Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to...

Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire,Fifteenth to Eighteenth CenturiesAuthor(s): Jonathan GrantSource: Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 179-201Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078753 .

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Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline77:

Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to

Eighteenth Centuries

JONATHAN GRANT

Florida State University

In

the field of Ottoman history, scholars have often advanced an

interpretation of decline. Traditionally, the argument states that the

Ottoman empire reached its peak in the sixteenth century under Suley man the Magnificent, and thereafter began an inexorable stagnation and decline lasting until the twentieth century. Historians often point to the Ottoman naval defeat at Lepanto in 1571 or the failure of the

second siege of Vienna in 1683 as events marking the waning fortunes of Ottoman power and the beginning of the "decline."1

The use of the term decline as it has been applied by Middle East

scholars to the Ottoman case presents several problems. Implicit in any notion of "decline" is some kind of comparison. After all, an empire

Journal of World History, Vol. io, No. i

?1999 by University of Hawai'i Press

179

1 Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (Chicago: University of Chi

cago Press, 1972), pp. 67, 73; Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe (London: Thames

and Hudson, 1968), p. 195; P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: A Political

History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 61-70; Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman

Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (New Rochelle: Orpheus Publishing, 1973), pp. 41

52; A?ir Arkayin, Ikinci Viyana Kusatmasi 1683 (Ankara: Gnkur. Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etiit Ba?kanligi Yayinlari, 1983); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 21-39. See also Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, eds., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1014 (Cambridge: Cam

bridge University Press, 1994), for the most recent discussions of the decline thesis.



i8o JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, SPRING 1999

can only be seen as declining in comparison to some measure, whether it be other powers or its own imperial past. As historians have em

ployed the concept, the unit of measure (if mentioned at all) is often

overly broad or inappropriate to the Ottoman context. In its broadest

application, Ottoman "decline" has served as a negative judgment on

Islamic society as a whole and its inability to match the march of

progress and rising power of Western society since the seventeenth

century. In this instance the unit of comparison is the civilization.2

Such a basis for comparison is ill-chosen because the notion that the

strength of a civilization can be measured in military success is an

obviously dubious proposition, as the examples of Renaissance Italy or

the thirteenth-century Mongols make clear.

Besides selecting a vague unit of measure, proponents of the

decline thesis tend to be rather imprecise about the scale by which they measure the Ottoman "decline." For example, they may posit an eco

nomic or cultural/social decline that contributed to a military decline, but invariably this so-called decline was in relation to an economically

expanding "West."3 However, neither the "West" nor "Islamic society" was a monolithic entity, and within each civilization there existed

states with varying degrees of military capability. Most often scholars

have used the term the West or Europe generically, when they actually meant England, France, and Holland. The use of these western Euro

pean states as the basis for measuring Ottoman military decline has

obscured the actual Ottoman conditions by placing them in the wrong context. The Ottomans did not operate in western Europe, but rather

in eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.4 In fact decline is not

a useful term at all, because it reflects more a moral judgment passed by

Europeans convinced of their own superiority than an accurate assess

ment of Ottoman capabilities after 1571 or 1683. To be sure, the "declinists" offer more than a monocausal expla

nation. Halil Inalcik, perhaps the foremost advocate of the declinist

position, points to population pressure, fiscal crisis, and Europe's new

military technology as contributing to Ottoman decline by the early

2 Reuben Levy, An Introduction to the Sociology of Islam (London: Harrison and Sons,

1933). Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civ

ilization, vol. 3: The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), offers a more nuanced assessment of the decline of Islamic civilization after

1700. See also Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer

sity Press, 1988). 3 The foremost example of such studies is H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society

and the West, vol. 1, pt. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950). 4 A notable exception is Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace:

Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783 (Leiden: E. ]. Brill, 1995).



Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire 181

seventeenth century. In his view, "the Ottoman failure meant that a

traditional Asiatic culture, even when it borrowed war technology from the West, was doomed before the rise of modern Europe.... The

Ottoman decline was as much the outcome of Western Europe's modern economic system as of superior European military technology."5

Although some aspects of Ottoman economic decline have been seri

ously called into question, the role of superior European military tech

nology and its production in contributing to Ottoman decline has

remained an operative assumption.6 Instead of thinking in terms of "decline," it is more useful to recon

ceptualize the problem in terms of locating Ottoman capabilities on

the scale of the international production hierarchy, which includes arms

production, arms transfers, and technological diffusion. Therefore, I shall

attempt to compare Ottoman military and naval capabilities against the Ottomans' own past accomplishments and the achievements in

war technology and production made by the Ottomans' European rivals

and neighbors. When placed in the proper context, it becomes appar ent that up to the early nineteenth century the "decline" was certainly not inexorable.

Keith Krause has recently put forth a model for the spread of mili

tary technology as a diffusion wave that settles into a hierarchy of mili

tary producers. Typically a wave begins as a period of rapid innovation, followed by the diffusion of military technology from the first-tier inno

vators to second-tier exporters, and concludes with attempts by third

tier states to create their own indigenous arms industry through tech

nological imports. Accordingly, producers in the first tier innovate at

the technological frontier, those in the second tier adapt weapons at the

technological frontier, and third-tier producers copy and reproduce existing technologies but do not capture the underlying process of

innovation or adaptation.7 The first wave was triggered by the gun

powder revolution in the early fifteenth century and had largely run its course by the mid-seventeenth century. By that time the centers of

first-tier production were England, the Low Countries, and (ephemer

5 Inalcik and Quataert, eds., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, p.22.

6 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," in An Economic and Social History

of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, ed. Inalcik and Quataert, p. 468. For a thorough refuta tion of the interpretation of Ottoman economic decline in the period 1500-1800, see

Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 1-23.

7 Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cam

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 30-31.



l82 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, SPRING I999

ally) Sweden.8 After the initial revolutionary wave came a period of

incremental innovation that began in the late seventeenth century

and ended in the early nineteenth century. Among the innovations of

this secondary wave were the development of boring cannon (rather

than casting cannon in a mold), the conversion from matchlock fire

arms to flintlocks, and the lightening of field guns and carriages.9 The second-tier producers were a more fluid group. The Italian

states of Milan, Venice, Genoa, and Brescia had been first-tier manu

facturers in the first half of the fifteenth century, but gradually declined

into the second tier. By 1500 Milan was importing cannon, and by 1606 half the Venetian fleet was built abroad. Although Italian pro

ducers had dropped into the second tier, they remained important arms

exporters. Migration of skilled workers served as the main mechanism

for the technological diffusion into Sweden, Russia, France, Spain, and

the Ottoman empire between 1450 and 1650. Among these newcomers,

however, only France, Russia, and Spain successfully reached the

second tier. For the Ottomans, Italy proved an important supply source,

especially in the early period of Ottoman expansion, 1450-1500.10

By employing Krause's model it is possible to reformulate the ques

tion of Ottoman decline in a more precise way: Did the Ottomans

decline from their initial position in the production hierarchy? Based

on Krause's schema, it becomes clear that the Ottomans remained a

third-tier producer throughout the period from the fifteenth century to

the early nineteenth century. In other words, the Ottomans did not

drop a tier in their military technological capabilities, and it is mislead

ing to view them as in decline by comparing them to first-tier producers, such as England and Holland. Furthermore, their immediate rivals in

Poland, Hungary, and the Balkans possessed comparable capabilities, while Egypt and Iran were actually below the third tier and were

import-dependent.11 Given this regional context, the Ottomans were

able to maintain themselves as a regionally dominant power.

The comparison with Iranian capabilities is instructive. In their

struggle with Safavid Iran, Ottoman forces initially held a distinct tech

nological advantage. At the battle of Chaldiran in 1514 Ottoman

troops armed with firearms and artillery crushed a Safavid force that

lacked guns. In 1528 the Iranians were victorious over the Ozbegs

because of their artillery, which they obtained from the Portuguese. In

8 Krause, Arms and the State, p. 38.

9 Krause, Arms and the State, p. 54. 10

Krause, Arms and the State, pp. 37~45 11

Krause, Arms and the State, pp. 43, 51-52.




general, the Iranians chose to avoid pitched battles with the Ottomans

in favor of defensive scorched-earth tactics. Under Shah Abbas (1587

1629) Persian forces included an artillery corps of about 500 guns, and a series of sieges and counter-sieges of Baghdad resulted in a reassertion

of Ottoman control in the region and an effective stalemate of the

Ottoman-Iranian border by 1639. However, the Safavid artillery force

deteriorated rapidly under Abbas II (1642-66). Safavid rule ended in

1722 when the Persian army, equipped with twenty-four cannon, under a French commander but lacking unified command, suffered defeat at

the hands of Afghan forces without artillery. Iranian artillery and fire arms were imported throughout the period rather than manufactured

domestically. Thus, the Ottomans' capacity to produce their own arma

ments stood them in good stead in relation to their Safavid opponents.12 It has often been assumed that the decline in the military fortunes

of the empire after 1683 was continual and irreversible. For example, Bernard Lewis wrote, "The Ottomans found it more and more difficult to keep up with the rapidly advancing Western technological innova

tions, and in the course of the eighteenth century the Ottoman

Empire, itself far ahead of the rest of the Islamic world, fell decisively behind Europe in virtually all arts of war."13 Later he remarks, "And by the late eighteenth century the Ottomans, for so long self-sufficient in

armaments, found themselves obliged to place orders for ships in for

eign shipyards."14 Such statements are less than accurate accounts of the Porte's war

industries. It is true that a growing disparity between the products of

Ottoman war industries and those of their neighbors did occur over

the eighteenth century, but this gap was caused by the Porte's neigh bors borrowing the incremental innovations, such as galleons, frigates,

techniques of cannon-boring, light field guns, new-formula gunpowder,

12 Rudi Matthee, "Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in

Safavid Iran," in Safavid Persia, ed. Charles Melville (London: I. B. Taurus, 1996), pp. 391 410; David Morgan, Medieval Persia, 1040-1797 (London: Longman, 1994), pp. 116-17, 125-26, 135, 147, 150-51; Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 55, 64-87;

Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," pp. 420-22; Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Prince ton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 325.

13 Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 226.

14 Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, pp. 226-27. Similar interpretations can be

found in Gani Ozbaran, "War Industry Plants of the Ottoman Armed Forces," Revue inter

nationale d'histoire militaire 67 (1988): 67-76; Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965), pp. 78-87; lu. A. Petrosian, Osmans kaia imperiia mogushchestvo i gibel' (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), p. 134.



i84 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, SPRING 1999

and flintlock firearms. Once the effects became apparent to the Otto

mans, especially after the Russian conquest of the Crimea, the Turks

followed suit, with the result that by the beginning of the nineteenth

century Ottoman war technology was again competitive with that of

its rivals, especially Russia. Thus the Ottomans proved able to main

tain production at the third-tier level where they copied foreign tech

nology. To appreciate the limited degree of foreign dependence, it is

necessary to take a closer look at Ottoman war industries during the

early modern period.

Naval Production

Ottoman ship-production capabilities increased dramatically from the

fifteenth century to the sixteenth. The first Ottoman naval arsenal

had been built at Gallipoli under Bayezid I (1389-1402).15 At this

early stage the Ottomans also managed to construct ships on the Sea

of Marmara, the Aegean, and the Black Sea. From these limited facili

ties a small navy emerged, and by the time of Mehmed II ( 1451-81) the navy consisted of thirty galleys. By the time of Selim I (1512-20) tremendous growth in naval production had taken place. There were

110 naval yards and arsenals distributed among the Golden Horn, Galli

poli, Izmit, Gemlik, Sinop, Varna, Selcuk, Bodrum, Antalya, Rhodes,

Yalova, Birecik, and other locations. At Birecik in 1565 some 250 war

ships were launched, and according to the seventeenth-century Otto man writer Katip ?elebi, in 1567 a fleet of 550 ships issued forth from

the port.16 The main naval yards in Istanbul were huge operations. By the sixteenth century approximately 60,000 people worked at the

Golden Horn, while another 100,000 were employed at Kasimpa?a.17

Writing in 1585, after Lepanto, the Venetian bailo, Gianfrancesco

Morosini, described the Ottoman naval capacity:

The naval forces which the Great Turk uses to defend his empire are vast and second to none in the world. He has an enormous number of

galleys in his dockyard and he can turn out more whenever he wants,

151. H. Uzun?ar?ili, "Bahriyya," in Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition, 10 vols., vol. i

(Leiden: E. J. Brill, i960), p. 947. 16

Katip ?elebi, Tuhfetul Kibar Fi Esfari' l-Bihar, trans. Orhan ?aik G?kyay (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1973), p. 123; Necdet Sevin?, Osmanli Sosyal ve Ekonomik Diizeni

(Istanbul: U?dal Ne?riyat, 1985), pp. 145-46. 17

Sevin?, Osmanli Sosyal ve Ekonomik Diizeni, p. 147.




because he has plenty of wood, iron parts, skilled workers, pitch, tal

low, and all the other things needed. True, at present they do not have at hand all the armament they would need to outfit the as yet uncom

pleted galleys, much less those the Grand Signor has ordered made, and they are short of cotton sailcloth and other things. But his re

sources are so great that if he wanted to he could quickly assemble what

he needs; he has already begun to attend to this.18

Placing the battle of Lepanto into the context of Ottoman naval

production, it becomes clear that this seemingly profound turning point in Ottoman affairs actually proved to be quite superficial. True, the

battle itself was a decisive defeat for the Ottoman navy. Out of 230 Ottoman galleys, 80 vessels were sunk and 130 captured.19 Yet Otto

man naval production capabilities were left unaffected. The huge naval

arsenal at Kasimpa?a was still the largest in the world, and together with the other Ottoman dockyards it could make good the losses quite

quickly. Indeed, the French ambassador reported on 8 May 1572 that

the Turks had built 150 galleys in five months.20 In terms of naval con

struction, the Porte seemed to possess ample materials for a substantial

navy. Paul Rycaut, an English observer, appeared to be rather perplexed about the inability of the Ottomans to maintain a larger fleet in the

seventeenth century. He wrote, "Their Ports are several of them con

venient for building both ships and Gallies; the Arsenal of Constanti

nople hath no less than a hundred thirty-seven Voltas, or Chambers for

Building, and so many vessels may be upon the stacks at the same

time."21 He continued, "At Sinopolis [Sinop] near Trapesond [Trebizond] is another Arsenal: at Midia and Anchiale, Cities on the Black Sea, are

the like ... ; and yet the Turk for several years, especially since the

War with Cand?a, and their defeat at Sea, have not been able at most

to Equippe a Fleet of above 100 sail of Gallies."22 From his description it is obvious that the Ottomans had the facilities to produce a more

formidable navy. The observations of Morosini and Rycaut require some comment.

The striking feature for these observers in the sixteenth and seven

teenth centuries was the size of Ottoman naval yards. We should not

18 James C. Davis, ed., Pursuit of Power: Venetian Ambassadors' Reports (New York:

Harper and Row, 1970), p. 134. 19

Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, p. 91. 20

Jack Beeching, The Galleys at LePanto (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p. 228. 21 Paul Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (1968; reprint, Westmead,

England: Gregg International, 1972), p. 213. 22

Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, p. 213.




confuse size with efficiency. Although the arsenal in Istanbul was

maintained as a permanent facility, the size of the work force varied.

The majority of workers were employed only for the short term, and

the core of permanent staff was relatively small. Also, coerced labor

figured prominently in meeting the labor needs at the arsenal. Many of

the workers languished without pay for extended periods of time be cause the treasury was insolvent. Meanwhile, the official tax farmers,

who were charged with paying the arsenal's bills, proved slow and un

reliable.23 The physical capacity of Ottoman yards rightly impressed ob

servers, but the arsenal's fiscal weaknesses remained invisible to them.

Much has been made of the fact that the Ottomans were very slow in making the transition from galleys to galleons. After all, it was not

until 1682 that the Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa Pa?a accepted the prin

ciple of a fleet based on sailing galleons rather than galleys.24 But it

is important to bear in mind that the sailing galleon did not immedi

ately demonstrate superiority over the oar-powered galley in the mid

sixteenth century. Into the seventeenth century galleys in the Medi terranean could get the better of sailing ships. In consequence Spain

maintained its position as the premier galley power in the mid-seven

teenth century until the French under Louis XIV revived their galley fleet to make it the largest one in Europe at the end of that century. Even in the eighteenth century the galley proved its effectiveness for

the Russians in their operations against the Swedes in the Baltic.25 One possible explanation is that the Turkish reluctance to adopt

galleons stemmed from material considerations?that is, that the Otto man preference for a galley fleet over sea-going galleons was linked to

reduced timber supplies.26 The decline of the sancak of Kocaeli as the

main source of Ottoman timber in the mid-seventeenth century, and

the growing importation of hemp from Italy also at that time, indicate

23 Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," pp. 461-63.

24 Uzun?ar?ili, "Bahriyya," p. 948.

25 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West,

1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 87-88; John Francis GuiL

martin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp.

252-73; Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1978), pp. 15, 90-91; Paul W Bamford, Fighting Ships and Prisons: The Mediterranean Galleys

of France in the Age of Louis XIV (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973), pp.

11-24. 26 Rhoads Murphey, "The Ottoman Attitude towards the Adoption of Western Tech

nology: The Role of the Efrenci Technicians in Civil and Military Applications," in Contri

butions ?'l'histoire ?conomique et sociale de l'empire Ottoman (Leuven: Editions Peeters, 1983),

p. 292.




some kind of domestic shortfall.27 Nevertheless, this argument is not

completely satisfying. In the 1760s much of the accessible coastal areas

had been vastly deforested, and as a result the price of timber had

tripled from the 1740s to the 1760s.28 Yet the Ottomans managed to

produce galleons at that time. The provinces were still delivering wood to the arsenal as part of their tax, and in fact the archipelago islands were required to construct one or two ships called fricata in

proportion to their size or revenue.29 Moreover, Selim Ill's whole naval

modernization program in the 1790s was implemented with the same

timber supply conditions in effect. So it is difficult to see how reduced

timber supplies could have been a determining factor in the tardiness of Ottoman galleon construction.

A more compelling explanation can be found in the Porte's long naval rivalry with the Venetians. Ottoman naval developments had

always been closely intertwined with those of Venice. Back in its

infancy, in 1416, the Ottoman navy had fought its first sea battle

against the Venetians.30 Also, many of the experts who supervised the

building of war galleys in the sultan's yards had served as shipwrights in

Venice, and the Ottoman methods of construction were therefore

largely copied from those of the Venetians.31 This rivalry had great sig nificance for Ottoman naval development because the Venetians were

also reluctant to adopt galleons. Both the Ottomans and Venetians were latecomers to the idea of

galleon fleets, and for both the impetus for the adoption of sailing galleons came from the Atlantic powers in the seventeenth century. In

the late 1640s and early 1650s the Ottomans made considerable efforts to increase the number of their sailing vessels in response to their defeats by Atlantic sailing vessels operating as auxiliaries for the Vene tian fleet.32 Somewhat later, the Venetians began to encounter diffi culties in retaining the services of these foreign auxiliaries. Recogniz ing the vital role of sailing warships by this time, the Venetians began

building their own in 1667.33 Throughout the first half of the eighteenth

27 C. H. Imber, "The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent," Archivum Ottomanicum 6

(1980): 232. 28

Henry Grenville, Observations sur l'?tat actuel de l'empire Ottoman (Ann Arbor: Uni

versity of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 54. 29

Grenville, Observations, pp. 3-4. 30

Uzun?ar?ili, "Bahriyya," p. 947. 31

Beeching, The Galleys at LePanto, p. 152. 32

Katip ?elebi, Tuhfetul Kibar Fi Esfari' l-Bihar, pp. 185, 190, 225; R. C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 142.

33 Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant, p. 194.




century the Ottomans maintained a naval balance with the Venetian

forces. Henry Grenville still considered the Ottoman fleet comparable to that of Venice from what he observed in 1765.34 Unfortunately, by

merely keeping pace with the Venetians, the Ottomans fell behind the

Atlantic maritime powers. The inferiority of Mediterranean naval

power to Atlantic power only became clear when the main naval activ

ity in the western Mediterranean passed to Britain and France in the

second half of the 1700s.35

Judging by the sporadic naval construction programs in the first

decades of the eighteenth century, a lack of resolve seems to have

played the major role in limiting the size of the navy. Under the ener

getic leadership of Mezamorto Huseyin Pa?a toward the end of the

i6oos, the Ottomans followed the European naval switch from oar

powered to sail-powered galleons, which had occurred at the beginning of that century.36 Mezamorto's reforms continued into the reign of

Ahmet III (1703-30), and the number of new ships with large-caliber cannons increased.37 During the war against Peter the Great the Turks

were superior in number and size of ships on the Azov. In 1711 the

Azov fleet comprised eighteen men-of-war and fourteen galleys.38 Evi

dently the Ottomans were quite capable of significant naval construc

tion, because the vigilant Venetians worried about rumors of the Porte

forming a fleet of forty to sixty vessels in 1720.39 Whether or not

the Venetian intelligence reports were exact is less important than the

fact that such an Ottoman response was deemed credible by Venetian

authorities.

According to Baron de Tott, a French aristocrat who served as a

foreign expert in Ottoman arsenals, frigates were only introduced into

the Ottoman fleet during the Russo-Turkish War (1768-77), when

they participated in the Ottoman defeat at Chesme.40 It is likely that

frigates actually appeared slightly earlier. Henry Grenville mentioned

34 Grenville, Observations, p. 29.

35 Uzun?ar?ili, "Bahriyya," p. 948.

36 Stanford Shaw, Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280

1808, vol. 1 of History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1987), p. 226. 37

Shaw, Empire of the Gazis, p. 229. 38 B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Hamden, Conn.: Archon

Books, 1965), p. 25. 39

Mary Lucille Shay, "The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734 as Revealed in Des

patches of the Venetian Baili," University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences 27, no.

3 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944), pp. 74-76. 40 Baron Francis de Tott, Memoirs of Baron De Tott, vol. 2, pt. 3 (New York: Arno Press,

1973), p. 25.




frigates with forty to fifty cannons each in 1765.41 In any case, it was

not until after Selim Ill's naval reforms that the Ottoman fleet again became competitive with Atlantic Europe, although the Turkish defeat

at Chesme was not due to any technical deficiencies. The Turkish fleet

actually had larger vessels than the Russian fleet, and their artillery was

comparable.42

The naval reforms of Selim III (1789-1807) demonstrated that the

empire's domestic production was still capable of rising to the chal

lenge. In 1784 the navy consisted of twenty-two ships of the line and

fifteen frigates (of which nine were in poor condition).43 In the period

1784-88 there were twenty-five vessels carrying over sixty guns within

the Ottoman navy. One of these, a seventy-four-gunner, had been

built by French engineers.44 Between 1789 and 1798 some forty-five modern fighting ships were built and launched from the empire's ship

yards. Among these were three of the largest ships ever present in

the Ottoman fleet: the Selimiye (122 cannons), the BadiA Nusret (82

cannons), and the Tavus-u Bahri (82 cannons). By 1806 the fleet con

sisted of twenty ships of the line and twenty-five frigates, with a total

of 2,156 cannon.45 Additionally, shipbuilding at the arsenal had been

reorganized on European lines. The two old wooden drydocks were re

placed by three permanent stone ones, five new ship-building forms were constructed, and a new drydock was built, modeled on that of

Toulon.46

Istanbul was clearly the dominant center for Ottoman naval con

struction. The Selimiye, Tavus-u Bahri, BadiA Nusret, AsarA Nusret, Sedd

ul Bahir, and the BahrA Zafer were all launched from the naval yards in

Istanbul.47 These ships made up over one-third of the complement of

galleons constructed during the reign of Selim III. They also repre sented most of the navy's firepower. Besides galleons, the Istanbul

yards also produced two frigates, the MerkenA Gazi and the HumayA

Zafer, and six corvettes.48

While Istanbul played the most important role in naval construe


42 Petrosian, Osmanskaia imperiia mogushchestvo i gibel', p. 164.

43 Shaw, Empire of the Gazis, p. 154.

44 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism: i5th-i8th Century, vol. 3: The Perspec tive of the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 477.



47Nejat G?len, D?nden B?gune Bahriyemiz (Istanbul: Kastas A. S. Yayinlari, 1988), p. 118.

48 G?len, D?nden B?gune Bahriyemiz, pp. 118-19.



190 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, SPRING I999

tion, other ports made significant contributions. In Bodrum three

galleons were built between 1790 and 1796.49 Facilities at Sinop also

made three galleons in the years 1789-93. ?anakkale, Gemlik, Midilli, and Rhodes contributed an additional one galleon each to Selim's pro

gram. Rhodes served as the principal construction site for frigates, and

four came out of there from 1793 to 1797? Also, two corvettes were

launched from Rhodes, the first in 1796 and the second in 1799? Other naval yards at Eregli, Limni, Kemer, Kalas, and Sinop were

responsible for one frigate apiece.50 The Ottomans had relied on foreign expertise and had copied for

eign technology in their naval construction from the very beginnings of their navy. As the innovations from the first-tier Atlantic producers diffused across the Mediterranean via Spain to Venice, the Ottomans

became cognizant of them and incorporated these new types of ships into their own fleet. First galleons and then frigates joined the ranks

of Ottoman naval service after neighboring powers had similarly borrowed them.

Military Production

The question of when the Ottomans first employed cannon and fire arms in their military operations has not been definitively answered, but Ottoman cannon production gradually became more centralized over the course of the fifteenth century.51 In 1440, during the reign of

Mur?t II, a cannon foundry was established at Germe Hisar.52 After the

conquest of Constantinople, a permanent cannon foundry was estab

lished in the Galata district.53 Bayezid II (1481-1512) extended this

49 Guien, D?nden B?gune Bahriyemiz, p. 118.

50 Guien, D?nden B?gune Bahriyemiz, pp. 118-19.

51 There is evidence that cannoneers were present with Murat Han during the 1422

siege of Constantinople, and important fortresses used cannon?for example, Antalya in

1423. In the following years the Ottomans must have made the transition from siege guns to field guns, because during the time of Murat II (1421-51) the first clear usage of field

guns occurred at the second battle of Kossovo in 1448. Sevin?, Osmanli Sosyal ve Ekonomik

D?zeni, pp. 141-42; Paul Wittek, "The Earliest References to the Use of Firearms by the

Ottomans," in Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom, ed. David Ayalon (London:

Vallentine, 1956), pp. 142-43; V. ]. Parry, "Barud," in Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition,

1:1061; Mark C. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 (Phila

delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 336-41. 521. H. Uzun?ar?ili, Osmanli Devleti tesjdlatindan Kapukulu Ocaklari, vol. 2 (Ankara: Turk

Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1944), p. 35. See also Sevin?, Osmanli Sosyal ve Ekonomik D?zeni,

p. 142. 53 Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Eb?'1-Feth, trans. A. Mertol Tulum (Istanbul: Baha matbaasi,

i977)> P- 72.




production site, and Suleyman I (1520-66) had it renovated. In addi tion to the central arsenal at Istanbul, the Ottomans established Bel

grade, Buda, I?kodra, Teme?var, Pravi?te, and G?lamber as important provincial centers of cannon production.54 Besides these permanent establishments, other locations served as foundries, depending on the needs of the moment. Included in this category were Bilecik, Van, Kigi, Kamengrad, Rudnik, and Novobrdo.55

The size and quality of Ottoman cannons in the fifteenth and six

teenth centuries were quite impressive. Chemical analysis of Ottoman

guns cast in 1464 reveals that the bronze was of excellent quality.56 Among the monstrously huge guns produced by the Ottomans was the

balyemez. This term was derived from the Italian word pallamezza and

applied to Ottoman guns that fired the biggest shot.57 The use of an

Italian loanword reveals the origins of the technology copied by the Ottomans. During the reign of Selim I, cannon of this type were 820 cm in length and weighed up to 17 tons. Also under Selim I, the Otto

mans developed grooved cast cannon 425 cm long and 100 cm wide, a

feat not matched by the Germans until the nineteenth century.58 Unfortunately for Ottoman military fortunes, the methods and tech

niques that had served the Ottomans so well in the sixteenth century

began to be liabilities in the seventeenth century. The Ottoman pref erence for the production of siege guns, which were too heavy for use in a war of movement, continued through the seventeenth century.59 It was precisely at this time that European developments in the manu facture of mobile field artillery moved ahead. Raimondo Montecuc

coli, the Habsburg commander who defeated the Ottomans at the battle of St. Gothard in 1664, commented on Ottoman cannon:

This enormous artillery produces great damage when it hits, but it is awkward to move and it requires too much time to reload and site.

Furthermore, it consumes a great amount of powder, besides cracking and breaking the wheels and the carriages and even the ramparts on

which it is placed . . . our artillery is more handy and more efficient and here resides our advantage over the cannon of the Turks.60

54 Parry, "Barud," p. 1063.

55 Midhat Sertoglu, Osmanli Tarih Lugati (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1986), p. 341. 56 Parry, "Barud," p. 1061.

57 Sertoglu, Osmanli Tarih Lugati, p. 33.

58 Sevin?, Osmanli Sosyal ve Ekonomik D?zeni, p. 143.

59 Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, p. 186.

60 Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, p. 186.



192 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, SPRING 1999

Generally, though, Ottoman cannons were still regarded highly in

the seventeenth century. Rycaut wrote, "The Guns are the biggest and as well cast and moulded as any in the world; for the last Expedition in

Hungary there were 40 pieces of new Cannon cast and transported by way of the black Sea, and thence by the Danube unto Belgrade and

Buda."61 Domestic cannon production remained strong throughout the

eighteenth century, but the Ottomans' penchant for big, heavy guns

placed them at a disadvantage in mobile field battles against European forces armed with rapid-fire cannons. The Ottomans remained partial to the old balyemez and shaki cannons, and consequently their artillery

was no longer comparable to that of European powers.62 In effect, the

empire was manufacturing the wrong type of pieces. During the Otto man campaign against Ada Kale in 1738, the Austrians captured fifty cannons at Orsovo, but they could only take forty of them due to the

weight of the pieces.63 It was not until 1774 that a train of light field

artillery was cast for Ottoman service.64

While Rycaut had praised Ottoman cannon production in the

seventeenth century, barely over a century later Baron de Tott had no

similar inclination. In Tott's assessment, "the Founderies which they

already had were useless; . . . and the metal. . . was not hot enough when it reached the Moulds; the improper make of which added yet another defect to the Pieces they produced."65 Accordingly, the baron

suggested improved furnaces and the use of machines to bore the

cannon.66 After successfully casting twenty cannons with the new

method, he was ordered to prepare fifty four-pounders. He recorded

that, "The first work of the New Foundery was to be a Train of Field

Artillery, with which the Turks were entirely unprovided."67 Much to Tott's chagrin, the impact of his modern foundry was not

as great as he had hoped. After the completion of the pieces for the

field train, some new cannons were cast for the new forts on the

Dardanelles.68 Still, the new foundry remained underutilized. Soon after

the baron's departure, it ceased to manufacture cannons at all. The

failure of the facility was due primarily to financial difficulties. As the

61 Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, p. 200.


63 A. Z. Hertz, "The Ottoman Conquest of Ada Kale 1738," in Archivum Ottomanicum

6 (1980): 169. 64

Tott, Memoirs, p. 155. 65




Tott, Memoirs, p. 197.




baron himself remarked, "We have already seen that the Establish

ment of the new Foundery had not abolished the old. The Funds intended for the Artillery were spent upon that; and it was with diffi

culty that the necessary supplies were obtained for what was acknowl

edged to be much more useful."69 Baron de Tott's enterprise did yield some results. In the 1780s each artillery regiment received ten cannons:

four of the new rapid-fire sweat, two smaller abus, and four older balye mez and shahi cannons, for a total of 250 pieces.70 However, this proved to be inadequate. As reported to the French Foreign Ministry in 1793, "until today, the Turks have founded only bronze cannon and their

army and navy have no other. Their foundries and their forges are

pitiful."71 Selim III must have agreed with this opinion, because in March

1793 the sultan initiated a modernization program for artillery produc tion. Selim's program relied on an infusion of foreign machinery and

expertise. New machinery for the Imperial Cannon Foundry (Tophane) was imported from Britain and France. At the same time a group of cannon founders sent by the French Directorate occupied the old

foundry buildings in Hask?y.72 These buildings had originally been erected by Baron de Tott to manufacture the rapid-fire cannon, but

had been converted for the assembly of old-style muskets and bullets, which were reintroduced after Tott's departure. In addition to modern

izing existing works, the sultan sought to create new foundries. With

this goal in mind, seventy master workers were to establish a cannon

foundry.73 With the introduction of cannon-boring techniques and the cast

ing of light artillery by Baron de Tott in the early 1770s, the Ottomans

became the recipients of two important technological innovations, which constituted part of the second wave of Krause's model. To ap

preciate the context one should note that Russia had adopted these

techniques only a decade before the Ottomans, and that the Russians

also had made use of a foreign expert to acquire the knowledge for

cannon-boring.74 When viewed from an eastern European perspective,

69 Tott, Memoirs, p. 178.



72 Shaw, Empire of the Gazis, p. 140


74 In the Russian case the expert was a Dutch prisoner of war captured in Berlin in

1760. William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 167; Krause, Arms and the State,

p. 56.




the Ottomans were not significantly behind, and the Russian com

parison should mitigate some of Tott's negative characterizations of

Ottoman capabilities. Similarly, before faulting the Turks and the

"backwardness of Islamic society" for their need to import technical

assistance in artillery production, one needs to remember that Russia

under Catherine the Great (1762-96) was not self-sufficient in pro

ducing military technology either.75

Why did it seemingly take so long for the Ottomans to accept

lighter field artillery? The Ottoman timing was directly connected to

Russian tactical developments in the eighteenth century. Sieges were

the backbone of military operations in eastern Europe, and therefore

siege and fortress artillery were necessarily vital components. The Turk

ish fortresses guarding the northern approaches provided formidable

defense and set the conditions for the Russo-Turkish struggles. The

Turks eschewed field battles and withdrew into their fortresses, thereby

forcing the Russians to engage in siege operations. In 1769 the Rus

sians' lack of large guns prevented them from sustaining the siege

against the Turkish fort at Hotin, and as a result the Ottomans scored a

victory as the Russians were forced to retreat. The Russian tactical

innovations of aimed infantry fire, mobile field artillery, the use of

infantry squares, and the overall stress on speed and shock grew out of

challenges posed by the Turkish campaigns in the eighteenth century. In effect, Russian commanders had changed the rules of engagement

by the 1770s, and the Turks had to compensate.76 The heavy Ottoman

guns were still viable in defending their strongholds, but the greater Russian potency in the field now required the adoption of lighter field

guns.

The Ottoman system for the production of gunpowder followed

the pattern of that used for cannon. The state created factories backed

by state resources and directed by government-appointed commis

sioners. One such factory was the gunpowder plant (baruthane) at Kagi

than?", which produced seventeen tons of powder per month in 1571.77

Additionally there were large baruthanes at Belgrade, Konya, Birecik,

Aleppo, Hama, Van, Baghdad, Rhodes, Gallipoli, Izmir, Selanik, and

75 For a broad overview of Russia's technical backwardness, see Hans-Heinrich Nolte, "Tradition des R?ckstands: Ein halbes Jahrtausend 'Russland und der Westen'," Vierteiljahr

schrift f?r Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 78 (1991): 344-64; Krause, Arms and the State,

P-55 76

Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman, pp. 145, 151; William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in

Russia, 1600-1914 (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. 147-66. 77

Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, p. 160.




Teme?var.78 According to some sources, the first baruthane was estab

lished at Kagithane during the time of Bayezid II.79 Production of gun

powder was subject to centralized direction, and the whole process of

manufacturing, transporting, collecting, and using gunpowder was con

stantly monitored by the central government. The center was continu

ally urging improvements in both quality and quantity of gunpowder, and surplus powder was sent back to Istanbul for storage and redistri

bution to other munitions locales. Provincial powder works provided a

significant portion of the empire's production. Besides Egypt, there were

fourteen powder factories in Baghdad, and ten in Buda. The Buda works were supposed to provide 200-300 kantars (1 kantar =120 lb) to three

other fortresses in Hungary and another 500 kantars to Belgrade annu

ally. Meanwhile, Baghdad factories endeavored to supply 1,000 kantars

annually to Istanbul via the Aleppo road.80

It is difficult to gauge to what extent the Ottomans relied on for

eign sources for their supplies of gunpowder. Paul Rycaut noted already in the latter half of the seventeenth century that "their Gunpowder is

made but in small quantities about Constantinople, but comes from

divers places of Europe but that from Damascus is most esteemed."81 In

1678 a baruthane was built near Istanbul. This new powder works, along with an older works at Kagithane, produced 3,000 kantars of black

powder each year. From Egypt, some 1,200 kantars of saltpeter were

received for use in these baruthanes.82 After the one baruthane was

destroyed by a fire in 1697, a new powder works was established on the

outskirts of Istanbul in 1698. In addition, the Ottomans maintained

provincial powder works in Salonika, Gallipoli, Baghdad, Cairo, Bel

grade, and Izmir.83 During the second half of the eighteenth century a

powder factory was built in Damascus to meet the needs of the janis saries.84 Evidently, these production centers did not provide sufficient

quantities of powder, because by the second half of the eighteenth cen

78 Sertoglu, Osmanli Tarih Lugati, p. 34; Sevin?, Osmanli Sosyal ve Ekonomik D?zeni,

p. 144. 79

Sertoglu, Osmanli Tarih Lugati, p.34.

80Turgut I?iksal, "Gunpowder in Ottoman Documents of the Last Half of the 16th

Century," International Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (winter 1981-82): 81-91. 81

Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, p. 200. 82 Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar?ili, Osmanli Tarihi TV. Cilt. 2.Kisim XVIIII Y?zyil (Ankara:

Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1959), p. 579. 83 Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III,

ij8g-i8oj (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 142. 84 Abdul Karim Rafeq, "The Local Forces in Syria in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth

Centuries," in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 301.




tury the Porte was buying powder from Sweden and Spain.85 Henry Grenville found Ottoman powder to be of poor quality, and he ob

served rifle and pistol powder being imported from Holland and Venice in 1765.86 The Ottomans continued to produce powder using the six

teenth-century formula, while Europe had been using a more stable,

higher quality powder since the early 1700s.87

Finally, in the last decade of the eighteenth century the Ottomans

initiated measures to improve their powder production in both quan

tity and quality. In the summer of 1794, under the leadership of Tevki'i

'Al Ratik Efendi, modernization of the existing powder works was

attempted. The Porte ordered European equipment for the baruthanes at Bakirk?y, Gallipoli, and Salonika. The goal was a production level

of 5,000 kantars of European-type powder per year. Although this first

attempt was unsuccessful, efforts the next year were more rewarding. In April 1795 Mehmed ?erif Efendi and some British gunpowder experts remodeled twenty old wheels at Bakirk?y and added five new wheels.

Within a year production doubled from 1,500 kantars of old powder to

3,000 kantars of European powder. While similar modifications were

carried out at Gallipoli and Salonika, an entirely new powder factory was constructed at Azadli on the Sea of Marmara. This factory em

ployed water power instead of animal power. Azadli was so successful

that after 1797 Bakirk?y served only as a storage house and the works at Gallipoli, Salonika, and Izmir were closed entirely. After 1795 the

Ottomans could domestically produce sufficient quantities of powder, and they became completely free of imported powder.88

With regard to firearms, the Ottomans retained their own distinc

tive forms until very late in the eighteenth century. These Ottoman

varieties did not become inferior to European types until early in that

century. The muskets in use among Turkish forces up to the time of the

Austrian wars of the 1680s were by no means inferior. In fact, they were capable of a longer range than those used by the Austrians.89

Among local forces in Syria, the tabanja and the bawd tawil figured

prominently in the eighteenth century. Both of these firearms were

matchlocks. The tabanja was a pistollike weapon, while the tawil was a

long gun introduced in the second half of the 1700s.90 While match

85 Uzun?ar?ili, Osmanli Tarihi, p. 580.


87 Shaw, Between Old and New, pp. 142-43.

88 Shaw, Between Old and New, pp. 142-44.

89 Murphey, "The Ottoman Attitude towards the Adoption of Western Technology,"

p. 291. 90

Rafeq, "The Local Forces in Syria," p. 295.




lock muskets remained in Ottoman service until the end of the cen

tury, the flintlock had already become standard in European armies.

A noticeable increase in foreign firearms imports first became ap

parent in the eighteenth century. At that time, besides receiving arms

shipments from Istanbul, authorities in Syria began importing firearms

from Europe, and especially from Italy.91 The disadvantage with respect to Europe worsened, and by mid-century a large number of muskets

and pistols were coming from Holland and Venice.92 The Italian guns came mostly from the factories of Brescia in northern Italy.93 These

imports testify to the belt of transmission of military technology from

first- and second-tier producers (Holland and Venice, respectively) to

the third-tier Ottomans.

Some appreciation of the growing disparity between Europe and

the Ottomans in the quality of arms production can be gained from the

observations of Abdul Kerim Pa?a. In 1775-76 this diplomat was head

of the Ottoman mission to Moscow. On his journey, Adbul Kerim had

the opportunity to visit the Russian works at Tula. He observed:

In a large factory situated on the river, they manufacture instruments

of war such as rifles, pistols, pikes, rapiers, and other iron implements.

By using the water of the river in such services as working the water

wheels for forging iron, they ease their labors. They want to be supe rior to their fellow craftsmen and artisans in other countries in that

industry. By paying attention to detail and by being careful, they get more skilled and versed in the process day by day and produce very

pleasing and good firearms.94

This passage offers several insights into the condition of Ottoman arms production. As Itzkowitz noted, there is a strong hint in Abdul

Kerim's Sefaretname for the Ottomans to shape up and improve the

quality of their work.95 Also, it is revealing that the author felt the

need to mention the use of water power. All Ottoman arms factories

employed animal power at the time of this writing. On this point the

authorities evidently did not take the hint, because animal power remained predominant until the next century. Finally, Abdul Kerim's

praise for the Russian work points to the increasing importance of

91 Rafeq, "The Local Forces in Syria," p. 297.


93 V. J. Parry, "Materials of War in the Ottoman Empire," in Studies in the Economic His

tory of the Middle East, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 227. 94 Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, Mubadele?An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of

Ambassadors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 89. 95 Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 12.




Russia as the measure for Ottoman performance. He presents the Rus

sian factory and workers as a model worthy of emulation. Russia was

actually behind the first-tier European powers in its arms production,

although it was a firm second-tier power.96 Therefore, the Ottoman

diplomat's praise for Russian capabilities indicates that the Ottomans were aware of their relative position on the east European scale.

After having lagged behind for years, Ottoman production of fire arms dramatically returned to the technological mainstream in the

1790s. As he did in so many other areas of war production, Selim III

strove to revitalize arms production within the empire. In 1794 the

sultan issued orders for the janissaries to be supplied with new, Euro

pean-type weapons and ammunition, and it was hoped that entirely new equipment would be available by the end of the year.97 To accom

plish this task, a new musket factory was established at Levend ?ift lik.98 As a result of Selim's program, Ottoman firearms started to be

less distinguishable from foreign weapons and now fit into the general pattern of technical advances taking place in Europe.99

Despite Selim's strong desire, the modernization of the arms facto

ries was not entirely successful. The problem lay in the want of sus

tained, forceful leadership in the administration of the factories. The

weakness stemmed from the continual changes in the foreign personnel

placed in charge. In the years 1795-98, all the arms factories with the

exception of the one in Hask?y were under the guidance of two French

men, Aubert and Cuny. After the French invaded Egypt, English and

Swedish advisers assumed the duties. Besides the rivalries of the vari ous foreign advisers, the low level of competence of many of them

mitigated their effect.100

Conclusion

For the declinists, Ottoman military technological inferiority since the

seventeenth century has been taken as an integral part of the Ottoman

96 M. E. Yapp, "The Modernization of Middle Eastern Armies in the Nineteenth Cen

tury: A Comparative View," in War, Technologe and Society in the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 344; Christopher Duffy, Russia's Military Way to the West:

Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700-1800 (London: Routledge and Kegan

Paul, 1981), pp. 37, 179. 97

Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 119. 98

Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 131. 99

Parry, "Barud," p. 1064. 100

Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 141.




decline. Such a position is not warranted. Without a doubt the Turks

lost battles, wars, and territory after 1683. Nevertheless, up to 1740

they also defeated Peter the Great, regained territory from the Vene

tians and Austrians, and held off the Iranians on a second front.

These Ottoman victories may have owed a share to luck, but no

more than their defeats owed to misfortune. The Russian victories

over the Turks beginning in the 1770s should be attributed less to

Russian technological superiority than to tactical innovation, since

the wonder weapon turned out to be the bayonet. According to the

Russian general Golitsyn, Turkish rifles "are longer, stouter and of

better iron than those of the European but they make use of them

slowly and are always impatient to charge the enemy with saber in

hand . . . infantry fire doesn't stop them. Only the bayonet represses their ardor."101 Also, those Russian battles could easily have gone the

other way, and contemporary opinion did not rule out Russian defeat

in the first years of Catherine's war.102 Finally, the rousing Otto man victory over the forces of revolutionary France in 1801 at the

battle of El Honka in Egypt testified to the renewed vigor of the Turk

ish military.103 Ottoman domestic war production rolled back on track by the end

of the eighteenth century because the government became more syste matic in recruiting the foreign technical personnel to overhaul its pro duction facilities. In the 1780s, even before Selim III, the employment of foreign specialists in Ottoman establishments was becoming more

regular. The French themselves eagerly desired to build up Ottoman

naval and military strength, and French engineers and artisans super vised Ottoman manufacture of shells, bullets, ships, and artillery.104 As

the British embassy reported, the "French Mission continues to solicit

the Porte to hasten as much as possible her armaments, and prepara tions, by sea and land."105 Herein lay the decisive improvement in

acquiring the technical knowledge and integrating it into Ottoman

101 Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman, p. 130.

102 Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, pp. 86-87.

103 Dispatch from Major Holloway to General Hutchinson, Field of Battle, El Honka,

16 May 1801, in The Keith Papers, ed. Christopher Lloyd, vol. 2 (London: Navy Records

Society, 1950), p. 303. 104 Public Record Office (Kew), FO 261/1, Ainslie to Marquis of Carmathen, 9 October

1784, No. 22, and 25 November 1784, No. 25. 105 Public Record Office (Kew), FO 261/1, Ainslie to Marquis of Carmathen, 10 Janu

ary 1785, No. 1.



200 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, SPRING I999

domestic industry. Instead of relying on the random defection of

skilled Europeans into Ottoman ranks, as they had done earlier in the

century, beginning in the 1780s the Ottomans arranged with foreign states for formal missions to transfer the necessary techniques. As a

result, the Ottomans obtained the most recent plans and models for their arsenals and dockyards. Selim III was able to build on this base

when he initiated his reforms in the 1790s, and this closed the widen

ing gap between the Porte and its rivals over the century. Problems

remained with the Ottoman military establishment, but production had been restored.

From this examination of Ottoman war production capabilities it is

evident that the Ottoman empire experienced no inexorable decline

after 1571 or 1683. Furthermore, the Ottomans managed to remain on par technologically with their main rivals, the Venetians and the

Russians. Although Ottoman military production did lag behind the western European military technological developments during the

eighteenth century, this state of affairs was not irreversible, and by the end of that century the Ottomans had succeeded in catching the

wave of innovations. As we have seen, galleons, frigates, cannon

boring techniques, light field guns, new-formula gunpowder, and flint

lock firearms all found their way into Ottoman domestic manufactur

ing and use.

From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries the Ottomans man

aged to catch the first two diffusion waves of military technology, and

each time they developed a domestic production capability derived

from foreign expertise and copying foreign models. Although the tech

niques changed over time, the ability of the Ottomans to adopt new

technologies remained consistent with the capacity of a third-tier pro ducer throughout the period. In this light, the notion of Ottoman

"decline" is inappropriate and misleading. A case could be made, how

ever, for a discernible Ottoman decline after 1850. At that time the

Ottomans missed the next technological wave and actually began to

lose their domestic production capabilities entirely. A presentation of

the complete erosion of Ottoman war industries in the period 1854 1914 exceeds the scope of this essay. In brief, the dramatic and rapid

changes in war technology, from repeater rifles to machine guns and

from ironclads to dreadnoughts, combined with the development of

the mass army, caused a financial strain that Turkish resources could not

support. It became easier simply to restock with the newest imported weapons rather than lose time and money attempting to create and

maintain a domestic arms industry. German Mauser rifles and Krupp

artillery served as the standard issue for Ottoman forces, and British war




ships made up the Turkish navy.106 By the late nineteenth century the

Porte was completely dependent on foreign weapons imports and had

fallen below the third-tier level. It seems an ironic inversion of the

decline thesis to note that the period when the Ottomans were the most

receptive to Western institutional borrowings turned out to be the

time when the real decline to import dependency began.

106 Jonathan Grant, "The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports from the

Crimean War to World War I," unpublished paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the Society for Military History, Mongomery, Alabama.



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