Moment of Battle: The TwentyClashes That Changed the World.James Lacey and Williamson Murray.Bantam Books. 496 pages; black-and-white photographs; index; maps; notes.$30. Publisher’s website: www.ban-tamdell.com.

By LTC Michael BurkeU.S. Army retired

History is a vexing issue for Ameri-cans, since so much of our sense

of ourselves as a nation relies heavilyon how we see our own history. GlennBeck on the right and Oliver Stone onthe left are only recent examples in acomplex struggle over who controls thenarrative in our heads. Even Clio, themuse of history, has a Facebook page. Williamson Murray, one of our finest

military historians, and James Lacey, aprolific author and defense scholar,avoid such reductive popularizing asthey argue for the importance of mili-tary history in Moment of Battle: TheTwenty Clashes That Changed the World.They contend that contemporary acad-emic history deprecates both great menand great battles, and they focus onbroad social and political currents in-stead. Modeling their study after SirEdward S. Creasy’s 1851 book, The Fif-teen Decisive Battles of the World FromMarathon to Waterloo, the authors makethis explicit in their preface: “LikeCreasy, we have selected our battleson the basis of their long-term impacton the course of history, not on the ba-sis of their importance to the study ofmilitary art.” The battles range from antiquity to

the present, from Marathon in 490 B.C.to the 2003 battle for Baghdad. Six ofCreasy’s choices are examined—Mara-thon, Gaugamela, Teutoburger Wald,Hastings, the Spanish Armada andSaratoga. Their other choices differ be-cause of the 150-year period betweenCreasy’s book and theirs, one that sawthe American Civil War, the two world

wars and the decline of European colo-nial empires. Lacey and Murray have, however, a

bias similar to Creasy’s: one that is hu-manist, Protestant and British. Theirtreatment of the early battles—Mara-thon (Athens defeats Sparta), Gaug-amela (Greeks defeat Persians) andZama (Rome defeats Carthage)—es-sentially contrasts a humanist or West-ern culture with an Eastern or Africanone. These three battles permit the cre-

ation and spread of the Greco-Romanworld—its knowledge, values andpolitics, from which so much of ourcontemporary Western culture comes. The Battle of Teutoburger Wald

(Germans defeat Romans) makes theircase in reverse. They claim it set thestage for both world wars in that Ger-many was never brought into the am-bit of that same culture. They even goso far as to conclude that “there is lit-tle chance Germany will become cul-turally indistinguishable from the restof the West in any foreseeable timeframe.”Their discussion of the Thirty Years’

War’s Battle of Breitenfeld (Sweden de-feats the Holy Roman Empire) is simi-

larly confusing. They chose this battlemainly because the Swedish army wasvery much one we would recognize to-day, with standardized weaponry, in-tense training, flexible organizationand distributed leadership. It was radi-cally different from the Spanish-in-spired standard European tercio orga-nization of massed pikemen and mus-keteers that achieved cohesion throughmass alone. The battle meets the au-thors’ criteria in the sense that theSwedish model became the model forindustrial-power armies through ourown time. Breitenfeld, however, was not truly

decisive—the Thirty Years’ War draggedon for another 17 years, ending with anegotiated peace that radically changedpolitical boundaries but left the basic re-ligious contours of Europe more or lessintact. In this same chapter, the authorsspeculate about what would have hap-pened had the Catholic Hapsburgs pre-vailed over the Protestant Germans, ar-guing that the great burst of scientificknowledge that began in that centurywould have been crushed by the officialopposition of the Catholic Church. Itstreatment of Galileo is offered as an ex-ample, but this argument is not con-vincing.Once the authors move to more re-

cent times, their bias becomes clearer.Few would disagree with the idea thatTrafalgar, Vicksburg, Normandy, Mid-way and Kursk were truly decisive bat-tles. Some of their other choices, how-ever, might prompt debate. Defeatingthe Spanish Armada and then, twocenturies later, defeating the French inNorth America during the Seven Years’War ensured the rise of the British Em-pire, which changed the world in aprofound way: “English, not French,has become the dominant language ofglobal intellectual and commercial ex-change. … That reality bodes well forAmerica’s global interests and thecourse of history over the coming cen-tury.” Whether that empire was an un-

August 2013 � ARMY 61

ReviewsMilitary History Matters

62 ARMY � August 2013

alloyed good, which the authors seemto suggest, remains to be seen.The book gets truly interesting with

its last two battles, Dien Bien Phu andthe capture of Baghdad. In terms ofDien Bien Phu, the authors argue thatthe French losing control of theircolonies transformed warfare in thelate 20th century, and we are still re-sponding to the kind of conflict andshifting East-West balance of powerseen there. Lacey and Murray seem less sure in

their discussion of the American inva-sion of Iraq in 2003, which focuses onthe campaign to capture its capital—specifically, the actions of the 3rd In-fantry Division’s 1st Brigade to seizethe highway bridges into the city.Here, the authors go down to thecompany and platoon levels, evennaming some of the brave junior offi-cers and soldiers who helped win Ob-

jective Peach. They also present thedeliberations of the Iraqi leadership,something largely absent from otherreporting on the war. They depict theend of the battle as a great operationalsuccess, but they do not discuss thenext several years of civil war and con-flict within the country. They do stress,however, that the jury is still out onwhether or not this war or this battlewill rise to the decisive level of theirother 19.

This seems fair to me—it really istoo soon to tell—though I wonderif their earlier choices might illumi-nate this last: The Iraqi regime fitsmore or less into the East-versus-Westdynamic that informs so much of thebook. Perhaps we are meant to com-pare Gaugamela and Zama to thiscontemporary battle, or perhaps itwill fit into the authors’ dismissal of

Cannae (Carthage defeats Rome), amuch-studied battle that they claimultimately made no difference in thelong-term balance of power in the an-cient world. In the end, Murray and Lacey make

their case that military history and theoutcome of battles matter, but theyconfuse cause and effect. All these bat-tles occurred solely because the largersweeping forces of history broughtthem into existence. In addition, theirbiases skew some of their conclusions.If anything, this book invites readersto consider their own prejudices andopen themselves to a deeper study ofhistory of all kinds.

LTC Michael Burke, USA Ret., taughtEnglish at the U.S. Military Academyfor eight years. He served with the 1stArmored Division during the PersianGulf War.

Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare FromStalingrad to Iraq. Louis A. Di-Marco. Osprey Publishing. 320 pages;bibliography; black-and-white and colorphotographs; glossary; index; maps;$24.95. Publisher’s website: www.os-preypublishing.com.

By COL Kevin W. FarrellU.S. Army retired

As an ever-growing percentage ofmankind lives in urban environ-

ments, it stands to reason that warfarewill increasingly involve combat in andaround cities. Louis A. DiMarco arguesthat “the 21st century is going to be acentury of conflict” and that this con-flict will typically occur in cities, despiteAmerica’s supposed reluctance to fightin them. His most recent book, ConcreteHell, is a straightforward attempt to fa-miliarize readers with modern urbanbattles so they are able to better under-stand contemporary and future militaryaffairs. Specifically, DiMarco seeks tomake three main contributions to thefield: a basic appreciation of the “multi-ple dimensions of the urban battle-

field”; “analytical insights” drawn fromhistorical records for the purpose ofidentifying relevant tactical, operationaland strategic considerations for con-temporary combat; and, finally, to high-light the evolution of the urban battle-field from being “relatively simplistic”to a “highly complex hybrid mixture.”

Concrete Hell begins with a conciseoverview of the history of urban war-fare. The main body consists of eightchapters about iconic or emblematicurban battles and another that focuseson the lengthy British struggle against—and ultimate victory over—the IrishRepublican Army (IRA) in NorthernIreland. It concludes with a brief reca-pitulation of salient points from thepreceding chapters and a recommen-dation that future “urban combat … beclosely and effectively coordinated andsynchronized with political policy.” DiMarco’s many years of service on

the faculty at the U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, as well ashis experience shaping Army doctrinefor urban operations and counterinsur-gency warfare, clearly inform this vol-ume. Maps are simple and useful, andexcellent photographs complementeach chapter. The writing is competentand informative throughout, while theindex is surprisingly thorough.The two World War II battles fea-

tured in Concrete Hell—Stalingrad andAachen—have been covered in greatdepth in many previous works. French

Urban Warfare in the Modern Era

August 2013 � ARMY 63

efforts in Algeria and American effortsin Vietnam are familiar to students ofcontemporary military history. Chap-ter 4, “Urban Warfare From the Sea,”sheds welcome light on a critical junc-ture of the Korean War: the Inchonlandings and the liberation of Seoul. It is Chapter 7, however, “The Long

Urban War,” that is perhaps the book’sgreatest contribution. DiMarco pro-vides the reader with a coherent andconcise overview of the costly but sig-nificant British victory over the IRAthat took nearly four decades. In short,the author demonstrates how British se-curity forces in Northern Ireland, aftermuch trial and error, learned “to applymore sophisticated tactics, tied into anintegrated political and military strat-egy, and wean the Catholic communityfrom its steadfast support of the PIRA[Provisional IRA].” In other words, theBritish won the war when they strippedthe insurgents from their popular sup-port.Chapter 8, “Urban Death Trap,” will

likely be of interest in light of thebombings and subsequent manhuntfor the perpetrators in Boston this pastApril. Urban warfare has never beenpleasant, but this chapter identifies thesevere tactical and operational chal-lenges the Russians faced in Grozny,Chechnya, in 1994–1995 as well as thesavage nature of the fighting. In exam-ining the tactics and weapons em-ployed by both sides, DiMarco ob-serves that in this first, fleeting victoryof a lengthy war, “the Russian militarydid not outfight the Chechens; it over-whelmed them.” Although the tech-niques employed by the Russians andthe heavy casualties inflicted are un-likely to be employed by Americanforces anytime soon, the chapter pro-vides a solid analysis of an importantepisode in the annals of urban combat.

The remaining chapters address re-cent operations in Israel and Iraq.Chapter 9, “Invading the Urban Sanc-tuary,” examines the Israeli DefenseForces’ actions in Jenin, a center ofPalestinian resistance in the WestBank, in 2002. DiMarco characterizes itas a “successful operation” because itaccomplished the modest goal of “re-

ducing the Palestinian militants’ capa-bility to conduct terrorist attacks in-side Israel.” Chapter 10, “SystematicUrban Warfare,” analyzes the perfor-mance of the U.S. Army’s 1st BrigadeCombat Team of the 1st Armored Di-vision in Ramadi, Iraq, in 2006 and2007. DiMarco’s analysis concludeswith the rather astonishing claim that“the urban operations techniques pio-neered in Ramadi facilitated the with-drawal of all coalition military forcesfrom Iraq in 2011.” Both chapters de-tail events clearly, certainly makingthem useful as case studies, but thevery recent occurrence and subse-quent history in both regions demon-strate the inherent difficulty of histori-cal scholarship conducted on suchevents. Clearly, the Israeli situationcontinues to evolve, thus renderingthe author’s analysis of Ramadi in-complete and problematic.Unfortunately, the absence of end-

notes weakens this book, whether as awork of history or battle analysis. Forexample, many scholars would take is-sue with the declarations that “Stalin-grad was not the largest battle foughton the Eastern Front nor were thelosses suffered by the Germans at Stal-ingrad catastrophic. … There was no

reason at the time to think that Stalin-grad was anything but a temporary set-back.” Without supporting evidence,the reader wonders whether the authorbelieves the Battles of Kursk, Berlin, orany other were bigger and how theloss of an entire army of 300,000 menwas only a temporary setback. Further-more, in a subsequent comparison ofthe battles for Stalingrad and Aachen,DiMarco overlooks the crucial fact thatthe former battle involved two totali-tarian regimes at great power, whilethe latter witnessed a very different setof conditions and enemies. Overall, this book is recommended

reading for anyone interested in learn-ing about urban combat. Most of all, itwill be of value for soldiers wanting toquickly learn the history and the myr-iad tactical, operational, strategic andpolitical considerations associated withfighting in cities.

COL Kevin W. Farrell, Ph.D., USARet., is the former chief of military his-tory at West Point. He commanded acombined arms battalion in Iraq, andhis most recent book is The Militaryand the Monarchy: The Case andCareer of the Duke of Cambridge inan Age of Reform.

Kennesaw Mountain: Sherman, John-ston, and the Atlanta Campaign.Earl J. Hess. The University of NorthCarolina Press. 352 pages; photographs;maps; notes; bibliography; index; $35.Publisher’s website: www.uncpress.unc.edu.

By COL Cole C. KingseedU.S. Army retired

Six weeks after departing Chat-tanooga, Tenn., in May 1864 in hisquest to capture Atlanta, the armies ofMG William T. Sherman encounteredmassive field fortifications constructedby Confederate GEN Joseph E. Johnstonat Kennesaw Mountain. For Sherman,the ensuing battles outside Marietta,Ga., comprised the most desperate

phase of his career. For Johnston, Ken-nesaw Mountain represented the bestevidence that his Fabian strategy wassuccessful in inflicting casualties on hisadversary and delaying his advance toAtlanta.In Kennesaw Mountain, historian Earl

J. Hess provides an excellent analysisof the most critical engagements ofSherman’s Atlanta campaign, includ-ing the fighting around Kolb’s Farm onJune 22, 1864, and Sherman’s frontalassaults on the twin peaks of Kenne-saw Mountain on June 27. Hess’ book,“by necessity, is a study of high-com-mand problems, decisions, and tri-umphs on both sides of no-man’s-land, but it is also the story of commonsoldiers enduring and adjusting to thespecial rigors of continuous contact

Taking Atlanta

with the enemy.” What makes Kenne-saw Mountain National BattlefieldPark so significant is that the area con-tains the most important collection ofCivil War earthworks in the WesternTheater—remnants that are as impor-tant as those in the best battlefieldparks of the Eastern Theater.For Hess, Kennesaw Mountain is one

of the more valuable Civil War re-sources in the country. He was so im-pressed by his initial visit in 1986 thathe decided to make a career of studyingfield fortifications and their impact ontactical and operational levels of war. Hess has written several books, in-

cluding The Civil War in the West: Vic-tory and Defeat From the Appalachians tothe Mississippi. He is at his best as hediscusses the most important lessonsfrom the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.Several factors that distinguish Kenne-saw Mountain from the majority ofCivil War battles are the relatively shortfields of fire that characterized the fight-ing and the effectiveness of well-con-structed fieldworks. Despite the close-in

nature of combat, Sherman directed thebattle through the widespread use ofthe field telegraph, which provided himwith nearly minute-to-minute intelli-gence of his opponent’s tactics and op-erations.

Hess is not reluctant to offer hisown opinion on the strengths and

weaknesses of the belligerent parties.Here, he assigns neither commandinggeneral glowing accolades. He viewsSherman as a commander who wasbrilliant on the strategic offensive butwhose “sense of how to conduct thetactical offensive left something to bedesired.” Hess is far more critical ofJohnston and the corps commandersof the Army of Tennessee. He ques-tions Johnston’s delaying strategy andquotes Confederate corps commanderLTG W.J. Hardee’s own summary ofthe commander: “How to whip Sher-man is the problem to be solved, andour General has not yet been able tofind a solution.” Hess wholeheartedlyconcurs, quoting Confederate GENBraxton Bragg: “[Johnston] had nomore plan for the future than he hadhad in the past.” Hess also explores the tension that

existed among Sherman’s army com-manders, specifically Generals GeorgeH. Thomas, Joseph Hooker and JamesB. McPherson. All Sherman’s subordi-nate commanders endured the com-manding general’s wrath during theAtlanta campaign, but none more sothan Thomas. In an eyes-only commu-niqué to General-in-Chief Ulysses S.Grant, Sherman expressed his conster-nation with Thomas’ Army of theCumberland, which was “so habitu-ated to be on the defensive that, fromits commander down to the lowestprivate, I cannot get it out of theirheads.” Thomas arguably emerged asone of the Union’s premier Army-levelcommanders, but he entered neitherGrant’s nor Sherman’s inner circles,leading both senior commanders to diminish his worth to the Union wareffort. In the long run, Johnston’s delaying

strategy proved fruitless in that it notonly failed to dramatically impedeSherman’s advance but also drainedthe patience of Johnston’s civilian lead-ers in Richmond, Va. Why then didSherman order a frontal assault againstKennesaw Mountain when maneuverhad proven the forte of his advancingforces? Hess posits that Sherman feltcompelled to attack because of circum-

64 ARMY � August 2013

stances seemingly beyond his controlas well as undue command pressurefrom Grant. Hess also claims that Sher-man viewed Kennesaw Mountain asan experiment in that “he never in-tended wasting his manpower to thepoint that he could no longer sustainthe strategic offensive.”Kennesaw Mountain is a significant

contribution to the literature sur-rounding the Western Theater of theAmerican Civil War. It includes ap-

pendices that provide the order of bat-tle for the combatants in late June1864 as well as a detailed account ofhow veterans initiated preservationefforts in the 1890s that led to the for-mation of Kennesaw Mountain NationalBattlefield Park. Well-placed maps andbattle sketches also greatly enhance thetext.Well-preserved battlefields serve as

outdoor classrooms for any student ofoperations during this nation’s bloodi-

est conflict. In his superb analysis ofthe most important series of battles inSherman’s approach to Atlanta, Hessmakes a convincing case that there isno better forum to learn the intricaciesof Confederate fieldwork design andconstruction than the Battle of Kenne-saw Mountain.

COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret., Ph.D., aformer professor of history at the U.S. Mil-itary Academy, is a writer and consultant.

66 ARMY � August 2013

The Secret Rescue: An Untold Storyof American Nurses and MedicsBehind Nazi Lines. Cate Lineberry.Little, Brown and Company. 245 pages;black-and-white photographs; index;maps; notes; $27. Publisher’s website:www.littlebrown.com.

By Nancy Barclay Graves

While doing research on WorldWar II, Cate Lineberry, a former

staff writer for National Geographic andthe Web editor of Smithsonian, stum-bled upon the story of 2LT AgnesJensen Mangerich, a U.S. Army nursewith the 807th Medical Air EvacuationTransportation Squadron (MAETS),which was forced to land in Albania inNovember 1943 during a routine flightfrom Sicily, Italy to Bari, Italy. She refer-ences 2LT Jensen’s memoir, govern-ment records and testimonies fromother members of the party, including aseries of interviews with the last sur-viving member. She also traveled to Al-bania and interviewed family membersof those partisans who helped theAmericans, some of whom were chil-dren who remembered the cupkeAmerikane (American girls). Lineberryproduced a well-told story of incredibleheroism and sacrifice in war-torn Alba-nia. Her dedication—“For the forgottenheroes”—is particularly appropriate.On November 3, 1943, 13 nurses of

the 807th MAETS, along with 12 medicsof the same squadron and one from an-other squadron hitching a ride, em-barked on a routine two-hour flight

from Sicily to Bari, 260 miles away. Ablinding storm prevented them fromlanding at Bari. The pilots tried to getabove or below the storm and flewblind for several harrowing hours. See-ing an airfield that looked as though itcould accommodate the aircraft, theycame in for a landing. Unknown tothem, it was a German airfield. As they tried to land, the Germans

suddenly fired at them, and severalGerman planes took to the air to chasethem. The pilots managed to elude theGermans, but low on fuel and withsome damage to the tail of the planefrom enemy fire, they needed to land.They brought the plane down on whatappeared to be a dry lake bed. Almostimmediately, a group of partisansemerged from the trees and urged

them to follow quickly before the Ger-mans appeared. Thus began a nine-week saga of privation and fortitudeon the part of the Americans and hero-ism and generosity on the part of theAlbanian partisans.Lineberry describes their trek—

close encounters with the Germans,dangerous river crossings and endlessmountain climbs. They hiked throughsnow, rain and mountains as high as8,000 feet in south central Albania. Atlast, they were put in the hands ofBritish operatives who had beenplaced behind German lines to gatherintelligence. The British, in turn, putthem in contact with an Americanwho worked for the Office of StrategicServices (OSS) and had also enteredthe country on a clandestine mission.Ten weeks after the crash, 27 boardeda British motor launch and made theirway through German-controlled wa-ters safely to Bari. Meanwhile, three nurses who were

left behind when the other 27 escapedhad their own tale to tell. They werehoused with a family who concealedthem from the Germans, fed them andassured them they would get home.The partisan commander protectedthem—probably because their hosts,who happened to be winemakers,provided him with his favorite wine.During this time, the American OSSofficer returned to Albania, chargedwith rescuing the three remainingnurses.The partisans and British and Ameri-

can intelligence officers who helped the

‘The Forgotten Heroes’

Americans did so right under the nosesof the German occupiers, making for anincredible story. Lineberry has doneexcellent research into the clandestineBritish special operations executivebranch and the American OSS—pre-cursor to the CIA—both of whichplaced men behind enemy lines. Line-berry describes how these brave men—who, to the general public, are un-known heroes—risked their lives.

The detailed narrative of this Al-banian episode during World WarII is riveting. Lineberry has made thehitherto unpublished experiences ofthe nurses and medics of the 807thMAETS—and the four crew memberswho piloted their plane—a part ofWorld War II written history. She has included an overview of the airevacuation program, the intelligencebranches, and Albania and its bravepartisans. The story does not endthere, though, as Lineberry describesin an epilogue the lives of these 30Americans, the intelligence officers

who helped them, and the fate ofsome of the partisans who housed, fedand guided them after their experi-ence in Albania. Life was not kind tothe partisans: Some of them were tor-tured and executed for their roles. The Secret Rescue is a quick read

with some startling episodes, offeringglimpses into the lives of people whowere generally unknown in WorldWar II.

Nancy Barclay Graves is a freelancewriter who lives in Arlington, Va.

August 2013 � ARMY 67

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