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Matthew LinleyInternational Relations Capstone SeminarDecember 6, 2013

Big Brother or Blood Brother? Sino­DPRK Foreign RelationsDoug Wilson

“North Korea is the Impossible State. The regime, created in 1948 out of the division of the

Korean Peninsula by U.S. and Soviet occupation forces at the beginning of the Cold War, has

outlasted anyone's expectations. Even after the mighty Soviet Union and other communist

regimes collapsed some two decades ago, this enigmatic Asian nation continues to hang on”

(Cha 7).

International relations scholars haven't been able to explain North Korea's international relations. Some

characterize North Korea as psychopathic, others characterize North Korea as having lost touch with reality

while others yet portray North Korea as emotionally needy and codependent (Oh and Hassig 175). China is

North Korea's long time and currently, only ally. The relationship between China and North Korea has

changed a lot since the Korean War although there is no consensus as to what the relationship between China

and North Korea really is. One hypothesis among international relations scholars is that China and North

Korea have a “blood brother” relationship built on historical solidarity and shared ideology (Liu 348). Sharing

a long border and having a long history together have created a norm where China is the big brother or takes a

protector role over North Korea (349). However, this can't explain why relations between China and North

Korea are sometimes bad and why they sometimes disagree about ideology. Another hypothesis is that China

and North Korea's leaders have a cultural affinity because Kim Il Sung was raised and educated in China from

the age of 14 (Hun 151). Furthermore, China and North Korea are both agrarian rather than industrial

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societies, are nationalistic rather than imperialistic and and therefore Sino­DPRK relations are generally closer

than their relations with any other nations (155). This can't explain why Sino­DPRK relations have remained

the same during changes in DPRK leadership and it can't explain why there were times when relations were

bad between China and North Korea when Kim Il Sung was still the leader. Other explanations for

Sino­DPRK relations dismiss North Korea as being completely irrational, blundering through international

relations. This view of North Korea as an irrational villain is best expressed by Adrian Buzo:

On many occasions the DPRK displayed a crude, predatory outlook on international relations,

embracing support for international terrorism, bribery, petty forms of coercion, smuggling and

widespread abuse of diplomatic privileges including arms, drugs and currency dealing…a

foreign policy which renders a country isolated and widely reviled cannot be either

well­conceived or well­executed. (Oh and Hassig 175)

Finding a real explanation for Sino­DPRK relations is important to the study of International Relations

because there is currently no widely accepted theory that explains North Korea's behavior in international

relations. The United States has continually failed in negotiations with North Korea since the Clinton

administration began using a neoliberal institutionalism approach. China has also failed in getting North Korea

to cooperate regarding nuclear weapons. For most other states, relations with North Korea are terrible or

non­existent. Because North Korea is sometimes seen as a threat, it's important for the world to understand

North Korea's behavior in international relations. The United States and China in particular could benefit from

learning what works in order to minimize the risk of conflict in the region. This article seeks to answer the

question of why regional allies sometimes criticize each other's provocations and why other times, they even

support them. In the context of China and North Korea, the risk of an American military intervention has been

a constant since the end of the Korean War, however the probability of an American intervention changes. The

threshold of perceived threat, where the probability of an American intervention is too high, is different

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between China and North Korea. This is because the potential benefits of North Korea's provocative actions

usually, but not always, are much higher for North Korea than China . When the risk of American military1

intervention exceeds China's threshold of perceived risk, it has incentive to try and prevent North Korea from

further provoking America. When the threshold of perceived risk isn't exceed, China might sometimes even

support North Korea's provocations. Therefore, large states criticize their smaller ally's provocations when

they feel there is a possibility of provoking military intervention which would destabilize the region.

For the purposes of this article, a list of North Korean provocations from 1950 until 2013 was complied.

Not all provocations were included, however this list creates a continuum of North Korean provocations from

the Korean war until now. Each event was categorized according to the type of provocation, the Chinese

response, the American response and United Nations Security Council resolutions. Chinese responses were

taken from Xinhua News Agency newspaper articles accessed from LexisNexis Academic Newspaper

database and Xinhua News Agency newspaper articles published in the Foreign Broadcast Information

Search daily reports database (FBIS), the United States' principal record of political and historical open

source intelligence. American responses were taken from The New York Times newspaper articles accessed

from LexisNexis Academic Newspaper database. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution

information was accessed from the UNSC official website. For the purposes of this article, Hannah Fischer of

the Congressional Research Center's definition of provocation will be used as:

To include armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies;

hijacking; kidnaping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation

1 An exception to this is the January 1969 “Blue House Raid” in which North Korean agents infiltrated the South Koreanborder and attempted to assassinate the Korean President and bomb the “Blue House”, which is the South Korean versionof the White House. The 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo is also an exception. It was later discovered in secret documentsreleased from the Romanian Embassy in China that the Chinese Communist Party had vowed support for North Korean ifthey would attack South Korea. The leaked document from the Romanian Embassy stated “We, the Chinese diplomat added,share the conviction of the Korean comrades that war is drawing near and the People’s Republic of China has repeatedlydeclared that it would grant its full support to the DPRK” (Lerner 7).

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against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of

the South Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations;

and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. (Fischer 2)

This definition is appropriate for the purposes of this paper because it excludes armistice violations, which

are quite frequent between North and South Korea. Actually there are hundreds of thousands of armistice

violations. It also excludes North Korea's domestic politics which is appropriate because it matches the system

level of analysis used in this article.

Chinese and American responses were hand codified as “primary actions”. The list of possible “primary

actions” was taken from the Inter­University Consortium for Political and Social Research's (ICPSR) World

Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) code­book by Charles A. McClelland, University of Southern California

(McClelland). Each “primary action” was given a numerical value from the code­book. The unit of analysis is

provocation/response. Each provocation is taken from daily newspaper reports and the response is codified as

a primary action under it's corresponding number. This measure of international response is appropriate for the

purposes of this article because it was designed specifically for International Relations research, the variety of

“primary actions” is large enough to accurately represent responses to events in International Relations and

using the code­book increases the reliability and consistency of measuring responses to world events.

China has viewed it’s border with North Korea as a permanent and unchanging zone of peace since the 10th

century (Cha 342). North Korea is a source of insecurity for China because it has been invaded from the

Korean Peninsula in the past. Therefore, China sees North Korea as a strategic buffer zone and the stability of

North Korea enhances China's security. Liu criticizes the idea that China is mainly interested in keeping North

Korea as a buffer zone because modern warfare decreases the importance of geographic proximity and the

buffer zone is a hindrance to economic ties with South Korea (Liu 350). Liu's criticism is inconsistent with

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Wohlforth's theory about the strategic advantages of geography however (Wohlforth 28). Wohlforth doesn't

believe that technological advances can eliminate that strategic advantage and that many international relations

scholars underestimate it's importance. The research in this article tends to support Wohlforth's theory and

discounts Liu's theory. In terms of economic ties, China­South Korean trade was ten times that of

China­North Korea trade by 1990 and by 1997 that gap had grown three times larger (Oh and Hassig 157).

China still tends to react negatively towards North Korea's provocations when America sends signals that it is

willing to have a military intervention against North Korea. The strength of China's reaction to North Korea is

usually related to the strength of America's reaction against North Korea and not the type of provocation. A

good example of this is the 1993 and 2006 nuclear crises. Both nuclear crises had a corresponding UNSC

resolution, numbers 825 and 1695 respectively, but China abstained from voting in 1993 and actually voted

for the resolution against North Korea in 2006. During the 1993 nuclear crisis, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian

Qichen stated unequivocally that China did not support sanctions but during the 2006 nuclear crisis, China

voted for sanctions (Mack 356). Why the change? The difference was that during the 1993 nuclear crisis,

America only expressed alarm and threatened some non­military economic sanctions ("U.N. Asks DPRK to

Reconsider"). During the 2006 nuclear crisis however, America showed a willingness for a military intervention

and China supported the UNSC resolution ("U.N. Agrees on Resolution Against North Korea”). China may

have been worried that North Korea would become “the next Iraq” but it seems that North Korea was willing

to take that risk anyway because it knew that America was already preoccupied with military operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan. There never was an intervention but the events support the idea that China still values

North Korea as a strategic buffer zone and that's it's importance has not diminished because China is willing to

take actions to keep the peace on the Korean peninsula.

A second example of how China's reactions to North Korean provocations are usually related to the

strength of America's reaction is the submarine infiltration incidents. In 1996, the first and most serious

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submarine infiltration in terms of South Korean security occurred when a DPRK submarine ran aground and

the crew of over 20 escaped onto the beach eluding the South Korean Army for weeks until they were all

finally killed or captured ("Two South Korean Soldiers Killed"). In 1998, two more North Korean

submarines were discovered in South Korean waters. The first one was in June and the second was in

December. All three of these incidents were seen as armistice violations by South Korea and each time,

evidence was discovered that the purpose of the submarine's mission was espionage and sabotage . However,2

only the June, 1998 submarine infiltration provoked a threat from America to “punish” North Korea (“South

Urges Joint Inquiry"). Because America made a threat, China also responded more negatively towards North

Korea during the June, 1998 incident (“South Korea Alleges DPRK Submarine On Espionage"). America

made accusations against North Korea during the December, 1998 submarine infiltration but there was no

threat and therefore, China remained neutral on the matter (“North Korean Vessel Is Chased"; “DPRK

Submersible”) . The 1996 incident was of course the most serious in terms of the size of the submarine, the

number of crew members who infiltrated onto South Korean territory and the reaction from the South Korean

military however, neither America or China responded seriously to the incident.

A third example of how China's reactions to North Korean provocations depend on America's reactions is

the Yeonpyeong naval battles. There are occasional incidents involving fishing boats and sightings of spy boats

but the Yeonpyeong incidents are more serious because they were actual naval battles. The Yeonpyeong

islands are near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) of territorial waters that divide North Korea and South Korea.

The first battle of Yeonpyeong was in 1999. This was considered to be the most severe naval clash between

2 The June 1998 submarine was found to contain diving equipment, RPG­7 rockets, automatic weapons and South Koreancanned beverage. It was believed that the espionage agents killed the five crewman before committing suicide themselves asfive crew members were found to have been shot in the body and four in the head from apparent suicide (“South KoreaAlleges DPRK Submarine”). Ammunition and uniforms were discovered on the beach during the 1996 incident (“NorthKoreans Slip Into South”). The dead crew members were also dressed in civilian clothing and not military uniforms (“ElevenDPRK infiltrators").

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North Korea and South Korea since the Korean war. The American response was complicated and

contradictory. US officials made statements such as:

This latest incident fit the standard model for North Korean negotiations...They create a crisis.

Then they demand concessions in return for backing down. The Perry report, if and when we

get it, should take into account this kind of brinksmanship . ("Korean Clash May Ruin U.S.3

Reconciliation Bid.")

The statements made it clear that North Korea's actions weren't being taken seriously. They were being

interpreted as signals to America that North Korea was defiant but US officials felt that it was a bluff.

Surprisingly, the US reacted anyway by making a show of force with navy ships and aircraft. In addition, the

US sent the Aegis­class cruiser Vincennes and the guided­missile destroyer Mobile Bay to the area ("Two

Koreas' Navy Vessels"). However, there was never any official statement or threat made against North

Korea. Although America did make a show of force, China didn't react very strongly to the situation and

remained quiet. Zhang Qiyue, Spokeswoman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry only expressed “deep concern”

about the confrontation (“China Concerned About Confrontation”). It's difficult to say what China's level of

threat perception was in this situation. The show of force seems to have been interpreted as a signal in return to

North Korea however and China's mild response is consistent with the theory that China will only criticize

North Korea's provocations if it feels that there is a threat of military intervention.

The second battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002 was similar but it drew a very different response from China. In

the beginning, immediately after the confrontation, China reacted as it did during the 1999 naval clash. This

time it was Spokesman Liu Jianchao of the Chinese Foreign Ministry who delivered the message of “deep

concern” over the situation ("China Concerned Over Clash"). However, shortly after that the US made a bold

3 The Perry report refers to former Defense Secretary William J. Perry's three day visit to Pyongyang in an attempt to get NorthKorea to stop selling and testing missiles in exchange for lifting sanctions as a part of the Clinton administration's neoliberalinstitutionalism approach to North Korea.

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statement about the situation declaring that it had canceled sending a delegation to North Korea and halted

negotiations stating that it was an "unacceptable atmosphere in which to conduct the talks” ("U.S. Changes

Mind"). The US accused North Korea of having committed an armed provocation and considering this event

was during the “Axis Of Evil” policy of the Bush Administration, it was clear that America wasn't willing to

tolerate as much as it was last time (2). After the US halted the negotiations, China changed it's tactics towards

North Korea and began to gently persuade them towards cooperation with South Korea and the US ("China

backs DPRK"). China didn't criticize North Korea but it was a clear message that China wanted North Korea

to relax hostilities because Spokesman Liu Jianchao of the Chinese Foreign Ministry made a statement that

“the recent fire­exchange incident was merely an episode in the course of the on­going relaxation of tension on

the Korean Peninsular” and that “the Chinese side hopes that the situation on the peninsula will be able to go

on developing toward the direction of relaxation” (2). Later in the same month, the US continued to be firm

towards North Korea by conducting a joint salvage operation with the South Korean Navy to retrieve a ship

which had sunk in the second battle of Yeonpyeong ("S.Korea, USFK to Conduct Patrol Boat Salvage”).

That was a clear signal to North Korea because the reason for the battle in the first place was a dispute over

the NLL and by conducting the salvage operations, America was unilaterally rejecting that claim.

These three cases demonstrate that when China perceives a high risk of American military intervention due to

North Korea's provocations, it tries to prevent North Korea from further provoking America in order to

maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. China sees North Korea as a strategic buffer zone and the stability

of North Korea enhances China's security. Therefore, large states criticize their smaller ally's provocations

when they feel there is a possibility of provoking military intervention which would destabilize the region. These

findings are consistent with Wohlforth's theory about the strategic advantages of geography because it shows

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that China still values North Korea as a buffer zone in the region even though technology should have

shortened distances and closed gaps (Wohlforth 28).

One problem with the author's theory is that the time period is mostly limited to post­cold war events. It's

possible that this is only an explanation of North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong­Il or in the post Cold

War environment and that it can't explain Sino­DPRK relations during the cold war or under a different leader.

To address this criticism, it should be noted that North Korea's tactics in International Relations have always

remained constant. It may appear that things are different because North Korea has switched to nuclear

weapons for provoking it's neighbors instead of bombings and kidnappings, but the tactic is the same for North

Korea. Data is limited because the LexisNexis Academic Newspaper database only has The New York

Times newspaper articles from January 1st, 1977. It is possible to find articles older than that in other archives,

but the scope of this research was limited to online databases. Another problem is that although Xinhua News

Agency has been publishing in English since 1944, there is a period of almost complete black­out on North

Korea from 1966 until 1977 during the Great Proletarian Revolution in China under Mao. There were several

important events that occurred during this event and data is available but for the purposes of consistency, only

data from the The New York Times and Xinhua News Agency was used.

This article is important to the study International Relations because most states have continually failed in

negotiations with North Korea. America especially has been unsuccessful since the Clinton administration

began using a neoliberal institutionalism approach and experienced no further success under the Bush

administration. China has also failed in getting North Korea to cooperate regarding nuclear weapons. If the

author's theory is correct, then China and America should work together in order to get North Korea to

behave how they want. This could increase peace in the region and benefit everyone.

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