ReviewingtheEvidenceBaseonMigrationandPreventingandCounteringViolentExtremism(P/CVE)1

AbstractThispaperexaminestheexistingevidencebaseregardingviolentextremismandradicalizationaspush factors for migration and displacement, with a particular emphasis on displacement andmigrationfromAfrica,theMiddleEastandAsia,toEurope.Itexplorestheextenttowhichthereisevidencethatmigrantsandmigrationfromtheseregionscouldserveasameanstocounterviolentextremisminsourcecountries.Thereisasignificantgapintheexistingacademicandpolicyliteratureregardingtherelationshipbetween violent extremism and migration, both in terms of violent extremism as a driver ofdisplacement and migration, but also the role that migration and migrants play in eithercounteringorexacerbatingviolentextremisminsourcecountries.Giventhepaucityoftheevidencebase, case studies of Nigeria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, offer the opportunity to consider the inter-relationshipsingreaterdetail.AnalysisoftheseexampleshighlighttheextenttowhichEuropeanpolicymakers should avoid oversimplified conclusions about inter-relationships and causality, asthere are pertinent distinctions even at the sub-national level. Classic programmes that seek toaddressviolentextremismbyimprovinglevelsofeconomicopportunityanddevelopmentmayserveto increasemigration levels.However, eachof these cases suggest thataddressing thequality ofgovernance,systemicortargetedmarginalization,identitybasedpersecutionandthelackofsocio-economic opportunities which offer long-term ‘social capital’ prospects may be root-causecommonalities that can address both phenomena simultaneously through targeted aid anddevelopmentprogramming.

ExecutiveSummaryForoveradecade,counteringviolentextremism(CVE)hasplayedaprominentroleinEUforeignpolicy,particularlywithinthecontextofEUcounter-terrorismstrategies inAfrica, theMiddle East, and Asia. In response to a rapid increase inmixedmigrationflows to Europe, mainly in the form of asylum seekers and economic migrants fromAfrica, the Middle East, and Asia, European policymakers have sought to betterunderstandthedriversofdisplacementand“rootcauses”ofmigrationfromtheseareas.Yet there is relatively little academic scholarship or policy documents that seek toexamine migration and violent extremism as interconnected phenomena. With bothissues at the forefront of EU foreignpolicy, a better understandingof the linkages, orlackthereof,betweenviolentextremismandmigrationwouldofferEUpolicymakersanopportunitytomoreefficientlyandeffectivelyallocateaidanddevelopmentresourcestoward meeting both priorities: countering violent extremism and managing mixedmigrationflows.

1ByTuesdayReitano,DeputyDirector, andPeterTinti, SeniorResearchFellow,Global Initiativeagainst TransnationalOrganisedCrime,Geneva(www.globalinitiative.net).TheGlobalInitiativeisamemberoftheEUfundedCT-MORSEConsortium(http://www.ct-morse.eu/).

Thereareseveralcontemporaryexamplesinwhichthedriversofviolentextremismandthedriversofmigrationwouldappeartooverlapconsiderably,butthedriversand“rootcauses” ofmigration aremultifaceted. Violent extremism and the activities of violentextremistsareoftenapushfactor formigrationanddisplacement,butmaynotbetheonlyorthemostsalientdriverinagivencontext.Violentextremismandradicalizationaredirectdriversofmigration in caseswhere specific groups, suchas ISIS (Iraq) andBokoHaram (Nigeria)deliberately target certain communities.Given themultifacetednature of these drivers and “root causes,” there is limited evidence available thatsuggestsviolentextremism–withtheexceptionofexamplesofforceddisplacement–iseitheracauseorconsequenceofmigration.Thus,onecannotconcludethatareductioninviolentextremismandradicalizationinagivencontextwillreducemigrationflowsincertainsourcecountries.

There isa limitedevidencebase thatmigrantsandmigrationcanserveasameans tocounter violent extremism, in part because there is no scholarly consensus on thedriversofviolentextremism,nor is therequantitativeorconclusiveevidenceonwhatcausesindividualstoberadicalizedorresorttoviolentextremism.Eveninthecasesinwhichviolentextremismisapushfactorformigration,therelationshipbetweenthetwoisbynomeansstraightforward.Thereare,however,severalhypothesesonthedriversof violent extremism that are strongly supported by existing literature,and in certaincountriesandcontexts,manyofthesedriversoverlapwiththedriversofmigration.

The examples of Iraq, Nigeria, and Afghanistan, all of which are source countries ofirregular flows to Europe with high levels of violent extremism, highlight potentialopportunitiesandrisksforpolicymakers.Inallthreecases,weseethatboththedriversof migration and violent extremism are specific to the national context, and includeoverlapping,cross-cutting,andmulti-facetedfactors:

• In Iraq, sectarianism, political interests, perceived marginalization and poorgovernance are the most identifiable drivers of violent extremism among theIraqipopulation,andarealsotheprimaryreasonsattributedtomigration.

• In Nigeria, ethnic conflicts, the unequal distribution of resources, and protestsagainstprevailingideologiesandpowerstructuresareseenasdriversofviolentextremism; whilst migration is promoted by violence related to extremism, aswellasdesireofimprovedeconomicandsocialconditionsthatisenabledbytheextensiveNigeriandiasporanetwork.

• In Afghanistan, the roots of violent extremism aremost typically attributed tofrustrations over physical insecurity, government corruption, poverty andgrowing income inequality. It is the continued and chronic insecurity that areseen as the primary drivers of migration, a phenomenon that is enabled by alongstandingcultureofmobilityinthecountry.

Commonalitiesthatcanbeidentifiedbetweenthethreecasespointtothefactthatpoororunequalgovernanceandservicedeliveryarecitedasrootcausesofbothmigrationandviolentextremisminthesecountries.Lackofprospectsfora‘future’,whetherdueto

instability, inequality or targeted policies of discrimination were also common.Therefore, the points where the drivers of violent extremism and the drivers ofmigration overlap considerablymay offer an opportunity for the EU and itsmemberstates to integrateCVEprogramming intomigrationpolicies,andviceversa.However,thesecasesrequiregoingbeyondthefacileassumptionthatimprovingsocio-economicconditionswillamelioratetherootcauseswithoutcommensurateeffortstoimprovethequality of governance, social inclusion and perspectives for socio-economicadvancement.

There issomenascentevidencethatmigrantsandmigrationcananddoplayarole inaddressingsome,butnotall,of theunderlyingdriversofviolentextremism, includingpromoting economic development and cross-cultural understanding, as well asrepresentingauthenticvoicesthatcounterthenarrativesandpropagandaespousedbyviolentextremistgroups.Theremaybecontexts inwhichviolentextremism isapushfactorformigration,yetmigrationisalsoapotentialmitigatingforceagainstthedriversofviolentextremism.Whilegranularityofanalysis isrequired, itappears that there ismore likely to be a convergence between drivers of violent extremism andmigrationwheremigration is conflict or violence related. Inother contexts, however,where thedrivers are socio-economic, the ameliorating actions may result in higher rates ofmigration.

YetthesethreecasesalsohighlighttheextenttowhichanyattempttoincorporateCVEprogramming into efforts that seek to address the “root causes” of migration, riskoperating under overly simplistic theories regarding both violent extremism andmigration. Until drivers of both phenomena, and their relationship to each other arewell-understood,effortstotackletherootcausesofonerisksexacerbatingthedriversoftheother.Thismightparticularlybe the casewhereefforts to curbmigrationdeprivecommunities of an opportunity to mitigate the dangers of violent extremism, thusmakingthemmoresusceptibletoviolentextremismanditsconsequences.Atthesametime,programmesthatseek tomitigate the impactofviolentextremismby improvingissues of economicor socialmarginalisation,might also encouragemigration that hasbeenproventoincreaseaspovertylevelsfall.

Therefore, there is a need to distinguish between drivers of refugee movement anddriversofeconomicmigration,aswellaswhetherEuropeanpolicymakersaretryingtostemallmigrationfromsourcecountriesasopposedsimplytodiscouragingmigrationfrom said countries to Europe. Similarly, questions remain regarding the efficacy ofprogrammes to counter violent extremism, as well as the effectiveness of aid anddevelopment programmes designed to address “root causes” of migration. Efforts tocounterviolentextremismandcurbmigrationthroughaidanddevelopmentmayevenprovecounterproductive.Incertaincontexts,theremaybeopportunitiesfortheEUtoincorporate CVE into its migration policies, and vice versa, but policymakers shouldproceedwithcautionandahighdegreeofcontextspecificity,giventhelimitedevidencebaseregardingviolentextremismasapushfactorformigrationanddisplacement,andtheefficacyofCVEprogrammes.

Introduction

Since 2005, countering violent extremism (CVE) has become an increasingly integralpart of EU foreign policy, particularly within the EU’s broader counter-terrorismstrategy.2Morerecently,unprecedentedmixedmigrationflowsintoEuropefromAfrica,the Middle East, and Asia have renewed interest in the drivers and “root causes” ofmigration.3The interrelationship between these two phenomena, both the extent towhichviolentextremismandradicalizationaredriversofmigration,andtheextent towhichmigrationcouldserveasamitigatingfactorforrisingviolentextremism,remainsalmostentirelyunexaminedbypolicymakersandacademics.4

Giventhecentrality thatbothCVEandmanagingmixedmigrationhave forEU foreignpolicy, specifically in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, there is a need not only tocontinue to refine our understanding of both phenomena individually, but also toexaminehowbothphenomenainteractwitheachother.Thelimitedexistingscholarshipand analysis that does address the intersection of violent extremism and migrationlargely focuses on the susceptibility of displaced populations to violent extremistideologies and the degrees to which migrant communities are incubators ofradicalization.5Amorenuancedunderstandingofthenexusbetweenviolentextremismand mixed migration may enable more efficient and effective allocation of aid anddevelopment resources, potentially incorporating CVE programming into migrationpolicy, and vice versa. More importantly, a better understanding of the relationshipbetweenviolentextremismandmigrationmayaidpolicymakerstoensurethateffortsto counter violent extremism do not undermine efforts to manage mixed migrationflows,andviceversa.

This paper is broken down into four sections. The first examines the extent towhichexisting literature indicates violent extremism and radicalization are push factors formigration and displacement. The second explores three specific case studies whereviolent extremism and large scale migration intersect: Afghanistan, Nigeria and Iraq.Building upon the analysis established in sections one and two, the third sectionexaminestheextenttowhichmigrantsandmigrationare(orcanbe)ameanstocounterviolentextremismandradicalizationanddebatespotentialopportunitiesforintegratingCVEprogrammingintomigrationpolicy,andviceversa,aswellasthepossiblerisksofsuchintegration.Thepaperconcludeswithasectiondiscussingtheimplicationsofthesefindings on EU CVE and migration programming, as well as recommendation for EUpolicymakersgoingforward.

Itshouldbenotedthatthefocusofthispaperisoncross-bordermigrationratherthaninternalmigrationandinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).Theterm“migrant” isused

2EUForeignAffairsCouncil.Councilconclusionsoncounter-terrorism.(February9,2015).3Carling,JorgenandTalleraas,Catherine.Rootcausesanddriversofmigration:Implicationsforhumanitarianeffortsanddevelopmentcooperation.PeaceResearchInstituteOslo(2016).4Schmid, Alex P. and Tinnes, Judich. Links between Terrorism and Migration: An exploration. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism(May2016).5RESOLVENetwork.BuildingConsensusandSettingPriorities forResearchonViolentExtremism:WorkingPaperonFindings fromExpertConsultations.(September2016).

to encompass asylum seekers, refugees, and economicmigrants, and thebroaduseoftheterm“migrant”shouldnotbeconstruedasacommentaryonthelegalstatusofthepopulationsandcommunitiesdescribedbelow,orthelegalprotectionsthattheyshouldor should not be afforded.Many of thesemigrantsmay be irregularmigrants,whosemovement takes place outside the regulatory frameworks of source, transit anddestination countries. Similarly, the term “mixed migration” is used to capture thecomplexity of contemporarymigration flows, and includes themovement of refugees,asylum seekers, economic migrants, environmental migrants as well as smuggledpersons,victimsoftrafficking,statelesspersons,andunaccompaniedminors.

SectionI:Violentextremismandradicalizationaspushfactorsformigrationanddisplacement

The drivers and “root causes” of migration are multifaceted, often overlapping, andrarely follow an easily discernible causal chain inwhich certain variables definitivelyleadtomigration.6Therearedistinctionstobemadebetweentemporarydisplacement(including internally), due to conflict, natural disaster or other forms of short terminsecurity; more systemic levels of refugee movement and asylum seeking due toprotracted conflict, instability or persecution (by the government, local authorities ornon-state actors), or protracted failures to meet basic and humanitarian needs inrefugee contexts; or themigration that is driven by chronic poverty or the desire forsocialoreconomicadvancement.Manypeople increasinglymove foracombinationofthesereasons,complicatingthedefinitions,aswellastheinternationalnormsthatapplyinresponse.7

European policy debates about “root causes” of migration have traditionally beendivided.One side views refugeemovementwithin the frameworkof conflict or crisis-drivenmigration,thusfocusingonhumanitarianaction,peace-building,andinthelong-term, looking at addressing systemic factors for conflict prevention. The other side ofthisdebateseekstoaddresstherootcausesofeconomicorsocialmigrationundertheover-archingumbrellaof“migrationmanagement”wherebyinnatedesiresformigrationinthesouthernhemisphereareaddressedaspartoflabour-forceplanninginthenorth.The logic of “prevention” of unplanned, illicitmigrationhas subsequently extended toEuropeanpolicythinkingwithpovertyalleviationandeconomicdevelopmentinsourcecountriesoftenputforwardasameanstostem,reduce,andmanageirregularmigrantflowsfromdevelopingcountries.8

While conflict is often a push factor formigration, there is limited evidence availablethatviolentextremismisacauseorconsequenceofmigration.9Theclearestexamplesin 6Cummings, Clare; Pacitto, Julia; Lauro, Diletta and Foresti, Marta.Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends ofmigration to Europe. Overseas Development Institute: Working Paper 430 (December 2015); Carling, Jorgen and Talleraas,Catherine.Rootcausesanddriversofmigration:Implicationsforhumanitarianeffortsanddevelopmentcooperation.PeaceResearchInstituteOslo(2016).7Carling, Jørgen,Gallagher,AnneT. andHorwood, Christopher.BeyondDefinitions:Globalmigrationandthesmuggling-traffickingnexus.RegionalMixedMigrationSecretariat,Nairobi(2016).8Carling,JørgenandTalleraas,Catherine.Rootcausesanddriversofmigration:Implicationsforhumanitarianeffortsanddevelopmentcooperation.PeaceResearchInstituteOslo(2016).9Deniz,Yesil.ViolentExtremismandMigration.EDAMCenterforEconomicandForeignPolicyStudies.(May2016).

which violent extremism and radicalization are direct drivers of migration are caseswhere specific groups, such as ISIS (Iraq and Syria) and Boko Haram (Nigeria)deliberately target certain communities, or where widespread campaigns of violenceoveraprotractedperiodcoincidewithsocio-economic justifications formobility, suchastheTalibaninAfghanistan.Inthesecases,themigrantisnotmerelymovingtoescapeconflict or the effects of conflict, but rather, to avoid being the specific targets orcollateraldamageofviolentextremism.

Atpresent, there isnoscholarlyconsensuson thedriversofviolentextremism,nor isthere qualitative or conclusive evidence regardingwhat conditions or variables causeindividualstoberadicalizedorresorttoviolentextremism.10Whileviolentextremismisa “global and interrelated trend,” the reasonswhy an individual joins BokoHaram inNigeria or the Taliban in Afghanistan are unique to local contexts and personalcircumstances.11Thatsaid,severalbroaderhypothesesstretchingacrossnumerouscasestudieson thedriversof violentextremismdohavemerit,12and thereare contexts inwhichthedriversofviolentextremismandtheidentifieddriversofmigrationoverlap.A2015 study conducted by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), for example,consideredseventeenhypothesesregardingviolentextremism,andfoundthatonlyfiveofthemwere“stronglysupported”byexistingliterature.13Thetablebelowplacesthesefivedriversintheleftcolumn.Therightcolumnliststhegeneraldriversofmigration,asidentifiedinrecentacademicandpolicyliterature.14

Thetablebelowhighlightstherelativelylimitedextenttowhichsomeofthedriversofviolent extremism and drivers of migration may be intertwined, placing a focus onviolence,insecurityandinequality.Wheretheynotablydivergeisthatviolentextremismappears to be heavily underpinned by identity perceptions, politics and persecution,whereas the commonly accepted drivers of migration are primarily socio-economic.Basedon thedriversoutlined in the tableabove, efforts toaddress the root causesofviolent extremism may have the effect of encouraging, rather than discouraging,migration. You could broadly conclude, however, that the correlationbetween violentextremism andmigration may prove salient or strong in the cases where conflict orviolenceisthekeydriverofmigration,butinothercontexts,theamelioratingactionstocounter violent extremism may result in a higher degree of economic or sociallymotivatedmigration.

10Modirzadeh, Naz. If It’s Broke, Don’t Make it Worse: A Critique the U.N. Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent ViolentExtremism.(January23,2016).11Lindborg,Nancy.TheCausesandConsequencesofViolentExtremismandtheRoleofForeignAssistance.TestimonySubmitted fortheRecordSenateAppropriationsSubcommitteeonState,ForeignOperationsandRelatedPrograms.(April12,2016).12Allan, Harrit; Glazzard, Andrew; Jesperson, Sasha; Reddy-Tumu, Sneha; Winterbotham, Emily. Drivers of Violent Extremism:HypothesesandLiteratureReview.RUSI(October16,2015).13Allan, Harrit; Glazzard, Andrew; Jesperson, Sasha; Reddy-Tumu, Sneha; Winterbotham, Emily. Drivers of Violent Extremism:HypothesesandLiteratureReview.RUSI(October16,2015).14Cummings, Clare; Pacitto, Julia; Lauro, Diletta and Foresti, Marta.Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends ofmigrationtoEurope.OverseasDevelopmentInstitute:WorkingPaper430;andCarling,JorgenandTalleraas,Catherine.Rootcausesanddriversofmigration:Implicationsforhumanitarianeffortsanddevelopmentcooperation.PeaceResearchInstituteOslo(2016).

GeneralDriversofViolentExtremism“StronglySupported”byexisting

literature15

GeneralDriversofMigrationsupportedbyexistingacademicandpolicy

literature16Thesearchforpersonalandgroupidentitiesamongthosewhofeelthishasbeenunderminedbyrapidsocialchangecanincreasethevulnerabilityoftheyoungtoradicalization

Politicalinsecurity,conflict,andviolencethatdrivespeopletofleetheircountryforfearoftheirphysicalsafety.

Thegrowthofreligiousandethnicidentities(particularlyiftheycompetewithloyaltiestothestateorareexacerbatedmymarginalization)canbeexploitedbyextremistideologues

Economicinsecurityinsourcecountriesandopportunity(comparative,real,andperceived)abroad.Note:theabilitytomigrate(financiallyandlogistically)iscrucial.

Governmentfailuretoprovidebasicservices(health,education,welfare)allowsextremistgroupstomeettheseneedsandbuildsupportasaresult

Broadereconomicdevelopment,andeconomictransitionsfrom“verypoor”to“poor,”“lowermiddleclass,”and“middleclass”islikelytoincreasemigration.Thus,economicdevelopmentreinforces,ratherthanreducesmigration.Thus,thereisa“two-wayrelationshipbetweenmigrationanddevelopment,andpovertyeradicationhasamarginalimpactonmigration”

Intheabsenceofpeaceandsecurity,populationsareoftenreadytoacceptanyentitythatoffersstability

“Cultural”and“social”factorssuchasfamilialsupport/pressuretomigrate,migrationasacommonpracticewithincertainculturesandcommunities,reinforcedbysuccessstories(realandperceived),increasinglytransnationalidentitiesfurtherreinforcedbymodernICT

Whereinequalityandinstitutionalizeddiscriminationcoincidewithreligiousorethnicfault-lines,thereisanincreasedlikelihoodofradicalizationandmobilization

Stateasylumpolicies,visaregimesandbordercontrols.Bordercontrolsandvisasshapemigrantflows,asmigrantsadapttheirroutesanddestinationsaccordingtoexistingpolicies,andthesmugglingmarketisoftendictatedbythepresenceofpoliticalandphysicalbarrierssuchasvisarestrictionsorfences.Asylumpolicesalsoplayamajorroleinshapingroutesandpreferreddestinationcountries,dependingonthesourcecommunity.

15Allan, Harrit; Glazzard, Andrew; Jesperson, Sasha; Reddy-Tumu, Sneha; Winterbotham, Emily. Drivers of Violent Extremism:HypothesesandLiteratureReview.RUSI(October16,2015).16Cummings, Clare; Pacitto, Julia; Lauro, Diletta and Foresti, Marta.Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends ofmigrationtoEurope.OverseasDevelopmentInstitute:WorkingPaper430;andCarling,JorgenandTalleraas,Catherine.Rootcausesanddriversofmigration:Implicationsforhumanitarianeffortsanddevelopmentcooperation.PeaceResearchInstituteOslo(2016).

As previously noted, the drivers of migration vary widely depending on the context,particularlywhenconsideringforceddisplacementandrefugeeflowsversuseconomicmigration, and a granular and context specific analysis is required. The subsequentsection applies this analytical framework to three case studies: Nigeria, Iraq andAfghanistan.

SectionII:CaseStudiesandIdentifyingPotentialOpportunities

In certain contexts, the existing overlap between violent extremism and large scalemigrationinseveralcontemporarycontextsrepresentsbothanopportunityandariskfor European policymakers. Certain cases could allow formore effective and efficientdeployment of aid and development resources via programmes that integrate CVEprogrammingintomigrationpolicies,andviceversa.Yetevenincasesinwhichviolentextremism is a salient push factor for migration, the relationship between the twophenomena is by nomeans straightforward, and predicting theways inwhich policyinterventionsmight impact the relationship is fraught with challenges. The followingcasestudieshighlightpotentialopportunitiesandrisks:

CaseStudy1:NigeriaScholars and analysts disagree on which are the most salient drivers of violentextremisminnorthernNigeria,whichhasmostrecentlymanifesteditselfintheIslamicStateinWestAfrica,agroupmorecommonlyreferredtoasBokoHaram.Whilethereisnoconsensus regarding theextent towhich radical Islam, religiouseducation (or lackthereof)andoutsideinfluencearedriversofviolentextremisminnorthernNigeria,thevastmajorityofanalysesindicatesthateconomicandpoliticalmarginalization(realandperceived) among various communities in northern Nigeria, government corruption,dissatisfaction with provision of government services, and heavy-handed militaryresponses by the government are all key drivers of violent extremism in northernNigeria.17

Although it lacks the ideological and religious components of the conflict in northernNigeria, violent extremism in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region shares many of the samedrivers.The“economyofconflict” in theoil-richNigerDelta iscomplex,buteconomicmarginalizationandunderdevelopment,corruption,anddissatisfactionwiththewayinwhich oil profits are allocated to the local community arewidely cited as underlyingdrivers of violent extremism in the Niger Delta.18Similarly, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, 17Olojo, A. Nigeria’s Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram.The International Centre forCounter-Terrorism(14October2013);Onuoha,FreedomC.WhyDoYouthJoinBokoHaram?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace:SpecialReport (June 2014); Alasia, Ibifuro Joy. Demystifying Extremism in Nigeria: Understanding the Dynamics of Boko Haram. AfricanCentre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (23 October 2015); Babalola, Oluwatosin. Combating Violent Extremism andInsurgency inNigeria:ACaseStudyof theBokoHaramScourge. The Center for Global and International Studies and The ForeignMilitary Studies Office (2013); andWalker, Andrew.What IsBokoHaram? United States Institute of Peace: Special Report (June2012).18Newsom,Chris.ConflictintheNigerDelta:MoreThanaLocalAffair.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace:SpecialReport(June2011);Ikelegebe,Augustine.TheEconomyofConflictinthePilRichNigerDeltaRegionofNigeria.Nordic JournalofAfricanStudies14(2):208-234 (2005);Dambazau,Abdulrahman.NigeriaandHerSecurityChallenges.Harvard InternationalReview (2014); and Sayne,Aaron.What’sNextforSecurityintheNigerDelta?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace:SpecialReport(May2013).

where thousands have died amid a cycle of violence between Christian and Muslimcommunities as well as farmers and pastoralists in recent years, state and localgovernment policies that discriminate against certain groups over others, as well asendemiccorruption,haveexacerbatedtensionsbetweencommunitiesstrugglingtocopewithpoverty,unemploymentandtheacuteeffectsofclimatechange,thusfuellingethnicandsectarianviolence.19

Detected Nigerian arrivals at European border-crossings along the “CentralMediterranean route” has increased from 449 in 2012 to nearly 40,000 in 2016. The37,554Nigeriansdetected in2016comprised21%ofalldetected irregulararrivals toEuropevia this route, themostof anynationality, and representeda71% increase inNigerian arrivals from the year before.20The drivers of migration out of Nigeria aremultifaceted.TheconflictinnorthernNigeriastemmingfromtheon-goingBokoHaraminsurgencyhasdisplacedover2millionNigerians,closeto200,000ofwhomhavefledtoneighbouringNiger,CameroonandChad.YetforceddisplacementduetoviolenceisonlyonedriverofmigrationfromNigeria,andonlyaffectsaportionofthosewholeavethecountryeveryyear.Aperceivedlackofeconomicopportunitiesthroughoutthecountryis widely cited as a driver of migration for Nigerians who seek employment andeducationalopportunitieswithinAfricaaswellasinEurope,withirregularmigrationtoEuropeviatheMediterraneanemergingasakeytransitroutefortensofthousandsofNigeriansinrecentyears.21

Asnotedabove,existingresearchindicatesthatpoliticalandeconomicmarginalizationstemmingfromandexacerbatedbygovernancefailuresaredriversofviolentextremisminnorthernNigeria,theNigerDelta,andtheMiddleBelt,whichindicatesthatwhileCVEprogramming should be tailored to each particular circumstance, questions of goodgovernanceareattheheartofviolentextremismthroughoutNigeria.Outsideofforceddisplacement, available research suggests that acute inequality and perceived lack ofsocio-economic opportunities within Nigeria, and better opportunities abroad, bothwithinAfricaandfurtherafieldinEurope,areoneofthekeydriversofmigrationfromNigeria.

ThemostsalientoverlappingdriverofbothviolentextremismandmigrationinNigeria,therefore, isaperceivedgovernment failure toprovidebasic servicesandaperceivedlackofeconomicopportunities.Asaresult,programmesthatfocusongoodgovernance,servicedelivery,andfightingcorruption,ratherthanprogrammingwithanarrowfocuson expanding livelihood opportunities and job creation,would have the dual effect ofengaging two of themost salient drivers of both violent extremism andmigration inNigeria.Atthesametime,EUpolicymakersshouldbeawarethateconomicdevelopmentin and of itself is not likely to reducemigrant flows out of Nigeria, asmost research

19HumanRightsWatch.NewWaveofViolenceLeaves200Dead. 27 January2011;UnitedStates InstituteofPeace.EconomicsandConflict:MeasuringtheCostsofConflictintheMiddleBeltStates,Nigeria.InsightLetter(Spring2015);andTheEconomist.NoendinsighttoviolenceinNigeria’sMiddleBelt.(5April2016).20Frontex.RiskAnalysisfor2017(February2017).21Isiugo-Abanihe,UcheC.andInternationalOrganizationforMigrationNigeria.MigrationinNigeria:ACountryProfile2014.IOM(2016);Mberu,BlessingU.andPongou,Roland.Nigeria:MultipleFormsofMobilityinAfrica’sDemographicGiant.MigrationInformationSource(June30,2010).

indicates that emigration from low-income countries increases with economicdevelopment,andonlydecreasesonceacountryreachesupper-middleincomelevels.22

CaseStudy2:IraqExisting literature on violent extremism in Iraq indicates that although a range ofvariables,suchassectarianismandpoliticalinterests–bothforeignanddomestic-areimportant components of the on-going conflict, perceived marginalization and poorgovernance are the most identifiable drivers of violent extremism among the Iraqipopulation.ArecentreportbyMercyCorpsbasedonthreeyearsofpublicpolling, forexample,concludedthatinjustice(perceivedorreal)stemmingfrompoorgovernanceisthekeydriverofviolentextremism in Iraq, and that levelsofviolencedecreasewhenmarginalized groups begin to believe that the government is going to be moreresponsive and fair.23Similarly, the emergence in Iraq ofwhat eventually became theIslamicState(ISIS),afterthemilitarydefeatofitsprecursorAl-QaedainIraq,islargelyattributed to a failure by the Iraqi government and the international community toaddressArabSunniperceptionsofpoliticalandsocio-economicmarginalizationrelativetootherethnicgroups.24Existing scholarship suggests that the drivers of migration from Iraq are less clearlydiscerniblethanthedriversofviolentextremism.LikeNigeria,forceddisplacementasadirectresultofconflictincertainareasofthecountryaccountsforacertainamountofexternal migration flows into neighbouring countries and various countries in theMiddle East. Yet there is relatively little information available about the drivers ofmigrationfromIraqintoEurope,orsecondarymigrationamongIraqisdisplacedintheMiddleEastwhothenmigratetoEurope.Similarly,itisuncleartheextenttowhichthestaggering increase in irregular Iraqi arrivals in Europe in 2015 (90,130 in 2015comparedtoonly382in2014)wasaresultofIraqisbeing“pulled”bytheemergenceofsmuggling networks that developed around Syrian demand for smuggling services,rather thandrivers in Iraq.25AFebruary2016studybythe InternationalOrganizationfor Migration, in a non-representative sample of 379 Iraqis emigrating from Iraq toEurope,foundthat80%ofthoseinterviewedcited“nohopeforfuture”astheirprimaryreasonformigrating,withonly10%citing“generalviolence”asthemainpushfactor.26The results indicate that the key driver of migration from Iraq to Europe is lessattributabletoviolenceandconflict,thanitistoabeliefthatsocio-economicprospectsarebleakandunlikelytoimprove.Although more systematic research would need to be carried out, the literature ondrivers of violent extremism and drivers ofmigration referenced above suggests that 22Clemens,Michael.DoesDevelopmentReduceMigration?CGDWorkingPaper359.WashingtonDC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment(2014).23Proctor,KandTesfaye,B.InvestinginIraq’sPeace:HowGoodGovernanceCanDiminishSupportforViolentExtremism.MercyCorps(December2015).24Berge,Wietsevanden.CounteringViolentExtremismintheKurdistanRegioninIraq. InternationalCentre forCounter-Terrorism(May10,2016);Boghani,Priyanka.InTheirOwnWords:SunnisonTheirTreatmentinMaliki’sIraq.Frontline(28October2014)andal-Qarawee,Harith.TheRiseofSunniIdentityinIraq.TheNationalInterest(5April2013).25TintiandReitano,“Smuggler,Saviour”op.cit.26InternationalOrganizationforMigrationIraqMission.MigrationflowsfromIraqtoEurope.DisplacementTrackingMatrix(2016)

good governance is again at the heart of many people’s decision to join or supportviolent extremist groups, as well as their decision to leave Iraq in search of socio-economic opportunities abroad. Therefore, programming that directly addressesinclusivegovernanceandbetter representation in government institutions couldhavethedualimpactofengagingboththedriversofmigrationandviolentextremism.It should be noted, however, that engaging perceptions of political and economicmarginalization is by no means a straightforward process. It requires programminguniquelydesignedforeachindividualcommunitythatisbeingtargeted.Perceptionsofwhatgoodgovernancewouldlooklikeandwhatpeopleexpectfromtheirgovernmentcan vary widely depending on the community.Whereas members of one communitymightwish thestateweremorepresent in theireveryday lives,othersmightwish forlessinteractionwithstateofficials.A“bottomup”approachtogovernancethatincludeslocalactorsandcivilsocietyorganizationsisessential,andshouldbepursuedinplaceofdevotingresourcestostrengtheningandproppingupformalinstitutionsthatfunctionatnational, regional, or even provincial level, but may lack legitimacy. As theaforementioned Mercy Corps report concludes, developing a stronger cooperativerelationship between civil society and government, improving the capacity of localactorstoplayaroleingoodgovernance,andsettingupmechanismsforlocalfeedbackareessential.27CaseStudy3:AfghanistanIn Afghanistan, the drivers of violent extremism identified by recent scholarship andpolicy analyses conclude that the most salient drivers of violent extremism aregrievancesthatstemfromfrustrationsoverphysicalinsecurity,governmentcorruption,povertyandgrowing incomeinequality.28Althoughrecentstudies indicate thatviolentextremist ideologies are widely unpopular among the majority of Afghans, theseideologiesarethekeytotranslatingexistinggrievancesintoradicalization.29Thatsaid,theprocessfromgrievancestorecruitmenttoradicalizationisrarelyalinearone.30Onerecent study, for example, found thatmarginalization and “bad governance”were themost salient push factors of violent extremism, with “social capital” grounded in theability to increase social status through obtaining material things, as a key “pullfactor.”31The key factors drivingmigration from Afghanistan is conflict and insecurity, thoughbothdriversare“interlinkedandinseparable”fromeconomicfactorsthatpushAfghans

27Proctor,KandTesfaye,B.InvestinginIraq’sPeace:HowGoodGovernanceCanDiminishSupportforViolentExtremism.MercyCorps(December2015).28Porges,MarisL.RadicalizationProcessesinAfghanistan.CTCSentinel(18January2012).29 Idrees, Muhammad. Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Central Asia Policy Briefs #41.NorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairsandOSCEAcademy(September2016);andPorges,MarisL.RadicalizationProcessesinAfghanistan.CTCSentinel(18January2012).30Fazli, Reza; Johnson, Casey and Cooke, Peyton. Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan. United StatesInstitutesofPeace:SpecialReport(2015).31Fazli, Reza; Johnson, Casey and Cooke, Peyton. Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan. United StatesInstitutesofPeace:SpecialReport(2015).

tomigratebothinternallyandexternally.32Furthermore,distinctionsbetweeneconomicmigrants and refugees in the Afghan context are increasingly hard to define,33andexistingliteratureoftendoesnotdistinguishbetweenthetwowhendiscussingdriversofmigrationfromAfghanistan.34While insecurity and a range of socio-economic factors drive Afghans to migrate ingeneral,therearecertainpushandpullfactorsthathavebeenidentifiedamongAfghanswhoseektomigratetoEuropeinparticular.AfghanswhochoosetomigratetoEurope,mostoftenirregularlyduetoalackoflegalavenues,areprimarilymotivatedbyalackofeconomic and social opportunities in neighbouring countries within the region, theunpredictabilitythatcomeswith“boomandbust”cyclesofinternationalaidanddonors,and mistreatment by government authorities and local populations in Pakistan, Iran,Gulf States, India and Turkey.35Within the context of decades of forced displacementand migration and cyclical violence, near universal access to information technologythatallowsAfghanmigrantstocommunicatewitheachotherglobally,particularlywithmembers of the established Afghan diaspora, has not only increased aspirations tomigratetoEurope,butmadeitmorefeasibleforagreaternumberofAfghans.IntheAfghancontext,migrationhaslongbeenusedaspartofaresiliencestrategyforthose affected by decades of war and cyclical conflict.36Migration is a key copingstrategyforAfghans,anestimated76%ofwhomhaveexperienceddisplacementintheirlifetime.37YetunlikeIraq,thepresenceofoverlappingdriversofviolentandextremismandmigration does not necessarily translate to clear opportunities for incorporatingCVEprogrammingintoeffortstocurbmigration.Infact,existingliteraturesuggeststhatleveragingmigrationasameansfordevelopmentandpeace-buildingwouldbeamoreeffectiveapproachtoaddressingtheissueofviolentextremism.38Asaresult,Europeanpolicymakerswoulddowelltoconsiderinwhatwaystheycanencouragepoliciesthatengage theAfghandiaspora and allow forAfghans tomigrate cyclically, plugging intoeconomichubsintheregionandfindingvariouslegalandformalavenuesforgeneratingincomethroughmigration.39

32Lopez-Lucia, Elisa. Migration and Conflict in Afghanistan. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1243. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC,UniversityofBirmingham(2015). 33Amiri,Rahmatullah.Continuingconflict,continuingdisplacementinsouthernAfghanistan.ForcedMigrationReviewIssue46(May2014).34Lopez-Lucia, Elisa. Migration and Conflict in Afghanistan. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1243. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC,UniversityofBirmingham(2015).35Hakimi,Hameed.UnderstandingtheDriversofMigrationtoEurope:LessonsfromAfghanistanfortheCurrentRefugeeCrisis.VisionEuropeSummit(October26,2016).

36Hakimi,Hameed.UnderstandingtheDriversofMigrationtoEurope:LessonsfromAfghanistanfortheCurrentRefugeeCrisis.VisionEuropeSummit(October26,2016).37MaastrichtGraduateSchool.ComplexitiesandChallengesinAfghanMigrationPolicyandResearchEvent. ISAcademyPolicyBriefNo.14(2013).38Agah,Asif.Migration-DevelopmentNexusinthePost-ConflictSetting:SomeEvidencefromAfghanistan.GSID-Nagoya(2014).39MaastrichtGraduateSchool.ComplexitiesandChallengesinAfghanMigrationPolicyandResearchEvent. ISAcademyPolicyBriefNo.14(2013).

SectionIII:Migrantsandmigrationasameanstocounterviolentextremismandradicalization

Atpresent, there isnoscholarlyconsensuson thedriversofviolentextremism,nor isthere qualitative or conclusive evidence regardingwhat conditions or variables causeindividualstoberadicalizedorresorttoviolentextremism.40Asaresult, theevidencebasethatmigrantsandmigrationareorcouldbeameanstocounterviolentextremismislimited,theresearchthatdoesexistindicatesthatsomehypotheseshoweverwarrantfurtherexploration.

There is some evidence, for example, that migrants and migration do play a role inaddressingsomeoftheunderlyingdriversofviolentextremism.Migrantsandmigrationareamechanismforpromotingeconomicdevelopmentthroughtheremittanceswhichthey return. While the overall development benefit accrued for a country throughremittances has beenwidely debated, there is little controversy that on an individualfamily level,remittancesplayanimportant incomesmoothingandresiliencerole.Thiscould serve to reduce the catalytic factorswhich prompt radicalisation, but there hasbeennosystematicstudyuponwhichtoconcludethis.

Similarly, migrants, with their experience living in contexts outside those in whichviolentextremismandradicalizationmaybeincubating,canrepresentauthenticvoicesthatsharealivedexperiencethatcountersthenarrativesandpropagandaespousedbyviolent extremists.41There has been no study that the authors of this paper couldidentify that has specifically looked at the likelihood that those migrants eithervoluntarily or forcibly returned may contribute to rising violent extremism in theirsource countries. In fact, examinations of the experiences of returnees is altogetherunderstudied.42A 2003 study observed that “the way returnees perceive ‘home’ andtheywaytheydefinetheiridentityinfluencestheirreintegrationprocess.”43Thereisanassumed difference between voluntary and involuntary returnees,where the latter isassumed to have a more antagonistic attitude towards their home state, therebypresumably increasing the likelihood that they may feel alienated, or be drawn todeviant behaviour (including criminality) or to insurgent groups. For voluntaryreturnees, those who herald from populations with a high degree of transnationalmobility,theconceptof‘home’mayhavelittlevalue,andtheirreintegrationprocessberelatively superficial. Forothers, evenwhen theyarekeen to returnhome,may feel asense of estrangement or challenges of re-rooting themselves back into theircommunities due to the diversity of their experiences in transit or within Europe.44Whether this makes them more susceptible to radicalisation is a question as yet

40Modirzadeh, Naz. If It’s Broke, Don’t Make it Worse: A Critique the U.N. Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent ViolentExtremism.(January23,2016).41Koser,Khalid.Howmigrationcanhelpfightviolentextremism.WorldEconomicForum(February18,2015).42This isnotdue to lackof interest,butmore to the technicalchallengesofundertakingsustained longitudinal researchwith thereturnedpopulationonceithasbeennominally‘integrated’intothesourcecommunityunderthepurviewofasovereignstate.43Tania Ghanem, “When Forced Migrants Return ‘Home’: the psychological difficulties returnees encounter in the reintegrationprocess”,RefugeeStudiesCentre,WorkingPaperNo.16,UniversityofOxford,October201344Ibid.

unexplored in any systematic way, but presumably would be highly unique to eachindividualsituation.

Migrants can play a role in undermining some of the drivers of violent extremismhighlighted above by including socio-economic inequality by helping certaincommunities mitigate the negative impact of existing inequalities, institutionaldiscrimination,andmarginalizationthatcanleadtoviolentextremism.45However,onecanconcludethatjustastherearecontextsinwhichviolentextremismisapushfactorformigration,migrationisalsoapotentiallyamitigatingforceagainstdriversofviolentextremism.Thishypothesiswouldneedtobefurtherexamined,anditwouldbeequallynecessarytoconsidertheextenttowhichnegativeexperiencesasamigrantmightserveas driver of violent extremism and radicalization in source and destination countries.Furthermore,theextenttowhichmigrantswhoaredisplacedbyviolentextremismareinturnsusceptibletobeingradicalised,particularlyincasesofprotracteddisplacement,warrants further investigation. Governments that host large populations of refugeesdisplaced by conflict, as is the case in Pakistan regarding Afghan refugees and KenyaregardingSomalirefugees,oftenportrayrefugeepopulationsasasecurityrisk.Limitedresearchindicatesthatthosewhoaredisplacedaresusceptibletoviolentextremismincircumstanceswhereeducationandemploymentopportunitiesarepoorandfreedomofmovementislimited,46andviolentextremistgroupshavesoughttorecruitrefugeesanddisplacedpersons into their ranks,but there isapaucityof informationregarding theextent to which displaced or returned populations are particularly vulnerable torecruitmentbyviolentextremism.

SectionIV:ImplicationsforEUProgramming/Recommendations

The three cases of Nigeria, Iraq, andAfghanistan underscore the extent towhich anyattempt to incorporate CVE programming into efforts that seek to address the “rootcauses” of migration, and vice versa, risk operating under overly simplistic theoriesregardingbothviolentextremismandmigration.Furthermore,therelationshipbetweenviolent extremism and migration in all three contexts are ones in which a poorlydesigned policy intervention premised on a misdiagnosis of either phenomena risksexacerbatingonedriverevenifitamelioratestheother.Theriskofsuchanoutcomeisparticularlyacute inwhichefforts tocurbmigrationmightdeprivecommunitiesofanopportunitytomitigatethedangersofviolentextremismthroughmigration.Effortstostemmigrationcouldthereforehavetheadverseeffectofmakingcertaincommunitiesmoresusceptibletoviolentextremismanditsconsequences.

Thedriversofviolentextremismandradicalizationarecase-specificandnotalwayswellunderstood, nor are the drivers and “root causes” of migration, which meansunderstandingbothwithincase-specificcontexts isessential. Inparticular, theneedtodistinguishbetweendriversofforceddisplacementandrefugeemovementasopposedto socio-economic migration is required, as is a growing acknowledgement that the

45Koser,Khalid.Migrationasasolutiontoviolentextremism.TheWorldBank(December17,2015).46Koser,KhalidandCunningham,AmyE.MigrationandViolentExtremisminContemporaryEurope.WorldBank(3March2016).

categories of “asylum seeker” versus “economicmigrant” and “conflict” versus “post-conflict” are increasingly hard to delineate. Governance and service delivery failures,inequality,marginalizationandlackof ‘afuture’thatoffersopportunitiesforaccrualofsocialcapitalandadvancement,however,arekeythreadswhichrequireasharperfocus,greater research and targeted programming. One such area would includeunderstandingandaddressingtheradicalisationeffectsonreceivingcountries,andhowCVE initiatives could be mainstreamed into asylum seeker reception, processing andsubsequentrefugeeintegration(orreturn)initiatives.In determining whether there is an opportunity to integrate CVE programming intomigrationpolicy, it isessential thatpolicymakersdifferentiatebetweenefforts to stopforced displacement and end refugee producing situations, from efforts in whichEuropean policymakers are trying to stem migration from source countries anddiscouragemigrationfromsaidcountriestoEurope.Finally, it is important to acknowledge that serious questions remain regarding theefficacyofprogrammestocounterviolentextremismandhowtoevaluatethem,aswellas the effectiveness of aid and development programmes designed to address “rootcauses”ofmigration.Oneofthegreatrisksofsuchprogrammingisthatwhilealackofmeasurable results might be frustrating for policymakers, efforts to counter violentextremism and curb migration through aid and development may even provecounterproductive. In certain contexts, there may be opportunities for the EU toincorporate CVE into its migration policies, and vice versa, but policymakers shouldproceedwithcautiongiventhelimitedevidencebaseregardingviolentextremismasapushfactorformigrationanddisplacement,andtheefficacyofCVEprogrammes.Recommendations

1. Move away from the view that migration is something that can be reducedthrough “preventive” measures like poverty alleviation and economicdevelopment. Migration is an important development strategy for manyindividuals,drivenbyarangeofsocial,economicandculturalfactors,forwhichoutsideassistancecannotbeameresubstitute.

2. ItwouldbemoreeffectivetofindwaysinwhichtheEUcouldleveragemigrantsandmigrationtocounterviolentextremism:heretheroleofdiasporagroupsinconflictresolution,inpoliticalparties,insupportinglocaleconomicdevelopment(throughinvestmentsineducationorinfrastructure,forexample)orinprovidinghumanitarian relief, should be monitored carefully. Remittance flowsincreasinglyfaroutweighthescaleofODA,andassuchareanimportantdynamicto understand within the context of both better migration management andaddressingtherootcausesofviolentextremism.However,itshouldbenotedthatefforts to improve or amplify the efficiency of remittances may well result inhigherratesofmigrationas theywillresult ingreaterdisposable incomeandahigherreturnoninvestmentforthemigrant.

3. In cases where it does appear that the drivers of violent extremism and thedrivers of migration overlap, think beyond platitudes of “livelihood

opportunities” and “job creation” and consider other necessities such as basicservice provision, educational opportunities, most importantly “goodgovernance”asdefinedby localcommunities.Allof theabovearedevelopmentoutcomes that can mitigate violent extremism and make communities moreresilient to extremist ideologies. In the case of service delivery, however, whodelivers those services is also of relevance – effectively improving governmentservice delivery in previously marginalised communities may ameliorate theperceptionof inequalityor isolation,whereasdelivery throughexternal serviceprovidersmayenhanceit,aswellastheperceptionthatthereisbettertobehadoverseas.

4. Considerthatifmigrationisanimportantmeansforcommunitiestomitigatetheimpact of violent extremism, the EU could pursue policies that encourage anarray of legal migration options for migrants from communities at risk ofradicalisationinordertoincreasecommunityresilience.Possibleoptionsincludedeveloping robust seasonal labour migration schemes to and from the EU;supportforinter-regionalmigrationregimesthatallowformigrantstoplugintoeconomiesintheirownregion,andprovidingincentivesandsupporttocountriesthathostrefugeesthatencourageintegrationofrefugeepopulations.

5. In a given context, policymakers need to clearly define the “problem” they aretrying to solve.Apolicy intervention that seeks toengage thedriversof forceddisplacementisdifferentfromonethatseekstostembroadermixedmigrationtoEurope. The former is a humanitarian endeavour, and there might be clearlyidentifiable opportunities to incorporate CVE programming into migrationpolicies; the latter is a calculatedeffort that seeks tousehumanitarianaidanddevelopment cooperation for political ends, regardless of the aspirations orneedsofpeopleinthesourcecountries.

6. The issues, and potential radicalisation risks, of migrant populations forciblyreturned lacks any study, which reduces the possibility that return andreintegrationcouldbemadeCVEsensitive.Thelimitedinformationonreturneeexperiencessuggeststhat(whileeachcaseis,ofcourse,unique),muchdependson the expectations and self-identity of the specific migrant. A greaterunderstandingofthesedynamicsmightallowforCVEapproachestobeappliedduringthereturnandreintegrationprocess.Acommon-senseconclusionisthatreturns in all cases should be undertaken in such a way as to maximise thedignityandensuretherightsofthereturnee.Reintegrationeffortstocountriesorregionswithexistingextremistelements,shouldprovidelong-termsupportbothto returnees and their host communities, including psycho-social support andmonitoring.

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