Review Patricia Crone s Book Arabia Without Spices

8/13/2019 Review Patricia Crone s Book Arabia Without Spices

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"Arabia Without Spices": An Alternate Hypothesis

Gene W. Heck

Journal Of The American Oriental Society, 2003, Volume 123, pp. 547-576.

American Oriental Society

First Composed: 6th January 2005

(We do not necessarily agree with everything written in this article - Islamic Awareness)

The Issue of "Makkan Trade and the Rise of Islam"

The Historiographic Challenge

The Methodological Confrontation

re than fifteen years have passed since Patricia Crone stunned the world of orientalism by positing dramatically new

potheses regarding the role of Makkah in sixth to seventh-century A.D. trans-Arabian trade. Seeking to discern the

nomic dynamic of the early Islamic state, her thesis contended that both the composition and direction of Hijazi-Najdide in the era leading up to the rise of Islam were not as they have been commonly portrayed. Her presentation derived its

ngth from its sophisticated scientific analyses of the prevalence of specific commodities, particularly "spices," in

temporary trade flows. Its core analysis centered upon certain critical commonalities between sixth to seventh-century

kkan imports and exports, and in its effort to make trade patterns fit, even speculated that the Qurashis' primary base of

mmercial operation was not where modern Makkah stands today. The essence of this theme was compellingly argued in

t 2 of her 1987 work,Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam, which she titled: "Arabia Without Spices."

one's work has been aggressively attacked by various scholars in recent years - an assault that has focused, in particular,

on her employment of what is termed "negative evidence argumentation": to wit, the absence of source references to

de implies the actual absence of trade. Such analytic techniques, of course, are not uncommon in medievaloriography, nor are they unique to Islamic scholarship. Six decades earlier, it will be recalled, it was a decline in

erences to eighth-century trans-Mediterranean commerce, documented primarily in Western ecclesiastical sources, that

duced the Pirenne thesis positing that an Islamic trade blockade had precipitated Western Europe's "Dark Ages."

at the results are similar should come as no surprise. Both arguments have failed to persuade because each confronts the

mplex challenge of seeking to reconstruct the structure of any economy, medieval or modern, based on evaluating a

rket-basket of commodities cited in export trade. The examples found are often too sporadic to have serious economic

sequences. Despite the fact that some seventy-five percent of its governmental revenues are generated by oil

duction, for example, modern Saudi Arabic typically generates less than three percent of its gross domestic productmation from non-oil export earnings. In both modern and medieval contexts, then, using select trade data as barometers

economic dynamism does not invariably yield accurate results. In Crone's case, they have produced quite controversial

ults. Indeed, seldom have hypotheses predicated upon an absence of commercial evidence invoked such intense

olarly scrutiny. R. B. Serjeant, in a 1990 article, for instance, describes her contentions as:


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calculated to attract publicity by shocking Islamists through the strange theories that it advances on pre-Islamic Mecca, novel

theories to be sure, but founded upon misinterpretation, misunderstanding of sources, even at times incorrect translations of

Arabic.[1]

e acrimony has been longstanding. For while Crone and Serjeant have polarized the Hijazi trade discussion, Watt, Wolf,

ter, Shaban, Simon, Peters, Donner, and Ibrahim - and before them, Sprenger, Lammens, and sundry others -

structed the basic intellectual infrastructure upon which it is built.[2]Much of the controversy centers on the continuing

ate over the general reliability of the medieval Arabic sources as a foundation for sound economic analysis. Such a

logue does enjoy a certain logic, since the topic is historical and original sources are a prime tool of the historian. The

liest classical sources are vulnerable to criticism since, founded on oral traditions as captured by often biased literary

iquarians, they are, by their very nature, anecdotal. As such, they can be useful in illustrating certain incidents and

nds, but unless taken in aggregate, as a basis for serious commercial history, in a non-pejorative sense, they are often

e more than the early medieval equivalents of tabloid journalism. This is not itself a formal criticism, but rather a

racteristic common to most chronicled medieval sources. While they can be useful in research, they must be recognized

what they are and treated accordingly.

th Crone and Serjeant concede the challenge of attempting to ascertain the existence or non-existence of particular types

rade based on fragmentary evidence.[3]While the former calls the early sources "of questionable historical value," the

er describes them as "selective and the data that they record so fragmentary that argument from negative evidence has

e value."[4]In the ongoing early Makkan trade debate, both contentions probably are correct. The problem is threefold.st, a prime reason that Crone and Serjeant struggle in their argumentation is that they are trying to force early trans-

insular Arab commerce into something that it most likely was not: to wit, the overarching economic raison d'etre of

kkah. Such an approach, however, is little more than the exercise of "recreating the elephant by feeling the dimensions

ts trunk." For an ever-present danger of engaging in negative evidence argumentation using limited trade data is that it

build toward conclusions that did not, in reality, obtain.

ond, they are arguing from the shaky foundations of modern historiographic invention respecting sixth to seventh-

tury Hijazi transit trade. Crone and Serjeant, as well as F. E. Peters, properly take issue with the conventional notion

t the longstanding commerce in spices and other luxury goods to the Mediterranean basin during the early Christian

turies had continued to the rise of Islam.[5]This was an interpretation pioneered by Lammens, popularized by Watt and

lf, and promoted, to a certain degree, even by Donner. It has often been accompanied by a notion that the success of

temporary Makkah as a trade emporium was highly instrumental, morally, economically, and socially, in the rise of

m. Watt asserts:

By the end of the 6th century A.D., they (Hijazi traders) had gained control of most of the trade from Yemen to Syria - an

important route by which the West got Indian luxury goods as well as South Arabian frankincense.

Commercial prosperity had let not merely to greater disparities in wealth, but also to a partial breakdown in the system of clans and

tribes on which the security of Makkah depended.... It is against this social and moral background that we must look at the religious

beliefs current in Makkah immediately before Muhammad's call.[6]

t even Watt, who has contributed two important works -Muhammad at MakkahandMuhammad at Medina- as

nerstones for these socioeconomic contentions, devotes but two brief paragraphs to the nature of this hypothesized

ns-Hijazi luxury trade and just five others to the underlying indigenous industrial base that would have made a more

rant Makkah-centric regional trade economically viable.[7]

ough this traditional notion, as noted, has been rejected by Crone, Serjeant, and others - at times, even attributing the

erent misinterpretations to the ambiguity of the medieval Arabic sources themselves - such exegesis is no more than a

aw man" dialogue, as the sources never seriously claimed a trade in oriental luxury commodities coincident with the

of Muhammad. Instead, they document a more voluminous trade in lower unit-value, indigenous West Arabianducts - animals, leather, foodstuffs, cloth, perfumes, and similar consumer goods - a reality recognized by Sprenger,

ter, Simon, and Peters.[8]Some of the regional import-export ventures in such commodities were, in reality, quite large,

h commercial caravans consisting of as many as 1,500, 2,000, and even 2,500 transport camels at the dawn of Islam, as

d in the sources.[9]


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ere arepassimreferences to a sixth and seventh-century trade in luxury goods in the sources, to be sure. Ibn Sa`d

icates that early in his career, the Prophet Muhammad owned silk garments that he subsequently abandoned as

entatious.[10]Ibn Habib relates that the would-be Hijazi king `Uthman b. Huwayrith al-Asadi al-Qurashi contracted a

mmercial pact to send spices to the Byzantines. Al-Isfahani contends that al-Nu`man b. al-Mundhir imported silk (harir)

d other cloth from Aden to al-Hirah.[11]Silk cloth also apparently was imported to the region to produce some other

gant clothing reported in the late pre-Islamic era.

t overall, the urban centers of the erstwhile Roman empire, whose requirements for oriental luxury goods had for

turies been the lifeblood of trans-Arabian commerce, were now in economic chaos; and in the Hijaz itself, the demand

widespread importation of silk that had prevailed in earlier centuries has been explicitly explained by the compiler oforical traditions, al-Bukhari. With the rise of Islam, Muhammad banned Muslim men from wearing silk. [12]Hence, the

king silence of the sources on a more general sixth to seventh-century trans-Hijazi trade in spices and other oriental

ods likely signaled exactly what was meant. That trade had died. [13]Accordingly, Crone most probably is correct when

asserts that: "Meccan trade was thus a trade generated by Arab needs, not by the commercial appetites of the

rounding empires," yet she errs when she continues: "and it is as traders operating in Arabia rather than beyond its

ders that the Meccans should be seen."[14]For, as will be demonstrated, it is not what early Makkan trade was not, but

at it was, that merits further scrutiny. Yet comprehending its composition also requires an understanding of the

nomic base from which it was derived. For what the sources do describe, as indicated, is a substantial, economically

sequential, trade in fundamental staples: consumer and industrial goods that the contemporary Hijaz unquestionably did

duce.

ally, the sketchy evidence from which orientalists debate is most often gleaned from the folklorist format the Arab

oniclers present. The early sources do not pretend to be detailed economic compendia. They are instead collections of

man interest stories purporting to have, and generally enjoying, some basis in fact. But to attempt to portray the

nomic vitality of the sixth to seventh-century Hijazi based on the early Arabic sources alone, without ancillary evidence

d more advanced analytic techniques, is tantamount to attempting to reconstruct the economy of New York state based

ely upon the archives of theNew York Post. Prudent scholarship dictates that the trivialities in such details not be

gnified. As Watt states of the traditional accounts, they are "not true in the realistic sense of the secular historian." [15]

eed, Crone herself acknowledges the futility of the undertaking using "the methodology that currently prevails in thed."[15]

ough damning, however, the sheer frankness of such concessions nonetheless simultaneously suggests that perhaps a

mewhat different perspective and a different set of analytic tools are required to define more precisely the trade and

ustrial structures of the Hijaz at the rise of Islam. To these ends, seeking to reconcile the conflicting views, the analysis

t follows augments the ongoing sixth to seventh-century Makkan "commercial structures dialogue," by synthesizing

rce documentation with extant physical evidence. We then view the findings through the prism, and using the tools, of

modern business economist - in so doing, drawing analogies with the operational dynamics of contemporary commerce

t display similar characteristics. This can be a productive analytic approach. For, given the horizontally integrated free

rket economy that then prevailed in West Arabia, "modified upstream development regression analysis" - i.e., tracing

commodities of trade back to their basic production processes, and in turn, further back to their original resource inputs

an, in this instance, yield illuminating insights. [17]

The Issues in Question and the Tools Needed to Address Them

at this inquiry seeks new methods - including archaeology, radiocarbon dating, industrial production and distribution

lysis, and other modern scientific techniques - to capture more accurately the commerce and industry of early medieval

st Arabia is no mere happenstance. Crone herself calls for better evaluative tools and evidence. To wit: "Without

rectives from outside the Islamic tradition, such as papyri, archaeological evidence, and non-Muslim sources, we havee hope of reconstituting the original shapes of this early period."[18]

eview of her principal concerns, thus, is in order. For, given the vigor of the early Makkan trade dialogue precipitated

Crone through her critical source analysis, it is illuminating to examine the principal contentions of her thesis. Among

m, she is baffled by certain bilateral trade transactions. A two-way exchange of certain cloths, agricultural foodstuffs,


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d animals between Syria and the Hijaz, for instance, is incongruous to her: "Once again, we see the Meccans engaged in

peculiar activity of exporting coal to Newcastle while at the same time importing it from there."[19]In other words, if

ountry X" were to produce a commodity and ship it to "Country Y," in Crone's view, then any evidence suggesting that

ountry Y" shipped certain commodities within the same commercial categories back to "Country X" clearly must be

wed. Yet such two-way market flows abound in trade statistics, both historical and modern. This market reality is

cisely why French restaurants are to be found in New York and there are "McDonald's" on the Champs-Elysees; this is

o why Toyotas are common in the streets of Detroit and Fords grace the parking lots of Tokyo.

s not at all surprising, then, to find a diverse product mix circulating in the early medieval Hijaz. For Makkah, with its

egrated network of seasonal markets, was legendary in its role as a key entrept where competing goods fromoughout the region were sold. Indeed, by its very nature, this is the entrept's prime role: to serve as a commercial

eting ground. Consequently, analysis of the trading patterns of a major modernMideast entrept such as Dubai, based

anecdotal newspaper accounts of proximate, productive "fixed plant" industrial activity, would doubtless result in

malies identical to those found by Crone in sixth and seventh-century West Arabia - portraying a caricature of this

namic twenty-first century free port as a mere economic backwater in the course of Euro-Afro-Asian commerce.

ch, of course, is not the case. Because demand, price, quality, and consumer preference do invariably create their own

de patterns, it is not surprising that early medieval Busrans and Hijazis should have displayed mutual affinities for each

ers' clothing and the foodstuffs; or that such products should have been exchanged in the contemporary markets of

kkah and its environs. Indeed, these are the very factors that cause Pakistani leisure suits to be sold in haberdasheries in

an centers of the West today.

ond, Crone is vexed by certain quantification concerns; to wit, that certain episodes in the sources appear to be

plicates, "mirror images," of each other. Speaking of two reported early Muslim raids on northbound Makkan

mmercial caravans, for instance, she states:

That the stories of the raids at Qarada and Ìs are doublets is obvious. In both stories, a Qurashi caravan loaded with silver (coined

or uncoined) is raided by Muhammad's men. The silver is owned or guarded by Safwan b. Umayya or Abu Sufyan in the Qarada

story, by Safwan b. Umayya or Abu Sufyan in that about Ìs, and the Muslim commander is Zayd b. Haritha in both. It is hard to

believe that the same commander twice intercepted a Meccan caravan loaded with the same commodity and manned by very much

the same people.[20]

t upon closer scrutiny, the possibility that these parallel stories actually are "doublets" is not as obvious as it may appear.

re, both the political and economic dynamics in play become noteworthy, making a qualitative reevaluation of the

rce evidence highly appropriate. From a military standpoint, this was an extremely active era. Al-Waqidi documents at

st ninety-three major Muslim "ghazawat" and "saraya" in the first Hijri decade; while Ibn Sa`d cites eighty-five and al-

ahabi seventy-two.[21]Within this ongoing series of armed military expeditions and raids, moreover, there is a frequent

urrence of common commodities, as well as of key individuals, the latter both as force commanders and as caravan

ders. Given these realities, we may observe the following of this particular "doublet."

ough the circumstances are somewhat similar, the two confrontations nonetheless appear at two separate, distinct, known

s, and occur three years apart.

r is the claim that each caravan was carrying silver that was subsequently stolen a remarkable coincidence. For as Ibn

aq claims, and as will be demonstrated below, the prime role of precious metals in such caravans was for use as

rrency" in barter transactions for other commodities that actually were the prime targets of the multilateral trade

sions.[22]What the Muslims were plundering, then, was money - "investment capital" - common to all caravans. This

cumstance makes a different commodity mix, with the same precious metals-denominated investment capital, probable

each individual caravan. It likewise explains why these caravans were carrying silver both to and from Syria, anothernomenon that concerns Crone.[23]

hile Zayyid b. Harithah does serve as expedition leader in both the al-Qaradah and al-Ìs engagements, he likewise

ears in numerous others, among them at least five cited by al-Dhahabi in A.H. 6 alone, the year of his raid at al-Ìs.[24]

ch raids, it seems, ranked among his prime preoccupations. So the fact that he is cited in engagements at two sites,


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arated in time by three years, may not be all that extraordinary.

ere is admittedly some confusion in the sources as to who actually was in charge of these two trade missions. Al-

ahabi places Abu Sufyan as a member of the caravan ambushed at al-Qaradah and Abu al-Às b. al-Rabi` in that at al-[25]as does Ibn Ishaq.[26]Al-Waqidi places Safwan b. Umayyah as a spokesperson within the al-Qaradah caravan and

firms the presence of Abu al-Às and Àbd Allah b. Abi al-Rabiàh in the al-Ìs caravan.[27]Ibn Sa`d, in turn, places

wan b. Umayyah and Àbd Allah b. Abi Rabiàh within the al-Qaradah caravan and Safwan b. Umayyah and Abu al-

within that at al-Ìs.[28]Though there is undeniable overlap in the participations reported in these two events, that in

lf does not necessarily render them apocryphal. For Qurashi caravans generally were quite large, at times comprising as

ny as 2,500 camels. Yet they consisted of finite numbers of participants who habitually carried the goods of others.us, it is not at all surpris ing to find the names of certain principal merchants recurring in the narration of various

mmercial events, nor of numerous other prominent merchants similarly cited in the sources, among them al-Aswad b. al-

ttalib, his son Zamàh, and Huwaytib b. Àbd al-Ùzza, in conjunction with trade missions in general and with these two

particular.[29]

s no way implausible to conclude from the evidence, then, that Makkan caravans formally operated as ongoing, quasi-

manent functional units frequently containing many of the same key players - or that participation by a merchant, or

up of merchants, in a given mission, such as at al-Qaradah, did not perforce preclude them from involvement in another,

ilar trade mission three years later, such as at al-Ìs. Indeed, given the complex, integrated organizational commercial

uctures then in place, it would be surprising if this scenario were not the case. For such Makkan caravans served in a key

vate sector transport role run by the same "shipping company" carrying the goods of many people.

sum, though there are parallels in the dual accounts, it is not unequivocal that the primary source treatment of these two

ds is indeed a "doublet," as Crone contends. In this instance, in fact, the odds are likely that it was not, as there is strong

ntervailing evidence that suggests two separate incidents. At the close of her book, however, she returns to this

gation of "recurring themes" with more compelling evidence, detailing "miracle stories" attributed to the Prophet

hammad.[30]Here, her claim may be more plausible, as it is more likely to find embellishment by devout followers in

ir descriptions of the accomplishments of someone whom they believe to be the "Seal of the Prophets" than in their

re mundane accounts relating that Abu Sufyan customarily led commercial caravans, that the banu Sulaym mined gold,hat Caliph Muàwiyah was a grower of grapes.

ch realities are not ipso factofailures of scholarship, of course. They merely indicate that further examination of the

nomic circumstances is required, underscoring the cogency of Crone's call for more tangible non-documentary evidence

augment the Islamic sources. The ultimate solution, though, lies not in geographically transforming the Qurashis further

he north, as she also attempts, but instead in better comprehending what the trade base really was. For it is not what the

rces do not say that is important; it is what they do say. The evidence is finite, without doubt. But it can unquestionably

restructured to make more economic sense - recasting the industrial determinants of the early medieval Hijaz into a new

mmercial model.

ch realities thus suggest that a more productive analytic course might be to commence by examining what we do know

ut the Hijazi economic dynamic at the time of the Prophet Muhammad's religious ascendancy, synthesizing chronicled

imony with physical artifacts representing the workings of early medieval industrial activity residual in the region, in

search for alternate hypotheses to explain the role of trade in forging that dynamic. The quest perforce begins with

cious metals.

The Preeminence of Precious Metals

suggested above, Crone doubtless is correct when she, like Serjeant, Peters, and others, argues that the longstandingns-Hijazi-Mediterranean trade in "spices" and other luxury goods that characterized the early Christian centuries had lost

ch of its vitality by the sixth century A.D.[31]But her contention may be as important for what it doesn't claim as for

at it does.[32]For an effective examination of the incipient dynamism of the Qurashi Makkan economy probably should

initially target export trade at all. An analogy to the economic structure of modern Saudi Arabia is likely a more

ductive inquiry.


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ly in the twentieth century, before the discovery of oil, an overwhelming proportion of Hijazi public revenues - upwards

ninety percent - was derived from providing for the needs of religious pilgrims - the identical retail trade that had

tained the Qurashis fourteen centuries before. Merchandise exports then were modest, not unlike those recorded in much

he most recent (1993-2003) decade, wherein Saudi Arabia's non-oil goods and services export sales have fluctuated

ween 1.32% and 2.88% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) formation.

d modern trade economists sought to capture the vigor of the modern Saudi Arabian economy based on these non-oil

ort figures - undeniably far more comprehensive in its coverage than mere fragmentary commercial references

tained in the medieval Arabic sources - they would have missed entirely the fact that the Kingdom, despite its reduced

revenues, nonetheless has produced record real GDP creation in recent years. The reason: liquid minerals - petroleumd its derivatives - still constitute about seventy-five percent of the nation's aggregate annual budgetary revenues. The

son: absent a concerted analytic focus on other key economic, commercial, and financial factors, measurements of

rchandise and service exports are often no more an effective gauge of economic activity today than they are for the

enth century.

t the comparison to modern Saudi Arabia in explaining the early medieval Qurashi economy does not end with raw

ort data. For Crone likewise asserts the quite striking claim that precious metals played no economically significant role

he contemporary Hijazi commerce: "The Meccans cannot be said to have exported gold and silver at all.... Meccan trade

s cannot be identified as a trade in gold."[33]Peters take the argument further still:

There are, in fact, no external indications that Mecca was prosperous or that there was any capital to invest.... The absence of gold

and silver coins is perhaps somewhat startling, but only because we assume that the city lived on a monetary economy, which it

almost certainly did not. And two conclusions immediately present themselves in consequence: that Mecca was not involved in

international trade.... and second, whatever business the Quraysh were, in fact, conducting, it had to perforce be, and appears to

have actually been, quite literally barter....[34]

t, as subsequent analysis will demonstrate, here both scholars can be challenged. For careful reading of the medieval

ab geographers leaves little doubt that at the rise of Islam, the analogue in seventh-century Arabia's western province to

twenty-first century eastern province's abundance of liquid minerals was hard minerals - precious metals. Elsewhere, the

minent role of indigenous Hijazi gold and silver mining in driving the operating dynamic of the early Islamic state hasn amply documented. Their industrial and commercial contributions cannot be underestimated. For when they are

tored into the contemporary equation, a quite different economy emerges.[35]

eed, the combination of source documentation and residual onsite physical evidence makes readily apparent that one

not begin to comprehend the functioning of the early medieval Hijazi economy without first perceiving the

ispensable role of precious metals. Mining created a variety of production, refining, and distribution jobs at over a

usand separate sites. Jewelry-making further contributed to expansion of the local employment base. Gold, silver,

per, and iron were inputs in other industrial production. Precious metals were, moreover, the investment capital that

derwrote that production. Equally significantly, they lubricated commerce, serving as its currency base for financing

port acquisitions as well as "import substitution" indigenous industrial development. They were, in fact, capital looking

a place to happen.

t, here a clarification of the role of precious metals in shaping trade is critical. For Crone may well be right, at least in

t, when she asserts that the early Makkans did not export vast amounts of gold and silver; although, in an age of bulk

lion transactions, the linguistic distinction between gold "exported" in countertrade for other goods, and gold used as

rrency" to purchase other goods, may not be commercially significant. For what the foreign recipients of such metals

mately did with such metals is not germane to the nature of the trade of the Hijazis. Makkan merchants undeniably did

ry substantial quantities of bullion on their international trading caravans, whether for export or transactional purposes.

sponding to Crone's specific concern that they reportedly carried gold and silver both to and from Syria, however, therces make quite clear that it was the latter function - used as currency payments for commodities - that was more

mmon.[36]

Ishaq explicitly says, in fact, that the precious metals seized by Muslims in their various raids on caravans was intended

use as coin. When the Muslims won silver as booty in their raid at al-`Is in 8/630, it was trade investment capital they


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re plundering. Al-Waqidi's report that al-Harith b. Àmir b. Nawfal had 1,000 mithqals, Umayyah b. Khalaf 1,000

hqals, members of the banu Àbd Manaf 15,000 mithqals, and the banu Makhzum 5,000 mithqalsof gold invested in

of Abu Sufyan's periodic northbound Syrian caravans concurrently makes clear that it was carried in the form of

lion to be used as currency to underwrite commerce. [37]

u Baqa', in turn, claims that it was this quite common use of bullion in monetary transactions that caused one Syrian

toms agent to query Ùmar b. al-Khattab in some astonishment: "A caravan of Quraysh coming to Syria without gold?

at isn't possible!"[38]Contending that gold was the driving force behind their commerce, he adds that the Ghassanids

uld customarily relieve Makkan merchants of a portion of it in transit fees whenever Hijazi caravans passed through

ir territories.[39]

portant for understanding the economic dynamic of contemporary west Arabia, then, is the reality that precious metals

re the prevailing current denominator. Early Hijazi mining proceeds created quality jobs, incomes, marketable products,

d all of the stimulatory economic multiplier effects normally attendant thereto. But it was in their contemporary use as

oney" that precious metals made their greatest financial impact.

ere were other proximate currencies percolating throughout the Near East in pre-Islamic times, to be sure, including the

zantine gold dinar and the Persian silver dirham. Indeed, the Qur'an explicitly mentions the dinar, [40]the dirham,[41]and

waraq[42]- the latter defined by al-Mawardi also as a "silver coin,"[43]most probably of Himyaritic issue - and it was the

cific weights of such foreign currencies that were the denominational basis for determining by proxy the value of the

azis' precious metal bullion used in commerce. Thus, the Arab sources commonly describe early Muslim commercial

nsactions in dinarand dirhamterms - employing them as numeraires- monetary benchmarks corresponding to specific

mmon-use bullion weights, as there were very few "Arabic" coins struck in the first half century of Islam.

, irrespective of the provenance of any particular currency denominator, use of precious metals in their uncast state was

preponderant transactional practice. By way of example, the qintarwas a bullion coin weight equivalent to 4,000

ars. Al-Baladhuri attests to the widespread operation of this bulk bullion trading practice,[44]a claim affirmed by al-

qrizi[45]and Ibn Sa`d.[46]In sum, indigenously produced Hijazi gold and silver were the "capital bridge" that

mpensated for commodity trade deficits, making possible acquisitions that were not directly attainable through barter;d because of them, the values of commodity exports did not, of necessity, have to equal the values of product imports. A

iew of the extant evidence is illuminating.

compelling confirmation that the medieval Arab chronicler's claims of abundant wealth in precious metals were not

irely apocryphal, there exists much physical testimony that documents their continuing existence. Indeed, hundreds of

ly medieval Hijazi-west-central Najdi mining locations are known, and some are even now being reopened for

duction. Several sites merit particular attention. Among them, the productivity of "al-Mindah" mine is lavishly lauded in

-Islamic poetry; and several others - Mahd al-Dhahab, al-Nuqrah, Bahran, and Biram among them - are directly linked

Arabic historical geographies to contemporary activities of the Prophet Muhammad's Quraysh tribe.[47]Many others of

more than 1,000 sites in West Arabia mined in the early Middle Ages, whose residual evidence remains, likely were

o active in his era. Indeed, carbon 14 datings from wood residuals at the smelters that supported these mining operation

vities suggest that many dated to the pre-Islamic age and the earliest decades of Islam. [48]

e financing of these early medieval Arabian mining operations appears to have been a "hybrid" individual/corporate

tem wherein private capital was employed. The purchase of one particular mine by Ùmar b. Àbd al-Àziz, and the

lective ownership of the principal banu Sulaym mine, Mahd al-Dhahab, in the caliphal reign of Ùmar b. al-Khattab will

described presently. Al-Baladhuri relates that, at the rise of Islam, the tax-farming of state mining properties whereby

nes would be consigned to private interests in exchange for payment of the zakat, or alternately, the khumslevy - was

o prevalent. Both he and al-Bakri cite a variety of mining properties that were tax-farmed as "iqtaàt" to localrepreneurs by the Prophet Muhammad.[49]

vate exploration and discovery likewise appear to have played key roles in mine ownership. Ibn Hajar quotes members

he banu Lihb as asserting "We brought the Prophet of God ore from al-Àqiq, and he wrote us a letter stating: 'Whoever

ds something, it is his - and the twenty percent tax (khums) is to be levied on precious metals.'" Given the abundance of


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vately owned medieval mining properties that are documented in the Arabic sources whose physical evidence remains,

n, it is clear that precious metals production was a key private sector industry in Muhammad's era.

eed, many of these mining sites clearly were "big business." Source evidence and the remnants of on-site barrack-like

uctures indicate that they were often labor-intensive, employing as many as two thousand men. Production volumes also

re impressive. Evidence suggests that in historic times an estimated 1,500,000 ounces of gold were produced from the

re than one million tons of ore mined at the still producing mine Mahd al-Dhahab; and that more than 1,000,000 ounces

gold were produced at al-Hamdah in the early medieval era as well.

he early medieval Hijaz, gold and silver reigned preeminent. They were the key determinants that distinguished theatively wealthy Makkan economy from its early medieval Near East counterparts. To take these valued commodities out

he contemporary West Arabian trade scene, then, would unquestionably produce the same economically vacuous results

f oil were to be deleted from modern Saudi Arabia's export data. To project the full economic picture, precious metals,

dominant components of both local industry and commerce, must be factored in. Credit precious metals with their

per role in driving the operating dynamic of the Hijaz economy at the dawn of Islam, however, and the remaining

mensions of the contemporary commercial and industrial picture fall readily into place.

The Question of an "Arabia Without Spices" (Instead With Gold and Silver)

The Framework for Debate

alysis to this point has focused upon Crone's controversial trade claims. Yet, if a fuller contemporary commercial picture

o exist, the scope of analytic inquiry must be more encompassing than mere concerted focus on a single scholar's

tributions, however careful their construction or compelling their contentions. Indeed, to ensure optimal accuracy,

entific evaluation must transcend historiographic revisionism, tempering existing evidence with tests of classic economic

ory.

estions of both the chronology and character of pre-Islamic commerce have recently received considerable attention

m other, equally distinguished medieval Near East historians. Robert Simon, Mahmood Ibrahim, and F. E. Peters, for

ance, are likely quite correct in their concurrence that the sixth century witnessed dramatic geopolitical developments

t precipitated the culmination of the gradual transformation of the Makkan economy from a transit trade in luxury goods

he regional distribution of more basic, indigenously produced consumer goods. Simon states that "the rise of Makkan

de and the beginning of North Arabian history were not bolts from the blue, but were in close causal relationship with

history of the neighboring powers, i.e., Mecca's history was part of contemporary world history." [50]

ere is much to commend this contention. For the economies of the early medieval Red Sea littoral and southern

diterranean basin were neither "static" economic systems, nor did they evolve in isolation, but instead were profoundlypacted by powerful synergies between them. Hence, the Qurashis' preeminence in early medieval Hijazi trade was no

ident. Indeed, the convenient convergence of a sixth-century series of significant events had, almost by default,

ivered control of ongoing commerce directly into their hands.

ose events, largely economic at their origin, included: (i) an intensely hostile military confrontation between the

zantines and the Sasanids within the region throughout much of the sixth century; (ii) attendant exorbitant tariffs and

port and export controls imposed by these twin combatants upon goods transiting their borders; (iii) a series of trade-

ated alliances and counter-alliances between them and the Abyssinians and Yemenis; (iv) attempts to set up allied local

al chiefs as "kings" on the Arabian Peninsula; (v) various skirmishes between these twin superpowers' trade vassals

hin the western peninsula, the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids respectively; and finally, (vi) Abyssinian occupation of

men in A.D. 525, which significantly disrupted Sasanid northbound commerce and diplomacy. [51]

ese sundry conspiracies and intrigues predictably failed, it appears in retrospect, because of the unyielding natures both

he region and of its diverse inhabitants. Describing the unsuccessful attempt of the Byzantines to install Christian


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vert `Uthman b. al-Huwayrith al-Asadi al-Qurashi as a proxy "King of Makkah" as part of their strategic commercial

iative, for instance, al-Zubayr b. Bakkar calls the Qurashis "a fiercely independent people who would never subject

mselves to the sovereignty of a king." Accordingly, while the Byzantines and Sasanids were militarily engaged with

h other, the Qurashis quickly moved in to fill the resultant economic and administrative voids. [52]

roitly perceiving the resulting commercial vacuum, according to medieval Arabic sources, the Hashimi clan of the banu

raysh now moved with great dispatch. Among their various initiatives, for instance, they immediately concluded trade

eements with local representatives of the regional superpowers situated at their Arabian peninsula borders to broker

ir goods, as well as with other indigenous tribes guaranteeing them shares of the profits in exchange for security for

rashi caravans as they transited their territories.[53]

e failure of the Yemeni invasion of the Hijaz in A.D. 570, moreover, combined with the "Hurub al-Fijar" - a series of

ty intertribal wars for commercial control of West Central Arabia circa A.D. 580 wherein the Qurashis vanquished the

u Hawazin, banu Qays, and other allies of the regional commercial power, al-Hirah - would ultimately assure the

shimis preeminent trade hegemony. These developments would likewise soon prove seminal not only for the Qurashis'

n economic interests but also for the evolution of the Hijaz itself as a formidable commercial force. For the Hashimi

ng elite quickly demonstrated far-reaching economic and diplomatic talents, the effective range of which transcended

borders of the peninsula, producing a flourish of regional trade expansions involving key exports as well as imports.

eir achievements concurrently enhanced the geographic mobility of Qurashi merchants within an ever-expanding

work of mercantile activities.[54]

mbined with these tectonic political and economic shifts, and attendant changes in Mediterranean-based market demand

els, it is likely not coincidental that the commodity mix of trans-Hijazi trade now gradually devolved from those

scale," high unit-value oriental goods previously demanded by the rapidly degenerating urban centers of the Roman

pire as well as by Byzantium's war-ravaged and economically deteriorating provinces, to higher volume, lower unit-

ue Arab goods, in order to meet more fundamental consumer requirements in the proximate Near East. For, with Yemen

d al-Hirah also both in decline, and with the Byzantines and Sasanids mutually preoccupied, the Qurashis' political and

mmercial interests were now effectively unleashed and unconstrained.

cordingly, the Arabic chronicles are likely quite accurate in portraying the first/seventh-century Hijaz as an integrated,

ltidirectional commercial emporium trading in the exchange of basic staples and the import of fundamental economic

ds. From the north arrived the oils, foodstuffs, grains, wines, clothing, and weaponry of Syria and Iraq; from Persia to

northeast, iron products, musk, ambergris, and jewels; from the west, the slaves, ivory, and incense of Abyssinia; and

m the south, the cloths and perfumes of Yemen. Concurring in the commercial portrayal that the sources describe, the

lyses of Simon, Ibrahim, and Peters are probably generally correct in identifying within its trade flows "aromatics,"

h as frankincense and laudanum, indigenous to the Arabian peninsula, and not the more general "condiments," such as

ger, pepper, and other seasonings that Crone evaluates in her broader interpretation of the English term "spices." [55]

t, while the primary Arabic sources for sixth-century Arabia do speak of an ongoing trade in "aromatics," with only

sing references to "condiments," the evidence is not entirely unequivocal. Various sources, for instance, cite an

ewood used as incense in the Hijaz at the dawn of Islam called "Indian wood" (`ud al-Hind). There are similar

ications that ginger was exported to Aden from India and Ceylon, from classic antiquity through the sixth and seventh

turies, and it is likewise cited in the Qur'an using its Indian name:zanjabil. The fourth/tenth-century Arab scholar, al-

mmi, asserts that the Quraysh also exported pepper, as well as cloth and leather goods, from the Hijaz to Syria. Thus, the

rces provide certain indications that throughout this era, the Hijaz continued to be a venue for at least some Indian

continent "luxury goods" - most likely to meet Arabian peninsula and other proximate southwest Asian market demand.

e fundamental nature of the private financial system that underwrote economic activity in the contemporary Hijaz is

ewise a source of scholarly contention that merits further scrutiny. In such a focus, of course, clear distinction must be

wn between "mercantile capitalism" - surplus capital generated as profits at the margin through commercial exchange -

d "industrial capitalism" - investment capital employed to underwrite facilities of production. Mahmood Ibrahim, for

mple, accepts the contemporary utility of mercantile capitalism, while discounting industrial capitalism, in framing an


10/35

nomic model for sixth-century Arabia, whereas Simon and Peters do not. Contending that Makkan merchants merely

ded in the goods of others, Ibrahim states:

Merchant capital is that fraction of capital that is generated purely through exchange, whether merchants controlled the means of

production, as in Yemen, or not, as in Mecca.... As they did not own means of production at the time, Meccan merchants merely

bought and sold their merchandise, accumulating profit as they increased commercial activity and enlarged the area of their

market.... Having on surplus of their own, Mecca's merchants thus accumulated capital only through trade occasioned by the

institution of the haram, providing us with a classic illustration of exchange as the origin of merchant capital. [57]

t here, both conclusions may be challenged. For the sources clearly suggest that both capitalistic structures were very

ch in evidence, particularly in the era of Muhammad when the dynamics of "Islamic economics" were initially beingged. While the evidence is less comprehensive for the pre-Islamic era, it is nonetheless clear that, by the first half of the

enth century, West Arabia was far more than a mere string of way-stations on the classic trade routes of antiquity. The

ion was instead a significant production center that manufactured commodities in surplus to be marketed by its

rchants in regional commerce. It is how that productive investment was financed at its inception that merits further

sideration.

as subsequent sections demonstrate, many first/seventh-century entrepreneurs were sufficiently wealthy that no

ernal investment capital was necessary to underwrite their productive ventures. Abu Talib, for instance, was among the

kkan wheat growers who sold their own produce, according to Ibn Qutaybah. [58]Al-Baladhuri relates the grudging

essment by Ùmar b. Àbd al-Àziz of an unproductive mining property that he had purchased from the offspring of

al b. al-Harith al-Muzani which had been previously awarded to his family as a land concession by Prophet Muhammad.

ook at what was extracted from it and what I spent on it," he complains.[59]

t there likewise were collective forms of productive investment. At the rise of Islam, practically every wealthy Makkan

s invested in agrarian properties near al-Ta'if.[60]Al-Baladhuri describes a land reclamation partnership between Harb b.

mayyah and sundry Sulamis that was financed with a mudarabahcontract.[61]Al-Bakri, in turn, speaks of a dispute at

hd al-Dhahab gold mine among the original investors, mine workers, and other Sulamis in the caliphal reign of Ùmar b.

Khattab.[62]Hence, though source references more commonly appear in commercial transactions, the concept of "pooled

estment capital" to finance goods production was not unknown in the sixth and seventh centuries.[63]

may be concluded, then, that the more prevalent commerce-based form of aggregate capital employment was due to its

as much as an income transfer mechanism aimed at wealth redistribution as to its use as a capital mobilization

rument. Some sources, al-Qurtubi among them, for example, indicate that Hashim, progenitor of the Quraysh, urged

ser merchants to pool their capital in order to gain from strength in numbers. Such comparative advantage appears to

e been critical. For the sources suggest that this was an age of keen mercantile competition, with munafarah, an intense

ng for social status based on wealth and material strength, in the ascendancy - and with financial failure according to

me sources, even leading at times certain commercially unfortunate Makkan merchants to contemplate ritual suicide

ifad).[64]

e institutions ofsadaqah(alms-giving, and laterzakat), rifadah(providing food), andsiqayah(providing water) - as well

he banning of monopolistic practices (ihtikar) - were similar mechanisms aimed at wealth redistribution as well as at

acting pilgrim merchants to Makkah. To underwrite the costs of such provisions, the Qurashi progenitor Qusayy b.

ab levied taxes on both indigenous and incoming merchants. Thus, as Ibrahim contends, the notion of pooled merchant

ital as a welfare institution, as well as a commercial capitalization tool, must not be discounted. Indeed, it was integral

he Qurashis' innovative marketing approach of brokered security (khafarah) caravan (ilafi) traffic.[65]

e evolution of each of these commercial phenomena, therefore, deserves further study in combination both with what the

ab chroniclers claim and what today remains in the form of tangible physical evidence. Given the general pedagogicpticism regarding the reliability of the early Arabic sources, much of the current scholarly debate has centered upon

aluative methodology." Which analytic tools can most effectively be employed to substantiate or discredit extant data?

e forensic undertaking is complicated by the highly fragmentary nature of the source accounts themselves. For often a

ss of anecdotal data must be woven together in the quest for a more consistent, rational whole. The difficulty has been

mpounded further by the targeted focus of modern inquiry. However, the narration of functional economic history was


11/35

ally not the foremost objective of the medieval Arab chronicler.

ven such challenges, Crone and others have called for new analytic tools to examine the extant body of finite evidence.

e challenge is daunting. Yet such tools often do exist. Among them are physical remains, such as mining tailings,

mnants of dams and other edifices, as well as the evaluative techniques of modern economic analysis.

e historiographic challenge thus is significant. Absent incontrovertible evidence, a substantial measure of deductive

soning often is required to ascertain underlying economic realities. For while there are residual tailings that indicate the

dertaking of medieval West Arabian mining, and the ruins of contemporary dams to suggest the cultivation of

iculture, there is no market produce that reveals a specific commercial commodity mix, nor "Geniza documents" tomonstrate the incidence of trade, nor often, even an abundance of artifacts to prove the workings of particular crafts.

ncurrently, the possibility cannot be discounted that certain economic manifestations that do exist are ex post facto

nomena produced in later Umayyad or even early `Abbasid times. Analysis thus must focus on people, events, and

facts whose existence can be linked to times and places certain.

e textual evidence is undeniably finite, diverse, and complex, to be sure. At the same time, it is often complementary,

h each part comprising a piece of a greater puzzle, capturing a collage of synergistic production and distribution

ctions that can be retrofitted to recreate the operations of a functional market-driven industrial system. In this quest, the

rces provide a certain corroborative utility, since at least five documented cross-checks can be combined to offer a fuller

nomic picture. They include: (i) Qur'anic references to the pursuit of specific industries and crafts; (ii) chroniclers'

ounts of private sector undertakings of such productive activities; (iii) source references to official attempts to promote

ir operational development; (iv) documentation attesting to systematic trade in the resulting products; and (v) accounts

regulation of that trade by Muhammad and other contemporary authorities.

e prospects for corroboration thus compel the analyst to evaluate any given body of textual evidence as a "data

mposite," seeking to discern, in detail, what the totality of information, both chronicled and physical, may reveal about a

ticular economic function's operation and chronology. Part of the analytic challenge is subjective, part must be

pirical. In the first instance, the challenge is to ascertain whether, in a particular circumstance, if the testimony of a

en source is suspect, perhaps through an error in transmission or reception, could other, corroborating, chroniclers,ng independently, have made the identical mistake?

he latter case, artifacts and advanced technology-based analytic tools - such as infrared sensing and radiometric dating -

fill in the blanks left by the written manuscripts. But while scientific evaluation as well as the application of modern

nomic theory can aid in the discovery process, they too clearly have their limitations. For while they may provide

pshots of specific economic phenomena at a given time, they nonetheless still require the reliability of corroborating

dence, including the veracity of the medieval Arabic sources, to develop a fuller picture. The underlying determinant, in

h instance, must again revert to the subjective issue of "preponderant plausibility," when the data are viewed in

regate.

other words, does the combination of what the sources have to say convey a coherent economic logic? If in

croeconomic functioning, for instance, they are remarkably accurate in depicting the mechanical operations of early

dieval precious metals mining, of which there is ample physical proof, why should one then conclude that they are

egorically wrong about trade, the crafts, and agriculture, of which there is less tangible proof? Here, however, the crucial

inction may often be less one of kind than of degree. To wit, despite a possible embellishment in numbers, does a given

rce provide a probable underlying truth in its data documenting the functioning of a particular industrial sector?

e medieval Arab chroniclers were not entirely oblivious to economic reality, and hence deserve a certain attention in

asuring their merit. As R. B. Serjeant has aptly stated: "criticism of historical sources should aim at eliciting from themat is possible to accept as evidence, not at manufacturing a case for destroying them in toto."[66]This goal is crucial in

onstructing early medieval Arab economic history. For, without a reasonable willingness to accept elements of truth in

early source accounts, there remains no basis for meaningful commercial and industrial reconstruction of the

t/seventh-century Hijaz. Moreover, analysis is left with the improbable conclusion that Arab chroniclers, working quasi-

onomously on an ad hocbasis, a full seven centuries before Adam Smith, heuristically and inadvertently derived an


12/35

most perfect (albeit fictitious) working model of what today is known as "free market economics."

Defining the Economic Dynamics of The First/Seventh-Century Hijaz

ving fixed the primacy of precious metals at the core of early medieval Western Arabian economic operations, the

llenge becomes that of fitting into place remaining pieces of the contemporary industrial and commercial puzzle - a

tch made possible by the availability of significant, albeit anecdotal, source data. Indeed, when viewed in aggregate, and

ough the analytic prism of modern economic theory, the chroniclers' accounts often may be seen not as mere human

erest stories, but as complementary components of a highly functional, integrated microeconomic system.

e ready availability of adequate supplies of investment capital to support production has previously been demonstrated;

d with such finance available in abundance, a greater understanding of the other factors of production falls into place. At

stage, a review of the uses to which these capital resources were put, as well as of the operations of the economic base

ustries to which they were committed will be helpful.

The Productivity of Agriculture

spite the barren setting, there can be little doubt that agriculture played a key role in the commercial vitality of thet/seventh-century Hijaz. The region's landscape was dotted with trees, bushes, grasses, and plants, and fertile oases

sted at al-Ta'if, al-Nakhlah, Khaybar, Fadak, Turabah, Yanbu`, Wadi al-Qura, al-Suwarqiyah, Wadi al-Àqiq,

oughout al-Madinah region, and elsewhere. The Àsir, to the south, also historically served as a key breadbasket for

st Arabia. The farm produce of these areas included grains such as wheat and barley, sorghum, alfalfa, a wide variety of

etables, citrus and other fruits, grapes, olives, dates, and pomegranates.

Ta'if, called by al-Qalqashandi "a little bit of Heaven transported by God from Syria to the Hijaz" - a beneficiary of a

stantial 200-450 millimeters of rain annually - was particularly known for its grape and raisin production, with

àwiyah b. Abi Sufyan, Àbd Allah b. Àbbas, al-Àbbas b. Àbd al-Muttalib, Abu Talib, and Àmr b. al-Às all owning

ge vineyards there. It, together with al-Madinah, was also legendary for exporting quality wines made from dates and

pes. Indeed, the very first booty won by Muhammad's newly formed Muslim forces were al-Ta'ifi wines, raisins, and

her goods seized from a Qurashi caravan in their raid at al-Nakhlah. [67]

tes, another farm product, also were ubiquitous and were used not only as a basic foodstuff but also as an in-kind

rency to settle commercial obligations. Because of their durability, raisins too were extremely convenient foodstuffs,

h as commercial goods and consumables, the latter particularly on lengthy trade and military expeditions. They likewise

ld be used in local desalination and water-purification processes, and al-Istakhri indicate that their production was

ther prime industry of al-Ta'if region. Of these farm products, the Qur'an states: "We grow for you gardens of date

ms and vines; in them, you have abundant fruit, and of them, you eat."[68]

Various regions throughout the Hijazinguished themselves through their cultivation of particular farm products. Numerous Qu'ranic verses testify to the

ndance of dates, grapes, grains, fruits, and vegetables produced in the vicinity of al-Madinah. The fruit and date farms

al-Ta'if were famous both for their quantity and quality of output. Khaybar similarly was known for its fine dates,

ereas Dumat al-Jandal (modern al-Jawf) was situated in an area propitious for the production of dates as well as cereals.

azi agriculture was frequently carried out on a significant scale. Capital availability was a key to its success, with

althy citizens often cited as major financiers of agrarian activities. In al-Madinah region, Muàwiyah b. Abi Sufyan and

hah b. Ùbayd Allah appear as major wheat growers, with the latter credited as the first to grow wheat in Wadi Qanah

th of the city. The sources report that investments in ten farms by Muàwiyah, who owned numerous grain and date-ducing properties in the vicinities of Makkah and al-Madinah, resulted annually in the production of 150,000 camel

ds of dates and 100,000 camel loads of wheat.[70]This future caliph also dedicated special care to developing properties

he Wadi al-Qura area and elsewhere that had been previously owned by Jewish farmers. The famed Muslim conqueror

Egypt, Àmr b. al-Às, is said to have had a vineyard in al-Ta'if that contained more than one million vines; whereas

mzah b. Àbd Allah b. Zubayr owned a grove of 20,000 date palms in al-Furu`. Al-Samhudi relates that Ja`far b. Talhah


13/35

nt 200,000 dinars for land reclamation on his estate in Umm Ìyyal, which contained 20,000 spring-irrigated date palms

t produced 4,000 dinars in annual income.[71]

estock likewise was a key industry at the dawn of Islam, with animal herds frequently very large. We have already

ed that caravans consisting of as many as 2,500 camels are cited in the sources. The victorious Muslim forces reportedly

zed 24,000 camels in the battle of Hunayn in the year 8/630. Ibn Àbd al-Barr asserts that future caliph Ùthman b.

ffan personally contributed 950 camels, 50 horses, and 1,000 dinars to the embryonic Islamic army. Over 1,000 horses

ticipated in the Muslims' conquest of Makkah in 8/630; and in the battle of Badr in 2/624, Prophet Muhammad is said to

e employed seventy camels in his cavalry.[72]Muàwiyah b. Abi Sufyan similarly was reportedly the beneficiary of an

mal bequest involving 2,000 sheep,[73]and Zubayr b. Bakkar relates that a prime occupation of Hakim b. Hizam wasrketing camels at the Makkah market.[74]He likewise relates the purchase of a female slave in exchange for 100 she-

mels.[75]

us, farming clearly was a significant industry within Islam's birthplace, the Hijaz. And again, there is physical evidence,

he form of remains of irrigation canals and dams dating to this period, to support the documentary sources. Indeed, the

mnants of at least nineteen dams from that period still exist in various state of preservation in the Hijaz - thirteen in al-

if region, three in the vicinity of the Khaybar Oasis, and three near al-Madinah. While many of these dams were built in

early Islamic era, recent archaeological expeditions investigating their structural design and provenance suggest that

me, such as "Sadd Qasr al-Bint," in the Khaybar region, likely are attributable to late pre-Islamic times. [76]

The Output of Manufacturing

e non-agricultural industrial base of the early medieval Hijaz was likewise quite diverse, ranging from mining to hunting

d fishing, to construction and manufacturing, and other productive undertakings. Amongst the various enterprises,

igenous manufacturing was an industrial sector that consisted of several substantial sub-sectors, as Hijazi craftsmen

re engaged in diverse productive activities that created a noteworthy selection of marketable commodities. For

strative purposes, let us focus on five key sub-sectors: (i) jewelry-smithing, (ii) black-smithing, (iii) tanning, (iv)

tiles, and (v) perfumes.

Jewelry-Smithing. Because of the proliferation of indigenous gold and silver, it was logical that jewelry-making would

ome a key profession. Hijazis were historically known for their love of decoration with precious metals, and the Qur'an

unds with references to gold and silver as esteemed possessions. For instance, "Fair in the eyes of men is the love of

ngs they covet; women and sons; heaped up hoards of gold and silver"; and "For them will be Gardens of Eternity;

eath them, rivers will flow; they will be adorned therein with bracelets of gold." [77]Malik b. Anas relates that so

sionate were local Arabs in their reverence for gold and silver tableware at this time that the Prophet felt compelled to

its production and use as being an ostentatious detraction from religious observance.[78]

welry-making was a specialty of Jews in general - and of the Jewish banu Qaynaqa` in al-Madinah in particular. This city

s especially known for its craftsmen of precious metals throughout early medieval times. Al-Salihi al-Shami relates that

en Prophet Muhammad vanquished the banu Qaynaqa` in al-Madinah, he seized great numbers of swords and black-

thing and jewelry-making equipment.[79]Al-Waqidi, in turn, affirms that the principal products sold in "suq bani

ynaqa` in the pre-Islamic era were jewelry, bows, lances, and swords.[76]Indeed, Medinese jewelers, together with the

dsmiths of Fadak and Khaybar, were regionally renowned for the quality of their work; and al-Samhudi, citing Ibn

balah, indicates that there were more than three hundred jewelers at this time in the Medinese suburb of al-Zuhrah alone.

kkah, al-Ta'if, and Wadi al-Qura likewise reportedly had sizable jewelry-smithing sectors. Their output doubtless

oyed a receptive market, as references to jewelry permeate the sources - and include descriptions of opulent rings,

rings, bracelets and anklets, bangles, pendants, and other objects of adornment. One lady of al-Madinah, Zaynab bint

àwiyah al-Thaqafiyah, reportedly owned a necklace whose gold content weighed more than twenty mithqals.[82]

ld and silver plating also was a handicraft pursued by early medieval Hijazi jewelry smiths. The sword worn by Prophet

hammad upon his triumphant entry into Makkah in 630 reportedly had gold and silver inlay. The sword of Abu Jahl,


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zed as booty in the Battle of Badr in the year 2/624, is said to have had similar features; and lances and shields likewise

re often embellished in this manner. Doors and window frames were a particular focus of gold-leaf decoration. Al-

raqi, al-Fasi, and al-Qutbi relate that in pre-Islamic times, Qurashi tribal chieftains would take great pride in

bellishing the Ka`bah with elaborate gold and silver overlay - a practice that has been perpetuated until the present day.

Blacksmithing. With iron ore and copper available in commercial quantities on the Arabian peninsula, blacksmithing

s another craft practiced in many of the towns and villages of the sixth and seventh-century Hijaz. Production included

apons, tools, utensils, and sundry other iron goods, as well as local copper kitchenware and piping. Pre-Islamic poetry

ols the virtues of professional iron-working.

[84]

When the first/seventh-century Arab conquests dramatically increasedcontemporary demand for weaponry such as swords, shields, arrowheads, and other instruments of war, additional iron

was imported from India and Persia via al-Basrah for use in armaments production. Hijazi craftsmen thus made metal-

rking a significant cottage industry at the rise of Islam. Indeed, the sources indicate that there were at least thirty

minent blacksmiths plying their trade during the Prophet's era in Khaybar. They further relate that at the siege of al-

if, after the battle of Hunayn in 8/630, a Roman slave skilled in smithing, who took the name al-Azraq b. Ùqbah al-

aqafi after defecting to the Muslim camp and embracing Islam, became renowned for his work. Al-Azdi reports the

sence of wholesale iron dealers operating in al-Madinah at this time as well. [85]

cal metal-working output appears to have been substantial. Upon the Muslims' subjugation of the banu Qurayzah in

26, for instance, the victorious troops reportedly seized 1,500 swords, 2,000 lances, 300 suits of armor, and 500 shields.ree thousand lances are also said to have been employed in the battle of Hunayn in 8/630, an encounter wherein, the

oniclers claim, Muhammad armed his troops for battle with two hundred suits of armor provided by Safwan b.

mayyah.[86]The Qur'an makes frequent references to body armor - for instance, "Make thou coats of mail; balancing well

rings of chain armor"; and "It was We who taught the making of coats of mail for your benefit to guard you from each

er's violence."[87]The Qur'an, in fact, devotes an entire chapter to iron, Surat al-Hadid, where we find the following

se: "We sent down iron, an ingredient for war, as well as having many benefits for mankind."[88]

hammad's son Ibrahim's day-care was provided by the wife of a blacksmith, Abu Sayf. Another of his close

uaintances was the Makkan blacksmith, Khabbab b. al-Aratt, who also specialized in the manufacture of swords. He is

d in the sources as having made a number of swords for al-Ìsa b. Wa'il, tribal chieftain of the banu Jumah. An

rentice, Marzuq al-Sayqal, worked with him as a "metal-polisher"; and together, they reportedly embellished the

phet's favorite sword, dhu al-Faqar, which, Ibn Sa`d reports, had been seized as booty by the Muslims from the Quraysh

he battle of Badr. Walid b. al-Mughirah, al-Às b. Hisham, and al-Azraq b. Ùqbah al-Thaqafi are among other Arab

cksmiths known to history; the latter, according to al-Baladhuri, having been a slave freed by Prophet Muhammad after

conquest of al-Ta'if.[89]

) Tanning and Leather-Making. Given the abundant livestock resources of the early medieval Hijaz, it was logical that

preparation (al-dibaghah) of animal hides and skins (adm) for leather should likewise become a key contemporary

ustry. To this end, leather craftsmen would purchase hides from local tanners to manufacture tents, saddles, bridles,ord sheaths, shields, knapsacks, clothing, shoes, sandals, belts, sacks, food containers, floor coverings, water basins,

tles, and other containers. Even certain very prominent Makkans, among them Abu Sufyan b. Harb and Ayyub al-

khtiyani, reportedly worked as leather merchants. The sources relate that both men and women were involved in the

ning profession, the economic significance of which is indicated in the Qur'anic verse: "It is God who made your

itations homes of rest for you; and made for you out of the skins of animals dwellings which you find most light when

u pause in your travels; and makes out of their wool and soft fibers valuable things and articles of convenience to serve

u."[90]

ather-making was particularly prominent in al-Ta'if area, a region famous for the quality of its production to the extent

t it enjoyed a significant export market, not only to Suq Ùkaz and other neighboring areas, but also to Syria, Egypt,

men, Persia, Iraq, and Abyssinia. The fourth/tenth-century Yemeni geographer al-Hamdani marvels at the extent of al-

if's leather industry, calling it "a land of tanners," and al-Waqidi and other chroniclers as well cite numerous commercial

avans departing from there bearing leather goods.[91]


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his trade, the sources relate that Hashim b. Àbd Manaf commenced his commercial career by gaining official

mission to sell leather goods in Byzantine-occupied Syria. They likewise contain various references to camel caravans

ring leather goods from the Hijaz to Syria as well as to Àmr b. al-Às and others selling Hijazi leather goods in Egypt

d Abyssinia; and indeed to Àmr b. al-Às ostensibly discussing the merits of his Hijazi hides with the latter's ruler.

mongst the first goods seized by the Muslims as booty was al-Ta'ifi leather, in their raid on a Makkan caravan at al-

khlah.[92]

abundance of both wild and domesticated animals, combined with a suitable climate, made al-Ta'if region a natural

ter for the processing of hides and for leather goods manufacturing. In addition, qaraztrees, which produced a

stance used in tanning, were indigenous to both the Hijaz and the Najd. This product appears to have enjoyed a briskmand, as one Companion of Muhammad reportedly became so wealthy brokering it that he was known as "Sa`d al-

raz."[93]

her cities of the region developed significant tanning and leather-making industries as well. Both Makkah and al-

dinah had major hide-processing centers, importing their qarazfrom Wadi al-Àqiq, near al-Madinah. A variety of

rces suggest that the sale of leather goods in the regional markets was generally quite buoyant, particularly at the peak

he pilgrimage season.[94]

Textiles and Weaving. Hijazi textiles also were a flourishing industry. Weaving was an art form in early medieval

abia that capitalized upon the ready availability of various raw materials. Wool was available in abundance. It was an

ut in the production of yarn, which local craftsmen specialized in weaving into useful household and clothing articles.

ing and sewing cloths also were key sub-sectors of this industry, and al-Bukhari devotes several chapters of his book of

ditions to their pursuit. Various Companions of the Prophet - among them Àbd al-Rahman b. 'Awf, Àmr b. al-Às, al-

bayr b. Àwwam, Talhah b. Ùbayd Allah, and future caliphs Abu Bakr and Ùthman b. Àffan - are said to have

cialized as cloth (bazz) merchants, marketing their output in the aswaqof al-Madinah.[95]

s was a significant regional industrial sector, both in trade and manufacture. Al-Waqidi cites the inventories of one

rchant consisting of 1,500 articles of clothing and twenty bales of Yemeni cloth on sale in al-Madinah during the time of

Prophet; and other sources indicate that at one point in Muhammad's era, no less than seven caravans bearing Syrianth arrived in al-Madinah in a single day. Egyptian and Coptic textiles likewise made their way along well-plied trade

tes to a variety of Hijazi markets.[96]Slaves appear to have been extensively involved in indigenous clothing

nufacture. Al-Isfahani states that Ùmar b. Abi Rabiàh owned seventy slaves who were engaged in weaving, [97]that

mbers of the banu Makhzum employed slaves for the same purpose, [98]and still others were involved in weaving date-

m leaves into baskets and other useful products.[99]

wahsfrom the early Islamic era - coverings measuring fourteen meters by forty-seven meters, bearing gold and silver

orative embroidering (and later Qur'anic verses), made each year to cover the Ka`bah during the pilgrimage season -

nce sophisticated tailoring.[100]They were not invariably entirely "Hijazi," of course, for the requisite cloth was often

ported from Yemen or Egypt. Perpetuating a tradition that dated to pre-Islamic times, the Makkan historian al-Fasi

ates that whereas Muhammad covered the Ka`bah with "al-thiyab al-Yamaniyah," his early successors had dressed it

h cloth made of Egyptian "Coptic" linen.[101]

netheless, local decorative and inlay workmanship often appears to have been intricate. Certain sources claim that it was

third caliph, Ùthman b. Àffan, who introduced brocaded ornamental embellishments to the kiswah, a practice that

ears to have grown increasingly more elaborate with the passage of time. Though it was not until the onset of the

hth/fourteenth century, according to a much later chronicler, al-Fasi, that Qur'anic inscriptions first appeared, the

rces nonetheless make clear that the Prophet and his caliphal successors were committed to quality workmanship and

red no expense in the manufacture of the kiswah, a phenomenon that has been perpetuated to the present day.[102]

relative cost analogy, even with modern automated technologies, the most recent kiswahs- black, five-piece silk

tains covering 658 square meters - have required for production each year the Saudi Riyal equivalent of more than U.S.

5 million and more than two hundred laborers. The heretofore cited 100-dinar gowns and 1,000-dirham thiyabsaid to

e been worn by contemporaries of Muhammad - not to mention the Prophet's grandfather's burial gown, which


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ortedly was gilded with 1,000 mithqalsof gold - must also have been distinguished by their fineness to have

mmanded such imposing prices.[103]The latter story, however, may border on the apocryphal, since the gold weight alone

his burial gown would have exceeded three kilograms.

Perfumes. Perfumes likewise were in high demand in contemporary West Arabian commercial markets, causing al-

khari to title a significant section of his assembled traditions "A Chapter on Buying Perfumes and Musk." [104]The Hijaz,

d al-Ta'if in particular, were known both for the production of fragrances and their subsequent wholesale and retail

ribution, a portion of which would be dispatched annually to Makkah to perfume the Ka`bah. [105]Abu Jahl's mother is

d to have sold perfumes in Makkah, as did Àbd Allah b. Kathir.[106]Al-Isfahani states that during one pilgrimage season,

mar b. Abi Rabiàh purchased perfumes and cloth at the Makkan market valued at a thousand dinars; and adds that heen procured such goods from the Yemen as well.[107]Al-Tabari asserts that Àbbas b. Àbd al-Muttalib also dealt in

meni perfumes,[108]whereas al-Kindi testifies that Àmr b. al-Às sold perfumes (as well as leather goods) in Egypt;[109]

d al-Isfahani claims that Hakam b. Abi al-Às sold them to the Lakhmids in al-Hirah.[110]

Qutaybah indicates that in addition to being a major grain broker, Abu Talib was a perfume merchant dealing in a kind

ed ìtr.[111]The compiler of prophetic traditions, Muslim, describes the operations of a first/seventh-century Qurashi

rchant in al-Madinah who traded in a perfume-yielding plant called idhkir.[112]Al-Baladhuri, in turn, relates that there

re over four hundred perfumers at this time in al-Madinah alone, and that they participated with Prophet Muhammad in

defense of the city while it was under siege by Umayyad forces.[113]

sum, the industrial economy of the Hijaz at the rise of Islam was not as primitive as it has been portrayed. Indeed, wealth

erated from precious metals made productive investment possible in a very diversified industrial base, enabling local

repreneurs to pursue a wide variety of economic ventures. The early Makkans did possess commodities to consume and

ort, and trade in them they did, producing those complex bilateral trade patterns that seem to have mystified Crone. Let

now turn to a review of her most perplexing trade concerns.

Unraveling the "Coals To Newcastle" Enigma

The Role of Multi-Directional Trade in Forging the Medieval Hijazi Economic Dynamic. Recent scholarly analysis has

used extensively upon the countertrade dimension in early medieval Hijazi commerce; and with apparent reason, as it

s not inconsequential. The diversified economic base of early Makkah and its environs constituted a significant

sumption center, both from the standpoints of production inputs and consumer purchases, as well as serving as a crucial

us for transit trade. The division of labor documented in the Arabic sources suggest that local merchants and

repreneurs met both their business and personal consumption requirements through acquisitions from others. Wholesale

chases to meet the physical needs of pilgrims and other participants in the seasonal trade fairs in the form of foodstuffs,

t housing, and other accommodations lent further impetus to regional market demand. At the same time, the reported

alth of local businessmen suggests that Makkah's citizens possessed sufficient resources to make such acquisitions.

e sources thus make clear that the legend of an expansive early medieval Hijazi trade was by no means a myth. It was,

ead, the story of a dynamic, diverse, integrated economy comprised not just of merchants and financiers but of miners,

mers, jewelers, black-smiths, tanners, tailors, and other producers; in short, people who had commodities to trade, to

ort as well as to import. In the species of free market economics then at work in the Hijaz, we observe the truism that

ade follows demand," producing quite natural bilateral commercial flows.

t Crone, among others, wrestles with what she calls the "carrying coals to Newcastle" trade phenomenon. Why would a

ion export products from a specific commodity category - be it clothing, leather goods, or foodstuffs - to a particular

a, and then import products from the same category back again? From the standpoint of economic theory, the answer is

ple. Demand, quality, taste, preference, and price differentials play highly significant roles in creating particular

mmercial patterns. It often is the case that one region manufactures a lesser quality product that meets lower or middle-

ss needs, while another makes more pricey, sophisticated products of the same generic type, and that these goods are

n exchanged between them. That is why one finds today a particular industrial district of Germany manufacturing


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lkswagens, "people's vehicles," while another produces the more expensive Mercedes.

s a timeless axiom of macroeconomics that the only way net wealth is generated in any jurisdiction is through the

metimes quite complex combination of external exports and reverse investments. Foreign trade has historically been

requisite to both processes, since selling only to those within the same jurisdiction is economically no more than a zero-

m game; as it is an inescapable commercial reality that if you are to produce significant wealth through industrial

duction, then you must export the products that you make. This fact has been recognized in all civilizations, and the

ly medieval Hijazis were clearly no exception.

us it is that the Qur'an speaks of annual trading caravans to Yemen and Syria; and the early sources find Hashim, theensible Qurashi founder of Makkan international trade, in southern Syria selling leather goods and cloth, indeed setting

an entire Qurashi trading community there. Thus it is that we also find Abu Sufyan and Àbd al-Rahman b. Àwf often

Syria selling leather, cottage cheese, and clarified butter; the Prophet himself journeying to Busra with his uncle Abu

ib to promote the sale of diverse products including, through a mudarabahtrade contract, the merchandise of his future

e Khadijah; the military commander Àmr b. al-Às in Egypt selling perfumes and leather; Hakam b. Abi al-Às in al-

ah selling perfumes; Ùthman b. al-Huwayrith contracting to sell clarified butter to Byzantine Syria; and Abu Sufyan in

q, Ùthman b. Àffan and Saìd b. al-Às in Syria, Àbbas b. Àbd al-Muttalib, Abu Rabiàh, and Walid b. al-Mughirah

Yemen, and Àmr b. al-Às and Umarah b. Walid al-Makhzumi in Abyssinia on similar trading expeditions.[114]

they were on a common mission: promoting familiar products, all of which were manufactured in their home base, the

az, at the rise of Islam. One need not be baffled by their activities. Nor is it illogical that contemporary Hijazis, like

er manufacturers, should want to export the commodities that they produced. This is homo economicusat work -

ating trade patterns dictated by the quest for net wealth generation, as shaped by market demand, unit price, and

sumer preference.

The Role of the Pilgrimage in Shaping Makkan Trade. As we have seen, the nature and content of the Makkah region's

h and seventh-century export flows can be rationally explained by evaluating the full spectrum of commodities

igenously produced. The same is true for imports. For it is not improbable that, because of other, equally cogent

nomic factors, the early Makkans should have wanted to procure products within commodity categories similar to thosey exported. Indeed, given a sizable, albeit fluctuating, consumer base that possessed a nucleus of self-sustaining

ductive industries but a paucity of various specific natural resources, what they imported may be as economically

nificant as what they exported.

cordingly, one finds reports of Hashim importing wheat from Syria; of Syrians bringing grains and oils to Makkah in the

phet's era; of Makkans also bringing oils from Syria by camel caravan (al-zayt al-rikabi, an early version of the "mobile

corporation"); of wheat being brought in from Hawran and al-Balqa'; of Àbd al-Rahman b. 'Awf employing seven

ndred camels to import grains and flour back from Syria after having delivered other agricultural commodities there; of

bd Allah b. Judàn bringing two thousand camel loads of honey, wheat, and clarified butter, and Talhah b. Ùbayd Allah

rying quantities of cloth back from the Levant as well; of Àbd Allah b. Abi Rabiàh selling Yemeni perfumes in al-

dinah; of Safwan b. Umayyah, according to both al-Azraqi and al-Fakihi, running a market facility in lower Makkah

erein he stored goods that he imported from Egypt; and sundry other reports documenting Hijazi imports of various

maments, food products, clothin g, textiles, and perfumes from Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and Abyssinia - commodities

ilar to those that they also made and exported to those countries. [114]

hat was the dynamic? Again, nothing more than demand, price, and preference - the basic functioning of free market

nomics - at work in the early Makkan economy. This is why the Makkans delivered clothing and foodstuffs to Syria and

o brought back their Syrian commodity equivalents. This is also why Michigan, which has its own dairy herds, imports

eses from a sister state, Wisconsin, just as successful Western businessmen today often prefer Hong Kong tailored suitsocal fashions.

one is aware of the bilateral trade activities cited above. Many, if not most, of them, are mentioned in her book. Yet she

mains troubled by the "common commodities" dimension to bilateral trade, based on a few transactions documented in

cdotal source evidence, while missing the true significance of the total trade picture. "It makes no sense," she laments.


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But it does.

e annualHajjhas historically generated dramatic seasonal shifts in local populace levels; and with them, concomitant

nges in consumer demand. In the off-season in early Makkah, the regional economic base probably was adequate to

et proximate consumption needs and even to permit some exporting, thereby creating rational, market-driven economies

scale. But during the rapid upswing in numbers of consumers in the sacred months of pilgrimage, more voluminous

ports of transport animals, foodstuffs, clothing, and other consumer goods doubtless were required - commodity needs

t, in slacker times, would be met through local production. To meet these seasonal requirements, then, the Makkans had

mport consumer goods in substantial wholesale volume.

ere were other concurrent cogent commercial and economic factors actively at work in the early medieval Makkan

rketplace as well. For example, basic production economics would dictate that annual manufacturing infrastructure

acity not be substantially expanded for just three months of increased consumption, particularly for perishable goods

t could not be stockpiled in this pre-refrigeration age. Also, transportation economics would dictate that Hijazi merchant

mel caravans not return from their destinations emptyhanded. Only with additional wholesale acquisition risk could they

ectively compete, at retail, with the incoming foreign pilgrim-merchants with their own home-based goods - a practice

dily viable within the essentially laissez faireeconomy that characterized the contemporary Hijaz.[117]Moreover, in this

ht merchandise demand market, selling to foreign pilgrims products from their own homelands with which they were

uainted would doubtless have been more marketable than the promotion of less familiar, and perhaps lesser quality,

azi goods. Finally

Review Patricia Crone s Book Arabia Without Spices

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