REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES...

REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZONCITY

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Case No~ SB-17-CRM-1495For: Violation of Section 3 (e), of

Republic Act No. 3019

THEODORE B. MARRERO, etaL,

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andTRESPESES,J.1

Promulgated:

~qIW):M((y

For resolution is accused Theodore B. Marrero, Nenita D.Lizardo, Helen K. Mac1i-ing, Paulo P. Pagteilan, Lily Rose T.Kollin, Florence R. Gut-omen, Edward B. Likigan, Soledad.Theresa F. Wanawan, Jerome M. Falingao, Abdon A. Iminganand Abelard T. Pachingel's "Manifestation with MOtiO~

• Sitting as a spedal membe, of 'he 3" Olvlsloopu"uaot to Adm'o's"a"ve O,de, No. 091-2018 dated roFebruary 9, 2018. ,Y.

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1495People vs. Marrero, et al.

Reconsideration of Resolution dated 04 January 2018"2 datedJanuary 15,2018.3

The accused-movants insist on the [1] existence of"inordinate, capricious and unreasonable delay" In thepreliminary investigation of the present case and [2]applicability of the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Divisionin the case ofPeople v. Reyes, et al.4

Accused-movants Marrero, et al.) claim that from the periodof March 16, 2008, to March 17, 2011, the Office of theOmbudsman failed to take any action on the resolution of thepreliminary investigation of this case. 5 They further assert thatthe actions supposedly taken by the Office of the Ombudsmanfrom the time the respondents (now accused-movants) filedtheir counter-affidavit on August 26, 2011 , up to the resolutionof the complaint on July 1, 2016, were mere re-assignments ofthe present case. Thus, the said re-assignments cannot serve asa valid justification for the five-year delay in this case.6

Moreover, the accused-movants submit that thedeclarations of the different divisions of the Sahdiganbayanmust avoid confusion and/ or conflicting pronouncements.Consequently, they invoke the ruling of the Fifth Division of thisCourt in People v. Reyes,7 wherein the Court granted themotion to dismiss filed by the accused on the ground ofinordinate delay.

In its ((Opposition to the Manifestation with Motion forReconsideration of Resolution dated January 4) 2018" datedJanuary 31, 2018,8 the prosecution chronicles anew theantecedent proceedings relative to the preliminary investigationof this case, to wit:

2 The subject Resolution was actually promulgated on December 22, 2017.3 pp. 603-608, Record4 Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0633; p. 604, Record5 p. 604, Record6 p. 605, Record7SB-16-CRM-06338 pp. 702-718, Record

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB,.17-CRM-1495People vs. Marrero, et ai.

3.1 On Janu~ 24, 2007, private complainant Harry C.Dominguez filed before the Office of the Ombudsman anMfidavit-Complaint of even date for violation of RA No.3019 and RANo. 9184 against, among others, accusedGovernor Maximo B. Dalog and herein accused-movantsmembers of the Bids and Awards Committee of theProvincial Government of Mountain Province regardingthe procurement of one (1)unit of Mitsubishi Van in theamount of One Million Pesos (Pl,000,000.00).9 TheMfidavit-Complaint was docketed as OMB-L-C-07-Ol06-A.I0

3.2 In the meantime, on February 5, 2007, privatecomplainant Dominguez submitted a Letter to theNational Bureau of Investigation (NBI) requesting saidbureau to investigate the procurement of the sameMitsubishi Van; 11

3.2.1 Subsequently, private complainantDominguez filed with the NBI an Affidavit datedFebruary 6, 2007 charging accused GovernorMaximo B. Dalog, herein accused-movants, otherofficials and employees of the ProvincialGovernment of Mountain Province and thesupposed supplier of the subject Mitsubishi VanRonald C. Kimakim, proprietor of Ronhil Trading,Inc., with Estafa through Falsification of PublicDocuments, Violation of RA No. 6713 and RA No.3019;12

3.2.2 On March 3, 2008, the Department of Justice(DOJ) indorsed the NBI's investigation Report,together with private complainant Dominguez'sFebruary 6, 2007 Affidavit and other documents, tothe Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.The documents indorsed by the DOJ were receivedby said office on March 17, 2008;13

3.2.3 Subsequently, on August 1,2008, the Officeof the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon turned7

9 Footnote omitted10 Emphasis supplied by the prosecution k611 Footnote omitted12 Footnote omitted '

" Footnote omitted I'

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1495People vs. Marrero, et ai.

the NBI'sInvestigationReport, together with privatecomplainant Dominguez's February 6, 2007Affidavitand other documents, to the PreliminaryInvestigation Administrative Adjudication andReviewBureau (PARB)of the Officeof the OverallDeputy Ombudsman in accordance with OfficeOrder No. 65, s. 2008 which transferred casesinvolving respondents occupying the position ofGovernor and/or Vice-Governor to the PARB toexpedite and accelerate the conduct of preliminaryinvestigation and/ or administrative adjudication ofsuch cases.

3.3 In the meantime, with respect to the proceedingsbefore the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-C-07-Ol06-A where Counter-Affidavits were filed by accusedGovernor Maximo B. Dalog, Pagteilan, Kollin, Gut-omen,Likigan, Pinangga and Wanawan, GIPO II Judy AnneDoctor-Escalona issued the Resolution dated March 25,2009, dismissing the charges of violation of RANo. 3019and RANo. 9184 as contained in the January 24, 2007Affidavit-Complaint of private complainant Dominguez.Said Resolution was later on approved by DeputyOmbudsman for Luzon Mark E. Jalandoni by authorityof the Ombudsman pursuant to Office Order No. 136, s.2010;14

3.4 Private complainant Dominguez then filed a Motionfor Reconsideration dated June 7,2010 in OMB-L-C-07-106-A, arguing that in the aforesaid Resolution datedMarch 25, 2009 no determination was made to thedocumentary evidence submitted by the NBI;15

3.5 In its Order dated September 6, 2010 in OMB-L-C-07-0106-A, the Office of the Ombudsman deniedprivate complainant Dominguez's Motion forReconsideration. However, with respect to his secondcomplaint (Le., the Affidavit dated February 6, 2007)and the NBI documents, the Office of the Ombudsmanordered that said second complaint be assigned acriminal docket for the conduct of a preliminaryinvestigation. Said Order was approved by the/?

14 Footnote omitted / '

~Footnoteom;tted ~ '/.


Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez on December29,2010;16

3.6 On January 18, 2011, the second complaint, whichis for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documentsand violations of RA No. 6713 and RA No. 3019,together with the NBI documents, was tra.I1smitted tothe CRD for appropriate action;17

3.7 The second complaint was docketed as OMS-C-ll-Ol07-C18 and transmitted to the PARB for preliminaryinvestigation on March 16,2011. The case was assignedto Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer JudyAnne Escalona of the PARBon March 17,2011;19

3.8 On March 17, 2011, PARRDirector Mary AntonetteYalao issued an Order directing herein accused-movants and other respondents in OMB-C-C-11-0107-Cto file their respective counter-affidavits andcontroverting evidence with respect to the secondcomplaint, together with its supporting documents;20

3.8.1 On April 27, 2011, counsel for accused-movants Marrero, Lizardo, Pagteilan, Kollin, Gut-omen, Likigan, Wanawan, Falingao, Imingan andPachingel filed an Entry of Appearance withMotion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits;21

3.8.2 On May 2, 2011, accused-movant Macli-ing, together with her husband Bartolome Macli-ing, filed a Joint Motion for Extension of Time tofile Counter-Affidavits;22

3.8.3 OnAntonette

May 2, 2011, PARB Director MaryYalao issued an Order granting the/?

)j!'

16 Footnote omitted17 Footnote omitted18 Footnote omitted19 Footnote omitted20 Footnote omitted21 Footnote omitted22 Footnote omitted


aforesaid motions for extension of time to filecoun ter-affidavi ts;23

3.9 On May 24, 2011, accused-movants Marrero,Imingan, Falingao, Pagteilan, Kollin, Gut-omen, Likigan,and Wanawan filed their respective Counter-Affidavits inOMB-C-C-II-0I07-C.24 Accused-movant Mac1i-ing filedher Counter-Affidavit on May 26, 2011.25

3.10 On July 4, 2011, private complainant Dominguezfiled in OMB-C-C-II-0 107 -C a Motion for Consolidationand Manifestation seeking the consolidation of said casewith OMB-L-C-07-0106-A;26

3.10.1 In the meantime, in OMB-L-C-07-0106-A,private complainant Dominguez filed on July 4,2011 a Motion for Consolidation and SecondMotion for Reconsideration, praying that theOffice of the Ombudsman reconsider the Orderdated September 6, 2010 which denied his firstmotion for reconsideration and to consolidateOMB-L-C-07-0106-A with OMB-C-C-OI07-C;27

3.10.2 On August 26, 2011, counsel for accused-movants Marrero, Lizardo, Pagteilan, Kollin, Gut-omen, Likigan, Wanawan, Falingao, Imingan andPachingel filed a Comment/ Opposition toComplainant's Motion for Consolidation andSecond Motion for Reconsideration in OMB-L-C-07-0106-A;28

3.11 On January 5, 2012, OMB-C-C-II-I07-C was re-assigned to Atty. Daisy Grace M. Paas, also of the PARB,for the conduct of the preliminary investigation;29

3.12 On October 17, 2012, private complainantDominguez filed a Manifestation with Motion toWithdraw Complaint in OMB-C-C-II-0I07-C, stat~

23 Footnote omitted { /24 Footnote omitted25 Footnote otnitted26 Footnote omitted27 Footnote ~mitted28 Footnote omitted29 Footnote omitted


that after further inquiry he determined that thegovernment did not suffer any injury since theambulance unit was actually delivered; that, uponverification and inquiry, the facts on which the Decision(Resolution) in OMB-L-C-07-0106-A was based wereextant and subsisting; and that his complaint in OMB-C-C-II-0I07-C is a mere reiteration of his complaint inoMB-L-C-07-0 106-A;30

3.13 On June 5, 2014, OMB-C-C-II-0I07 was re-assigned to GIPO II Rachel C. Favila, also of the PARB,for consideration and appropriate action;31

3.14 On November 4, 2014, GIPO II Favila issued theResolution in OMB-C-C-II-0 107-C, finding probablecause that herein accused-movants, together withaccused Governor Maximo B. Dalog and other officialsemployees of the Provincial Government of MountainProvince, in conspiracy with accused Ronald C.Kimakim, violated Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as.amended. The charges of Estafa through Falsification ofPublic Documents and Violation of RA No. 6713 weredismissed;32

3.15 In the same Resolution dated November 4, 2014,GIPO II Favila declared that the Order dated September6, 2010, which directed that the second complaint andNBI documents be docketed (OMB-C-C-II-0I07-C) for aseparate preliminary investigation, put an end to theancillary issue of consolidation of OMB-L-C-07-0106-Aand OMB-C-C-II-0I07-C·33,

30 Footnote omitted31 Footnote omitted32 Footnote omitted33 Footnote omitted

3.16 The November 4, 2014 Resolution of GIPO II Favilathen went up the hierarchy of review in the Office of theOmbudsman. After the Resolution was reviewed byDirector James G. Viernes, Overall Deputy OmbudsmanMelchor Arthur H. Carandang reviewed the same andrecommended its approval to Ombudsman con~

I1J,y.


Carpio Morales on January 12, 2015.34 After reviewingthe Resolution, it was approved by Ombudsman Moraleson July 1, 2016;

3.17 On July 28,2016, accused Ronald C. Kimakim fileda Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the approvedResolution dated November 4, 2014.35 Herein accused-movants, except accused-movant Mac1i-ing, filed aMotion for Partial Reconsideration36 of the sameResolution on August 4, 2016;

3.18 On August 8,2016, GIPO II Favila issued an Orderdenying the aforesaid motions for partialreconsideration. Said Order was approved byOmbudsman Conchita Carpio Morales on August 10,2016;

3.19 On August 24, 2016, the CRD received the Motionfor Partial Reconsideration dated August 11, 2016, ofaccused Governor Maximo B. Dalog relative to theaforesaid Resolution dated November4, 2016;

3.20 In the meantime, after the Resolution of GIPOFavila was approved by Ombudsman Morales on July 1,2016, the proposed Information in this case for violationof Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 went through a reviewprocess until it was eventually approved by OmbudsmanMorales on January 23, 2017. It was then filed with theSandiganbayan on August 1,2017.37

The prosecution further points out that [1] the period forthe determination of delay in this case should be reckoned fromMarch 16,2011, or when the second complaint was docketed asOMB-C-II-OI07-C and was transmitted to the PreliminaryInvestigation Administrative Adjudication and Review Bureau(PARB) for preliminary investigation;38 [2] mere mathemati~

34 Footnote omitted J' /35 Footnote omitted36 Footnote omitted37 pp. 703-709, Record ~38 p. 709, Record JO \J '

f-

a..olutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1495People vs. Marrero, et ai.

reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient in determiningwhether the constitutional right of the accused to speedydisposition of cases has been violated;39 [3] the records of thiscase are bereft of any indication that the proceedings before theOffice of the Ombudsman were attended by vexatious,capricious and oppressive delays;40 [4] jurisprudence dictatesthat the concept of speedy disposition of cases is consistentwith reasonable delays;41and, [5] none of the accused-movantsfiled a single motion for early resolution or at least manifestedthat they are not waiving their right to speedy disposition ofcases.42

Relying on the case of Dela Peiia v. Sandiganbayan,43the prosecution argUes that there are several factors to beconsidered in the determination of the existence of inordinatedelay and whether or not the constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases of the accused had been violated. Itexplains that the pronouncement in Dela Peiia had beenconsistently adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases ofRepublic v. Desierto, et al.,44 Lumanlaw v. Peralta,45 Gaas,et aL, v. Mitmug,46 Tan v. People,47and Villa v. Escalona, etaL48

The prosecution also submits that the ruling of theSupreme Court en bane in Gaas has not been overturned tothis date. It points out that the cases of Coscolluela v.Sandiganbayan49 and People v. Reyes, et al.,so cannot beapplied to the present case because of the differences in theirfactual milieus. It stresses that unlike the petitioners inCoscolluela, the accused-movants were very much aware thatthere was a pending case against them because they aGtively

/'39 p. 709, Record40 p. 710, Record41 p. 7101 Record42 p. 711, Record43360 SCRA478 (2001)44 399 SCRA452 (2002)45482 SCRA396 (2006)46 553 SCRA335 (2008)47586 SCRA139 (2009).,48 743 SCRA351 (2014)49701 SCRA188 (2013)50 SB-16-CRM-0633


participated in the proceedings before the Office of theOmbudsman. However, they failed to assert their right tospeedy disposition of cases.51

Finally, the prosecution urges the Court to deny theaccused-movants' prayer for the cancellation of the warrants ofarrest against them. It claims that the Regional Trial Court ofBontoc has not transmitted to this Court the accused-movants'undertaking and other pertinent documents, including theoriginal Official Receipt which indicates the payment of the cashbond set by the Court. 52 Also, the prosecution notes that th~photocopies of the cash bond submitted by the Regional TrialCourt of Bontoc, Mountain Province failed to include the OfficialReceipt evidencing the payment of the cash bond by accused-movant Imingan.53

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The Court finds the accused-movants' motion forreconsideration of the Court's Resolution promulgated onDecember 22,2017, bereft ofmerit.

To begin with, the issue of inordinate delay was passedupon by the Court in its assailed Resolution.54 Therein, theCourt reviewed the factual antecedents of the present case andweighed the conduct of both the Officeof the Ombudsman andthe accused-movants vis-a.-vis the [1] length of delay; [2] reasonfor the delay; [3]accused-movants' assertion or non-assertion oftheir right to speedy trial; and, [4] prejudice caused to theaccused-movants resulting from the delay. In holding that therewas no inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation of the.presentcase,th~Courtheld/!

151 p. 715, Record52 p. 716, Record53 p. 716, Record54 pp. 570-598, Record


IV. There was noinordinate delay inconduct of thepreliminaryinvestigation of thepresent case thatwould warrant itsdismissal.

In Ombudsman v. Jurado,55 the Supreme Courtclarified that although the Constitution guarantees theright to speedy disposition of cases, such speedydisposition is a flexible concept. To properly define thatconcept, the facts and circumstances surrounding eachcase must be evaluated and taken into account: 56 Thereoccurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition ofa case only when the proceedings are attended byvexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or whenunjustified postponements of the trial are sought andsecured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, along period of time is allowed to elapse without the partyhaving his case tried.57 Consequently, a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved would notbe sufficient. 58

In the very recent case of Remulla v.Sandiganbayan,59 the Supreme Court reiterated theneed for the courts to weigh the different facts andcircumstances surrounding each case60 in order todetermine whether an accused's right to speedydisposition of cases had been violated. According to theHigh Tribunal, as early as 1983, in the case of Martinv. Ver,61 the Supreme Court had already adopted the"balancing test" laiddownby the UnitedStates SU/?

55561 seRA 135 (2008) ~56 Remulla If. Sandlganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 201757Dacudaa If. Gonzales, 688 SCRA109 (2013)58 Ombudsman If. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008); See also Dacudao If. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2013),Enriquez If. Office of the Ombudsman, 545 SCRA618 (2008) ,59G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 201760 Erhphasis supplied61 208'Phil. 658 (1983)


Court in the case of Barker v. Wingo,62 as this testcompels the courts to approach such cases on an adhoc basis. 63

Indeed, the cases invoked by the accused-movantsto support their claim of inordinate delay cannot beblindly applied to the present cases without a closescrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstancessurrounding the preliminary investigation of the presentcase. To reiterate, particular regard must be takenof the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case inorder to determine whether or not there has been aviolation of the accused's right to speedy disposition ofcases.64

The prosecution recounts that on January 24,2007, private complainant Harry C. Dominguez filedbefore the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint against the herein accused regarding theprocurement of one (1) unit of Mitsubishi van in theamount of Php1,000,000.00. The said complaint wasdocketed as OMB-L-C-07-106-A.65 On February 5, 2007,the same complainant requested for an investigation ofthe procurement of the same Mitsubishi Van from theNational Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

A review of the record of this case shows that in aletter dated January 28, 2008, NBI Director Nestor M.Mantaring wrote to the Provincial Prosecutor ofMountain Province, transmitting for preliminaryinvestigation the findings of Inspector Valentino T.Valbuena of the NBI-Cordillera Administrative Region,in his investigation report. On March 3, 2008, theDepartment of Justice (DOJ) endorsed the NBI'sInvestigation Report, together with private complainantDominguez's Affidavit dated February 6, 2007, andother documents, to the Office of the DeputyOmbudsman for Luzon.66 The documents endorsed~

62407 US514 (1972)63 p. 6, Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 201764 Dela Peiia v. Sandiganbayan, 360 seRA 478 (2001)

, 65 p. 490, Record66 p. 491, Record

RelIOlutlonCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1495People vs. Marrero, et ai.

the DOJ were received by said office on March 17,2008.67 On March 3, 2008, Mountain ProvinceProvincial Prosecutor Moses C. Aycchok transmitted thecomplete records of the present case to the Office of theOmbudsman.68

The Office of the Ombudsman further explainsthat on August 1, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon turned over the said report and other documentsrelating to the present case to the PreliminaryInvestigation Administrative Adjudication and Review(PARB)of the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsmanin accordance with Office Order No. 65, series of 2008,which transferred cases involving respondentsoccupying the position of governor or vice-governor tothe PARB.69

In its Resolution dated March 25, 2009, GIPO IIJudy Anne Doctor-Escalona dismissed the charges ofviolations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 9184 againstthe respondents in Case No. OMB-L-C-07-106-A.7oAccording to the prosecution, private complainantDominguez filed a motion for reconsideration of theadverse resolution on June 7, 2010. The said motion forreconsideration was denied by the Office of theOmbudsman in its Order dated September 6, 2010,which was approved by then Ombudsman Merceditas N.Gutierrez on December 29,2010.71

On January 18, 2011, the second complaint(which is the subject of the present case), wastransmitted to the Central Records Division (CRD)of theOffice of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.72 OnMarch 16, 2011, the same complaint, together withpertinent NBI documents, was docketed as OMB-C-ll-Ol07-C and transmitted to the PARB for the conduct ofpreliminary investigation.73 In an Order dated MarCh.~.17,

67 p. 491, Record /: -68 p. 9, Record69 p. 491, Record70 p. 492, R~cord71 p. 492, Record72 p. 492, Record73 pp. 492-493, Record


2011, PARBDirector Mary Antonette Yalao directed theaccused-movants and the other respondents in the saidcase to file their respective counter-affidavits.74 Afterfiling a motion for extension to file their counter-affidavits,respondents Marrero, Imingan, Falingao, Pagteilan,Kollin, Gut-omen, Likigan and Wanawan filed the sameon May 24, 2011.75 Accused-movant Macli-ing followedsuit and filed her counter-affidavit on May 26, 2011. OnJuly 4, 2011, private complaint Dominguez moved forthe consolidation of Cases Nos. OMB-C-ll-0107-C andOMB-L-C-07-106-A. Private complainant Dominguez alsofiled the same motion in OMB-L-C-07-106-A. On August26, 2011, the respondents (now accused-movants) filedtheir comment/ opposition to the said motion.76

According to the prosecution, Case No. OMB-C-ll-l07-C was re-assigned to Daisy Grace M. Paas of thePARB on January 5, 2012, for the conduct ofpreliminary investigation. 77 On October 17, 2012,private complainant Dominguez filed a "Manifestationwith Motion to Withdraw Complaint" in Case No. OMB-C-11-107-C.78 On June 5,2014, Case No. OMB-C-ll-107-Cwas re-assigned anew to GIPO-IIRachel C. Favila of thePARB for appropriate action.79 In a Resolution datedNovember 14, 2014, GIPO-II Favila found probablecause to indict the accused-movants and their co-accused of the crime herein charged. 80 Th~ prosecutionsubmits that the said resolution passed through thehierarchy of review in the Officeof the Ombudsman andwas ultimately approved by Ombudsman ConchitaCarpio Morales on July 1, 2016.81

Accused-movant Kimakim filed a motion for partialreconsideration on July 28, 2016.82 Herein accused-movants, except for accused-movant Macli-ing, filed /7

74 p. 493, Record t /75 p. 493, Record76 p. 494, Record77 p. 494, Record78 p. 494, Record79 p. 494, Record80 p. 495, Record81 p. 495, Record82 p. 495, Record

ReaolutioDCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1495People vs. Marrero, et ai.

motion for partial reconsideration on August 4, 2016. Inan Order dated August 8, 2016, the Office of theOmbudsman denied the aforesaid motions forreconsideration. The same order was approved byOmbudsman Morales on August 10,2016.83

The prosecution ratiocinates that the Informationin the present case went through another reviewprocess until it was eventually approved byOmbudsman Morales on January 23, 2017.84 TheInformation in the present case was filed with the Courton August 1~2017.85

To begin with, the date of the filing of the firstcomplaint, docketed as Case No. OMB-L-C-07-106-A,which was dismissed should not be included in thecomputation of the period to determine the existence ofinordinate delay in this case because the present case isnot based on the said dismissed complaint. Notably, thesecond complaint, which involved thirteen (13)respondents and became the basis for the institution ofthe criminal charge lodged before the Court, wasdocketed on March 16, 2011.

As hereinbefore shown, the Office of theOmbudsman took prompt action after the secondcomplaint was docketed for preliminary investigation.Also, the motions for reconsideration filed by therespondents were immediately resolved. While there wasdelay in the disposition of the case before the Office ofthe Ombudsman, the Court does not find such delay asvexatious, arbitrary, capricious or oppressivewarranting the dismissal of the present case.

Jurisprudence teaches that the concept of "speedydisposition of cases" is consistent with reasonabledelays; what the Constitution prohibits areunreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays /"7

83 p. 42, Record84 p. 496, Recordasp. 5, Record


render rights nugatory. 86 Onlywhen the proceedings areattended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressivedelays; or when unjustified postponements of the trialare asked for and secured, or when without cause orjustifiable motive a long period of time is allowedto elapse without the party having his case triedwould there be a violation of the right to speedydisposition of cases.87

In this case, the period during which the recordsof this case were examined and reviewed, the timepoured into the research of pertinent laws andjurisprudence in reviewing the [1] counter-affidavits filedby the respondents, [2]motions for consolidation of casesfiled by private complainant Dominguez in Cases Nos.OMB-L-C-07-0106-A and OMB-C-C-ll-0107-C, [3] themotion to withdraw complaint filed by the same privatecomplainant in Case No. OMB-C-C-ll-0107-C, [4] themotions for reconsideration filed by the respondentstherein, and [5] the levels of review that the case had togo through and the exercise of legal judgment anddiscretion must also be taken into consideration indetermining the existence of inordinate delay. Asjurisprudence instructs, the essential ingredient in theadministration of justice is that it must be orderly andexpeditious and not mere speed.88

It is noteworthy that the accused-movants neverasserted their right to speedy disposition of cases duringthe preliminary investigation of Case No. OMB-C-C-ll-Ol07-C. Also, the submission of their counter-affidavitsand motions for reconsideration in the above-mentionedcase debunks their claim that they reasonably assumedthat the case against them was dismissed. Indeed, theaccused-movants failed to take any step in order toaccelerate the proceedings before the Office of theOmbudsman. While it is true that a respondent in acriminal case has no obligation to followup on his cas~

" Braza v. Sandl.anbayan, 691 seRA 471 (2013); See also Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 seRA 135 (2008), ~Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 423 (2004), Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., 327 SCRA 145 (2000),Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA153 (1987) --87 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA135 (2008); Emphasis supplied88 Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA294 (2004)


it is likewise jurisprudentially settled that the accused'sassertion of his/her right to speedy disposition of casesis entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determiningwhether or not he / she is being deprived there of;89

hence, failure to claim such right will make it difficult toprove that there was a denial of their right to speedytrial.

Moreover, the accused-movants' claim that theywere prejudiced by the delay because most of theirdocumentary evidence, specifically the trip tickets of thevehicle in issue, "had long been disposed oj lacksfactual basis and remains unsubstantiated. Withoutany conclusive factual basis, the claim deserves noweight in law.9o

To be clear, the Court carefully weighed the factualcircumstances surrounding the preliminary investigation of thiscase before the Office of the Ombudsman and applied the four-fold test in declaring that although there may have been delayin the resolution of the preliminary investigation, this is not thekind of delay that is constitutionally abhorred. To stress, a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient indetermining the existence of inordinate delay.91 What isproscribed is unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delaywhich render rights nugatory.92

The invocation by the accused-movants of the ruling of theSandiganbayan, Fifth Divsion in People v. Reyes, et aL,93 as afurther ground to support their present motion purportedly toavoid confusion and/or conflicting pronouncements fails topersuade. /'7

to7*

89 See Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008) citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972), Tan v. People, 586SCRA 139 (2009), Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008), Tilendo v. Sandlganbayan, 533 SCRA 331(2007), and Spouses Uy v. Adriano, 505 SCRA625 (2006)90 Spouses Uy v. Adriano, 505 SCRA625 (2006)91 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA135 (2008)92 See Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008), Mendoza-Ong v. Sandlganbayan, 440 SCRA423 (2004),Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., 327 SCRA145 (2000), Caballero v. AI/onso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987)93 Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0633


To repeat, it is jurisprudentially settled that in cases wherethe violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition ofcases is the issue, courts are compelled to approach such caseson an ad hoc basis.94 In other words, there is an imperativeneed for the Court to weigh the different facts andcircumstances surrounding each case in order for it to come upwith a sound resolution; hence, the ruling of theSandiganbayan, Fifth Division which was resolved under adifferent set of facts and circumstances cannot be applied to thepresent case.

At any rate, it must be remembered that this Courtoperates in Divisions of three (3) Justices each and eachDivision functions independently of the other.95 In Francisco v.Rojas,96 the Supreme Court teaches that while a ruling of aparticular division of the Court of Appeals may be takencognizance of in some cases, it cannot bind or prejudice a rulingof another division thereof, the former being a co-ordinateauthority, thus:

In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, thedecisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts; thecourts of co-ordinate authority do not bind eachother;97 and the one highest court does not bind. itself,it being invested with the innate authority to ruleaccording to its best lights.98 The principle of staredecisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinalrules established by the Supreme Court in its finaldecisions.

Applying by analogy the above-mentioned pronouncementto the present case, the rulings of the other divisions of thisCourt likewise have no binding force on the findings of thisDivision.Further, it must be emphasized that the only jUdi/1

94 See Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 201795 Preagido v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 143 (2005) citing De Guzman V5. People, 119 SCRA337 (1982)96723 SeRA 423 (2014) ~97 Emphasis supplied98 Footnote omitted

•II

7

Re.olutioDCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1495People V8. Marrero, et ai.

decisions which form part of our legal system are the decisionsof the Supreme Court.99 Thus, only the rulings and decisions ofthe Supreme Court can serve as binding precedents to thedeterminations to be made by the Sandiganbayan.10o

On the issue on whether or not bail had been posted bythe accused-movants, the Court reviewed the followingdocuments extant from the records of this case, viz:

1. Original copies of Official Receipt Nos. 4141398 to407 indicating the payment of the cash bond byaccused-movants Marrero, Lizardo, Macli-ing,Pagteilan, Kollin, Gut-omen, Likigan, Wanawan,Falingao and Pachingel which were attached totheir present motion;101

2. Original copies of the Cash Bond Undertakingwhich was subscribed and sworn to by the saidaccused-movants on January 11, 2018, beforeAtty. Simon Jr. K. Toyokan, Clerk of Court IV,Regional Trial Court, Bontoc, MountainProvince; 102

4. Certified true copies of the Official Receiptsevidencing the payment of the cash bond of theabove-mentioned accused-movants;104

5. Accused Identification Sheet which included thefingerprints of the same accused-movants;105

Order dated January 11, 2018, issued by SergioJr. T. Angnganay, Executive Judge, Regional Trial

_____ c_ou_rt_o_f_Bontoc,Mountain Province, indicatin~

99Quasha Pef'la Ancheta &Nolasco Law Office vs. Court of Appeals, 607 SCRA712 (2009) ( ./

100 Barriga v. Sandlganbayan, 586 SCRA63 (2009) ;I()101 p. 60B-A, Record102 pp. 621-630, Record103 pp. 631~640, Record •104 pp. 641-650, Record y .105 pp. 651-670, Record /


that the said accused-movants voluntarilysubmitted their person before the Court andposted a cash bond in the amount ofPhpI5,000.00, respectively;106and,

7. Order dated January 11, 2018, issued by SergioJr. T. Angnganay,ExecutiveJudge, RegionalTrialCourt of Bontoc, Mountain Province,directing anyofficerof the law to cease and desist fromarrestingthe person of the above-mentioned accused-movants.107

Thus, the Court holds that the above-mentioneddocuments sufficiently demonstrate that accused-movantsMarrero, Lizardo, Macli-ing, Pagteilan, Kollin, Gut-omen,Likigan, Wanawan, Falingao and Pachingel had posted bailbefore the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province.However, the record of this case is bereft of any evidenceshowing that accused-movant Abdon A. Imingan posted therequired bond to secure his provisional liberty.

In sum, the accused-movants failed to raise any new orsubstantial matter that would warrant the reconsideration ofthe Court's Resolution promulgated on December 22,2017.

WHEREFORE, the Court [1] DENIES accused-movantsTheodore B. Marrero, Nenita D. Lizardo, Helen K. Macli-ing,Paulo P. Pagteilan, Lily Rose T. Kollin, Florence R. Gut-omen,Edward B. Likigan, Soledad Theresa F. Wanawan, Jerome M.Falingao, Abdon A. Imingan and Abelard T. Pachingel's Motionfor Reconsideration dated January 15, 2018, for lack of meritand/or being pro-forma, and [2]NOTES the manifestation of theaccused-movants with respect to the posting of their cashbonds and accordingly recalls the warrants of arrest issuedagainst accused-movants Theodore B. Marrero, Nenita D.tizardo, Helen K. Macli-ing, Paulo P. Pagteilan, Lily Rose T.Kollin, Florence R. Gut-omen, Edward B. Likigan, SoledadTheresa F. Wanawan, Jerome M. Falingao, and Abelard T./l

~/'~06pp. 671-680, Record107 pp.,681-690, Record


Pachingel.

Set the arraignment of the accused and pre-trial on March9,2018, at 1:30 in the afternoon.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

TO R. FERNANDEZss ciate Justice

PARO M. E-Presiding Justice

Chairperson

PESES. te Justice

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