Research-policy dialogues in the risk society The case of...
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Research-policy dialogues in the risk society The case of migrant integration policy-making in Europe
Working paper Please do not distribute without the authors’ consent
Peter Scholten
Associate Professor Public Policy & Politics
Erasmus University Rotterdam PO Box 1738, NL 3000 DR, Rotterdam
[email protected] www.peterscholten.eu
Stijn Verbeek
Postdoctoral Researcher Erasmus University Rotterdam
PO Box 1738, NL 3000 DR, Rotterdam [email protected]
Abstract This paper focuses on how research-policy dialogues evolve in areas characterized by social risks. The risk society literature asserts that in more complex, uncertain and uncontrollable problem situations, there is not only a process of scientification of politics but also politicization of science. This means that processes of knowledge production and –utilization have become increasingly entwined and that dialogue structures have become more and more ad-hoc. Migrant integration policymaking is taken as a revelatory case of a policy problem that has manifested itself as one of the most distinct social risks of this era. Our analysis of migrant integration policymaking in five EU countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK) and on the EU level indeed reveal profound changes in the nature of research-policy dialogues since migrant integration has manifested itself as a social risk. We found that dialogue structures became more ad-hoc, often established in response to distinct political or problem events. In addition, we found evidence that more indirect and symbolic forms of knowledge utilization prevailed: in almost all cases, knowledge was used primarily to legitimate government institutions or to substantiate government policies. Finally, analysis also provides evidence of the mutual conditional relationship between knowledge production and –utilization; the deinstitutionalization of research-policy dialogues and the politicization of science also contributed to a growing fragmentation of migrant integration research in terms of institutes involved as well as in terms of knowledge paradigms.
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Introduction
Contemporary society is increasingly faced with social risks that challenge the nature
of policymaking, or at least the traditional image of it. The notion of social risk refers
to increasingly complex and unpredictable character of social problems (Beck,
1992a; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). Scholars have attributed attention to the
changing role of social research in policymaking in relation to these social risks.
Society is moving beyond the traditional model of ‘science speaking truth to power’
(Wildavsky, 1979), which was based on a powerful belief in objective scientific
knowledge. Beyond the ‘scientification of politics’ that characterized the rational
approach to policymaking, the risk society is experiencing a simultaneous
‘politicization of science’ where the credibility of science is put on the line and
scientific disagreements increasingly surface (Gieryn, 1999; Weingart, 1999a).
This article deals with the issue of migrant integration and policies aimed at
promoting it. It is an interesting case, firstly, because the issue of migrant integration
experienced an extreme politicisation in many European countries. In the early
phases, migrant integration was not discussed politically at all, because the countries
did not perceive themselves as immigration countries. In reality, most Western
European countries (except the UK) organised labour recruitment schemes. These
immigrants were labelled 'guestworkers' however, who would return home after a
temporary stay. After the acceptance of historical or even ongoing immigration, the
integration of newcomers into mainstream society got more and more political
attention. In the early 2000s, international focus-events (9/11, London, Madrid) and
national focusing events seemingly showing that lack of migrant integration
threatened societal harmony triggered a new phase, in which the migrant integration
issue was perceived as one of the most important social problems to be 'solved' by
national politicians.
Migrant integration policy-making is interesting, secondly, because the relation
between migrant integration research and policy-making seems to have changed
significantly as well. In the Netherlands, for example, an intimate symbiosis between
social researchers and policymakers for a long time provided a technocratic motor for
policymaking and contributed significantly to the growth and institutionalization of
migration studies (Favell, 2003). Yet, this relationship between research and policy
has become more and more contested, in the public debate as well as amongst
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scholars themselves. Opposition to the use of academic expertise as the source of
policy making has grown as the public debate on migration and integration has
become increasingly politicized. On the one hand, the supposed 'failure' of the
migrant integration policies of the past is to a certain extent blamed on the scientists
who were involved in their formulation. In Netherlands, researchers in the migrant
integration domain are nowadays often accused of 'multicultural bias' and
'solidarising' too much with the immigrants. On the other hand, scholars have
expressed disenchantment with the impact of close relations between immigrant
integration research and policy making on the development of integration as a
research field in itself (Bommes & Morawska, 2005). In particular, they have
observed a strong ‘national disposition’ in knowledge production by researchers of
integration because of their connection to national policy settings (Lavenex, 2005;
Scholten, 2011; Thränhardt & Bommes, 2010). In other words: as the topic
politicised, the research-policy dialogues on migrant integration seem to have
politicised as well. In a reflexive fashion, the way the policies were made became the
object of political controversy itself.
This article relates the risk society literature with the literature from science and
technology studies (STS). In STS, scholars like Ezrahi (1990), Gieryn (1999),
Jasanoff (1994; 2013) have shown how knowledge utilisation and knowledge
production have changed and how both developments are connected. Hoppe's work
(2005) for example shows that there are structural differences between different
types of "boundary arrangements" between science and policy and that each
arrangement affects and is affected by patterns of knowledge utilisation and
knowledge production. Hence a solid understanding of the different types of research
policy dialogue structures is necessary to understand the politicisation of research
policy dialogues in the context of the politicisation of the issue at hand. In terms of
knowledge utilization, besides instrumental modes of knowledge utilization there is a
growing recognition and advancing theorisation of symbolic modes of knowledge
utilization as well (Boswell, 2009). In terms of knowledge production, it is increasingly
recognized that the production and validation of knowledge claims is a context-
dependent and power-driven process (Gieryn, 1995). As such, recognizing the
interactive relationship between knowledge production and knowledge utilization also
helps us to reach beyond the scientific exceptionalism that has characterized the
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rational policy analysis movement and study how the production of social scientific
knowledge is itself contextualized (Radin, 2000; A. L. Schneider & Ingram, 1997).
To this aim, this article explores the changing nature of research-policy dialogues in
the risk society. It takes migrant integration policy-making is a case study, while
adopting a long-term perspective to capture the development of research-policy
dialogues in the context of mounting political attention for the issue. It poses the
following central research question: how did research policy dialogues on migrant
integration in Europe develop in the context of the politicisation of the issue? In the
theoretical framework below, it will be argued that this question should be studied by
looking at three elements of research-policy dialogues (dialogue structures,
knowledge utilization, and knowledge production) and their interrelationships.
Social research and policymaking in the Risk Society
The Risk Society literature asserts that a shift is taking or has taken place from a
society oriented at ‘natural risks’ that can be controlled rationally to a complex late-
modern society oriented primarily at ‘manufactured risks’ produced by human
intervention (Adam, Beck, & Van Loon, 2000; Beck, 1992b; Lupton, 1999; Taylor-
Gooby & Zinn, 2006). Awareness of such ‘new risks’ would challenge the rational
mode of government, where knowledge and expertise are key resources for policy
development and problem-solving. In a risk society, knowledge itself is contested as
part of a broader process of ‘politicization of science’ (Weingart, 1999b). In fact, new
risks reveal the uncertainty and context-dependency inherent to knowledge claims.
Scholars like Hajer (1995) have revealed how researchers are often active parts of
specific ‘discourse coalitions’, whereas Rein and Schon (1996) argue that ‘intractable
policy controversies’ cannot be resolved by examining the ‘facts’ precisely because
there are disagreements about the nature of the facts and about their relevancy.
Recognizing the changing role of knowledge in the risk society also asks for a
reconfiguration of governance relations and of relations between knowledge
producers and policymakers in particular. Several scholars [Baumgartner and Jones,
1993, 2005] speak of responsive modes of governance as more fitting in a societal
context characterized by new risks. This still involves a central role for knowledge in
policymaking, but not in rationally steering of social problems but rather in responding
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to mostly unpredictable risks. Rather than proactively steering society according to a
medium- to long-term ‘masterplan', with the help of scientific 'planning agencies',
contemporary politicians would behave much more like risk managers, constantly
reacting to incidents and events that seem to call for instant action.
In order to study research-policy dialogues in the risk society, a distinction can be
made between three different but related aspects of such dialogues. First, this
involves the structural dimension of research-policy relations, or how the research-
policy nexus is organized and institutionalized. Second, it involves processes of
knowledge production as well, or how knowledge claims are framed and selected
within the realm of scientific research itself. Third, it involves patterns of knowledge
utilization, in policy as well as other spheres like politics and civil society.
A key assertion from both the risk society and the STS literature is that these three
facets of research-policy dialogues have become increasingly entwined. Shapin and
Shaffer (1985, 332) speak of a ‘conditional relationship between the nature of the
polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity.’ This
means that there will be a conditional relationship between knowledge production
and –utilization, very much reflecting the simultaneous scientification of politics as
well as politicization of science that characterizes the risk society. Rather than
dialogue structures that create a linear relationship where research ‘enlightens’
policymaking, dialogue structures would increasingly condition this mutual
relationship. This assertion can be elaborated into three more specific hypotheses
concerning dialogue structures, knowledge utilization and knowledge production.
Dialogue structures
The structural shape of the ‘research-policy nexus’ refers to formal and informal
arrangements through which knowledge is exchanged between research and policy.
The rational model that has provided the basis for modern government involved a
strongly institutionalized research-policy nexus that enabled scientific experts a
relatively strong primacy in policymaking. In terms of research-policy relations, this
has often been described in terms of a technocratic model that enabled science to
‘speak truth to power’ (Hoppe, 2011b; Wildavsky, 1979). Technocracy involves
formal and direct forms of policy involvement of scientific experts and is usually
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associated with a culture of depoliticization. For instance, such technocratic relations
would involve a central role for relatively independent research committees with a
science-based and rational approach to policy problems, mostly operating beyond
the scope of public and political debate. Whereas the technocratic model emphasizes
in particular the process of ‘scientification of politics’, the risk society literature
emphasizes the simultaneous process of politicization of science (Beck, 1992b;
Weingart, 1999b). In this context, scholars like Wagner (1991) and Hoppe (Hoppe,
1999; Hoppe, 2011a; Hoppe, 2005b) claim that his technocratic model for the
research-policy nexus would increasingly make place for models that contextualize
the role of science and attribute more primacy to politics.
Boundary organisations often play a central role in research-policy relations (Guston,
2007; Miller, 2001). These are organisations that are situated in between the fields of
science and policy. Usually, they are explicitly designed to engage in specific sorts of
research-policy relations. Boundary organisations (Guston 2000, Miller 2001) can
come in many shapes and sizes, e.g. think-tanks, scienc-based advisory bodies,
expert committees, etc. Although such organisations are often portrayed as ‘bridges’
or ‘transmission belts’ between research and policy, they generally have a more
active role (and an interest) in research-policy relations that go both ways. They are
often hybrids of the structures of both fields, combining elements of both science and
politics (Miller 2001). However, they derive much of their credibility from clearly
demarcating science and politics, and from positioning themselves somewhere in
between; the so-called ‘two-worlds metaphor’ (Stone 1998, 121).
This leads to the first hypothesis inspired by the risk society literature, stating that
research-policy dialogue structures will deinstitutionalise as political attention for an
issue mounts. This means that they will be (a) less direct, (b) less closed or confined
to a small number of actors, and (c) less stable as before. Firstly, knowledge conflicts
are increasingly fought out in public, which means that knowledge producers and
knowledge utilisation increasingly communicate indirectly via the media. Secondly,
and relatedly, the increased public nature of research-policy dialogues gives other
actors the opportunity to participate - and, conversely, these other actors (NGOs,
lobby groups, public intellectuals, citizens - virtually anyone who can get a voice in
the media or can claim some kind of legitimacy in the 'border region' between
science and policy) 'open up' the existing research-policy dialogues in the first place.
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Thirdly, due to the rise of the responsive mode of governance, research-policy
dialogues will increasingly take place in an ad hoc fashion, depending on the
unpredictable and seemingly erratic mood swings of the polity. If an issue 'comes up',
after a focusing event for example, research-policy dialogues will be setup depending
on the perceived necessities of the moment. Rather than having a firmly
institutionalized research-policy nexus where one actor, mostly likely a government
associated research agency or committee, plays an enduring, key role in brokering
between knowledge and policy, in a risk society one would expect multiple boundary
organizations brokering between various knowledge providers and various
knowledge utilizers in various ways.
Knowledge utilization
Another facet of research-policy dialogues that would have changed in the context of
the transformation to a risk society, involves how knowledge is utilized in processes
of policymaking. The rational mode of government would be characterized by direct
(i.e. scientists communicating with policymakers directly) and immediate forms of
knowledge utilization, where knowledge was used conceptually for framing policy
issues as well as instrumentally for developing concrete policy responses. In
contemporary literature this form of knowledge utilization is often framed as ‘evidence
based policymaking’, with research and expertise as key sources for policy
development (Sanderson, 2002; Young, Ashby, Boaz, & Grayson, 2002). A modest
form of this rational model is proposed by Weiss (1977), who speaks of a more
gradual ‘knowledge creep’ where knowledge also frames and supports policy
measures but often in a more indirect (for example via the 'enlightenment' of the
general public) way and not immediately, but after a while.
Besides such instrumental knowledge utilization, Boswell (2009) distinguishes two
distinct symbolic forms of knowledge utilization. Rather than being used as input for
determining a concrete policy position, knowledge can also be used just to
substantiate pre-existing policy positions. In this substantiating function, research is
supposed to provide authority to policy decisions already taken by substantiating
these policy decisions with relevant (and supportive) knowledge and expertise.
Besides substantiating policy decisions, research can also be used to plainly
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legitimize individual actors or organisations. This legitimizing function of research and
expertise goes beyond substantive research findings, referring to the mere symbolic
act of signifying the 'capacity to make sound decisions' (Boswell 2009).
This leads to our second hypothesis, stating that in areas where social risks are
manifested, patterns of knowledge utilization will be symbolic rather than
instrumental. Rather than utilization of knowledge claims in policy formulation in a
depoliticized setting, scientific knowledge claims will be contested but will continue to
play a role in more symbolic ways. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
distinction between 'instrumental' and 'symbolic' knowledge utilisation may be too
simple to capture the complexities in knowledge utilisation in the migrant integration
issue domain (Caponio, Hunter & Verbeek). After all, from a reflexive awareness of
the existence of different kinds of knowledge logically follows that an analysis of
contemporary patterns of knowledge utilisation should distinguish between different
kinds of knowledge right from the start (ibid.). In the analysis below, we integrate
Hall's (1993) distinction between first order, second order, and third order learning
with Boswell's typology to build a slightly more elaborate theory to study knowledge
utilisation in research policy dialogues.
Knowledge production
The simultaneous ‘scientification of politics’ and ‘politicization of science’ also
involves a recognition of the impact of research-policy relations on knowledge
production in itself. The objectivist policy analytics movement led by Lasswell
(knowledge of policy, in policy and for policy) sustains what Schneider and Ingram
(A. Schneider & Ingram, 1993) describe as ‘scientific exceptionalism’; it preserves
that ‘blackbox’ of scientific knowledge production and the image that scientific
knowledge claims are objectivist and value-free. Ezrahi (1990) argues that this
scientific exceptionalism has played a central role in the modernisation of
government (Latour, 2012), providing an important political resource for
depersonalising and depoliticising ideological state control, and thereby legitimising
modern liberal democratic politics.
Science and technology studies (STS) have contributed significantly to
deconstructing scientific exceptionalism, by drawing attention to the many ways in
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which scientific claims making can be context-dependent and interest-driven.
Nowotny a.o. (Nowotny, 2003) and Jasanoff (2013) speak of the co-evolution or
coproduction of science and society, referring to the science-politics nexus as a key
axis for this coproduction which means that science not only speaks to society but
society also speaks back to science. As the boundaries between science and politics
have become increasingly transgressive and permeable, the impact of the broader
political setting on the choice of scientific methods, selection of evidence, framing of
research questions and findings has increased. Even for quantitative data, the choice
for variables to measure and indicators to use is contextualized (Porter, 1996).
Gieryn (1999) and Jasanoff (1995) have conceptualized this interaction between
science and politics in terms of ‘boundary work’, or the social construction of
‘boundaries’ that define some claims as scientific and others as non-science. These
boundary work practices may thus lead to the monopolization of specific knowledge
claims or ‘paradigms’ or for instance to the expulsion of others as non-science.
Boundary work can also involve expansion, which occurs when actors that support a
specific knowledge paradigm or specific values or ideas about proper science
manage to expand that paradigm, or it can involve strengthening the autonomy of
research versus other spheres like politics and policymaking.
Policy scholars like Majone (1989) Haas (2004), Hajer (1995), Fischer (1990a;
Fischer, 2003) and Sabatier (1987) have drawn attention to the policy context in
which such boundary work practices take place. Majone (1989) was one of the first
authors to draw attention to this argumentative role of science. He observed that
science produces evidence rather than factual descriptions. Such evidence is
“selected from the available stock [of facts and information, PS and SV] and
introduced at a specific point in the argument in order to persuade a particular
audience of the truth or falsity of a statement” [source]. This discards the image of
science as a somewhat distant producer of objective, value-free knowledge, for an
image of science as an engaged and value-oriented activity that provides the
intellectual argumentation for particular policy positions. It shows how the production
of scientific knowledge is affected by the political context and how it plays a role in
persuasion and argumentation in this political context. Hajer (1995) shows how
scientists are involved in the production of contextualised discourses that bring
together discourse coalitions. Furthermore, Fischer speaks a politics of expertise,
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where the production of specific knowledge claims should also be seen in the
broader political context (Fischer, 1990b). For instance, when focusing on the role of
think thanks in US politics, Fischer shows how the provision of expertise itself is
politicized and how research is not just used but also produced as forms of political
ammunition. As such, knowledge claims can lend authority to policy and political
claims, also within a politicized context.
This leads to our third hypothesis, stating that in cases of social risks where there is a
scientification of politics as well as a politicization of science, research fields will
become increasingly fragmented, both in terms of research paradigms and research
institutions. This hypothesis involves a clear step away from scientific exceptionalism
and a full recognition of the transgressiveness of science-policy boundaries and the
argumentative role of knowledge claims and scientists within discourse coalitions.
Methodology
This paper explores the abovementioned hypotheses concerning changes in the
research-policy nexus, knowledge production and knowledge utilization in the risk
society. It focuses on the case of migrant integration policies as a revelatory case of
a social risk that has been recognized as such in countries throughout Europe. As
migrant integration is primarily a national policy domain, the paper focuses on
migrant integration policies in five European countries with very different types of
migrant integration policies: Austria, German, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. In
addition, we will also analyse the emerging research-policy relations on the EU level.
These are the embedded cases, meant to create a more general picture of how
research-policy relations change under specific conditions. These case-studies were
implemented as part of the DIAMINT project on ‘Science-society dialogues on
migrant integration in Europe.’ Throughout this comparative paper, references will be
made to the Austrian (Leipold and Borkert, 2012), Dutch (Verbeek, Entzinger and
Scholten, 2012), German (Heckmann and Wiest, 2012), Italian (Caponio and Quirico,
2012), UK (Hunter and Boswell, 2012) and EU (Geddes, 2012) country reports for
DIAMINT.
An analysis will be provided of migrant integration policymaking in various European
countries (the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Italy) and on the EU level.
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This provides a broad coverage of policies in different parts of Europe (with new as
well as old migration countries) but also a selection that involves countries with very
different policy philosophies over the past decades (the more multiculturalist
approaches in the UK and the Netherlands, the more welfare-state oriented
approaches in Austria and Germany and the more recent ad-hoc and pragmatic
approach in Italy). The analysis is based on approximately 150 interviews conducted
with researchers and policymakers in the various countries, as well as an extensive
review of policy documents and secondary literature on migration studies as well as
migration policymaking.
Empirical analysis: migrant integration policy-making in the risk society
Migrant integration has distinctly manifested itself as a new social risk over the last
decades. Clearly to be distinguished from immigration policies that deal with entry
and exit regulations (Hammar, 1985), the integration of migrants in to their host
societies has been an issue for ages. However, it has become much more urgent,
complex and politicized over the past decades. Globalization, as a key force behind
the development of the risk society, has also brought about migration streams of
much larger scale than ever before (Castles & Miller, 2003). Whereas there has
always been some degree of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in most societies,
late-modern societies have become ‘super-diverse’ or ‘hyper-diverse’ (Vertovec,
2007) in the sense the sum of ethnic cultural and religious minorities sometimes
make up for more than half of the population, especially in urban areas.
When immigration increased rapidly for most West-European countries in the 1960s
and 1960s, most countries responded by developing national policies aimed
achieving a multicultural societies in which the growth of diversity could be
accommodated. Though these policies contributed significantly to the integration of
migrants, in most European countries this multiculturalist approach has been
discarded as a failure over the last decade or so. Migrant integration has increasingly
become an issue of high politics, with disagreements not just about what migrant
integration actually is but also on how it has been or how it should be dealt with.
Migrant integration clearly appeared to be an issue not to be resolved through a
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rational multicultural approach, but instead a much more intractable issue where
policies and policy measures sometimes become just as contested as the social
problem of integration itself.
This contestation of migrant integration policies has also affected the role of social
research. Parallel to the development of migrant integration policies, the field of
migration studies evolved rapidly over the past decades (Bommes & Morawska,
2005; Favell, 2003; Vasta & Vuddamalay, 2006). Initially there was, in most
countries, a close relationship between researchers and policymakers on the national
level, some even speak of a symbiosis (Scholten, 2011). This would have contributed
to a ‘national disposition’ of migration scholars. Over the last decade or so the role of
migration scholars in policymaking appears to have changed significantly. Not only
has the field of migration research become increasingly fragmented, the role of
researchers in policymaking has also become more contested.
In the following we will examine how the politicization that manifested migrant
integration as a distinct social risk, has affected research-policy relations in Austria,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and on the EU level. Rather than structuring
our analysis per (embedded) case, we will provide an analysis per hypothesis to see
to what extent it stands for the different (embedded) cases selected.
Austria
In the Austrian case, politicization occurred in the first half of the 2000s. This period
was characterized by a normalization of right-wing policies against immigrants in
Austria, also fuelled by international focus events like the 9/11 attacks in the United
States (Leipold & Borkert, 2012: p. 17). Before the 2000s, there was a consensus
that migrant integration was not an issue at all: immigrants were just seen as
workers. The politicization of migrant integration led to a focus on the assimilation of
migrants into Austrian society.
Before the 1990s, no dialogue structures existed in Austria. Informal research-policy
dialogues came into existence in the 1990s and they continue to exist. In the 2000s
however, “(…) a scientification and a politicization of integration seemed to go hand
in hand” (ibid: p. 17). There are now more stable dialogue structures than before (i.e.
there are more science-policy boundary organisations). Some of these structures are
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practically closed to the media and the general public. Recently, since 2010, in
Austria one can witness a move towards further institutionalisation of direct research-
policy relations (ibid: p. 48). However, the Austrian study notes that politicization in
the 2000s may have also contributed to the growth of informal dialogue structures,
i.e. de-institutionalisation. There are now more informal dialogue structures and they
are often ‘opened up’ (ibid: p. 39) (i.e. they involve the media and the public).
Researchers themselves played a strong role in the process of creating informal
dialogue structures, as in Germany. Often the same researchers participate in formal
and informal networks.
After the initial phase (before 1990), when migrant integration research was born and
scientific knowledge was not utilised, one can see a quite stable mixed pattern of
knowledge utilisation. In Austria, political institutions mainly use knowledge in a
substantiating fashion, with also strong examples of legitimising knowledge
utilisation. But, as in the German case, in the 1990s there was some ‘knowledge
creep’, i.e. some instrumental utilisation. This involves the recognition of the fact that
so-called Gastarbeiter were not 'guests' and also that they were not just workers, but
'people'. There is still some instrumental use of applied research (first and second
order, not third), but nowadays there is mainly substantiating knowledge utilisation.
Leipold and Borkert (2012: 45); “experts agree that ‘expertise’ is used according to
political rules not to scientific consideration”. (…) Furthermore, the development of in-
house research facilities at the Ministry of Interior points to a bias towards the
legitimizing function of knowledge”.
In terms of knowledge production, we see a significant growth in the scale of
migration research and continuity in terms of paradigmatic fragmentation within this
field: there is no trend towards increasing knowledge conflicts. Instead, "the Austrian
research landscape on migrant integration is characterised by enduring
fragmentation and isolation of individual researchers during the past four decades"
(ibid: p. 30, emphasis added). The analysis shows that the Austrian research
landscape on migrant integration cannot be divided by ‘schools of thought’ but rather
by certain ‘issue domains’ that dominate research, public debates and funding
schemes (ibid: p. 27). Overall, Austria is characterized by a strong “elite consensus”
which spans both the major politicians and the major scientists (Münz 2011, as cited
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in Leipold & Borkert, 2012: p. 28). At the same time, however, the Austrian case
displays a remarkable continuity in institutional fragmentation.
Germany
Politicization of migrant integration in Germany started in the late 1990s. Before, the
political consensus was that it was not an issue, as Germany would not be a country
of immigration (“kein Einwanderungsland”). Heckmann and Wiest (2012: 7) observe
that although German governments recognized the necessity to address the social
integration of migrants already in the 1970s, a systematic integration policy was
introduced only at the end of the 1990s. However, by the end of the 1990s, migrant
integration had become a key policy concern.
The German case does not show one clear trend in the development of research
policy dialogue structures, rather two separate trends. On the one hand there are
now more stable dialogue structures than before (i.e. there are more science-policy
boundary organisations). Some of these structures are more or less closed to the
media and the general public. In particular the “well funded research department of
the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) is a very good example for
efforts to inform the polity and other parts of state and local administrations and a
broader public of NGOs.” (ibid: 14). On the other hand, there are now more ad hoc
dialogue structures and they are often ‘opened up’ (i.e. they involve the media and
the public). Researchers themselves played a strong role in the process of
deinstitutionalisation. Heckmann and Wiest (ibid): "For a long time [we thought] the
best way to attract politicians’ attention to our research results was to get in contact
with them directly […], but that was the wrong course. To critically follow political and
public debates means to use the media and the public in order to raise political
interest in findings and expertise from migration research.” (Interview with migration
scholar).
The German case study gives a rich and nuanced picture of knowledge utilisation in
the migrant integration issue domain. Firstly, the German case clearly shows that
before asking the question "is there a trend from instrumental to symbolic knowledge
utilisation, or vice versa?", one should ask the question "is there a trend from non-
use of knowledge to knowledge utilisation, or vice versa?". Knowledge may “(…) be
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ignored and not be utilized at all. This is true for the period of Ausländerforschung in
the 1970s and for most of migration research in the 1980s” (ibid: p. 16). But in the
1990s there was some ‘knowledge creep’, i.e. some instrumental utilisation after
more than 15 years. In particular, “[t]he ethnic minority approach (…) has greatly
influenced the process of recognizing Germany as a country of immigration” (ibid: p.
11). Nowadays, as in the Netherlands, in policy-making there is only instrumental use
of first or second order information: “Especially in the field of integration-monitoring,
there are some indications of “evidence-based” policy-making through the increasing
employment of expert knowledge from empirical social research to deliver
information and data on the state of the integration processes.” (expert interview). In
general, substantiating knowledge utilisation is the rule rather than the exception in
Germany: “Other experts argue that policy-makers often draw selectively on external
expertise and forms of consultancy by choosing the expertise which strengthens and
subsequently fosters their own positions and concepts. If it doesn’t, policy-makers
take note of the expertise but don’t use it. (various expert interviews: see Heckmann
and Wiest, p. 17).
In terms of knowledge production, German migration research has grown
enormously since the 1980s. This involved not just academic research, but
bureaucratic research funded by the political system as well” (ibid: p. 26).
Furthermore, as Heckmann and Wiest observe, “the institutional settings for such
research [academic and bureaucratic research on migrant integration] have greatly
expanded and differentiated” (ibid: 26). There is also increasing paradigmatic
fragmentation: nowadays, research on migrant integration in Germany can be
described as a very “differentiated and increasingly specialized field of research
which includes various disciplines of the social sciences such a sociology,
geography, history, linguistics, education, political science, economics, law,
psychology and social anthropology” (Bommes 2010: 127).
Italy
In Italy, politicisation already occurred in the 1990s, but international focusing events
and a national focusing event (in 2006) kept the issue of migrant integration high on
the political agenda. Politicisation went hand in hand with a decreasing political
consensus on the issue: in the earlier phase (mid 1970s-late 1980s), immigrants
16
were just seen as temporary workers. Before the 1990s most parties agreed that Italy
was not a country of immigration, but a transit country. In other words, there was
consensus that it was not an issue. In the 1990s, in the context of rising anti-
immigrant movements, there was a brief period of socio-economic framing in the
national migrant integration policy, though in terms of implementation it amounted to
very little. In the 2000s one can witness a conflict between the socio-economic frame
[promoted by CNEL for example] and the socio-cultural frame in official migrant
integration policies (Caponio & Quirico, 2012).
No clear trend could be observed in Italy towards institutionalisation or
deinstitutionalisation. Research-policy relations in general have been quite loose for
decades, and the issue domain of migrant integration is no exception to this rule.
There were two brief "technocratic experiments" (in 1993 and 2000-2001), but they
were effectively undone after the election of centre-right coalitions (ibid). After a
national focusing event in August 2006, a scientific ad hoc committee was
established. In this dialogue structure, political rather than scientific primacy was
secured (Caponio et al.).
The Italian case shows "very little knowledge utilisation whatsoever" (Caponio et al.)
until the 2000s. In Italy, there is a long tradition in politics of distrust towards expert
knowledge, in particular social-scientific knowledge. In the field of migrant integration,
this partly stems from “(…) the overlapping between expertise and pro-immigrant
activism that (…) has characterised the emerging of the migration research
infrastructure in Italy.” (ibid: p. 44). Incidentally, there is some instrumental use in the
2000s, but only of first or second order information. An example is the scientific
committee established in 2006 that advised on how to improve citizenship values of
immigrants (the preordained political goal of the committee). Apart from that, in the
2000s, knowledge was mainly used in a substantiating and legitimising way (Caponio
et al.). There would have been ”(…) a certain continuity in an essentially symbolic
function played by experts’ knowledge in Italian policymaking on immigrants
integration can be highlighted. Actually, research studies commissioned in order to
provide evidence for policymaking have been but a few, and their actual relevance in
decision making processes has been questioned by all the interviewed partners. ”
(ibid: p. 42; also see Cvajner and Sciortino 2011, cited in Caponio & Quirico, 2012: p.
42).
17
As in the other cases, knowledge production in Italy increased: from the 1990s till the
present day. In contrast to for example the Netherlands, Italian research on migrant
integration has never been characterised by a single dominant paradigm. There have
always been several schools of thought (ibid: p. 14-27). However, there was
increasing institutional fragmentation in the 1990s and 2000s: “ (…) the research
infrastructure has developed along two main directions: the consolidation of some of
the first independent research institutes (…), and in particular of those which
characterised for their Catholic background; the emerging of new, independent
institutes characterising less for their activism in favour of immigrants (see the case
of Caritas) but more for their academic profile (even when not directly linked to the
University) “ (ibid: p. 25).
The Netherlands
The Netherlands was one of the first European countries to embark on centrally
coordinated policy efforts to promote migrant integration. The Ethnic Minorities Policy
that was framed in the 1980s involved a clear attempt toward rational societal
steering, focusing in particular on the emancipation and participation of specific
immigrant minorities in the context of the Dutch multicultural society. Researchers
played a key role in the development of these policies, via a strongly institutionalized
research-policy nexus that has been framed by some as a ‘technocratic symbiosis’
(Rath, 2001). During the 1990s this Ethnic Minorities Policy was gradually reframed
into a more socio-economically oriented Integration Policy (Entzinger, 2003).
However, in a dramatic surge of politicization immediately after the turn of the
millennium, the Dutch multicultural project was discarded as a failure or ‘tragedy.’
From a relatively depoliticized issue, migrant integration became a central concern to
national politics in the early 2000s, triggered amongst others by the rise of a populist
party as well as several national and international incidents. This led to what has
become perceived as the assimilationist turn in Dutch policies, with policies focusing
not just on socio-economic participation but also a degree of socio-cultural adaptation
(Scholten, 2011).
This politicization had direct consequences in terms of the dialogue structures in the
2000s. Whereas policy developments in the 1980s and 1990s had influenced by very
18
directly research (Scholten, 2012), the relation between research and policy became
much more contested in the early 2000s. A clear gap emerged between research
and policy, manifest not just in a decrease of interaction between researchers and
policymakers but also in the public questioning of the credibility of scholars that had
previously been involved in this domain. The political and public debate, the alleged
multiculturalist bias of scholars put their credibility on the line. When a Parliamentary
Investigative Committee on the Integration Policy issued an advisory report from a
research institute that eventually concluded that the integration process was
relatively successfully, the parliamentary committee became itself subject to fierce
public and political controversy because of lack of political vision and relying too
much on ‘multiculturalist’ scientists (Scholten and Van Nispen, 2008). When the
Scientific Council for Government Policy, which had previously played a key role in
this policy domain, issued a new report in 2001 and another in 2006, these reports
were largely ignored.
In the context of this broader de-institutionalization of the research-policy nexus in
this area, what was maintained in this period involved a more bureaucratic nexus
between research and policy that fed a more symbolic type of knowledge utilization.
In particular the Social and Cultural Planning Office, a government-associated data-
provider, continued to play a key role in the provision of key data on the integration
process. These data, often involving indicators that were set in close relation to
government policies, are used to substantiate government policies by monitoring the
progress of integration in specific policy areas and providing a tool for
interdepartmental coordination. They provide a form of ‘mandated truths’ (Salter,
1988) that can be used as a soft means of coordination in the relation with policy
departments other than those responsible for integration per se. A part from this
substantiating form of knowledge utilization, the 2000s formed a period where
knowledge utilization decreased. This should be seen against the background of
what Duyvendak describes as the ‘articulation function’ of Dutch migration politics in
this period (or Prins: hyperrealism), where politics tried to regain popular legitimacy
by raising the voice from the street in matters of migrant integration.
Finally, in terms of knowledge production, the punctuation of the technocratic
symbiosis that had contributed to a rise of the Dutch ‘minorities research industry’
(Essed, 2000) in the 1980s and early 1990s, does not seem to have affected the
19
further growth of Dutch minorities research. It has however clearly contributed to a
growing fragmentation of minorities research, in institutional terms as well as in terms
of knowledge paradigms. Most Dutch universities nowadays have research groups
on minorities or migration research, and with the decreasing dependency on national
funds the Dutch research community has become strongly internationalized. This has
also contributed to a diversification in terms of methods as well as knowledge
paradigms. This is also manifested in open knowledge conflicts between scholars.
The UK
In the United Kingdom, politicisation of the migrant integration issue occurred already
in the late 1950s in response to a national focusing event ('race riots'). This initiatied
a period of relative continuity until well in the 1990s, with a dominant policy frame that
has been characterized as ‘multicultural race relations’ (Favell 1998, Bleich 2003)
However, a national focusing event (‘mill town riots’ 2001) and international focusing
events (9/11) led to renewed politicisation in the early 2000s. This led to a policy
reframing where rather than celebrating diversity, policy initiatives began to
emphasise activities and values shared in common, under the heading of ‘community
cohesion’.” (Hunter 2012)
The UK case (Hunter 2012) does not show a clear trend towards either
institutionalisation or de-institutionalisation of research-policy dialogue structures on
migrant integration. The early politicization (in the 1950s) was followed by research-
policy dialogues with independent commissions and informal networks. Informal
Research-policy dialogues were influential in period 1979-1997 and more formal
attempts failed. Interestingly, think tank researchers were more influential than
academics. Hence we witness a long term – stable - preference in UK for
government backed ‘independent commissions', headed by a 'safe pair of hands',
convened on a ‘one-off' ad hoc basis as a response to particular focusing events
(ibid: P. 56). Advisory bodies have at times been venues for research-policy
dialogues, but there is a low degree of institutionalisation overall (ibid: P. 56)
The UK case study does not reveal a clear trend in knowledge utilisation, though it
concludes that there was overall mainly substantiating knowledge utilisation after
2000 to promote the 'community cohesion' frame. In the earliest phases (1950s and
20
1960s), some indirect instrumental outcomes (‘knowledge creep’ or 'enlightenment')
can be observed. This holds in particular for the 'Race Relations'-frame which
originally was developed at universities. However, as Hunter (2012: 58-59) writes:
"(…) Bleich argues that “[s]ocial research (…) contributed directly to the formulation
of eventual dominant frames in Britain, but it was one of a number of influences
rather than constituting an overwhelming element” (Bleich 2011). There also was
some substantiating use, also in the period before 2000, and throughout the period
(from the 1950s until the present day) also legitimising use, because independent
commissions partly function as a "substitute for political action" (Scholten 2011).
Like the other cases, the UK shows trend towards increasing knowledge production:
from the 1950s till the present day. At the same time, we see increasing paradigmatic
fragmentation and increasing institutional fragmentation: research on migrant
integration in the UK is now being done in far more organisations than before: “[T]he
initial period of social scientific research on the question of integration was
characterised by consensus, with an agreement that the approach to the question
should focus on the concept of ‘race relations.’ (…) The 1970s and 1980s were
marked by a growing politicisation and fragmentation of the field, leading to the
emergence of rival schools of thought. (…) At the present time, at least three of the
five schools identified – multiculturalism, civic integrationism and comparativism – vie
for influence over policy.” (Hunter, 2012).
The EU
The politicization of migrant integration at the EU level cannot be compared with the
politicization in most of the national cases. Politicization in the context of EU
institutions rarely involves a similar scale of political attention as on the national level.
Furthermore, the politicization of migrant integration has been primarily indirect, so
via the nation states that declared migrant integration an important political priority
and have raised this issue within intergovernmental fora in particular (such as the
Dutch government during its presidency in 2004). Migrant integration has clearly
emerged on the EU policy agenda as well, especially after the Tampere meeting in
1999, but thus far EU institutions have developed very limited policy competencies in
this area (Geddes, 2005). Basically, EU competencies are restricted to anti-
discrimination and employment equality policies and to spill-overs from the common
21
immigration policy, such as the family reunification directive and the long term
residence directive. In 2004 the EU memberstates agreed to a list of Common Basic
Principles of Integration, which were elaborated into a common Integration Agenda.
However, the focus has remained limited to Third Country Nationals and has hardly
been elaborated into concrete policy tools and measures.
In spite of its limited policy competencies, the EU did develop a complex but very
extensive research-policy dialogue structure. This includes various organizations
aimed at facilitating the exchange between researchers and policymakers, such as
the European Migration Network (EMN) and the Migration Policy Group, but also
specific funding schemes such as the INTI program (preparatory actions for the
integration of third country nationals), the European Refugee Fund and the European
Integration Fund as well as of course the European framework programmes. As
Scholten and Geddes (forthcoming) observe, a trend can be observed from dialogue
structures aimed primarily at facilitate the horizontal exchange of knowledge and
expertise between countries (and between cities), to more ‘vertical structures’ that
mobilize research and expertise based on a clear EU policy agenda. For instance,
the EMN has becoming increasingly oriented at the vertical relations between
memberstates and EU institutions rather than on the collection and comparison of
national data, and the EIF funding scheme clearly reflects the policy priorities form
the European Common Integration Agenda.
Precisely in the absence of concrete policy tools, such efforts to mobilize expertise
played a key role in the ‘soft governance’ of migrant integration policies from the EU
level. The trend from horizontal to more vertical dialogue structures also reflects a
shift from legitimizing to more substantiating forms of knowledge utilization. Initially,
the EU attempted to acquire legitimacy for some for of involvement in this area, not
so much by formulating its own policy priorities but by bringing together data and
research in comparative projects with the aim of promoting some degree of policy
convergence. The more vertical structures reflect the formulation of specific EU
policy priorities and more direct efforts to mobilize policy action on the national level
to address these priorities. In this context, the EIF and ERF also directly fund
(especially local) policy measures that reflect EU policy priorities. Recently, the EU
has also supported the development of the Migration Policy Index (MIPEX), which
collects and compares data from various policy areas related to migration as well as
22
provides a ‘ranking’ of countries according to the fit with EU policy priorities. This
MIPEX has become increasingly used to monitor national compliance with EU
policies and mobilize national policy efforts by ‘blaming and shaming’ rather than by
hard governance structures.
EU level dialogue structures have, beyond doubt, had a very large impact on
knowledge production in the field of migrant integration. In a research field that had
long been known for its national focus and strong policy orientation, according to
some even ‘methodological nationalism’ (Favell, 2003: Glick-Schiller, XXX), the EU
has provided a key stimulus for comparative research and the internationalization of
migration research. Researchers from throughout Europe were brought together in
comparative EU-sponsored projects (such as INTI, EIF and ERF projects) and in
informal and formal networks like the IMISCOE network (network of excellence on
International migration, Integration and social cohesion in Europe, sponsored under
the EU 6th framework programme).
Comparative analysis
When comparing the findings from the various cases for the first hypothesis on the
de-institutionalization of research-policy dialogues in the context of politicization of
social risks, we found very mixed evidence in support of the hypothesis. Both the
Dutch, Italian and UK cases clearly show how in a politicized setting research-policy
relations obtained at most an more ad-hoc character. This seems less so for Austria
and Germany, where more effective efforts have been made to develop an
institutional nexus (such as the BAMF in Germany). The EU case does not seem to
support the hypothesis as it provides an example of how precisely in the politicized
setting of migrant integration it attempted to mobilize research as strategic boundary
work to support the Europeanization of migrant integration policies.
What does stand out from practically all cases in terms of dialogue structures is the
central role of ad-hoc and often government-associated committees in research-
policy dialogues at critical junctures in the policy process. In Germany, Italy, the UK
and the Netherlands, such committees were put in place in the aftermath of political
events (such as the Fortuyn revolt in Dutch politics or the political victory of the SPD
in Germany) or focus events (such as the milltown riots in the UK) and opened up a
23
temporary channel for research-policy dialogues. However, as the UK as well as
Dutch cases show, such committees were often very selective in their opening up to
researchers and knowledge claims and though their public profile was often high,
their policy consequences were not always very direct. In fact, the committees from
the UK (Cantle), the Netherlands (Blok) and Germany (Sussmuth) show how easily
the knowledge claims selected by these committees can lead to public controversy
and contestation of the committees’ authority itself. This suggests that the
establishment of these ad-hoc committees should be seen more as a political reflex
to intractable and immediate policy situations rather than as efforts to engage in
critical reflection based on research.
Furthermore, several of the cases suggest that media are playing an increasingly
important role in opening up dialogue structures to a broader set of actors and to the
public. Dialogue structures in the rational policy model were mostly closed to a
relatively small network of scholars and policymakers: the traditional route was then
to communicate with policymakers directly, for instance in private without media
coverage, in committees, boundary organisations, conferences, informal dinners etc.
Another route we observed especially in the Dutch, German and UK cases involved
communicating with policymakers indirectly, via the media. In the project we found
numerous examples of public intellectuals who have media strategies to influence
migrant integration policy-making.
A comparative analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis on
symbolic knowledge utilization in the context of social risks. All the cases of how in
the context of politicization in the 2000s, knowledge utilization became primarily
symbolic and more in particular substantiating of nature. Some of the cases, such s
the Dutch case, show how initially (well before the 2000s) research did provide a
direct stimulus for policy development, such as in the UK and in the Netherlands in
the 1950s and 1980s respectively. In the 2000s the use of knowledge claims has
clearly become more selective, aimed at substantiating the policies as formulated in
the political arena. For instance, in the UK research was utilized for substantiating the
community cohesion frame that emerged in politics after the milltown riots.
A very specific form of more legitimating knowledge utilization was found in Germany
and in the Netherlands. These countries utilized in particular data produced by
government-associated data providers such as the BAMF in Germany and the SCP
24
in the Netherlands. The indicators on which data was provided are, in both countries,
determined together with government agencies. As such, these institutes provide a
sort of ‘mandated truths’ (Salter, XXX) that are used in the often complex inter-
departmental and multi-level governance of migrant integration; they provide
ammunition to raise problem awareness and trigger policy interventions by other
actors within the complex governance network of migrant integration policymaking.
Our analysis thus shows that politicization does not so much lead to the absence of
knowledge utilization (though the Italian case appears to approximate that position),
but rather to changing forms of knowledge utilization. In fact, the EU case shows that
precisely because of the politicized setting in which it operates and the absence of
concrete policy measures, the mobilisation and use of knowledge provide important
tools for the soft-governance of migrant integration policies.
Finally, a comparative analysis provides mild support for the third hypothesis on the
relation between politicization and the diversification of knowledge claims and the
rise of knowledge conflicts. Whereas research Austria and Italy had been fragmented
even before politicization, the German, Dutch and UK cases in particular show
growing fragmentation. Before politicization, migration scholarship in these countries
had revealed a relative consensus within their respective national context, leading to
what has been framed as distinct ‘national models of integration’ (German welfare
state model, Dutch multiculturalist model, British race relations model). Following
politicization (though at different paces, for instance much earlier in the UK than in
the other countries), these national models became contested and open knowledge
conflicts emerged in each of these countries. The EU case seems to be different in
this respect, especially as it stands out more in terms of the comparative method that
it promotes than in terms of a distinct knowledge paradigm that is mobilized.
Evidently, the trend that is signalled toward more ‘vertical’ dialogue structures and
knowledge use to substantiate EU policy priorities, may signal a first step towards
mobilizing a EU supportive knowledge paradigm.
Interestingly, the de-institutionalization of research-policy dialogues and growing
fragmentation of knowledge paradigms on the national level reflects a growing
alignment of knowledge paradigms between the countries. Whether an indirect effect
of EU involvement in this research area, the growing international and comparative
orientation has beyond doubt had an effect on national (and local) research as well.
25
Knowledge paradigms seem to be increasingly aligning along disciplinary lines
(political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, law) but in very similar ways
within the various countries that were examined.
Table 1: Summary of findings on the impact of politicization on research-policy
dialogues in the six examined cases.
Hypothesis I:
De-
institutionalization
of research-policy
nexus
Hypothesis II:
Symbolic
knowledge
utilization
Hypothesis III:
Diversification of
knowledge
paradigms
Austria +/- + +/-
Italy + + +/-
Germany - + +
The Netherlands + + +
The UK + + +
The EU - + -
Conclusions
This paper focuses on how research-policy dialogues evolve in areas characterized
by social risks. The rational model of ‘science speaking truth to power’ seems to
apply in particular to relatively well-structured problems. The risk society literature
asserts that in more complex, uncertain and uncontrollable problem situations, there
is not only a process of scientification of politics but also politicization of science.
This means that a rational position characterized by scientific exceptionalism and a
linear model of knowledge production and instrumental knowledge utilization cannot
be maintained. Rather, the risk society literature asserts that processes of knowledge
production and –utilization have become increasingly entwined and that dialogue
structures have become more and more ad-hoc and play a central role in the mutual
relation between research and policy.
26
Our analysis focused on migrant integration policymaking as a revelatory case. An
initial belief in the rational construction of a multicultural society, which had prevailed
especially in ‘old’ immigration countries like the UK and the Netherlands, has made
place for dramatic politicization and an almost European-wide rejection of
multiculturalism as a failure. As such, migrant integration has manifested itself as one
of the most distinct social risks of this era, inherently connected to the process of
globalization and the new opportunities technology offers for travel and
communication, but also seemingly uncontrollable in terms of the consequences of
migration for cultural and religious diversity, public attitudes toward migrants and
participation of migrants in society. Moreover, whereas migrant integration research
has co-evolved with the need for policy-relevant knowledge and expertise to engineer
a multicultural society, a wide disenchantment seems to have descended upon
research-policy dialogues. Policymakers as well as the broader public seem to have
lost faith in the rational steering of integration issues based on knowledge and
expertise, and have sometimes even cast doubt on the credibility of the researchers
involved. Researchers similarly have lost faith in the responsiveness of policymakers
to knowledge and information in the context of the dramatic politicization of
policymaking.
Our analysis of migrant integration policymaking in five EU countries (Austria,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK) and on the EU level indeed revealed
profound changes in the nature of research-policy dialogues since migrant integration
has manifested itself as a social risk. We found that dialogue structures became
more ad-hoc, often established in response to distinct political or problem events. A
striking similarity between the countries involved the establishment of ad-hoc
government committees to channel research-policy dialogues at critical junctures in
policy development, such as the Blok, Sussmuth and Cantle committees in the
Netherlands, Germany and the UK respectively. However, we also found that
politicization did not void all efforts to develop more institutional dialogue structures,
such as in Germany and Austria. Especially the EU case shows that ‘going technical’
or mobilizing specific types of research should not always be seen as a strategy of
depoliticization, but can also offer a form of ‘politics with other means.’
Whereas the rational model of government assumes direct and instrumental forms of
knowledge utilization, our case-study provides clear evidence that more indirect and
27
symbolic forms of knowledge utilization prevailed. In almost all cases, knowledge
was used primarily to legitimate government institutions or to substantiate
government policies. This involved amongst others the mobilization of specific data
that can be used as a soft-governance tool for policy coordination (BAMF, SCP,
MIPEX), as well as the establishment of expert committees to substantiate policy
frames (such as the community cohesion frame in the UK or the new immigration
country frame in Germany). This conclusion does put a big question mark to the
assertion in the risk society literature that research should play a key role in reflection
processes in response to new risks. Our analysis does not provide evidence of
reflection in response to new risks, rather of the absence of such reflection or
evidence-based policymaking.
Concerning the distinction between symbolic and instrumental knowledge utilization,
our analysis shows that the different types of knowledge utilization can in practice be
strongly entwined. For instance, third order instrumental knowledge utilisation (i.e.
using knowledge to change a policy position at the level of the ‘policy paradigm’)
always has a legitimising effect as well, because by changing one`s policy position
on the basis of knowledge, one also legitimises one`s agency as it signifies "the
capacity [of an actor] to make sound decisions” (Boswell 2009: []). First and second
order instrumental knowledge utilisation, i.e. changing a policy position at the level of
instruments or settings of instruments (Hall 1993), also have a legitimising effect.
Furthermore, first and second order instrumental knowledge utilisation have a
substantiating effect at the higher order(s), because they are not questioned but
reaffirmed. Good examples are the suggested policy instruments by the Italian
scientific committee (to promote ‘shared citizenship’) and the UK Cantle committee
(to promote ‘community cohesion’). Both committees proposed which policy
instruments could be used to attain a certain preordained policy goal. In other words,
by working within a specific policy paradigm, they reaffirmed – substantiated – it.
By combining insights from STS with the risk society literature, our analysis also
provides evidence of the mutual conditional relationship between knowledge
production and –utilization. The changing nature of dialogues structures and
changing forms of knowledge utilization disbanded the strongly national coproduction
of knowledge that had prevailed in a number of countries. As such, the
deinstitutionalization of research-policy dialogues and the politicization of science
28
also contributed to a growing fragmentation of migrant integration research in terms
of institutes involved as well as in terms of knowledge paradigms.
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