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Int. J. Struct. & Civil Engg. Res. 2015 A F Shaikh and W N Deulkar, 2015

PUNE METRO RAIL PROJECT: A REVIEW

W N Deulkar1 and A F Shaikh2*

1 Associate Professor, D Y Patil College of Engineering, Akurdi, Pune 411044, India.2 M.E. Student, D Y Patil College of Engineering, Akurdi, Pune 411044, India.

*Corresponding author:A F Shaikh ayub24686@gmail.com

ISSN 2319 – 6009 www.ijscer.comVol. 4, No. 1, February 2015

© 2015 IJSCER. All Rights Reserved

Int. J. Struct. & Civil Engg. Res. 2015

Review Article

INTRODUCTIONIn early 2010, Pune Municipal Corporation(PMC) approved a proposal to build a metrorail system in Pune based on a DetailedProject Report (DPR) prepared by the DelhiMetro Rail Corporation (DMRC) in 2009. Thedecision was taken despite of numerousconcerns raised by many citizens groups andexperts about various issues such as thechoice of gauge and its impact on system cost,throughput, etc., financial burden sharing by

The increasing levels of congestion on Pune road network coupled with high private vehicleusage prompted the planners and the implementing agencies to go for transportationinfrastructure improvements. The planners have realized the fact that there should be aphenomenal change in the existing transportation system that would investigate a substantialshift from Private vehicles to Public Transit. Thus a need for an appropriate Mass Transit systemwas felt and Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) was entrusted with preparation of DetailedProject Report (DPR) for identifying the potential corridors for implementation of Metro Railsystem in Pune. This paper critically reviews and analyzes the decision making systems behindthe proposed Pune metro rail system and its detailed project report, and exposes manyweaknesses in both. The decision making system is seen to be ad hoc, and not sufficientlytransparent or participative. The detailed project report suffers from many serious methodologicaland analytical errors. This analysis and experience from other cities suggests that cities areincreasingly seeking single large, big budget solutions to their urban transport problems withoutexploring the many simpler, cheaper and more effective options that are available.

Keywords: Mass Transit, Metro Rail, Infrastructure, DMRC, etc.

citizens of Pune, impact of an over groundmetro on the city’s heritage and skyline, impactof the proposed routes on buildings in the cityand impact of the proposed Floor Area Ratio(FAR) increase. In this paper, we criticallyanalyze both the decision making processbehind approving the metro rail proposal andthe metro rail proposal itself. The analysis alsoleads to broader questions regarding planningand governance of urban transport in thecountry.

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The proposal initially approved by PMC wasfor two corridors (I and II) of metro rail.Subsequently, due to a delay in arriving at anagreement with neighboring PimpriChinchwad regarding corridor I, PMC decidedto proceed with corridor II which is entirelywithin its jurisdiction. Table 1 gives an overviewof the proposed metro rail system (DMRC,2009). The capital costs are exclusive of anytaxes and based on September 2008 prices,and which come to about Rs. 226 cr per km.Proposed peak hour headways are about 3.5to 4.5 min, and 8 to 12 min for corridor I and II,respectively. The ridership estimates arebased on dense (or super crush) loading of 8persons per sq.m. The DPR predicts that atthis ridership and cost, the proposed metrorail will make a positive socioeconomic impacton Pune city.

DECISION MAKINGPROCESSES BEHIND PUNEMETRO RAILReconstruction of the timeline of various eventsled to the approval of the metro rail proposalby the General Body of the PMC based onanswers to a set of questions asked under theRight to Information Act. An analysis of theserepl ies suggests that the DPR wascommissioned within sufficient justification, theterms of reference for the DPR were weak andthere were weaknesses in governanceprocesses and engagement with citizens.

Table 1: Details of Proposed Metro Rail System (After DMRC 2009)

Corridor Details Length Over Ground Estimated Cost Expected Daily Ridership

(km) Stretch (km) (Rs cr) 2011 2021 2031

I: PCMC to Swargate 16.5 km 11.5 km 4,911 348,387 397,228 443,849

II: Vanaz to Ramwadi 15 km 15 km 2,217 136,309 212,020 290,515

Ad-Hoc Decision Making and WeakTerms of Reference

PMC commissioned DMRC to prepare a DPR

for metro rail based on the views expressed at

two meetings involving city MLAs in June and

September 2006, and a previous study by

RITES (2001). But the scope of work given to

RITES for its report was only to forecast the

demand for a high capacity mass transport

network and identify suitable corridors for it.

Thus, the RITES report was also commissioned

pursuing the need for a high capacity network

rather than evaluating for its need. The other

citation by DMRC is a guideline from the Ministry

of Urban Development (MoUD) that all cities

with a population of over 3 million should

consider metro rails. However, the need for a

metro rail is not dependent only on the city’s

population but also on city’s form, presence of

a central business, other road network, etc.

(Mohan, 2008).

The terms of reference given to DMRC for

the DPR only to identify suitable corridors for

a metro rail system. Guidelines for mass transit

clearly states that DPR should be part of an

integrated, comprehensive plan, providing an

analysis of alternatives, details of stakeholder

consultations and details of feeder networks,

parking and para transit facilities. Further, the

30 km length mentioned is to thought of as it

appears to be of 22.5 km (RITES, 2001).

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Therefore it is seen that the DPR for Pune’smetro rail is commissioned based on somead hoc recommendations and without anyprevious comprehensive multi modal study ofPune’s transport justifying the need for a metrorail. Moreover, its terms of reference did notcomply with the guidelines of MoUD andconsequently the report submitted by DMRCdid not consider alternatives, feeder services,etc.

Governance Processes

The governance processes adopted during thedecision making for Pune’s metro rail raisesome following issues:

1. PMC put up the metro rail DPR on itswebsite soon after it was received.However, it did not actively seek publicparticipation inputs and initiate a publicdebate. In fact, the appendix to the letterfrom PMC to Government of Maharashtrarequesting approval for implementingcorridor II mentions that DMRC are provenexperts regarding metro rail hence, theirreport needed no critical review by anindependent committee (PMC, 2010).

2. Six months after the DPR was submitted,the Standing Committee of the PMCapproved it in just one day based on arequest from the Municipal Commissioner.Some members of the Standing Committeeadmitted later at a public meeting that theyapproved the DPR without even reading itand believing that, it was in the city’s bestinterests.

3. PMC organized a ‘public hearing’ in June2010 to understand citizen’s grievancesabout the proposed metro rail. PMC’srequest to the Government of Maharashtra

for seeking permission to proceed withcorridor II claims that grievances raised atthe hearing had been addressedsatisfactorily (PMC, 2010). However, as thefollowing examples from the appendix to therequest shows the following dissatisfaction

a. It states that previous studies like theComprehensive Mobility Plan (CMP)were studied to finalize routes for themetro rail in the CMP, though the CMPwas commissioned after the metro railDPR. Indeed, the metro rail DPR doesnot even mention the CMP, while theCMP refers to the DPR clearly pointingto their relative chronology.

b. It states that the viability of the projectwould be ensured by private funders whomay fund 50% of the project cost. Sucha statement coming from a authority likethe PMC is of concern and displays alack of understanding of the distinctionbetween financial viability of a projectand its social desirability. Given that farebox revenues will not be sufficient for areasonable return on investment,investors would necessarily depend onGovernment support in the form ofviability gap funding, free or subsidizedland, tax concessions, etc.

c. It states that improvement andstrengthening of Pune Municipal andPimpri Municipal ltd. (PMPML) the busservice is continuing in parallel thoughPMPML had a full time CMD for over ayear and many posts on its Board ofDirectors have been vacant.

d. It states that the plan prepared by DMRCis a comprehensive transport plan though

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PMC’s own terms of reference to DMRCclearly state that its job was only toidentify approximately 30 km of metro railalong feasible corridors.

4. PMC agreed to extend the proposedcorridor II to the current airport and Kharadi,subject to demand, finance, etc. Theseextensions seem arbitrary as there are nostudies to justify them, particularly when anew airport has also been proposed forPune.

5. PMC approved an FAR increase by 4,stating that it was required to increasemetro rail ridership and to raise financesfor it. However, the DPR predicts a denseload of 8 persons per sq.m with the currentland use pattern, suggesting that corridordensification is not required for the desiredridership. DPR states that only 6% of totalrevenue is expected from propertydevelopment and FAR increase is notcritical to finance the metro rail. This raisesdoubts about the true motives for theproposed FAR increase.

CRITIQUE OF PUNE METRORAIL DPRIn addition to ad hoc decision making, weakgovernance and inadequate public engagementanalysis identifies shortcomings with theseinclude methodological errors and overestimation of the benefits from the metro railwhich are then used to demonstrate that it has apositive social impact. The clarification on manyof the points were requested.

Methodological Problems

The methodological problems in DPRsubmitted by DMRC are listed below.

1. DMRC commissioned a report from IITBombay to project ridership along potentialof metro rail corridors (IIT Bombay, 2008).To do this, IIT Bombay used a ‘statedpreference survey’ asking citizens for theirpreferred mode of public transport fromamong various alternatives. Surveys werecarefully designed as it can introduce a biasin a respondent’s answer. But the IITBombay survey used a leaflet, states thatPune’s metro will provide “cost of travelcomparable to bus fare, trains will run atconvenient frequency of 3 min during peakhours and comfortable sitting in A/Cenvironment”. None of these claims holdstrue in the DPR. Therefore, the ridershipfigures were estimated from a deeplyflawed consumer survey, which advertiseda service that was very different from theservice that was actually designed.

2. The commuter survey also askedrespondents to choose between theproposed metro rail and current frequenciesand capacities of existing modes. Thisignores the possibility that frequencies andperformances of both the existing bussystem and suburban rail system can besignificantly improved at a fraction of thecost and time required for the metro rail. Inother words, the metro travel demand wasforecasted by comparing an ideal yet to beimplemented metro rail with the currentstate of other neglected and under fundedpublic transport services.

3. Public transport modes such as the metrorail are considered desirable because theycan win people away from private vehicles.For this, various public transport modesmust complement each other and not

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compete. But, the DPR is silent aboutintegrating the metro rail with other publictransport modes. In fact, the two proposedcorridors compete with the proposed BRTand existing suburban rail along their entirelength.

In addition to these methodological errors,the report also contains many data anomaliesand inconsistencies which raise morequestions about the DPR.

Cost-Benefit AnalysisOne of the key justifications given by the DPRfor its proposal is a socioeconomic costbenefit analysis which shows that thesocioeconomic benefit of the project outweighsits costs. The costs considered in the DPR arethe capital and operational costs, whilesocietal benefits are said to arise from variouscategories such as savings in time, fuel, vehiclemaintenance cost and infrastructuremaintenance cost. It is questionable that howmuch productive use can be made of the fewminutes saved per trip by a person, andwhether items such as reduced vehiclemaintenance costs should even beconsidered. Moreover, the costs consideredin the DPR do not include costs such as thecost of capital.

Even if we overlook these discrepancies,the cost benefit analysis given in the DPR isflawed. The DPR estimates total benefits tosociety from the metro rail in 3 horizon years –2011, 2021 and 2031. It is seen that the benefitclaimed for 2011 is vastly over estimated –the same analysis also applies to the otheryears. Analysis of the three categories (timesavings, vehicle maintenance savings and fuelsavings) with the largest claimed benefits and

provide alternative estimates using data fromthe DPR itself such as trip length distributionand metro rail ridership, augmented with a setof conservative assumptions such as fuel costof Rs. 60/L, average mileage of 45 kmpl andannual maintenance cost of Rs. 3000 for twowheelers, and 10 kmpl and Rs. 15000 for cars.Other assumptions made are explained atappropriate locations below.

Time Savings

DPR, the benefit of value of time saved byshifting to metro rail from other modes. Eachmetro rail trip is estimated to save 45 min in2011 and the claimed money equivalentsavings of the aggregate annual time savedadds up to 56% (Rs. 524 cr) of the total claimsannual benefit (Rs. 934 cr). This includes notonly time saved in travel but also the walkingand waiting time for one’s transport andmoney/time equivalent of factors such as travelcomfort.

Many reports, including a studycommissioned by DMRC, state that Pune’saverage peak hour road speed is about 2025 kmph, while the speed of the proposedmetro rail is 33 kmph [10, 11, 3, 2]. The DPRalso states that 75% of journeys are shorterthan 9 km. Assuming an average speed of 20kmph for other modes, 75% of journeys wouldtake a maximum of 27 min by other modesand 16 min by metro rail. Therefore, the traveltime saving is just 11 min for 75% of thejourneys.

Metro rail users who have shifted from twowheelers or cars would not save any time inwalking to the metro rail station and waitingfor a train – in fact, they would lose time. Giventhat peak hour ridership estimated for the

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metro rail is based on dense loads of 8persons per sq. m, they would also not gainanything from added travel comfort. Therefore,the maximum saving for all such metro railusers would be at most 11 min over 75% ofjourneys, with actual savings even lower dueto reduced time savings and comfort.

Users who have shifted from buses couldperhaps have some time equivalent savingdue to higher waiting times and discomfortfactors, though their walking times are likely toincrease since bus stops are likely to be closerto homes and offices than metro rail stations.Even the higher waiting time and discomfortfactors are questionable because: a) peakhour headway of the proposed metro railcorridors is only 4 and 8 min in 2031, which abus system can easily match and b) the metrorail is designed for dense loads of 8 personsper sq. m which is comparable to buses atpeak hour. Even if we conservatively assumethat all bus users pay a penalty of 15 min pertrip (10 min for waiting and 5 min fordiscomfort), 75% of bus users switching tometro rail would have a time equivalent savingof only 26 min as their journeys would be lessthan 9 km.

It is obvious that the time savingscomponent presented in the DPR is vastly overstated. A detailed analysis (see Section 3.2.4)shows that even if all the metro rail trips byusers who switched from buses (thus providingmaximum time savings), the total time savingsin 2011 comes only to Rs. 273 cr against theclaimed Rs. 524 cr savings.

Fuel Savings

The DPR estimates fuel savings of Rs. 123 crsavings in 2011 by considering a modal shift

to metro rail from other modes. This does notaccount for behavioral changes such asinduced travel and longer commutes that mayresult because of the introduction of a metrorail system. Even if one ignores suchoversights, the claimed benefits in thiscategory are still over estimated.

Based on the assumed fuel efficiencies fortwo wheelers and cars, and actual bus faresprojected for 2011, estimates show that fuelsavings are only to the tune of Rs. 37 cr (30%of claimed benefit) under a reasonablescenario of 35% of metro rail users switchingfrom buses, 40% from two wheelers and 25%from cars. It is only in a scenario where about65% of the metro rail users switch from cars(thus providing the greatest fuel savings), thatthe estimated fuel saving come close to theclaimed saving. But note that such a metro railusage pattern would greatly reduce timesavings.

Vehicle Maintenance Savings

The second highest category of claimedsavings (Rs. 161 cr in 2011) comes fromsavings in vehicle maintenance costs. Usingassumption of a 50% reduction in vehiclemaintenance cost of persons switching to themetro rail from their vehicles, the estimatedsavings in this category is only Rs. 60 cr in2011 (37% of the claimed benefit) when 35%of metro rail users come from buses, 40% fromtwo wheelers and 25% from cars. The claimedsavings become possible only when about85% of metro rail users have shifted from cars.Note once again that such a share of shiftsfrom cars greatly decreases time savings.

Benefit ComparisonThe different possible ridership scenarios for

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the proposed metro rail and estimate likelybenefits in 2011 are compared against thebenefits claimed by the DPR. Each scenariorepresents a particular combination of shiftsfrom buses, two wheelers and cars to metrorail and benefits under these scenarios arecalculated using the DPR’s methodology inspite of reservations about it.

Figure 1 presents the benefit under differentscenarios. The DMRC scenario represents thebenefit claimed in the DPR. The 0-0-100 and100-0-0 scenarios represent the extremescenarios where all metro rail users come fromeither cars or buses respectively, andcorrespond to the maximum overall estimatedbenefit and maximum benefit from time saved.This is followed by six scenarios, eachrepresenting a ‘reasonable’ modal shift. As canbe seen, the estimated benefit in all scenariosis considerably lower than claimed in the DPR.The highest estimated benefit is in theextremely unrealistic 0-0-100 scenario whichis also 36% lower than claimed. Theestimated savings in all other scenarios(including the 100-0-0 scenario) is only about

Figure 1: Estimated Savings UnderVarious Scenarios of Shifts

40% of the claimed savings, thus establishingthat the benefits claimed in the DPR are highlyexaggerated.

Figure 2: NPV of DMRC DPR Under theDifferent Scenarios at 12% Discount Rate

Desirability of the Metro Rail System

Based on the presented cost and benefit flows,the DPR concludes that the proposed projecthas an overall socioeconomic return of about+5% at a 12% discount rate, and hence it isgood for the city. Figure 2 shows thesocioeconomic NPV of the metro rail (also at12% discount rate) using our benefit estimatesand the costs given in the DPR under differentscenarios. As can be seen, the proposed metrorail has a negative socioeconomic NPV in allscenarios in spite of conservative assumptions.Issues such as not achieving the projectedridership as seems likely are not considered(Mohan, 2008). This raises serious questionsabout the DPR and implementation of theproposed metro rail for Pune.

CAG (2008) given the serious flaws in theDPR suggested it should be critically reviewedby the Government of Maharashtra andGovernment of India. In addition, the Delhimetro’s under achievement of ridership andquestions asked about its accountability and

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governance by the Comptroller and AuditorGeneral strongly indicate that DMRC projectreports must not accepted on faith by cityadministrations.

CONCLUSIONIndian cities, with the help of DMRC, areplanning to invest about Rs. 2 tn in metro railsystems. But our analysis shows that the DPRprepared by DMRC for Pune has many seriousanalytical and methodological flaws, makingthe proposal highly questionable. Therefore,there is an urgent need to revisit all proposedmetro rail projects and critically review them.An independent expert group should conductthe review based on clear, objective criteriaand examine all aspects such as theirjustification, governance, accountability,viability and integration with other modes, andthe review findings should be publicly debated.

India is urbanizing rapidly but its urbangovernance institutions, systems andcapacities have not kept pace. This gives riseto the problems presented above, resulting inbig, expensive projects that often do not deliverthe promised benefits and neglect of cheaper,quicker alternatives that may be morebeneficial. This needs to be addressedurgently. ULBs must be reformed to make themtransparent and directly accountable to citizens,and undertake integrated, comprehensive, leastcost planning considering supply and demandside options. Otherwise, it is very likely thatthere would be large investment in urbantransport projects with very little benefits, and ourcities will grow increasingly grid locked andunlivable. In turn, this could well put the brakes onthe country’s much touted economic growth story.

REFERENCES1. CAG (2008), “Performance audit of

phase I of Delhi Mass Rapid TransitSystem by Delhi Metro Rail Corporation”,Comptroller and Auditor General of India,Report 17 of 2008

2. DMRC 2009, “Detailed Project Report forPune Metro”, Delhi Metro Rai lCorporation.

3. IIT Bombay (2008), “Traffic forecast forthe proposed metro rail project in Punemetropolitan area, Transportationsystems engineering group”, Departmentof Civil Engineering, IIT Bombay, March2008.

4. Mohan D (2008), “Mythologies, metro railsystems and future urban transport”,Economic and Political Weekly, January26, 2008

5. Parisar (2010), City and the Metro,Proceedings of a national round table,Parisar, July.

6. PMC (2010), Letter dated 28th June 2010from Pune Municipal Corporation toGovernment of Maharasthra requestingapproval of corridor II of the proposedPune metro.

7. Ramachandraiah C (2009), “Maytas,Hyderabad metro and the politics of realestate”, Economic and Political Weekly,Jan 17, 2009

8. RITES (2001), Mass Rapid TransitSystem for Pune Metropolitan Area,RITES Ltd., Jan 2001.

9. Various (2010), “Letters, questions andpetitions submitted to PMC by citizens

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groups such as the Pune Metro JagrutiAbhiyan and Pune Technical Coalition”,2010

10. WSA (2008a), “Comprehensive MobilityPlan for Pune City, W ilbur SmithAssociates”, IL&FS Urban InfrastructureServices Ltd., 2008

11. WSA (2008b), “Study on traffic andtransportation policies and strategies inUrban areas in India commissioned bythe Ministry of Urban Development(Government of India)”, Wilbur SmithAssociates, May 2008.