REPORT Reefer/ro-ro ship FJORD ICE – 9HDP7 Grounding on 14 September … · 2015-01-21 ·...

2004-11-30

REPORT

Reefer/ro-ro ship FJORD ICE – 9HDP7

Grounding on 14 September 2004

SWEDISH MARITIME SAFETY INSPECTORATE 2004-11-30 SE-601 78 NORRKÖPING Phone: +46 (0)11 19 10 00 Fax: +46 (0)11 23 99 34

REPORT

Reefer/ro-ro ship FJORD ICE - 9HDP7 – Grounding on 14 September 2004

Our reference: 080202-04-17008 Maritime Casualty Investigation Division

Jörgen Zachau, +46 (0)11 19 12 73

The report can also be read on our website:

www.sjofartsverket.se – In English > Maritime Safety Inspection > Marine Casualties & Near-Accidents > Casualty Reports

Photo: Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged

Reefer/ro-ro ship FJORD ICE - 9HDP7 – grounding on 14 September 2004

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Summary ........................................................................................................................... 2

Account of facts................................................................................................................. 3 The ship .............................................................................................................................. 3 The fairway......................................................................................................................... 7 Weather and currents .......................................................................................................... 8 Collection of facts............................................................................................................... 8

Sequence of events ............................................................................................................ 8 According to the master ...................................................................................................... 8 According to the chief officer ........................................................................................... 10 According to the 2nd officer ............................................................................................. 10 According to the boatswain .............................................................................................. 10 According to the chief engineer........................................................................................ 11 According to VÄSTANVIK ............................................................................................. 11

The occurrence at island Ven......................................................................................... 12

Analysis............................................................................................................................ 13 Rest hours ......................................................................................................................... 13 The occurrence at island Ven............................................................................................ 14 The grounding................................................................................................................... 14 Lone watchkeeper ............................................................................................................. 15 AIS and radio communication .......................................................................................... 15 The fairway....................................................................................................................... 16 Miscellaneous ................................................................................................................... 16

Causes and factors .......................................................................................................... 17

Observations.................................................................................................................... 17

Recommendations........................................................................................................... 17

Damage ............................................................................................................................ 18

Results of the investigation............................................................................................. 18

Encl. 1: Chart 921, extract 2 The near accident west of Ven, radar image Swedish Naval Forces Malmö 3 The grounding, radar image Swedish Naval Forces Malmö


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Summary

Just after 2300 on 14 September, after having caused a near accident earlier in the evening, FJORD ICE run aground south-east of the lighthouse Flintrännan NO, position 55º36'.8 N 012 º53'.6 E (see enclosure). The grounding was preceded by the ship being positioned too far to port side in the fairway and when encountering another ship just before the grounding she turned even further to port and thus worsened the situation.

Relatively strong current may have influenced the situation. The master was alone on the bridge until just before the grounding, when the helms-man came to the bridge; no system with a designated look-out was applied on board.

By means of the AIS (Automatic Identification System) of the Swedish Maritime Administration and radar tracks from Swedish Naval Forces Malmö it has been possible to make an accurate reconstruction of the course of events.


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Account of facts

The ship

Name: FJORD ICE

IMO No.: 8 008 814

Call sign: 9HDP7

Port of registry: Valletta, Malta

Shipowner: Fjord Cooler Ltd, Valletta, Malta

Operator: Fjord Shipping A/S, Norge

Gross weight: 2 753

Dead weight (summer):

2 706 tons

Length over all: 74.75 m

Breadth: 14.20 m

Draught: F=5.0 m A=5.4 m (at departure)

Classification: DNV

P&I: Gard

Year built: 1982

Construction material:

Steel

Engine power: 2 134 kW

Crew: 14 (safe manning 11)


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FJORD ICE was built in 1982 at Astilleros de Atlantico, Santander, Spain, originally equipped with a stern ramp and refrigeration capacity. She has previously gone under the names LOEN STREAM, FRIO INDIANIC, EVEREST, QUASAR and EL SEPTIMO.

The main engine was a 12 cylinder Wärtsilä diesel No 3549. FJORD ICE was equipped with a pitch propeller. There were three auxiliary engines of make Cummins Kta19 G2. Normally two of those were in operation when the ship was running. There was no shaft generator.

Since two years she was equipped with a bow thruster of make Brunvoll No. 3139, type SPT-VP, with a capacity of 345 kW.

She was a ro-ro ship with a stern ramp. The engine room was thus located under the cargo hold far abaft. The superstructure was also in the aft and contained crew areas and navigation bridge, among other things. On the weather deck forward of the superstructure there were two derricks (SWL 3.3 tons) and hatches. This arrangement was not original but a later addition.

The equipment on the bridge comprised inter alia two radar equipments, Racal-Decca BT502 (3 cm) and Furuno 21" FR 2115 (10 cm); in addition there were two GPS devices, Furuno GP 30 (connected to the radar) and KODEN KGP 98 (in the chart cabin). Both were set at geodesic date WGS-84.

Furthermore there were one electronic chart MaxSea 7.3 (connected to the GPS Furuno), one automatic steering control C. Plath Navigat III DHI-05G and one Furuno Universal AIS FA-1001 (connected neither to the radar nor to the electronic chart, i.e. stand-alone type). The positions given on the electronic chart could be set by the operator and was said to have been set to mark a position every hour. The AIS could show either a list of targets with data in rows showing name, distance and bearing with the closest target on top in a sliding scale, or a circular picture with the own ship in the centre showing the course over ground of all targets (including own ship), pictured to scale with distance and bearing, i.e. like a true motion

1 AIS signal receiver. AIS: Automatic Identification System, a communication system which transmits certain data from a ship to receivers within reach.


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picture but without tracks or speed vector. The scale could be set as desired.

The bridge was of conventional type with traditional wings. The central conning position was to starboard where the electronic chart and the 10 cm radar were located. Abaft to starboard was the chart room, from which the visibility forward was very limited. Also the visibility to aft was very limited from the bridge, in practice one had to go out on the bridge wing to get a view to the aft.

The cargo space consisted of three decks, all of which ran through the whole ship. Normally the cargo was handled via the hatches and by the ship’s cranes but from time to time this was done via the stern ramp and a land based crane. Usually the cargo consisted of frozen fish, loaded in Norway, Scotland, in the Shetland Islands or Iceland and unloaded in some Baltic port.

FJORD ICE generally passed the Sound through Flintrännan if loaded, and through Drogden if ballasted. Thus she passed the Sound 4–5 times per month. This specific voyage was from Klaksvik, the Faeroe Islands, to Klaipeda, Lithuania with frozen fish. On the occasion the British charts BA 2594 and BA 903 were used, geodesic date WGS-84. A thorough plan had been made up for the voyage. According to the plan WP2 11 was west of the island of Ven, WP 12 a little less than 2.5 M south of Pinhättan and WP 13 just east of the buoy Flintrännan No. 1.

The company’s working instruction showed that when sailing in narrow passages and in darkness at least two people should be on the bridge. The company policy also is said to explicitly forbid use of alcohol on board.

Port state controls: FJORD ICE has been subject to a number of port state controls in the last years. None of these has caused a detention. The latest control was carried out at Florö, Norway, on 10 August, 2004, and showed no deficiency.

The watch system: On board FJORD ICE a traditional three-watch system was applied with relief every fourth hour with the 2nd officer as the first

2 WP: ”waypoint”, position for course change.


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watch of the day 00–04, followed by the chief officer 04–08 and the master 08–12, etc.

Also in the engine room a continuous watch system was applied. The chief engineer had his watch hours 8–12 and 20–24.

The deck crew was working daytime and was on watch duty only in extra-ordinary cases, e.g. in narrow fairways and at poor visibility.

The crew: According to the safe manning regulation of the flag state FJORD ICE shall have a minimum of 11 crew members for the trade in question. On the present voyage there were 14 crew members, all of which were Ukrainian nationals. The ship was duly manned.

The master had been at sea for 23 years, and a master since December 2000, when he signed on FJORD ICE. He worked a rota system of 5 months on and 5 months off. This turn had been going on since mid May. He got his Master Mariner license 8 years ago.

The helmsman had been at sea for 22 years and was signed on as boatswain.

The master’s rest hours: In the 24-hour periods preceding the grounding the master’s work and rest hours were as follows:

0000 – 0700 Rest 0800 – 1200 Watch 1200 – 1300 Lunch and short rest 1300 – 1600 Paper work 1600 – 1930 Rest 2000 – 2400 Watch

0100 – 0700 Rest 0800 – 1200 Watch 1200 – 1300 Lunch and short rest 1300 – 1430 Paper work. Bad weather 1500 – 1800 Now and then on the bridge 1830 – 1930 Rest 2000 – 2400 Watch


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0000 – 0700 Rest 0800 – 1200 Watch 1200 – 1300 Lunch and short rest 1300 – 1700 Paper work preparing arrival 1700 – 1900 Dinner and short rest 1900 – On the bridge for passage through the Sound

Employment conditions of the crew: Overtime work of 103 h/month was included in the basic salary, i.e. overtime was not payable until additional hours were made. Regular working hours were 8 h/day, i.e. 56 hours per week.

The fairway

When going south in the Sound to pass through Flintrännan and under the Öresund bridge one needs to steer a course of 140–145º until the east sparbuoy Sjollen is passed. Then 1.1 M (nautical mile, 1 852 m) remains, abt. 7 minutes at 10 knots speed, until a new course 221º through Flint-rännan shall be steered. In order to facilitate meetings there are instructions in the chart about traffic separation, the intention of which is to make northbound ships south of the buoy Malmö Redd to go 0.5 M further to south-east.

After course alteration the first lighthouse to port, Flintrännan NO on the south-east side, is 2.5 M away (15 minutes at 10 knots speed). Just south-east of the lighthouse is the ground Kalkgrundet. The lighthouse shows green light if the approaching ship is close to the north-west side of the fairway, or white in case the ship is slightly further to the south-east. The following lighthouses to port, the south-east side, show red light.

Between the waypoint and Flintrännan NO two green buoys are passed on the starboard side, to the north-west. Like these, the lighthouses following to starboard (to the north-west), show green light. These lighthouses stand in pairs with red lights to port (to the south-east) in the remaining part of Flintrännan, starting 1.1 M after passing Flintrännan NO. The fairway then makes an obvious road with green lighthouses to starboard and red ones to port, with the exception of Flintrännan NO.

Flintrännan NO, as also the Öresund bridge slightly further to the south-east in the fairway, are equipped with racon signals, i.e. a distinct Morse signal in the shape of a dotted lineis, visible on the radar screen.


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Weather and currents

On the occasion (2300–2400) the visibility was good and the wind moderate, 6–10 m/s (5 B) from SSW. Data on the current are obtained from the measuring buoy in Oljehamnsleden, abt. 1 M north-west of the waypoint. According to those data the current was slight. However, according to statements made by pilot and boatman in Malmö the conditions at the measuring buoy do not correspond to those in Flint-rännan, especially not at flood (current going south) as was the case at the event. Information from an approaching ship, heading north-east in Flint-rännan, stating that there was countercurrent of just under 2 knots, can thus be considered confirmed. The Swedish Coast Guard ship 048 states that the wind was SW 10–12 m/s (6 B) and the current was north-east, abt. 1 knot at around 0330, i.e. the current had changed direction after the grounding.

Collection of facts

Interviews with the ship’s crew (master, chief officer, 2nd officer, helmsman and chief engineer).

Interviews with the master and 2nd officer of VÄSTANVIK. Testimonies from OCEAN PRINCESS via authorities in Latvia.

Information from the ship and from the company.

Information from the Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Police, the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Malmö, Malmö VTS, Furuno, radar tracks from the Swedish Naval Forces, Malmö, tracks from the AIS of the Swedish Maritime Administration, data on currents from the Port of Malmö. Interviews with the pilot in question and the surveyor of the Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate. Statements from pilot and boatman in Malmö.

Sequence of events

According to the master

The chief officer had been on watch 1600–2000 and after having had his dinner the master came to the bridge at about 1900 when the narrow part of


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the Sound was to be passed. The master reckoned to be on the bridge until 0100 or 0200. After midnight the 2nd officer would come to assist him.

The radar and the electronic chart were well organized on the bridge. The function of the GPS was excellent, not even in Norway with high mountains surrounding did the system fail. The radar to starboard (10 cm) was the one most used, since the other one was not considered satisfactory. The speed was abt. 11.5 knots.

There were some fishing-nets and a few small boats around, but not much traffic as to the rest. The visibility was good, the wind abt. 6 B (11–13 m/s) and it was no problem for the master to be alone on the bridge, which he was except for some visit to the WC (at which the bridge was left unmanned).

At 2215 the WP 12 to the south-west of Barsebäck was passed. The position was marked in the chart and a change to chart BA 903 was made.

The boatswain had been asked to finish his work some hour earlier in the afternoon since he would be helmsman when passing Flintrännan. The master planned to wake him up around 2230, which he also did. Thus the boatswain came to the bridge after a checking round on deck at the time.

At 2243 the next waypoint was passed, WP 13. The master first altered the course and then marked the position on the chart. The new course was 223º. The course alteration was made by the master himself by means of the automatic steering. FJORD ICE came to pass close to the green buoy Flintrännan No. 3 (just south-west of Flintrännan No. 1).

There were a lot of lights from ashore and the master therefore did not notice a ship that came off the fairway to cross it from the west. On the AIS he could see bearing and distance to the ship but not its identity. The master called the ship: ”Ship on my starboard side, please change your course”; afterwards he changed to manual steering at which both steering engines were running. It all happened quickly and the master did not wait for an answer. Since there was not space enough on the starboard side he chose to turn to port to avoid a collision. The turn was not completed to a full turn, but the master let go back to starboard. Soon after an alarm came from the engine (overload), the speed was 0 and the ship was thus grounded. The time was then abt. 2310.


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Then the general alarm was activated and a check-up of the cargo holds and the engine room was started immediately. Soundings were made, and the company was contacted.

The master did not navigate by means of a single light, but used also radar and electronic charts. All lights were as expected. He is not completely sure, but thinks that the course steered was 223–224º. The master altered the course as needed. His belief is that he misjudged the current just after the turn at the waypoint which initiated the course to Flintrännan.

According to the chief officer

The chief officer was on watch duty 1600–2000, except when he was relieved by the 2nd officer for dinner at abt. 1800. Then he went to his cabin, read a book, went to the mess-room and other usual things. He fell asleep at about 2300, but was awakened by the general alarm and went to the bridge. Earlier in the evening nothing unusual had happened.

According to the 2nd officer

The 2nd officer went off duty at 1600 and went for a stroll. At 1800 he was on the bridge to relieve the chief officer for his meal, 15–20 minutes. He then went to watch TV for a couple of hours. Abt. 2000 he took a shower and rested. Nothing unusual happened before the grounding – it was quite an ordinary evening.

This strait had been passed many times, it was the regular route of the ship. Both GPS devices were in good working order.

The 2nd officer came to the bridge after the grounding and found the boatswain at the helm and the master at the instruments on the starboard side.

According to the boatswain

On board FJORD ICE the boatswain was working only in daytime. When he came up to the bridge after his checking round on deck, abt. 2230 or just after, the automatic steering was activated. He checked the magnet compass and the course steered, the steering engines and the automatics. It was all OK. On the bridge everything was as usual.


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After a while, 15–30 minutes, the master ordered manual steering and the boatswain carried out the order. Thus both steering engines were running. Immediately after came the order “helm hard aport”. Then the order was “steady as she goes” and some second after “hard astarboard”.

The boatswain cannot remember that the master made a radio call, neither what course the ship held when he came up to the bridge. His duty was to steer, and that is what he concentrated upon.

However he remembers that there were many disturbing lights.

According to the chief engineer

The chief engineer was on watch duty 2000–2400. The main engine and two auxiliary engines were in operation. Everything was running smoothly and quite normal. At abt. 2300 he heard changes in the sound of the main engine and the ship was running aground.

He had 24 years at sea, 4 of which on board FJORD ICE.

According to VÄSTANVIK

VÄSTANVIK was northbound through Flintrännan, planning to turn to starboard towards Limhamn just at the north-eastern end of the fairway. The weather was fine with good visibility and moderate wind. In Flintrännan she met NORDÖ LINK, which had recently left Malmö for Travemünde. VÄSTANVIK kept far to starboard in the fairway because of the meeting, which caused no problem. The AB on watch duty was on the forecastle to prepare for the arrival. On the bridge were also the master and 2nd officer. Everything appeared to be quite normal.

From the north came another ship, which for a while seemed to go towards Malmö. As VÄSTANVIK had come closer to Flintrännan NO, which she would round by the course alteration to starboard towards Limhamn, the approaching ship ahead of VÄSTANVIK was on the “wrong side” of the fairway. For this reason VÄSTANVIK went as close as possible to Flintrännan NO. It was then noticed that the current was quite strong, nearly 2 knots, setting south-east. The distance to the oncoming ship, which did abt. 11 knots, was abt. 1.5 M. The course of VÄSTANVIK was abt. 060º and that of the oncoming ship abt. 227º. VÄSTANVIK passed Flintrännan NO and started her turn to starboard. The oncoming ship then


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turned to port side, towards VÄSTANVIK so therefore VÄSTANVIK reduced her turning radius from the normal 1.0 M in order to get quicker onto her new course. The oncoming ship then turned back, as if to get back to her correct course, but too far to south-east. After the quick turn VÄSTANVIK made the course steady and the crew saw that the oncoming ship would run aground, but it was too late to take action. VÄSTANVIK called on the VTS, at first a couple of times without getting an answer, then made a third call which was answered. Information was sent to the VTS that a ship probably had grounded. The VTS then called the oncoming ship. The person on the oncoming ship who answered the call sounded calm and matter-of-fact.

On board VÄSTANVIK it was estimated that the shortest distance between the ships had been 0.1 M. That was when VÄSTANVIK had already passed the course line of the oncoming ship. No radio contact was established between the ships. The master of VÄSTANVIK sometimes avoid taking contact with other ships since an answer is rarely given. There was no other traffic in the area.

VÄSTANVIK was equipped with an electronic chart of make Adveto. The situation has been studied on board afterwards. An AIS was connected to the electronic chart. That means that the data of the AIS could be seen directly on the screen connected to the electronic chart.

The occurrence at island Ven

Earlier in the evening FJORD ICE passed east of Ven. Almost straight to the west of the lighthouse Ven was WP 11, which was reached at 2052 according to notes on the chart. Following the voyage plan a course alteration to port, i.e. towards Flintrännan, should have been made. Instead FJORD ICE continued on unaltered course abt. 1.4 M, i.e. abt. 8–9 min. After that the ship turned hard to port, almost straight to the east, and hence came on collision course with the tanker OCEAN PRINCESS of 82 000 ton dead weight, also heading south. According to statement of the master of OCEAN PRINCESS, who carried a Danish pilot, attempts were made to contact FJORD ICE on the radio but in vain. About 4 minutes after the previous turn FJORD ICE turned again, this time to starboard, away from OCEAN PRINCESS. Simultaneously OCEAN PRINCESS took an evasive manoeuvre, away from FJORD ICE. From the radar images of the Swedish


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Naval Forces, which depicts the event, one can estimate the shortest distance between the ships to be 0.05 M, i.e. abt. 100 m.

FJORD ICE completed the starboard turn all around and then set course for Flintrännan.

The master of FJORD ICE stated that he was alone on the bridge during his watch until the boatswain came up to steer through Flintrännan. When asked he answered that nothing special or unusual had happened in the evening. When shown the radar images displaying the occurrence he could not account for it. He gave a few possible explanations, but did not really acknowledge the situation. Not until later he said that he “remembered a ship”.

On the following day only the planned voyage positions were marked on the ship’s chart. Thus the actual positions were not marked. On the other hand there were remains from earlier positions which had been erased. These may correspond to what really happened according to the radar and AIS images. The master admitted that the positions on the chart may have been altered after the occurrence.

Analysis

Rest hours

During the latest three 24-hour periods the master had in fact had the rest hours dictated by the regulations, i.e. a minimum of 10 out of 24 hours. His rest hours, however, were split up in several occasions and not limited to a maximum of two, as dictated by the regulations (Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code, STCW A-VIII/1). This fact may have caused that the master was fatigued. Surely he could have rested in the most recovering hours of the night, (from midnight till breakfast) before he went on his watch duty again at 0800, but since he had been on board for abt. 4 months and the night rest hours at times probably had been interrupted by work, it is possible that this has been fatiguing. There is no reason to presume that the 24 hour periods just before the grounding should be exceptions, but this pattern has probably been the regular on board the ship for a long period of time. Research findings show that such long periods with working hours up to 14 hours per day is fatiguing and can be so without the individual really being aware.


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When asked the master could not or did not want to show the rest hour journals. The investigator thus got the impression that the journal routines have been indulgent up to the occurrence.

The occurrence at island Ven

The master could not or did not want to tell what happened west of Ven. Neither could he or did he want to tell if a deviation alarm sounded when FJORD ICE passed WP 11. It is not likely that he would not remember a near accident with a big tanker, but on the other hand it might be possible, since the factual grounding later on may have caused other incidents to seem insignificant to him.

The reason why FJORD ICE did not turn as planned can thus not be stated with certainty. It might be so that the master had dropped off, but also that he might have been busy with some other business during the minutes the ship continued on her original course. There may have been a phone call, chart work, paperwork or similar. No matter the reason, when he realized the deviation he made a hard turn to get back to the track instead of setting a new course towards the next waypoint. This turn was made without checking the traffic in the immediate area and led to the near accident with OCEAN PRINCESS (International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, COLREG, rules 5 and 8).

The grounding

According to information from VÄSTANVIK inter alia, there was at the time strong current to the south. Such current has of course brought FJORD ICE to the south and would have required a greater course altera-tion at the turn at the buoy Flintrännan No. 1 than what was in fact made. It is probably so that the course alteration would have been sufficient in case of no current, but a southward current of 1–2 knots was strong enough to get FJORD ICE out of course so that a continued turn would have been necessary.

Furthermore, the tracks from the radar and AIS clearly show that FJORD ICE already when rounding the buoy Flintrännan No. 1 had come too far to the south-east. This unfavourable position was never adjusted, and FJORD ICE continuously headed in a direction which in practice meant that she was on the right course but off the intended track. Thus FJORD ICE did not lie tight to starboard in the fairway, as stated by the master.


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The oncoming ship, VÄSTANVIK, approached in the fairway and not from the west, as claimed by the master of FJORD ICE. A meeting would not have caused any problem. Instead the meeting took place starboard to starboard, and contrary to regulations in force the master of FJORD ICE turned to port instead of starboard (rule 14). He claimed that the reason was that FJORD ICE was so close to the starboard side of the fairway that his ship would then have got outside the fairway. This was not the case.

Lone watchkeeper

Contrary to the practice and standing order of the company as well as regulation in force (rule 5 and STCW A-VIII/2 part 3-1 13) there was no look-out on the bridge. An active look-out, in addition to the master, could no doubt have prevented the occurrence off Ven as well as the grounding at Flintrännan.

AIS and radio communication

All ships involved in the two situations were equipped with AIS. In spite of this fact no communication was established between the ships. OCEAN PRINCESS claim to have made efforts in vain. This has not been con-firmed, nor is it known whether OCEAN PRINCESS did make use of information from the AIS for the call.

The master of FJORD ICE claims to have called upon the oncoming ship when FJORD ICE approached Flintrännan, without getting an answer. A check-up of tape recordings from the time period shows that no such call was made.

On both occasions an efficient communication would easily have prevented the occurrences. To achieve an efficient communication one needs to know to whom one speaks, so that the person in question realizes that he is the person sought. In this respect the AIS is an excellent tool since it shows name and call sign of other ships. Unfortunately FJORD ICE carried an AIS display of stand-alone type, i.e. it was not connected to radar equipment nor to electronic charts. Thus several screens must be watched to display relevant facts, which eliminates one of the most important advantages of the AIS. In addition one has to be foresighted enough to have exactly the AIS presentation displayed that gives the best view of direction and distance. The best way to make use of the advantages


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of AIS in stressful situations is to have it connected to the radar, which in fact is the main instrument for navigation.

The fairway

At the north-easterly entrance of Flintrännan towards the south-west a number of caisson lighthouses are located in pairs. Those on the north-western side, to starboard, show green lights whereas the opposite ones show red lights. An exception is the lighthouse Flintrännan NO, located to the south-east of the fairway, just before the lighthouses in pairs. Flintrännan NO, which must be passed on the north-western side, shows white light in bearing (calculated towards the lighthouse) 217º–274º, red 274º–146º and green 146º–217º. A check-up of the borderline between the white and the green sector has established that there is no interference in the lights.

During this investigation it has been discussed whether it is suitable that Flintrännan NO under certain circumstances shows green light in spite of the fact that the lighthouse is on the port side of south-west bound ships. The very clear buoyage of the fairway as to the rest, in combination with the racon signals from Flintrännan NO and the Öresund bridge, should fulfil the requirements from the navigation point of view. The sectorization serves a purpose in other aspects. To remove it could lead to difficulties in such cases.

Miscellaneous

There are reasons to assume that the master has been incommunicative and unwilling to tell what really happened. This has been of disadvantage to the investigation.

However, the results of the analysis show that the ship was run in an almost negligent and indulgent manner. It has not been possible to establish a reason for this. Nothing in the investigation material indicates that the master of FJORD ICE was drunk or under the influence of any other drug.

No doubt did the master fail in checking the navigation (rules 5 and 7).


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Causes and factors

• The immediate cause for the grounding was that the master had not checked the navigation satisfactorily.

• The strong southward current, confirmed by witnesses, had a negative impact on the course of events.

• There was no look-out on the bridge.

• It is probable that fatigue contributed to the events.

• The AIS was not connected to the radar which means that the conditions for communication was not optimized.

Observations

Obviously the master of FJORD ICE did not have full control of the situation around the ship and her location in the fairway.

The master of FJORD ICE was lone watch-keeper on the bridge. Consistently and contrary to regulations in force and the instructions of the shipowner one had in practice abolished a look-out.

Recommendations

• A continuous control of the ship’s navigation, her position and surrounding traffic is important.

• The shipowner of FJORD ICE should ensure that the regulations in force are complied with as regards look-out.

• The shipowner of FJORD ICE should ensure that routines and rules as regards rest hours on board are complied with.

• The rules concerning AIS should be altered in order to achieve highest possible safety. Such an alteration should at least include the possibility for the officers to integrate the AIS with the radar equipment.


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Damage

The bow-thruster room and the double bottom tanks 1 and 3 to port got extensive damage. Double bottom tanks 2 and 4 got minor damage. Early in the morning of 16 September the ship mainly got afloat by herself and was anchored near the grounding site. Then she went by her own engines and with assistance of a tug-boat to berth in Malmö, where she was examined by divers. FJORD ICE was then permitted to go to Fredericia for repair. In all abt. 20 tons of bottom plates were exchanged.

Results of the investigation

• The master of FJORD ICE did not have complete control of the navigation of the ship.

• FJORD ICE got too far to port after the turn towards Flintrännan.

• The strong current contributed to the fact that the ship did not lie right in the fairway.

• FJORD ICE turned to port at the meeting with VÄSTANVIK and thereby her deviation from the intended track increased.

• On board FJORD ICE no system with designated look-out was applied contrary to regulations in force and the shipowner’s instructions.

• The master did not fully comply with the rest hour regulations.

• By contact by VHF the near accident situation before the grounding as well as the grounding itself could have been avoided.

• AIS of ”stand alone” type does not optimize the safety level.


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