Research proposal v1.0
-
Upload
matthijs-van-tuijl -
Category
Documents
-
view
395 -
download
1
Transcript of Research proposal v1.0
![Page 1: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Succes and Failure on the (Populist) Right: The Case of Wilders and Verdonk
Research Proposal
Matthijs van Tuijl
0850845
Master Thesis Political Behaviour and Communication
Leiden University
18-03-2011
Prof. Dr. Galen Irwin
![Page 2: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
‘I want to be Prime-Minister’1 was Rita Verdonk’s claim on October 18 2007, when
she founded her movement Trots op Nederland (TrotsNL, Proud of the Netherlands). At that
point in time not an unrealistic claim, with the opinion polls having her at 25 seats 2. Geert
Wilders with his Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Freedom Party), lost half of his supporters to
Verdonk when she announced her party3. However, on June 9 2010, the day of the Dutch
General election, Wilders managed to secure 24 seats and Verdonk was voted out completely
by the people.4 How is it possible that Rita Verdonk could not win any seats in the end and
that Geert Wilders showed a significant growth?
That there was a potential for Verdonk to be successful was clear from the previous
general election in 2006, when she was involved in a fierce battle for the leadership of the
Liberal party (VVD) with now Prime-Minister Mark Rutte. She just lost, but did manage to
get more votes during that election than Rutte. With 620,555 votes, she got almost 100,000
votes more than her party leader5. Verdonk was forced to leave the VVD after an internal
dispute, with the leadership contest, in practice, still going on after the elections. When she
left, as figure 1 shows, she remained popular and was therefore for a while seen as a serious
force within Dutch politics. Geert Wilders, himself also a former VVD MP, having left the
party a few years earlier, enjoyed growing support after the elections until Verdonk founded
her new movement. At that point in time there were two new right wing parties looking for
the favour of the Dutch voter, only one was capable of claiming victory in the end.
Verdonk and Wilders have often been called populists, due to their approach to
politics (Lucardie 2007; Vossen 2010). While the reasons behind the political success of
populist parties have been studied in detail, focusing on elements as political leadership (or
charisma), protest voting and issue preferences (Eatwell 2005; Van der Burg and Mughan
2007), there is still no definite answer on how they managed to succeed and what elements are
most important. While there are many examples in Western Europe of populist parties
effectively claiming an influential position within their countries’ politics, the parties that do
not make it have received less attention.
What is interesting about the movements of Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders, as figure
1 shows us, is that it was not just success or only failure. There were many ups and downs in
popularity in the years between elections. What happened during these years? Why Verdonk
1 ‘Verdonk wil in Torentje; ‘Trots op Nederland’ moet Fortuyn evenaren’ , De Telegraaf, October 18 20072 Nieuw Haags Peil, November 4, 20073 Nieuw Haags Peil, October 21, 20074 ‘Tweede Kamer 2010’, Kiesraad, June 9, 20105 ‘Proces-verbaal Tweede Kamer 2006’ , Kiesraad, November 27
2
![Page 3: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
did not make it in the end and Wilders did, will therefore be the puzzle of this thesis. The
findings of this study could contribute to a better understanding of the development of
populist parties in general. What explains the differences in electoral outcome for them? It
leads to the research question of this study.
What explains the success of the PVV and the failure of Trots op Nederland in the period
2006-2010?
11/22/2
006
1/23/2
007
3/26/2
007
5/27/2
007
7/28/2
007
9/28/2
007
11/29/2
007
1/30/2
008
4/1/2
008
6/2/2
008
8/3/2
008
10/4/2
008
12/5/2
008
2/5/2
009
4/8/2
009
6/9/2
009
8/10/2
009
10/11/2
009
12/12/2
009
2/12/2
010
4/15/2
0100
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Parliamentary Opinion Polls 2006-2010
PVVTON
Num
ber o
f Sea
ts
Source Peil.nl
Figure 1.
1. Theory
In order to find an answer to the research question it is necessary to look at what these
parties or movements actually are. It is claimed that Wilders and Verdonk are populists, but
what that is still remain ambiguous. Even though it is not the focus of this study to define
populism, it is important to know what we are actually dealing with. When that definition is
more clear, characteristics of the PVV and TON can be compared to that to see if they fit the
picture. If they can be qualified as populist parties, there is a possibility to look at
explanations for success and failure of populist parties and test these for Verdonk and
Wilders.
1.1. Populism
Especially in Europe there is a growing number of right wing populist parties entering the
arena and successfully claiming a position in parliament. According to some, the de-
alignment process that took place across Europe, led to the rise of these new parties, focusing
3
![Page 4: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
more on party leaders and less on a fixed ideology (Dalton et al., 2002: 22, 31-32). The FPÖ
in Austria and the Danish People’s Party are just a few examples of parties that even managed
to participate, in some form, in their countries’ government.
Populism is a concept that is not that easy to define in terms of when a party can be called
a populist party. It is a concept that has many features and is has developed over time. In his
study on Populism, Paul Taggart (2000) describes this process and defines modern populism
as the New Populism, which has its roots in Western Europe. He sees it as a movement of
multiple parties across countries with some defining characteristics. First of all, it is reaction
to bureaucratised welfare states and corruption within the existing political parties. Secondly
they reconstruct politics around a key issue, either taxation, immigration and nationalism or
regionalism. Thirdly, they organise themselves differently from existing parties, as a result
from distrust of political institutions. Party membership is only active and direct in the form
of elected officials and personalised leadership is prevalent. Fourth, they like to establish a
link between the people and them and place themselves outside of the centre of the political
spectrum (Taggart, 2000: 75).
Canovan explains this link to the people more clearly by distinguishing between three
different types: the united people (as in a nation), our people (in an ethnic sense) and the
ordinary people (against the privileged) (Canovan, 1999: 5). These separate types make the
faces of populism more clear. It can focus on a certain ethnic group and be an excluding
factor or it can rebel against the elite and be the voice of the common man. The elite is seen as
corrupt and going against the general will. Cas Mudde considers that to be the centre piece of
populism, the restoration of the will of the people in a country. In that way, populism is a very
moralistic ‘ideology’ (Mudde, 2004: 543-544). In this view, the common man is no longer in
power, the elite is and that is de facto a bad thing. Populist parties are there to restore popular
control over a nation.
The important thing to realise from the New Populism of Taggart is that these parties are
effectively trying to find a niche in politics based on dissatisfaction with modern politics.
They see politics as no longer representing the people and try to re-establish that link with
them by focusing on issues that appeal to certain groups in society. As Taggart explains, the
people are here portrayed as an unity within a heartland. That heartland can best be seen as an
imaginary place that emphasises all the good and virtues aspects of life. It is however not all
inclusive. It is to a large extent based on nationalism of an ‘organic community’, excluding
certain groups in society (Taggart, 2000: 95, 97). Related to this is the creation of conspiracy
theories. The elite conspires together, no longer protects the heartland and there should be
4
![Page 5: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
something done about that. This is argued to be a major factor to mobilise support (Ibid.:
105).
Leadership is also a defining feature of populist parties. With populist parties you can
have two types of leadership. Most common is the type based on charisma, centred around
leaders with a large popular appeal. When this is however not present, it is argued that in that
case it tends to be authoritarian (Ibid.: 103). The result of this leadership is the creation of a
populist mood. The idea that something needs to change fundamentally and the country needs
to be reshaped. This mood has the power to encourage otherwise non active citizens to
participate in politics and to get out and vote (Canovan, 1999: 6).
Interesting points are raised by Mudde in clarifying some basic elements of populism,
related to democracy and leadership. As he argues, when it comes to democracy, populist
parties want responsive government not necessarily direct democracy. They want the outcome
to be representing the will of the people, but those people do not have to participate directly,
as long as they are heard. On the point of leadership, he says that the people want their leaders
to be in touch, but not be one of them (Mudde, 2004: 558-559). This marks some interesting
aspects of populist parties and can explain for the apparent paradox of authoritarian leadership
and listening to the will of the people. That will needs to be represented by the political
leaders, but the people should not take over from them. Although some other scholars present
a somewhat more different picture and argue that populist parties will demand more direct
democracy. Democracy should in that view be seen as an ideal that includes ‘referenda,
popular consultation and direct elections of office- holders (Keman and Krouwel, 2007: 25).
What we see is that the concept of populism is not unambiguous. However, as seen above,
there are still some defining features of these parties.
1.2. Wilders and Verdonk as Populists
In order to analyse the success and failure of populist parties in the case of Wilders and
Verdonk, it is important to establish what kind of characteristics they share with this populist
image as sketched above. If they are populist leaders, then it is possible to test explanations of
success and failure of populism for them. If they differ from the ideal populist picture, then
this can be taken in account when conducting this study.
Koen Vossen, comparing Wilders and Verdonk in terms of populist tendencies,
distinguished seven features of populism comparable to the points mentioned above. Some of
them, the ‘folksy style’ and ‘voluntarist approach’, are somewhat similar to other points. The
folksy style more or less relates to how politicians act, being one of the people, speaking with
5
![Page 6: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
the same language. The voluntarist approach relates to politics not having to be as complex,
the peoples’ qualities are enough to govern (Vossen, 2010: 25). These two points clearly
focus on the incompetent elite in comparison to the people. It again stresses the fact that the
political organisation has become filled with an unnecessary bureaucracy that needs to be
fixed. The voluntarist approach also moves away from a politician as a professional. The
common man should be represented and therefore there is no need for professionals.
(Vossen, 2010: 34)
Wilders
As shown in table 1, there are some doubts with Vossen about the basic idea of Geert
Wilders as a populist in the traditional way. He calls Wilders a half-hearted populist, mainly
because he is a professional politician and he is not glorifying the people to the extent that a
true populist would do. Instead he also criticizes them on occasions (Vossen, 2010: 30). The
interesting thing about this is that Wilders is a former MP for the VVD, as is Rita Verdonk,
but in contrast to her, he spend quite some more time there. He had been active for the
parliamentary party since 1990, working as a policy advisor. Known as a hard worker,
Wilders was living politics. This is illustrated by the fact that when he was forced to leave
parliament after the 2002 elections, he was devastated, having no alternative for politics
whatsoever (Fennema, 2010: 66). Wilders can therefore with reason be called a professional
politician and not so much a ‘common man’. It might be this background that prevents him
from actively calling on the people as a source of wisdom and more relying on his own mind.
In contrast to not glorifying the people, Wilders does denounce the elite and rises up
against them. He has managed to create a link between progressive politics and the anti-
establishment idea of populism. He has created an image of the Dutch elite as a leftis elite
with an inclination for cultural and moral relativism (Vossen, 2010: 27 ). It might be this
explicit definition of the elite that explains how being a professional politician at the one hand
6
![Page 7: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
but mixing that with some form of populism at the other. It is just a certain part of the political
spectrum that is completely on the wrong path. Wilders wrote a ‘declaration of independence,
his starting point for his movement. In this he explicitly mentions that elite let ‘this’ happen
and now hold their hands in the air and say there is nothing they can do about it anymore
(Fennema, 2010: 103).
With this he focused on the cultural aspects. This also shows his focus on the
progressive elite, conspiring against society. He made a distinction between the Labour party
of Wouter Bos, which he thought to be pampering, and the VVD. The people that did not
want it to go completely wrong, should vote VVD (Ibid., 105). The exponent of this focus on
the cultural and moral relativism of the Dutch elite, is his own conspiracy theory about Islam
taking over Europe (Eurabia). As Vossen shows, Wilders actively spreads this image of
islamification, referring to many experts in the field. With this he is trying to give weight to
his claims and focus his campaign on the issue of immigration of Moslim immigrants
(Vossen, 2010: 27).
Vossen gives no definite answer on whether Wilders is a charismatic leader, calling it
difficult to measure in his case because of the closed nature of the party. However according
to him the style of leadership is more important in his case. Wilders is the only member of his
party, trying to control the internal decision making (Ibid.:28). This relates to the points made
by Taggart on authoritarian leadership. Wilders, whether charismatic or not, should then more
be seen as an authoritarian leader.
Paul Lucardie (2007), also shows the special position Wilders has put himself in. He
qualifies Wilders as a right-wing, semi- hearted liberal nationalist and populist (181). As well
as Vossen, he acknowledges that Wilders his behaviour is not one of standard populism.
Wilders focuses on freedom, but it is limited and very inconsistent with respect to (Islamic)
religion. The populism, although by some seen as limited is according to Lucardie clearly
noticeable in his reference to the people and the corrupt elite (2007: 179-180). Geert Wilders,
although not being the ideal type can therefore be characterised as a populist politician.
Especially his anti-elite politics and the focus on Islam as the key issue around immigration
are clear indicators. The leadership elements can also be found. What is however clear is that
Wilders has some points that distinguish him from an average populist.
Verdonk
Where Wilders is a somewhat more complicated story in terms of populism, Verdonk
seems all the more fulfilling the standard definition of a populist. As can be seen in table 1,
7
![Page 8: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
she scores on all the criteria that are outlined. Research on her speeches and interviews show a
clear distinction between the corrupt elite and the people as the virtuous element in society.
There is a distrust of the people caused by the elite (Vossen, 2010: 30). Note here that
Verdonk does not care for the elite being left or right wing, it is just the elite. Unlike Wilders
she tries to take on the entire establishment and does not even leave out her own former party.
She mentioned Mark Rutte as being too left wing and therefore also being out of touch with
the people. When founding her movement she did not want to take sides either and think in
the old way of how the political spectrum was divided. She did not want to be mentioned left
or right, but wanted to think in old and new (Lucardie, 2007: 181). With this she cannot be
seen as more distinguishing herself from the establishment or elite and taking the side of the
people. From her history it does make sense for her not just to criticise the left, since she was
ousted by the VVD party leaders, but favoured by the people during the elections. In general
we can see Verdonk trying to frame that image of her party taking on politics in general.
The other important point to qualify Verdonk as a populist is that she emphasises
vigorously on voluntarism and direct democracy. In her view the people should govern and
we do not need politicians to sort out the best solutions. This is best illustrated by the fact that
she wanted citizens to discuss with each other what the best solutions to certain problems are.
The real knowledge of ordinary people would improve this country (Vossen, 2010: 31). What
we see here is Verdonk going away from the politician as a professional in politics. Politicians
should listen to the people and she goes to extremes to establish that link. She also did not
present a real party manifest until very late. Just a couple of months before the elections, she
presented her plans to the public. She then focused on taxation, subsidies and other public
spending6.
The personality of Verdonk was therefore very important. As Vossen stresses, she mainly
relied on her own popularity and her image she had built during the years before. Trots op
Nederland is very apolitical, in that way and more a feeling. (Vossen, 2010: 32-33). Because
of that lack of content of what the party is really about, it is difficult to clearly explain what
kind of party or movement it is. It could only somewhat be qualified as a nationalist party.
She does emphasize Dutch culture and the relevance of putting that up front, but not as
extreme as Wilders does it. She could therefore best be seen as a populist liberal-conservative
(Lucardie 2007: 182). The clear difference here is that Wilders actually wants to tackle the
influence of Islam in society, whereas Verdonk does not see that danger. She sees it more in
6 ‘ToN richt pijlen op ambtenaren’ De Telegraaf, April 8 2010
8
![Page 9: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
terms of not letting the Dutch society fade away in general. By focusing on taxation and more
power to the people, she fits very clearly in the classic image as depicted by Taggart.
1.3. Success and Failure
With this outline of populism and Wilders and Verdonk as populist leaders it is now
possible to look at the elements that explain success and failure. In general there are three
reasons that can be defined why people vote for populist parties: The protest vote, in reaction
to other parties; voting for the charisma or leadership or voting for substance of policy
preferences.
The protest vote comes from what Immerfall sees as a neo-populist agenda. He focuses
on what the emphasize is of a populist party and sees its appeal accordingly. He argues it to be
important for such a party to hold together what he calls, a neo-populist coalition. This is
aimed at exploiting country specific issues, mainly focused on the economic situation of the
nation, in order to attract voters (Immerfall, 1998: 250). Populism here is seen as a reaction to
what is happening in a country and the reason of existence is an appeal to the people. Populist
parties, by showing what is wrong, have a reason to exist. Voters then react to this by seeing
the establishment as incompetent who fail to take care of the nation and vote for the party that
raised those questions (Ibid., 258). This explanation of the populist vote has nothing to do
with the appeal of leadership or what plan are presented to the people. It is the basic idea of
framing the image of the corrupt elite that let the people down and is not representing the
general will anymore.
As Taggart explains, there are a problems with the way populist parties behave or are
organised, especially in this way. One of those things is their critique on established parties.
They want to distance themselves from them, but are forced, by the way politics is organised,
to behave in a similar way. As a consequence, they have a large risk of internal conflicts or
collapsing (Taggart, 2000: 100). In practice it comes down to a very simple logic. At first a
populist party successfully explains why the old parties are not the right choice for the voter.
With this they create momentum for them to grow support. However, since this is not based
on concrete plans or policy they fall in the trap they have created for themselves. Once the
people notice that they are not capable of fulfilling their needs either, the image of a strong
counter party disappears and the party collapses.
Roger Eatwell sees the importance of charisma in leaders for explaining the success of
populist parties. Whereas it is a concept that cannot be defined very easily and can take on
many forms, he focuses on the personal presence of the leader. It is about being able to create
9
![Page 10: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
the right image on television and to catch the right sound bite and not so much about the
physical attraction of the party leader. The focuses of the publicity tend to be on the
personality of the leader and this creates electoral appeal (Eatwell, 2005: 108). This approach
takes away the idea of charisma just being about the leader and puts the emphasis on the
actions of him or her. It still remains a personalised attraction, but of a different nature.
Taggart sees the problems with charismatic leadership in the long run. He argues it to be
unstable and not very reliable. Politicians can never be certain how to effectively sustain their
charisma and it is therefore very unstable (Taggart, 2000: 102). As long as politicians are seen
to be charismatic and are capable to catch the eye of the people, they will continue to be
popular. However relying on charisma alone seems to form a problem in the long run. A new
contender can come along and take away the support or people will start to see through the
charismatic mask.
Van der Burg and Mughan (2007) conclude from their study of Dutch populist leaders,
that they do not have a greater effect on the voting behaviour than their counterparts from the
established parties. Even for Pim Fortuyn, arguably a very charismatic man, there was not to
be found any significant difference between his leadership appeal and that of other politicians
(Van der Burg and Mughan, 2007: 44). This further puts pressure on the effectiveness, if any,
of just the leader as a token to attract votes. Even though in a best case scenario it helps to
improve voting for the party, it seems to be the case that a populist party cannot rely on the
leader alone.
There is more to it and Mughan and Paxton (2006) try to explain this with a case study of
anti-immigrant feelings in Australia. What they find is that policy preference is highly
significant as an explanation for the populist vote. Only if there is correspondence between
what voters want and what parties offer them, will they vote for them (Mughan and Paxton,
2006: 354, 357). It seems that voters have an idea of what they want to happen in a country
and need parties to defend this or to bring this forward. It can effectively boost the claim
made by many populists that the old parties are not representing the will of the people. It
could be the case that it is then more than a protest vote and basic rhetoric and gives a chance
for parties that can actually find a niche in politics to grow and become important.
Ivarsflaten, shows the volatility of populist parties when it comes to issues and thereby
also acknowledges the importance. She shows that the saliency of (especially the economic)
issue is important (Ivarsflaten, 2005: 489). The populist voter does look at issues and does
take in account the state of the nation and is not simply affected by rhetoric or leadership
appeal. Van der Burg and Fennema (2003) firmly support this conclusion and state that
10
![Page 11: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
conclude from their analyse on the development of anti-immigrant parties, that voters vote
according to their issue preferences. They argue that voters for those parties vote for the same
reasons on a party as any other voter does. Some evidence even hints that they are even more
ideological voters. (Van der Burg and Fennema, 2003: 66. 70-71). It seems that we should not
underestimate the voters for populist parties. There is evidence that they are not the simplistic
voters as some people hold them to be. The strength of a party does not just rely on the
leadership or on a protest vote. It depends heavily on which issues are salient and whether a
party manages to bring them forward in a right way. There are therefore many ways for a
populist party to go wrong and it depends on the context whether such a party is successful or
not.
1.4 Sub-questions/Expectations
Based on the literature and the characterisation of both Wilders and Verdonk, it is possible
to formulate some sub questions to analyse the success and failure of their parties. As seen
above there are three main reasons for the success of populist parties, these will serve as a
guide for explaining the differences between the two parties and finding an answer to the
research question. From this it is possible to distinguish between the following sub questions.
Q1: What was the influence of the ‘protest vote’ for Wilders and Verdonk?
It follows from the literature that the protest vote can be one of the reasons why people
vote for populist parties. The protest vote is a result of the party emphasising the difference
between the old and the new. The establishment has failed the people and the new (populist)
party is there to re-establish the link between the people and the government. For the protest
vote explanation to contribute as an important factor of success, we would expect to see the
populist party to rally against the old parties and their politics. Furthermore the emphasis
would be on the old elite that has failed the people and the importance of restoring that faith
and giving power back to the people. An important explanation for failure here is the inherent
implications of this strategy. When parties run into problems themselves (mostly internal),
this will backfire and the protest vote will no longer be of any use to the populist party. If they
no longer have the image of being the new that will get rid of the habits of the old, we will
expect to see failure.
Q2: What was the influence of leadership as an explanation for success and failure?
11
![Page 12: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
A second explanation of success can be found in the leadership appeal or
personification of politics. It works either through charisma or authoritarian leadership.
Whereas charisma is not an easy concept to define, for the purpose of this study it will be
operationalised in a comprehensive way. Here it will just mean the personal appeal of a leader
to attract voters. For this to work out, we will expect to see less or none emphasizing on issues
or ideas, but attention for the leader in general. It is expected that voter appeal will go up
when a lot of attention is given to the populist leader. The danger here is the unstable factor of
charismatic leadership. It seems that emphasising on just the personal appeal of the leader for
too long can pose a problem and an unstable basis for a party to continue to grow further or
hold its position. Authoritarian leadership can be a further explanation for a populist party to
maintain a strong position. This type of leadership is expected to be very important for
holding the party together and we are expected to see differences with regards to voter
preferences for parties.
Q3: What is the influence of issue preferences and saliency?
The final sub question relates somewhat to the second. What is more important, having a
leader with a big charismatic appeal or talking about the issues and focusing on improving
specific things? For this question we would expect to see attention to issues relating to voter
appeal. It is also expected that certain issues will result in more support of voters than others.
When parties talk more about salient issues or create saliency for an issue they are expected to
increase their voting potential. Failing here could be the result of two different things. First of
all, it could mean that the specific party is unable to create any substance to link themselves
to. This could mean that the party focuses more on leadership potential or has other reasons
not to focus on the issues. The other explanation is that a party emphasises an issue that
apparently is not that salient to the general public or where they take a (in the eyes of the
public) wrong stand on.
2. Methodology
This will be an qualitative research on the success and failure of Wilders and Verdonk in
the period between 2006 and 2010. The reasons to focus on Wilders and Verdonk are clear.
They both have clear elements of populism in them and both had a large (initial) appeal to the
public. In the period between 2006 and 2010, as seen in figure 1, some interesting
developments took place with respect to the voting potential of the two politicians/parties.
Verdonk joined the race for the populist vote. Verdonk and Wilders both had their ups and
12
![Page 13: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
downs in the polls, eventually resulting in Verdonk dropping to nothing and Wilders reaching
an all-time high. It can therefore be qualified as a period with many changes and different
sides. This makes it an interesting period to analyse, for it can test on different moments in
time the different expectations as outlined above.
A newspaper analysis of De Telegraaf will be carried out of this period. The reason to
take De Telegraaf as the focus of this study is that this paper is well known for its right wing,
often populist, sympathies. The long-time motto of the paper: ‘De krant van wakker
Nederland’, relating to the newspaper being there for the (active) Dutch people, is also a
reference to this populist appeal. If any it will be this paper that follows the development of
these populist parties closely. They will also be more likely to portrait a certain picture of the
parties with respect to their potential of representing the people. By analysing newspaper
content through Nexis Lexis, a reconstructing will be made of the selected period. With this
reconstruction we can see what actually happened and what explanations are more important
for the success and failure. Note here that the aim of this research is not to establish causality
between media coverage and populist success. Rather the media coverage is used to create the
essential narrative.
The searchterm ‘Rita Verdonk’ for the period September 21, 2007 (the day before the
2006 general election) to June 10, 2010 ( the day after the 2010 general election) resulted in
649 De Telegraaf hits. A similar search for ‘Wilders OR PVV’ resulted in 2378 hits. In order
to analyse importance of these articles, the polls as indicated in figure 1 will be followed.
Several points in time, as seen in the figure, are indicated as crucial moments or periods.
These crucial moments are operationalised as moments where major changes occurred in the
opinion polls. Some of them are periods where both Wilders and Verdonk fluctuated, these
are indicated with black arrows. The red ones refer to the period of change for Verdonk and
the blue arrows to crucial periods for Wilders. The articles will be grouped in the time frames
of these periods giving the advantage of seeing differences in style, magnitude and issue v
leadership.
Next to the media narrative of the Telegraaf, there is also some interesting data that can
be linked to the opinion polls. Peil.nl carried out separate small researches on important
moments over these four years. Many relate to the confidence in the party leaders over time,
but they also focus on specific issues when they appeared to be more salient or played a role
in decision making on that moment in time. The Dutch election study 2010 can also be used
to back up the story. Sympathy scores for the parties (both TON and the PVV) and the
sympathy scores for the party leaders (both Wilders and Verdonk) were generated with these
13
![Page 14: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
surveys, providing us with data on the importance of both. For Wilders some additional
questions were asked: What issue comes to mind when thinking of the PVV and do you agree
with the PVV on that issue? What other issue comes to mind when thinking of the PVV and
do you agree with the PVV on that issue? How much would you trust Geert Wilders with
being Prime-Minister?
The advantage of doing this qualitative research over a more quantitative approach is that
a better understanding can be acquired about the circumstances under which the shifts in
popularity took place. This can then be linked to the theory on populist support, sub-questions
can be answered on the basis of the relevant narrative. This in-depth approach can shed more
light on what factors are different for these two parties and should therefore not be limited to
raw data. It could provide for a more comprehensive explanation of why one populist party
fails and the other succeeds. In a nutshell that is the aim of this study.
3. List of References
Canovan, M. (1999) ‘Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’, Political
Studies, 47: 2-16.
Dalton, R. J., McAllister, I. & Ferdinand Muller-Rommel (2002) ‘Political Parties in a
Changing Europe’, in Luther, K. R. & Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, Political Parties in
the New Europe, Oxford: OUP.
Eatwell, R. (2005) ‘Charisma and the Revival of the European Extreme Right’ in Rydgren, J.,
Movements of Exclusion: Radical right wing populism in the western world, New
York: Nova Publishers.
Fennema, M. (2010) Geert Wilders: Tovenaarsleerling (third revised edition). Amsterdam:
Prometheus.
Immerfall, S. (1998) ‘The Neo-Populist Agenda’ in Betz, H-G. and S. Immerfall (Eds), The
New Politics of the Right: Neo-populist parties and movements in established
democracies, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
14
![Page 15: Research proposal v1.0](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022082502/55679942d8b42a1a588b5143/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Ivarsflaten, E. (2005) ‘The Vulnerable Populist Right Parties: No Economic Realignment
Fuelling Their Electoral Success’ , European Journal of Political Research, 44: 465-
492.
Keman, H. en Krouwel, A. (2007) ‘The Rise of a New Political Class: Emerging New Parties
and the Populist Callenge’, The NET Journal of Political Science, 5 (1): 20–39.
Lucardie, A. (2007) ‘Rechts‐extremisme, populisme of democratisch patriotisme?’ Jaarboek
DNPP, 2007: 176-190.
Mudde, C. (2004) ‘The populist Zeitgeist’, Government & Opposition, 39 (3): 541-563.
Mughan, Anthony and Pamela Paxton (2006) ‘Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Policy Preferences
and Populist Party Voting in Australia’ , British Journal of Political Science, 36: 341-
358.
Taggart, Paul (2000) Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Van der Brug, Wouter and Meindert Fennema (2003) ‘Protest or Mainstream? How the
European Anti-Immigrant Parties Have Developed into Two Separate Groups by
1999’ , European Journal of Political Research 42: 55-76 .
Van der Burg, W. & Mughan, A. (2007) ‘Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-
Wing Populist Parties’, Party Politics, 13(1): 29-51.
Vossen, K. (2010) ‘Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert
Wilders compared, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 11 (1): 22-38.
15