REVIEW OF THE BOOK THE CORPS AND THE SHORE BY 0. PILKEY AND K. DIXON

James R. Houston1 and Robert Dean*

I U. S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Coastal Engineering Research Center, Vicksburg, MS 39 180-6 199

Z~epartment of Coastal and Oceanographic Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 326 1 1

The book The Corps and the shore1 by Orrin Pilkey and Katherine Dixon harkens back to

those good old days of yesteryear when heros wore white hats and were always good and

completely right and villains wore black hats and were always bad and completely wrong.

The book's heros are coastal geologists, scientists, foreign engineers, and

environmentalists (if they disagree with the Corps of Engineers) and the villains are the

Corps of Engineers, American engineers, and' environmentalists (if they agree with the

Corps). Since t!-e world presented is always black and white, the book quickly becomes

tedious in its predictability. Further, the book's insistence on villains always being

villains leads to many obvious inconsistencies. For example, the book presents five case

studies of Corps' projects. If the Corps' solution for a case study was a structure

(Sargent Beach), it should have been beach nourishment. If the solution was beach

nourishment (Folly Beach), it should have been to do nothing. If the solution was to do

nothing (Camp Ellis), it should have been to do something. The Corps is always wrong no

matter what it does. It is illustrative to review the book's first three case studies and

compare inconsistencies in the criticisms.

CASE STUDIES

Folly Beach, South Carolina, is the first of ,the book's case studies (Pilkey and

Dixon explain that the name comes from an old English word meaning a tree-crested dune

ridge). The book strongly criticizes the Corps' beach-nourishment project constructed

in 1993, arguing that Folly Beach should have moved buildings rather than nourished its

beach. Folly Beach residents had funded a study that concluded the Charleston jetties

built by the Corps in 1896 were responsible for their beach's erosion problems, and,

therefore, the Corps should pay the majority of nourishment costs. The book dismisses

Folly Beach's complaint as ". . . a grand effort to persuade everyone of Folly Beach's

. { status as the victim of a Corps' navigation project . . . 'I Yet the book presents nothing

P supporting its sweeping conclusion that the study lacked merit.

After blasting the Corps for nourishing the beach at Folly, the book notes the

project was authorized and funds appropriated through a "congressionally added

project."1 "Congressionally added" means the Corps did not recommend the project, but

Congress authorized it, appropriated funding, and inserted the project into the Corps'

program (with the President signing relevant bills). This is an important point because

the book often vilifies the Corps for basically following the law. Obviously, Federal

agencies are required to follow the laws of 'the land and Administration policies. We

would not have a democratic society if they were not. In this case the Corps comes under

blistering attack in the book for basically'obeying the law.

The book also criticizes the project's performance: "What we view as a

spectacularly unsuccessful beach is said by the Corps to be working as expected."l One

month after fill completion, Orrin Pilkey was quoted as saying, "It's still disappearing . . . They're still pumping as we speak, and when they're finished, there will be no beach.

This is the worst case I've ever seen."2 However, the Corps' Coastal Engineering

Research Center (CERC) documented an average beach width of 40 meters (about 130

feet) along the Folly Beach fill one year after construction - close to the 44-meter

width the Corps predicted (prior to fill placement) as the one-year width.3 The book

says, "We are puzzled by the reported average 130-foot beach width, given our own

observations and the accounts of local re~idents."~ CERC's account of beach width is

based on detailed measurements, published in the peer-reviewed literature3, and

publicly available. The book also says that two years after fill placement (1995) there

is " . . . little dry beach remaining and the storm berm largely gone . . . "At the time

of writing, two years post-replenishment . . . Looking to the north and south from the

eighth floor of the Holiday Inn, the view is much as it was pre-replenishment.d

However, a published series of 16 photographs covering the length of the Folly Beach

nourishment show remarkable differences between the beach before nourishment and 2

years after nourishment (August 1995). The photographs show in August 1995 " . . . wide beaches and extensive dunes along almost the complete fill length."4 This condition

of the beach differs completely from the book's description of Folly Beach pre-

nourishment as " . . . nothing but long lines of rock and rubble revetments, seawalls,

and groins as far as the eye could see. Some were large, some small, most were

dilapidated, and all were ugly. The beaches were largely-gone except for narrow slivers

of sand in a few places at low tide."l Unless the Corps with its published ground surveys \~

of beach width and photographs covering the fill's length is conducting a rather elaborate

hoax (akin to the Apollo moon-landing 'hoax" claimed by flat-earth proponents), the

book is simply wrong (As an example of the photographs, see Photographs 1-3.

Photograph 1 shows pre-fill conditions, Photograph 2 is 2 112 years after fi l l

placement and 6 months after the book says the beach looked similar to the pre-fill

beach, and Photograph 3 is 3 112 years after fill placement in July, 1996, just after

Hurricane Bertha).

Camp Ellis, Maine, is a case study very similar to Folly Beach, but the book takes a

completely different (and inconsistent) position. As with Folly Beach, residents blame

erosion problems on jetties built in the 1800's. The book says jetties were built in

1867 and 1891, erosion problems started in 1905 to 1910, and the shoreline was back

to pre-jetty times by 1934. This is 43 to 67 years after construction of the jetties. A

series of Corps' reports starting in 1920 concluded that the jetties were not responsible

for local erosion. It would seem that the book would take the same position for Camp

Ellis as it did for Folly Beach. That is, it would question claims that the jetties were a

cause of Camp Ellis' erosion, and the Corps would be admonished to have no involvement

in the problem - just let nature take its course and the town move its buildings.

However, unlike Folly Beach, the book is sympathetic to resident claims that the jetties

caused erosion (although it can cite no study supporting this position), and when the

Corps ultimately decides to do nothing at Camp Ellis, the book criticizes the Corps and

sympathizes with the plight of local residents. The chapter ends with the exchange, "'Is

that it? Is that the end of the whole study?' queried a citizen from the back row. 'That's

about it,' replied the New England Division (of the Corps) representative."'

The book notes CERC used an hydraulic model to study Camp Ellis and says that

using it, "The CERC had come up with a solution that was prohibited by Maine's beach

preservation law. Instead of working within the Maine system and evaluating the

nourishment, jetty alteration, and building relocation alternatives that were within the

law, the Corps' research center suggested additional armoring . . . " I This is not true.

CERC used the model to work within the Maine system, studying the area's coastal

processes and a range of potential "soft" erosion solutions including beach nourishment,

depositing a protective dredged-material berm offshore, and removal of the entire

existing north jetty.5 CERC did not use the model to study jetty modifications until near

the end of the model's life when Camp Ellis residents asked for tests, and the Maine

Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) agreed. The MDEP sent a letter telling

the Corps, "Alterations to the jetties, including any expansion, are not expressly

prohibited by state regulation . . . "6 and, "It does seem that testing this scenario in the \

model may provide some useful data that will not be available once the model has been

destroyed."6 CERC tested a wide range of options for the erosion problem at Camp Ellis,

but none had a benefitcost ratio greater than one. Therefore, the Corps recommended

the same do-nothing option Pilkey and Dixon recommends for all other case studies in

their book. But when the Corps recommends to do nothing, it is wrong once again.

Residents of Sargent Beach, Texas, join the Corps as villains in the next case study.

The chapter starts, "If there is ever a contest to determine which American beach

community looks the ugliest, Sargent Beach, Texas, will certainly be a top contender."

"The town is little more than a few dozen fishing shacks and cottages perched atop

dredged-spoil mounds that line both sides of the Gulf lntracoastal Waterway (GIWW) . . . "1 Apparently, these residents are modern day squatters with the book noting, "Since

most of Sargent Beach's fishing shacks and cottages are built on the spoil mounds,

ownership in a practical sense, is indeterminate."l The "beachn is described as having

little sand and being " . . . strewn with a wide variety of flotsam and jetsam including

hard hats, plastic milk cartons, and children's toys."l

After basically describing Sargent Beach as the beach from hell, the book notes that

the issue was not threatened houses or the rapidly eroding shoreline, but protection of

the GlWW against breaching by the sea. Sargent Beach has a rapidly eroding coastline

(40 to 60 feet per year) with little sand and an exposed marsh mud that erodes rapidly.

Onck the Sargent Beach land buffer between the GlWW and ocean is eroded, this section of

the GlWW would be open ocean.

So what should be done? The book first proposes "Let Nature take its course." "We

doubt that loss of the waterway along Sergeant Beach would hamper shipping to a

significant degree."' No studies are cited to support this contention. Texas proponents

of action to prevent breaching of the GlWW contended that a breach would have heavy

economic consequences to the State of Texas and the Nation. Since the State favored

action, the Corps was required by law and Administration policy to perform studies to

determine if there were solutions to the problem with benefit-cost ratios greater than

one. The low-cost solution consistent with environmental laws was a revetment that was

ultimately built. Had the Corps wanted to do nothing.and let Nature take its course, laws

and Administration policies governing the Corps would not have permitted this course.

The book seems to recognize this: "In the end, the coalition expended a lot of effort . . . to

push a project that the Corps was obligated to do anyway under its mandate to maintain

the intracoastal waterway."l Again, .even when the authors recognize the Corps has no

option but to follow the laws and Administration policies that rule its actions, the Corps

is still the villain.

The book says that a preferable option to a revetment would have been to route the

GlWW through the San Bernard National Wildlife Refuge wetlands. The book admits this

would lead to the " . . . eventual loss of many acres of wetlands."l The Fish and Wildlife

' Service joins the Corps as a villain at this point: ". . . the Service narrowly focused on

saving a piece of its wetland as it exists today, with little if any consideration for

surrounding natural areas or the potential long-term ~onse~uences . "~ Villains in the

book are often named. In this case, a specific Fish and Wildlife Service scientist who

cannot respond is criticized in the book for having sent the Corps a letter stating his

belief that a revetment would have a ". . . positive environmental benefit by serving as a

point of attachment for sedentary organisms, that, in turn, would provide a good source

for mobile organisms."l The book criticizes the "U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's

inflexible, no-wetland-change requirement" and "the National Environmental Protection

Act (NEPA) requirement that a new wetland of equivalent area and type be established,"

since these requirements made the cost of relocating the GlWW through the Wildlife

Refuge wetlands greater than the revetment c0st.l One suspects that i f at this point the

Corps rather than the book were criticizing the US. Fish and Wildlife and NEPA, Pilkey

and Dixon would be roasting the Corps.

The book at first agrees with the Corps' conclusion that a beach-nourishment

option would be too costly: ". . . the replenished beach's erosion rate would exceed 40

feet annually, making the cost of repeated sand pumping virtually out of the

However, the book says there is an " . . . alternative for Sargent Beach akin to beach

replenishment. Taking sand from the Brazos delta . . . and putting it into the longshore

transport system of the local beaches would increase the sand supply to Sargent ~each." '

The Brazos delta is 30 miles from Sargent Beach. How can placing sand directly on

Sargent Beach (or Folly Beach) be economically hopeless as the book suggests, but

putting it in the littoral system 30 miles from a beach eroding 40 to 60 feet annually be

effective and economically viable?

The book sees a future Sargent Beach where the revetment makes beach access

increasingly restricted, and "The popular Texan pastime of driving on the beach will no

longer be possible at Sargent ~ e a c h . " ~ The book is worth reading just to learn that

Orrin Pilkey is concerned about the plight of Texans who will not be able to drive on

beaches. However, "A lot of money will have been made by Sargent Beach property

owners . . . " with the sprouting of "Large, expensive buildings next to and behind the

wall . . . It is hard to imagine large, expensive buildings sprouting on "spoil mounds"

of "indeterminate" ownership next to a junkyard beach on which Texans cannot even

drive.

MORE INCONSISTENCIES

The book continues its inconsistencies in another chapter by praising Dutch coastal

engineers while criticizing U.S. coastal engineers. Pilkey and Dixon do not grasp the

irony of praising engineers of the world's most highly-engineered coastal zone, where

rather than retreat from the sea's advance (the solution touted in the book), the Dutch

have successfully advanced their land at the sea's expense. The praise is centered around

Dutch coastal engineers not (according to the book) using mathematical models in their

beach-nourishment designs. Actually, Dutch coastal engineers have been among the

world's more active in developing complex coastal-processes mathematical models.They_

do not use them much for beach-nourishment design because they do not have to perform - --conomic analyses such as those required in the U.S. by Administrat~on polic)i - - -

Instead, the Dutch are committed to a national policy of holding their shoreline in place

through annual placement of 8-million cubic yards of sand. This is more than twice the

3.8-million cubic yards placed annually in Corps' projects from 1950-1993.~ The

Dutch believe it practical, economic, and environmentally responsible to use beach

nourishment to indefinitely hold the position of their North Sea coast8 (which has a

wave climate at least as severe as U.S. coasts). The Dutch approach is at odds with the

book's philosophy that says of beach nourishment, "The practice, always expensive and

always temporary, has met with mixed success and is of questionable merit as a long-

term coastal management strategy."l Since Dutch engineers have been successful

battling the North Sea for centuries, it is hard to argue that their beach-nourishment

strategy is not a good long-term coastal-management strategy.

Despite the fact that most Corps' spending on shore protection since 1960 has been

for beach nourishment rather than structures7, the book continues its inconsistencies

by implying the Corps'still builds many coastal structures. After railing against the

Corps for building structures, the book references a photograph of a seawall at Folly

Beach - clearly implying that the Corps built the structure (it did not). This is

reminiscent of the video, The Beaches are Moving, where Orrin Pilkey stands before the

Monmouth, New Jersey, seawall criticizing the'corps for building seawalls, and

implying the seawall at his back was built by the Corps (it was not). The book seems to

accept the hard-to-argue fact that the Corps spends little on shore-protection

structures. "At the national level, the Corps may have refocused its emphasis from

seawalls to beach replenishment as the environmentally preferable erosion response."l

However, the book claims ". . . - . most coastal district offices are still working to fortify

the nation's beaches."l " . . . the structural 'solution' is the one proposed more often \.

rrlan not by Corps district offices."l Apparently these District offices have not been

very successful in pushing most of these structural solutions, since only about 10% of

Corps spending on shore protection since the 1970 has been for structure^.^

THE ULTIMATE INCONSISTENCY - BEACH NOURISHMENT

Much of the remainder of the book is previously-published material attacking

beach nourishment and related issues such as the equilibrium-profile and closure-depth

concepts and numerical modeling of coastal processes. A previous review of the book

noted that many of the book's arguments in these sections ". . . come across as a latter-

day Luddite attack on technology."9 The book basically argues that the only long-term

coastal-management solution (regardless of circumstances) is to retreat because

ultimately Nature always has the winning hand. An analogous argument would have us

discard the practice of medicine because ultimately Nature wins, and we all die. A do-

nothing approach is fine for undeveloped beaches. However, since Administration policy

requires storm-damage reduction to be the primary benefit, Federal beach-nourishment

projects are in developed areas. The book admits that beach nourishment reduces storm

damage: "There is no question that replenished beaches do reduce storm damage to

buildings in beachfront cornmunitie~."~ Further, it recognizes the undesirable

consequences of doing nothing: "Without beach replenishment most United States East

Coast hot spots - Atlantic City, New Jersey; Coney Island, New York; Ocean City,

Maryland; Virginia Beach, Virginia; and Jacksonville Beach and Miami Beach, Florida -

would be beachless, concrete fortre~ses."~ Still, to the puzzlement of the reader, beach

nourishment is one of the book's villains. A previous review reflects this puzzlement:

"Nourishment represents the 'natural' approach to coastal protection, restoring the sand

to the beach where it can dissipate the wave energy. This approach is now used

throughout the world, with demonstrable success. So it is difficult to understand why

Pilkey continues to attack this approach with such fervor."g

This book by Pilkey and Dixon was published the year after the National Research

Council (NRC) performed a study and published an authoritative book on beach

no~r i shmen t .~0 Ironically, Orrin Pilkey was one of the NRC report authors (CERC

recommended that he be a panel member on the NRC study). The NRC report concluded

that beach nourishment is a viable long-term approach to erosion problems and

favorably discussed many of the things strongly criticized by Pilkey and Dixon in their

book (equilibrium profiles, closure depth, models such as GENESIS). Apparently, Dr.

Pilkey was not able to convince the eminent panel of his peers that his viewpoints were

valid since the "latter-day Luddite" viewpoint is no where to be found in the NRC report.

7

What could not muster peer-review support in the NRC study is instead published in The

Corps and the Shore.

AVERSION TO ANYTHING QUANTITATIVE

The book's neo-Luddite view of technology is nowhere stronger than in its

criticism of numerical models, where its aversion to technology actually appears to

extend to anything quantitative including field data! The chief expressed concern in the

book is the use, by coastal engineers, of computational models to predict the behavior of

beach-nourishment projects, profile change during storms, and equilibrium beach

profiles. The book's argument that such models cannot possibly represent nature exactly

is appreciated and shared by most coastal engineers applying the models. These

engineers recognize the need to question whether model results are reasonable and put

models through their paces to determine the degree of confidence warranted. The value

as 2 learning structure of making predictions prior to project construction,

subsequently monitoring the project, then later comparing predictions with monitoring

results appears to go unrecognized in the book. Engineers are criticized as not taking

into consideration the complexities of nature, yet it appears contradictory that the book

does not present data refuting the use of such models. This is surprising since data exist

and are available to Pilkey and Dixon for evaluation and comparison, for example for the

Folly Beach nourishment project. The book relies instead on anecdotal information from

individuals sharing the authors' views. In reading the entire book, this pattern of data

avoidance is so prevalent that one must question if it is not purposeful, thereby leaving

the authors full latitude to express their preconceived views without being constrained

by facts. The book's claim that computational models simply do not work is completely

understandable given that the two major equations presented in the book are either

incorrect or incorrectly interpreted. The equation representing the equilibrium beach

profile (Page 68) has the depth interpreted as the distance offshore and vice versa for

the distance offshore, while the equation representing the longshore sediment transport

(Page 57) is incorrect. If these are the equations the book contends do not represent

nature, we must wholeheartedly agree!

LACK OF BALANCE

The book focuses on making the case that Corps' Districts do not present complete

results and Corps' researchers are guilty of a lack of balance and of practicing "Client

Science," i-e., the scientific results of a study are either bent or selectively accepted to

fit the client's desires and needs. The engineer is thus the captive of his or her client.

The irony is that the book itself is replete with a lack of balance extending from the case

studies and misstatements on performance by the Corps in particular, and engineers in

general, to the views of particular individuals quoted on specific projects. For example,

no mention is made of dozens of successful nourishment and other coastal engineering

projects, and the demonstrated capabilities to predict their performance at least to some

degree. As examples, the Delray Beach nourishment project was first constructed in

1973 to replace a sloping seawall that had proven ineffective, and as a result of this

initial nourishment and three renourishments over the 23-year span, the beach has

been widened by about 80-180 feet within the project area, and substantial widening

has occurred both north and south of the project area.' A second case is the sand

bypassing plant at Hillsboro Inlet, Florida. This facility has been quietly and effectively

doing its job of transferring sand from the updrift side to the downdrift side of this

small-craft navigational entrance for approximately 30 years. The book finds no middle

ground, no matter of degree in the capability to represent nature and design effectively.

In this manner, the book closes off the avenue of establishing present capabilities,

identifying the weak links, and directing research efforts to improving capabilities. In

doing this, Pilkey and Dixon could be considered as serving a different clientele, which

results in "Press Science" where there is a need to speak in absolutisms: "the project

failed, the project will wash away in the first storm, the design was a tragedy," etc., and

it is essential that the comments be critical and expressible as sound bites. In this

scenario, the authors' clients are the Press with a reward of public exposure and a

platform to continue espousing their views. The price of becoming the captive of the

Press is the need to, on demand, continue the litany of strident unbalanced criticism

without conveying to the Public the two sides of these important issues and the almost

certain greater loss of the capability of seeing and weighing both sides of issues.

Certainly, the coastal-engineering successes cited above of Delray Beach and Hillsboro

Inlet would not provide good Press fodder!

CONCLUSION The Corps and the Shore is a partisan book with an almost religious fervor not

often seen outside debates on creationism versus evolution. The Corps would seem to be a

large enough target for the book to spare a little even handedness. However, in the book

you can be assured that the Corps of Engineers is always the villain, and the book will

seemingly take completely inconsistent positions from chapter to chapter to ensure

villains remain villains. After a couple of hundred pages of strident criticism, part o i

the final chapter ". . . discusses several recommendations that we (the authors) believe

help the Corps in its current role as steward of the nation's beaches."l If dialogue

is the destination, the authors have taken a curious path.

The majority of U.S. coastal engineers and scientists concur that coastal zone

management is a serious issue for the Nation due to the population concentration along

the coastline, the effects of sea-level rise, and the associated concentration of hazards.

Thus there is the need to contribute to a rational National approach to address these

complex technical and social problems. Appropriate management cannot be "one solution

I" fits all," but in order to be viable, each solution must be tailored to the particular

1 circumstances of the area of concern. Also, coastal hazards should be considered within

I the broader framework of the many hazards to which our society is exposed. The book i

has taken on an important subject in need of improved methods and policy, a subject

which deserves a sincere and balanced approach. Some of the book's factual history

recounting backgrounds of particular case studies was quite interesting and provided an

essential element of an effective treatment of the subject. Similarly, some of the early

history of the Corps' involvement in coastal issues as well as the recommendations of an

improved Corps working structure merit consideration. However, in aggregate, the book

by Pilkey and Dixon, unfortunately presents an extremely unbalanced view of coastal

engineering and the Corps' role in coastal-zone management, and thus provides little

assistance to the Public that can be used for decision making and formulation of a

rational, acceptable, and defensible coastal-zone policy for the Nation's future.

REFERENCES

1 . Pilkey, O.H. and K.L. Dixon, 1996, The Corps and the Shore. Island Press,

Washington, D.C.

2. Cleeland, N., 1993. "Sands are running out on the nation's beaches". The San

Diego Union-Tribune, Page A1 , April 14, 1993.

3. Ebersole, B. A., Neilans, P. J., and M. W. Dowd, 1996, "Beach-Fill Performance

at Folly Beach, South Carolina (1 Year After Construction) and Evaluation of

Design Methods," Shore & Beach, Vol. 64, No. 1, 11-26, January 1996.

4. Houston, J.R., 1996, "Discussion of Young,'R.S., Pilkey, O.H., Bush, D.M., and

E.R. Thielke, A Discussion of the Generalized Model for Simulating Shoreline

Change (GENESIS)," Journal of Coastal Research, 11 (3), 875-886, Summer

1996.

5. Bottin R. R., Mize, M.G., and Z. Demirbilek, 1995, "Camp Ellis Beach, Saco Bay,

Maine, Model Study of Beach Erosion," Technical Report CERC-95-11, August

1995. \

Witherill, Donald T., Memo from the Maine Department of Environmental f

Protection to Colonel Brink P. Miller, Division Engineer, New England Division,

.. A

Corps of Engineers, March 1, 1994.

7. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1994, "Shoreline Protection and Beach Erosion

Control Study, Phase I: Cost Comparison of Shoreline Protection Projects of the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers", IWR Report 94-PS-1, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, Washington, D.C.

8. Verhagen, H.J., Pilarczyk, K.W., and G.G.A. Loman, 1994, "Dutch Approach to

Coastline Management", Proceedings, Permanent Association of Navigation

Congresses, Topic II, Subject 4, 69-90, Seville, Spain.

9. Komar, Paul, 1996, "A Maverick on the Beach," New Scientist, Vol. 151, No.

2041, 41, August 3, 1996.

10. National Research Council, 1995, Beach Nourishment and Protection, National

Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

11. Beachler, K.E., 1993, "The Positive Impacts to Neighboring Beaches From the

Delray Beach Nourishment Program," Proceedings of the 1993 National

Conference on Beach Preservation Technology, Tallahassee, Florida, 223-238.