Chapter 4

Coming Ashore

Initial Landings

All of the pieces of the operation came togeth-er in Somalia in the early days of December 1992.Actually, some forces were already in place.Teams from Special Operations Forces, as part ofOperation Provide Relief, were providing securityat airfields, as well as protecting the Air Forcecombat control teams that were operating at them.These specially trained teams also were a compo-nent of Provide Relief and were sent into the air-fields to prepare the fields for subsequent air oper-ations and to control the aircraft. Also, on 7December, members of Company C, 2d Battalion,

The U.S. Navy and Marines were the firstunderway. The Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group(ARG), composed of the USS Tripoli (LPH 10),USS Juneau (LPD 10), and USS Rushmore (LSD47), left Singapore on 23 November and headedtoward the Persian GulL Commanded by CaptainJohn W. Peterson, USN, the ready group movedinto the waters off the southern Somali coast on 3December. Planning for the operation by thegroup began in earnest the week before, when awarning order was received. At about the same

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00656

Marines and sailors stand at the edge of the deck of the Tripoli (LPI-1 10). In the background are four Marine CH-46Sea Knight helicopters scouting the area before the landings at Mogadishu.

5th Specialsecurity andenvoy when

Forces Group (Airborne) providedsniper support for America's specialhe arrived in Mogadishu.

32 RESTORING HOPE IN Sorv1uA

15th MELJ, Westpac '92-93

A Colorado native and the son of a career U.S. AirForce officer, Cot Gregory S. Newbold commanded the15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a force in the vanguardof the American commitment.

time, Amphibious Squadron 5, commanded byCaptain Brian Boyce, USN, based on the WestCoast of the United States, received a warningorder that it also would support the operation. Inaddition, Captain Boyce would be the chief ofstaff for Rear Admiral James B. Perkins Ill, USN,

who would command the maritime prepositioningforce. Amphibious Squadron 5 would have theresponsibility for maritime prepositioning shipoperations and the offload.91 The condition of theport was still a question for these officers, as wasthe infrastructure available. The ability to quicklyoffload, stage, and move equipment and supplieswould be critical to the operation, but the capabil-ities of the port could not be determined untilcoalition forces were on the ground. In the inter-im, U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams fromthe Tripoli ready group conducted beach and porthydrographic and reconnaissance surveys ofpotential landing sites.

The amphibious group carried the 15th MarineExpeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)(15th MEU (SOC)), commanded by ColonelGregory S. Newbold, which would make the ini-tial landings scheduled for the early morning ofthe 9th. The MEU had come under the operationalcontrol of Central Command on 30 November. Inaccord with the joint task force order, the MEU"splashed tracks" from the Juneau at 0330 to meetan H-Hour of 0500.92 Every available means oflanding was used. The SEALs swam in from off-shore and 170 Marines assaulted in 18 "Zodiac"boats to secure the port facility. Amphibious

OVIC DN-ST-93-02668

A Marine 5-ton truck towing a 155mm M198 howitzer disembarks from an Assault Craft Unit 5 air-cushion landingcraft at Mogadishu.

COMING ASHORE 33

assault vehicles carried the majority of the landingforce, followed by helicopters and air-cushionedlanding craft.93

The initial landings were made at 0540. TheMarines and SEALs landed across the beaches ofMogadishu and came out of the dark surf wherethey were greeted by the bright lights of televisioncameras. Ignoring the disturbing presence of themedia as best they could, the reconnaissance par-ties pushed inland to their objectives, located atthe port and the airfield. According to plan, theprepositioning ship MV lstLt Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011), which had arrived from Diego Garciathe previous day, was brought directly to the pierto offload, expediting the movement of equip-ment.94

Other than the illuminated landing, the initialportions of the operation went quickly andsmoothly. Colonel Newbold had stated he wantedto "accomplish our mission by overwhelming anyopportunity for forces to oppose us. ... This is a

low intensity conflict environment requiring [a]dramatic show of force (to create the respect thatwill minimize opposition), mind-numbing speed(so that we maintain the initiative), and a willing-ness to neutralize those who attack us (to deterfurther violence)."95 The strength and speed hedesired were in evidence as the forces movedbeyond their initial objectives and into the city. Hewas able to declare the airport open at 1145 andthe first c-i 30 aircraft landed soon thereafter.96The Air Force Lockheed C-141 carrying membersof the task force headquarters touched down just afew minutes later.

The Marines quickly passed through the city tothe United States Embassy compound, where theysecured the chancery. By the end of the day, theyhad established their forward operations com-mand post at the airport.97

In addition, the first of the coalition partnersarrived and were incorporated into the defensiveperimeter. This was a company of the 2d French

34 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC 00-50-00-00670

At Mogadishu airport, Marines stand guard in a light armored vehicle while cargo is unloaded from a U.S. Air ForceC-14 lB Starlifter aircraft.

Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, whicharrived by airplane from their base in Djibouti.98The company came under American operationalcontrol. The Legionnaires would soon be fol-lowed by thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen,and Marines from 22 other countries.

As the coalition forces moved into Mogadishuthey encountered a city that had felt the ravages oftwo years of civil war and anarchy. There was noelectricity, no running water, and no functioningsanitation system. Law enforcement was nonex-istent because there were no police or judicial sys-tem. Public buildings had been looted anddestroyed and most private homes were severelydamaged; virtually every structure was missing itsroof and had broken walls, doors, and windows.The commerce of the city was at a standstill.Schools were closed and gangs of youths roamedthe streets. Crowded refugee camps seeminglyfilled every parcel of open land, and new graveswere encountered everywhere. The sound of gun-fire could be heard throughout the city.

There had been no opposition to the landings orthe subsequent movement of forces into theAmerican Embassy compound. However, on this

first day, the operation's first shooting incidenttook place. A vehicle containing nine Somalis rana checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires,who opened fire at the fleeing automobile, killingtwo and wounding seven.99 This incident wasunfortunate but within the rules of engagement.By running the roadblock, the Somalis had poseda threat to members of the coalition, and theLegionnaires had to react. Soon, sniper fire wasadded to the troops' list of concerns, especiallyaround the port area. While not causing casualties,the desultory fire was an annoyance and an indi-cation of what was to come.

General Johnston flew into Mogadishu on 10December. The combined joint task force estab-lished itself inside the American Embassy com-pound, with the main headquarters in the chancerybuilding. With the arrival of coalition forces, thejoint task force became a combined joint taskforce. Later, the title would change officially toUnified Task Force Somalia (UNTTAF). En a sym-bolic and emotional gesture for the Marines, theflag raised over the compound was one that hadonce flown over the Marine barracks in Beirut.The embassy compound itself was a shambles.

COMING ASHORE 35

recreated while mountains offilth and trash needed to becleaned out. To make room forthe arrival and assembly areaneeded for the prepositioningforce shipping to offload itsequipment, old warehouseshad to be bulldozed.Eventually, 54 acres werecleared for this purpose. TheU.S. Navy support elementbrought in extra materialswhen it arrived, and new bar-racks, galleys, and heads werebuilt over time. While theoffload of the Lum,nus contin-ued, on a selective basis, the

Photo courtesy ot the Italian Armed Forces first priority was for engineerA typical street in the Italian sector of Mogadishu crowded with pedestrians, equipment and materials.vehicles, and market stalls. Combat support vehicles and

weapons like tanks andartillery were left on board.10°

It was long and frustrating work. A maritimeprepositioning force squadron contains enoughequipment and supplies for a Marine brigade of16,000 men. To accomplish the job smoothly andefficiently there are several distinct units thatmust participate. The first of these is the offloadpreparation party; a small group of Marines whocome on board the ship while it is underway toprepare the equipment for its eventual offload and

The buildings had literally been stripped to thebare walls; even the paving tiles had been pried upand carried away. The floors of the chancery wereburied in trash and debris a foot deep. Bodieswere found in some areas of the grounds. The staffquickly went to work cleaning out work areas andliving spaces to establish a camp.

Logistical Buildup

In the critical early days,all logistical support for thegrowing coalition forcescame from what the 15thMEU. was able to providethrough its service supportgroup, what the aUies couldbring themselves, and fromthe maritime prepositioningforce shipping. The offloadof these important vesselswas critical. The Lummus hadarrived the previous day andwas ready to begin itsoffload, which was scheduledto last for four days. But first,the port area itself neededconsiderable attention. Therewas no infrastructure, noteven wires left on the lightpoles. Everything had to be

Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

The ravages of the civil war were evident in this neighborhood in the Italian sec-tor of Mogadishu. Many of the buildings had no roofs and all were severely dam-

aged.

36 RESTORING HOPE TN SOMALIA

use. The next is the survey, liaison and reconnais-sance party, which flies into the designated port toprepare it for the imminent operation. The next isa U.S. Navy unit, the Navy support element thatundertakes the operation of the offload of equip-ment and its movement through the arrival andassembly area. Finally, the unit that will use thegear must arrive on time to move offloaded equip-ment and supplies out of the port to make roomfor what is coming off next. A miss in thesequence can mean congestion and delays. Also,during normal operations, the entire ship will beoffloaded, but Restore Hope was not an ordinaryoperation.

Every commander must balance many require-ments, making the best use of limited resources.In this case, the conflict faced by the commanderwas to strike the proper balance between combatforces and logisticians, which had to compete forlimited space on aircraft. So, in placing the prior-ity for building up the force of fighters quickly,the support troops had to wait. This in turn caused

additional delays at the already burdened port.The offloading of ships took longer than project-ed because unneeded equipment had to be movedrepeatedly or back-loaded onto the ships.

Force Buildup

Concurrent with the logistical buildup was thearrival of the forces. The airport quickly became ascene of considerable activity as more aircraftarrived, bringing in more of the UNITAF head-quarters and elements of Marine Forces Somalia(MarFor). Once again, the conditions in Somaliacaused problems for planners and operators. Thelimited capacity of the Mogadishu airport meant astrict schedule had to be maintained for arrivingand departing aircraft. This in turn affected thescheduling of aerial refueling and the use of theintermediate staging bases the Air Mobility Com-mand had set up in Egypt and Yemen. Aircraftcould only be called from the staging bases oncethere was a clear time slot at Mogadishu. Those

DvIc DD-SD.OO.00804

This view of the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu shows the chancery building in the center surrounded byits own walL Another wall, in the background, enclosed the rest of the compound. By late December 1992, the areato the top of the picture was filled with tents, mess halls, and other facilities for the UNITAF staff.

COMING ASHORE 37

DVIC DD-ST-OO-00801

This aerial view of the port of Mogadishu shows three cargo ships and a number of large, medium, and small ves-sels moored to the docks. The port played an important role during the relief effort.

aircraft then had to hurriedly unload passengersand cargo and depart quickly)°' In spite of com-plicated and hectic scheduling, the buildup ofcoalition personnel continued at a rapid pace.

On 7 December, Major General Charles E.Wilhelm, commanding general of the 1st MarineDivision, assumed MarFor commander duties. On10 December, he flew out of Camp Pendletonwith a small battle staff and arrived at Mogadishuthe next day)°2 MarFor would provide the basicstructure around which the task force would bebuilt. As other forces, American or coalition,arrived in the theater, they would initially beplaced under the operational control of MarFor.

The largest American force after the Marineswas the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division(Light Infantry), which would form Army ForcesSomalia. Because of the manner in which such anArmy division deploys, its movement actuallyhad begun on 7 December, when the first of seventrainloads of equipment departed Fort Drum, NewYork, for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey. Overthe next 10 days, 450 railcars were used to move

more than 1,500 pieces of the division's equip-ment to the military ocean terminal at Bayonne.103There they were loaded on board ships for thelong joumey to the Horn of Africa. The soldierswere preparing for their deployment at the sametime. Classes were held on the country's history,culture, terrain, and problems soldiers couldexpect. Needed equipment was brought in to fillrecognized shortages, some of it from the divi-sion's "round-out" brigade, the 27th Brigade,New York Army National Guard. The divisionhelicopters were readied for use in the deserts ofSomalia with the addition of particle separatorsand global positioning system equipment. Desertcamouflage utilities (known as battle dress uni-forms or "BDUs" to the Army) were procured andissued. 104 Troops were sent to the ranges to fireand battle-sight their weapons, ironically oftenfiring in the snows of a New York winter as theyprepared for movement to equatorial Africa.

The division was originally expected to start itsdeployment on 19 December. However, on 10December, a decision was made by UNITAF that

38 RESTORThJG HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DD-SD-OO-00747

Among the maritime propositioning ships to dock at Mogadishu was the Algol class vehicle cargo ship, USNS Altair.

Onboard cranes unload the ship's cargo of military supplies and vehicles.

Army Forces Somalia should begin its deploy-ment much sooner. When General Wilhelmarrived in the theater, he immediately assumedoperational control of the 15th MEU (SO C) andthe French forces and focused efforts on securingthe port, the airfield, and the embassy compound.With the arrival of 1st Marine Division's 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, MarFor was able tobroaden the coalition's control to areas outsideMogadishu. This began at Bale Dogle, whichUNITAF had recognized early in its planning asan important location from which to extend theforce into the interior of the country. The 15thMEU (SOC)'s Battalion Landing Team, 2dBattalion, 9th Marines, supported by elements ofMarine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, wasgiven the mission, which it planned and accom-plished within 48 hours. The Marines seized theairfield in a helibome assault prior to the arrival ofArmy forces.'°5

The first U.S. Army unit to deploy wasCompany A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry. The sol-diers and the battalion's tactical command postloaded on board three Lockheed C-141 Starlifter

troop transport aircraft on 11 December for adirect flight into the airfield at Bale Dogle, nowheld by the newly arrived Marines. The soldiersarrived within 24 hours and went immediatelyfrom deployment to employment as they relievedthe Marines who had secured the airfield.'06 * TheArmy assumed full control for Bale Dogle airfieldon 15 December.

These early successes led to criticism ofUNITAF by several members of the media.Journalists openly questioned why UN1TAF wasnot pushing more quickly and aggressively intothe interior, especially to the town of Baidoa,described as "The City of Death," where theimpact of famine and suffering were at theirworst. General Johnston, however, would not bepressured into hasty action. The responsibility forthe accomplishment of the mission and the safetyof the members of the coalition force was his

* Due to time zone differences, the soldiers actually arrivedon 13 December.

COMING ASHORE 39

alone, and he knew LTNITAF was quickly buildingin strength and would soon expand into the otherplanned relief sectors. He wanted this to be donein an orderly manner, without spreading the avail-able forces too thinly over the ground. Headdressed the issue in a television interview,explaining his reasons and laying the matter torest. 107

Meanwhile, the country began to show thecoalition soldiers all the facets of its character.Marines, sailors, and soldiers were generallygreeted with smiles and waves from the Somalisthey encountered on the streets, but there weresome who seemed determined to test the resolveof UNITAF. Sniping became a routine part ofdaily existence; seldom more than simple harass-ment, it still provided an edge to the life and workof the task force. Sniping was especially a prob-lem at the port, which was overlooked by an oldprison the gunmen used to cover their activities.Marines quickly secured the prison area andended the problem in the immediate location. Butthroughout UNITAF's time in Somalia, sniping atconvoys or into the various compounds wouldremain a daily occurrence.

The first direct attacks on UNITAF membersalso took place during these early days. In twoseparate incidents on 12 December three aircraftof Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, oneBell TJIH-1N Huey and two Bell AH-1W SuperCobras, were fired upon. The UH-1N Hueyreceived damage to its rotors. In the second inci-dent, the attack helicopters returned fire with20mm guns and missiles (the attack helicopterscarried tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided, or TOW, missiles), destroying two "tech-nicals" and damaging one American-made Ml 13armored personnel carrier)08 Such immediate,overwhelming, and deadly response was preciselywhat General Johnston set in his commander'sguidance as the best antidote for aggression by thefactions or bandits.

Just as American forces were proceeding toSomalia, so were the military contingents of sev-eral coalition partners. One of the first of theseforces to begin moving were the Canadians, whohad received their own warning order to partici-pate in the U.S.-led operation on 4 December.Originally, they had prepared to deploy their forceas a part of United Nations Operation Somalia and

DVIC DD-SD-O0-00805

The cargo from a U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy aircraft is unloaded on the flight line at Mogadishu airport while a MarineUH- iN Huey helicopter flies overhead. Beyond the main runway is the Indian Ocean shoreline.

Starlifter at Griffis Air Force Base, New York, as equipmentSomalia.

had sent the auxiliary oil replenishment shipHMCS Preserver (510) to Somalia. Under theCanadian forces' Operation Deliverance, the shiparrived at Mogadishu on 12 December. Theadvance headquarters of the Canadian JointForces Somalia landed at Mogadishu on 13December and embarked on board tbe ship. Theircontribution to the forces on the ground was to bea Canadian Airbome Regiment Battle Group, theadvance party of which arrived by U.S. Air ForceLockheed C-S Galaxy aircraft at Bale Dogle on 14Decem 09

The Italian contingent also began to arrive atabout this time. Their force was initially com-posed of two elements: two battalions of theFolgore Airborne Brigade, a famed parachuteunit; and the San Marco Battalion, a navalinfantry unit. The Italian forces were also sup-ported from the sea by the Italian Navy's 24thNaval Group, which carried heavy equipment andsupplies. The first elements of the brigade, a smallspecial forces reconnaissance element of 23 men

led by Major Gennaro Fusco, left I taly on 11December. They arrived in Mogadishu on 13December and reoccupied the Italian Embassy on16 December."° The brigade would arrive in fullforce by 24 December. On the 23d, the San MarcoBattalion arrived in Somali waters with the navalgroup. Brigadier General Bruno Loi arrived on 20December and took command of the FolgoreBrigade in what the Italian forces calledOperation Ibis.

Thousands of miles to the south, on 15December, the Prime Minister of Australia, TheRight Honorable Paul John Keating, announcedthat his nation would contribute forces as well.The Australian participation would be calledOperation Solace and their force would be formedaround a battalion group. The battalion selectedwas 1st Battalion, 1st Royal Australian Regiment,stationed in Townsville. This unit was the alertbattalion of the Australian Ready DeploymentForce. The contingent of 930 soldiers includedengineer and administrative support elements, as

40 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

ovic DA-SC-94-00321

An M998 high-mobility multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (humvee) is loaded onto an Air Mobility Command C-141Bof the 10th Mountain Division is readied for shipment to

COMING ASHORE 41

well as armored personnel carriers. The battal-ion's artillery battery commander and forwardobservers would act as liaison and provide civilaffairs capabilities. The Australian reconnaissanceparty departed on 21 December and arrived inMogadishu the next day.11'

Another of the United States' traditional allieswas preparing to send an important contributionto the coalition. The Turkish army created a spe-cial task force built around an existing mecha-nized infantry company, 1st Company, 1stBattalion, 28th Mechanized Brigade, stationed inAnkara. The company was strengthened with aquartermaster platoon, a transportation platoon, asignal section, a medical section, and an engineersection. In all, the reinforced company numbered300 soldiers. The advance party left Ankara andarrived in Mogadishu on 19 December. Theremainder of the Turkish force proceeded by railto the port of Mersin beginning on 17 December.There, they boarded three Turkish Navy ships thatsailed on the 17th and brought them directly toMogadishu on 2 January 1993.h12

By mid-December many other forces, large andsmall, were also proceeding to join UNYI'AF.Several of these came from the Middle East andAfrica. They included a reinforced motorized riflecompany from Kuwait, an all-volunteer unit thatbegan arriving on 14 December.113 The Kingdomof Saudi Arabia sent elements of its 5th RoyalSaudi Land Forces Airborne Battalion, reinforcedwith medical, engineer, and maintenance pla-toons. Numbering up to 669 soldiers, the firstSaudis entered Mogadishu on 19 December, withtheir forces fully in Somalia by the end of themonth.114 For the first time in its history,Botswana sent soldiers to serve outside its bor-ders. Out of an army totaling only 5,500,Botswana sent 300 soldiers in a composite com-pany."5 Several other countries, such as Pakistan,the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Nigeria,Tunisia, Morocco, and Zimbabwe, all sent liaisonofficers and small advance contingents in prepa-ration for larger contributions to be made late inDecember or in January. To add to the strength ofthe air forces, the German Air Force continued to

DVIC DF-SD-97-02528

Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, unload their packs after boarding a C-141B cargo air-craft, which will take them to Bale Doyle, Somalia.

42 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

provide three C-160 Transall cargo aircraft thathad been flying relief supplies out of Mombasa,Kenya, as part of Operation Provide Relief. TheBritish Royal Air Force did the same with two C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, which it also hadbeen using in Provide Relief The Royal NewZealand Air Force sent three Andover transportaircraft from its Number 42 Squadron to fly trans—port within the theater.

Into the Interior

The arrival of all these forces, and the promiseof others to come shortly, gave General Johnston

the strength and flexibility to push into the interi-or. Bale Dogle, strongly occupied by coalitiontroops, would be the springboard for the next stepinto Baidoa.

With the French forces already under the oper-ational control of MarFor, UNITAF and MarForplanners decided to prepare a combined operationto secure the city. Task Force Hope was formedfrom the French 2d Foreign Legion ParachuteRegiment, and elements of the French SpecialOperations Command and the 13th ForeignLegion Demi-Brigade, and 15th MEU. ii 6 The taskforce left Mogadishu on 15 December andsecured the airfield the next day through a com-

COMING ASHORE 43

OVIC DN-ST-93-O1 388

The day after American Marines and French soldierssecured Baidoa, Marines of the 15th MarineExpeditionaty Unit provide security for a convoy bring-ing food to the "City of Death."

bined ground and helibome movement. There wasno opposition. Relief convoys, escorted by coali-tion forces, began bringing supplies to Baidoa thatafternoon."7

The Marines and French soldiers immediatelyestablished security posts and started patrols ofthe city. The presence of a large number of armedmen was quickly noted and was a source of someconcern. On 18 December, Somalis fired frominside one of their compounds upon members ofTask Force Hope. The area was quickly surround-ed and entered and all arms were confiscated."8The incident highlighted a need, both inside therelief sectors and throughout the area of opera-tions, for a policy concerning weapons control.

The rapid success of the Baidoa operationbrought the first phase of Operation Restore Hopeto a close. It also provided the basic framework bywhich all other operations to secure objectiveswould be organized and executed. The push to the

remaining humanitarian relief sectors wouldinvolve the U.S. Marines or Army in a series ofjoint and combined operations with coalition part-ners. Wherever possible, these operations woulduse the forces of the coalition nations that had vol-unteered to assume responsibility for the particu-lar sectors.

The system by which these operations wereordered and controlled became fairly standard andreflected how IJNITAF functioned. A series ofdaily fragmentary orders were issued, or more fre-quently if necessary. The orders listed objectivesto be taken, forces to be employed, and dates foraccomplishment of the missions. Coordinatinginstructions were provided as necessary and notedany support that was required along with specificforce assignments. Each day, the next fragmentaryorders would contain more information, adjustdates if necessary, and note the commanding gen-eral's additional orders or guidance. 1JNITAFheadquarters operations section thus became ascene of continuous work as liaison officers fromvarious U.S. units and coalition forces attendedplanning meetings within the future operationscell, run by Colonel Peter A. Dotto. All the while,ongoing operations were monitored in the currentoperations cell under Colonel James B. Egan.

Another critical part of each operation was toprepare the local population for the arrival ofUNTTAF forces. This task fell to AmbassadorRobert B. Oakley, who had been appointed byPresident George H. W. Bush because of his expe-rience in Africa as Special Envoy to Somalia.Ambassador Oakley assisted the military inunderstanding the Somali people and culturalnuances. He also provided insight into the tanglethat was Somali politics."9 For each operation,Oakley would travel to the particular city inadvance of military forces to meet with the localelders and leaders. He would explain in detailwhat was about to happen to reduce the risk ofconfrontation. The following day, aircraft woulddrop leaflets over the city that repeated the peace-ful intentions of the coalition members and itshumanitarian purpose. They also would wam thepeople not to interfere with UNITAF forces oroperations. in this manner, the coalition forceswould find a soft landing at each objective.'20

Securing the Relief Sectors

With Fragmentary Order 7, UNITAF beganplanning to take the next objective: Kismayo. The

44 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-5D-00-01 031

American Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robed B. Oakley, speaks to a group of Somalis. Behind him isU.S. Army BGen Lawson VI Magruder Ill, commander of Task Force Kismayo.

Belgian forces' 1st Parachute Battalion hadarrived in Mogadishu on 13 December. Led byLieutenant Colonel Marc Jacqmin, the paratroop-ers would have responsibility for securing theKismayo relief sector, then controlling it alongwith elements of the Army's 10th MountainDivision. Kismayo lies approximately 200 milessouth of Mogadishu, on the coast just below theequator. It is the site of Somalia's second largestport, after Mogadishu, and it had been an impor-tant base for the Somali Navy. An airfield ofappropriate size for military cargo aircraft wasonly a few miles outside the city. Holding thisarea would provide another port for the receiptand onward transport of relief supplies. TheBelgian forces were placed under the operationalcontrol of MarFor for this operation. Because ofits location on the coast, an amphibious operationwas chosen to secure the city and its facilities.Captain John Peterson, commander of the Tripoliamphibious group, was designated as the com-mander of the amphibious task force andLieutenant Colonel Jacqmin as the commander ofthe landing force. The landing force was com-posed of Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines,from the 15th MEl] (SOC), and two platoons of

Belgian paratroopers. The amphibious task forceitself consisted of the Juneau and the Rushmorefrom the United States Navy, and the French shipPS Dupleix, an antisubmarine warfare guidedmissile destroyer. Captain Peterson transferred hisflag to the Juneau, U.S. Navy SEALs embarkedon the Dupleix to perform pre-landing reconnais-sance and surveillance of the beach and theMarines and Belgian paratroopers embarked onboard the American ships.'2'

Because of the presence of two warring fac-tions in the city, a preparatory political and diplo-matic maneuver was very important. On 17December, contact was made with ColonelAhmed Omar Jess, leader of the Kismayo region'sSomali Patriotic Front faction, and MohamedSaid Hirsi, who was know as General Morgan andled an independent faction in the area, setting upan agreement whereby Kismayo would be anopen city. Jess and his troops would remain in thecity, and Morgan and his followers would move20 kilometers to the north.'22

The Belgians already had sound experience inamphibious doctrine and the operation wentsmoothly. On the morning of 20 December, the

COMING ASHORE 45

Marines landed in amphibious assault vehicleswhile the Belgians came ashore in air-cushionedlanding craft and helicopters. There was no oppo-sition to the landing and control was passedashore within a few hours. Captain Peterson andLieutenant Colonel Jacqmin went immediately tothe center of the city, where they met with ColonelJess, who protested the presence of the colonialBelgians. Lieutenant Colonel Jacqnñn quicklyquieted Jess's anger and made it clear the coali-tion forces would not be intimidated.'23 *

By the end of that first day the overall strengthof the Belgian forces in Kismayo consisted of the11th Company and the Close ReconnaissanceSquadron, equipped with Scimitar tracked recon-naissance vehicles. With the arrival of additionalBelgian reinforcements, the U.S. Marine compa-ny was released from tactical control and with-drew from Kismayo the next day. By 30December, the Belgians had 550 men in thecity.124

The successful completion of the Baidoa oper-ation made it possible for UNITAF to quickly planto secure another city notorious as a scene of suf-feting and death; Bardera, located about 217 kilo-meters southwest of Baidoa, at the end of a dryand dusty track. With the arrival of more combatunits from the 1st Marine Division (notably theremainder of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, fol-lowed shortly thereafter by the lead elements of3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and the headquarters ofthe 7th Marines) there was enough power on theground to push on to this important inland city.Colonel Emil R. Bedard, commanding officer ofthe 7th Marines, departed Mogadishu for Baidoawith his Marines on 22 December; only three anda half days after these units began arriving in the-ater. 125

Prior to leaving Mogadishu, the unit meshedwith the attachment of amphibious assault and

* The issue of colonial troops was one that caused consider-able anxiety and sensitivity in the UNITAF staff. Several ofthe coalition allies once had colonies in Africa. France andItaly once had colonies in Somalia itself. Where possible, useof troops from these nations had to be done with considera-tion of the feelings of the local populace. For instance, in lateDecember, plans to secure the city of Merka originally calledfor the use of Italian troops. When the local populationprotested strongly about the return of the Italians, this opera-don was given to Army Forces Somalia as well as theItalians. The issue of colonialism also was a handy rallythgcall for the various factions when they organized protestsagainst the presence or actions of UNITAF.

OVIC DN-ST-93-o1 396

Members of Company C, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, ofthe 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, exit from a P-7A 1amphibious assault vehicle after arriving to set up acheckpoint in Kismayo.

light armored vehicles. (The advance elements ofboth the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion and the3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion had arrivedin Mogadishu on 19 December.) On ChristmasEve, after a long road march choked with dust, theMarines secured the airfield at Bardera. The nextday they controlled all access to the city by hold-ing a key bridge and the river crossings over theJubba, as well as the principal road junctions.Patrols were quickly sent out to provide securityfor the task force as well as for the people of thecity. Coordination was made with the local non-governmental agency to get the relief food ship-ments moving in. Another early concern was tosecure the market area in the center of town so itcould again open for business.'26

The next two operations were originallyplanned to occur nearly simultaneously usingFrench and Italian forces to take control of the

46 REsiURING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIG DD-SD-OO-00987

An estimated 30,000 Somalis inhabited the town of Bardera. Ills one of the most populated towns hi the othe,wisesparsely populated region of southwest Somalia.

humanitarian relief sectors that would becometheir responsibilities. Planning for the operationsto Oddur and Gialalassi was ongoing at UNITAFheadquarters by 16 December, concurrent withthe planning for the Bardera operation.

Oddur lies 260 kilometers northwest ofMogadishu, 110 kilometers north of Baidoa, andclose to the Ethiopian border. Its airport containsa 4,000-foot runway capable of handling C-130aircraft. It was noted in briefings there was a well-organized militia in the area, as well as some oldSoviet military equipment)27 The task force forthe operation would consist of elements of theFrench 5th Combined Arms Overseas Regimentand the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion,with logistic support, and Company C, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, which was placed underthe tactical control of the commander of theFrench forces.'28

UNTTAF Fragmentary Order 8, issued on 18December, called for the French forces to secureOddur "on or about 24 December." Many of theunits to be involved, however, were still arriving.Fragmentary Order 12, issued on the 21st,

rescheduled the date ofChristmas Day. On Christmas Eve, the same daythe Marines were moving to Bardera, Frenchforces began their road march to Oddur. Theypassed that day on the road and arrived in Odduron 25 December. Over the next few days, theremaining French forces in Somalia were broughtfrom Mogadishu to Oddur. From there, they werequickly reassigned to outlying towns: the 13thDemi-Brigade had responsibility for Wajid; the5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment forCeelgasass; and the Legion for El Berde, whilethe headquarters, cavalry detachment (an aviationunit), and support battalion, were at Oddur. On the29th, Major General Rene de l'Home, the com-mander of French forces in Somalia, requested theboundary of the relief sector be moved east toinclude the town of Tiyegloo. Administratively,

* if the road to Bardera was dusty, the road to Oddur waseven worse. The fine dust was like red talc in places, explod-ing underfoot with each step or billowing in clouds behindvehicles. It covered men and machines in a natural camou-flage.

the operation for

COMING ASHORE 47

the town had always been a part of the Oddur dis-trict and it was therefore proper to include it inthat sector. The request was approved at UNITAF.The French forces soon dispersed themselvesthroughout the relief sector, eventually occupying21 platoon-sized advance posts from whichpatrols could be made.'29

As early as 16 December, Fragmentary Order 7had tasked the Italian forces to secure Gialalassi.Subsequent orders refined and amplified this ini-tial order. Gialalassi is about 115 kilometers northof Mogadishu, and is situated on the WebiShebelle. In intelligence briefings, this city wasdescribed as being on dry, flat ground, with asmall forest to the north. There were two airfields,one of which was C-I 30 capable. Traveling on theroads was expected to be slow. A United SomaliCongress faction under Ali Mahdi Mohamed heldthe area and had a security force at the airfieldswith some recoilless rifles. Bandits were reportedto he operating along the road.13° FragmentaryOrders 9 through 14, issued between 19 and 24December, assigned considerable force to theoperation. U.S. Air Force engineers were ordered

to provide support in inspecting and repairing therunway if necessary. Army forces would provideconvoy security and establish a forward armingand refueling point at the airfield. MarFor wouldgive helicopter, engineer, and medical evacuationsupport as necessary. Navy Forces Somalia wouldprovide fixed-wing close air support. With theItalian forces still arriving, the date for the opera-tion was changed from 26 to 27 December.

By the 26th, the Italian forces were assemblingat the port. Two companies of the FolgoreBrigade, with headquarters, reconnaissancegroup, and mortar and antiarmor gun sectionsbivouacked in a warehouse, while motor transportand armored personnel carriers were assembled.A convoy of relief trucks also staged at the port,loading grain that had just arrived on a cargo ship.That same day, a section of U.S. Army vehiclesand a platoon of U.S. Army military policemounted in hardened humvees armed with auto-matic grenade launchers also entered the port andjoined up with the Italian forces.

The operation began in the early morning of 27December. The convoy left the port area and

Photo courtesy ot the Italian Armed Forces

Italian forces enter the town of Gialalassi on their way to secure the nearby airfield. One of the more flexible unitsof the Italian military, the Folgore Brigade could operate by means of airdrops or as a light infantry brigade.