Rethinking moral panic

8/19/2019 Rethinking moral panic

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Rethinking 'Moral Panic' for Multi-Mediated Social WorldsAuthor(s): Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. ThorntonSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 559-574Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591571 .Accessed: 11/10/2011 18:37

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2/17

Angela McRobbie

nd SarahL. Thornton

Rethinking

moralpanic'

or multi-mediated

socialworlds

ABSTRACT

It is now over

twenty years since the well-established

ociologyof

deviance along with the emergent

sociology of mass

media pro-

duced the concept of 'moral panic'.

The various studies

of youth

culture, drugtakers and the media

reaction to these

and other

phenomenaproducedsome of the

most mportantwork n post-war

Britishsociology.This articleargues

that it is now time

that every

stage in the process of constructing

a moral panic, as

well as the

socialrelationswhich support t, should

be revised. lt

suggests hat

more attentionshould be paid to the consequencesof the great

expansionof the

mediaand to the

manymore participantsnvolved

in public debate(including,for example,

commercial

promotions

departmentsand pressuregroups).

We argue that 'folk devils'are

less marginalized han they once

were; they not only find them-

selves vociferously

and articulately

upported in the same mass

media that castigates

hem, but their

interestsare also defended by

their own niche

and micro-media.Finally, he articlesuggests

that

whatwere more

stablepointsof social

controlhaveundergonesome

degree of shift,if not transformation.

'Moralpanic' s

now a term regularlyused byjournalists

o describea

process which politicians,

commercialpromotersand media

habitu-

ally attemptto incite.

It has become

a standard nterviewquestionto

put to Conservative

MPs:are they not whippingup a moral

panicas a

foil to deflect attentionawayfrom

more pressingeconomic

ssues?It

has become a routine

means of making youth-orientated

cultural

productsmore alluring;acid housemusicwasmarketedas 'one of the

mostcontroversial

ounds of 1988'set

to outrage thosewho decrythe

glamorization f drug culture'.l Moreover,

as moral panics seem to

guarantee the

kind of emotional involvement that keeps

up the

interestof, notjusttabloid,but broadsheet

newspaperreaders,

as well

as the ratings of news and true crime

television, even

the media

PfflJ Volumeno. 46 I.ssueno.

4 I)ecembo 1995 1eSvSN0007-1315

)londonSchoolof2:conomcs 1995


3/17

AngelaMcRobbie ml

SarahL. Thornton

60

themselvesare

willingto take some of the blame.

Sue Cameron,dis-

cussing 'new uvenile crime'on

BBC2'sNewsnight,

sks, 'Is it not the

media tself whichhas helped tocreatethis phenomenon?'

Moralpanics,

once the unintended

outcomeof journalisticpractice,

seem to havebecome

a goal. Rather hanperiods o

whichsocietiesare

subject every

now and then' (Cohen

1972/80:9), moral panics have

become the way

in whichdaily eventsare brought

to the attentionof

the public.Theyare a standard esponse,

a familiar,

ometimesweary,

even ridiculous

rhetoricratherthan an exceptional

emergency nter-

vention.Used by politicians o orchestrate

onsent,

by business o pro-

mote sales in certain

niche markets,

and by mediato make home and

social affairs newsworthy,moral panics are constructedon a daily

basis.

Given their

high rate of turnoverand the increasing

endency to

labelall kinds

of mediaevent as 'moral

panic',we think t is time to take

stockof the revisions,

hen consider

the strengthsand weaknessesof

this key concept.

Although both

the originalmodel of moral panics

and the reformulationswhich ntroduced

notions

of ideologyand he-

gemonywere

exemplary nterventions

n theirtime,we argue that t is

impossible o relyon the old models

withtheirstages

and cycles,univo-

cal media, monolithicsocietalor hegemonicreactions.The prolifer-

ation and fragmentation

of mass, niche and micro-media

and the

multiplicity f voices,which compete

and contestthe meaningof the

issues subject

o 'moralpanic',suggest

that both the originaland re-

vised models are

outdated n so

far as they could not possibly ake ac-

count of the labyrinthine

web of determiningrelations

which now

exist between

social groups and the media, 'reality'

and represen-

tation.

THE ORIGINAL

I HEORYOF MORALPANICS

Althoughthe

argument hatmediacoveragecan have

an activerole in

creatingdeviant

behaviour wes

ts existence o symbolicnteractionist

theoriesof 'labelling' cf. Becker

1963;Wilkins1964),

t was the pion-

eering studies

of Jock Young (1971)on the social

meaning of drug-

taking and Stanley

Cohen (1972/1980) on the media-inspired

on-

frontationsbetween mods and rockers,and their edited collections

(Cohen 1971; Cohen and Young

1973) which developed

and effec-

tively aunched he conceptof 'moral

panic'.Not only

did theirstudies

explorehow agentsof socialcontrol

ikethe policeplayed

a role in 'am-

plifying'deviance,but theydeveloped

a vocabularyor understanding

the powerful

part playedby the

media.This meantgoing beyond the

sociologicalaccountswhich ooked

at patternsof ownershipand con-

trol as signs of complicitybetween

media and government.Attention


4/17

Rethinkingmoral anic'

or multi-medzatedoctalworlds

561

was now being paid to

the ideologicalrole of the media and the active

construction f certain

kindsof meaning.

In addition, this workexplored how deviantbehaviourwas inter-

active rather than absolutist.

It was more often the outcome of

complexchainsof social nteraction han the product

of young people

with a predisposition,

ndividually r environmentally,

owardscrime

or rule-breakingbehaviour.Finally his approach

challenged moral

guardians by suggesting that their overreaction

was counterpro-

ductive.The mediacoverage

of devianceactedas a kind of handbook

of possibilities to be picked over by new

recruits. Worse still,

segregatingyoung people

away rom the community reateda greater

riskof long-term ocialdisordersince 'a societycan controleffectively

only those who perceive

themselves to be

members of it' (Young

1971:39). Overreaction, herefore, contributed

to further polariz-

ation, though this might

have been the desiredeffect, as StuartHall et

al. (1979) aterargued.

Cohen'sFolk Devils

and Moral Panics is rightfullya classicof media

sociology,embracing

a greater degree of complexity

than the many

summaries f the work

ndicate.He acknowledges

hatsocialcontrol s

uneven and much less mechanistic than the

model of deviancy

amplificationsuggests. Indeed one group of respondents (drawn

from the non-mod,

non-rocker public) criticizes

the media for

over-reporting he clashes,

whileothersdescribe

how they camedown

to the beachto havea

look at the 'fun'.Cohen has

a sophisticated rasp

of how these events fed

into popular folklore

('Whereare the mods

and rockers today?'

was a question he was repeatedly asked while

carryingout his fieldwork)

and when the panic had finally run its

course and de-amplificationhad set in, the characters

n this drama

settled into history

as recognizable social types belonging to a

particularperiod, sometimesreferred to, evenby the agents of social

control,with a hint of

nostalgia.

HOOLIGANS, HISTORY,

AND HEGEMONY

Engagingdirectlywith

the law and other rhetoric

of Thatcherism n

the late 1970sand into the 1980s, Geoff Pearson's

Hooligans:A Hzstory

of Respectable ears(

1983)focuseson the way moral

panicsoften entail

looking backto a 'golden age' where socialstabilityand strong moral

disciplineactedas a deterrent o delinquencyand

disorder.However,

twentyyearspreviously, he same processcould

be seen in operation:

the 'kids' were seen

as unruly and undisciplined, unlike their

counterparts f the previous

decade. The sameanxietiesappearwith

startling egularity; hese

involve he immorality f young people, the

absence of parental

control, the problem of

too much free time

leading to crime, and

the threat which deviant

behaviour oosesto


5/17

562

Angela

McRobbte

nd

Sarah

L.

Thornton

national

dentity

and

labour

discipline.

Pearson

hows

how,

during

the

940s,

there

were

scares

about

'cosh

boys'

and

Blitz

kids

and

how,

in

he

1930s,

there

were

a

string

of

moral

panics

aboutthe misuseof

eisure

time and the decline of the British

way

of

life

through

the

opularity

f

Hollywood

inema.

Pursuing

his

chain

of

investigation

ack

hrough

the

nineteenth

century,

Pearson

argues

that

the

nature

f

the

complaints

and

the

social

response

to

them

provides

a

ormative

nd

consensual

language

for

understanding

he

turbu-

ence

f

social

change

and

discontinuity.

The

value

of

this

historical

tudy

s

to

cast

a

critical

hadow

over

any

claims

about

he

dramatic

ise

n

iolent

crimes

carried

out

by

young

people.

Instead,

t

shows

how

oral

anics

in

society

act

as

a

form

of

ideological

cohesionwhich

raws

n

a

complex anguageof nostalgia.he

studies

of

Cohen,

Young

and

Pearson

show

moral

panics

as

cting

n

behalf

of

the

dominant

social

order.

They

are

a

means

of

rchestrating

onsent

by

actively

intervening

n

the

space

of

public

pinion

nd

social

consciousness

hrough

the

use

of

highly

emotive

nd

rhetorical

language

which

has

the

effect

of

requiring

that

something

e

done

about

it'.

The

argument

about

deviancy

ampli-

ication

s

precisely

hat

where

such

strategies

are

indeed

followed

by

ocial

nd

legislative

action,

they

also

reassure

he

public

hatthereis

trong

governmentandstrongleadership.t sonly

with

theories

of

ideology

hat

the

idea

of

the

media's

moral

anics

s

defining

and

distorting

social

issues

gives

way

to

a

more

ntegrated

nd

connective

understanding

of

the

construction

of

eaning

cross

the

whole

range

of

media

forms

and

institutions.

olicing

)ze

Cnsis

(

1979)

by

Stuart

Hall

and

his

colleagues

at

the

Centre

or

Contemporary

Cultural

Studies

(CCCS),

University

of

Birming-

am

arks

a

turning

point

in

this

respect.

They

introduced

a

more

arxist

nd

a

more

theoretical

vocabulary

o

the

terrain,

which

was

ore

alatable

o

Britishsociologists hanmuchof the

structuralist

ndsemiological

analysis

of

the

mass

media

which

followed

it,

first,

ecause

t

drew

on

the

empirical

model

of

the

moral

panic

and,

econd,

ecause

of

its

concern

for

history

and

political

culture.

As

a

esult,

olicing

the

Crzsis

can

be

seen

as

bridging

the

gap

between

ociology

nd

cultural

tudies.

Policing

he

Crisu

introduced

he

Gramscian

oncept

of

hegemony

o

nalyse

he

way

in

which

moral

panics

around

mugging

and

the

lleged

criminality

f

young

Afro-Caribbean

males

created

he

social

onditions

f

consent

which

werenecessary or theconstruction f

a

ocietyore focused

towards

aw

and

order

and

less

inclined

to

the

iberalism

nd

'permissiveness'

f

the

1960s.

This

particular

nalysis

f

the

oral

panic

shows

it

not

to

be

an

isolated

phenomenon

but

a

onnective

trategy,

part

of

the

practice

of

hegemony

which

enlarges

he

phere

f

influence

which

Gramsci

abelled

'civil

society'.

The

oral

anic

then

becomes

an

envoy

for

dominant

deology.

In

the


6/17

Rethinkingmoral anic'or multi-medzatedoczalworlcls

563

languageof commonsense, it operatesas an advancewarning ystem,

and as such it progresses from local issues to matters of national

importance, rom the site of tension and petty anxietiesto full-blown

social and politicalcrisis. The authors are alert to the complexityof

historical and social breakdown which, they claim, can then be

managedonly throughthe escalation f the controland coercion.This

begs manyquestions n relation o the scaleof socialcontrol,but what

is particularlymportant s the recognition hat ideology s a suffusive

socialprocess,and that it is not a simple questionof the distortionof

truth, but rather that ideology is a force which works continuously

through the mobilization f'common sense'.

Despitethe pivotalposition

Policing the Crisis

occupies n the history

of the concept of moral panic, the panoramicsweep of its Gramsci-

influencedargumentacrossthe entire landscapeof post-warBritain

makes it more a work of classic neo-Marxist scholarship than a

sociologyof deviance.Critical esponsehasthus been dividedbetween

those sociologistswho take issue with the study's empiricalclaims,

suggestingas Waddingtondoes that

the evidence cited in support of the view that the situationwith

regard to crime in general and 'muggings' n particularwas not

gettingdramaticallyworse,and in some respects howsan improve-

ment, does not in fact support this contention. (Waddington

1986:257)

and writers ike PaulGilroywho drawfrom the studya vocabularyor

developing further an analysis of race and ethnicity, relocating

Policing theCrisiswithina more distinctlyCulturalStudiesperspective.

(Gilroy 1987) More recently Schlesingerand Tumber (1994) have

returned to the sociologyof crime reportingand both responded to

Hall

et al.

(1981) and re-visitedmoralpanictheoryas a whole.

As its title suggests,Simon Watney's olicingDesire(1987) looks not

at crime but at so-calleddeviantsexual practice, akingthe debatesof

Policing the Crisis further by providing a foundation for a better

understandingof how controversial ocial and sexual issues become

inscribedwithcertainkindsof meaningacrossa wide varietyof media

forms. Watneyrightlypointsout that the gradualand stagedcreation

of a 'folkdevil'as describedby moralpanictheoristsapplies o neither

gay men and lesbiansnor people who are HIV positive.Instead here

is a whole world of 'monstrous'representations.Since sexuality is

subjectedto regulation and control through a multiplicityof insti-

tutionseach with their own distinctivediscursivepractices nd textual

strategies,moral panics are not, as some have suggested, the key to

understanding ears and anxietiesaboutAIDS. As Watneyputs it

the theoryof moralpanics s unable o conceptualise he massmedia

as an industry ntrinsicallynvolvedwith excess, with the voracious

appetite and capacity or substitutions,displacements, epetitions


7/17

564

AngelaMcRobbiendSarahL. Thornton

and signifyingabsences.Moralpanictheory s alwaysobliged n the

final instance to refer and contrast 'representation' o the arbi-

tration of 'the real', and is hence unable to develop a full theory

concerning the operationsof ideology within all representational

systems.Moralpanicsseem to appearand disappear, s if represen-

tation were not the site of permanent struggle of the meaning of

signs. (Watney1987:4 1

Classicmoral panic theoristswould ignore the daily endorsement

(not to say enjoyment)of heterosexuality s an ideologicalnorm and

the consequencesthis has for those who are excluded. Policiesand

practiceswhichare concernedwith policingdesire'do not, according

to Watney,emanate from one or two centralizedagencies of social

control.They are endemic n mediaand society,and in thiscontextthe

moral panic is best seen as a local intensification r 'the site of the

current front line' rather than a sudden, unpleasantand unantici-

pated development (Watney 1987:42). Watney suggests that our

understanding of moral panics might be fruitfully informed by

psychologicalmodels which seek to understand the ambivalence,

excessive nterestand even fascinationdisplayedby moralguardians

for the objectsof their distaste.

Through considering he meaningswhichhave developedaround

AIDS and homosexuality,Watney replaces the vocabularyof the

moralpanic with that of representation, iscourseand the 'other'.In

so doing, he is able to bring to his workconceptsdrawn rom fieldsof

psychoanalysis,ilm studiesand culturalstudiesto producea deeper

accountof processesof exclusionand regulation hanthatavailable n

the traditional ociologyof socialcontrol.

CONTESTING 'SOCIETY' AND 'HEGEMONY'

Britishsocietyand media,youth cultureand 'deviance' ave changed

considerablysince the 1960s, and these historical ransformations

bring to light some of the theoreticaland methodological imits of

these various studies. In original moral panic theory, 'society'and

'societal reactions' were monolithic and, as others have already

argued, ultimatelyfunctionalist.Similarly,Hall et al., Pearson and

Watney perhaps over-state hegemony and overlook the counter-

discourses rom whichthey drawand to which hey contribute. n the

1990s,when socialdifferentiation nd audiencesegmentation re the

order of the day, we need takeaccountof a plurality f reactions, ach

with their different constituencies,effectivities and modes of dis-

course.

Given the kinds of moral panic to which they attend, it is

problematic hat Cohen's society',Pearson'sdescriptionof collective

memoryand Hall

et al. 's

'hegemony' xclude youth. Ethnographies f


8/17

Rethinkingmoral anic'formulti-medzatedoctalworlds

565

contemporaryyouth culture (cf. Thornton 1995) find that youth are

inclinednotto lamenta safe and stablepastbut o have overwhelming

nostalgia or the dayswhen youthculturewasgenuinely ransgressive.

The 1990s youth culture is steeped in the legacy of previous 'moral

panics'; fighting mods and rockers, drug-taking hippies, foul-

mouthedpunksand gender-bendingNew Romantics re partof their

celebrated olklore. Whetheryollth culturesespouse overt politicsor

not, they are often set on being culturally radical'.Moralpanic can

therefore be seen as a culminationand fulfillmentof youth cultural

agendas in so far as negative news coverage baptizestransgression.

Whatbetter way to turn difference into defiance, lifestyle nto social

upheaval, eisure nto revolt?

Disapprovingmass media coverage legitimizesand authenticates

youth culturesto the degree that it is hard to imaginea Britishyouth

'movement'without itt For, in turning youth into news, mass media

both frame subsultures as major events and disseminate them; a

tabloid ront page zs requentlya self-fulfillingprophecy.Sociologists

might rightly see this in terms of 'deviancyamplification', ut youth

have their own discourseswhich see the process as one in which a

'scene' s transformed nto a 'movement'.Here youth have a point, for

what gets amplified is not only a 'deviant'activity,but the records,

haircutsand dance styleswhichwere aid o accompany he activities.

Knowledgeof this youth-cultureethos is such that its exploitation

has become a routine marketing strategy of the publishing and

recording industries. For example, the 'moral panic' about 'Acid

House' n 1988, 1989 and 1990 beganwitha predictionon the backof

the albumthat launchedthe music genre. The sleeve notes described

the new sound as 'drug induced', 'sky high' and 'ecstatic'and

concluded with a prediction of moral panic: 'The sound of acid

tracking will undoubtedly become one of the most controversial

sounds of 1988, provoking a split between those who adhere to its

undergroundcreed and those who decry the glamorization f drug

culture.'In retrospect, his seems prescient,but the statement s best

understood as hopeful. Moral panics are one of the few marketing

strategiesopen to relatively nonymous nstrumental ancemusic.To

quote one music monthly, they amount to a 'pricelessPR campaign'

(Q,January1989)2.

Following London Records' sleeve notes, the youth-orientated

music and style press repeatedlypredictedthat a moral panic about

Acid Hollse was 'inevitable'.3 nnuendo, then full-blown exposes

about Ecstacyuse in British clubs, appeared in the music press for

months before the storywas picked up by the tabloids.By the end of

August, many magazines were wondering why the tabloids were

ignoring the issue, while others, confident of eventual moral panic,

imagined possible headlines like 'London Gripped by Ecstacy 'or

'Drug Crazed New Hippies in Street Riot' (TimeOut 17-24 August


9/17

566

Angela

cRobbie

nd

Sarah

L.

Thornton

1988).

n

September

1988,

during

the

'silly

eason',

he

tabloids

inally

took

he

bait

and

subjected

the

culture

to

the

full

front-page

treatment.he government,Labouroppositionandthe policewere

keen

o

ignore

the

topic

for

as

long

as

they

possibly

could,

only

belatedly

aking

statements,

arrests

and

recommending

egislation.

This

moral

panic

was

incited

by

a

couple

of

culture

industries

e.g.

recording

nd

magazine

publishing)

well

versed

n

the

'hip'

deologies

of

outh

subsultures.

In

addition

to

the

difficulty

we

have

n

excluding

rather

arge

social

groups

nd

industrial

activities

rom

accounts

of

'society'

r

'consen-

sus',

o

we

can't

gnore

the

many

voices

which

now

contribute

o

the

debateuringmoralpanics.In the 1990s,interestgroups,pressure

groups,

obbies

and

campaigning

xperts

are

mobilized

o

intervene

n

moral

anics.

For

example,

the

spokeswoman

f

the

National

Council

for

One

Parent

Families,

Sue

Slipman,

played

a

leading

role,

on

an

almost

weekly

basis

over

a

period

of

three

or

six

months,

in

diminishing

he

demonization

by

the

Tories

of

young

single

mothers

for

having

children

without

being

married.

One

of

the

main

aims

of

pressure

groups

is

timely

ntervention

n

relevant

moral

panics

-

to

be

able

to

respond

instantly

o

the

media

demonization f the group they represent,and to provide

infor-

mation

and

analysis

designed

to

counter

this

representation.

The

effectiveness

f

these

groups

and

in

particular

heir

skills

at

working

with

he

media

and

providing

highly

professional

soundbites'

more

or

less

on

cue

make

them

an

invaluable

resource

to

media

machinery

working

o

tight

schedules

and

with

increasingly

mall

budgets.

They

allow

he

media

o

be

seen

to

be

doing

their

duty

by

providing

balance'

in

their

reporting.

At

the

same

time,

they

show

how

'folk

devils'

can

and

do

'fight

back'.

This phenomenonof becomingan expert,having

been

a

deviant,

has

a

long

history

n

the

field

of

serious

crime,

drug

abuse

andjuvenile

delinquency.

However,

he

proliferation

f

groups

recently

set

up

to

campaign

on

behalf

or

with

folk

devils

and

the

skill

with

which

they

engage

with

media

s

an

extremely

mportant

development

n

political

culture.

When

Labour

and

Conservatives

ake

the

same

line

on

law

and

order,

arguing

for

'effective

punishment'

and

the

need

for

the

tnoral

regeneration

f

society,

many

media

are

inclined

o

give

voice

to

other,

sometimes

dissenting,

groups.

In

the

absence

of

an

immediate

and articulateresponse from Labour,

such

groups

occasionally

function

as

a

virtual

form

of

opposition

to

the

government.A new

political

ociology,

aking

nto

account

he

prominence

of

the

media,

might

fruitfully

explore

the

precise

sphere

of

influence

and

the

effectiveness

of

these

organizations.

This

marks

a

series

of

developments

which

have

occurred

perhaps

in

response

to

the

impact

of

moral

panic

theory

itself,4

i.e.

the

sociologist

as

expert.

At

least

some

of

the

agents

of

social

control

must


10/17

Rethinking

moralpanic'for

ulti-mediated

oczalworlds

567

have been listening

when

figures ikeJock

Young and

Geoff Pearson

were invited

to add their voices

to these

debates, because

in recent

incidentswherethere have been fears that disorderor olltbreaksof

rioting

mightspread o

other

areasor to other cities,

the

playingdown

of the scaleof

such incidentshas

been

a recurrent eature

and a

point

of recommendation

y the police

in relation

o the media.

Although

moral panicsare

anti-intellectual,

ften characterized

y

a certain religious

fervour,and

historically

most effectively

used

by

the right, only

a predominantly

right-wing

national

press arguably

stops

them

from being amenable

to the current

left.

Of course,

government

s alwaysadvantaged,

due

to higher number

of authori-

tativenews sourcesandto institutionalizedgenda-setting.But,there

is always

he possibility

f backfire.For

example,

whenJohn Major

at-

temptedto build

upon

the moralpanic

around single

mothers'

if not

initiated,

hen certainly

ueled by government

spokespeoplebecause

it helped

legitimize

welfare cutbacks)

with his

'Backto Basics'

cam-

paign,

the media, followed

by Labour,

deflected

the empty rhetoric

backonto the

Tory party,

urning he campaign

nto an

ad-hoc nvesti-

gation

into the personal

moralityand sexual

practices

of Tory

MPs.

The delicate

balance

of relationswhich

the moralpanic

sociologists

saw existingbetweenmedia, agents of socialcontrol, folk devilsand

moral guardians,

has

given way to a

much

more complicated

and

fragmented

set of connections.

Each

of the categories

described

by

moral panics

theorists

has undergone

a process

of fissure in

the

intervening

years.

New liaisons

have been

developed

and new

initiatives

pursued. In

particular,

wo groups seem

to be making

ever

more

vocaland 'effective'

ntervention:

pressure

groupshave,among

other

things, strongly

contested

the vocalityof

the traditional

moral

guardians;

and

commercial

interests

have planted the

seeds, and

courted discourses,of moral panic in seekingto gain the favourable

attentionof

youthful

consumers.

This

leads us to query

the usefulness

of the

term 'moralpanic'

a

metaphor

which depicts

a complex

society as

a single

person who

experiences

sudden

fear about its

virtue.

The term's anthropo-

morphism

and

totalization rguably

mystify

more than

they reveal.Its

conception of

morals overlooks

the youthful

ethics of

abandon

and

the

moral imperatives

of pressure

groupsand

vocal experts.

In the

l990s,

we need

to acknowledge

he perspectives

and articulations

f

differentsectorsof society.Newsociologiesof socialregulationneed

to shift attention

away

from the conventional

points in

the circuit

of

amplification

nd control

and look instead

o these other

spaces.

MORAL

PANICSFOR EVERY

MEDIUM

Not only need

the attitudes

and activities

of different

social groups

and

organizationsbe

taken into

account and

not subsumedunder

a


11/17

568

Angela

cRobbie

nzl

Sarah

L.

Thornton

consensual

society',

but

also

the

disparate

perspectives

of

different

mass,

iche

and

micro-media

need

to

be

explored.

Britain

saw

a

remarkable3 per cent increase n consumermagazine itlesduring

the

980s

-

the

result

of

more

detailed

market

research,

ighter

arget

marketing

nd

new

technologies

ike

computer

mailing

and

desk-top

publishing

Marketing

13

August

1993).

Crucially,

he

success

of

many

of

hese

magazines

has

been

in

the

discovery

and

effective

represen-

tation

f

niches

of

opinion

and

identity.

As

seen

above,

moral

panic

is

a

favourite

opic

of

the

youth

press.

When

he

mass

media

of

tabloids

and

TV

become

active

in

the

'inevitable'

oral

panic

about

Acid

House',

he

subsultural

ress

were

ready. hey tracked he tabloidseverymove,re-printedwholefront

pages,

nalysed

their

copy

and

decried

the

mzsrepresentation

f

Acid

House.

ome

30

magazines

now

target

and

speak

up

for

youth.

Another

area

of

development

s

the

gay

and

lesbian

press

who

are

represented

y

several

national

and

regional,

weekly

and

monthly

papers,

magazines

and

free

sheets,

some

of

which

have

become

sub-divided

y

age,

like

the

long-established

Gay

News

which

takes

a

different

ditorial

ine

from

the

younger,

ess

political

Boyz.

Of

course,

these

developments

are

very

much

dependent

on

the

development

of

a pinkeconomy'andthecommercial ecognitionof thepresenceand

persistence

f

high

levels

of

gay

discretionary

ncome.

Despite

their

proliferation

and

diversification,

owever,

he

media

are

obviously

not

a

positive

reflection

of

the

diversity

f

Britain's

ocial

interests.

This

is

partly

because

there

are

large

groups

of

people

in

which

the

media

are

not

economically,

and,

therefore,

editorially

interested

crucially,

he

D

and

E

'social

grades'

which

are

categorized

by

the

National

Readership

urvey

as

the

unskilled

working

class

and

'those

at

the

lowest

evels

of

subsistence',

n

other

words,

he

long-term

employedandpoorlypensioned.Butevenhere,thereare

glimmers

of

hope.

The

Big

Issue

is

now

perceived

as

the

newspaper

voice

of

the

homeless.

Other

groups

and

agencies

produce

a

never-ending

low

of

newsletters

and

press

releases

many

of

which

are

written

in

a

house-style

ustomized

o

the

needs

of

the

journalists

on

national

and

local

media.

So-called

olk

devils

now

produce

their

own

media

as

a

counter

to

what

they

perceive

as

the

biased

media

of

the

mainstream.

Moreover,

hese

niche

and

micro-media

an

even

attempt

o

incite

their

own

moral

panics.

Take,

for

example,

two

rival

political

groups,

the SocialistWorkersParty(SWP)

and

the

British

National

Party

(BNP)

-

both

of

which

have

their

own

tabloid

papers,

whichspeakto

their

members

and

attempt

to

reach

out

beyond.

In

the

wake

of

the

election

of

a

BNP

councillor

n

Tower

Hamlets

n

autumn

1993,

the

fascist

BNP

paper

wrote

hysterically

bout

he

lost

neighbourhoods

f

the

white

working

class

and

vilified

members

of

the

Anti-Nazi

League

(ANL,

a

branch

of

the

SWP)

as

'ANAL'

cum.

The

SWP

paper,

on

the

other

hand,

recounted

how

fascism

was

sweeping

the

country

and


12/17

Rethinkingmoralpanic'formulti-mediatedocialworlds

569

full-outNazismwas ust around the corner,due to the actionsof their

chief 'folkdevil',not the BNP hooligan,but the police- those 'traitors'

to the working lasswho gavethe BNP the protectionof the state.Both

attemptedto fuel violent politicalaction with their respectivemoral

panic discourses - arguably with a measure of success. This case

suggests hat moralpanics,of this localizedvariety,are not necessarily

hegemonic.

But one needn't urn to specialistmagazines nd newspapers o find

the plurality nd divergencesof opinion thatcharacterize oday's and

probablyyesterday's) moral panics'.Even the national dailies have

dependablydifferent stances.The paper whose tone and agenda is

closest to 1960/1970s-stylemoral panic is probablythe DailyMail.

Duringthe Thatcheryears, he DailyMailpractisedand perfected he

characteristics f hegemony, n a waywhichwas n uncannyharmony

withThatcherism. t wasa dailyprocessof reachingout to winconsent

through endlessly defining and redefining social questions and

representing itself as the moral voice of the newly self-identified

middleclassas wellas the old lower-middle lass.The factthatthe Mail

is the only nationaldailywithmore female than male readers if only

51 per cent female - undoubtedly nforms ts respectablegirl'sbrand

of moral ndignity.Hence, hysteriaabout single and teenage mothers

is perfect material or a DailyMailmoralpanic.

Tabloids like the Sun prefer to espouse an altogether different

brandof moraloutrage.Witha toplesssixteen yearold on page 3 and

a hedonistic pro-sex editorial line, their moralism need be finely

tuned. But that doesn't stop them from being the most preachyand

prescriptive f Britain'sdaily papers,with page after page of the 'Sun

says . . .' However, the Sun's favourite moral panics are of the 'sex,

drugs and rock'n'roll' ariety storiesabout other people having far

toomuch un, if only becausethe paper is set on maintaininga young

(and not graying)readership.Moreover, hese kindsof storyhave the

advantageof allowingtheir readersto have their cake and eat it too;

they can vicariouslyenjoy and/or secretly admire the transgression

one moment, then be shocked and offended the next. When con-

sideringthe waymoralpanicsworkwithindifferent publications, ne

need keep in mind that Sun readerstake their paper a good deal less

seriously than Mail readers take theirs. As Mark Pursehouse dis-

covered in interviewingSun readers, one of the key pleasures in

reading he Sun s the processof estimatingwhatpartof a story s true,

whatpartsexaggeratedor totally nvented.(cf. Pursehouse1991)

In the last few years, the broadsheetshave not only made use of

more visual and colour material, they also seen to have adopted

tabloid-styleheadlines to accompany heir tabloid supplements.For

example, the covers of the GuardianG2 section frequently sport

exaggerated, sensationalheadlines. 'BLOODON THE STREETS':

They're PackingPistols n Manchester' nnounces a story about the


13/17

570

AngelaMcRobbie ruS arahL Thornton

increasinguse of firearmsby youngdrug dealerson mountainbikes n

Manchester'sMoss Side

(Guardzan

9 August 1993). Given the more

measuredcopy which follows, the

Guurdzan

would seem to be using

this 'shockhorror' anguage o lightenup the story- the capital etters

signifying an ironic borrowing of tabloid style. But, as the Sun's

language s understoodby manyof its readersas tongue-in-cheek, he

Guardzan'srony gives it an alibi,but not absolution.Moreover, hese

mixtures of outrage and amusement point to the 'entertainment

value' of moral panics - something mentioned but not really inte-

grated into previous models. (cf. Curran and Sparks 1991 for a

critiqueof the sastigmatic erspective' f accountsof politicsand the

presswhichoverlookentertainment.)

In considering heDailyMail, theSunand theGuardzan,we've ound

that each paper has its own styleof in-housemoralism.As the British

pressbecomesmorecompetitive, ne strategy or maintaining ealthy

circulation igures s for a newspaper o cast tself in the role of moral

guardian,ever alert to new possibilities or concernand indignation.

It would seem that professional ournalistic tyle,carefullyattunedto

the popularityof 'human nterest' tories,drawson a moralistic oice

which, for the purposes of variety, it is willing to undercut with

occasional rony, okes, etc.

Althoughthe multiplicity f contemporarymoralpanics s perhaps

best demonstrated n relation o printmedia,the sametendenciescan

be found in radio and television. Even with only four terrestrial

channels,new definitionsof youth programming aveopened a space

for counter-discourses.Television producer Janet Street-Porter,

drawing on the cut-up graphic style of punk and indicatinga new

commitment on the part of broadcasters o take youth seriously,

pioneered YouthTV' in the mid-eighties hroughherDef II serieson

BBC2.In keepingwiththiscommitment everalof these programmes

were explicitly aimed at countering youthful folk devils and moral

panics,particularly round drugs. Thus an informativeand rational

BBC2Reportageprogrammeon the use of Ecstasy n raveculturecan

be set against he much more traditional ensational nd fearfulCook

Report ITV) on the same subject 1992).

MEDIATED SOCIAL WORLDS

In addition to unpacking society',on the one hand, and the 'media',

on the other, the third consideration n updating models of 'moral

panic'need be that the media is no longer somethingseparable rom

society. Social reality is experienced through language, communi-

cation and imagery. Social meanings and social differences are

inextricably ied up with representation.Thus when sociologists all

for an accountwhich ells how life actually s, and whichdealswiththe


14/17

Rethinkingmoralpanic'for ulti-mediatedocialworlds

571

real ssuesrather hanthe spectacular nd exaggeratedones, the point

is that these accountsof realityare alreadyrepresentations nd sets of

meanings about what they perceive the 'real' issues to be. These

versionsof 'reality'wouldalsobe impregnatedwiththe markof media

imageryratherthan somehow pure and untouched by the all-perva-

sive tracesof contemporary ommunications.

The media have long been seen to be embedded in the fabric of

society.Whatmay be constitutivelynew is the degree to which media

have become something with which the social is continuouslybeing

defined. For example, characterizationsike 'Mirror eader'or 'Times

reader' often give us as good an indication of social class as the

mentionof a particular ccupation.Socialage and generation rather

than biologicalage) are playedout in the relationbetweenRadiosOne

and Two or Capital 1tMand Capital Gold. Subtle differences of

gender identityare negotiatedwhen, say,a working-classwomansays

she dislikesall soap operas,preferring nsteadnews, sportand nature

programmes.Similarly, t the riskof being cliche, for a man to admit

his devotion to the films of Joan Crawfordand Judy Garland s, in

some contexts,tantamount o 'comingout'.

At another level, the hard and fast divide between media pro-

fessionalsand media 'punters'seems to have broken down to some

extent. The ownership of home video-cameras, he new space for

broadcasting ome video materialon national elevision in series ike

VideoDiartes), he existence of 'right to reply' programmes, the

possession of degrees in media studies all point in this direction.

Audiencescan be creditedwith possessinga greaterdegree of 'media

literacy' than they did in the past. Also important here is the

introductionof a distinctivelyamateurish rather than professional)

style of presentation,developed by Channel Four's The Tube n the

early 1980s and best reflected in the 'fluffed' mannerismof its two

presenters,Jools Holland and Paula Yates. Finally, the increasing

relianceon the audienceas a resource or successful elevision,either

as visualizedparticipants r audible nternalaudiences, eemsto give a

positive place to the audience in the processof programmeproduc-

tion.

The strengthof the old modelsof moralpanicwasthatthey marked

the connection between 'the media' and 'socialcontrol'. But, nowa-

days, most political strategiesare media strategies. The contest to

determine news agendas is the first and last battle of the political

campaign.Moreover, he kinds of social issues and politicaldebates

which were once included on the agendasof moral panic theoristsas

sites of socialanxiety,and even crisis,could now be redefinedas part

of an endlessdebateaboutwho 'we'are and what our'national ulture

is. These are profoundly homeaffairs'.The daily ntensityand drama

of theirappearance nd the manyvoicesnow heard n the background

but in the foreground,punctuatingand producingreality,point more


15/17

572

AngelaMcRobbteruS arahL. Thornton

to the reality of dealing with social difference than to the unity of

currentaffairs(cf. Hall,Connelland Curtis1981).

CONCLUSIONS

Whathasbeen arguedhere is thatthe modelof moralpanic s urgently

in need of updatingpreciselybecauseof its success.Whilethe theory

began ts life in radical ociology, he strengthof the argumentquickly

found its way into those very areas with which it was originally

concerned, influencingsocialpolicyand attitudes o deviancegener-

ally. As a result,the police,as agentsof socialcontrolnow show some

awarenessof the dangersof overreaction,while sectorsof the media

regularlyremind viewersof the dangers of moral panic and thus of

alienating sections of the communityby falsely attributing o them

some of the characteristicsf the so-called olk devils.

Crucially, he theory has, over the years, drawn attention to the

importance f empowering olk devilsso thattheyor theirrepresenta-

tives can challenge the cycle of sanctionsand socialcontrol.Pressure

groups, lobbies,self-help and interestgroups have sprung up across

the country and effectively positioned themselves as authoritative

sourcesof comment and criticism.They now contribute o the shape

of publicdebate, playinga majorrole in contestingwhat hey perceive

as dangerousstereotypesand popularmisconceptions.

The theory has also influencedbusinesspractice,albeit hroughan

undoubtedlymore circuitous oute.Culture ndustrypromotions nd

marketing people now understand how, for certain products like

records, magazines,movies and computer games, nothing could be

betterfor salesthan a bit of controversy the threatof censorship, he

suggestionof sexual scandalor subversiveactivity.The promotional

logic is twofold: first, the culturalgood will receive a lot of free, if

negative,publicitybecause tsassociationswithmoralpanichavemade

it newsworthy;second, rather than alienating everyone, it will be

attractive to a contingent of consumers who see themselves as

alternative,avant-garde,radical,rebelliousor simplyyoung. In the

old models of moral panic, the audience played a minor role and

remainedrelativelyuntheorized.With few exceptions, hey were the

space of consensus,the spaceof media manipulation, he spaceof an

easily convinced public. A new model need embrace the complex

realmof reception readers,viewers, istenersand the various ocial

groups categorizedunder the heading of public opinion cannot be

read off the representation f social ssues.

The moral panicswe have been discussinghere are less monolithic

than those the classicmodel implied. Recentmoralpanicsdo remain

overwhelminglyconcerned with moral values, societal regularities

and drawingof lines betweenthe permissible nd the less acceptable.

However, hard and fast boundariesbetween 'normal'and 'deviant'


16/17

Rethinking

moralpanic'formulti-mediated

ocial

workls

573

would seem

to

be less

common

if

only

because

moral

panicsare

now

continually

contested. Few

sociologists

would

dispute

the

expansion

over the lastdecadeof what used to be called,quitesimply, he mass

media.The

diversification f

forms

of

media and

the

sophisticated

restructuringof

various

categories

of

audience

require

that, while

a

consensual

social

morality

might

still be a

political

objective,

the

chances

of

it being

delivered

directly

through the

channelsof

the

media

are

much less

certain.

(Date

accepted:

October

1994)

Angela

McRobbie,

Department

fSocial

Science

Loughborough niversity

of

Technology

and

SarahL.

Thornton

Departmentf

Media

Stuxlies

University f

Sussex

NOTES

1.

Sleeve

notes of The

Ho?vse ound of

Chicago

VolumeII:

Acid

Tracks

eleased n

January

1988by

London

Records a

label

of

Polygram

nternational).

2. This

may

not, in

fact, be

new.

Perhaps

the first

publicity

campaign

intentionally o

courtmoral

outragewas

conducted by

Andrew Loog

Oldman

who,

back in

the 1960s,

promotedthe

RollingStones

as dirty,

irascible,rebel-

lious

and

threatening. cf.

Norman1993)

3. Cf. 'New Acid Daze',

New Musical

Express(6

February

1988);

'Acid

Daze',

Record

Mirror(20

February

1988);

Acid

Daze',

MelodyMaker

(27

February1988);

Darren

Reynolds 'Acid

House', Soul

UndergroundApril

1988).The

repetition

of the

phrase

'Acid

Daze'

suggeststhe

stories

were PR ed.

4.

Cohen's

Folk

Devilsand

Moral

Panics

and

Young's

The

Drugtakers

avebeen on

the

syllabi of

many

A-level

sociology

.

* .

.

courses anct unlversltycourses In so-

ciology,

social

policy,

social work,

and

more

recently

media

tudies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Becker,H.

1963

The

Outsiders,New

York:

FreePress.

Cohen, S.

(ed.) 1971

Images of

Deviance,

Harmondsworth:

enguin.

Cohen,

S.1972/1980

Folk

DeviEsnd

Moral

Panics:

The

Creationof

the Mods

and

the

Rockers,

Oxford: Basil

Blackwell.

Cohen,

S.

and Young,

J. (eds)

1973

The

Manufactureof the

News:

Deviance,Social

Problerns nd

the

Mass

Media,

London:

Constable.

Curran,J.

1978

'The Press

as an

Agency

of

Social Control:

An

historical

perspec-

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G. Boyce

et

al. (eds)

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rom

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H. 1994

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Thornton,S.

L 1995 ClubCulture:Music,

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Subsultural

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polity.

Waddington,

P.

A.J.

1986

Mugging

s

a

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Panic:

A

Question

of

Proportion',

BntishJournal

of Sociology

7(2):

245-59.

Watney,

S.

1987

Policing

Desire:

Pornogra-

phy,

AIDS

and

the

Media,

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Methuen.

Wilkins,

L.

T.

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Social

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Social

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Research,

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