REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBA YAN

QUEZON CITY

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Cases Nos. SB-l 7-CRM-0263-0280For: Violation of Section 3 (e),

Republic Act No. 3019

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, S.J., J. andFERNANDEZ, B., J.

LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, etale

Promulgated:

CZ1~~_

For resolution is accused Lawrence L. Cruz, Ruderic C.Marzo, Moises Dalisay, Jr., Marlene Young, Riza Jane P. Magaro,Jose L. Zalsos, Providencio A. Abragan, Jr., Ariel P. Anghay, RoyL. Openiano and Bayani C. Areola's ((Motion for Leave to Allowthe Conditional Examination of Defense Witness ProvidencioAbragan, Sr., Before Trial" dated August 4, 201~

'pp. 147-153, Vol. II, Rew,d A(A

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

Accused-movants Cruz, et al., pray that the examination oftheir intended witness, ProvidencioAbragan, Sr., be made beforetrial pursuant to Section 12, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules onCriminal Procedure and the Revised Guidelines for ContinuousTrial.2

The accused-movants submit that their intended witness iseighty-three (83)years old and is suffering from serious lingeringillnesses due to his advanced age. In fact, their intended witness'attending physician had already barred the former fromtravelling.3 They further aver that witness Abragan, Sr., residesin fligan City, Lanao del Norte, which is undeniably one hundred(100)kilometers from the place of trial.4

Accused-movants Cruz, et al., enumerate the followingmatters which their intended witness will testify on:

a. Abragan, Sr., served as City Councilor of IliganCity for more or less thirty (30) years after beingfirst elected to the position in 1964. He was CityCouncilor in 2004 when the Integrated Bus andJeepney Terminal South-bound was established;5

b. Sometime in early 2000, Iligan City was seriouslyhampered by the worsening traffic problem,primarily caused by the existence and operationsof illegal terminals in the city proper;6

c. On or about December 2002, Iligan Cityestablished an Integrated Bus and JeepneyTerminal at Tambo, Hinaplanon, Iligan City;7

d. The establishment of the Integrated Bus and, Jeepney Terminal did not solved [sic] SatiSfaC~

p. 147, Vol. II, Record

3 p. 150, Vol. II, Record ~ Y\J4 p. 150, Vol. II, Record5 p. 148, Vol. II, Record6 p. 148, Vol. II, Record7 p. 149, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

e. The south-bound public utility vehicles [sic]operators complained of the traffic congestioninside the Iligan City Proper;9

f. Abragan, Sr., being the Chairman of theCommittee on Transportation and Committee onPolice and Public Safety, was tasked to look for theappropriate site for a new terminal that willaccommodate the public utility vehicles plying thesouth-bound route;10

g. The primary criteria set was that the suitable siteshould be outside of the City Proper but not farfrom the City so that it would be easily accessibleto the riding public; 11

h. After diligent search, the only available land areathat fits the criteria was the land owned by thenKiwalan Lumber Company, containing an area ofmore or less two (2) hectares;12

1. To solve the traffic problem, time was of theessence to prevent damage to or [sic] life orproperty arising from the daily traffic gridlock andcongestion within the City Proper to restore vitalpublic services, infrastructure facilities and otherpublic utilities; 13

J. In view thereof, immediate action is necessary tocurb the worsening traffic problem and hence, theCity Government availed of negotiatedprocurement in entering into a lease contract; 14

Abragan, Sr., negotiated for the terms of the leas~

8 p. 149, Vol. II, Record /' ,/9 Idl°ldll/d121dBId141d

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

contract with the Kiwalan Lumber Companysometime in 2004;15

1. He was a City Councilor in 2008 when the leasecontract was renewed; 16

m. To ensure that the amended rental rate would bereasonable and advantageous to the City, thematter was forwarded to the City AppraisalCommittee to determine the prevailing rates forlease of lots within the vicinity of the lot subject ofthe lease contract;17

n. Other relevant matters connected to theforegoing.18

In its Comment dated August 23, 2017,19 the prosecutionsignified that it interposes no objection to the present motion.However, it submits that Section 12, Rule 119 of the RevisedRules on Criminal Procedure requires that the present motion besupported by an affidavit of the accused and other evidence asthe court may require. The prosecution points out that thepresent motion is .not supported by the affidavits of theaccused.20

Section 12, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules onProcedure readS:~

EfJiM

15 p. 149, Vol. II, Record16/d17 /d18 p. 150, Vol. II, Record19 pp. 154-157, Vol. II, Record20 p. 156, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

SEC. 12. Application for examination of witness foraccused before trial. -When the accused has been held toanswer for an offense, he may, upon motion with noticeto the other parties, have witnesses conditionallyexamined in his behalf. The motion shall state: (a) thename and residence of the witness; (b) the substance ofhis testimony; and (c) that the witness is sick or infirmas to afford reasonable ground for believing that he willnot be able to attend the trial, or resides more thanhundred (100)kilometers from the place of trial and hasno means to attend the same, or that other similarcircumstances exist that would make him unavailableor prevent him from attending the ,trial. The motionshall be supported by an affidavit of the accusedand such other evidence as the court may require.21

Thus, pursuant to the above-quoted rule, the presentmotion should be supported by the affidavits of the accusedseeking the application for examination of a witness before trial.

In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court has consistentlyruled that although the rules of procedure are intended topromote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and the swiftunclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, strictadherence to procedural rules must not be met at the expense ofsubstantial justice.22 In Coderias v. Estate of Juan CidocO,23the Supreme Court ruled, thus:

Wehave ruled time and again that litigants shouldhave the amplest opportunity for a proper and justdisposition of their cause - free, as much as possible,from the constraints of procedural technicalities. In theinterest of its equity jurisdiction, the Court m77

21 Emphasis supplied ,) #22 Zarsona Medical Clinic v. Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, 739 SCRA 169 (2014); ~ Iso~JEnriquez and Sia v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 544 SCRA590 (2008); Honda Cars Makati Inc. v. Court ofAppeals, 588 SCRA 209 (2008); Penoso v. Dona, 520 SCRA 232 (2007); Philippine Amusement and GamingCorporation v. Angara, 475 SCRA41 (2005); Aguam v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA784 (2000); and, Ginete v.Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA38 (1998)23699 SCRA684 (2013)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

disregard procedural lapses so that a case may beresolved on its merits. Rules of procedure shouldpromote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, theCourt may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolvesubstantial issues raised by the parties.

Rules of procedure ought not to be applied ina very rigid, technical sense, for they are adoptedto help secure, not override, substantial justice,and thereby defeat their very ends.24 Indeed, rules ofprocedure are mere tools designed to expedite theresolution of cases and other matters pending in court.A strict and rigid application of the rules that wouldresult in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather thanpromotejustice must be avoided.

In this case, the prosecution aptly notes that the presentmotion does not contain any supporting affidavit of the accused.However, the present motion is accompanied by a MedicalCertificate dated July 28, 2017, executed by Dr. Celina S.Torres-Jo. Therein, Dr. Torres-Jo attests that the intendedwitness Providencio Abragan, Sr., has been under her care sinceNovember 2016, for elevated blood pressure and shortness ofbreath, congestive heart failure, hypertensive heart disease andhypertension; that Abragan, Sr., has a recurring episode ofdifficulty in breathing; and, that the intended witness is alsodiagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in acuteexacerbation. According to Dr. Torres-Jo, Abragan, Sr., is not fitto travel because of the said medical conditions.25

Considering the afore-cited reasons given by Dr. Torres-Joexplaining the inability of Abragan, Sr. to travel, the Court findsthat the accused-movants have satisfactorily shown the need forthe conditional examination of their intended witness, Abragan,Sr. In other words, there is substantial compliance with theprocedural rules by the accused-movants. The Court take~

24 Emphasis supplied25 Ip. 153. Vol. II. Recoed ~ ~

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

liberal interpretation of the technical rules in favor of theaccused-movants to afford them the amplest opportunity for aproper, just and complete presentation of their case.

WHEREFORE, in the higher interest of substantial justice,the Court GRANTS accused Lawrence L. Cruz, Ruderic C.Marzo, Moises Dalisay, Jr., Marlene Young, Riza Jane P. Magaro,Jose L. Zalsos, Providencio A. Abragan, Jr., Ariel P. Anghay, RoyL. Openiano and Bayani C. Areola's ((Motionfor Leave to Allowthe Conditional Examination of Defense Witness ProvidencioAbragan, Sr., Before Trial" dated August 4, 2017.

Set the conditional examination of the intended defensewitness Providencio Abragan, Sr., on October 18, 2017 at 8:30in the morning and 2:00 in the afternoon before the ExecutiveJudge of the Regional Trial Court in the City of fligan.

:A.MPARO ~BO JE-Presiding JusticeChairperson

o R. FERNANDEZs iate Justice

A E T. FE ANDEZAssociate Justice