggested in the present essay. That

study looks at somewhat different versions of two prerequisites (existence

of a market economy and horizontal linkages among different spheres of

civil society), and equally, different versions of some characteristics of civil

society (existence of friendly disagreement, civility and the importance of

rule of law in state-civil society relationship) taken up in this article.10

Impediments to and Prerequisites for Civil Society

Impediments

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Widespread populism, clientelism, opportunism, and personalism (as against

individualism) and the like would constitute one set of impediments to the

emergence and developmet of civil society. Virtually sole emphasis on

interest politics and rights-based individualism may encourage all kinds of

egoistical acts. The government policies that target almost solely political

supporters may create an imbalance among the resources enjoyed by

different segments of society, which in turn may create a situation where

some parts of society may be less able than others to participate in civil

societal activities.11

Secondly, such developments as state-led modernization,

industrialization, and/or economic development as well nation-building may

work against civil society having autonomy from the state.12 In different

degrees and manners, each of the above phenomena may lead to

authoritarian systems of government, rendering the development of

pluralism rather difficult.13 In the course of industrial or economic

development projects, although governments may allow the emergence of

different groups and interests for the sake of developing a national

economy, they may at the same time prefer a basically state-led economy.

The modernization and nation-building efforts carried out by the state, in

turn, may lead the latter to engender certain transformations in society as

well as polity at the expense of some institutions and people. Consequently,

little scope may be left for the development of autonomous voluntary

organizations or associations. Moreover, under such circumstances, among

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other things, the designation of the common good by people14 may also

become impossible, because that task would in all probability be preempted

by the state itself.

Last but not least, such phenomena as ethnic nationalism, religious

fundamentalism, and closed ideologies of different hues and colors would

render the development of civil society almost impossible.15 In such cases,

homogeneity and unanimity would be the ultimate goals, leaving little scope

for pluralism. Exclusive identities and disrespect for the “other,” deriving

from dogmatic tenets and rigid traditions as well as closed ideologies, would

carry the day, all of which discourage free dialogue and debate among and

within the constituent spheres of civil society. In brief, one would come

across chains clasped on free reasoning.

Prerequisites

One of the most important prerequisites for the flourishing of civil society is

the presence of countervailing powers to the central authority.16 The

inability of the center to dominate the periphery opens the way for a polity

where the name of the game is not suppression, but that of negotiation and

persuasion. It is under such circumstances that societal elements would not

be smothered by the state. After all, where political associations are are not

allowed, it would be difficult for civil associations to flourish.17.

Historically, major institutions that limited the powers of the state turned

out to be aristocracy and/or middle class.18 In the case of the latter, there

was a need for that class to comprise entrepreneurs rather than bureaucratic

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and/or other elite elements. Bureaucratic stratum and/or intelligentsia would

not necessarily cherish liberal practices; thus, they would not in all

probability have a sympathetic attitude toward voluntary associations.

Furthermore, entrepreneurial middle classes would be the supporters of rule

of law, for they need an environment where the members of those classes

are protected against all kinds of encroachments of their rights and where

contracts they enter into would be under the protection of the state. In any

case, rule of law is indispensable for freedom of expression, which in turn

facilitates dialogue within and among the constituent units of civil society.

However, it should be kept in mind that the presence of an entrepreneurial

middle class by itself does not guarantee the flourishing of civil society,

because, as already implied, that class itself may not be autonomous from

the state. This brings us to the second significant prerequisite for the

flourishing of civil society, which is the existence of a market economy19.

Where there is market economy the bulk of the resources that a country

commands are not controlled by the state. The non-monopolization of those

resources by the state in turn makes the autonomy from the state of the

business firms as well as other societal institutions possible and renders

them at least at a par vis-à-vis the state. Moreover, market economy, being

more productive than alternative models of economic system, enables the

members of civil society to have at their disposal more resources which they

can use for civil societal activities.20

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Thirdly, the spread of literacy and a mass print culture constitutes two

vital and interrelated prerequisites for civil society. In the last analysis, civil

society is a debating society writ large. Both among and within its

constituent spheres, there would be a continuous and lively discussion of the

social, economic, and political issues. For that debate to be meaningful, the

parties involved should be well informed concerning the three sets of issues

in question. This would become possible where there exists a commonly

shared language, the bulk of the people are literate, and there is an easily

accessible media. In other words, the people in question would have a

tradition of keeping themselves abreast of social, economic, and political

developments.21

Fourthly, for debate among the constituent spheres of civil society to take

place, first there should be horizontal linkages among those spheres. This

means that if historically a society evinced a segregative structure, the

departmentalization among societal sectors that this would have involved,

should have been deconstructed so that the development of reciprocal and

cooperative relations among constituent spheres of civil society would

flourish and the latter would facilitate a widespread dialogue and exchange

of ideas among the members of the latter spheres.22

However, even this is not sufficient; last but not least, one should also

not come across an in-group-out-group orientation among the members of

the civil society. Such an orientation is usually an upshot of lack of trust

among people. Trust among people is another important prerequisite for

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civil society, for in its absence widespread dialogue and exchange of ideas

would not be possible and where, being suspicious of other people’s ulterior

motives and goals, there would be reluctance for cooperative action and

projects.

Primary Characteristics of Civil Society

Where on the whole the impediments cited have been absent and the

prerequisites delineated above have been present, it would be possible for a

civil society to flourish. One of the characteristics of that civil society would

be pluralism. Pluralism here turns out to be two-fold. First, as already

implied, each of such distinct spheres as politics, economy, and religion

would have autonomy from others. Secondly, internally each of those

spheres functions in a plural manner. In either case, there would not be

hegemonic domination on the part of each of those spheres, for civil society

is a venue of conflict as well as consensus.23 The conflict in question would

be expected to be a productive one, because civil society would be able to

reach consensus and thus govern itself.

Pluralism by its very nature leads to disagreement. In civil society,

disagreement is looked upon as inevitable, for dialogue rather than the

imposition of certain views upon others is the name of the game. In civil

society, disagreement turns out to be non-hostile; the parties to the dialogue

try to reach a common point acceptable to everybody rather than endeavor

to refute each and every point made by the others. By common point, the

reference is not to unanimity, but, as pointed out, to consensus. Thus,

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dialogue would become productive; civil societal elements would manage to

come up with their own constructive and feasible missions, programs, and

policies. This would render civil society an efficacious actor to be reckoned

with.

It should also be noted that the consensus in question would be a

dynamic one in two senses: First, at a particular time frame there may be

diverse conceptions of common good, and that, in good faith, the members

of civil society would strive to arrive at a consensus on what should be

considered as common good at that particular juncture. Secondly, the

members of civil society would adopt a future orientation in respect to

common good, keeping in mind that what is presently considered as the

common good may not be in the best interest of the future generations.24

Altruism is an important characteristic of the members of civil society.

Altruism is one of the factors that leads the members of civil society to have

a concern for the common good, and the latter would facilitate arriving at

consensus.25 In the process, they endeavor to build up solidarities. To use

Shils’s terminology, while conflict is the “spice of life”, solidarity is the

cradle of altruism.26

Here, it should also be noted that the common good in question is not

taken as a moral idea of social order dictated by such impediments to civil

society as ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and/or closed

ideologies of different types. Rather, it should be envisaged as an ethical

idea of social order. The former is time and place-specific and less open to

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different interpretations, while the latter is formulated in more general

terms.27 As a consequence, as compared to the moral idea of social order an

ethical idea of social order can be more easily accommodated to different

milieu and needs, and it would be easier for the members of civil society to

reach consensus where it is necessary.

The members of civil society act in the manner delineated here because

they adopt a responsive, and certainly a sympathetic attitude toward others’

particular views, preferences, and interests; after all, the members of civil

society need to take into account the latter views, preferences, and interests

when formulating common good. In the last analysis, the common good

discussed here would be arrived at as a consequence of efforts to reconcile

the particular and the general.

As civil society is after both the desirable and the feasible, it avoids

utopia and adopts realism; it would have ideals, though it stays away from

being ‘idealistic’. It does not look upon heroism with favor; however, it is

determined to pursue what is in the public interest against all odds. Utopia,

subscription to what is idealistic, and heroism would give rise to conflict

and clash between people. That is why utopia, subscription to what is

idealistic, and heroism are alien phenomena to civil society.28

Since deliberations in civil society are conducted in a collective manner,

another characteristic of civil society is that of toleration. Here, toleration is

not taken as just “putting up with others”; it involves considering others at

least equal in dignity, intelligence, and trustworthiness, and thus having

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respect for them.29 Collective decision-making is not possible unless

egalitarianism as a principle governs the relations among the parties

involved in the deliberations.

In collective decision-making, egalitarianism is complemented by

civility, which involves displaying courtesy and the skill of conducting a

debate without being offensive to other parties. Toleration as respect makes

possible joint endeavors; civility helps to maintain a smooth dialogue with

others. Civility, also contributes to a process vital to civil society already

mentioned – that of participants to a debate not only being interested in

refuting others’ arguments, but viewing such an occasion as an opportunity

to learn from others, and thus becoming of capable jointly formulating

missions, programs, and policies that all can live with.30

As for the civil society-state relationship, that particular relationship is

more complex than it is often realized. According to the received wisdom,

civil society sometimes removes authoritarian political regimes from power;

once a more democratic system of government is set up, civil society tries to

prevent a democratic system of government from drifting to

authoritarianism, and additionaly from time to time it doubles as the state,

when the state is unable to attend to some matters deemed important. It is a

fact, however, that civil society conducts other functions, too. Civil society

has autonomy vis-à-vis the state; As Michael Walzer has succintly put it, it

is a “space of uncoerced human association.”31 Civil society is expected to

act in an advisory capacity to the state, by coming up with policy proposals

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on diverse matters, all with a view to bringinh about a “better quality of

life.” Another vital function that civil society would perform is that of

moderating political participation and demands by injecting a degree of

realism to them. What is referred to here is societal version of Samuel P.

Huntington’s political institutionalization,32 or social institutionalization.

Turning to the state, for one thing, the latter maintains rule of law and,

thus, safeguards civil society not only against the state functionaries that

may be involved in illegal action against what they consider as

“undesirable” elements of civil society, but the state also prevents some

non-state groups from acting in a similar manner towards civil society.33 It

follows that the state plays a protective role in respect to civil society, for it

regulates all associational activity by fixing their boundaries.34 For this

reason, neither the state nor civil society would act as a rival vis-à-vis each

other; consequently, they do not harbor hostile attitudes toward one another.

On the contrary, concerning a number of issues they complement each

other.

Civil Society in Turkey

Are There Impediments to Civil Society in Turkey?

May one consider populism, clientelism, opportunism, and personalism as

obstacles to the development and flourishing of civil society in Turkey? It is

possible to respond to this question in the positive. Historically, in the

absence of intermediary structures particularly in the Ottoman Empire but

also in the Republican period (1923 to the present), there has been a direct

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relationship between the subjects (in the Ottoman Empire)/citizens (in the

Republic), on the one hand, and the state, on the other. As already noted, the

Ottoman sultans considered themselves responsible for the welfare of the

people, and the people, when in need of resources and other amenities, had

nowhere to turn to but to the state. In the Republican period, too, one has

observed a similar situation particularly following the transition to multi-

party period. Consequently, if civil society is expected to pay attention to

the common good and if people have to display a certain level of altruism,

Turkey has not been the most suitable context for such phenomena to hold

sway. For in Turkey, rather than forming horizontal relations with others

and trying to oblige the state to act in a responsive manner to their group

interests, peripheral groups have attempted to oblige the state pay attention

to their specific interests.35

Throughout the Republican period, there have been intense efforts for

modernizing the country, starting with the process of industrialization and

continuing with economic development in general. At the same, during this

period, there have been a gradual and constant march towards a more open

polity and society. The basic reason behind this particular evolution has

been the fact that modernization was identified with Westernization and

democracy was viewed as an indispensable component of Westernization.36

The modernization project in question aimed at bringing about a transition

from a religious community, considered to be chained to the dogmas of

Islam, to a secular nation, the members of which were expected to use their

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reasoning faculties and not turn to the Book at each and every instance they

were going to make a decision.

Consequently as early as 1924 and 1930, Turkey experienced two,

though brief, periods of multi-party politics. They were brief, because they

were considered to have formed a threat to the modernization project in

question, not because of an inherent opposition to a more open polity.37

Consequently, as modernization project made progress, the democratization

gained speed. In 1945, Turkey made a definitive transition to multi-party

politics. The military interventions that took place the later decades did not

aim at long-term authoritarian regimes, but had the goal of ‘saving

democracy from itself’. That was why while several Latin American

countries experienced long-term military authoritarianism, in Turkey, when

it intervened, the military immediately gave a date for their return to their

barracks and kept its promise. Furthermore, from the late 1990s onwards,38

not only another military intervention became most unlikely, in addition, the

behind the scenes interventions of the military to day-to-day politics also

became somewhat less frequent, though did not come to a definitive end.

The overall development delineated here increasingly left more scope for

action to the civil society. It is possible to argue that at the turn of the

century, the Turks on the whole may be considered to have freed themselves

from many of their chains. On the other hand, given military or civil

parentheses to this overall evolution, whether the intellectually freed

individuals are willing and enthusiastic to take initiative on many,

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particularly sensitive, issues, remains a moot point. It is patent that to the

extent to which people continue to have reticence to play an active role vis-

à-vis societal issue, to that extent civil society could not be expected to

effectively impinge on the state.

Have such phenomena as ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism,

and/or closed ideologies of different types rendered the development of civil

society in Turkey impossible? The ethnic separatism first came to the

agenda in the early 1920s and lingered on until the end of the 1930s.

However, at the time, it did not on the whole lead to a serious cleavage in

the society or, for that matter, in the polity. In fact, excepting a few

individuals, the bulk of the political stratum have not viewed the Kurdish

rebellions as basically an ethnic issue.39 In the1984-1999 period, when

Turkey experienced similar ‘troubles’, the situation had not been much

different. For the bulk of the people, it continued to be a non-issue. At most,

from time to time, some people debated the Turkish versus Kurdish identity

and whether one should talk about it as a ‘Kurdish’ question; however, this

issue has not divided large numbers of people into opposite camps. As

compared to the earlier round of ‘troubles’, one may argue there has been a

more extensive debate on the issue; however, that debate primarily took

place in the polity rather than society.

The so-called ‘religious fundamentalism’, however, has posed a greater

threat to constructive debate in Turkey. From 1969, the date the first legal

religiously oriented political party was set up, to the present, this issue

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divided the Turks into two almost warring camps. It thus turned out to be

one of the important reasons behind the two military interventions, in 1980

and 1997. It was always concluded that religiously oriented political parties

had used religion for political purposes.

The issue became particularly acute following the 2002 general elections,

when the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP),

won the elections and, for the first time in Turkey, a religiously oriented

political party formed a majority government. This situation made some

secularists concerned about the ultimate aims of the AKP – whether or not

that party would try to bring back a state based on Islam. While the AKP

leadership cadres, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have

argued that they are pious people, but prefer secular politics, the secularist

camp in question have thought that the AKP has been engaged in takiyye, or

dissimulation, that is hiding one’s ulterior motives until the time is ripe to

disclose them. This conflict has made it impossible for the two groups and

their followers to be engaged even in a semblance of constructive debate.

All in all, in Turkey populism, clientelism, opportunism, and personalism

that that country inherited from the Ottoman Empire lingered on. Further

more, people displayed a reluctance to take initiative. On the other hand,

political system was to a large extent democratized, making it possible for

civil society to develop. Ethnic separatism did not lead to a generalized

hostility among the people. Yet, suspicions of dissimulation on the part of

Islamists have created a tension in the country.

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Does Turkey Have the Necessary Prerequisites for Civil Society?

As already mentioned, the first prerequisite for flourishing of civil

society is the presence of countervailing powers to central authority. In

Ottoman times (c.1299-1924), the bureaucratic center managed to exercise

control over all sources of power that could emerge outside the boundaries

of the legitimate power structure.40 Under the circumstances, there was little

scope for the emergence of any kind of social stratum with autonomy from

the center. Furthermore, the social strata that existed were based neither on

property rights, nor were they, in the Durkeimian sense, ‘secondary

structures’ that could act as countervailing powers vis-à-vis the center. The

closest Ottoman equivalents to intermediary structures that could act as

countervailing powers were trade guilds, village councils, and the tribal

organizations. The latter could not really be considered as intermediary

structures, because they could exercise no control over the activities of the

center.41 In any case, these entities enjoyed only limited autonomy, for their

activities were closely monitored by the bureaucrats appointed by the

center.42

Until the last two decades of the twentieth century, the situation in the

Turkish republic had not been any different. It is true that over the years,

there had been a proliferation of unions, voluntary organizations,

associations, and nongovernmental organizations. However, even what had

been considered as prominent interest group associations in Turkey as the

Industrialists and Businessmen Association of Turkey (Türkiye Sanayiciler

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ve İşadamları Derneği-TÜSİAD) have had little or no impact on the

formulation of public policies.43

Turning to the second prerequisite for the development and flourishing of

civil society – that of market economy -, in the Ottoman Empire came to

center dominated the society and economy. The Sultan himself was

responsible for the welfare of his subjects.44 The major concern of capital

Istanbul was that of providing for the welfare of the ruling stratum, for

instance by transferring to that city adequate foodstuffs, rather than

promoting economic development in general.

This was coupled with an ethnic division of labor – the Muslims

preoccupied themselves with agriculture and the non-Muslims with finance

and trade. This state of affairs further weakened the hand of the societal

elements vis-à-vis the center. One upshot of this particular arrangement was

that from the early nineteenth-century onwards, what could pass as interest

group associations were set up by the state and used by the latter as its own

instrument.45 With the departure of the the bulk of the non-Muslim

economic actors in the closing decades of the Empire, the Republican

Turkey came to have neither adequate manpower nor capital for the

flourishing of a market economy. Still, between 1923 and 1929, the country

experimented with a liberal economic policy. However, in the wake of the

1929 world economic crisis and the failure of the liberal policies pursued

earlier, Turkey adopted a state-led economic policy aiming at étatist

protectionism. This policy continued even after 1950 when center-right

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governments came to power. Among other things, the number of state

economic enterprises kept increasing. In the process, industrialists and

businessmen in that country that needed the state as a provider of credit for

the start of new economic ventures. Under such circumstances, the private

sector could hardly challenge the state.

It is true that with the coming to power of the Motherland party

government (1983), Turkey substituted an export-led economic policy for

an import-substitution one. However, the architect of that policy, Turgut

Özal, prime minister from 1983 to 1989, had as his targets those of

rendering the Turkish economy competitive at international markets and

sidelining the traditional civil bureaucracy, which he perceived as an

obstacle for the policy adopted; Özal did not look with sympathy to the

contribution of the private sector to the making of economic policies.46 This

was apparent from the fact that he set up a brand new economy bureaucracy

in Ankara.47

It cannot be denied that at the turn of the century, Turkey had come to

have a dynamic private sector that successfuly competed at international

markets and commanded a significant amount of capital. The relationship

between that sector and the state has increasingly become one of dialogue;

yet, that dialogue has not been a continuous one and, in most instances, the

last word has seemed to belong to Ankara.

As to the widespread literacy, shared means of communication and a

mass print culture, here Turkey fares fairly well. In 2005, the literacy rate

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was 87.4 percent.48 That same year, 95 percent of homes had a TV set, and

the average time period people watched TV was 4.5 hours per day. People

also spent three hours everyday to listen to radio. The latter constituted 73

percent of the people, the 15-24 age groups constituting the majority in the

last category. It must also be pointed out that particularly from the early

1990s onward, the satellite system and cable TV became quite widespread

particularly in the urban areas. As to print media, again in 2005 Turkey had

3,450 daily publications and 918 weeklies.49

Given these figures, one may conclude that people in Turkey are well-

informed on major issues facing the country. One may also assume that

particularly in the Republican period, one cannot talk of the segregation of

people into isolated communities that could end up in barring horizontal

linkages among the constituent spheres of civil society. However, whether

the presumed well-informed people interacting with each other have also

been engaged in constructive debate leading to a consensus and, thus, policy

suggestions is another question. We return to that issue below.

To sum up, until the last two decades of the twentieth century one could

hardly speak of the existence of countervailing powers in Turkey. One can

talk of a similar situation vis-à-vis market economy; here, too, a substantive

opening in that general direction has been relatively recent. On the other

hand, widespread literacy, shared means of communication, and a mass

print culture had been around for longer periods of time.

Primary Characteristics of Civil Society in Turkey

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Does one come across pluralism in Turkey, that is, do any of the different

spheres such as politics, economy, and religion dominate others and does

each and every such sphere internally function in a plural manner? In the

case of politics, since 1945, there has been a multi-party politics in Turkey,

which, from 1961 onwards, when Turkey adopted proportional

representation, even led to political party inflation. However, the number of

parties represented in Parliament was reduced to manageable levels when

Turkey adopted in 1983 a rather high electoral quotient of ten percent. The

plurality in the numbers of parties, however, has not been matched by

pluralism in the internal functioning of those parties. Turkish political

parties have been dominated by their leaders.50

Furthermore, as noted above, in Turkey the societal entities could hardly

impinge upon the state. One expected consequence of this situation has been

the virtual absence of responsiveness on the part of governments to societal

elements. The governments in Turkey have functioned far more

autonomously from and thus have not been responsive to social groups than

their counterparts in advanced democracies. This has, for instance, been the

case in the sphere of economics. The economic actors have found it rather

difficult to impinge upon the state actors. In fact, governments often placed

their supporters in the governing bodies of the peak interest group

associations such as TÜSİAD.

From the 1980s onwards, on the whole the situation remained not much

different from the earlier periods. It is true that the governments allowed

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interest group associations to freely articulate their views and interests;

however, whether the former have incorporated those views in the policies

they formulated remained an open question. In any case, governments

themselves initiated their, what turned out to be rather infrequent, meetings

with the representatives of the associations in question, and not the other

way round. Consequently, during the post-1980 period, too, the associations

continued to criticize the governments for leaving them out of the picture.

Although Turkey adopted market economy and the private sector began to

command rather ample resources; yet, its interest group associations

nevertheless remained as ‘outsiders’, and could not become ‘insiders’.51

Turning to the sphere of religion, in the Ottoman Empire, in general

Islam did not turn out to be proscriptive concerning state policies; rather,

often resort was made to that religion in order to legitimize the policies

already formulated. On the whole, the Muslim subjects were granted leeway

to live their religion in the manner they chose to. It is true that people turned

to religious personages for guidance concerning several issues in their

personal and to some extent community lives; yet, the type of Islam, which

was salient, was the Sufi version of Islam that has urged individuals to

preoccupy themselves with upgrading themselves morally and, thus, treating

others with tolerance and respect. It was also a call for altruism.52

In the Republican period, an effort was made to further liberate citizens

from the presumed chains engendered by Islam. One of the most important

premises of the new Republic was secularism; the goal was that of enabling

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the people to use their own reasoning faculties rather than turning to the

Book. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (affiliated to the Prime Ministry)

was saddled with the responsibility of seeing to it that the preachers at

mosques delivered sermons along the lines just mentioned.53 Islam was also

expected to provide solidarism among the Muslims and serve as an anti-dote

against the radical ideologies on the right and on the left as well as against

ethnic separatism. In this context, one sore point throughout the Republic

has been the conscious ignoring of the presence of that country’s Alevis, or

the Turkish version of Shiites,54 and remaining unresponsive to their needs.

Obviously, this particular policy somewhat detracted from pluralism one

came across in Turkey. This situation may change in the near future; at the

turn of the century, on different occasions, the Directorate declared that

some reforms will be made regarding this issue, though, up until the present

writing (May 2007), no concrete steps had yet been taken along those lines.

Does one come across in Turkey friendly disagreement that makes

dialogue and thus reaching consensus possible? One important factor that

stands in the way dialogue ending up in consensus in that country has been

the phenomenon of non-friendly disagreement in high politics, which in turn

has led to a similar cleavage among the societal actors. It is true that Turkey

has had myriad societal organizations and associations; but, the latter have

been divided among themselves on cultural and/or ideological issues. The

tension between secular TÜSİAD and the reliously oriented Association of

Independent Industrialists and Businessmen is a case in point.55 The

25

polarization in question, which involved an insistence on ‘absolute truths’,

prevented the parties from acting in a realistic manner and meeting at a

common ground.56 Giving one important example, neither secular Kemalist

nor Islamists, particularly the former, have shown an inclination agree on

common good.57 The ‘secularist’-‘Islamist’ confrontation was intertwined

with the absence of interpersonal trust, respect for the other, and thus

‘associability’. This state affairs at times also displayed an absence of

civility on the part of the members on both sides.58 On the other hand, it has

been noted that the public sphere in Turkey has shown characteristics of

value neutrality in respect to ethnic and kinship ties.59

Concerning the state-civil society relations in Turkey, it has been shown

that the state in that country has its autonomy from society, although it came

up with a legal order ‘based on criteria, which are universally applicable’.60

On the other hand, that same state has not been able to systematically

enforce the laws and regulations’.61 As for the society, as it has already

been noted that the latter has always remained in a defensive, that is, an

‘outsider’ position vis-à-vis the state.

Conclusion

Turkish case in respect to the relationship between civil society and the

establishment of democracy displays a similarity to the Spanish case; in

both instances, factors other than civil society played a significant role in the

transition to democratization and the adoption and institutionalization of

basic rights and liberties. One may even suggest that the cause and effect

26

relationship between civil society and the passage from an authoritarian

system of government to a more open political system and democratization

has been the reverse of the relevant argument in this regard derived from the

post-1991 Eastern European experience, i.e. the presence of civil society

being regarded as indispensable for the transition to a democratic system of

government. In contrast, in the case of Spain and Turkey, democratization

has set the stage for the flourishing of civil society, not the other way round.

Here one may raise the query that if, in a given case, a certain type of

civil society plays an important role in bringing about a democratic system

of government, do we need another type of civil society once the

authoritarian system of government has been replaced by a democratic one?

Concerning this issue, a distinction that Foley and Edwards have drawn our

attention seems useful. The latter authors has made a distinction between the

so-called ‘Civil Society I’ and ‘Civil Society II’; the former model depicts

civil society basically as an associational life that is characterized by civility

on the part of its members while the latter model takes civil society as a

sphere of action that has its autonomy from the state and, thus, is able to

resist a tyrannical regime. Conceptualizing two models of civil society vis-

à-vis the query raised above turns out to be appropriate even if the particular

definitions of those two models suggested by Foley and Edwards is not

necessarily useful. What we are driving at is that where civil society turns

out to be an opposition movement, its members may come to have an anti-

state, that is, an anti-central authority, attitude, which may not be functional

27

in a context where civil society is both dependent and independent of the

state. While civil society cannot exist without the protection the state

provides to it by maintaining, for instance, law and order and rule of law,

one also cannot talk of democracy where civil society does not have an

adequate degree of autonomy from the state.

The particular paradigm adopted in this essay -- in terms of which

impediments, prerequisites, and the resultant characteristics of civil society

are investigated -- also enables one to come to the conclusion one cannot

definitively argue that there is or there is not a civil society in a given time

and place. Depending upon the existence and non-existence of the

constellations of impediments and prerequisites in a given period and

geography, one may come across certain dimensions of civil society, and

not other dimensions.

In Turkey, such lingering impediments as populism, clientalism,

opportunism and populism seems to have prevented the members of civil

society from entertaining an idea of a common good and this has become an

obstacle for the development of dynamic consensus when needed. This state

of affairs must also have had an adverse impact on the development of trust

among the members of civil society and, consequently, on the building of

horizontal linkages among the members of civil society. Similarly, the

continuing weakness of civil societal entities that could act as a

countervailing power vis-à-vis the state rendered the latter to remain as

28

strong for the flourishing of an egalitarian relationship between the state and

civil society.

On the other hand, the presence of a certain degree of modernization,

economic development, and industrialization, the spread of literacy and

mass print culture, the consolidation of democracy as well as the absence of

a generalized hostility among various elements in society, perhaps a

consequence of the fact that one has not come across ethnic nationalism,

religious fundamentalism, and closed ideologies, may be the reasons why in

Turkey there have emerged numerous civil societal entities, some of these

entities have developed intense interest concerning some specific societal

problems such as environment, gender issues, salvage operations following

some natural disasters such as earthquakes, and the like.

Notes and References

1 Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic

Consolidation’, Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (July 1994), p. 8. 2 Ernest Gellner, Condition of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London:

Allen Lane, 1994), p. 189. 3 Göran Therborn, ‘Beyond Civil Society: Democratic Experiences and

Their Relevance to the Middle East’, in Civil Society and Democracy in the

Muslim World, Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Perrson, eds. (Istanbul: Swedish

Research Institute in Turkey, 1997), p. 47. 4 Omar G. Encarnación, ‘Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy

in Spain’, Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 1 (2001), p. 60. 5 Abdau Maliqalim Simone and Edgar Pieterse, ‘Civil Societies in

Internationalized Africa’, Social Dynamics 19, no. 2 (1993), pp. 41-69.

29

6 Marc Morjé Howard, ‘The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society’,

Journal of Democracy 13, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 157-159. 7 Ibid., p. 164. 8 For examples of studying civil society in Turkey from the perspective of

the problems of democracy and/or citizenship rather than those of civil

society, see Ergun Özbudun, ‘Civil Society and Democracy in Turkey’, in

Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, Elisabeth Özdalga and

Sune Persson, eds. (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1997);

Nilüfer Göle, ‘Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in

Turkey’, in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, Metin Heper and Ahmet

Evin, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); Ayşe Kadıoğlu,

‘Gelecekte Devlet ve Sivil Toplum Örgütlerinin İşbirliğine Yönelik Sonuç

Yorumları’, in Devlet ve Sivil Toplum Bağlamında Halk Katılımcılığı ve

Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, no ed. (Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 2002). 9 Şahin Alpay, ‘Türkiye’de Devlet-Sivil Toplum Dengesi Yeniden

Kurulmalı’, in Sivil Toplum, Yurdakul Fincancı, ed. (Istanbul: Türkiye

Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırma Vakfı, 1991); Gülgün Erdoğan Tosun,

Demokratikleşme Perspektifinden Devlet-Sivil Toplum İlişkisi (Istanbul:

Alfa Yayınları, 2001). 10 Sefa Şimsek, ‘The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From

Quantity to Quality’, Turkish Studies 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 46-74. 11 J. A. Hall, ‘In Search of Civil Society’, in Civil Society: Theory, History,

Comparison, idem, ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1995), p. 14 12 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 13 Ibid. p. 8. 14 This point is elaborated below. 15 Hall, ‘In Search of a Civil Society’, pp. 16-17; Bryan S. Turner, ‘Islam,

Civil Society, and Citizenship: Reflections on the Sociology of Citizenship

and Islamic Studies’, in Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, N.A.

30

Butenschon, U. Davis, and M. Hassasian, eds. (Syracuse: Syracuse

University Press, 2000), p. 31. 16 Hall, ‘In Search of a Civil Society’, p. 4. Here, Hall gives the historical

example of nobility and church acting as countervailing powers to kings. 17 Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, ‘The Paradox of Civil Society’,

Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996), p. 44. 18For the importance of aristocracy as a countervailing power see Reinhard

Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkley:

University of California Press, 1978), Chapter Seven. 19 On the relationship between market economy and democracy see Robert

Dahl, On Democracy (Virginia: Yale University Press, 1998), Chapter 13. 20 Edward Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civility’, in The Virtue of Civil Society:

Selected Essays on Liberalism, Steven Grosby, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty

Fund, 1997), p. 331 21 Hall, ‘In Search of Civil Society’, passim. 22 Don E. Eberly, ‘The Meaning, Origin, and Applications of Civil Society’,

in The Essential Civil Society Reader, idem, ed. (Lanham, Maryland:

Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 17. It should also be pointed out that in

the absence of such horizontal linkages, the vertical relations between the

state, on the one hand, and individuals or the constellations of individuals,

whether formally organized or not, on the other, leaves societal actors

vulnerable to undue control from above 23 Edward Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civility’, p. 330. 24 Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civility’, p. 346; Walzer, ‘The Civil Society

Argument’, p. 98. 25 That civil society is concerned with public rather than private interests is

underlined by, among others, Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward

Democratic Consolidation’, p. 6. 26 Shils, ‘Civility and Civil Society’, in The Virtue of Civil Society, Grosby,

ed., p. 97.

31

27 Eberly, ‘The Meaning, Origin, and Applications of Civil Society’, in p.

13. 28 XXXX 29 Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civility’, p. 338. 30 Eberly, ‘The Meaning, Origin, and Applications of Civil Society’, pp. 63-

101 and Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civility’, pp. 320-355. 31 Michael Walzer, ‘The Civil Society Argument’, in Dimensions of Radical

Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, Chantal Mouffe, ed.

(London: Verso, 1992), 89. 32 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12ff. 33 Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civility’, p. 332 34 Walzer, ‘The Civil Society Argument’, p. 103. 35 See, inter alia, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus

Governance’, Turkish Studies 2, no. 1 (Spring 2001), p. 64. 36 Metin Heper, ‘The ‘Strong State’ and Democracy: The Turkish Case in

Comparative and Historical Perspective’, in Democracy and Modernity, S.

N. Eisenstadt, ed. (Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1992), p. 146. 37 Although he was not in a particular hurry to make a transition to multi-

party politics, Atatürk, the founder of the state, believed in the innate

capacity of the people to make progress. Metin Heper, The State Tradition

in Turkey (Walkington, U.K.: Eothen Press 1985), Third Chapter. 38 In its 1997 intervention, the military mobilized several societal groups

and did not act alone. 39 Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: Question of Assimilation

(London: Macmillan/Palgrave, forthcoming). 40 Şerif Mardin, ‘Power, Civil Society and and Culture in the Ottoman

Empire’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 11 (1969), p. 26. 41Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (North Humberside: The

Eothen Press, 1985), p. 101; Metin Heper, ‘The State and Interest Groups

32

with Special Interest to Turkey’, in Strong State and Interest Groups: The

Post 1980-Turkish Experience, idem. ed., (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991),

p. 13. 42 Mardin, ‘Power, Civil Society and and Culture in the Ottoman Empire’, p.

32. 43 It is for this reason that on the whole the individual holding companies try

to exercise influence upon bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of

policies so as to make it beneficial for them. Heper, ‘The State and Interest

Groups with Special Reference to Turkey’, in idem, Strong State and

Economic Interest Groups: The Post 1980 Turkish Experience, p.17. 44 Mardin, ‘Power, Civil Society and and Culture in the Ottoman Empire’, p.

29. 45Heper, ‘The State and Interest Groups with Special Interest to Turkey’, in

Strong State and Interest Groups: The Post 1980-Turkish Experience, p. 15. 46 Heper, ‘Interest Group Politics in post-1980 Turkey Lingering Monism’,

in Strong State and Interest Groups: The Post 1980-Turkish Experience,

pp.173-176. 47 Metin Heper and M. Selçuk Sancar, ‘Is Legal-Rational Bureaucracy A

Prerequisite For A Rational-Productive Bureaucracy? The Case of Turkey’,

Administration and Society 30, no. 2 (May 1998), pp. 150-154. 48 www.worldbank.org/tr 49 www.byegm.gov.tr . It is true that a sheer increase in shared means of

communication and mass print culture in itself would not turn everybody

into well-informed citizens because what people watch and listen differ

from one person to another. Yet, one may argue that such an increase in

what what people watch and read would contribute, though in different

levels, to people’s becoming aware of the current issues ina certain context. 50 It must be noted in passing that in Turkey the absence of intra-party

democracy has been a mixed-blessing; in such parties as the Nationalist

Action Party and the Justice and Development Party, the leaders prevented

33

those parties from drifting to anti-system tendencies. This has contributed to

the flourishing of civil society. 51 Heper, ‘The State and Interest Groups with Special Interest to Turkey’, in

Strong State and Interest Groups, idem, ed., p. 18. 52 Halil İnalcık, ‘Tarihsel Bağlamda Sivil Toplum ve Tarikatlar’,

unpublished manuscript, pp. 5-7; Müjgan Cumhur, Anadolu’nun

Bütünleşmesinde Ahmed Yesevi’nin Yeri (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi,

1997), pp. 40-42. 53 For an elaboration, see David Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey

(Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1999), pp. 28-31. 54 In fact, Alevis do not use the appellation Şi’i for themselves. For the

detailed analysis of the relationship between the Alevis and Shi’ism see

Ibid., pp. 139-141. 55 Şimsek, ‘The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey’, pp. 61-62. 56 Reşat Kasaba, ‘Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities’, in

Rethinking Modernity and National Identity, idem and Sibel Bozdoğan, eds.

(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 18. 57Şimsek, ‘The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey’, p. 63. 58 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity and Change?’ in

Turkish Transformation: New Century-New Challenges, Brian W. Beeley,

ed. (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 2002), pp. 62-66. 59 Binnaz Toprak, ‘Civil Society in Turkey’, in Civil Society in the Middle

East, Volume Two, Augustus Richard Norton, ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995),

p. 87. 60 Ibid., p. 88. 61 Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity and Change’, p. 70.