Review of New Zealand’s Oil Pollution Preparedness and ...

Maritime New Zealand

Review of New Zealand’s Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Capability

February 2011

Thompson Clarke Shipping Pty Ltd

Suite 8, 11 Beach Street Port Melbourne Vic 3207

Australia

Tel: +61 3 9646 3155 Fax: +61 3 9646 3437

E-mail: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Maritime New Zealand Review of New Zealand‘s Oil Pollution Preparedness & Response Capability

Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 i

Reliance and Disclaimer

The professional analysis and advice in this report has been prepared by Thompson Clarke Shipping (TCS) for the exclusive use of the party or parties to whom it is addressed (the addressee) and for the purposes specified in it.

This report is supplied in good faith and reflects the knowledge, expertise and experience of the consultants involved. The report must not be published, quoted or disseminated to any other party without TCS‘s prior written consent. TCS accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any loss occasioned by any person acting or refraining from action as a

result of reliance on the report, other than the addressee.

In conducting the analysis in this report TCS has endeavoured to use what it considers is the best information available at the date of publication, including information supplied by the addressee. Unless stated otherwise, TCS

does not warrant the accuracy of any forecast or prediction in the report. Although TCS exercises reasonable care when making forecasts or predictions, factors in the process, such as future market behaviour, are inherently uncertain and cannot be forecast or predicted reliably.



Table of Contents

1 Glossary of Terms ......................................................................................................................1 2 Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................3

2.1 Legislative & Regulatory Framework...................................................................................3 2.2 Maritime Skills Shortage .....................................................................................................3 2.3 OPAC ................................................................................................................................3 2.4 Government Departments ..................................................................................................3 2.5 Iwi ......................................................................................................................................3 2.6 Royal New Zealand Navy ...................................................................................................3 2.7 Oil Pollution Fund ...............................................................................................................3 2.8 Response Arrangements ....................................................................................................4 2.9 Contingency Planning.........................................................................................................4 2.10 Tier Response ....................................................................................................................4 2.11 Response Participants........................................................................................................4 2.12 Regional Councils ..............................................................................................................4 2.13 Ports ..................................................................................................................................5 2.14 Oil Industry .........................................................................................................................5 2.15 Training & Exercises ..........................................................................................................5 2.16 Equipment ..........................................................................................................................5 2.17 Towage & Salvage .............................................................................................................5 2.18 Value for Money .................................................................................................................6 2.19 Trends in the Future Operating Environment ......................................................................6

3 Summary of Recommendations ..................................................................................................7 3.1 High Importance .................................................................................................................7 3.2 Moderate Importance .........................................................................................................8

4 Project Scope ........................................................................................................................... 11 5 Background .............................................................................................................................. 12

5.1 Project Team .................................................................................................................... 12 6 Legislative Framework .............................................................................................................. 13

6.1 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response & Cooperation, 1990 (OPRC) 13 6.2 Maritime Transport Act 1994 (MTA 94) ............................................................................. 14 6.3 Maritime New Zealand's Statement of Intent ..................................................................... 15 6.4 Oil Pollution Advisory Committee (OPAC) ......................................................................... 17 6.5 Government Departments ................................................................................................ 17 6.6 Oil Pollution Fund ............................................................................................................. 19

7 Response Arrangements .......................................................................................................... 21 7.1 New Zealand‘s Capability – Spill Size ............................................................................... 21 7.2 Contingency Planning....................................................................................................... 21 7.3 Tier Response .................................................................................................................. 23 7.4 Regional Councils ............................................................................................................ 23 7.5 Ports and Oil Spill Response ............................................................................................ 27 7.6 Oil Industry and Oil Spill Response ................................................................................... 31 7.7 MNZ Contractors .............................................................................................................. 33 7.8 International Assistance ................................................................................................... 34

8 Response Participants .............................................................................................................. 36 8.1 Marine Pollution Response Service (MPRS) ..................................................................... 36 8.2 Regional Councils ............................................................................................................ 37 8.3 Ports and Oil Spill Response ............................................................................................ 41 8.4 Oil Industry and Oil Spill Response ................................................................................... 45 8.5 MNZ Contractors .............................................................................................................. 47 8.6 International Assistance ................................................................................................... 48

9 Training & Exercises ................................................................................................................. 50 9.1 MPRS Training ................................................................................................................. 50 9.2 Regional Council Training................................................................................................. 52 9.3 Industry Training .............................................................................................................. 53

10 Equipment ................................................................................................................................ 54 10.1 Regional Councils ............................................................................................................ 54 10.2 Booms ............................................................................................................................. 55


Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 ii

10.3 Skimmers ......................................................................................................................... 55 10.4 Oil Recovery Vessels (ORVs) ........................................................................................... 57 10.5 Recovered Oil Storage Systems ....................................................................................... 57 10.6 Dispersants and Dispersant Application Systems ............................................................. 58 10.7 Communications Equipment ............................................................................................. 59 10.8 Yokohama Fenders .......................................................................................................... 59 10.9 Recommended Equipment Purchases and Indicative Costings ......................................... 59

11 Towage and Salvage ................................................................................................................ 61 11.1 New Zealand Capability Overall ........................................................................................ 61 11.2 Harbour Towage Capability .............................................................................................. 61 11.3 Third Party Capability ....................................................................................................... 61 11.4 Australian Capability ......................................................................................................... 62

12 Value for Money ....................................................................................................................... 64 13 Trends in the Future Operating Environment ............................................................................. 65

13.1 New Zealand Liner Trades ............................................................................................... 65 13.2 Tanker, Bulk and Break Bulk ............................................................................................ 65 13.3 Environmental Constraints................................................................................................ 65 13.4 Regulatory Issues............................................................................................................. 66 13.5 Lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon and Montara .................................................... 66


Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 1

1 Glossary of Terms

AFEDO Ayles Fernie Dispersant Spray System

AIP Australian Institute of Petroleum

AMOSC Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre

AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority

AREC Amateur Radio Emergency Communications

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

AWE Australian Worldwide Exploration Ltd

CIMS Coordinated Incident Management System

CLC International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage

DIP Dynamic Incline Plane

EARL East Asia Response Ltd

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EHS Environment Health & Safety

ES Environment Southland

FPSO Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Unit

FTE Full Time Equivalent

FUND International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage

HM Harbour Master

IMO International Maritime Organization

IPIECA International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association

ISF International Shipping Federation

LMS/S Lamor Slickbar Multi Skimmer

MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency

MEPC Marine Environment Protection Committee (IMO)

MFAT Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade

MIRT Marine Incident Response Team

MTA Maritime Transport Act (1994)

MNZ Maritime New Zealand

MOSRA 2010 Marine Oil Spill Risk Assessment

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPRS Marine Pollution Response Services

MSA Maritime Safety Agency

MT Metric Tonnes

NCP National Contingency Plan

NMOSCP National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan

NOSC National On Scene Commander

NOSSC National Oil Spill Services Centre (Te Atatu)

NRT National Response Team

NSW New South Wales

NT Northern Territory

NZ New Zealand



NZMOSPS NZ Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy

NZWHC New Zealand Wildlife Health Centre

OPAC Oil Pollution Advisory Committee

OPF

OPL

Oil Pollution Fund

Oil Pollution Levy

OPPRC 2010 Review Oil Pollution Preparedness Response Capability

OPRC 90 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response & Cooperation 1990

ORV Oil Recovery Vessel

OSR Oil Spill Response

PEANZ Petroleum Exploration Association of New Zealand

PWC PriceWaterhouseCoopers

R&D Research and Development

RC Regional Council

RFT Request for Tender

RCG Regional Council Groups

RMA Resource Management Act 1991

RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force

ROSC Regional On Scene Commander

RRC Regional Response Centre

SA South Australia

SAR Search and Rescue

SCAT Strategic Consultation and Training

SOI Statement of Intent (MNZ)

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SOPEP Shipboard Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plans

SOSREP UK Secretary of State‘s Representative for Marine Salvage and Intervention

SPREP South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme

SRC Shoreline Response Centre

STOS Shell Todd Oil Services

TCS Thompson Clarke Shipping

TPK Te Pūni Kokiri

VHF Very High Frequency Radio

WSL Warren Spring Laboratory

WWF World Wildlife Federation



2 Executive Summary

In conducting this Review, the Thompson Clarke Shipping (TCS) team visited 16 locations in New Zealand and consulted with some 50 organisations. In doing so, TCS obtained a wide range of viewpoints on the current arrangements to respond to oil spill incidents in New Zealand waters. The Review has not identified any significant gaps in the present response system that could lead to a response not being mounted. However, the Review has identified a number of issues, which if addressed could make New Zealand‘s capability to respond significantly more effective. The following is a summary of the main conclusions from this Review.

2.1 Legislative & Regulatory Framework

The Review was required to ―determine if MNZ is meeting its obligations under the OPRC 90‖. TCS has established that New Zealand is fulfilling its obligations under OPRC 90 to which it is a signatory. MNZ has maintained a keen interest in IMO matters over a number of years. MNZ staff have been valued contributors to the work of the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee‘s OPRC Working Group. New Zealand‘s engagement at IMO/MEPC/OPRC/SPREP should be encouraged and continue in the future. New Zealand should consider establishing an OSR R&D program, possibly in conjunction with AMSA. No evidence was found to suggest MNZ is falling short of its pollution response obligations under MTA 94.

2.2 Maritime Skills Shortage

During the conduct of the review several stakeholders identified the maritime skills shortage as an issue. MNZ Management provided advice that more mariners had been recruited into MNZ than had resigned in recent years. Clearly there is an erroneous perception here that MNZ will need to monitor and manage. MNZ will need to carefully monitor the diminishing resource of maritime expertise not only for MNZ but also within the Regional Councils.

2.3 OPAC

TCS has established that there is a very high degree of acceptance within the stakeholder community that OPAC is a worthwhile, representative and effective advisory body. There are some concerns in the regions that information gathered at OPAC meetings does not always find its way back from their sector‘s representative on the committee.

2.4 Government Departments

Several Government Ministries and Departments are noted in the 2006 Strategy as having roles to play in oil spill response. In interviews with officials from these Ministries and Departments, TCS established that their understanding of those roles differed in some cases from those stated in the 2006 Strategy. These differences need to be addressed prior to completion of the 2011 Strategy.

2.5 Iwi

It is apparent that there is no strategy in place for dealing with wāhi tapu (sacred places). For this reason, it is proposed to include Māori in oil spill training programmes. The form that the Māori-directed training might take (i.e., who is involved and how are they involved) needs to be considered.

2.6 Royal New Zealand Navy

The RNZN maintains its own stock of oil spill response equipment and operates a number of vessels that could be deployed in an OSR. There clearly are synergies to be achieved here and MNZ should fully explore the potential to utilise this resource.

2.7 Oil Pollution Fund

Expenditure on OSR exceeds income from the OPF annually by about $1m. The Fund‘s reserves are diminishing. The three leading cost centres that account for more than half the total current year budgeted OPF costs of just over $4.5m are Personnel, Regional Council Costs and Head Office Overhead. The single largest item (Regional Council Costs) covers 16 Regional Councils of which the five most significant (each with $80k budgeted costs or over) account for $450k or 45% of the total.



2.8 Response Arrangements

The MNZ web site nominates 3,500 tonnes as the 1-in-100 years spill event for which New Zealand is maintaining a capacity to respond. MOSRA10 compares their analysis of the 1–in–100 years spill event of 1,000 tonnes with the MOSRA 04 spill of 2,300 tonnes. It is important to note that the MOSRA10 is a risk-based profile and is focused on likelihood and consequence of a spill and therefore is different from the planning definition. An earlier Strategy and risk analysis undertaken in 1998 had the value at 7,000 tonnes. It is noted that the size of the 1-in-100 years spill is reducing and by default this could mean that the capacity to respond could also be reduced. MOSRA10 identifies the offshore area off the Taranaki coast as having the highest risk profile in New Zealand waters. While the historic oil spill incidence in the area is low, the potential is high. The 2011 Strategy should clearly identify what the New Zealand capability is expected to respond to - it is recommended for national planning this be 5,500 tonnes; based on I00,000 tonnes tanker with one wing tank damaged. For lower risk areas the MOSRA10 figure of 1,000 tonnes is considered to be reasonable.

2.9 Contingency Planning

New Zealand has a highly regulated prescriptive system in place for development and approval of contingency plans. This should provide consistency of plans around the country. An issue was identified during the stakeholder consultation in respect of Tier 1 plans. In a number of areas stakeholders advised that any spill in the area automatically became a Tier 2 spill and the responsibility of the Regional Council to respond. Other jurisdictions such as the UK and Australia require their port and oil terminal operators to have substantial resources in their own right and on site to respond to Tier 1 incidents.

2.10 Tier Response

There are similarities with the Tier response arrangements in New Zealand, Australia, and the UK where Tier 1 represents a local response, Tier 2 is Regional and Tier 3 is National. Responsibility for the response varies due to the different legislation and governance arrangements in the different countries. It is arguable that a Tier 1 response in New Zealand has become almost defunct; consequently TCS has proposed a review of Tier 1 contingency plans to reflect and ensure operators of Tier 1 sites have an appropriate capability to respond relative to the risks associated with their operations.

2.11 Response Participants

New Zealand has a National Response Team (NRT). However, findings by the Review team suggest that there is insufficient attention being given to the ongoing development of this team and incorporation of lessons learned by New Zealand personnel who have attended major oil spills in Australia and the United States of America (USA) in the past few years. MNZ‘s Marine Pollution Response Services (MPRS) unit is located in Auckland and operates from within facilities at the National Oil Spill Services Centre (NOSSC) in Te Atatu. MPRS‘s services are delivered by a team of ten people (8.2 FTE). Feedback provided by stakeholders is that the MPRS unit within MNZ is highly regarded by those that it deals with. The unit is considered to have a high level of expertise and conducts its work effectively. However, some expressed the view that they would like to see MPRS personnel take a greater role in support of major regional exercises.

2.12 Regional Councils

Regional Councils are a key constituent in New Zealand‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. There are 16 Regional Councils participating in oil spill response in New Zealand. New Zealand currently has 16 separate contingency plans for a Tier 2 response. A reduction in the number of contingency plans would significantly assist in achieving consistency of such plans, reduce duplication of effort, and improve the auditing process. Councils are required to adhere rigidly to cost centres specified in their budgets. In every case this was considered to be too restrictive and unnecessary. TCS considers that a number of notional Regional Council Groups (RCGs) (say, five) could provide a more effective oil spill response arrangement than having the current 16 Regional Councils individually involved. Our proposition, based on the MOSRA10 and some geographic consideration, is to have three RCGs in the North Island and two RCGs in the South Island. TCS has noted during stakeholder discussions that Regional Council stakeholders were often of the view that training and exercises could have a more regional focus, be conducted in the region and replicate



events that they would be expected to respond to. Local training programs tend to focus too heavily on large spills, particularly in lower risk areas.

2.13 Ports

The ports do not see themselves as polluters and therefore not responsible for a Tier 1 plan or providing a pollution response. They see no reason why they should have any responsibility to respond to a spill from a ship at their berth. The general comment made was ―oil in the water – Regional Council responsibility‖. However the ports, while stating that they did not have a role or responsibility to respond to oil spills in ―their port‖, said they have trained labour and floating assets available if needed by the Regional Council and provide space to MNZ (at commercial rates) to store oil spill response equipment. When compared to other jurisdictions, Australia and UK, the New Zealand ports are the exceptions in that they play a very limited or no role in New Zealand‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements and similarly bear no related cost.

2.14 Oil Industry

MOSRA10 indicates two areas of oil industry activity where the risks of an oil spill are high - Marsden Point (Northland East Coast) and New Plymouth (Taranaki offshore). The operators have in place a small amount of equipment and some trained personnel for initial on site response. However the general outcome was no different to elsewhere in New Zealand; each spill would become a Tier 2 spill and be the responsibility of the Regional Council (or MNZ if outside the 12 mile limit). There are no formal mutual aid agreements between the operators; some have informal arrangements where they would share resources, while two operators would seek assistance from OSRL in the event of a major incident. It would appear that the oil industry is doing very little heavy lifting by way of preparedness and response particularly when compared with the oil industry in Australia or elsewhere.

2.15 Training & Exercises

Currently New Zealand has approximately 400 regional responders trained to respond to oil spills. Advice provided by MPRS operational managers is that in general terms most have been trained to a relatively low level. Of the 400 approximately 60 of these are NRT personnel who have been trained to a higher level. The view of MPRS staff is that a greater level of NRT training is required, particularly at the management level, including incident management team level.

2.16 Equipment

TCS reviewed Maritime New Zealand‘s (MNZ) equipment and dispersant holdings and associated systems to ensure that New Zealand is equipped with sufficient and appropriate equipment to respond effectively to oil spills. In general terms a significant quantity of this equipment is that which is intended to respond to major oil spills and comprises heavy duty boom and large skimmers. This equipment provides New Zealand the capability to respond effectively to larger oil spills up to the recommended spill size of 5,500 tonnes. However, it takes time to prepare and deploy heavy duty equipment. Time is the essence in spill response operations and it is essential that on site response agencies have access to equipment that is not only effective but of a size and weight that facilitates quick deployment if the potential effects of an oil spill are to be mitigated successfully at an early stage. The recommended changes are likely to incur capital expenditure of about NZ$2.4m on new equipment and a write off of about NZ$0.4m of obsolete equipment.

2.17 Towage & Salvage

New Zealand‘s towage capability beyond enclosed water harbour towage is limited as witnessed at the time of the Jody F Millennium incident. There is limited third party commercial open water towage and salvage capability under New Zealand flag in New Zealand waters that might be available for a marine pollution incident outside port limits. In Eastern Australia there is a greater capability but it would take 4 -5 days to mobilise from time of commitment which would be subject to current commercial constraints.



2.18 Value for Money

Under the current system, MNZ annually recovers about $3m from payers of the Oil Pollution Levy. It spends more than $4m annually on maintaining a response capability. Therefore, it could be argued the current payers of the Oil Pollution Levy are currently getting exceptional value for money, but of course such a financial environment is unsustainable because this is being achieved by drawing on reserves accumulated over a number of years. TCS is of the view that if the key recommendations in this report are implemented together with the proposed changes to the Oil Pollution Levy, then New Zealand will continue to get value for money in this activity while preserving some reserves for unforeseen emergencies.

2.19 Trends in the Future Operating Environment

2.19.1 Shipping

Changes to shipping patterns may reduce the locations of and likelihood for larger oil spills from long haul international ships but may increase their potential size. In turn the numerical chances of smaller spills from domestic or regional vessels may increase across a broad front within New Zealand waters. 2.19.2 Environment

The unpredictable nature of the sea conditions around New Zealand, particularly on the West Coast, which is exposed to the prevailing (south-westerly) winds coupled with low sea temperatures make tackling an offshore oil spill extremely difficult. The universal view amongst the experts consulted in this Review was that spill containment efforts would most likely be restricted to port waters or on the shoreline and not at sea. The focus therefore must largely be on a shoreline-based response. 2.19.3 Regulatory Issues

New international regulations which are due to come into effect in coming years should have a notable influence on the safety, integrity and environmental impact of ocean going ships, particular in respect of bunker tanks and carbon emissions. 2.19.4 Deepwater Horizon & Montara

Two major oil spills in the offshore industry in the past two years have heightened global and regional attention on the offshore sector, and the value of related international cooperation and comparative learning.



3 Summary of Recommendations

TCS makes a number of recommendations that we believe, if implemented by MNZ, would enhance the New Zealand oil spill response capability. Where possible, we have endeavoured to cost the impact of these recommendations, particularly capital expenditure, in the body of the report. A significant number of the recommendations are considered to be ―administrative‖ in their implementation and are costed as neutral. Our position is that their implementation should be covered by current staff operating in their designated roles. Some recommendations would have a cost impact on organisations outside MNZ (oil industry and ports). No attempt has been made to estimate such costs. However, indicative costs associated with the purchase or disposal of Oil Spill Response equipment are outlined in the table in Section 10.9. Recommendations have been ranked in order of importance - High Importance and Moderate Importance. These are summarised in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.

3.1 High Importance

Rec No Section Ref Recommendation

1 6.1 MNZ should maintain a role at the IMO, in particular with the MEPC/OPRC Working Group.

5 6.5 Government departments that have a role in oil spill response should be consulted during the construction of the 2011 Strategy and any text concerning their role is agreed before being included in the Strategy.

6 7.1 The 2011 Strategy should clearly identify what the New Zealand capability is expected to respond to. A figure in the order of 5,500 tonnes; based on I00,000 tonnes tanker with one wing tank damaged; is considered to be reasonable.

7 7.2 MNZ should conduct a complete review of the Tier 1 (Part 130B) plans. In particular plans for the high risk, high capacity sites such as tanker terminals and FPSOs should be constructed to deliver a response outcome consistent with the volumes and type of oil they handle and the risks they pose. They should be required to have in place a response capability able to sustain a response to a significant amount of oil, possibly in the order of up to 100 tons or more.

8 7.3 In conjunction with the Tier 1 Contingency Planning recommendation, the Tier 1 Response Arrangements should be reviewed taking into consideration three concepts: by having different levels of Tier 1 capabilities for different response organisations (boat stop, tanker terminals, FPSOs and ports); an ―oversight authority‖ for a Tier 1 response which would be either the Regional Council ROSC or the MNZ NOSC; and for planning and training purposes, a notional spill quantity be allocated to each Tier 1 response organisation.

11 8.2 MNZ and OPAC should consider the concept of having a number of Regional Council Groups (RCGs) for contingency planning, oil spill response, training and equipment (storage and maintenance), either through the construction of administrative entities, or by way of notional amalgamation. This will also require a change management consultation process with the Regional Councils, with a review and amendment to Marine Protection Rule Part 130C.




12 8.3 MNZ and OPAC should engage the New Zealand port owners/operators to ensure that they become responsible for a Tier 1 response within port limits.

13 8.4 The New Zealand oil industry should be required to substantially upgrade and enhance their Tier 1 response capability relative to the risks of their operations.

14 8.4 The New Zealand oil industry should develop formal mutual aid arrangements between the oil industry participants in New Zealand and engage the resources of Tier 3 response organisations outside New Zealand.

16 9.1 A high level of priority should be given to redeveloping NRT training at spill management, operational, wildlife and field levels. Key elements including planning, operations, logistics, finance and administration, SCAT, aerial surveillance and media training need to be incorporated in NRT training modules.

20 9.2 MNZ/MPRS should ensure that a wide range of equipment, including high end equipment, is deployed and exercised in the regions.

22 10.1 MNZ/MPRS should engage with the Regional Councils and other stakeholders regarding their oil spill response equipment needs and risk context and ensure that appropriate equipment is supplied to the Regional Councils.

24 10.2 Two Harbour Buster systems or some other suitable option should be purchased for location at Marsden Point and New Plymouth, and that the Troilboom at Marsden Point be disposed of.

29 10.6 There should be a suitable percentage of the New Zealand stock of the dispersant Corexit 9500 (30,000 litres) located in the New Plymouth area.

33 10.6 One of the Simplex helicopter-borne dispersant spray bucket systems should be relocated from NOSSC Te Atatu to New Plymouth.

34 13.4 MNZ management should ensure that the relevant recommendations contained in the MNZ Deepwater Horizon discussion paper are implemented.

3.2 Moderate Importance


2 6.3 The Marine Environment Protection KPIs should be reviewed to ensure that they better reflect the New Zealand capability and readiness to respond.

3 6.4 OPAC members should develop more formal structures to enable the dissemination of information. MNZ should ensure that OPAC minutes were sent to each Regional Council, possibly to the ROSC or their manager.

4 6.5 MNZ should fully explore the potential to utilise RNZN and other Government Departments‘ expertise and resources in an OSR by building on existing Memoranda of Understanding.




9 7.4 MNZ should investigate the benefits to be accrued from the development of a New Zealand industry core group that would be available to support response operations. Experienced core group members could be nominated as members of New Zealand‘s NRT.

10 7.5 MNZ should conduct a complete review of ICC arrangements to establish whether it currently has consistent and optimal performance and outcomes.

15 8.5 MNZ should review a formal contract for the services of advanced scientific support, including those pertaining to dispersants

17 9.1 MNZ should review the potential benefits of its key presenters having a certificate in adult education and training. It is further recommended that MNZ consider making pre-reading material available online to participants prior to their attendance at courses conducted by MPRS.

18 9.1 MPRS should review the content and adequacy of their courses, particularly for shoreline clean-up and use of dispersants, and ensure that they are meeting the needs of response personnel.

19 9.1 MNZ, in conjunction and with the support of the offshore oil industry, should develop and implement a regular Tier 3 combined desktop and equipment mobilisation exercise program to test response arrangements at the platforms and FPSOs.

21 9.3 MNZ/MPRS should engage with the New Zealand oil industry and develop an oil spill response training package specifically tailored to the oil industry needs.

23 10.2 The current rollout of rapid response boom should continue until ports/facilities in identified high risk areas have a sufficient quantity of rapid response boom on site to allow operators to initiate an effective first response.

25 10.3 MNZ should purchase (possibly six) new multi head skimmers of either

Vikoma Komara Duplex Skimming System

Lamor Slickbar Multi Skimmer LMS/S

and the two Aquaguard multi head skimmers be disposed of.

26 10.3 MNZ should assess the availability and purchase suitable skimmers (possibly the Komara Mini Skimmer System) to monitor and replace as necessary the fourteen Komara 12K units that are reaching their end of life cycle and are no longer supported by the manufacturer.

27 10.4 With regard to the three ORVs, MNZ should review the life cycle of the ORVs and develop a replacement program that spans a greater period than the current life cycle.

28 10.4 MNZ should relocate the ORV Kuaka from Te Atatu to a location on Auckland Harbour under the oversight of the Auckland Harbour Master




30 10.6 MNZ should ensure that all dispersant storage sites comply with the New Zealand chemical storage guidelines for these products.

31 10.6 Sufficient 1,000 litre IBCs should be acquired to enable dispersant to be decanted from aging steel drums.

32 10.6 Two AFEDO dispersant spray systems, for fitting to vessels of opportunity, should be purchased and located at NOSSC Te Atatu and New Plymouth.



4 Project Scope

The MNZ Request for Tender clearly outlines the review objectives and scope. In summary, these require a review of the effectiveness of New Zealand‘s current marine oil pollution response capability in general and in particular whether MNZ is meeting its obligations under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response & Cooperation 1990 (OPRC 90), MTA 94, and the MNZ Statement of Intent. Specifically these required TCS to:

Assess the effectiveness of the current relationships and responsibilities between MNZ, OPAC, contractors and local government resources.

Compare New Zealand‘s response capability and funding arrangements with approaches undertaken in other countries.

Identify gaps in New Zealand‘s preparedness and response regime, considering structures, administration, people, training, exercises and equipment (type, quantity and location) to respond to threats as identified in the MOSRA 2010. Identify efficiencies in the context of managing sustainability.

Assess the implications of future trends and other influences locally and internationally particularly in regard to the outcomes of the USA response in the Gulf of Mexico (Deepwater Horizon) explosion and of the Australian response to the Montara rig fire and oil spill in the Timor Sea to the Maritime New Zealand Revised Proposal for Review of OPPRC.

Determine the appropriateness of the current arrangements, including funding, to deliver a marine oil spill response service for New Zealand. Assess existing international relationships and agreements that may contribute during a response that is beyond New Zealand‘s response capability.

Conduct an analysis of accountabilities, roles, and resources required to meet the needs of New Zealand and the stakeholders for preparedness and response now and into the future, and make recommendations on the capability to ensure that those who fund the system are getting value for money.

The key deliverable of the project is a report addressing the objectives and scope of work outlined in the RFT providing recommendations for changes to resourcing, protocols, processes and current regimes to enable MNZ to meet OPRC 90 and the MTA 94 obligations and optimise its response capability overall.



5 Background

The Maritime Transport Act 1994 (MTA) requires the Director of Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) to develop and maintain the New Zealand Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy (The Strategy). This Strategy is at the core of MNZ‘s role of ensuring that New Zealand‘s marine environment is and will remain safe, secure and clean for all its users. Hence it's Mission Statement: “to lead and support the maritime community to take responsibility for ensuring safe, secure and clean seas”. Section 284 of the MTA defines the purpose of the Strategy as being to: 1. describe the actions to be taken and by whom the action is to be taken in response to a marine

oil spill in New Zealand waters 2. promote a standard response to marine oil spills in New Zealand, and 3. promote the coordination of marine oil spill contingency plans and the action taken in response

to marine oil spills under such plans. This applies within a context in which MNZ also has to contribute to achieving an integrated, responsive and sustainable national transport system. The aim of this Strategy is to set out how New Zealand will cost effectively minimise the impact of oil pollution from ships and transfer sites, exploration and production activities on the marine environment. The Strategy recognises the need for the national spill capability to reflect and be able to respond to the current risk profile, which critically depends on the related Risk Assessment and Capability Review. The Strategy has to be updated at regular intervals (every five years) with the last Strategy being produced in 2006. To meet this requirement, MNZ has completed a Risk Assessment (MOSRA 2010) and this capability review (Oil Pollution Preparedness Response Capability (OPPRC 2010 Review) is the second element of a three stage process. The OPPRC 2010 Review, using the MOSRA 2010 as a foundation, has sought to identify any potential gaps in the current preparedness and response system. The OPPRC Review considers how MNZ meets its marine oil spill preparedness and response obligations under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990 (OPRC 90), the MTA 1994, and MNZ Statement of Intent. The OPPRC 2010 Review examines the structure, equipment resources and people that underpin New Zealand‘s marine oil pollution preparedness and response system to ensure that an effective response can be provided in a cost effective manner whereby those who fund the capability are getting value for money. It is vital that the updated Strategy in 2011 be underpinned by and have clear linkages to an up to date oil spill risk assessment, the MOSRA 2010, which in turn must provide the key context for the ensuing capability review, the OPPRC 2010 Review. TCS was required to conduct a benchmarking study to compare the preparedness and response to oil spills for the UK and Australia to that in New Zealand. Rather than have a separate chapter relating to UK and Australia, relevant comparisons are made throughout the report and a summary of Australia‘s preparedness and response arrangements is at Appendix 3.

5.1 Project Team

The TCS project team comprised:

Richard Stevens (Project Director)

Sandy Galbraith (Project Manager)

David Baird

Russell Plume

Ray Lipscombe

Ray Barlow



6 Legislative Framework

6.1 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response & Cooperation, 1990 (OPRC)

The OPRC convention is the fundamental driver for the marine oil spill response regime in New Zealand. MPRS was formed during the 1990s to satisfy the OPRC Convention (1990) that requires all signatory countries to:

have training and people in place to respond to regional marine based oil spills

hold equipment ready for use during a marine oil spill

have an exercising regime for these trained people and equipment

have plans in place so that there is some preparation done before a spill occurs and;

engage in regional cooperation with other like-minded countries New Zealand signed the OPRC Convention in 1998. The comments above are from the MNZ website relating to OPRC and pollution response. It is noted that the OPRC receives scant mention in the 2006 Strategy and is not mentioned in the MTA 94 Part 23 (Reprint as at 10/09/08). When developing the 2011 Strategy, MNZ should ensure that the OPRC 90 receives a prominent position in the Strategy. If an opportunity arises during amendments to MTA 94, MNZ could consider making a reference to OPRC 90 in Part 23. MNZ has maintained a keen interest in IMO matters over a number of years. MNZ staff have been valued contributors to the work of the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee‘s OPRC Working Group. A past Manager of MPRS was Chairman of the OPRC Working Group. This is seen to be a significant achievement and recognition of the New Zealand capability in this area. This engagement has provided significant value to New Zealand‘s reputation and standing in the international oil spill response community. It is primarily through this OPRC engagement that New Zealand has developed its international oil spill response profile and reputation. Following on from this New Zealand‘s oil spill responders were invited with confidence to assist with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response in the USA. New Zealand is also a long standing supporter of SPREP activities in the region. New Zealand‘s engagement at IMO/MEPC/OPRC/SPREP should be encouraged and continue in the future. The Review was required to “determine if MNZ is meeting its obligations under the OPRC 90”. TCS has established that New Zealand is fulfilling its obligations under OPRC 90. This is a key oil spill response convention and having agreed to it New Zealand must ensure that it maintains faith with the convention. Maintaining a role at the IMO and in particular with the MEPC / OPRC Working Group has enhanced New Zealand‘s international reputation and this engagement should continue. There are a number of Articles under the OPRC 90 that parties to the convention have agreed. Some are classed (by the Reviewers) as “administrative” others are considered “operational”. It is the “operational” articles that have been considered when determining the degree to which MNZ is meeting its OPRC 90 obligations. 6.1.1 Article 3 – Oil Pollution Emergency Plans

Oil Spill Response (OSR) plans are in place for New Zealand flag ships, offshore units and production facilities, ports and oil handling facilities. These plans are integrated into the New Zealand national system, approved and audited by the national authority MNZ. 6.1.2 Article 4 - Oil Pollution Reporting Procedures

A comprehensive reporting procedure is in place where MNZ using the facility of RRC New Zealand maintains a full time receiving and dissemination service for oil pollution reports from ships, aircraft and any other source.



6.1.3 Article 5 – Action on Receiving an Oil Pollution Report

The New Zealand National and Regional contingency plans outline the responsibilities for parties to assess and respond appropriately to deal effectively with the reports received. 6.1.4 Article 6 – National and Regional Systems for Preparedness and Response

New Zealand has established a national response arrangement underpinned by three tiers based on responsibility to respond. Response equipment is prepositioned around the country. Programs for exercising and training are in place and carried out. Contingency plans are in place and available for use. 6.1.5 Article 7 – International Cooperation in Pollution Response

New Zealand has assisted other countries with technical support and equipment following oil spills. This occurred most recently in the US (Gulf of Mexico) and Australia (the Timor Sea and ship-based incidents in Brisbane and Gladstone). New Zealand has frequently assisted Pacific Island neighbours with oil spill response activities. 6.1.6 Article 8 – Research and Development

New Zealand does not have a specific OSR R&D program (beyond that through its involvement with Massey University and Cawthron) while AMSA in Australia maintains an active OSR R&D program. Consequently, New Zealand should consider establishing an OSR R&D program, possibly in conjunction with AMSA. 6.1.7 Article 9 – Technical Cooperation

New Zealand participates actively in conjunction with Australia in assisting with mutual training and technology sharing programs. New Zealand is an active participant in the Pacific region in providing training and technical assistance. 6.1.8 Article 10 – Promotion of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation in Preparedness and

Response

New Zealand has a bilateral agreement with Australia. New Zealand should, in keeping with the spirit of Article 10, establish bilateral agreements with some of its Pacific neighbours.

Recommendation 1 (6.1) H MNZ should maintain a role at the IMO, in particular with the MEPC/OPRC Working Group.

It is estimated that the cost of implementing this recommendation is neutral as attendance at MEPC/OPRC Working Group is continuing an existing practice.

6.2 Maritime Transport Act 1994 (MTA 94)

For the purposes of the OPPRC Review the key intent of the MTA 94 is:

To ensure that participants in the marine transport system are responsible for their actions

To protect the marine environment

To continue, or enable, the implementation of obligations on New Zealand under various international conventions relating to pollution of the marine environment.

The relevant sections of the MTA 94 concerning oil spill preparedness, response and recovery are found in Parts 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, & 27. MNZ is fulfilling OPRC obligations and since MTA 94 # 23 incorporates the core of OPRC 90, prima facie MNZ is complying with the MTA 94; and at no time was any comment made by stakeholders to challenge this compliance. It is noted that for protection of the marine environment the MTA 94 references the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), International Convention on Civil



Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND). There appears to be no mention in the MTA 94 of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC). This is somewhat surprising and is an issue that could be addressed the next time amendments to the MTA 90 are being proposed. Part 23 of the MTA 90 brings into New Zealand statute all the key elements of the OPRC 90 requirements.

6.3 Maritime New Zealand's Statement of Intent

The Statement of Intent (SOI) sets out MNZ‘s medium term intentions and undertakings in respect of its role as the national maritime safety agency as agreed with the Minister of Transport. It informs the parliament and the public of the outcomes MNZ is setting out to achieve, and contributes to the government priority of providing value for money services. This Review has been asked to determine if MNZ is meeting its obligations under the SOI in respect of the OPPRC. Relevant statutory functions for MNZ under the MTA 94 and other functions are:

To promote protection of the marine environment in New Zealand and beyond New Zealand, in accordance with New Zealand international obligations.

To ensure New Zealand‘s preparedness for, and ability to respond to, marine oil pollution spills.

To cooperate with, or provide advice and assistance to, any government agency or local government agency when requested to do so by the Minister.

To provide information and advice with respect to maritime transport and marine protection and to foster appropriate information and education programmes with respect to maritime transport and marine protection.

To develop and maintain marine protection rules and for the Director to grant exemptions from maritime protection rules.

For the Director to exercise control over entry into the maritime transport system through the granting, suspending or revoking marine protection documents. .

For the Director to promote compliance with marine pollution standards in the maritime transport system.

Noting the requirements of the OPRC 90, other International conventions and the MTA 94 the functions identified above would appear appropriate. Consequently we conclude MNZ is meeting its obligations under the SOI. The SOI identifies a number of strategic challenges that have relevance to the OPPRC Review. 6.3.1 Maritime Skills Shortage

The maritime industry is competing with other sectors to be seen as a viable employment option for New Zealanders - the maritime qualifications framework is currently a barrier to attracting mariners into the industry. (SOI page 14)

During the conduct of the review several stakeholders identified the maritime skills shortage as an issue. Concern was expressed from a number of quarters in government and industry regarding the diminution of maritime skills particularly in MNZ where a number of senior marine qualified and experienced staff had left the organisation. The question of where would the MNZ Executive and the Marine Incident Response Team (MIRT) receive its high level marine advice on shipping related operations in the future was also raised as a concern by a number of those interviewed during the consultation process. MNZ Management provided advice that more mariners had been recruited into MNZ than had resigned in recent years. Clearly there is an erroneous perception here that MNZ will need to monitor and manage. Regional Councils and the associated role of the Harbour Master are an integral part of the New Zealand oil spill response arrangements. Harbour Masters have in the past been senior members of the Regional Council management team. Increasingly Regional Councils are reducing the level of



Harbour Master within the Regional Council organisational structure (e.g. in Auckland Regional Council, the HM was at council seniority level 2.5 and is now down at level 5, which reflects on seniority and pay). Some Regional Councils no longer employ Harbour Masters, preferring to “contract in” the services of an experienced mariner from the local port company. While this may appear to be a satisfactory solution and a way of sharing a diminishing resource a number of those consulted expressed concern with the arrangements. Contracted Harbour Masters said they would work on a Regional Council oil spill response team but they would not take on the role of Regional On Scene Commander (ROSC) due to perceived conflict issues, both legal and commercial. There is no mandatory qualification for Harbour Master in the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA 91). The accepted “rule” is that the Harbour Master is qualified to command the largest ship that enters the Regional Council port(s). Some people suggested that the Harbour Master and definition of his requisite qualifications should come under the MTA. The maritime skills shortage is not unique to New Zealand. Australia and the UK are experiencing similar issues regarding experienced qualified mariners being in short supply. MNZ will need to carefully monitor the diminishing resource of maritime expertise not only for MNZ but also within the Regional Councils. 6.3.2 Funding

Objective 4.4 Ensure funding for the MPRS covers the cost of providing the service. Complete a capability review of New Zealand’s oil pollution preparedness and response capability. Consult with the maritime industry and introduce a new oil pollution levy. These objectives are being undertaken and are the subject of this Review report to the MNZ Authority. The levy objective has recently completed a stakeholder consultation phase and MNZ has submitted a proposal to the Minister of Transport concerning the OPF levy. During stakeholder consultations many stakeholders expressed frustration with the inordinate time it has taken MNZ to progress the levy issue. The way that this project has been managed has in the view of some stakeholders led them to doubt MNZ‘s commitment and engagement with stakeholders. There is an issue here of national, and possibly international, reputational risk for MNZ which will need to be monitored and managed. 6.3.3 Strategy

Objective 4.5 Maintain MPRS as the centre of excellence for marine pollution matters. Review and update a new marine oil spill strategy. Complete review of National Response Team (NRT) training and skills and implement recommendations. These actions are now in place with the completion of the MOSRA 2010 and the commencement of the OPPRC Review will inform and develop the 2011 Strategy. This OPPRC review considers the NRT and makes appropriate recommendations 6.3.4 Key Performance Indicators

Output class 2 Marine Environment Protection - outlines the performance measures for marine pollution response capability. These are effectively the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of the New Zealand marine pollution response capability. These KPIs need to reflect a target outcome and an actual outcome in order to demonstrate on-going performance improvement. For example with equipment ready for response if 95% availability is the target then this should be stated. With training rather than state the number of courses, a better measure could be the number of trainees that are targeted. Possibly a cost/student measure could also be considered. NRT availability and capability could be considered for inclusion in Output 2.1

Recommendation 2 (6.3) M The Marine Environment Protection KPIs should be reviewed to ensure that they better reflect the New Zealand capability and readiness to respond.

It is estimated that the cost of implementing this recommendation is neutral as it is primarily an administrative matter.



6.4 Oil Pollution Advisory Committee (OPAC)

Under the MTA 94, Maritime New Zealand is obliged to receive advice from OPAC. The legislation states:- 1) There shall continue to be a committee, to be called the Oil Pollution Advisory Committee, to

give advice to the Authority on the following matters: a) the New Zealand Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy: b) the fixing and levying of oil pollution levies imposed under Part 24 c) the use of the New Zealand Oil Pollution Fund: d) any other matters related to marine oil spills that the Minister, or the Director, from time to

time specifies by notice to the Committee. 2) The Minister of Transport shall appoint to the Committee—

a) the Director; and b) such other persons as the Minister from time to time determines; and c) a chairperson of the Committee.

3) The Minister shall, in appointing members of the Committee, consider whether the Committee should have members who represent, or have experience relating to, the following: a) the shipping industry: b) the oil and gas exploration industry: c) the oil and gas production and distribution industry: d) the Petroleum Industry Emergency Action Committee: e) operators of port facilities: f) regional councils: g) Maritime New Zealand: h) the Ministry of Transport: i) the Ministry for the Environment: j) the Department of Conservation: k) Te Puni Kokiri.

4) The Committee may, subject to any written directions of the Minister, regulate its procedure as it thinks fit.

5) Members of the Committee shall be appointed on such terms and conditions (including travelling allowances and expenses) as the Minister from time to time determines.

6) Any travelling allowances and expenses determined by the Minister under subsection (5) shall be paid out of the New Zealand Oil Pollution Fund.

TCS has established that there is a very high degree of acceptance within the stakeholder community that OPAC is a worthwhile, representative and effective body. There are some concerns in the regions that information gathered at meetings does not always find its way back from their sector‘s representative on the committee.

Recommendation 3 (6.4) M OPAC members should develop more formal structures to enable the dissemination of information. MNZ should ensure that OPAC minutes were sent to each Regional Council, possibly to the ROSC or their manager.

It is estimated that the cost of implementing this recommendation is neutral as it is primarily an administrative matter.

6.5 Government Departments

Several Government Ministries and Departments are noted in the 2006 Strategy as having roles to play in oil spill response. In interviews with officials from these Ministries and Departments, TCS established that their understanding of those roles were somewhat different to those stated in the Strategy. Summarised in brief below, are their understandings of their roles. 6.5.1 Ministry for the Environment

The relationship with MNZ is on an "as needs" basis (i.e., to keep the Minister informed as required).



6.5.2 Ministry of Fisheries

The Ministry has a direct interest in spill response and is seeking a higher level of engagement with MNZ. 6.5.3 Department of Labour

The Department claims to have no direct interest in spill response despite establishing OH&S standards on the rigs. 6.5.4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade

New Zealand does not have a formal EEZ in the Ross Dependency, so MNZ has no formal role in responding to marine oil spills in that region. Nevertheless, MFAT / MNZ participate in efforts aimed at reducing the risk of releasing oil. MNZ has a number of roles is disaster management in the South Pacific which includes Oil Spill Response. It appears that there is a need for some clarification of some aspects of that role. Under normal circumstances a request for assistance comes from a country to MNZ by way of the New Zealand High Commission in the country concerned and from there through MFAT. Disaster relief in whatever form it takes – including OSR functions – is always given as assistance under the direction of local officials. In the context of MNZ‘s OSR functions in the South Pacific, issues that appear to require some clarification are:

How the cost of OSR functions is recovered. The current practice is to treat the cost as an ―aid intervention‖ if the costs are ―substantial‖. This understanding requires clarification.

The upper limits of response commitment, in terms of personnel and material, also needs clarification.

The MOU between MNZ and MFAT concerning these issues appears to require some attention with respect to these issues.

6.5.5 Te Pūni Kokiri

This organisation‘s primary concern is contamination of food resources and intrusion, encroachment into, or contamination of wāhi tapu (―sacred place(s)‖). It is apparent that there is no strategy in place for dealing with wāhi tapu. The precise locations of wāhi tapu must remain confidential to Māori. Because Wāhi Tapu are usually urupa (cemetaries), there is an understandable reluctance to reveal their precise location

1. For this reason it was proposed to include Māori in oil spill training

programmes. The form that the Māori-directed training might take (i.e., who is involved and how are they involved) needs to be considered. Local government is the organisation that most commonly interacts directly with Iwi. They are set up to handle this conventional part of their activities

2. It was considered that a spill response which would

normally include direct interaction with local agencies (local government, ambulance, fire service, police, port companies and the community) should also specifically include Iwi. It is worth remembering that in the context of the East Coast that the proportion of Māori in the population is relatively very high (in excess of 50%) and there is commensurate sympathy for Iwi views in the community. On the South Island, Environment Southland (ES), which is responsible for the highly sensitive Fjordland, reported that a healthy and cooperative relationship had been developed with the Ngai Tahu Maori people following the Don Wong incident in 1998. At the time of the incident, Iwi representatives expressed serious concerns about its impact on the environment and their traditional grounds. The Southland Regional Council took a proactive approach, flying a number of representatives down to the scene to experience the response first hand. Subsequently, four local councils opted to jointly fund an Iwi coordinator/liaison officer to work in this area in conjunction with a

1 Among other things, grave sites often contain highly valuable artefacts.

2 It is noted that at least one Iwi doesn‘t see itself as ―the public‖.



wildlife adviser from the Department of Conservation. This initiative is regarded as providing a solid means of ensuring communication with Iwi interests are maintained at a high level. 6.5.6 Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management

Civil Defence operates Emergency Management Centres around the country and has extensive experience and ready access to key logistical needs. Synergies could be achieved by closer cooperation in some operational areas (notably logistics). The possible mutual use of Emergency Management Centres around the country should be explored. 6.5.7 Royal New Zealand Navy

The RNZN maintains its own stock of oil spill response equipment and operates a number of vessels that could be deployed in an OSR. There clearly are synergies to be achieved here and MNZ should fully explore the potential to utilise this resource.

Recommendation 4 (6.5) M MNZ should fully explore the potential to utilise RNZN and other Government Departments‘ expertise and resources in an OSR by building on existing Memoranda of Understanding.

Cost of implementing this recommendation is neutral as it is considered an administrative issue. Recommendation 5 (6.5) H Government departments that have a role in oil spill response should be consulted during the construction of the 2011 Strategy and any text concerning their role is agreed before being included in the Strategy.

Cost of implementing this recommendation is neutral as it is considered an administrative issue.

6.6 Oil Pollution Fund

The objective of the OPF is to provide sufficient funding to maintain New Zealand‘s marine oil spill preparedness and response capabilities, and to pay the costs of responding to spills where the source is unidentified, or where the full costs are not recovered from the polluter. A new methodology for allocating the levy is currently being evaluated by industry. It has been proposed by MNZ for two reasons. 1. The current method for calculating the levy has been in place for more than a decade, and so

it is appropriate to look at whether it is the ‗best‘ methodology. A threat-based model has been identified as the preferred methodology for calculating the levy. It is considered that this approach is more equitable and effective than the current method.

2. It is imperative to ensure that an adequate level of OPF reserves is maintained. MNZ administers its maritime oil pollution response via the Oil Pollution Fund (OPF), which is audited annually as part of MNZ‘s own audit of its financial performance. Currently (2009/10 Actual and 2010/11 Budget) the OPF receives income of approximately $3.3m p.a., of which approximately 70% is derived from the Oil Pollution Levy imposed on foreign going vessels and just under 20% from domestic shipping. The remaining 10% is funded by offshore platform and well operators and interest from the diminishing fund reserves. Comment on the sources of OPF revenue and the method of raising this revenue are outside the scope of this review and are the subject of a Consultancy Document issued by MNZ to stakeholders in December 2010 for comment, which has now been submitted to the Minister for approval. The cost structure of the OPF covers the MPRS capability at Te Atatu, Regional Council Operations (storage, maintenance, exercise and training costs and Tier 2 Plan maintenance), third party contracts and MNZ overheads related to maritime pollution response. Major cost centre details (actual 2009/10 and budget 2010/11) are set out in NZ$‘000s in the table below:



Item 2009/10 Actual

20010/11 Budget

% of Budget Total

% change v. 2009/10

Personnel 766 750 16.6 -2.1

Operating Costs 373 356 7.9 -4.6

OSR & Equipment R&M 111 94 2.1 -15.3

Travel & Communications 203 263 5.8 +29.6

Training & Exercises 230 305 6.7 +32.6

Regional Council Costs 933 999 22.1 +7.1

National Plan Contracts 429 437 9.7 +1.9

Professional & Admin Services 262 249 5.5 -5.0

Depreciation 384 384 8.5 Nil

Head Office Overhead 710 690 15.2 -2.8 Total 4,401 4,527 100.0 +2.9

The three leading cost centres that account for more than half the total current year budgeted OPF costs of just over $4.5m are Personnel, Regional Council Costs and Head Office Overhead. The single largest item (Regional Council Costs) covers 16 Regional Councils of which the five most significant (each with $80k budgeted costs or over) account for $450k or 45% of the total – in descending order of budget size these are:

Environment Canterbury

Auckland Regional Council

Northland Regional Council

Taranaki Regional Council

Environment Bay of Plenty The budget for Environment Canterbury at just under $107k is the largest, ahead of Auckland, Bay of Plenty, Northland and Taranaki who are identified in the recent MOSRA as the areas with high oil spill risk. In light of this their share of the Regional Councils budget is arguably unduly low given their risk profile. Two cost centre areas that appear to have major increases in expenditure in 2010/11 are Travel & Communications and Training & Exercises. These increases are more apparent than real as a result of the high levels of cost recovery for these cost centres related to MNZ‘s involvement in the response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico during 2009/10.



7 Response Arrangements

7.1 New Zealand’s Capability – Spill Size

Maritime New Zealand currently maintains a response capability of sufficient size to counter an oil spill of 3,500 tonnes, which is deemed to be a 'one in a hundred year' event. If the scale of an incident is beyond the nation's domestic capability, arrangements are in place to secure overseas assistance. This relationship is reciprocal - New Zealand will be expected to assist its neighbours if requested.

3

7.1.1 Nominating Spill Size

The MNZ web site nominates 3,500 tonnes as the 1-in-100 years spill event for which New Zealand is maintaining a capacity to respond. MOSRA10 compares their analysis of the 1–in–100 years spill event of 1,000 tonnes with the MOSRA 04 spill of 2,300 tonnes. An earlier Strategy and risk analysis undertaken in 1998 had the value at 7,000 tonnes. It is noted that the size of the 1-in-100 years spill is reducing and by default this could mean that the capacity to respond could also be reduced. IPIECA Report Series (2nd Edition March 2000) – A Guide to Contingency Planning for Oil Spills on Water, has the following table:

Impact of tanker size on credible spill

potential (tonnes) Typical Tonnage

(deadweight)

Slight Grounding or Collision

(one wing tank)

Grounding with Rupture

(two wing plus one centre tank)

Bunker Fuel

30,000 700 3,000 450 50,000 1,100 5,000 750 70,000 3,000 12,500 1,800

100,000 5,500 21,000 2,300 200,000 10,500 45,000 2,750

It can be seen from this table a significant oil spill is possible for ships operating to and from the New Zealand Refinery at Marsden Point. MOSRA10 identifies the offshore area off the Taranaki coast as having the highest risk profile in New Zealand waters. While the historic oil spill incidence in the area is low, the potential is high. A value of spill size is needed to enable the planners to determine the capability, particularly the equipment that needs to be available to respond.

Recommendation 6 (7.1) H The 2011 Strategy should clearly identify what the New Zealand capability is expected to respond to. A figure in the order of 5,500 tonnes; based on I00,000 tonnes tanker with one wing tank damaged; is considered to be reasonable.

It is estimated that the cost of implementing this recommendation is neutral. While it has the effect of increasing the nominated capacity from 3500 tonnes to 5500 tonnes it could be expected that a resulting increase of equipment may be required. However, the New Zealand system put into place in 1998, with equipment, MPRS and 400 trained responders to defend 7000 tonnes is still substantially in place. The system in place today should be capable of defending 5500 tonnes.

7.2 Contingency Planning

New Zealand has a highly regulated prescriptive system in place for development and approval of contingency plans. This should provide consistency of plans around the country. The Review team was unable to audit plans to the degree necessary to ensure that consistency was being achieved.

3 Taken from the MNZ website



The MTA 94 requires contingency plans be developed, approved by the Director MNZ, and reviewed regularly (not less than 3 yearly). The MTA 94 Part 23 s 286 to 298 covers issues associated with contingency plans in a series of Marine Protection Rules. Marine Protection Rules Part 130 prescribe the requirements for content and operation of contingency plans required under the MTA 94 Part 130A covers Shipboard Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plans (SOPEP) as required by MARPOL. In the New Zealand context these are considered Tier 1 plans. Part 130B covering Oil transfer Site Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plans requires owners of any oil transfer site where oil is transferred to or from a ship or offshore site to have an oil spill contingency plan. In the New Zealand context these are considered Tier 1 plans. The Director has delegated the power to approve Part 130B plans to the Regional Council where the activity is within the 12mile zone off shore. Part 130C covers Regional Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plans, and requires each Regional Council to have a contingency plan. The rule lays out the required content and format the plan must follow. These plans are the Tier 2 contingency plans and are approved by the Director (this task is carried out by MPRS). An issue arose during the stakeholder consultation concerned the Part 130B – Oil Transfer Site Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plans - which were generally referred to as Tier 1 plans. In a number of areas stakeholders advised that any spill in the area automatically became a Tier 2 spill and the responsibility of the Regional Council to respond. (Northport, Wellington, Auckland were three areas where this comment was made). It seems that a Tier 1 plan for a boat stop (un-attended self-service recreational boating fuelling point) is treated much the same as the Tier 1 plan for the tanker terminal at the New Zealand Refinery in Marsden Point. Regional Councils in the areas where there is high marine recreational activity maintained there was a substantial level of work associated with these lower levels of plans. It appears that because of the lower order of treatment that the Tier 1 plans receive, Tier 1 plans for some of the high risk areas are inadequate. A situation is developing in New Zealand where a Tier 1 response automatically becomes Tier 2 and the Regional Council takes over responsibility and mounts the response. Tier 1 plans have evolved to the stage where they are becoming a phone number the Regional Council phone number. Some oil industry stakeholders were of the view that such a limited Tier 1 response was appropriate as they paid the OPL, and it is appropriate that the proceeds be used to mount the response. The current Tier 1 requirements cover small operators (boat stops) to large capacity production facilities filling FPSOs. These vastly different operations appear to be treated in a similar fashion. Within the Tier 1 requirement, where the site is expected to mount its own response, the particular site spill response plan should be more specific regarding the quantum of oil that is expected to be defended / responded to. For example, a Tier 1 boat stop plan could be required to have a response capability to respond to a 1 tonne (1,000lts) spill of the product they handle (light boom, small skimmer and sorbents). A Tier 1 plan for a production facility/FPSO the quantum should be significantly larger possibly up to a 100 tonnes or more, with the provision of dispersants, vehicles for application (boats/aircraft), large booms and skimmers provided by the operator. The tier trigger to the next level would remain. For the boat stop, in the case of more than 1 tonne spills or when the site operator does not react satisfactorily then the Regional Council assumes responsibility. A similar process should apply for the larger enterprise: however in this case it is likely that the trigger would be directly to Tier 3. Other jurisdictions such as the UK and Australia require their oil terminal operators to have substantial resources to respond.



The question of approval for these high end plans deserves consideration. The Review team believes it is not appropriate that they be approved by the Regional Council.

Recommendation 7 (7.2) H MNZ should conduct a complete review of the Tier 1 (Part 130B) plans. In particular plans for the high risk, high capacity sites such as tanker terminals and FPSOs should be constructed to deliver a response outcome consistent with the volumes and type of oil they handle and the risks they pose. They should be required to have in place a response capability able to sustain a response to a significant amount of oil, possibly in the order of up to 100 tons or more.

7.3 Tier Response

7.3.1 New Zealand’s Tier Response

The Tiered response arrangements in New Zealand are set up and comply with the legislation managing oil spill response MTA 94 and the RMA 91. They also follow the Internationally recognised system of having ―three‖ tiers with Tier 1 being the smaller spill up to Tier 3 for the largest spills requiring a national response. They are well understood by the parties, who have demonstrated a capacity and capability to respond. However during the stakeholder consultations and review of other jurisdiction‘s arrangements a number of issues were identified that could be considered and may enhance the New Zealand three tier arrangements. 7.3.1.1 Tier 1 Response is site specific and the operator/owner of the site is expected to have a capability and be able to respond to pollution incidents for which they are responsible. If the spill is beyond the capability of the Tier 1 responder then the Regional Council will take charge and control of the response. Stakeholders advised that in many cases this Tier 1 to Tier 2 escalation trigger is automatic once oil is on the water. 7.3.1.2 Tier 2 A Regional Council response is a Tier 2 response. Councils maintain a response plan for the region, are provided with training, have mandated exercises and are provided with response equipment. If the Tier 2 spill is beyond the capability of the Regional Council to respond then the spill will be escalated to Tier 3 and MNZ will take charge and control of the response. There is another trigger which is identified in the National Contingency Plan but not the Strategy. This is – “are the response costs likely to exceed $250,000?” If yes, then the spill becomes Tier 3 7.3.1.3 Tier 3 This requires an MNZ response under the National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan. Tier 3 occurs when Tier 1 & Tier 2 escalation triggers occur, and spills beyond 12nm offshore are also Tier 3. In Tier 3 the NOSC assumes control of and responsibility for the oil spill response.


Regional Councils are a key constituent in New Zealand‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. The MTA94 part 23 s288 to 295 specify the requirements placed on Regional Councils whose region includes any coastline to respond to marine oil spills. Marine Protection Rules prescribe the requirements for regional marine oil spill contingency plans. Marine Protection Rule Part 130C describes the requirements of a Regional Council. These arrangements are the New Zealand Tier 2 response arrangements which are defined under MTA94 s288 as follows ― MTA94 s288 – The purpose of a regional marine oil spill contingency plan is to promote a planned and regionally co-ordinated response to any marine oil spill within a region that is beyond the resources of the persons who have caused the marine oil spill or that has not been appropriately responded to by such persons. There are 16 Regional Councils participating in oil spill response in New Zealand. The requirements for these Regional Councils under the MTA94 and Marine Protection Rule Part 130C are highly prescriptive and leave very little flexibility. Each Regional Council must have a Regional Contingency Plan based on Part 130C.



7.4.1 Regional Council Groups

TCS considers that a number of notional Regional Council Groups (RCGs) (say, five) could provide a more effective oil spill response arrangement than having the current sixteen Regional Councils individually involved. Our proposition based on the MOSRA10 and some geographic consideration, is to have three RCGs in the North Island and two RCGs in the South Island. When considering the MOSRA10, there are only three Regional Councils (Northland East Coast, Canterbury, and Taranaki) that for a 100 tonne spill have a total risk rating of more than 0 25 on a scale where the highest risk rating is (for Taranaki) at 0.80. Moving to a 1,000 ton spill only Taranaki ranks higher than 0.10 at 0.80.

Figure 1 - Regional Risk

While on exposure by oil type for all oils a spill of 20 tonnes may occur every 1.5 years somewhere in New Zealand.

Figure 2 - Total Coastal Spill Exposure by Oil Type

MOSRA 10 indicates that most Regional Councils should be prepared for a spill in the range of 20 tonnes. TCS has noted during stakeholder discussions that Regional Council stakeholders were often of the view that training and exercises could have a more regional focus, be conducted in the region and



replicate events that they would be expected to respond to. The feeling was that the training programs tended to focus very much towards large spills. TCS understands that the concept of “mutual aid” is well understood at Regional Council level, particularly within the civil defence component of Regional Council responsibility. Regional Councils have memoranda of understanding (MOU) with neighbouring Regional Councils that cover a range of issues for sharing resources and personnel. These MOUs could be developed further to include the concept of Oil Spill Response RCGs. Whilst TCS considered the adoption of somewhat rigidly structured groupings, the problems associated with funding such groupings within the current funding model proved difficult. Instead, TCS has opted in favour of the central MPRS approach coordinating budgets, training and exercises on a notional regional grouping basis – 3 in the North Island and 2 in the South Island would appear to provide appropriate levels of economies of scale. These five groupings are purely notional and would require further detailed analysis. Another possible approach is the notional amalgamation or grouping of Regional Councils. This approach avoids the construction of administrative entities at a level between Regional Councils and MNZ (which would probably require legislative changes). Council groupings would require administrative oversight by an appropriate body. MPRS is the logical entity to provide that oversight. A notional approach would make it possible to centralise the administration of most Regional Council spill response functions such as:

1. Budgeting. Budgeting would be done in a centralised way by MPRS and that function would no longer be required of Regional Council officers.

2. Training & Exercising. Planning for and execution of training and exercising would also be done at MPRS level and in respect of groups of Regional Councils rather than by and for individual Regional Councils. Among other benefits this would help ensure that exercises are always attended by enough people to make the process viable.

7.4.1.1 Contingency Plans New Zealand currently has 16 separate contingency plans for a Tier 2 response. A reduction in the number of contingency plans, would significantly assist with the consistency of plans, reduce duplication of effort, and improve the auditing process. 7.4.1.2 Exercises Part 130C requires that each Regional Council – “must ensure that the plan is regularly tested in accordance with an exercise program approved by the Director for each year which includes at least two field exercises…” With two exercises each year in each RCG there would be ten significant exercises (currently 32) in New Zealand for MPRS to oversee and manage. The quality of exercises and training should be significantly enhanced as a consequence 7.4.1.3 Regional On Scene Commanders Each Regional Council “shall from time to time appoint a regional on-scene commander for its region…” (MTA94 318(1)) In addition “The Director shall from time to time appoint a National On-scene Commander…” (MTA94 319 (1)). During the conduct of this review the National On-Scene Commander (NOSC) complement was four, while previously there had been up to six NOSCs. With 16 Regional Councils having to appoint a trained and qualified Regional On Scene Commander (ROSC), there are at least 16 ROSCs, possibly more with some Regional Councils having deputies trained and qualified. If each Regional Council has two ROSCs and there are six NOSCs, then over all there at least 38 people trained and qualified to take charge of an oil spill response. By consolidating the Regional Councils into five RCGs each group would have at least two ROSC who would be supported by five NOSCs. This would result in a significant reduction in training effort. The



residual capacity could be taken up by providing more frequent and higher level training to the ten ROSCs and five NOSCs. 7.4.1.4 Regional Response Teams There would be five regional response teams from the proposed RCGs. These teams would be trained and exercised on a regular basis in their region with the equipment they were responsible for, in the environment where they would be most likely required to respond. It can be seen that developing a RCG concept for Regional Council oil spill response significant synergies can be achieved, with associated efficiencies and associated cost savings. It is considered that to achieve the RCG outcome the MTA94 requirements need not be amended. What would be needed is a comprehensive change management consultation process with the Regional Councils, and a review and amendment to Marine Protection Rule Part 130C.

Recommendation 11 (8.2) H MNZ and OPAC should consider the concept of having a number of Regional Council Groups (RCGs) for contingency planning, oil spill response, training and equipment (storage and maintenance), either through the construction of administrative entities, or by way of notional amalgamation. This will also require a change management consultation process with the Regional Councils, with a review and amendment to Marine Protection Rule Part 130C.

7.4.2 Budget and Process Monitoring

There are a number of significant issues that arose during the stakeholder discussion relating to the process of budgeting for training and exercising at Tier 2 level. 7.4.2.1 Timing Budget estimates for are required from Regional Councils before the end of the January that precedes the financial year in which the budget will be used. This means that councils are budgeting for events up to 18 months in advance. 7.4.2.2 Approvals Budgets are commonly not approved until well after the financial year has begun. Councils must spend against budgets that have not yet been approved. At the time of conducting the stakeholder consultation (November), Regional Councils had not been advised by MNZ of their approved budget allocations. For example, in one case a council was using unapproved funds from the training and exercising budget five months into the financial year. 7.4.2.3 Under spending Training Budgets Because of the nature of training and exercising programmes, it is difficult to anticipate how training programmes might change in a way that affects the budget (availability of staff, the effect of weather on planned programmes etc.). In addition, it was noted that changes to training programmes are sometimes initiated by MPRS after the budgeting process has been completed. Some councils agreed that under spending was happening: however others, who maintained their budgets were being fully spent, were frustrated by the fact that if they wanted additional funding for an exercise or training it was never forthcoming. 7.4.2.4 Spending Councils are required to adhere rigidly to cost centres specified in their budgets. In every case this was considered to be too restrictive and unnecessary It is noted that virtually all councils pointed out that oil spill response and the associated training is a relatively very small part of their overall function. Regional Councils estimated (some had comprehensive time allocation figures) that around 1 FTE (full time equivalent) staff member only was committed to oil spill activities. This does not include Regional Council staff attending training or actual response. In the larger Councils with thousands of employees and billion dollar budgets for the



staff allocated to MTA 94 Part 23 functions it would be difficult to gain traction and support from senior management. At least one Council regarded itself as ―doing MNZ a favour‖. MNZ needs to be mindful of the place of oil spill response in the overall context of Regional Council functions and equally Regional Councils should recognise the importance of their obligations and role in this area.

7.5 Ports and Oil Spill Response

7.5.1 New Zealand Ports

Prior to 1988, New Zealand ports were managed under a Harbour Board arrangement, and like Harbour Boards/Authorities in the UK and Australia among other duties and functions, some being statutory, they maintained a responsibility for marine oil spill response. Ports in New Zealand now operate under a corporatized model with a responsibility to their shareholders under the umbrella of the Ports Companies Act 1988. This Act is quite specific in what it sees as the business of the Port Companies when taking over the role of the Harbour Board:

The principal objective of every port company shall be to operate as a successful business.

Does not include any undertaking that is a statutory function or duty of the Harbour Board relating to safety or good navigation.

Extracts from the Ports Companies Act 1988

A 50/50 owner of Northport Ltd is Northland Port Corporation (NZ) Ltd which was formed in 1988 when it purchased the assets of the Northland Harbour Board. Northland Port Corporation (NZ) Ltd is an investment company with holdings in a number of companies. The company's primary focus is the marketing of 180ha (approx.) of industrially zoned land at Marsden Point. Lease periods of up to 35 years are available and site areas are flexible depending on individual needs. Northport Ltd is the port operating company for the port of Marsden Point. Jointly owned by Northland Port Corporation and Port of Tauranga on a 50/50 basis, it is developing a deep water general/bulk cargo facility at Marsden Point. These comments are not here to single out Northland Port Corporation or Northport, they are merely an example of the corporate structure and make up of New Zealand ports. During the stakeholder consultation the TCS team found a similar situation at the other ports visited. The ports did not see themselves as polluters and were therefore not responsible for a Tier 1 plan or providing a pollution response. With the ships using their berths they did not see any reason why they should have any responsibility to respond to a spill from a ship at their berth. The general comment made was “oil in the water – Regional Council responsibility”.

However the ports while stating that they did not have a role or responsibility to respond to oil spills in “their port”, said they have trained labour available if needed by the Regional Council and provide space to MNZ (at commercial rates) to store oil spill response equipment. 7.5.2 Australian Ports

During 1998, a number of issues were raised about the operation of the Australian response arrangements and the role of port authorities in the National Plan arrangements, particularly in view of the privatisation and corporatisation of ports in a number of jurisdictions. A number of the newly “corporatized’ ports were taking the view that oil pollution was “not part of core business” for what was now essentially a “landlord” port operator. Up to this time the Port Authorities had provided a significant part in Australia‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements.



In 2000 a review of the National Plan was undertaken where the purpose was to determine if current arrangements, particularly with regard to the roles of port operators ...are adequate to provide an effective response to pollution of the sea by oil16 … One of the recommendations of the 2000 Review was that: The States/NT ensure... that each port within their jurisdiction maintains, either directly or indirectly, an appropriate preparedness and response capacity consistent with the level of risk within the port. Following the 2000 Review a substantial amount of oil spill response equipment from National Plan stockpiles was handed over to the ports to enable them to meet their required response capacity at the National Plan Tier 1 level, that is to say an oil spill of up to 10 tonnes. The engagement of ports in oil spill response varies due to the different legislation in each of the States. Two examples (NSW and Victoria) are provided below. However, what can be said is that the Australian ports are engaged in oil spill preparedness and response and continue to play a key role in the Australian capability. 7.5.2.1 Ports in Victoria In Victoria the State (waters) are divided into four regions. A port within a region comes under the jurisdiction of the contingency plan for that region that is managed and co-ordinated by the State Marine Authority. Ports within a region are required to have a marine safety and environment plan to manage marine pollution risks within their port boundaries. This is considered to be at Tier 1 level under Australian arrangements. Further to this Tier 1 requirement the Director of Marine Safety, under the powers provided by the Marine Act 1988 has directed that Port Companies/Corporations undertake the roles and functions of a Regional Control Agency (RCA) for their respective region. So the Port of Portland Pty Ltd (a private port operator) is required to take a leading role in oil spill response for the Portland region (Cape Otway to the SA border). The RCA role in oil spill response is similar to that of the Regional Council in New Zealand. 7.5.2.2 Ports in NSW In NSW the situation is slightly different where a Port Safety Operating Licence is issued to the NSW Port Corporations (Newcastle, Sydney and Port Kembla) under the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995. Under the Act the ports are required to:

exercise the port safety functions for which it is licensed in accordance with its operating licence.

Be responsible for “Port Safety Functions” which includes: the function of providing or arranging for the provision of emergency environment protection services for dealing with pollution incidents in relevant waters

The NSW Port Corporations are not only responsible for providing the Combat Agency role within the port boundary but also for a length of coastline outside the port. Outside these boundaries the NSW Marine Authority is the designated Combat Agency. 7.5.3 UK Ports

From the UK Marine Oil Spill contingency plan the ports (private or otherwise) play a key role in oil spill response: Ports, Harbours, Oil Facilities and Offshore Installations - Have a statutory responsibility for clean-up in their jurisdictions, ports to tier 2 (medium sized spill requiring regional assistance and resources), offshore installations to tier 3 (large sized spill requiring a national response and resources) .



7.5.4 Engagement of New Zealand Ports in Oil Spill Preparedness & Response

Figure 3 - Port 100 Tonne Oil Spill Probability

It can be seen from the table above that there is a significant probability of an oil spill in a New Zealand port. While the position taken by the ports ―they are not potential polluters‖ it should be said that the ships, the client of the ports, are the raison d’être that the port is there. An analogy can be drawn with situation that applies to airports; in another port situation ―airports‖ the airport is required to provide a fire and rescue service for their clients. Likewise the logic should follow that the port should provide a response to accidents that their clients may suffer. When compared to other jurisdictions, Australia and UK, the New Zealand ports play a limited or no role in New Zealand‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. Ports with their significant “marine” resources (expertise, resources and hardware) could provide a significant input into the New Zealand arrangements. MNZ should endeavour to engage this significant resource to a high degree in the oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. 7.5.5 Port Contribution to Oil Pollution Response Capability

While there are important differences in structure and organisation of oil pollution response capability between Australia and New Zealand, as neighbours across the Tasman and committed to mutual assistance under the current OPRC bilateral arrangements, there is some merit in comparing the contribution of ports in the two countries to the national oil pollution response effort. A significant source of pollution risk is derived from the vessels calling at and working cargo in the ports in the two countries, an activity which is fundamental to the business model and financial results of these organisations. Both maintain an important front line (at least Tier 1) capability on site to address any pollution incident within their port limits and in some cases in waters beyond port limits. As demonstrated in the samples below, in New Zealand this capability appears to be fully funded and recoverable financially from MNZ via the Regional Councils, while in Australia ports shoulder a share of this burden on their own account particularly in respect of State waters and those within port limits.



7.5.6 New Zealand Port Response Capability

Two sample ports, both key operators in the New Zealand port industry and both sited at areas of significant pollution risk, were consulted about their direct contribution on their own account to New Zealand‘s pollution response capability – Ports of Auckland and Port Taranaki Ltd. The Table below provides a basic profile of their respective operational and business scale and the oil response capability provided on their own account.

Item Auckland Taranaki

Profile

Ship Calls p.a. 1,426 717

Turnover NZ$m 165.7 37.8

Total Pre Tax Costs NZ$m 117.0 34.2

Net Assets NZ$m 396.8 87.6

Staff (FTE) 573 127 Oil Response Capability Funded by the Port

Response Operating Costs Nil Nil

Manpower Nil Nil

Assets Nil Nil

Port Contribution (funded by MNZ direct or via Regional Council)

Storage for response kit Floating Plant (tugs etc.) Training site (wharf) 8 trained response staff

Storage for response kit Floating Plant (tugs etc.) Wharf & Tug dispersant kits 8 trained response staff

7.5.7 Australian Port Response Capability

Two sample ports in Australia were similarly consulted about the same issues with somewhat different results.

Item Sydney Ports Tasports

Profile

Ship Calls p.a. 1,940 1,873

Turnover A$m 220.2 80.6

Total Pre Tax Costs A$m 135.0 79.1

Net Assets A$m 930.6 123.3


Response Operating Costs Data Confidential $21k (staff time)

Manpower 6 FTE 0.28 equivalent

Assets Data Confidential $40k capex (last year)

Port Contribution

4 Vessels (2 boom carrying & 2 anchor handling) Skimmers (weir, vacuum, belt, disc) & Offshore Boom Vehicles – 2 trucks, van, 4WD

4 x Tier 1 response trailers capex Maintenance response kit (inherited from AMSA) Staff Time 68 man days

7.5.8 Conclusions

While AMSA in Australia carries the lead responsibility for oil pollution response in the same way MNZ does in New Zealand and imposes a quarterly Protection of the Sea Levy on vessels, it is important to note that States/NT, industry and ports also provide funding, both direct and indirect, to carry out National Plan functions in Australia. Such a shared commitment arguably will provide better value for money than the present New Zealand system where MPRS effectively funds all costs related to maritime pollution response in the first instance. That said, both jurisdictions operate under the same basic principle that ―the polluter pays‖ and revenue for the response capability is raised via a levy on shipping and specific incident response costs are recovered from the polluter.



Recommendation 12 (8.3) H MNZ and OPAC should engage the New Zealand port owners/operators to ensure that they become responsible for a Tier 1 response within port limits.

7.6 Oil Industry and Oil Spill Response

7.6.1 New Zealand Oil Industry


MOSRA10 indicates two areas of oil industry activity where the risks of an oil spill are high - Marsden Point (Northland East Coast) and New Plymouth (Taranaki offshore).

7.6.2 Marsden Point

New Zealand Refinery operates at Marsden Point where there are two tanker berths. Crude oil is imported in tankers up to 120,000t/dwt. Refined products are exported in tankers up to 30,000t/dwt. Discharge rates for crude can be around 4000t/hour (66tonnes/minute); refined products can be loaded at around 1000t/hour (16 tonnes/minute) It can be seen from the table at 7.1.1 above that there is a significant spill potential from 100,000 tonne tankers operating to and from the New Zealand Refinery. On the operational side a hose rupture or pipeline failure during discharge could see up to 66 tonnes per minute being spilled. With the loading operation in addition to a hose or pipeline failure there is the added and more likely possibility of a tank overflow with a ―spill rate of some 16 tonnes per minute. The New Zealand Refinery has a Tier1 response arrangement in place as required by Part 130B. The New Zealand Refinery maintains a team of trained personnel (they have attended MPRS training) but other than leasing an oil recovery vessel from MNZ maintains no equipment on site at Marsden Point. A spill response at this facility is totally reliant on the equipment provided by MNZ and any spill would become a Tier 2 spill where the Regional Council would take over the response. The New Zealand Refinery trained personnel would form part of the Regional Councils response effort. Australian refinery and oil loading facilities have substantial ―first strike‖ equipment available. By example the crude oil export facility at Long Island Point Hastings Victoria (ExxonMobil) has a rapid deployment boom and skimmer arrangement in place, with additional equipment located close by on shore, all provided by ExxonMobil, and maintained, operated and deployed by the facility staff. In the event of an incident at the jetty or on the tanker, refinery staff can quickly deploy booms around the vessel from floating storage at the jetty. Permanent floating booms on the inshore side of the jetty protect the adjacent shoreline.



In the UK there is a statutory requirement for oil terminals in ports to have a response capability up to Tier 2 level When making comparisons with other jurisdictions (UK and Australia) the New Zealand requirement for the New Zealand Refinery to respond at this oil terminal is minimal.

7.6.3 Taranaki Offshore

MOSRA10 identifies the offshore area off the Taranaki coast as having the highest risk profile. In this area three companies are operating production wells and associated platforms. Oil is shipped out via pipeline to New Plymouth for transfer into tankers or into FPSOs and transfer into tankers. While the historic oil spill incidence in the area is low, the potential is high. The possibility for oil spills is similar to Marsden Point, such as tanker accidents (e.g. a collision off take tanker with the FPSO), pipeline/transfer hose failure, and tanker loading mishaps. The FPSOs are converted tankers and subjected to the same risks and challenges facing tankers, but in a more hostile environment. At the production sites potential spill quantities can be considerable. In Australia the Montara platform spilled at around 64 tonnes/day and it was some 75 days before the spill was controlled. With the Deepwater Horizon spill in the US Gulf the quantum spilled was significantly higher. The New Zealand requirements to respond are covered under the Part 130B Tier 1 response plans. The operators have in place a small amount of equipment to respond and some trained personnel. However the general outcome was no different to elsewhere in New Zealand; each spill would become a Tier 2 spill and be the responsibility of the Regional Council (or MNZ if outside the 12 mile limit). There are no formal mutual aid agreements between the operators; some have informal arrangements where they would share resources, while two operators would seek assistance from OSRL in the event of a major incident. The offshore industry in Taranaki has a number of people trained in oil spill response. They have attended MPRS courses. They willingly participate in regional exercises and would be available for deployment in a response. They have minimal equipment at their sites, relying on the Regional Council or MNZ to mount the Tier 2/3 response. In the offshore situation it is unlikely that the "contain and recover" option (booms and skimmers) would be practical for weather reasons, leaving a dispersant attack as the most practical option. The products being handled are apparently amenable to dispersants; however the window of opportunity is tight, at around four hours from start of spill. Due to the reliance on the Regional Council/MNZ to mount a response, it is doubtful if a reasonable first strike dispersant attack could be mounted within the window of opportunity. This would almost certainly lead to a coastal clean-up operation. Like Marsden Point, the New Zealand requirements on the Taranaki offshore oil industry are minimal when compared to the requirements in UK and Australia.

7.6.4 Australian oil industry

7.6.4.1 Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre – AMOSC Established in 1991, at a cost of A$10 million, the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) in Geelong, Victoria, this operation represents a major commitment by the Australian oil industry to safeguard the Australian coastline in the event of a major oil spill. The Centre is financed on an ongoing basis by nine participating oil companies and other subscriber companies. These companies carry out the vast majority of the oil and gas production, offshore pipeline, terminal operations and tanker movements around the Australian coast. AMOSC, a subsidiary company of the Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP), operates the oil industry‘s major oil spill response facility. Located at Geelong, AMOSC‘s stockpile of oil spill response equipment includes oil spill dispersant and containment, recovery, cleaning, absorbent and communications equipment. AMOSC has a permanent staff of seven. In responding to oil spills, the permanent staff is supplemented by participating oil company personnel specially trained for this purpose. Some eighty four company employees form the AMOSC Core Group.



In addition to oil spill response, AMOSC operates training courses at its well-resourced training centre at Geelong and at company sites. These training courses cover the full range of oil spill response activities, from equipment operation through to management activities. AMOSC also provides advice, auditing, and contingency planning and exercise management services. Selected AMOSC equipment is also available under short term hire arrangements, to cover temporary requirements for equipment, such as offshore drilling operations. Under AMOSC designated oil spill response resources of individual companies are made available to other companies and to the National Plan under service contract agreements administered by AMOSC.

7.6.5 UK oil industry

Offshore installations have a statutory responsibility for clean-up in their jurisdictions to Tier 3 level. The UK‘s Department of Energy and Climate Change places an obligation on operators of oil and gas installations to have approved plans in place to respond to a Tier 2 spill (regional – beyond the in-house capacity of the operator) within 2 to 6 hours, and a Tier 3 spill (requiring national resources) within 6 to 18 hours. To meet these obligations, operators enter into contractual arrangements with private oil spill response organisations.

7.6.6 New Zealand oil industry response issues

During the stakeholder consultation a number of issues were raised by the offshore oil industry operators. Industry operators indicated that they were keen to participate in training. A number of them had attended MNZ training, and while their comments were generally positive issues were raised. Some felt that there were no transparent objectives and outcomes being set for training and exercises. They would welcome more industry participation in MNZ training. Some identified a need for industry awareness training and would welcome MPRS providing this. Massey oiled wild life training was used as an example and was identified as a good model to follow. Industry would benefit from MNZ training tailored to their needs, which suggests MNZ needs to engage more with the local industry so as to create awareness and provide feedback on developments. The Petroleum Club a local (New Plymouth) forum that meets quarterly would be a useful conduit for MNZ to engage in the Taranaki region. MNZ should engage with the oil industry to ensure that the industry is a willing participant in the preparedness and response arrangements and in addition to paying an appropriate share of the levy takes more active role in preparedness to respond relative to their risks of their operations.

Recommendation 13 (8.4) H The New Zealand oil industry should be required to substantially upgrade and enhance their Tier 1 response capability relative to the risks of their operations.

Recommendation 14 (8.4) H The New Zealand oil industry should develop formal mutual aid arrangements between the oil industry participants in New Zealand and engage the resources of Tier 3 response organisations outside New Zealand.

7.7 MNZ Contractors

7.7.1 Wriggle Coastal Management

Leigh Stevens, the principal of Wriggle Coastal Management is an internationally recognised specialist in the use of dispersant who has developed systems and decision tools for the use and application of dispersants in New Zealand waters in the event of an oil spill. At the time of commencing this review, TCS was advised that Wriggle was not working under formal contract with MNZ and was being paid a small retainer (circa NZ$30,000) for its services. Given that Wriggle is a small company in high demand internationally and MNZ represents a tiny proportion of that company‘s business, TCS is



concerned that MNZ is in danger of losing a key locally available resource unless contractual arrangements are secured.

Recommendation 15 (8.5) M MNZ should review a formal contract for the services of advanced scientific support, including those pertaining to dispersants.

7.7.2 National Oil Wildlife Response Team

The National Oil Wildlife Response Team, based at Massey University in Palmerston North, is contracted by MNZ to supply capability and expertise in the area of avian wildlife recovery in the event of an oil spill. The value of the contract is circa $380,000 per year. The Team, which is run by veterinarian Dr Kerri Morgan, has adopted and developed internationally recognised techniques using an array of equipment based at Massey and in special blue boxes located at 16 sites around the country. A standard operating procedure (SOP) outlines the accepted best practice for oiled wildlife rescue and rehabilitation techniques following marine oil spills in New Zealand waters. It is intended to provide adequate guidance to allow a flexible, rapid and humane response to oiled wildlife incidents of any scale without compromising human safety. This document is a key reference document to the National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan and is intended as the principal reference document for the New Zealand Wildlife Health Centre (NZWHC) at Massey University, during oiled wildlife response. It is intended that Tier 2 regional oil spill contingency plans will be used in concert with this SOP to identify natural resources at risk in each region. The management of a Tier 3 oil spill is complex and involves a wide and varied range of specific responses. The response to oiled wildlife is integral as part of the wider oil spill response. TCS considers the current arrangements for wild life response to be World‘s Best Practice.

7.8 International Assistance

7.8.1 AMSA and AMOSC

The main source of international assistance to New Zealand is through the OPRC agreement that is in place with Australia. AMSA and MNZ are signatories to the agreement. The agreement lays out how Australia and New Zealand will assist each other in preparedness and response to an oil spill (Agreement is at Appendix 5). Under the agreement resources from Australia‘s National Plan (materiél and personnel), including AMOSC resources, can be made available to New Zealand. As part of the Australian National Plan arrangements, AMSA has an agreement with the AIP (Australian Institute of Petroleum). The agreement formalises the intention of AMSA and AIP to co-operate to ensure that the National Plan operates effectively and wherever possible is enhanced, and reflects the industry‘s commitment to maintain the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) as the major National Plan equipment stockpile for Australian waters. AMOSC is a subsidiary of the Australian Institute of Petroleum based in Geelong, Victoria, and is an integral part of the National Plan. In an oil spill response AMOSC has, in addition to its own staff, access to personnel from the major oil companies. AMOSC also coordinates the industry's mutual aid arrangements. An important part of the agreement is to share equally with AMSA the costs of maintaining the Australian fixed wing aerial dispersant capability. The agreement also makes the resources of AMOSC available not just to AMOSC subscriber companies, but through AMSA, to any pollution incident in Australia. In a response, New Zealand may call upon AMSA to assist, and AMSA through this agreement with the AIP/AMOSC may engage AMOSC as part of that assistance to New Zealand.



The OPRC 90 Memorandum of Agreement Part 6 says: Provision of equipment, materials or personnel under the control of the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), including equipment, materials or personnel under the control of Oil Spill Response (OSR), to Maritime New Zealand will be arranged by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority in accordance with the AMOSC/AMSA Hiring Agreement. The transfer of AMOSC equipment outside Australia is subject to the Centre Rules, which provide that in the first instance approximately one-third of the AMOSC inventory is available as the Overseas Pack. 7.8.2 OSR (Oil Spill Response)

Based in Southampton UK, OSRL (Oil Spill Response Ltd) has the largest stockpile of oil spill response equipment outside the USA, and has a mandate to operate worldwide. The company (including its Singapore based operation) provides a wide range of services and equipment in the event of a response, but also for preparedness in the areas of technical advice, contingency planning and training. Its participating members (shareholders) are 36 oil companies who are accountable for 60% of the world‘s oil production. There are also some 83 Associate members. OSR will not guarantee a response to non-members. OSR has been developing Alliances with other Tier 3 organisations globally. In May 2009 OSR and AMOSC established a ―Resources and Services Alliance‖ which gives AMOSC direct call out authority status to mobilise OSR resources for oil spill response in areas covered by AMOSC. This was indeed fortuitous timing as the Montara well head started its uncontrolled release on 21 August 2009. Through AMOSC the National Plan was able to mobilise OSR‘s assistance and an OSR C130 dispersant spraying operation was put to good effect along with 21 OSR personnel. A number of New Zealand oil industry operators advised TCS during the stakeholder consultation that in the event of a major oil spill they would be seeking to engage the services of OSR. It was not clear if the companies (or their principles) were members of OSR. 7.8.3 Australian Contractors

Australia has a number of oil spill contractors who have been involved in major national and international oil spills at operational and management levels, including incident controller and response advisers. They have significant knowledge and experience that could be employed in response to major oil spills in New Zealand.



8 Response Participants

8.1 Marine Pollution Response Service (MPRS)

MNZ‘s Marine Pollution Response Services (MPRS) unit is located in Auckland and operates from within facilities at the National Oil Spill Services Centre (NOSSC) in Te Atatu. MPRS is responsible to the General Manager Monitoring and Response for the protection of New Zealand‘s marine environment from pollution caused by shipping and other activities, including oil exploration and production. The unit coordinates New Zealand‘s national pollution preparedness and response capability. In any major oil spill MPRS will undertake a leading role in ensuring that an effective response is put in place to mitigate environmental and other damage. MPRS‘s services are delivered by a team of ten people (8.2 FTE) comprising a Manager MPRS, an Operations and Exercise Manager and a Planning and Training Manager, three equipment technicians, an administrator, a planning officer and two administrative officers who provide administration, planning and training support. Of the ten staff one of the equipment technicians works part time one day a week and one of the administrative officers has been on a fixed term contract to cover the absence of the administrator and the other administrative officer on maternity leave.

Figure 5 - MPRS Organisationl Chart

Staff turnover within MPRS is relatively low with the most recent departure being the Manager, MPRS who accepted an employment opportunity with the oil industry in the marine environment protection field in Australia. A new manager has been appointed to this position and he commenced duties in late November 2010. There is a significant level of experience by way of time in the job and attendance at national and international oil spills within MPRS. The two managers who report to the Manager MPRS have been with the unit for 10 and 11 years respectively, the two full time equipment technicians have been with the unit for 8 years (one had significant prior marine environment protection experience overseas before joining MPRS), the administrator has been with the unit 9 years, the planning officer and administration officer 8 years each. The two temporary employees, an equipment technician and the relief administration officer, have 2 years‘ experience with the unit.



Feedback provided by stakeholders is that the MPRS unit within MNZ is highly regarded by those that it deals with. The unit is considered to have a high level of expertise and conducts its work effectively. However, some expressed the view that they would like to see MPRS personnel take a greater role in support of major regional exercises. Consultation with staff confirmed that relationships with the regional councils is very good and staff retention within MPRS is an indicator that things are ―going well‖ within the unit. The greatest level of face to face liaison with the regional councils is through the two permanent equipment technicians. The work activities undertaken by MPRS are seen to fall into clearly defined areas including incident preparation and response, spill response training at operational and management levels, equipment procurement and maintenance and regional audits. Incident preparation includes the review of a wide range of oil spill response contingency plans. In view of project time constraints and the scope of work to be undertaken the review team did not analyse in any detail current and emerging workloads to determine the suitability of MPRS‘s management structure and staffing levels or the unit‘s ability to effectively manage its current and emerging workloads. However, based on the current 8 permanent and 2 casual staff positions it appears from information provided to the review team that present staffing levels are sufficient to allow MPRS to continue to meet its obligations. The original decision to locate the MPRS unit within the NOSSC in Te Atatu is considered to be appropriate. The team operates effectively from this location under the management of the Manager MPRS and the review team can find no valid or sustainable reason to suggest that the unit be located elsewhere within MNZ.


Regional Councils are a key constituent in New Zealand‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. The MTA94 part 23 s288 to 295 specify the requirements placed on Regional Councils whose region includes any coastline to respond to marine oil spills. Marine Protection Rules prescribe the requirements for regional marine oil spill contingency plans. Marine Protection Rule Part 130C describes the requirements of a Regional Council. These arrangements are the New Zealand Tier 2 response arrangements which are defined under MTA94 s288 as follows ― MTA94 s288 – The purpose of a regional marine oil spill contingency plan is to promote a planned and regionally co-ordinated response to any marine oil spill within a region that is beyond the resources of the persons who have caused the marine oil spill or that has not been appropriately responded to by such persons. There are 16 Regional Councils participating in oil spill response in New Zealand. The requirements for these Regional Councils under the MTA94 and Marine Protection Rule Part 130C are highly prescriptive and leave very little flexibility. Each Regional Council must have a Regional Contingency Plan based on Part 130C. 8.2.1 Regional Council Groups

TCS considers that a number of notional Regional Council Groups (RCGs) (say, five) could provide a more effective oil spill response arrangement than having the current sixteen Regional Councils individually involved. Our proposition based on the MOSRA10 and some geographic consideration, is to have three RCGs in the North Island and two RCGs in the South Island. When considering the MOSRA10, there are only three Regional Councils (Northland East Coast, Canterbury, and Taranaki) that for a 100 tonne spill have a total risk rating of more than 0 25 on a scale where the highest risk rating is (for Taranaki) at 0.80. Moving to a 1,000 ton spill only Taranaki ranks higher than 0.10 at 0.80.




While on exposure by oil type for all oils a spill of 20 tonnes may occur every 1.5 years somewhere in New Zealand.

Figure 7 - Total Coastal Spill Exposure by Oil Type

MOSRA 10 indicates that most Regional Councils should be prepared for a spill in the range of 20 tonnes. TCS has noted during stakeholder discussions that Regional Council stakeholders were often of the view that training and exercises could have a more regional focus, be conducted in the region and replicate events that they would be expected to respond to. The feeling was that the training programs tended to focus very much towards large spills. TCS understands that the concept of “mutual aid” is well understood at Regional Council level, particularly within the civil defence component of Regional Council responsibility. Regional Councils have memoranda of understanding (MOU) with neighbouring Regional Councils that cover a range of issues for sharing resources and personnel. These MOUs could be developed further to include the concept of Oil Spill Response RCGs. Whilst TCS considered the adoption of somewhat rigidly structured groupings, the problems associated with funding such groupings within the current funding model proved difficult. Instead, TCS has opted in favour of the central MPRS approach coordinating budgets, training and exercises on a notional regional grouping basis – 3 in the North Island and 2 in the South Island would appear to provide appropriate levels of economies of scale. These five groupings are purely notional and would require further detailed analysis.



Another possible approach is the notional amalgamation or grouping of Regional Councils. This approach avoids the construction of administrative entities at a level between Regional Councils and MNZ (which would probably require legislative changes). Council groupings would require administrative oversight by an appropriate body. MPRS is the logical entity to provide that oversight. A notional approach would make it possible to centralise the administration of most Regional Council spill response functions such as:

3. Budgeting. Budgeting would be done in a centralised way by MPRS and that function would no longer be required of Regional Council officers.

4. Training & Exercising. Planning for and execution of training and exercising would also be done at MPRS level and in respect of groups of Regional Councils rather than by and for individual Regional Councils. Among other benefits this would help ensure that exercises are always attended by enough people to make the process viable.

8.2.1.1 Contingency Plans New Zealand currently has 16 separate contingency plans for a Tier 2 response. A reduction in the number of contingency plans, would significantly assist with the consistency of plans, reduce duplication of effort, and improve the auditing process. 8.2.1.2 Exercises Part 130C requires that each Regional Council – “must ensure that the plan is regularly tested in accordance with an exercise program approved by the Director for each year which includes at least two field exercises…” With two exercises each year in each RCG there would be ten significant exercises (currently 32) in New Zealand for MPRS to oversee and manage. The quality of exercises and training should be significantly enhanced as a consequence 8.2.1.3 Regional On Scene Commanders Each Regional Council “shall from time to time appoint a regional on-scene commander for its region…” (MTA94 318(1)) In addition “The Director shall from time to time appoint a National On-scene Commander…” (MTA94 319 (1)). During the conduct of this review the National On-Scene Commander (NOSC) complement was four, while previously there had been up to six NOSCs. With 16 Regional Councils having to appoint a trained and qualified Regional On Scene Commander (ROSC), there are at least 16 ROSCs, possibly more with some Regional Councils having deputies trained and qualified. If each Regional Council has two ROSCs and there are six NOSCs, then over all there at least 38 people trained and qualified to take charge of an oil spill response. By consolidating the Regional Councils into five RCGs each group would have at least two ROSC who would be supported by five NOSCs. This would result in a significant reduction in training effort. The residual capacity could be taken up by providing more frequent and higher level training to the ten ROSCs and five NOSCs. 8.2.1.4 Regional Response Teams There would be five regional response teams from the proposed RCGs. These teams would be trained and exercised on a regular basis in their region with the equipment they were responsible for, in the environment where they would be most likely required to respond. It can be seen that developing a RCG concept for Regional Council oil spill response significant synergies can be achieved, with associated efficiencies and associated cost savings. It is considered that to achieve the RCG outcome the MTA94 requirements need not be amended. What would be



needed is a comprehensive change management consultation process with the Regional Councils, and a review and amendment to Marine Protection Rule Part 130C.

Recommendation 11 (8.2) H MNZ and OPAC should consider the concept of having a number of Regional Council Groups (RCGs) for contingency planning, oil spill response, training and equipment (storage and maintenance), either through the construction of administrative entities, or by way of notional amalgamation. This will also require a change management consultation process with the Regional Councils, with a review and amendment to Marine Protection Rule Part 130C.

8.2.2 Budget and Process Monitoring

There are a number of significant issues that arose during the stakeholder discussion relating to the process of budgeting for training and exercising at Tier 2 level. 8.2.2.1 Timing Budget estimates for are required from Regional Councils before the end of the January that precedes the financial year in which the budget will be used. This means that councils are budgeting for events up to 18 months in advance. 8.2.2.2 Approvals Budgets are commonly not approved until well after the financial year has begun. Councils must spend against budgets that have not yet been approved. At the time of conducting the stakeholder consultation (November), Regional Councils had not been advised by MNZ of their approved budget allocations For example, in one case a council was using unapproved funds from the training and exercising budget five months into the financial year. 8.2.2.3 Under spending Training Budgets Because of the nature of training and exercising programmes, it is difficult to anticipate how training programmes might change in a way that affects the budget (availability of staff, the effect of weather on planned programmes etc.). In addition, it was noted that changes to training programmes are sometimes initiated by MPRS after the budgeting process has been completed. Some councils agreed that under spending was happening: however others, who maintained their budgets were being fully spent, were frustrated by the fact that if they wanted additional funding for an exercise or training it was never forthcoming. 8.2.2.4 Spending Councils are required to adhere rigidly to cost centres specified in their budgets. In every case this was considered to be too restrictive and unnecessary It is noted that virtually all councils pointed out that oil spill response and the associated training is a relatively very small part of their overall function. Regional Councils estimated (some had comprehensive time allocation figures) that around 1 FTE (full time equivalent) staff member only was committed to oil spill activities. This does not include Regional Council staff attending training or actual response. In the larger Councils with thousands of employees and billion dollar budgets for the staff allocated to MTA 94 Part 23 functions it would be difficult to gain traction and support from senior management. At least one Council regarded itself as ―doing MNZ a favour‖. MNZ needs to be mindful of the place of oil spill response in the overall context of Regional Council functions and equally Regional Councils should recognise the importance of their obligations and role in this area.



8.3 Ports and Oil Spill Response

8.3.1 New Zealand Ports

Prior to 1988, New Zealand ports were managed under a Harbour Board arrangement, and like Harbour Boards/Authorities in the UK and Australia among other duties and functions, some being statutory, they maintained a responsibility for marine oil spill response. Ports in New Zealand now operate under a corporatized model with a responsibility to their shareholders under the umbrella of the Ports Companies Act 1988. This Act is quite specific in what it sees as the business of the Port Companies when taking over the role of the Harbour Board:

The principal objective of every port company shall be to operate as a successful business.

Does not include any undertaking that is a statutory function or duty of the Harbour Board relating to safety or good navigation.

Extracts from the Ports Companies Act 1988

A 50/50 owner of Northport Ltd is Northland Port Corporation (NZ) Ltd which was formed in 1988 when it purchased the assets of the Northland Harbour Board. Northland Port Corporation (NZ) Ltd is an investment company with holdings in a number of companies. The company's primary focus is the marketing of 180ha (approx.) of industrially zoned land at Marsden Point. Lease periods of up to 35 years are available and site areas are flexible depending on individual needs. Northport Ltd is the port operating company for the port of Marsden Point. Jointly owned by Northland Port Corporation and Port of Tauranga on a 50/50 basis, it is developing a deep water general/bulk cargo facility at Marsden Point. These comments are not here to single out Northland Port Corporation or Northport, they are merely an example of the corporate structure and make up of New Zealand ports. During the stakeholder consultation the TCS team found a similar situation at the other ports visited. The ports did not see themselves as polluters and were therefore not responsible for a Tier 1 plan or providing a pollution response. With the ships using their berths they did not see any reason why they should have any responsibility to respond to a spill from a ship at their berth. The general comment made was “oil in the water – Regional Council responsibility”.

However the ports while stating that they did not have a role or responsibility to respond to oil spills in “their port”, said they have trained labour available if needed by the Regional Council and provide space to MNZ (at commercial rates) to store oil spill response equipment. 8.3.2 Australian Ports

During 1998, a number of issues were raised about the operation of the Australian response arrangements and the role of port authorities in the National Plan arrangements, particularly in view of the privatisation and corporatisation of ports in a number of jurisdictions. A number of the newly “corporatized’ ports were taking the view that oil pollution was “not part of core business” for what was now essentially a “landlord” port operator. Up to this time the Port Authorities had provided a significant part in Australia‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. In 2000 a review of the National Plan was undertaken where the purpose was to determine if current arrangements, particularly with regard to the roles of port operators ...are adequate to provide an effective response to pollution of the sea by oil16 …



One of the recommendations of the 2000 Review was that: The States/NT ensure... that each port within their jurisdiction maintains, either directly or indirectly, an appropriate preparedness and response capacity consistent with the level of risk within the port. Following the 2000 Review a substantial amount of oil spill response equipment from National Plan stockpiles was handed over to the ports to enable them to meet their required response capacity at the National Plan Tier 1 level, that is to say an oil spill of up to 10 tonnes. The engagement of ports in oil spill response varies due to the different legislation in each of the States. Two examples (NSW and Victoria) are provided below. However, what can be said is that the Australian ports are engaged in oil spill preparedness and response and continue to play a key role in the Australian capability. 8.3.2.1 Ports in Victoria In Victoria the State (waters) are divided into four regions. A port within a region comes under the jurisdiction of the contingency plan for that region that is managed and co-ordinated by the State Marine Authority. Ports within a region are required to have a marine safety and environment plan to manage marine pollution risks within their port boundaries. This is considered to be at Tier 1 level under Australian arrangements. Further to this Tier 1 requirement the Director of Marine Safety, under the powers provided by the Marine Act 1988 has directed that Port Companies/Corporations undertake the roles and functions of a Regional Control Agency (RCA) for their respective region. So the Port of Portland Pty Ltd (a private port operator) is required to take a leading role in oil spill response for the Portland region (Cape Otway to the SA border). The RCA role in oil spill response is similar to that of the Regional Council in New Zealand. 8.3.2.2 Ports in NSW In NSW the situation is slightly different where a Port Safety Operating Licence is issued to the NSW Port Corporations (Newcastle, Sydney and Port Kembla) under the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995. Under the Act the ports are required to:

exercise the port safety functions for which it is licensed in accordance with its operating licence.

Be responsible for “Port Safety Functions” which includes: the function of providing or arranging for the provision of emergency environment protection services for dealing with pollution incidents in relevant waters

The NSW Port Corporations are not only responsible for providing the Combat Agency role within the port boundary but also for a length of coastline outside the port. Outside these boundaries the NSW Marine Authority is the designated Combat Agency. 8.3.3 UK Ports

From the UK Marine Oil Spill contingency plan the ports (private or otherwise) play a key role in oil spill response: Ports, Harbours, Oil Facilities and Offshore Installations - Have a statutory responsibility for clean-up in their jurisdictions, ports to tier 2 (medium sized spill requiring regional assistance and resources), offshore installations to tier 3 (large sized spill requiring a national response and resources) .



8.3.4 Engagement of New Zealand Ports in Oil Spill Preparedness & Response

Figure 8 - Port 100 Tonne Oil Spill Probability

It can be seen from the table above that there is a significant probability of an oil spill in a New Zealand port. While the position taken by the ports ―they are not potential polluters‖ it should be said that the ships, the client of the ports, are the raison d’être that the port is there. An analogy can be drawn with situation that applies to airports; in another port situation ―airports‖ the airport is required to provide a fire and rescue service for their clients. Likewise the logic should follow that the port should provide a response to accidents that their clients may suffer. When compared to other jurisdictions, Australia and UK, the New Zealand ports play a limited or no role in New Zealand‘s oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. Ports with their significant “marine” resources (expertise, resources and hardware) could provide a significant input into the New Zealand arrangements. MNZ should endeavour to engage this significant resource to a high degree in the oil spill preparedness and response arrangements. 8.3.5 Port Contribution to Oil Pollution Response Capability

While there are important differences in structure and organisation of oil pollution response capability between Australia and New Zealand, as neighbours across the Tasman and committed to mutual assistance under the current OPRC bilateral arrangements, there is some merit in comparing the contribution of ports in the two countries to the national oil pollution response effort. A significant source of pollution risk is derived from the vessels calling at and working cargo in the ports in the two countries, an activity which is fundamental to the business model and financial results of these organisations. Both maintain an important front line (at least Tier 1) capability on site to address any pollution incident within their port limits and in some cases in waters beyond port limits. As demonstrated in the samples below, in New Zealand this capability appears to be fully funded and recoverable financially from MNZ via the Regional Councils, while in Australia ports shoulder a share of this burden on their own account particularly in respect of State waters and those within port limits.



8.3.6 New Zealand Port Response Capability

Two sample ports, both key operators in the New Zealand port industry and both sited at areas of significant pollution risk, were consulted about their direct contribution on their own account to New Zealand‘s pollution response capability – Ports of Auckland and Port Taranaki Ltd. The Table below provides a basic profile of their respective operational and business scale and the oil response capability provided on their own account.

Item Auckland Taranaki

Profile

Ship Calls p.a. 1,426 717

Turnover NZ$m 165.7 37.8

Total Pre Tax Costs NZ$m 117.0 34.2

Net Assets NZ$m 396.8 87.6


Response Operating Costs Nil Nil

Manpower Nil Nil

Assets Nil Nil

Port Contribution (funded by MNZ direct or via Regional Council)

Storage for response kit Floating Plant (tugs etc.) Training site (wharf) 8 trained response staff

Storage for response kit Floating Plant (tugs etc.) Wharf & Tug dispersant kits 8 trained response staff

8.3.7 Australian Port Response Capability

Two sample ports in Australia were similarly consulted about the same issues with somewhat different results.

Item Sydney Ports Tasports

Profile

Ship Calls p.a. 1,940 1,873

Turnover A$m 220.2 80.6

Total Pre Tax Costs A$m 135.0 79.1

Net Assets A$m 930.6 123.3


Response Operating Costs Data Confidential $21k (staff time)

Manpower 6 FTE 0.28 equivalent

Assets Data Confidential $40k capex (last year)

Port Contribution

4 Vessels (2 boom carrying & 2 anchor handling) Skimmers (weir, vacuum, belt, disc) & Offshore Boom Vehicles – 2 trucks, van, 4WD

4 x Tier 1 response trailers capex Maintenance response kit (inherited from AMSA) Staff Time 68 man days

8.3.8 Conclusions

While AMSA in Australia carries the lead responsibility for oil pollution response in the same way MNZ does in New Zealand and imposes a quarterly Protection of the Sea Levy on vessels, it is important to note that States/NT, industry and ports also provide funding, both direct and indirect, to carry out National Plan functions in Australia. Such a shared commitment arguably will provide better value for money than the present New Zealand system where MPRS effectively funds all costs related to maritime pollution response in the first instance. That said, both jurisdictions operate under the same basic principle that ―the polluter pays‖ and revenue for the response capability is raised via a levy on shipping and specific incident response costs are recovered from the polluter.



Recommendation 12 (8.3) H MNZ and OPAC should engage the New Zealand port owners/operators to ensure that they become responsible for a Tier 1 response within port limits.

8.4 Oil Industry and Oil Spill Response

8.4.1 New Zealand Oil Industry


MOSRA10 indicates two areas of oil industry activity where the risks of an oil spill are high - Marsden Point (Northland East Coast) and New Plymouth (Taranaki offshore).

8.4.2 Marsden Point

New Zealand Refinery operates at Marsden Point where there are two tanker berths. Crude oil is imported in tankers up to 120,000t/dwt. Refined products are exported in tankers up to 30,000t/dwt. Discharge rates for crude can be around 4000t/hour (66tonnes/minute); refined products can be loaded at around 1000t/hour (16 tonnes/minute) It can be seen from the table at 7.1.1 above that there is a significant spill potential from 100,000 tonne tankers operating to and from the New Zealand Refinery. On the operational side a hose rupture or pipeline failure during discharge could see up to 66 tonnes per minute being spilled. With the loading operation in addition to a hose or pipeline failure there is the added and more likely possibility of a tank overflow with a ―spill rate of some 16 tonnes per minute. The New Zealand Refinery has a Tier1 response arrangement in place as required by Part 130B. The New Zealand Refinery maintains a team of trained personnel (they have attended MPRS training) but other than leasing an oil recovery vessel from MNZ maintains no equipment on site at Marsden Point. A spill response at this facility is totally reliant on the equipment provided by MNZ and any spill would become a Tier 2 spill where the Regional Council would take over the response. The New Zealand Refinery trained personnel would form part of the Regional Councils response effort. Australian refinery and oil loading facilities have substantial ―first strike‖ equipment available. By example the crude oil export facility at Long Island Point Hastings Victoria (ExxonMobil) has a rapid deployment boom and skimmer arrangement in place, with additional equipment located close by on shore, all provided by ExxonMobil, and maintained, operated and deployed by the facility staff. In the event of an incident at the jetty or on the tanker, refinery staff can quickly deploy booms around the vessel from floating storage at the jetty. Permanent floating booms on the inshore side of the jetty protect the adjacent shoreline.



In the UK there is a statutory requirement for oil terminals in ports to have a response capability up to Tier 2 level When making comparisons with other jurisdictions (UK and Australia) the New Zealand requirement for the New Zealand Refinery to respond at this oil terminal is minimal.

8.4.3 Taranaki Offshore

MOSRA10 identifies the offshore area off the Taranaki coast as having the highest risk profile. In this area three companies are operating production wells and associated platforms. Oil is shipped out via pipeline to New Plymouth for transfer into tankers or into FPSOs and transfer into tankers. While the historic oil spill incidence in the area is low, the potential is high. The possibility for oil spills is similar to Marsden Point, such as tanker accidents (e.g. a collision off take tanker with the FPSO), pipeline/transfer hose failure, and tanker loading mishaps. The FPSOs are converted tankers and subjected to the same risks and challenges facing tankers, but in a more hostile environment. At the production sites potential spill quantities can be considerable. In Australia the Montara platform spilled at around 64 tonnes/day and it was some 75 days before the spill was controlled. With the Deepwater Horizon spill in the US Gulf the quantum spilled was significantly higher. The New Zealand requirements to respond are covered under the Part 130B Tier 1 response plans. The operators have in place a small amount of equipment to respond and some trained personnel. However the general outcome was no different to elsewhere in New Zealand; each spill would become a Tier 2 spill and be the responsibility of the Regional Council (or MNZ if outside the 12 mile limit). There are no formal mutual aid agreements between the operators; some have informal arrangements where they would share resources, while two operators would seek assistance from OSRL in the event of a major incident. The offshore industry in Taranaki has a number of people trained in oil spill response. They have attended MPRS courses. They willingly participate in regional exercises and would be available for deployment in a response. They have minimal equipment at their sites, relying on the Regional Council or MNZ to mount the Tier 2/3 response. In the offshore situation it is unlikely that the "contain and recover" option (booms and skimmers) would be practical for weather reasons, leaving a dispersant attack as the most practical option. The products being handled are apparently amenable to dispersants; however the window of opportunity is tight, at around four hours from start of spill. Due to the reliance on the Regional Council/MNZ to mount a response, it is doubtful if a reasonable first strike dispersant attack could be mounted within the window of opportunity. This would almost certainly lead to a coastal clean-up operation. Like Marsden Point, the New Zealand requirements on the Taranaki offshore oil industry are minimal when compared to the requirements in UK and Australia.

8.4.4 Australian oil industry

8.4.4.1 Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre – AMOSC Established in 1991, at a cost of A$10 million, the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) in Geelong, Victoria, this operation represents a major commitment by the Australian oil industry to safeguard the Australian coastline in the event of a major oil spill. The Centre is financed on an ongoing basis by nine participating oil companies and other subscriber companies. These companies carry out the vast majority of the oil and gas production, offshore pipeline, terminal operations and tanker movements around the Australian coast. AMOSC, a subsidiary company of the Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP), operates the oil industry‘s major oil spill response facility. Located at Geelong, AMOSC‘s stockpile of oil spill response equipment includes oil spill dispersant and containment, recovery, cleaning, absorbent and communications equipment. AMOSC has a permanent staff of seven. In responding to oil spills, the permanent staff is supplemented by participating oil company personnel specially trained for this purpose. Some eighty four company employees form the AMOSC Core Group.



In addition to oil spill response, AMOSC operates training courses at its well-resourced training centre at Geelong and at company sites. These training courses cover the full range of oil spill response activities, from equipment operation through to management activities. AMOSC also provides advice, auditing, and contingency planning and exercise management services. Selected AMOSC equipment is also available under short term hire arrangements, to cover temporary requirements for equipment, such as offshore drilling operations. Under AMOSC designated oil spill response resources of individual companies are made available to other companies and to the National Plan under service contract agreements administered by AMOSC.

8.4.5 UK oil industry

Offshore installations have a statutory responsibility for clean-up in their jurisdictions to Tier 3 level. The UK‘s Department of Energy and Climate Change places an obligation on operators of oil and gas installations to have approved plans in place to respond to a Tier 2 spill (regional – beyond the in-house capacity of the operator) within 2 to 6 hours, and a Tier 3 spill (requiring national resources) within 6 to 18 hours. To meet these obligations, operators enter into contractual arrangements with private oil spill response organisations.

8.4.6 New Zealand oil industry response issues

During the stakeholder consultation a number of issues were raised by the offshore oil industry operators. Industry operators indicated that they were keen to participate in training. A number of them had attended MNZ training, and while their comments were generally positive issues were raised. Some felt that there were no transparent objectives and outcomes being set for training and exercises. They would welcome more industry participation in MNZ training. Some identified a need for industry awareness training and would welcome MPRS providing this. Massey oiled wild life training was used as an example and was identified as a good model to follow. Industry would benefit from MNZ training tailored to their needs, which suggests MNZ needs to engage more with the local industry so as to create awareness and provide feedback on developments. The Petroleum Club a local (New Plymouth) forum that meets quarterly would be a useful conduit for MNZ to engage in the Taranaki region. MNZ should engage with the oil industry to ensure that the industry is a willing participant in the preparedness and response arrangements and in addition to paying an appropriate share of the levy takes more active role in preparedness to respond relative to their risks of their operations.

Recommendation 13 (8.4) H The New Zealand oil industry should be required to substantially upgrade and enhance their Tier 1 response capability relative to the risks of their operations.

Recommendation 14 (8.4) H The New Zealand oil industry should develop formal mutual aid arrangements between the oil industry participants in New Zealand and engage the resources of Tier 3 response organisations outside New Zealand.

8.5 MNZ Contractors

8.5.1 Wriggle Coastal Management

Leigh Stevens, the principal of Wriggle Coastal Management is an internationally recognised specialist in the use of dispersant who has developed systems and decision tools for the use and application of dispersants in New Zealand waters in the event of an oil spill. At the time of commencing this review, TCS was advised that Wriggle was not working under formal contract with MNZ and was being paid a small retainer (circa NZ$30,000) for its services. Given that Wriggle is a small company in high



demand internationally and MNZ represents a tiny proportion of that company‘s business, TCS is concerned that MNZ is in danger of losing a key locally available resource unless contractual arrangements are secured.

Recommendation 15 (8.5) M MNZ should review a formal contract for the services of advanced scientific support, including those pertaining to dispersants.

8.5.2 National Oil Wildlife Response Team

The National Oil Wildlife Response Team, based at Massey University in Palmerston North, is contracted by MNZ to supply capability and expertise in the area of avian wildlife recovery in the event of an oil spill. The value of the contract is circa $380,000 per year. The Team, which is run by veterinarian Dr Kerri Morgan, has adopted and developed internationally recognised techniques using an array of equipment based at Massey and in special blue boxes located at 16 sites around the country. A standard operating procedure (SOP) outlines the accepted best practice for oiled wildlife rescue and rehabilitation techniques following marine oil spills in New Zealand waters. It is intended to provide adequate guidance to allow a flexible, rapid and humane response to oiled wildlife incidents of any scale without compromising human safety. This document is a key reference document to the National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan and is intended as the principal reference document for the New Zealand Wildlife Health Centre (NZWHC) at Massey University, during oiled wildlife response. It is intended that Tier 2 regional oil spill contingency plans will be used in concert with this SOP to identify natural resources at risk in each region. The management of a Tier 3 oil spill is complex and involves a wide and varied range of specific responses. The response to oiled wildlife is integral as part of the wider oil spill response. TCS considers the current arrangements for wild life response to be World‘s Best Practice.

8.6 International Assistance

8.6.1 AMSA and AMOSC

The main source of international assistance to New Zealand is through the OPRC agreement that is in place with Australia. AMSA and MNZ are signatories to the agreement. The agreement lays out how Australia and New Zealand will assist each other in preparedness and response to an oil spill (Agreement is at Appendix 5). Under the agreement resources from Australia‘s National Plan (materiél and personnel), including AMOSC resources, can be made available to New Zealand. As part of the Australian National Plan arrangements, AMSA has an agreement with the AIP (Australian Institute of Petroleum). The agreement formalises the intention of AMSA and AIP to co-operate to ensure that the National Plan operates effectively and wherever possible is enhanced, and reflects the industry‘s commitment to maintain the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) as the major National Plan equipment stockpile for Australian waters. AMOSC is a subsidiary of the Australian Institute of Petroleum based in Geelong, Victoria, and is an integral part of the National Plan. In an oil spill response AMOSC has, in addition to its own staff, access to personnel from the major oil companies. AMOSC also coordinates the industry's mutual aid arrangements. An important part of the agreement is to share equally with AMSA the costs of maintaining the Australian fixed wing aerial dispersant capability. The agreement also makes the resources of AMOSC available not just to AMOSC subscriber companies, but through AMSA, to any pollution incident in Australia. In a response, New Zealand may call upon AMSA to assist, and AMSA through this agreement with the AIP/AMOSC may engage AMOSC as part of that assistance to New Zealand.



The OPRC 90 Memorandum of Agreement Part 6 says: Provision of equipment, materials or personnel under the control of the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), including equipment, materials or personnel under the control of Oil Spill Response (OSR), to Maritime New Zealand will be arranged by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority in accordance with the AMOSC/AMSA Hiring Agreement. The transfer of AMOSC equipment outside Australia is subject to the Centre Rules, which provide that in the first instance approximately one-third of the AMOSC inventory is available as the Overseas Pack. 8.6.2 OSR (Oil Spill Response)

Based in Southampton UK, OSRL (Oil Spill Response Ltd) has the largest stockpile of oil spill response equipment outside the USA, and has a mandate to operate worldwide. The company (including its Singapore based operation) provides a wide range of services and equipment in the event of a response, but also for preparedness in the areas of technical advice, contingency planning and training. Its participating members (shareholders) are 36 oil companies who are accountable for 60% of the world‘s oil production. There are also some 83 Associate members. OSR will not guarantee a response to non-members. OSR has been developing Alliances with other Tier 3 organisations globally. In May 2009 OSR and AMOSC established a ―Resources and Services Alliance‖ which gives AMOSC direct call out authority status to mobilise OSR resources for oil spill response in areas covered by AMOSC. This was indeed fortuitous timing as the Montara well head started its uncontrolled release on 21 August 2009. Through AMOSC the National Plan was able to mobilise OSR‘s assistance and an OSR C130 dispersant spraying operation was put to good effect along with 21 OSR personnel. A number of New Zealand oil industry operators advised TCS during the stakeholder consultation that in the event of a major oil spill they would be seeking to engage the services of OSR. It was not clear if the companies (or their principles) were members of OSR. 8.6.3 Australian Contractors

Australia has a number of oil spill contractors who have been involved in major national and international oil spills at operational and management levels, including incident controller and response advisers. They have significant knowledge and experience that could be employed in response to major oil spills in New Zealand.



9 Training & Exercises

9.1 MPRS Training

MNZ currently conducts training to meet the needs of personnel at spill response management and operational levels. This training is complemented by an annual oiled wildlife response training course. 9.1.1 Regional Responders

The Regional Responders course held at NOSCC Te Atatu is conducted over four days with an approximate split of two days each for training room and field activities. The course is intended to provide basic oil spill response training for equipment and field operators. As currently structured this course now includes what was the Fundamentals Course and includes elements of planning and implementation of planning at the field level. The course addresses issues that include information on New Zealand‘s oil spill response system, health and safety, response options including dispersants, containment and recovery, shoreline clean-up and waste management. A degree of practical training on oil spill response equipment is provided. A three day Regional Responders revalidation course is held to ensure that personnel attend revalidation every six years after initial qualification. 9.1.2 Site Supervisors

The two day Site Supervisors Course at NOSSC Te Atatu addresses issues that include the spill response management and field structure, incident command system, role of the supervisor, planning, communications and leadership and teamwork. The course concludes with a series of exercises on the second day. 9.1.3 On Scene Commanders

The On Scene Commanders course is conducted over five days in the Auckland area. The recently restructured course is intended to qualify individuals for initial appointment as a Regional On Scene Commander (ROSC) and to revalidate for subsequent appointment as an ROSC. This course where response management issues are discussed and individual coaching provided to participants has a pass/fail regime. 9.1.4 Oiled Wildlife Response

The Oiled Wildlife Response Course is an annual two day course for personnel appointed to New Zealand‘s National Oiled Wildlife Response Team. The course is conducted by Dr Kerri Morgan of Massey University in Palmerston North. The aim of the course is to provide participants an overview of New Zealand‘s response system with a detailed explanation of the procedures and techniques for the capture, care and rehabilitation of oiled wildlife. 9.1.5 National Response Team Training

National Response Team (NRT) training is currently provided by MPRS personnel. At the present time this is essentially equipment based training with limited focus on management level training. In response to questions concerning priority that is being given to NRT training the response was that the current focus is on the implementation of MPRS‘s revised training program, which includes the Regional Responders course. MPRS staff expressed the collective view that NRT training is not being given the priority that they believe is required. The view was the NRT is always being spoken about but ―nothing is done‖. This view tended to confirm observations made by the review team following discussions with the two managers where it was noted that priority is currently being given to the revised Regional Responders course and NRT training will be addressed in more detail later. Staff expressed the view that revising the Regional Responders course was simply a continuation of changes to this course that has been occurring for some time and things had gone ―full circle‖ and were essentially back to where they had started. There was a degree of frustration among staff that NRT training was not being given a higher degree of priority than appeared to be case at present. In view of the important role of the NRT and the potential skills, knowledge and experience that its members can bring to a spill response the decision to effectively give priority to the Regional



Responders course, a course with content that has been around in one course or another for many years, is seen to be short-sighted. The 2003 Review of MSA Equipment Levels and Types addressed a range of other matters. The review recommended New Zealand give priority to establishing a National Response Team comprising personnel from operator to management level. The key issue to note here is that the recommendation addressed not only operator personnel but also management personnel. This recommendation was supported by MNZ management. However, progress in implementing the recommendation to accommodate management level personnel has been less than optimal. Currently New Zealand has approximately 400 regional responders trained to respond to oil spills. Advice provided by MPRS operational managers is that in general terms most have been trained to a relatively low level. Of the 400 approximately 60 of these are NRT personnel who have been trained to a higher level. The view of MPRS staff is that a greater level of NRT training is required, particularly at the management level, including incident management team level. By way of example to emphasise need for NRT training at a management level it was reported that there is only a single finance person on the team. New Zealand has supported response operations in Australia and more recently the Gulf of Mexico. The knowledge and experience gained by participants and which has been captured at post-deployment debriefing sessions should be acted upon and reflected in NRT training sooner rather than later.

Recommendation 16 (9.1) H A high level of priority should be given to redeveloping NRT training at spill management, operational, wildlife and field levels. Key elements including planning, operations, logistics, finance and administration, SCAT, aerial surveillance and media training need to be incorporated in NRT training modules.

9.1.6 Training Delivery

The issue of presentation skills at MPRS facilitated training course arose during the course of discussion with regional stakeholders. The common view expressed was that whilst in general terms the scope of training presented by MPRS was appropriate those presenting the training should ideally hold a certificate in adult education and training. On occasion the style of presentation was considered to be old fashioned and inappropriate to modern learning techniques. The comment “death by PowerPoint” was offered up on a number of occasions. Reference was made to the value that accrues from access to online pre-reading material and how this would enhance the effectiveness of courses.

Recommendation 17 (9.1) M MNZ should review the potential benefits of its key presenters having a certificate in adult education and training. It is further recommended that MNZ consider making pre-reading material available online to participants prior to their attendance at courses conducted by MPRS.

9.1.7 Course content

MPRS staff observed that time had been spent unnecessarily in review and changes to the former fundamentals course and the regional responders‘ course. Simply put the view was that over time things had gone full circle with no tangible evidence of any significant benefit for the time spent in reviewing, changing and amalgamating the courses. A further view expressed by MPRS staff was that there needs to be a greater emphasis on shoreline clean-up and dispersant training. Currently these issues are addressed as modules in the regional responder course. In a number of international jurisdictions shoreline clean-up is dealt with as a standalone training course



Recommendation 18 (9.1) M MPRS should review the content and adequacy of their courses, particularly for shoreline clean-up and use of dispersants, and ensure that they are meeting the needs of response personnel.

9.1.8 Exercises

MPRS staff reported that they had only conducted Tier 2 response exercises for offshore platforms and FPSO‘s. No matter how well managed; the four platforms and two FPSO‘s, one with a production platform, off the New Plymouth coast, present a significant spill risk that in all probability would be a Tier 3 spill.

Recommendation 19 (9.1) M MNZ, in conjunction and with the support of the offshore oil industry, should develop and implement a regular Tier 3 combined desktop and equipment mobilisation exercise program to test response arrangements at the platforms and FPSOs.

9.2 Regional Council Training

Regional Councils conduct two exercises annually, for example Northland Regional Council‘s exercise program generally revolves around deployment of the Roulunds Ro-Bay boom and a combined desktop and equipment deployment exercise. Their most recent exercises were held in November 2009 and May 2010 to coincide with quiet periods in the region. The desire to conduct exercises during quiet periods within council and port operations was a view expressed by other agencies also. Reflecting experience gained from his attendance at a spill in Australia that had a high element of shoreline clean-up operations Northland‘s maritime officer (and a Regional On Scene Commander) developed and managed a beach cleaning exercise. This was seen to be a positive application in an exercise setting of knowledge and experience obtained when representing New Zealand as a member of its National Response Team (NRT) at an incident overseas and a practical example of how lessons learned can be provided to other members of the country‘s response community. The most recent exercise conducted by Northland Regional Council where a helicopter was employed for dispersant spraying training clearly demonstrates this is a council where the lessons of history have been learned and are being applied in a constructive way that provides good learning outcomes. Well thought out exercises are important. We are aware of a case in a region where a lack of imagination saw an annual exercise that simply involved the deployment and recovery of sections of Roulunds Ro-Bay boom in the same location year after year with no measurable benefit to the council concerned. Notwithstanding the example discussed above, it is important that high end equipment such as Roulunds Ro-Bay boom, Terminator skimmers and support systems including recovered oil barges are deployed and exercised in the regions. As noted in a previous review “it is difficult to maintain skills levels unless equipment is deployed on a reasonably regular basis in the environment for which it is intended.” Failure to do so will result in poor equipment deployment and operating techniques and damage to the equipment as occurred at a relatively recent incident overseas because appropriate training has not been provided, or relatively inexperienced personnel are used to deploy and operate equipment in situations for which they have not been trained. It is equally important that experienced trainers and those who have used the equipment in training and operations are used to demonstrate the equipment. MPRS has highly experienced equipment technicians, including one who worked for a large international oil spill response cooperative before joining MNZ. The skills of individuals such as this can be utilised in ensuring that regional council staff continue to be trained on major spill response systems in the environment in which they are intended to operate. Limited value accrues from providing training on the larger and more complex systems in a central location when there is the opportunity to train personnel in the regions where spills occur.

Recommendation 20 (9.2) H MNZ/MPRS should ensure that a wide range of equipment, including high end equipment, is deployed and exercised in the regions.



9.3 Industry Training

During stakeholder discussions, oil industry participants referred to the training provided by MPRS. Generally their comments were complimentary and positive. All the oil industry operators that TCS spoke to had staff members who had participated in MPRS training. They said the main issue with the MPRS training and exercise regime was that it seemed to lack clear objectives and outcomes. Training/exercises could also be more focussed on the local region. Industry was keen to have training specifically tailored to their needs. They were also of the view that this training could be provided by MPRS. There is an opportunity here for MPRS and MNZ to engage with the oil industry and develop a training package specifically tailored to the oil industry needs. This training could be delivered by MPRS on a cost recovery basis. The issue of industry training also arose during discussions with MPRS staff. In general terms they supported MPRS providing dedicated training to industry personnel in order to ensure that there are sufficiently trained personnel available to initiate and sustain the response to a spill from an industry facility. Failure to do this will result in industry personnel continuing to be “drip fed” through the regional responder course without any chance of ensuring that industry has sufficient numbers of trained personnel available when needed.

Recommendation 21 (9.3) M MNZ/MPRS should engage with the New Zealand oil industry and develop an oil spill response training package specifically tailored to the oil industry needs.



10 Equipment

TCS reviewed Maritime New Zealand‘s (MNZ) equipment and dispersant holdings and associated systems to ensure that New Zealand is equipped with sufficient and appropriate equipment to respond effectively to oil spills. A major spill will always generate the need for a range of equipment, not only large, heavy-duty equipment. It is therefore appropriate and prudent that TCS review the adequacy of MNZ‘s current equipment holdings with a view to recommending a more appropriate mix of equipment. To give effect to its responsibilities and obligations under New Zealand‘s Oil Spill Response Strategy, the international OPRC Convention and the MTA 94, MNZ owns a broad range of oil spill response equipment. In general terms a significant quantity of this equipment is that which is intended to respond to major oil spills and comprises heavy duty boom and large skimmers. This equipment provides New Zealand the capability to respond effectively to larger oil spills. However, it takes time to prepare and deploy heavy duty equipment. Advice provided by representatives of regional councils and port companies is that it could take some two to three hours to prepare and deploy this equipment. Taking into account logistic support resource and personnel availability the experience of TCS personnel in the management and operation of oil spill response equipment is that regional council staff underestimated their estimate of time that it would take to deploy this equipment. Time is of the essence in spill response operations and it is essential that response agencies have access to equipment that is not only effective but of a size and weight that facilitates quick deployment if the potential effects of an oil spill are to be mitigated successfully. In 2003 a Review of MSA Equipment Levels and Types resulted in the purchase of additional response equipment and the write-off and disposal of obsolete equipment. Those conducting the review were also required to give effect to the New Zealand Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy and to international best practice in relation to equipment type and holdings. For indicative costs of TCS’s recommended equipment purchases and disposals, refer to the Table in Section 10.9.


Regional Councils and port companies made it quite clear that they require access to lighter and more easily deployed equipment in the first few hours of a response. However their representatives clearly recognised that heavy duty high capacity equipment has a key role to play when New Zealand is confronted with a major oil spill. Their view supports the observation that response agencies should not rely only upon heavy duty high capacity skimmers and offshore booms when a major spill occurs within sheltered bays and harbours. In 2001 an Audit of Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Efficiency conducted by PWC found that rapid response to a spill is essential and quick action can assist in reducing the risk of further spillage, minimising the resources and costs involved in containing and cleaning up the spill and reducing the risk of environmental damage. Members of regional councils at the time questioned the suitability of some MNZ (then MSA) equipment for rapid deployment. Some of those interviewed described the equipment as bulky and labour intensive and therefore not always ideally suited to rapid deployment if adequate personnel resources were not immediately available. The comments provided to PWC in 2001 were remarkably similar to those given to TCS 2010, albeit by different individuals. Clearly regional councils continue to believe that more can be done to facilitate a faster response to an incident through the provision of lighter weight more easily deployed equipment in those essential early hours of a response. Regional council representatives also advised PWC of the time taken to access MNZ equipment that is stored in wooden storage boxes. Whilst it was acknowledged that there were valid reasons for storing equipment in boxes it was also acknowledged that the equipment could be stored in other ways which provided the required level of security but also facilitated rapid deployment.



Recommendation 22 (10.1) H MNZ/MPRS should engage with the Regional Councils and other stakeholders regarding their oil spill response equipment needs and risk context and ensure that appropriate equipment is supplied to the Regional Councils.

10.2 Booms

Following the 2003 Review an additional 200 metres of Roulunds Ro-Bay boom was purchased to complement and bring to 1,800 metres New Zealand‘s overall holdings of this type of boom. This then allowed 600 metres each to be held at three strategic locations (NOSSC Te Atatu, Whangarei and New Plymouth). Additional equipment related activities undertaken since the 2003 Review include the purchase of Structurflex air curtain boom to replace obsolete and damaged solid buoyancy fence boom and the replacement of Slickbar Mk10 solid buoyancy boom with Structurflex 350mm rapid deployment solid buoyancy curtain boom. 10.2.1 Rapid Response Boom

A number of regional councils and port operators expressed concern at the lack of availability of suitable boom that would facilitate an initial quick but effective response to a major oil spill. In response to such concerns it is noted that MNZ is currently rolling out rapid response boom.

Recommendation 23 (10.2) M The current rollout of rapid response boom should continue until ports/facilities in identified high risk areas have a sufficient quantity of rapid response boom on site to allow operators to initiate an effective first response.

10.2.2 Trelleborg Giant Troilboom

The 2003 Review recommended that the three obsolete Giant Troilboom systems be written off. This was accepted. Based on the acceptance of this recommendation it is suggested that the system still in storage at Marsden Point be disposed of and replaced with a current generation trawl system such as the Harbour Buster. After the disposal of the three obsolete Giant Troilboom systems MNZ purchased a Harbour Buster system. In view of the fact that three trawl systems were disposed of and there is still a demonstrated need for such systems, it follows two additional Harbour Buster systems are needed to complement that held at NOSSC Te Atatu - these should be Marsden Point and New Plymouth.

Recommendation 24 (10.2) H Two Harbour Buster systems or some other suitable option should be purchased for location at Marsden Point and New Plymouth, and that the Troilboom at Marsden Point be disposed of.

10.3 Skimmers

New Zealand has oil recovery devices that fall into two reasonably distinct categories, small lightweight easily deployed skimmers and large heavier duty skimmers that require access to cranes and forklifts for deployment. The small skimmers have theoretical oil recovery rates of less than ten tonne per hour whilst the larger units have theoretical oil recovery rates of up to 100 tonne per hour. The fourteen Komara 12K disc skimmers with a nominal recovery rate of 12 tonne per hour that are situated at ports and other locations are no longer supported by the manufacturer by way of spare parts and other services. There are no new generation lighter weight multi-head skimmers with recovery rates that sit between the small and large skimmers referred to above currently held in MNZ‘s equipment inventory. It should be noted that regional councils have access to lightweight easily deployed skimmer systems such as Foilex, and Global weir skimmers and rope mop units. However, these are intended for use in



response to small spills and are, therefore, limited in their ability to respond effectively to larger spills. Councils also have access to Vikoma Komara 12K disc skimmers. 10.3.1 Multi-Head Skimmers

MNZ holds two Aquaguard multi-head skimmers at NOSSC. Whilst they reflect current technology insofar as being multi-head skimmers they are considered obsolete for a number of reasons. One such reason is the units‘ hydraulic oil capacity. Unfortunately the capacity is limited to the extent that the oil overheats quite rapidly, particularly when operating in warm to hot weather which then results in the units being inoperable. These units should be written off as obsolete and replaced with current and effective multi-head units suitable for the recovery of a range of oil types up to 30-40 tonne per hour. Examples of suitable skimmers include:


Lamor Slickbar Multi Skimmer LMS/S Purchase of such skimmers possibly six, will address not only the observations by the review team but also the concerns expressed by regional councils that there is no reasonable intermediate capacity between the small low capacity and large high capacity skimmers that are currently available. These new multi-head skimmers should not be placed at all New Zealand ports but at strategic locations that recognise findings from the recent risk assessment study, i.e. they be placed in high risk areas, such as Northland RC, Taranaki RC, Auckland RC, Canterbury RC, Southland RC and at NOSSC Ti Atatu.

Recommendation 25 (10.3) M MNZ should purchase (possibly six) new multi head skimmers of either:


Lamor Slickbar Multi Skimmer LMS/S

and the two Aquaguard multi head skimmers be disposed of.

10.3.2 Vikoma Komara 12K Disc Skimmers

MNZ has fourteen examples of this type of skimmer which are effective on lighter oils. Advice provided to TCS representatives by Vikoma is that the company no longer supports the Komara 12K by way of spare parts and other services. MNZ needs to assess the availability of a suitable skimmer to replace the Komara 12K units which are no longer supported by the manufacturer and are approaching obsolescence following changes in technology. It is noted that MNZ has purchased a Komara Mini Skimmer System with a nominal recovery rate of 7 tonnes per hour for evaluation as a replacement for the 12K.

Recommendation 26 (10.3) M MNZ should assess the availability and purchase suitable skimmers (possibly the Komara Mini Skimmer System) to monitor and replace as necessary the fourteen Komara 12K units that are reaching their end of life cycle and are no longer supported by the manufacturer.

10.3.3 Rope Mop Skimmers

A range of rope mop skimmers are held by MNZ. Whilst there was some suggestion that some be replaced, particularly the older larger units it is suggested that these be retained for the present time. They still represent technology that is in use today and have a role to play in spill response operations. 10.3.4 Skimmer Oil Recovery Rate

In relation to oil recovery rates it needs to be recognised that when specifying skimmer recovery rates manufacturers generally quote the output capacity of the offloading pump. This is not a true indication of skimming capacity. When preparing technical specifications to facilitate the purchase of skimmers purchasing agencies should specify that the nameplate capacity of the skimmer be determined by the ASTM Standard F-2709-08 Standard Test for Determining Nameplate Recovery Rate of Stationary Oil Skimmer Systems.



10.4 Oil Recovery Vessels (ORVs)

Based on experience and lessons learned from the Jody F Millennium spill at Gisborne in, 2002 and the Tai Ping grounding later the same year at Bluff, where AMSA made available a Marco ORV and crew to support response contingency arrangements, the 2003 Review recommended that New Zealand purchase two ORVs. With the support of the New Zealand Refining Company Ltd three Slickbar Dynamic Incline Plane (DIP) ORVs were purchased (Taranui, Marsden Point, Tukuperu, Picton and Kuaka, NOSSC Te Atatu). The Taranui is leased by the New Zealand Refining Company Ltd at Marsden Point. These major capital items were purchased in 2004/2005 and are due for replacement in 2029/2030. Consideration should be given to a phased replacement program for these ORVs that spans a period greater than the two years 2029/2030. The Te Atatu unit is intended to provide a response capacity to a major spill wherever it occurs in New Zealand. On the face of it the decision to hold the unit at Te Atatu appears reasonable. However consideration should be given to placing this unit with the Auckland Regional Council for response operations at the port in the first instance with the unit being available to respond to a major spill elsewhere. Auckland is one of New Zealand‘s major ports and provides bunkering services to clients. Typically, 12,000 tonnes of ship bunkers are provided each month (this figure fluctuates with the actual figure being 30,000 tonnes in October 2010). In 2008 and 2009 Auckland had four oil spills that involved sludge or spills of heavy fuel oil ranging from 350 to 1,500 litres. Access to an ORV would have been of value during the response. The option of retaining the ORV Kuaka at Te Atatu and deploying it from there to Auckland has been considered. Firstly the unit is not available for immediate use as trailer weight restrictions mean there is a requirement for the DIP400 module and power pack to travel separately and then be assembled on arrival at its destination, e.g. Auckland. Launching at Te Atatu is tidal dependent and requires a subsequent 50 to 60 minute transit to Auckland commercial ports. On balance there is merit in having the unit stored assembled at Auckland port and available for immediate use. The issue of transit times to RNZAF Whenuapai for deployment by Hercules aircraft has been considered. Transit time from Ta Atatu to Whenuapai is approximately 25 minutes and 35 minutes from the proposed storage location at Auckland‘s Outboard Boating Club In summary there appears to be no advantage in retaining the ORV Kuaka at Te Atatu when it could be serving a useful purpose as a response vessel at the nearby major port and from where it can be redeployed equally swiftly from Auckland as Te Atatu should the need arise. It is recommended that MPRS liaise with the Auckland Council Harbour Master Office with the aim of relocating the Kuaka to the Outboard Boating Club under the care of the Harbour Master. The proposal is that MPRS retain control, maintenance and associated costs with Kuaka available to the Harbour Master under a management plan to respond to Tier 2 spills as appropriate. The Auckland Harbour Master Office has a duty officer available 24/7 and access to Kuaka would not be an issue.

Recommendation 27 (10.4) M With regard to the three ORVs, MNZ should review the life cycle of the ORVs and develop a replacement program that spans a greater period than the current life cycle.

Recommendation 28 (10.4) M MNZ should relocate the ORV Kuaka from Te Atatu to a location on Auckland Harbour under the oversight of the Auckland Harbour Master

10.5 Recovered Oil Storage Systems

An obsolete 100 tonne capacity Pollutank recovered oil tank has been replaced by six 10 tonne capacity tow tanks.



10.6 Dispersants and Dispersant Application Systems

MNZ holds a range of dispersants suitable for application to differing oil types, including heavy fuel oil. Arguably, the most effective dispersant for use on heavier oils, including crude oil, is Corexit 9500. New Zealand‘s entire 30,000 litres stock of Corexit 9500 is held at NOSSC Te Atatu. Obsolete Warren Spring Laboratory (WSL) dispersal equipment was written off and replaced by smaller 50 litre capacity units. WSL equipment was designed to respond to a range of spill sizes from small to large, including offshore response operations where conditions allowed its use. The capability of the more recently purchased units are considered to be suitable for smaller spills only and New Zealand therefore requires equipment to respond to larger spills, including offshore operations. 10.6.1 Dispersant Location

NOSSC Te Atatu holds approximately 30,000 litres of Corexit 9500 dispersant. Half the current holding should be relocated to New Plymouth for response to a major oil spill. This recognises the risk that exists in the region and the movement of stock from Te Atatu to New Plymouth will lessen considerably the time taken to put in place the dispersant response option should it be required. 10.6.2 Dispersant Storage Sites

Advice provided by MPRS operational management personnel is that MNZ has redistributed dispersant holdings to give effect to new national storage guidelines for this type of product. Whilst the reason for redistribution as stated is noted it is considered that any distribution should have been on the basis of spill risk rather than to give effect to new storage guidelines. MNZ should review its current holdings and locations to ensure that dispersant storage location, type and quantity is appropriate and based on spill risk rather than simply compliance with national storage guidelines. It may well be that the result of such a review will confirm some of the current arrangements, however it is considered that robust review is needed to confirm to MNZ management that storage locations, type and quantity are appropriate to risk. 10.6.3 Dispersant Drums

Dispersant stocks are held in aging and rusting 200 litre drums. MNZ should initiate a program to decant dispersant stocks from steel drums into 1,000 litre intermediate bulk containers (IBCs).

Recommendation 29 (10.6) H There should be a suitable percentage of the New Zealand stock of the dispersant Corexit 9500 (30,000 litres) located in the New Plymouth area.

Recommendation 30 (10.6) M MNZ should ensure that all dispersant storage sites comply with the New Zealand chemical storage guidelines for these products.

Recommendation 31 (10.6) M Sufficient 1,000 litre IBCs should be acquired to enable dispersant to be decanted from aging steel drums.

10.6.4 Vessel Application Systems

The 2003 Review recommended that the obsolete WSL equipment be written off. This was accepted and done. Replacement was by way of 50 litre dispersant systems. These replacement systems are considered suitable for response to small but not large spills. A system suitable for use in large spills and offshore operations is still considered necessary. It is recommended MNZ purchase two AFEDO spray systems developed by Ayles Fernie in the United Kingdom for use from vessels of opportunity. Each system comprises a power pack and pump, manifolds and two boomless AFEDO spray nozzles complete with transportation and storage box. It is further recommended that one unit be held at NOSSC Te Atatu and the other at New Plymouth.



10.6.5 Aerial Systems

Two Simplex helicopter borne spray buckets are held at NOSSC Te Atatu. To recognise the recent risk assessment study it is recommended that one system be relocated to New Plymouth for response to a major oil spill. This recognises the risk that exists in the region and the movement of one bucket from Te Atatu to New Plymouth will lessen considerably the time taken to put in place the dispersant response option should it be required in the Taranaki region.

Recommendation 32 (10.6) M Two AFEDO dispersant spray systems, for fitting to vessels of opportunity, should be purchased and located at NOSSC Te Atatu and New Plymouth.

Recommendation 33 (10.6) H One of the Simplex helicopter-borne dispersant spray bucket systems should be relocated from NOSSC Te Atatu to New Plymouth.

10.7 Communications Equipment

The 2003 Review recommended the purchase of two portable satellite telephone systems to provide acceptable emergency response communications in remote areas. In 2010 MNZ purchased a satellite broadband communications system, a VHF over internet system, a VHF digital base station and digital repeater and VHF handsets to enhance response communications to give effect to the recommendation.

10.8 Yokohama Fenders

It was suggested to the review team by one representative at MPRS that there may be little if any benefit in MNZ retaining ownership of its Yokohama fenders. In essence the suggestion has merit, particularly as AMSA disposed of its Yokohama fenders some years back. However, this needs to be balanced by an ability for authorities to be able to access fenders at short notice should the need arise. If there is doubt that fenders can be sourced, by authorities or salvors, at short notice when required then it is recommended that they be retained.

10.9 Recommended Equipment Purchases and Indicative Costings

The table below summarises recommended Equipment Acquisitions and Disposals (MNZ OPPRC 2010) Reco # Equipment Acquisition Units Cost/unit Total Cost

Booms

22 Rapid response boom

23 Harbour Buster 2 $476,000 $952,000

Skimmers

24 Medium capacity skimmers – possibly six


3 $45,000 $135,000

Lamor Slickbar Multi Skimmer LMS/S 3 $50,000 $150,000

25 Komara Mini Skimmer System (to replace 14 Vikoma Komara 12k skimmers)

14 $34,000 $476,000

Dispersants

30 1,000 lts IBCs (intermediate bulk containers) for 40,000 lts

40 $330 $13,200

31 AFEDO 50 spray system 2 $38,000 $76,000 TOTAL $1,952,200



Reco # Equipment Disposals Units Closing value Total Cost

23 Troil Boom 1 $1,687 $1,687

24 Aquaguard Skimmer 2 $41,444 $82,888

25 Kamara Skimmer 8 $16,637 $133,096

25 Kamara Skimmer 6 $29,729 $178,374 TOTAL $396,045

New equipment prices are estimates in $NZ obtained from manufacturers in January 2011. Disposal closing values are from OPF FA Detailed Schedule – Book 06/2011 – Book closing value.



11 Towage and Salvage

11.1 New Zealand Capability Overall

New Zealand‘s towage capability beyond enclosed water harbour towage is limited as witnessed at the time of the Jody F Millennium incident. This section of the report reviews the capability residing in the principal New Zealand ports, that is provided by third parties (i.e. PB Sea-Tow and the offshore supply vessels serving the Taranaki Basin), and that which might be called on from Eastern Australia.

11.2 Harbour Towage Capability

Appendix 6 provides a profile of the towage capability with a bollard pull in excess of 20 tonnes currently existing in New Zealand‘s 12 principal ports. Typically this fleet of 29 tugs is only crewed to provide services in enclosed waters (i.e. within port limits) as is the case at Centreport Wellington. Port Taranaki is the critical exception, given its need to provide services to the oil and gas operations in the offshore oil and gas fields. As a result it has three tugs with BP of 40, 30 and 28 tonnes respectively equipped and crewed for open water operations. All three have fire fighting capability and the value of this resource is demonstrated by the recent rescue by the Taranaki tug Rupe of Pacifica‘s coastal vessel, Spirit of Resolution, when it lost its rudder in a storm last September on departure from Onehunga. Other ports with powerful tugs (c.60+ BP), built within the last 10 years are:

Northport – Bream Bay: 65 BP

Napier – Akuriri: 70 BP

Wellington - Tiaki: 68 BP

Lyttelton – Black Adder: 62.5 BP

Otago – Otago: 58 BP This distribution around the North and South Islands is potentially helpful in addressing incidents in NZ waters.

11.3 Third Party Capability

As previously mentioned there is limited third party commercial open water towage and salvage capability in New Zealand waters that might be available for a marine pollution incident outside port limits. 11.3.1 PB SeaTow

PB Sea-Tow as a commercial tug and barge company headquartered in Auckland owns or operates a significant tug fleet in the SW Pacific numbering some 12 vessels, 75% of which have a bollard pull in excess of 20 tonnes. Details are provided in Appendix 6. However all except two of this fleet are under Cook Islands flag and are now operating in Australia, primarily in WA and Queensland under commercial contracts of anything between 6 months and 3 years. Given the flag under which they are registered, and the location and duration of their current commercial commitment, effectively they would not be available for any marine oil pollution emergency in New Zealand waters. Besides its Cook Island flagged fleet, PB SeaTow does manage and operate two New Zealand flag tugs in open New Zealand waters. MV Koraki (125GT, 16T BP) operates under contract to Golden Bay Cement and tows their cement barge between Auckland and Whangarei. MV Kokiri (252GT, 21T BP) operates under contract to Port Marlborough and is based at Picton to provide towage services for the woodchip vessels using that port. Subject to agreement with the contracted customers these two vessels could be available for open water anti-pollution initiatives. 11.3.2 Offshore

In addition there are normally not less than two offshore supply boat/oil & gas work vessels based in Port Taranaki in connection with the offshore energy exploration and production activities in the Taranaki Basin. Currently these are two anchor handling supply vessels, the Pacific Chieftain (1297 GT, 60m LOA), and the Swiber Torunn (1537 GT, 58m LOA). The first is Singapore flag and the



second Marshall Islands. While such vessels come and go there are normally a couple of comparable workboats based in New Plymouth and sometimes more, depending on the exploration programmes in the Taranaki Basin. Availability for offshore anti-pollution initiatives would depend on commercial negotiation unless the incident happened to involve one of the facilities these vessels were contracted to service. In addition Marsol Shipping base the Panama flagged diving support vessel Marsol Pride (1798 GT 60m LOA) in Nelson under the management of Unimar Ltd. Availability for offshore anti-pollution initiatives would depend on commercial negotiation unless the incident happened to involve one of the facilities these vessels were contracted to service.

11.4 Australian Capability

As was the case with the Jody F Millennium at Gisborne, there is the potential to call on towage capability from Australia in an emergency, either under the reciprocal arrangements between MNZ and AMSA or on a directly negotiated commercial basis. It should be borne in mind that any such capability will take 4 – 5 days to mobilise and arrive on site in New Zealand depending on where the tugs are based at the time. 11.4.1 Svitzer

This operator has 6 tugs currently based on the east coast of Australia that are suitable for emergency response work.

Tug Port Built GRT LOA HP kW Bollard

Pull Class Type Fire Fighting

(foam)

Austral Salvor Brisbane 1986 470 34 4800 3579 64 ABS ASD Yes

Wickham Newcastle 1990 496 37 4800 3580 50 LR VSP Yes

Woona Sydney 1984 423 32 3600 2685 50

ASD Yes

Keera Melbourne 1986 480 34 4800 3600 62 ABS ASD Yes

Cooma Westernport 1983 473 34 3800 2835 50 LR ASD Yes

Hastings Westernport 1983 473 34 3800 2835 50 LR ASD Yes

The tugs listed above are committed to harbour towage work in the ports indicated. Under NMERA Svitzer is also contracted to AMSA to maintain an emergency towing vessel (ETV) for the ocean area adjacent to where these tugs are based. In the event of an incident or potential incident that could result in environmental damage to the Australian coastline AMSA can invoke its powers of intervention and direct Svitzer to send a tug to a casualty. In 3 years, over quite a few incidents AMSA has only invoked these powers on one occasion; however in that period Svitzer has responded to a number of incidents by reaching a commercial agreement with the shipowner involved. If powers of intervention are not involved, then due to shipping schedules it may not be possible to release a tug from port duties without running into service issues in the port and having to deal an unhappy port and its customers. There are three hurdles to get over to release a tug, and all require a relief tug to be in place. 1. Commitments in the port 2. ETV coverage in Australia 3. Svitzer Salvage requirements Dispatch of a tug/tugs to New Zealand is therefore neither easy nor necessarily very effective given the lead time – although in the case of the Jody F Millennium it worked out positively as it has with other incidents elsewhere in the SW Pacific.



11.4.2 PB Towage

Similarly PB Towage has a growing towage fleet in eastern Australia. Currently it has 3 tugs that might be suitable for emergency work in New Zealand as detailed in the following table.

Tug Port Built GRT LOA HP Bollard Pull Type

PB Leichardt Townsville 2010 294 29 5000 64 ASD

PB Herbert Townsville 2010 294 29 5000 50 ASD

PB Hunter Sydney 2000 297 29 4000 50 ASD

The same constraints would apply to their deployment in New Zealand as for the Svitzer vessels. 11.4.3 Smit

Additionally, as of January 2011, Smit has a five year contract to provide 5 x 30m LOA 70T bollard pull LNG compatible tugs to the port of Gladstone with an option for a 3 year extension. These are brand new Robert Allan designed Uzmar built vessels and registered with AMSA as emergency response/salvage capable under NMERA. In addition there will be a 6

th tug based at Gladstone to

handle spot business in Queensland within 36 hours steaming of the base location– this is a Damen 3211 new build of similar capability. Technically these vessels could also provide emergency services in New Zealand. 11.4.4 Issues and Opportunities

Given the lack of open water towage capability in New Zealand, careful consideration needs to be given to a number of options for improving it:

Negotiating with ports additional to Taranaki to register and crew selected vessels so they are available for open water operations

Discussing with North Port (who are rumoured to be considering upgrading their harbour tugs) a cost sharing arrangement whereby the new tugs would have an open water capability

Discussing with the Royal New Zealand Navy, whom we understand are considering the design and ordering of a replacement dive vessel, the possibility of a shared multi-purpose vessel with emergency response capability (both anti-pollution and salvage)

Reviewing and confirming with AMSA the mechanism whereby MNZ might access Australian towage capability under NMERA.



12 Value for Money

It is apparent that OSR arrangements vary considerably from country to country and are in important characteristics effectively unique to each jurisdiction. Because of the highly variable nature of OSR arrangements, it was considered inappropriate to attempt a value-for-money comparison of New Zealand arrangements with those of other jurisdictions. Furthermore, it must be remembered that a value-for-money comparison makes the implicit assumption that the comparison is between a jurisdiction that is being tested (i.e., New Zealand) and a jurisdiction which is assumed to be a ‗benchmark‘ in its OSR function. Without such a ‗benchmark‘, value-for-money comparisons would be misleading or invalid. It is considered that because the internal workings of OSR functions are so variable, making a value-for-money comparison must be made using parameters that are common to different jurisdictions. Examples of such parameters are: 1. The amount of money spent maintaining a response capability. 2. The amount of money spent responding to actual spills. 3. The amount of money recovered from spillers after a clean-up has been mounted.

For example, the ratio of money spent maintaining a response capability to money recovered from spillers could be used as a straightforward measure of OSR efficiency. Note that values produced by this approach are only comparable in relative terms. In others words, there is no value derived from a comparison which gives rise to an absolute measure of value-for-money. In its most pragmatic sense, the fundamental questions are:

Is the level of service appropriate and cost effective?

Is New Zealand getting value for money?

Can it get better value for money?

Under the current system, MNZ annually recovers about $3m from payers of the Oil Pollution Levy. It spends more than $4m annually on maintaining a response capability. Therefore, it could be argued the current payers of the Oil Pollution Levy are currently getting exceptional value for money, but of course such a financial environment is unsustainable because this is being achieved by drawing on reserves accumulated over a number of years.

TCS is of the view that if the key recommendations in this report are implemented then the question of value for money will be answered. By rationalising the Regional Council into several notional groupings instead of the current 16 separate response agencies, bringing budgetary control of training and exercises directly under MPRS, increasing the contribution of the ports and oil industries under Tier 1, upgrading, modernising and geographically better targeting response equipment to meet the risk profile and changing trends in fuel use, all adds up to an enhanced value for money proposition.



13 Trends in the Future Operating Environment

13.1 New Zealand Liner Trades

Container liner services calling at New Zealand are changing, particularly over the last 4 years (2007 – 2011), which straddle the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It could be argued some of the industry responses to the GFC where major international container ports saw declines in container volumes of 15% or more in 2009 and leading container ship operators incurred financial losses of upwards of US$1b were atypical. However we consider that unlikely in New Zealand, where a number of factors encourage operators to rationalise their services, namely:

A small total international market (at around 2.5m Teus p.a. full and empty, which is less than half that of Australia, which in turn is only 20% of the total throughput of Singapore)

Imbalanced trade flows - exports exceed imports in all ports except Auckland, where the reverse is true, and Lyttelton – roughly balanced.

Imbalanced box flows by type with strong inbound flows of dry 40 ft containers and outbound flows of refrigerated containers, both 20 ft and 40 ft

11 ports all competing particularly for international exports. The net impact of these characteristics can be seen in three trends: 1. A tendency to rationalise and merge services 2. A tendency to reduce the number of port calls in any given service to reduce costs 3. A tendency to increase vessel size to gain economies of scale and lower box slot cost These trends have in a number of cases combined and resulted in a reduction of port calls in New Zealand by international ships, which in turn leads to hubbing, use of domestic feeders (primarily Pacifica and Strait Shipping) and overseas transhipment, particularly for European services over either Australia or Singapore/Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia. The liner RoRo trades (both general cargo and specialist car carriers) are not expected to change radically unless local demand grows dramatically. Both are likely to continue to call at a prime port in the North Island (Auckland supplemented to a degree by Wellington) and one in the South Island (Nelson or Lyttelton). There is little to suggest that the international liner container trades will not continue to rationalise their New Zealand schedules, reduce the number of direct ports calls via hubbing (Auckland, Tauranga & Lyttelton) and introduce progressively larger ships. This subject is the focus of a recent detailed research by the New Zealand Shippers Council (NZSC) in the Big Ships Study. This trend will in turn lead to a growth in the number of port calls for both domestic and Tasman services (which at present are as much domestic feeder as Tasman services) together with a more limited growth in ship size compared with the long haul international trades due to port infrastructure constraints (wet and dry side). Overall this will reduce the locations of and likelihood for larger oil spills from long haul international ships but may increase their potential size. In turn the numerical chances of smaller spills from domestic or regional vessels may increase across a broad front across New Zealand.

13.2 Tanker, Bulk and Break Bulk

There is little to indicate that there will be significant changes to the size and distribution of tanker shipments on the New Zealand coast in the foreseeable future. Similarly, bulk and breakbulk ships are likely to operate similar volumes and distribution patterns to that which exists today.

13.3 Environmental Constraints

The remote location of New Zealand, its geography and rugged coastline, maritime climate and exposure to cold open seas, all contribute to a unique set of issues when attempting to address a marine oil spill.



The unpredictable nature of the sea conditions around New Zealand (particularly on the West Coast which is exposed to the prevailing SW‘ly winds) coupled with low sea temperatures make tackling an offshore oil spill extremely difficult. The universal view amongst the experts consulted in this Review was that spill containment efforts would most likely be restricted to port waters or on the shoreline and not at sea. The focus therefore must largely be on a shoreline-based response. Much of New Zealand‘s coastline involves remote areas where access is difficult and Regional Councils need to ensure that they have a detailed understanding of the coastline in their areas and how to access it other than by sea. This information needs to be widely disseminated around the oil spill response community to ensure quick and effective action when the need arises. The use of dispersant in highly environmentally sensitive areas must be handled with care, but TCS observed that MNZ appears to have systems in place to monitor the use of such dispersants in an oil spill and ensure that Regional Councils and community groups are conversant with the efficacy and limitations of dispersants. Notes on the condition and disposal of dispersant in stock are to be found in Section 9.6.3.

13.4 Regulatory Issues

New international regulations which are due to come into effect in coming years should have a notable influence on the safety, integrity and environmental impact of ocean going ships. The first relates to remotely locating bunker tanks on new ships so as to reduce the possibility of these tanks being breached on impact with another object. The second related to carbon emissions. Changes to marine engine emissions will mean that in future, ships will not need to use the heavy grade fuel oils (e.g. Bunker C) that are currently utilised. From an OSR perspective, these lighter fuels will be easier to handle and possibly more amenable to the use of dispersant and may render obsolete some of the current equipment used to tackle oil spills.

13.5 Lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon and Montara

Two major oil spills in the offshore industry in the past two years have heightened global and regional attention on the sector. The largest of these - on BP's Deepwater Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico - killed 11 workers on April 22, 2010 and discharged 4.9m barrels of crude oil into the Gulf before the leak was capped on July 15. This equates to 57,650 barrels a day. Closer to home (and considerably smaller in scale), in August 2009, there was an uncontrolled release of oil and gas from the Montara Wellhead Platform, which seeped between 400 and 2,000 barrels a day of oil into the Timor Sea for a period of 74 days. The volume of oil spilt from the Montara was Australia‘s third largest oil spill after the Kirki oil tanker in 1991 and the Princess Anne Marie oil tanker in 1975. However, the blowout is the worst of its kind in Australia‘s offshore petroleum industry history. New Zealand has not been immune to offshore incidents. In October and November 2010, oil company OMV New Zealand, part of the Austrian OMV Group, reported two oil spills from the Raroa floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel, which it charters from Singapore based ship management company Tanker Pacific. The vessel is permanently moored in the Maari oil field 80km off the Taranaki Coast. Both spills, which were small in volume, were immediately reported to MNZ and action was quickly taken by the company to minimise their impact. The official government reports into the Deepwater Horizon and Montara incidents both demonstrated patterns of industry complacency and failure to adhere to Standard Operating Procedures. A US presidential panel in its final report on the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in January called for an overhaul of oil industry practices and the creation of an independent safety watchdog to avoid a repeat of the disaster. The report said the central lesson to be drawn from the catastrophe is that no less than an overhauling of both current industry practices and government oversight is now required. To assure human safety and environmental protection, regulatory oversight of leasing, energy exploration, and production require reforms even beyond those significant reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon disaster.



Weeks after an explosion, US Interior Secretary Ken Salazar broke up the federal agency that oversaw rig safety and sold leases to oil companies. However, the commission called for even tougher measures, urging in the report that the US government "create an independent agency within the Department of the Interior with enforcement authority to oversee all aspects of offshore drilling safety." The panel also put some of the burden on the oil industry to reach and maintain "dramatically increased" safety standards called for in the report. The report said that because regulatory oversight alone would not be sufficient to ensure adequate safety, the oil and gas industry would need to take its own, unilateral steps to increase dramatically safety throughout the industry, including self-policing mechanisms that supplement governmental enforcement. The Australian Government Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, published in November 2010, echoed the theme of the US report, stating that the incident on the NW Shelf was caused by operator complacency and a lack of adherence to standard operating procedures, not just the extension of casing in the horizontal well section. The commission of inquiry revealed gaping holes in the oversight of what ostensibly was a routine operation in shallow water. The report highlighted glaring lapses in regulatory oversight by Australia's federal-state regime. It described the Northern Territory Department of Resources as "not a sufficiently diligent regulator", adopting a "minimalist approach to its regulatory responsibilities". Regulation of Australian offshore oil activities is still to be overhauled. It relies on federal-state cooperation and the Australian Government has not yet secured agreement with Western Australia to create a single national regulator. WA controls more than half the industry in Australia. The New Zealand offshore oil and gas industry is a relatively new one in global terms. During industry consultation, TCS observed that several Government agencies held varying responsibilities within the industry‘s regulatory framework. There therefore exists the potential for similar oversight breakdown to those that occurred in the US and Australia. At the operational level, there are a variety of stages in an offshore field‘s development which pose risks and various mechanisms in which these are controlled. The offshore development process starts with the facility BOD (Basis of Design) philosophies and safeguarding strategies as well as HS&E studies to fine tune these and support the facility Safety Case and Environment Plan. The studies contain information on the Major Accidents that could occur, the Major Environmental Hazards and the systems and equipment that are in place to manage the risks from these events/hazards. This information plus other sources is used to help identify the SCEs (Safety Critical Elements) which have a significant role in the prevention, control, mitigation or recovery from Major Accidents or Major Environmental Hazards (MAE). Security threats and terrorist issues could lead to MAEs, and procedural aspects are generally managed via Security Plans rather than Safety Cases or Environment Plans. Major Environmental Hazards are those hazards that are identified in a facility‘s Environment Plan as having the potential to result in major environmental impact. These are not limited to accident/incident type events, and also include continuous emissions and planned discharges (e.g. produced water discharge, venting, flaring). Significant Pipeline Accident Events (SPAEs) are defined as events connected to a pipeline or work on a pipeline which cause or create a significant risk of human death. Different facilities have different hazard management strategies, equipment, operations or hazards therefore the list of SCEs and Performance Standards for each facility will be unique. Each national jurisdiction will have its own set of regulations which must be followed. Generally, managing the Major Accident Events and Major Environmental Hazards by ensuring that sufficient integrity barriers remain in place at all times will go much of the way to satisfying the regulations in all national jurisdictions. In a New Zealand (and Australian) context, there are four issues to be considered:



1. Training / skills of offshore workers, number of personnel on facilities and their ability to respond to an incident. 99% of offshore workers will not fight a fire / spill but will evacuate. Most offshore ERPs reflect this approach. Therefore external resources are heavily relied upon to deal with these scenarios.

2. Adequate development of Performance Standards for critical equipment in order to respond to a leak / spill. Generic PSs are in circulation, which are not adequate, despite meeting compliance of the regulations.

3. Remote location of facilities coming online or planned to come online and the ability to adequately respond to MEHs

4. Willingness of offshore operators to share data / resources / personnel in the event of a MEH. Late in 2010, MNZ produced a discussion paper outlining its role in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response. MNZ undertook 16 deployments each lasting about 21 days. Of those deployed, ten were MNZ staff (two deployed twice) and three were drawn from the National Response Team (NRT). Those from the NRT are employed by Regional Councils. One MNZ‘s senior manager also attended an International Observers Program. MNZ‘s commitment drew to a close with a NRT member from Northland Regional Council returning on 7 November 2010. The MNZ Deepwater Horizon Discussion Paper recommended that:

Command structures are clearly defined with responsibilities. While New Zealand currently has this for a single ―simple‖ spill it does not for spills that cross local government boundaries or spills of national significance (it has been argued by some that the existing CIMS structure is scalable and that the National Contingency Plan already defines these responsibilities).

MNZ ensures that electronic incident response systems are refined to ensure the flow of information and that these systems have the capacity to deal with information generated during a massive scale spill.

MNZ increases its engagement with other agencies with environmental monitoring responsibilities. This may take the form of specialist briefings and workshops for those agencies.

MNZ used the opportunity of the return of its first two staff to hold a full day of media briefing. This was highly successful. MNZ should hold regular (annual) media briefing to help develop a deeper understanding of oil spill response in New Zealand.

MNZ will investigate building strategic relationships with a number of logistics companies and military logistics specialists and exercise this aspect of responding.

Consideration should be given to setting up a strategy cell. This cell should be located separately from the main response, staffed with experience senior responders and should look at longer term issues and plans. It is likely that this function should sit within the national incident response body. The results of this cell should then set the agenda for the lower level tactical planning teams.

A separate study be conducted on the media response. It is likely that there will be a number of useful studies that can form the basis for developing lessons for New Zealand.

MNZ continue to engage in international oil spill response events. This is likely to be the best means to give responders direct job experience. This needs to involve active international engagement. Therefore funding should be allocated to this objective.

A set of pre-agreed criteria be developed for the deployment of MNZ staff to international spills. This would allow decisions to be made at the lowest appropriate level and allow for an agile response when timeframes are short.

Leadership training be included for MPRS and the NRT staff.

Rostering systems be integrated into MNZ‘s incident response system.

Recommendation 34 (13.4) H

MNZ management should ensure that the relevant recommendations contained in the MNZ Deepwater Horizon discussion paper are implemented.

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Maritime New Zealand Review of New Zealand’s Oil Pollution Preparedness & Response Capability - Appendices


Reliance and Disclaimer The professional analysis and advice in this report has been prepared by Thompson Clarke Shipping (TCS) for the exclusive use of the party or parties to whom it is addressed (the addressee) and for the purposes specified in it. This report is supplied in good faith and reflects the knowledge, expertise and experience of the consultants involved. The report must not be published, quoted or disseminated to any other party without TCS’s prior written consent. TCS accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any loss occasioned by any person acting or refraining from action as a result of reliance on the report, other than the addressee.

In conducting the analysis in this report TCS has endeavoured to use what it considers is the best information available at the date of publication, including information supplied by the addressee. Unless stated otherwise, TCS does not warrant the accuracy of any forecast or prediction in the report. Although TCS exercises reasonable care when making forecasts or predictions, factors in the process, such as future market behaviour, are inherently uncertain and cannot be forecast or predicted reliably.



Table of Contents

Appendix 1 – Interview Questionnaire .................................................................................................. i Appendix 2 – Stakeholder Organisations Consulted ........................................................................... ii Appendix 3 – Memorandum of Arrangement between AMSA & MNZ ................................................ iv Appendix 4 – OPRC Agreement .......................................................................................................... v Appendix 5 – Towage & Salvage Capability ....................................................................................... vi



Appendix 1 – Interview Questionnaire

TCS – NZ OPPRC Review 2010

DRAFT STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE & DISCUSSION DOCUMENT

======================================================================

Prior to all interviews, we should have a generic introduction that follows this format:-

- Who we are

- What we are up to

- Be aware that there is a 3 Stage approach to reviewing New Zealand’s capability in respect to oil pollution response

1. Risk Assessment MOSRA

2. Capability Review

3. Develop a Strategy

- We are doing Stage 2 – the Capability Review

- MNZ will develop Stage 3 - the Strategy

- The current MOSRS was published in July 2006. The new one will be developed after this process.

As our introductory letter pointed out, the aim of this project is to:

• Identify gaps … in New Zealand’s response regime.

• Assess interrelationships MNZ, OPAC, 3rd party contractors, local gov.

• Assess the appropriateness of the current arrangements, including international relationships and arrangements.

• Identify and assess future response trends [in context of Deepwater Horizon / Montara].

• Compare New Zealand response capability … with other jurisdictions.

• Analyse accountabilities

- Can we now discuss what you understand to be your role and responsibilities under MOSRS?

GENERAL QUESTIONS (to all stakeholders)

1) What do you understand to be your organisation’s role and responsibilities under MOSRS?

2) How would you describe your relationship with MNZ?

3) Does MNZ contribute to your function in a way that makes it possible for you to do what is required of you?

4) How would you describe your relationship with OPAC?

5) Does OPAC contribute to your function in a way that makes it possible for you to do what is required of you?

6) What is your understanding of the responsibilities and requirements

- New Zealand’s OPRC 90

- MTA 94

- MNZ’s Statement of Intent

7) What resources/finances do you contribute?

8) Do you think you are getting value for money under the current arrangements?

9) For resources to continue in the future, what do you need?

10) Given your understanding of future trends do you foresee

a. difficulties in fulfilling your obligations

b. level of response capability required changing (increasing / decreasing with e.g., shipping trends)

c. changes in dominant bunker fuel types

d. changes in the statutory nature of the coast for which you are responsible (e.g., the creation of a marine reserve)

11) Within your organisation, how many man years exists of experience with marine oil pollution?

Zero 1-5 yrs 6-10yrs 11-20yrs 21yrs +

12) Have you handled actual spills and if so what were the nature of those spills?

13) Do you participate/contribute to training and exercises?

14) In your opinion are exercises adequate to the purpose?

15) Do they suit the specific needs of your organisation?

- If not, in what way are they deficient?

16) Do you consider your role in the current marine oil spill response system to be appropriate given the nature of your organisation and its activities?

17) From your perspective what are the shortcomings / deficiencies in the current system?

18) How would you improve the current system?

19) If you are having difficulty meeting you’re your obligations, what do you see as the dominant constraining problem?

20) Locally, what is your biggest fear/risk in respect to pollution? In other words, what keeps you awake at night?

NOTE: We should consider whether any of the above questions should be presented in a quantitative style (No.11 is obvious). We should also bear in mind that the interview itself should not exceed 45 minutes.

SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION POINTS (for individual groups)

Please refer to each department and industry group’s responsibilities under MOSRS as published in the MOSRS report. We need to have clarity on where they should fit in before interviews. The groups identified are as follows:-

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

REGIONAL COUNCILS

SHIPPING INDUSTRY

FISHING INDUSTRY

PETROLEUM/OFFSHORE INDUSTRY

The aim of this part of the interview should be to discuss in some detail each party’s interpretation of its particular role and responsibilities. In addition, there should be some common agency/industry specific questions that tackle finance, legal and operational issues. Examples of these are outlined below.

GENERAL AGENCY/INDUSTRY SPECIFIC QUESTIONS 1) We are conducting an organisational review of MPRS and their contractor

arrangements. Do you have a view on how MPRS is operated and run?

2) Are the actions that you are currently responsible for under MOSRS appropriate to your organisation?

3) Do you believe you are the appropriate authority to engage in these actions in your region?

4) Any ideas how MPRS might be improved?

5) Training and exercises – how do you conduct them?

6) How do you conduct the monitoring of oil spill response in your region?

7) How do you conduct and maintain your contingency planning?

8) With your understanding of the budget and funding arrangements for oil spill response

- Are they adequate?

- Can they be improved?


Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 ii

Appendix 2 – Stakeholder Organisations Consulted Government Departments Department of Conservation Department of Labour Maritime New Zealand Ministry for the Environment Ministry of Civil Defence Ministry of Economic Development Ministry of Fisheries Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade Ministry of Transport Te Puni Kokiri

Regional Councils Auckland Regional Council Bay of Plenty Regional Council Canterbury Regional Council Gisborne District Council Hawke's Bay Regional Council Marlborough District Council Northland Regional Council Otago Regional Council Southland Regional Council Taranaki Regional Council Wellington Regional Council

Port Companies CentrePort (Port of Wellington) Eastland Port Limited Lyttelton Port of Christchurch Northport Limited (Marsden Point) Port of Napier Port of Tauranga Limited Port Otago Limited Port Taranaki Limited Ports of Auckland Limited PrimePort Timaru South Port New Zealand Ltd

Industry Bodies Petroleum Exploration Association of New Zealand Seafood Industry Council Shipping Federation Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC)


Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 iii

Commercial Organisations Australian Worldwide Exploration Ltd (AWE) International Shipping Federation North Tugs New Zealand Refining Company Origin Shell Todd (STOS) Silver Fern South Pacific Offshore

Contractors Massey Wildlife Centre

Environmental Organisations WWF


Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 iv

Appendix 3 – Memorandum of Arrangement between AMSA & MNZ


Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 v

Appendix 4 – OPRC Agreement

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON OIL POLLUTION PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND COOPERATION, 1990

THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT CONVENTION,

CONSCIOUS of the need to preserve the human environment in general and the marine environment in particular,

RECOGNIZING the serious threat posed to the marine environment by oil pollution incidents involving ships, offshore units, sea ports and oil handling facilities,

MINDFUL of the importance of precautionary measures and prevention in avoiding oil pollution in the first instance, and the need for strict application of existing international instruments dealing with maritime safety and marine pollution prevention, particularly the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, as amended, and also the speedy development of enhanced standards for the design, operation and maintenance of ships carrying oil, and of offshore units,

MINDFUL ALSO that, in the event of an oil pollution incident, prompt and effective action is essential in order to minimize the damage which may result from such an incident,

EMPHASIZING the importance of effective preparation for combating oil pollution incidents and the important role which the oil and shipping industries have in this regard,

RECOGNIZING FURTHER the importance of mutual assistance and international cooperation relating to matters including the exchange of information respecting the capabilities of States to respond to oil pollution incidents, the preparation of oil pollution contingency plans, the exchange of reports of incidents of significance which may affect the marine environment or the coastline and related interests of States, and research and development respecting means of combating oil pollution in the marine environment,

TAKING ACCOUNT of the "polluter pays" principle as a general principle of international environmental law,

TAKING ACCOUNT ALSO of the importance of international instruments on liability and compensation for oil pollution damage, including the 1969

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC); and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND); and the compelling need for early entry into force of the 1984 Protocols to the CLC and FUND Conventions,

TAKING ACCOUNT FURTHER of the importance of bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements including regional conventions and agreements,

BEARING IN MIND the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular of its part XII,

BEING AWARE of the need to promote international cooperation and to enhance existing national, regional and global capabilities concerning oil pollution preparedness and response, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries and particularly small island States,

CONSIDERING that these objectives may best be achieved by the conclusion of an International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General provisions

(1) Parties undertake, individually or jointly, to take all appropriate measures in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and the Annex thereto to prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident.

(2) The Annex to this Convention shall constitute an integral part of the Convention and a reference to this Convention constitutes at the same time a reference to the Annex.

(3) This Convention shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government noncommercial service. However, each Party shall ensure by the

Title OPRC 1990 / Articles

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adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of such ships owned or operated by it, that such ships act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

(1) "Oil" means petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products.

(2) "Oil pollution incident" means an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, which results or may result in a discharge of oil and which poses or may pose a threat to the marine environment, or to the coastline or related interests of one or more States, and which requires emergency action or other immediate response.

(3) "Ship" means a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, aircushion vehicles, submersibles, and floating craft of any type.

(4) "Offshore unit" means any fixed or floating offshore installation or structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities, or loading or unloading of oil.

(5) "Sea ports and oil handling facilities" means those facilities which present a risk of an oil pollution incident and includes, inter alia, sea ports, oil terminals, pipelines and other oil handling facilities.

(6) "Organization" means the International Maritime Organization.

(7) "SecretaryGeneral" means the SecretaryGeneral of the Organization.

ARTICLE 3

Oil pollution emergency plans

(1)

(a) Each Party shall require that ships entitled to fly its flag have on board a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan as required by and in accordance with the provisions adopted by the Organization for this purpose.

(b) A ship required to have on board an oil pollution emergency plan in accordance with subparagraph (a) is subject, while in a port or at an offshore terminal under the jurisdiction of a Party, to inspection by officers duly authorized by that Party, in accordance with the practices provided for in existing international agreements or its national legislation.

(2) Each Party shall require that operators of offshore units under its jurisdiction have oil pollution emergency plans, which are coordinated with the national system established in accordance with article 6 and approved in accordance with procedures established by the competent national authority

. (3) Each Party shall require that authorities or operators in charge of such sea ports and oil handling facilities under its jurisdiction as it deems appropriate have oil pollution emergency plans or similar arrangements which are coordinated with the national system established in accordance with article 6 and approved in accordance with procedures established by the competent national authority.

ARTICLE 4

Oil pollution reporting procedures

(1) Each Party shall:

(a) require masters or other persons having charge of ships flying its flag and persons having charge of offshore units under its jurisdiction to report without delay any event on their ship or offshore unit involving a discharge or probable discharge of oil:

(i) in the case of a ship, to the nearest coastal State;

(ii) in the case of an offshore unit, to the coastal State to whose jurisdiction the unit is subject;

(b) require masters or other persons having charge of ships flying its flag and persons having charge of offshore units under its jurisdiction to report without delay any observed event at sea involving a discharge of oil or the presence of oil:

(i) in the case of a ship, to the nearest coastal State;

(ii) in the case of an offshore unit, to the coastal State to whose jurisdiction the unit is subject;

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(c) require persons having charge of sea ports and oil handling facilities under its jurisdiction to report without delay any event involving a discharge or probable discharge of oil or the presence of oil to the competent national authority;

(d) instruct its maritime inspection vessels or aircraft and other appropriate services or officials to report without delay any observed event at sea or at a sea port or oil handling facility involving a discharge of oil or the presence of oil to the competent national authority or, as the case may be, to the nearest coastal State;

(e) request the pilots of civil aircraft to report without delay any observed event at sea involving a discharge of oil or the presence of oil to the nearest coastal State.

(2) Reports under paragraph (1)(a)(i) shall be made in accordance with the requirements developed by the Organization and based on the guidelines and general principles adopted by the Organization. Reports under paragraph (1)(a)(ii), (b), (c) and (d) shall be made in accordance with the guidelines and general principles adopted by the Organization to the extent applicable.

ARTICLE 5

Action on receiving an oil pollution report

(1) Whenever a Party receives a report referred to in article 4 or pollution information provided by other sources, it shall:

(a) assess the event to determine whether it is an oil pollution incident;

(b) assess the nature, extent and possible consequences of the oil pollution incident; and

(c) then, without delay, inform all States whose interests are affected or likely to be affected by such oil pollution incident, together with

(i) details of its assessments and any action it has taken, or intends to take, to deal with the incident, and

(ii) further information as appropriate, until the action taken to respond to the incident has been concluded or until joint action has been decided by such States.

(2) When the severity of such oil pollution incident so justifies, the Party should provide the Organization directly or, as appropriate, through the relevant regional organization or arrangements with the information referred to in paragraph (1)(b) and (c).

(3) When the severity of such oil pollution incident so justifies, other States affected by it are urged to inform the Organization directly or, as appropriate, through the relevant regional organizations or arrangements of their assessment of the extent of the threat to their interests and any action taken or intended.

(4) Parties should use, in so far as practicable, the oil pollution reporting system developed by the Organization when exchanging information and communicating with other States and with the Organization.

ARTICLE 6

National and regional systems for preparedness and response

(1) Each Party shall establish a national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents. This system shall include as a minimum:

(a) the designation of:

(i) the competent national authority or authorities with responsibility for oil pollution preparedness and response;

(ii) the national operational contact point or points, which shall be responsible for the receipt and transmission of oil pollution reports as referred to in article 4; and

(iii) an authority which is entitled to act on behalf of the State to request assistance or to decide to render the assistance requested;

(b) a national contingency plan for preparedness and response which includes the organizational relationship of the various bodies involved, whether public or private, taking into account guidelines developed by the Organization.

(2) In addition, each Party, within its capabilities either individually or through bilateral or multilateral cooperation and, as appropriate, in cooperation with the oil and shipping industries, port authorities and other relevant entities, shall establish:

(a) a minimum level of prepositioned oil spill combating equipment, commensurate with the risk involved, and programmes for its use;

(b) a programme of exercises for oil pollution response organizations and training of relevant personnel;

(c) detailed plans and communication capabilities for responding to an oil pollution incident. Such capabilities

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should be continuously available; and

(d) a mechanism or arrangement to coordinate the response to an oil pollution incident with, if appropriate, the capabilities to mobilize the necessary resources.

(3) Each Party shall ensure that current information is provided to the Organization, directly or through the relevant regional organization or arrangements, concerning:

(a) the location, telecommunication data and, if applicable, areas of responsibility of authorities and entities referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

(b) information concerning pollution response equipment and expertise in disciplines related to oil pollution response and marine salvage which may be made available to other States, upon request; and

(c) its national contingency plan.

ARTICLE 7

International cooperation in pollution response

(1) Parties agree that, subject to their capabilities and the availability of relevant resources, they will cooperate and provide advisory services, technical support and equipment for the purpose of responding to an oil pollution incident, when the severity of such incident so justifies, upon the request of any Party affected or likely to be affected. The financing of the costs for such assistance shall be based on the provisions set out in the Annex to this Convention.

(2) A Party which has requested assistance may ask the Organization to assist in identifying sources of provisional financing of the costs referred to in paragraph (1).

(3) In accordance with applicable international agreements, each Party shall take necessary legal or administrative measures to facilitate:

(a) the arrival and utilization in and departure from its territory of ships, aircraft and other modes of transport engaged in responding to an oil pollution incident or transporting personnel, cargoes, materials and equipment required to deal with such an incident; and

(b) the expeditious movement into, through, and out of its territory of personnel, cargoes, materials and equipment referred to in subparagraph (a).

ARTICLE 8

Research and development

(1) Parties agree to cooperate directly or, as appropriate, through the Organization or relevant regional organizations or arrangements in the promotion and exchange of results of research and development programmes relating to the enhancement of the stateoftheart of oil pollution preparedness and response, including technologies and techniques for surveillance, containment, recovery, dispersion, cleanup and otherwise minimizing or mitigating the effects of oil pollution, and for restoration.

(2) To this end, Parties undertake to establish directly or, as appropriate, through the Organization or relevant regional organizations or arrangements, the necessary links between Parties' research institutions.

(3) Parties agree to cooperate directly or through the Organization or relevant regional organizations or arrangements to promote, as appropriate, the holding on a regular basis of international symposia on relevant subjects, including technological advances in oil pollution combating techniques and equipment.

(4) Parties agree to encourage, through the Organization or other competent international organizations, the development of standards for compatible oil pollution combating techniques and equipment.

ARTICLE 9

Technical cooperation

(1) Parties undertake directly or through the Organization and other international bodies, as appropriate, in respect of oil pollution preparedness and response, to provide support for those Parties which request technical assistance:

(a) to train personnel;

(b) to ensure the availability of relevant technology, equipment and facilities;

(c) to facilitate other measures and arrangements to prepare for and respond to oil pollution incidents; and

(d) to initiate joint research and development programmes.

(2) Parties undertake to cooperate actively, subject to their national laws, regulations and policies, in the transfer of

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technology in respect of oil pollution preparedness and response.

ARTICLE 10

Promotion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in preparedness and response

Parties shall endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements for oil pollution preparedness and response. Copies of such agreements shall be communicated to the Organization which should make them available on request to Parties.

ARTICLE 11

Relation to other conventions and international agreements

Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as altering the rights or obligations of any Party under any other convention or international agreement.

ARTICLE 12

Institutional arrangements

(1) Parties designate the Organization, subject to its agreement and the availability of adequate resources to sustain the activity, to perform the following functions and activities:

(a) information services:

(i) to receive, collate and disseminate on request the information provided by Parties (see, for example, articles 5(2) and (3), 6(3) and 10) and relevant information provided by other sources; and

(ii) to provide assistance in identifying sources of provisional financing of costs (see, for example, article 7(2));

(b) education and training:

(i) to promote training in the field of oil pollution preparedness and response (see, for example, article 9); and

(ii) to promote the holding of international symposia (see, for example, article 8(3));

(c) technical services:

(i) to facilitate cooperation in research and development (see, for example, articles 8(1), (2) and (4) and 9(1)(d));

(ii) to provide advice to States establishing national or regional response capabilities; and

(iii)to analyse the information provided by Parties (see, for example, articles 5(2) and (3), 6(3) and 8(1)) and relevant information provided by other sources and provide advice or information to States;

(d) technical assistance:

(i) to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to States establishing national or regional response capabilities; and

(ii) to facilitate the provision of technical assistance and advice, upon the request of States faced with major oil pollution incidents.

(2) In carrying out the activities specified in this article, the Organization shall endeavour to strengthen the ability of States individually or through regional arrangements to prepare for and combat oil pollution incidents, drawing upon the experience of States, regional agreements and industry arrangements and paying particular attention to the needs of developing countries.

(3) The provisions of this article shall be implemented in accordance with a programme developed and kept under review by the Organization.

ARTICLE 13

Evaluation of the Convention

Parties shall evaluate within the Organization the effectiveness of Convention in the light of its objectives, particularly with respect to the principles underlying cooperation and assistance.

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ARTICLE 14

Amendments

(1) This Convention may be amended by one of the procedures specified in the following paragraphs.

(2) Amendment after consideration by the Organization:

(a) Any amendment proposed by a Party to the Convention shall be submitted to the Organization and circulated by the SecretaryGeneral to all Members of the Organization and all Parties at least six months prior to its consideration.

(b) Any amendment proposed and circulated as above shall be submitted to the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the Organization for consideration.

(c) Parties to the Convention, whether or not Members of the Organization, shall be entitled to participate in the proceedings of the Marine Environment Protection Committee.

(d) Amendments shall be adopted by a twothirds majority of only the Parties to the Convention present and voting.

(e) If adopted in accordance with subparagraph (d), amendments shall be communicated by the SecretaryGeneral to all Parties to the Convention for acceptance.

(f)

(i) An amendment to an article or the Annex of the Convention shall be deemed to have been accepted on the date on which it is accepted by two thirds of the Parties.

(ii) An amendment to an appendix shall be deemed to have been accepted at the end of a period to be determined by the Marine Environment Protection Committee at the time of its adoption, which period shall not be less than ten months, unless within that period an objection is communicated to the SecretaryGeneral by not less than one third of the Parties.

(g)

(i) An amendment to an article or the Annex of the Convention accepted in conformity with subparagraph (f)(i) shall enter into force six months after the date on which it is deemed to have been accepted with respect to the Parties which have notified the SecretaryGeneral that they have accepted it.

(ii) An amendment to an appendix accepted in conformity with subparagraph (f)(ii) shall enter into force six months after the date on which it is deemed to have been accepted with respect to all Parties with the exception of those which, before that date, have objected to it. A Party may at any time withdraw a previously communicated objection by submitting a notification to that effect to the SecretaryGeneral.

(3) Amendment by a Conference:

(a) Upon the request of a Party, concurred with by at least one third of the Parties, the SecretaryGeneral shall convene a Conference of Parties to the Convention to consider amendments to the Convention.

(b) An amendment adopted by such a Conference by a twothirds majority of those Parties present and voting shall be communicated by the SecretaryGeneral to all Parties for their acceptance.

(c) Unless the Conference decides otherwise, the amendment shall be deemed to have been accepted and shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (2)(f) and (g).

(4) The adoption and entry into force of an amendment constituting an addition of an Annex or an appendix shall be subject to the procedure applicable to an amendment to the Annex.

(5) Any Party which has not accepted an amendment to an article or the Annex under paragraph (2)(f)(i) or an amendment constituting an addition of an Annex or an appendix under paragraph (4) or has communicated an objection to an amendment to an appendix under paragraph (2)(f)(ii) shall be treated as a nonParty only for the purpose of the application of such amendment. Such treatment shall terminate upon the submission of a notification of acceptance under paragraph (2)(f)(i) or withdrawal of the objection under paragraph (2)(g)(ii).

(6) The SecretaryGeneral shall inform all Parties of any amendment which enters into force under this article, together with the date on which the amendment enters into force.

(7) Any notification of acceptance of, objection to, or withdrawal of objection to, an amendment under this article shall be communicated in writing to the SecretaryGeneral who shall inform Parties of such notification and the date of its receipt.

(8) An appendix to the Convention shall contain only provisions of a technical nature.

ARTICLE 15

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Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession

(1) This Convention shall remain open for signature at the Headquarters of the Organization from 30 November 1990 until 29 November 1991 and shall thereafter remain open for accession. Any State may become Party to this Convention by:

(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; or

(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, followed by ratification, acceptance or approval; or

(c) accession.

(2) Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument to that effect with the SecretaryGeneral.

ARTICLE 16

Entry into force

(1) This Convention shall enter into force twelve months after the date on which not less than fifteen States have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval or have deposited the requisite instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession in accordance with article 15.

(2) For States which have deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession in respect of this Convention after the requirements for entry into force thereof have been met but prior to the date of entry into force, the ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall take effect on the date of entry into force of this Convention or three months after the date of deposit of the instrument, whichever is the later date.

(3) For States which have deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date on which this Convention entered into force, this Convention shall become effective three months after the date of deposit of the instrument.

(4) After the date on which an amendment to this Convention is deemed to have been accepted under article 14, any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited shall apply to this Convention as amended.

ARTICLE 17

Denunciation

(1) This Convention may be denounced by any Party at any time after the expiry of five years from the date on which this Convention enters into force for that Party.

(2) Denunciation shall be effected by notification in writing to the SecretaryGeneral.

(3) A denunciation shall take effect twelve months after receipt of the notification of denunciation by the SecretaryGeneral or after the expiry of any longer period which may be indicated in the notification.

ARTICLE 18

Depositary

(1) This Convention shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral.

(2) The SecretaryGeneral shall:

(a) inform all States which have signed this Convention or acceded thereto of:

(i) each new signature or deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, together with the date thereof;

(ii) the date of entry into force of this Convention; and

(iii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Convention together with the date on which it was received and the date on which the denunciation takes effect;

(b) transmit certified true copies of this Convention to the Governments of all States which have signed this Convention or acceded thereto.

(3) As soon as this Convention enters into force, a certified true copy thereof shall be transmitted by the depositary to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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ARTICLE 19

Languages

This Convention is established in a single original in the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each text being equally authentic.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have signed this Convention.

DONE AT London this thirtieth day of November one thousand nine hundred and ninety.

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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON OIL POLLUTION PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND COOPERATION, 1990

ANNEX

Reimbursement of costs of assistance

(1)

(a) Unless an agreement concerning the financial arrangements governing actions of Parties to deal with oil pollution incidents has been concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis prior to the oil pollution incident, Parties shall bear the costs of their respective actions in dealing with pollution in accordance with subparagraph (i) or subparagraph (ii).

(i) If the action was taken by one Party at the express request of another Party, the requesting Party shall reimburse to the assisting Party the cost of its action. The requesting Party may cancel its request at any time, but in that case it shall bear the costs already incurred or committed by the assisting Party.

(ii) If the action was taken by a Party on its own initiative, this Party shall bear the costs of its action.

(b) The principles laid down in subparagraph (a) shall apply unless the Parties concerned otherwise agree in any individual case.

(2) Unless otherwise agreed, the costs of action taken by a Party at the request of another Party shall be fairly calculated according to the law and current practice of the assisting Party concerning the reimbursement of such costs.

(3) The Party requesting assistance and the assisting Party shall, where appropriate, cooperate in concluding any action in response to a compensation claim. To that end, they shall give due consideration to existing legal regimes. Where the action thus concluded does not permit full compensation for expenses incurred in the assistance operation, the Party requesting assistance may ask the assisting Party to waive reimbursement of the expenses exceeding the sums compensated or to reduce the costs which have been calculated in accordance with paragraph (2).

It may also request a postponement of the reimbursement of such costs. In considering such a request, assisting Parties shall give due consideration to the needs of the developing countries.

(4) The provisions of this Convention shall not be interpreted as in any way prejudicing the rights of Parties to recover from third parties the costs of actions to deal with pollution or the threat of pollution under other applicable provisions and rules of national and international law. Special attention shall be paid to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage or any subsequent amendment to those Conventions.

Title OPRC 1990 / Annex

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OPRC, 1990

(International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990)

International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990

In July 1989, a conference of some industrial nations in Paris called upon IMO to develop further measures to prevent pollution from ships. This call was endorsed by the IMO Assembly in November of the same year and work began on a draft convention aimed at providing a global framework for international cooperation in combating major incidents or threats of marine pollution.

Parties to the OPRC convention are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in cooperation with other countries.

Ships are required to carry a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan, the to be developed by IMO. Operators of offshore units under the jurisdiction of Parties are also required to have oil pollution emergency plans or similar arrangements which must be coordinated with national systems for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents.

Ships are required to report incidents of pollution to coastal authorities and the convention details the actions that are then to be taken. The convention calls for the establishment of stockpiles of oil spill combating equipment, the holding of oil spill combating exercises and the development of detailed plans for dealing with pollution incidents.

Parties to the convention are required to provide assistance to others in the event of a pollution emergency and provision is made for the reimbursement of any assistance provided.

OPRC/AmendmentsAdopted

EffectivedateAmendments

by date Artic les Annex

OPRC, 1990 Conference30 Nov. 1 9 9 0

13 May 1 9 9 5

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Thompson Clarke Shipping February 2011 vi

Appendix 5 – Towage & Salvage Capability

Annex A: New Zealand Port Towage Capability (>20BP)

Port Tug Built Type BP HP kw LOA m Firefighting Crew/Berths Northport Bream Bay 2007 ASD 65 4180 22.2 Yes 2/12

Takahiwai 2000 ASD 50 3300 22.5 Yes 2/7 Auckland Waipapa 2000 ASD 51 3282 22 2

Wakakume 2000 ASD 51 3282 22 2 Daldy 1975 Voith 24 1522 29.2 3

Tamaki 1972 Voith 21 1324 29.7 Yes 3 Tauranga Sir Robert 2000 Twin screw 50 3282 22 2

Te Matua 1992 Voith 40 2880 30.5 3 Kaimai 1977 Z Peller 28 1492 28.6 Yes 4

Napier Maungatea 1977 Z Peller 32 1492 28.6 Yes 4 Akuriri 2002 Voith 70 5200 23.8 3/LSA11

Gisborne Titirangi 1982 Directional 28 1640 23.7 3/12 LSA port Wellington Toia 1971 Voith 28 2014 32.4 Yes 3/15

Ngahue 1977 Voith 34 2168 31.8 3/7 Tiaki 2007 ASD 68 4166 24.5 Yes 3/6

Taranaki Tuakana 1996 Voith 40 2900 30.5 Yes LSA 22 Rupe 1984 Twin 30 1738 28.8 Yes LSA 8 Kupe 1971 Voith 28 2014 32.4 Yes 12

Nelson Huria Matenga 1984 Z Peller 30 2206 30.5 3 port only WH Parr 1972 Directional 23 1424 20.9 3 port only

Picton Kokiri* 1966 Voith 21 1272 32 Yes 4/LSA8 Lyttelton Blackadder 2002 ASD 62.5 3542 23.8 2/5 port only

Purau 1986 ASD 36 2206 31.3 Yes 3/5 o/s port Timaru Te Maru 1984 ASD 36 2206 32.5 Yes 3 port/5 at sea

Aoraki 2008 ASD 42 2646 28 Yes 3 port/5 at sea Otago Rangi 1974 Directional 28 1492 28.2 4 port only

Karetai 1975 Directional 28 1492 28.2 4 port only Otago 2003 Z Peller 58 3600 23.8 2 port only

South Port Monowai 1973 Voith 30 2000 32 3/5 LSA port Hauroko 1988 Voith 35 2640 30.5 Yes 3/11 LSA o/s pt

*managed by PB SeaTow

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