REPORT of the EFTA Court

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1

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REPORT of the EFTA Court

2014Book 3

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2014

Concept and Design: Tuuli Sauren, INSPIRIT International Communications, Brussels, Belgium

Reproduction is authorised, provided that the source is acknowledged. The recommended mode of citation is as follows: the case number, the names of the parties in the form used in the heading of the pages of the Report, the year (in square brackets) and title of the Report (EFTA Court Report), the page number.


2014

www.eftacourt.int

Concept and Design: Tuuli Sauren, INSPIRIT International Communications, Brussels, Belgium

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Photo: © Rob Schiltz

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

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ContentsForeword

I DECISIONS OF THE COURT

Case E-1/13, Míla v EFTA Surveillance Authority

– Summary 4

– Judgment, 27 January 2014 6

– Report for the hearing 30

Case E-12/13, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland

– Summary 58

– Judgment, 11 February 2014 60

Case E-23/13, Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)

– Summary 88

– Judgment, 9 May 2014 89

– Report for the Hearing 114

Case E-8/12, DB Schenker v EFTA Surveillance Authority

– Summary 148

– Order of the Court, 12 May 2014 151


Case E-26/13, The Icelandic State v Atli Gunnarsson

– Summary 254

– Judgment, 27 June 2014 256



– Summary 304

– Judgment, 7 July 2014 306


I

66

Joined Cases E-3/13 and E-20/13, Fred. Olsen and Others and Petter Olsen and Others v The Norwegian State, represented by the Central Tax Office for Large Enterprises and the Directorate of Taxes

– Summary 400

– Judgment, 9 July 2014 402


Case E-25/13, Gunnar V. Engilbersson v Íslandsbanki hf.

– Summary 524

– Judgment, 28 August 2014 526


Case E-15/10 COSTS, DB Schenker v Posten Norge AS

– Summary 616

– Order of the Court, 28 August 2014 618

Case E-8/13, Abelia v EFTA Surveillance Authority

– Summary 638

– Order of the Court, 29 August 2014 640

– Order of the President, 3 February 2014 663


Case E-24/13, Casino Admiral AG v Wolfgang Egger

– Summary 732

– Judgment, 29 August 2014 735



– Summary 802

– Judgment, 24 September 2014 803

Case E-3/14, EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway

– Summary 812


II

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

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– Summary 822



– Summary 830



– Summary 840


Case E-21/13, FIFA v EFTA Surveillance Authority

– Summary 854

– Judgment, 3 October 2014 856


Joined Cases E-4/12 and E-5/12 COSTS, EFTA Surveillance Authority v

Risdal Touring AS and Konkurrenten.no AS

– Summary 934

– Order of the Court, 14 October 2014 936

Case E-28/13, LBI hf. v Merrill Lynch Int. Ltd.

– Summary 970

– Judgment, 17 October 2014 972



– Summary 1018

– Judgment, 10 November 2014 1019


– Summary 1028



– Summary 1038


IIIContents

Case E-9/14, Proceedings concerning Otto Kaufmann AG

– Summary 1048



Case E-27/13, Sævar Jón Gunnarsson v Landsbankinn hf.

– Summary 1090




– Summary 1180

– Order of the Court, 25 November 2014 1182

– Order of the President, 30 April 2013 1202

– Order of the President, 30 May 2013 1211


Case E-18/14, Wow Air ehf. v The Competition Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið), Isavia ohf. and Icelandair ehf.

– Summary 1304

– Judgment, 10 December 2014 1305

– Order of the President, 30 September 2014 1330


Case E-10/14, Enes Deveci and Others v SAS Denmark, Norway, Sweden

– Summary 1364

– Judgment, 18 December 2014 1366


II ADMINISTRATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE COURT 1412

III JUDGES AND STAFF 1415

IV LIST OF COURT DECISIONS PUBLISHED IN THE EFTA COURT REPORTS 1423

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IV

Book 1

I. Decisions of the Court

Book 2

I

Book 3

case23_E_9_14final.indd 2 3/22/15 11:05 AM

Book 3

Case E-9/14Proceedings concerning

Otto Kaufmann AG


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Case E-9/14 Proceedings concerning Otto Kaufmann AG

CASE E-9/14Proceedings concerning Otto Kaufmann AG

(Admissibility - Exchange of information on convictions of legal persons - Freedom to provide services - Freedom of establishment - Directive 2004/18/EC

- Directive 2006/123/EC)

Judgment of the Court, 10 November 2014 ................................................. 1049

Report for the Hearing ................................................................................ 1066

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Princely Court of

Liechtenstein, who maintains the

Liechtenstein criminal record, asked

the Court whether EEA law requires

that where legal persons are convicted

by a criminal court, those convictions

must also be clearly recorded, for

example in a criminal record.

2. The Princely Court performs a

judicial function within the meaning

of Article 34 SCA in proceedings

concerning entries of convictions on a

criminal record. Although the convicted

legal person is a Liechtenstein

company, an interpretation of EEA law

is useful since the national law at issue

is capable of producing effects which

are not confined to one EEA State. The

request was therefore admissible.

3. An obligation to record convictions

of legal persons does not follow from

Articles 31 or 36 EEA. Neither do

Directives 2004/18/EC or 2006/123/

EC require an EEA State to enter

sanctions imposed by courts on legal

persons into the criminal record. The

directives may nonetheless require

an EEA State to provide information

upon request from another EEA State,

about convictions relevant to the

competence and professional reliability

of legal persons. The framework for

the maintenance and handling of such

information is a matter for national law.

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CASE E-9/14

Summary

RECHTSSACHE E-9/14Otto Kaufmann AG

(Zulässigkeit – Informationsaustausch über die Verurteilung juristischer Personen – Freier Dienstleistungsverkehr – Niederlassungsrecht – Richtlinie 2004/18/EG –

Richtlinie 2006/123/EG)

Urteil des Gerichtshofs, 10. November 2014 ............................................... 1049

Sitzungsbericht .......................................................................................... 1066

Zusammenfassung des Urteils

1. Das Fürstliche Landgericht, dem die Führung des liechtensteinischen Strafregisters obliegt, hat an den Gerichtshof die Frage gerichtet, ob dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen auch evident gehalten werden müssen, etwa im Wege eines Strafregisters.

2. Das Fürstliche Landgericht übt in Verfahren über die Eintragung von Verurteilungen in das liechtensteinische Strafregister eine Tätigkeit mit Rechtsprechungscharakter im Sinne von Artikel 34 ÜGA aus. Obwohl die verurteilte juristische Person ein liechtensteinisches Unternehmen war, ist die Auslegung des EWR-Rechts von Nutzen, da die nationale Gesetzgebung Wirkungen entfallen kann, die sich nicht auf einen einzelnen EWR-

Staat beschränken. Die Vorlage wurde daher für zulässig befunden.

3. Eine Verpflichtung strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen in ein Register aufzunehmen, folgt weder aus Artikel 31 noch aus Artikel 36 EWR-Abkommen. Auch ist es weder nach der Richtlinie 2004/81/EG noch nach der Richtlinie 2006/123/EG verlangt, dass ein EWR-Staat strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen gegen juristische Personen in ein Strafregister einträgt. Gleichwohl können es die Richtlinien erfordern, dass ein EWR-Staat auf Anfrage eines anderen EWR-Staats Auskünfte über Verurteilungen, die für die Kompetenz und berufliche Zuverlässigkeit juristischer Personen relevant sind, erteilt. Die Schaffung des Rahmens für die Erfassung und Verwaltung solcher Informationen ist Sache des nationalen Rechts.

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

10 November 2014

(Admissibility – Exchange of information on convictions of legal persons – Freedom to provide services – Freedom of establishment – Directive 2004/18/EC – Directive

2006/123/EC)

In Case E-9/14,

Otto Kaufmann AG

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by the Princely Court of Liechtenstein (Fürstliches Landgericht des Fürstentums Liechtenstein) on the interpretation of EEA law with regard to the recording of criminal convictions of legal persons,

THE COURT

composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President, Per Christiansen (Judge-Rapporteur) and Páll Hreinsson, Judges,

Registrar: Gunnar Selvik,

having regard to the written observations of the Liechtenstein Government, represented by Dr Andrea Entner-Koch, Director, and Thomas Bischof, Deputy Director, EEA Coordination Unit, acting as Agents; the Netherlands Government, represented by Mielle Bulterman, Head, and Charlotte Schillemans, Staff Member, European Law Division, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agents; the Norwegian Government, represented by Torje Sunde, advokat, Office of the Attorney General (Civil Affairs), and Ingunn Skille Jansen, Senior Advisor, Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agents; the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”), represented by Xavier Lewis, Director, and Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Temporary Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents; and the European Commission (“the Commission”), represented by Adrián Tokár and Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Members of its Legal Service, acting as Agents,

having regard to the Report for the Hearing,

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CASE E-9/14

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URTEIL DES GERICHTSHOFS

10. November 2014

(Zulässigkeit – Informationsaustausch über die Verurteilung juristischer Personen – Freier Dienstleistungsverkehr – Niederlassungsrecht – Richtlinie 2004/18/EG –

Richtlinie 2006/123/EG)

In der Rechtssache E-9/14,

Otto Kaufmann AG

ANTRAG des Fürstlichen Landgerichts des Fürstentums Liechtenstein an den Gerichtshof gemäss Artikel 34 des Abkommens der EFTA-Staaten über die Errichtung einer EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde und eines EFTA-Gerichtshofs betreffend die Auslegung des EWR-Rechts im Zusammenhang mit der Evidenthaltung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen juristischer Personen, erlässt

DER GERICHTSHOF

bestehend aus Carl Baudenbacher, Präsident, Per Christiansen (Berichterstatter) und Páll Hreinsson, Richter,

Kanzler: Gunnar Selvik,

unter Berücksichtigung der schriftlichen Erklärungen der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, vertreten durch Dr. Andrea Entner-Koch, Leiterin, und Thomas Bischof, Stv. Leiter, Stabsstelle EWR, als Bevollmächtigte; der Regierung der Niederlande, vertreten durch Mielle Bulterman, Leiterin, und Charlotte Schillemans, Mitarbeiterin, Sektion Europarecht der Rechtsabteilung des Aussenministeriums, als Bevollmächtigte; der Regierung Norwegens, vertreten durch Torje Sunde, Advokat, Amt des Regierungsadvokaten (Zivilsachen), und Ingunn Skille Jansen, Chefberaterin, Rechtsabteilung des Aussenministeriums, als Bevollmächtigte; der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, vertreten durch Xavier Lewis, Direktor, und Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Beamtin, Abteilung Rechts- und Verwaltungsangelegenheiten, als Bevollmächtigte, und der Europäischen Kommission (im Folgenden: Kommission), vertreten durch Adrián Tokár und Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Mitarbeiter des Juristischen Dienstes der Kommission, als Bevollmächtigte,

unter Berücksichtigung des Sitzungsberichts,

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having heard oral argument of the Liechtenstein Government, represented by Thomas Bischof; ESA, represented by Janne Tysnes Kaasin and Xavier Lewis; and the Commission, represented by Adrián Tokár, at the hearing on 1 October 2014,

gives the following

JUDGMENT

I FACTS AND PROCEDURE

1 By judgment of 23 January 2014, the Princely Court of Liechtenstein (“the Princely Court”) convicted Otto Kaufmann AG, a company registered in Liechtenstein, for failing to transfer employee and employer contributions to an occupational pension scheme. Otto Kaufmann AG was sentenced to a fine of CHF 700. The judgment was sent for registration onto the criminal record to the designated judge of the Princely Court who maintains the Liechtenstein criminal record.

2 The designated judge invited the public prosecutor’s office to submit observations on whether to enter the conviction of Otto Kaufmann AG onto the record. The prosecutor’s office opposed the entry of the conviction on the criminal record on the basis that Otto Kaufmann AG is not a natural person.

3 By letter registered at the Court on 25 March 2014, the Princely Court made a request for an advisory opinion on the following question:

Does the EEA Agreement, in particular the provisions on the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment and/or individual acts of secondary law (for example, Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts or Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, which have both been incorporated into EEA law), require that where national law allows for legal persons to be

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nach Anhörung der mündlichen Ausführungen der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, vertreten durch Thomas Bischof; der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, vertreten durch Janne Tysnes Kaasin und Xavier Lewis, und der Kommission, vertreten durch Adrián Tokár, in der Sitzung vom 1. Oktober 2014,

folgendes

URTEIL

I SACHVERHALT UND VERFAHREN

1 Mit Urteil des Fürstlichen Landgerichts des Fürstentums Liechtenstein (im Folgenden: Fürstliches Landgericht) vom 23. Januar 2014 wurde die Otto Kaufmann AG, ein in Liechtenstein eingetragenes Unternehmen, verurteilt, weil sie es versäumte, Arbeitnehmer- und Arbeitgeberbeiträge zur betrieblichen Pensionsvorsorge an eine Vorsorgestiftung abzuführen. Über die Otto Kaufmann AG wurde eine Geldstrafe in Höhe von CHF 700 verhängt. Das Urteil wurde zur Eintragung in das Strafregister an den für die Führung des liechtensteinischen Strafregisters zuständigen Landrichter des Fürstlichen Landgerichts übermittelt.

2 Der zuständige Landrichter ersuchte die Staatsanwaltschaft um Stellungnahme hinsichtlich der Eintragung der Verurteilung der Otto Kaufmann AG in das Strafregister. Die Staatsanwaltschaft trat der Eintragung der Verurteilung in das Strafregister entgegen, da es sich bei der Otto Kaufmann AG nicht um eine natürliche Person handelte.

3 In einem am 25. März 2014 beim Gerichtshof eingegangenen Schreiben stellte das Fürstliche Landgericht einen Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung in der folgenden Frage:

Gebietet es das EWR-Abkommen, insbesondere die Bestimmungen über die Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit bzw. einzelne Sekundärrechtsakte (beispielsweise die Richtlinie 2004/18/EG über die Koordinierung der Verfahren zur Vergabe öffentlicher Bauaufträge, Lieferaufträge und Dienstleistungsaufträge oder die Richtlinie 2006/123/EG über Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt, welche beide in den EWR-Rechtsbestand übernommen wurden), dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen

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convicted by a criminal court those convictions must also be clearly recorded, for example, in a criminal record?

4 The requesting court observes that there is no cross-border element to the case. However, in its view, the request for an advisory opinion is nevertheless admissible since the issue raised is capable of producing effects not confined to Liechtenstein. The national court refers in that context to Case C-367/12 Sokoll-Seebacher, judgment of 13 February 2014, published electronically, paragraphs 10 and 11.

5 Reference is made to the Report for the Hearing for a fuller account of the legal framework, the facts, the procedure and the written observations submitted to the Court, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only insofar as is necessary for the reasoning of the Court.

II LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law

6 Article 31 EEA reads:

1. Within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be no restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of an EC Member State or an EFTA State in the territory of any other of these States. This shall also apply to the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any EC Member State or EFTA State established in the territory of any of these States.

Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of Article 34, second paragraph, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of Chapter 4.

2. Annexes VIII to XI contain specific provisions on the right of establishment.


1. Within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be no restrictions on freedom to provide services within the territory of the

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vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen auch evident gehalten werden müssen, etwa im Wege eines Strafregisters?

4 Das ersuchende Gericht hält fest, dass die vorliegende Rechtssache keinen grenzüberschreitenden Bezug aufweist. Seiner Auffassung nach ist der Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung jedoch trotzdem zulässig, da die Fragestellung Wirkungen entfalten kann, die sich nicht auf Liechtenstein beschränken. Das nationale Gericht verweist in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Rechtssache C-367/12 Sokoll-Seebacher, Urteil vom 13. Februar 2014, in elektronischer Form veröffentlicht, Randnrn. 10 und 11.

5 Für eine ausführliche Darstellung des rechtlichen Hintergrunds, des Sachverhalts, des Verfahrens und der beim Gerichtshof eingereichten schriftlichen Erklärungen wird auf den Sitzungsbericht verwiesen. Auf den Sitzungsbericht wird im Folgenden nur insoweit eingegangen, wie es für die Begründung des Gerichtshofs erforderlich ist.

II RECHTLICHER HINTERGRUND

EWR-Recht

6 Artikel 31 des EWR-Abkommens lautet:

(1) Im Rahmen dieses Abkommens unterliegt die freie Niederlassung von Staatsangehörigen eines EG-Mitgliedstaats oder eines EFTA-Staates im Hoheitsgebiet eines dieser Staaten keinen Beschränkungen. Das gilt gleichermaßen für die Gründung von Agenturen, Zweigniederlassungen oder Tochtergesellschaften durch Angehörige eines EG-Mitgliedstaats oder eines EFTA-Staates, die im Hoheitsgebiet eines dieser Staaten ansässig sind.

Vorbehaltlich des Kapitels 4 umfasst die Niederlassungsfreiheit die Aufnahme und Ausübung selbständiger Erwerbstätigkeiten sowie die Gründung und Leitung von Unternehmen, insbesondere von Gesellschaften im Sinne des Artikels 34 Absatz 2, nach den Bestimmungen des Aufnahmestaats für seine eigenen Angehörigen.

(2) Die besonderen Bestimmungen über das Niederlassungsrecht sind in den Anhängen VIII bis XI enthalten.

7 Artikel 36 des EWR-Abkommens lautet:

(1) Im Rahmen dieses Abkommens unterliegt der freie Dienstleistungsverkehr im Gebiet der Vertragsparteien für Angehörige

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Contracting Parties in respect of nationals of EC Member States and EFTA States who are established in an EC Member State or an EFTA State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.

2. Annexes IX to XI contain specific provisions on the freedom to provide services.

8 Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”) reads:

The EFTA Court shall have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement.

Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal in an EFTA State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers it necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the EFTA Court to give such an opinion.

…

9 In asking whether the EEA Agreement imposes an obligation to record convictions of legal persons, the requesting court has mentioned Articles 31 and 36 EEA. Furthermore, as examples of secondary law, the requesting court has mentioned Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (“Directive 2004/18”) (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), and Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (“Directive 2006/123”) (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).

10 Furthermore, the Netherlands Government has introduced in its written observations as additional examples Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (“Directive 96/71”) (OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1), and Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (“Directive 2005/36”) (OJ 2005 L 255, p. 22).

11 As explained in the Report for the Hearing, these directives are all part of the EEA Agreement.

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der EG-Mitgliedstaaten und der EFTA-Staaten, die in einem anderen EG-Mitgliedstaat beziehungsweise in einem anderen EFTA-Staat als demjenigen des Leistungsempfängers ansässig sind, keinen Beschränkungen.

(2) Die besonderen Bestimmungen über den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr sind in den Anhängen IX bis XI enthalten.

8 Artikel 34 des Abkommens zwischen den EFTA-Staaten zur Errichtung einer Überwachungsbehörde und eines Gerichtshofs (im Folgenden: ÜGA) lautet:

Der EFTA-Gerichtshof erstellt Gutachten über die Auslegung des EWR-Abkommens.

Wird eine derartige Frage einem Gericht eines EFTA-Staates gestellt, und hält dieses Gericht eine Entscheidung darüber zum Erlaß seines Urteils für erforderlich, so kann es diese Frage dem EFTA-Gerichtshof zur Entscheidung vorlegen.

…

9 Im Rahmen der Frage, ob das EWR-Abkommen eine Verpflichtung zur Evidenthaltung von Verurteilungen juristischer Personen vorsieht, hat das ersuchende Gericht auf die Artikel 31 und 36 des EWR-Abkommens verwiesen. Darüber hinaus hat das ersuchende Gericht als Beispiele für Sekundärrechtsakte Richtlinie 2004/18/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 31. März 2004 über die Koordinierung der Verfahren zur Vergabe öffentlicher Bauaufträge, Lieferaufträge und Dienstleistungsaufträge (im Folgenden: Richtlinie 2004/18) (ABl. 2004 L 134, S. 114) und Richtlinie 2006/123/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 12. Dezember 2006 über Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt (im Folgenden: Richtlinie 2006/123) (ABl. 2006 L 376, S. 36) genannt.

10 Zudem hat die Regierung der Niederlande in ihrer schriftlichen Erklärung als weitere Beispiele Richtlinie 96/71/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 16. Dezember 1996 über die Entsendung von Arbeitnehmern im Rahmen der Erbringung von Dienstleistungen (im Folgenden: Richtlinie 96/71) (ABl. 1997 L 18, S. 1) und Richtlinie 2005/36/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 7. September 2005 über die Anerkennung von Berufsqualifikationen (im Folgenden: Richtlinie 2005/36) (ABl. 2005 L 255, S. 22) angeführt.

11 Wie im Sitzungsbericht erläutert, sind all diese Richtlinien Teil des EWR-Abkommens.

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12 Article 45(2)(c) of Directive 2004/18 provides that an economic operator who has been convicted of any offence concerning his professional conduct shall be excluded from participating in a public contract. As evidence that an economic operator has not been subject to such a conviction, the requesting EEA State shall, pursuant to Article 45(3) of Directive 2004/18, accept from the requested EEA State “the production of an extract from the ‘judicial record’ or, failing that, of an equivalent document issued by a competent judicial or administrative authority in the country of origin or the country whence that person comes showing that these requirements have been met …”. Where the State in question does not issue such documents or certificates, “they may be replaced by a declaration on oath or, in Member States where there is no provision for declarations on oath, by a solemn declaration made by the person concerned before a competent judicial or administrative authority, a notary or a competent professional or trade body, in the country of origin or in the country whence that person comes”.

13 Article 33(1) of Directive 2006/123 provides that EEA States shall, at the request of another EEA State, “supply information, in conformity with their national law, on disciplinary or administrative actions or criminal sanctions and decisions concerning insolvency or bankruptcy involving fraud taken by their competent authorities in respect of the provider which are directly relevant to the provider’s competence or professional reliability”.

14 Article 4(2) of Directive 96/71 and Article 56(2) of Directive 2005/36 provide for a similar exchange of information between EEA States in the fields covered by those directives.

National law

15 Pursuant to Section 1(1) of the Act of 2 July 1974 on Criminal Records and the Removal of Convictions from the Records (Gesetz über das Strafregister und die Tilgung gerichtlicher Verurteilungen; LR 330) (“Criminal Records Act”), a register shall be kept for the purpose of recording criminal convictions. According to Section 1(2), the responsibility for maintaining the record shall be assigned to a judge of the Princely Court. As explained in the request for an advisory opinion, the decision

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12 Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe c der Richtlinie 2004/18 sieht vor, dass ein Wirtschaftsteilnehmer, der wegen eines Deliktes bestraft worden ist, das seine berufliche Zuverlässigkeit in Frage stellt, von der Teilnahme an einem öffentlichen Vergabeverfahren ausgeschlossen werden kann. Als Nachweis für die Unbescholtenheit eines Wirtschaftsteilnehmers akzeptiert der ersuchende EWR-Staat gemäss Artikel 45 Absatz 3 der Richtlinie 2004/18 vom ersuchten EWR-Staat „einen Auszug aus dem Strafregister oder – in Ermangelung eines solchen – eine gleichwertige Urkunde einer zuständigen Gerichts- oder Verwaltungsbehörde des Ursprungs- oder Herkunftslands, aus der hervorgeht, dass diese Anforderungen erfüllt sind …“. Wird eine solche Urkunde oder Bescheinigung von dem betreffenden Staat nicht ausgestellt, „so kann sie durch eine eidesstattliche Erklärung oder in den Mitgliedstaaten, in denen es keine eidesstattliche Erklärung gibt, durch eine förmliche Erklärung ersetzt werden, die der betreffende Wirtschaftsteilnehmer vor einer zuständigen Gerichts- oder Verwaltungsbehörde, einem Notar oder einer dafür qualifizierten Berufsorganisation des Ursprungs- oder Herkunftslands abgibt“.

13 Laut Artikel 33 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2006/123 übermitteln EWR-Staaten auf Ersuchen eines anderen EWR-Staats „unter Beachtung ihres nationalen Rechts Informationen über Disziplinar- oder Verwaltungsmaßnahmen oder strafrechtliche Sanktionen und Entscheidungen wegen Insolvenz oder Konkurs mit betrügerischer Absicht, die von ihren zuständigen Behörden gegen einen Dienstleistungserbringer verhängt wurden und die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers sind“.

14 Artikel 4 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 96/71 und Artikel 56 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 2005/36 sehen in den von diesen Richtlinien abgedeckten Bereichen einen vergleichbaren Informationsaustausch zwischen den EWR-Staaten vor.

Nationales Recht

15 Gemäss Artikel 1 Absatz 1 des Gesetzes vom 2. Juli 1974 über das Strafregister und die Tilgung gerichtlicher Verurteilungen (LR 330) (im Folgenden: Strafregistergesetz) wird zum Zwecke der Evidenthaltung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen ein Strafregister geführt. Laut Artikel 1 Absatz 2 obliegt die Führung des Strafregisters dem Landgericht durch einen Einzelrichter. Wie im Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung erläutert, handelt es sich

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whether a conviction must be entered on the criminal record is considered a judicial activity under Liechtenstein law.

16 Section 2(1) of the Criminal Records Act establishes that all convictions handed down by domestic courts in relation to criminal offences or misdemeanours shall be entered on the criminal record. It is unclear, however, whether the conviction of a legal person must be entered on the criminal record.

III ADMISSIBILITY

Observations submitted to the Court

17 In its written observations, ESA has questioned whether the Princely Court can be considered a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 34 SCA when making a decision concerning an entry onto the criminal record, and accordingly, whether it is entitled to request an advisory opinion. However, having regard to Case E-23/13 Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, judgment of 9 May 2014, not yet reported, paragraphs 33 and 34, ESA assumes that the request is admissible.

18 This issue was not raised in any other participants’ written observations. However, at the oral hearing, the Commission shared ESA’s doubts on this point. It submitted that whether an activity is judicial for the purposes of Article 34 SCA must be determined according to EEA law and not on the basis of national law.

19 According to the Norwegian Government, it follows from the wording of the EEA Agreement and case law that the application of Articles 31 and 36 EEA requires a cross-border element. It appears from the reference itself that this condition is not fulfilled in the present case. The Norwegian Government contends therefore that the part of the question that relates to Articles 31 and 36 EEA is hypothetical and should be found inadmissible.

20 Were this not the case, the Norwegian Government continues, a request for an advisory opinion could in principle be made also in cases concerning

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bei der Entscheidung, ob eine Verurteilung in das Strafregister eingetragen wird, nach liechtensteinischem Recht um eine richterliche Tätigkeit.

16 Artikel 2 Absatz 1 des Strafregistergesetzes sieht vor, dass alle rechtskräftigen Verurteilungen durch inländische Strafgerichte wegen Verbrechen oder Vergehen in das Strafregister aufzunehmen sind. Unklar ist jedoch, ob auch die Verurteilung einer juristischen Person in das Strafregister einzutragen ist.

III ZULÄSSIGKEIT

Dem Gerichtshof vorgelegte Stellungnahmen

17 In ihrer schriftlichen Stellungnahme hat die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde in Frage gestellt, dass das Fürstliche Landgericht bei der Entscheidung über eine Eintragung ins Strafregister als „Gericht“ im Sinne des Artikel 34 ÜGA angesehen werden kann und deshalb berechtigt ist, einen Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung zu stellen. Im Hinblick auf die Rechtssache E-23/13 Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, Urteil vom 9. Mai 2014, noch nicht in der amtlichen Sammlung veröffentlicht, Randnrn. 33 und 34, geht die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde jedoch davon aus, dass der Antrag zulässig ist.

18 Die anderen schriftlichen Stellungnahmen gingen auf diese Thematik nicht ein. Bei der Anhörung der mündlichen Ausführungen schloss sich die Kommission allerdings den Zweifeln der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde an. Sie brachte vor, dass die Entscheidung, ob es sich für die Zwecke des Artikels 34 ÜGA um eine richterliche Tätigkeit handelt, auf der Grundlage des EWR-Rechts und nicht nach nationalem Recht zu treffen ist.

19 Nach Auffassung der norwegischen Regierung folgt aus dem Wortlaut des EWR-Abkommens und der Rechtsprechung, dass die Anwendung der Artikel 31 und 36 des EWR-Abkommens einen Auslandsbezug verlangt. Bereits aus dem Antrag selbst geht hervor, dass diese Voraussetzung im gegenständlichen Fall nicht erfüllt ist. Die Regierung Norwegens kommt daher zu dem Schluss, dass der Teil der Frage, der sich auf die Artikel 31 und 36 des EWR-Abkommens bezieht, hypothetisch ist und damit für unzulässig befunden werden sollte.

20 Wäre dies nicht der Fall, fährt die Regierung Norwegens fort, könnte ein Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung im Prinzip auch in Fällen mit

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purely internal situations, without any connection to EEA rules. This would

go beyond the aim of the advisory opinion procedure, which is to provide

an interpretation of EEA law against a factual background. The Court

should assist in the administration of justice in the EEA States. It should

not deliver advisory opinions on hypothetical questions without any bearing

on the dispute in the main proceedings.

21 The Norwegian Government acknowledges that the Court of Justice

of the European Union (“ECJ”) in Sokoll-Seebacher, cited above,

paragraphs 10 to 12, admitted a question relating to a case without a

cross-border element in the main proceedings. However, the reasoning

in Sokoll-Seebacher is based on circumstances that differ from those

of the present case. That case concerned a situation where it was

reasonably clear that a restriction on intra-EEA trade would be present

if the dispute in the main proceedings had concerned a national of

another EEA State. The Norwegian Government adds that a referring

court must also show that a response is actually useful for the

resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings, notwithstanding the

absence of a cross-border element.

22 In the present case, it appears from the request that no cross-border

element is involved. Furthermore, the Norwegian Government observes

that it has not been shown how the national rule in question may

constitute a restriction on intra-EEA trade. The Norwegian Government

therefore proposes that the part of the question relating to Articles 31

and 36 EEA be dismissed as inadmissible.

23 The question of inadmissibility due to the lack of a cross-border element

in the case was not raised in other written observations. However,

at the oral hearing, ESA concurred with the Norwegian Government’s

view that the part of the question relating to Articles 31 and 36 EEA is

inadmissible. ESA nonetheless assumed that the part of the question

relating to secondary EEA law is admissible.

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rein innerstaatlichem Sachverhalt ohne jeglichen Bezug zum EWR-Recht gestellt werden. Dies würde jedoch über die Zielsetzung des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens – nämlich eine Auslegung des EWR-Rechts im Hinblick auf tatsächliche Sachverhalte zur Verfügung zu stellen – hinausgehen. Der Gerichtshof soll zur Rechtspflege in den EWR-Staaten beitragen, nicht aber Gutachten zu hypothetischen Fragen abgeben, die für den Rechtsstreit im Ausgangsverfahren nicht massgeblich sind.

21 Die Regierung Norwegens räumt ein, dass der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (im Folgenden: EuGH) in der Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher, oben erwähnt, Randnrn. 10 bis 12, eine Frage zu einer Rechtssache ohne Auslandsbezug im Ausgangsverfahren zugelassen hat. Die Argumentation in der Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher basiert jedoch auf Umständen, die sich von denen des vorliegenden Falls unterscheiden. In der erwähnten Rechtssache handelte es sich um einen Sachverhalt, in dem hinreichend klar war, dass eine Beschränkung des Handels innerhalb des EWR vorgelegen hätte, hätte der Rechtsstreit im Ausgangsverfahren einen Staatsangehörigen eines anderen EWR-Staats betroffen. Die Regierung Norwegens fügt hinzu, dass ein vorlegendes Gericht ausserdem nachweisen muss, dass eine Antwort zur Klärung des Rechtsstreits im Ausgangsverfahren ungeachtet des fehlenden Auslandsbezugs tatsächlich massgeblich ist.

22 Im vorliegenden Fall scheint nach dem Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung kein Auslandsbezug zu bestehen. Zudem stellt die Regierung Norwegens fest, dass nicht nachgewiesen wurde, inwiefern die fragliche nationale Vorschrift eine Beschränkung des Handels innerhalb des EWR darstellen kann. Die Regierung Norwegens schlägt daher vor, dass der Teil der Frage, der sich auf die Artikel 31 und 36 des EWR-Abkommens bezieht, als unzulässig zurückgewiesen werden sollte.

23 Auf die Frage der Unzulässigkeit wegen fehlenden Auslandsbezugs der Rechtssache wurde in den anderen schriftlichen Stellungnahmen nicht eingegangen. In der mündlichen Verhandlung schloss sich die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde jedoch der Einschätzung der Regierung Norwegens an, dass der Teil der Frage, der sich auf die Artikel 31 und 36 des EWR-Abkommens bezieht, unzulässig ist. Nichtsdestotrotz ging die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde von der Zulässigkeit des Teils der Frage aus, der sich auf das EWR-Sekundärrecht bezieht.

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24 The Commission, also at the oral hearing, took the view that even where all the factual aspects are confined to one EEA State, the case may fall within the Court’s jurisdiction under the advisory opinion procedure provided that the national rules at issue are capable of imposing restrictions on intra-EEA trade. The Commission had doubts, however, whether the situation in Sokoll-Seebacher is comparable to the present case. In the Commission’s view, it does not appear obvious that the national rules at issue are capable of affecting intra-EEA trade.

25 In addition, the Commission observed that there is no indication that the authorities of another EEA State have requested Liechtenstein to provide information on Otto Kaufmann AG. It is therefore uncertain whether the directives referred to in the national court’s question are applicable at all in this case.

Findings of the Court

26 Under Article 34 SCA, any court or tribunal in an EFTA State may refer questions on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement to the Court, if it considers it necessary to enable it to give judgment.

27 However, a national court or tribunal may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature. In other words, a national body may be classified as a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 34 SCA when it is performing judicial functions, whereas, when it is exercising other functions, for example of an administrative nature, it may not be so classified (see Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, cited above, paragraph 32).

28 The Court recalls that the purpose of Article 34 SCA is to establish cooperation between the Court and the national courts and tribunals in order to ensure homogeneous interpretation of EEA law and to provide assistance to the courts and tribunals in the EFTA States in cases in which they have to apply provisions of EEA law. Accordingly, this purpose does not require a strict interpretation of the terms court and tribunal.

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24 Die Kommission stellte sich ebenfalls in der mündlichen Verhandlung auf den Standpunkt, dass selbst dann, wenn sich der gesamte Sachverhalt auf einen einzelnen EWR-Staat beschränkt, die Rechtssache in den Zuständigkeitsbereich des Gerichtshofs für das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren fallen kann, sofern die fraglichen nationalen Vorschriften zu einer Beschränkung des Handels im EWR führen können. Die Kommission bezweifelte jedoch, ob die Situation in der Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher mit dem gegenständlichen Fall vergleichbar ist. Nach Ansicht der Kommission scheint es nicht offensichtlich, dass die fraglichen nationalen Vorschriften zu einer Beeinträchtigung des Handels im EWR führen können.

25 Darüber hinaus stellte die Kommission fest, dass keine Hinweise darauf vorliegen, dass die Behörden eines anderen EWR-Staats Liechtenstein um Bereitstellung von Informationen über die Otto Kaufmann AG ersucht haben. Es ist daher ungewiss, ob die in der Frage des nationalen Gerichts angeführten Richtlinien in diesem Fall überhaupt Anwendung finden.

Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs

26 Nach Artikel 34 ÜGA kann jedes Gericht eines EFTA-Staats Fragen zur Auslegung des EWR-Abkommens an den Gerichtshof richten, sofern es dies zum Erlass eines Urteils für erforderlich hält.

27 Ein nationales Gericht kann dem Gerichtshof jedoch nur eine Frage vorlegen, wenn vor ihm eine Rechtssache anhängig ist und wenn es im Rahmen eines Verfahrens zu urteilen hat, das auf eine Entscheidung mit Rechtsprechungscharakter abzielt. Mit anderen Worten kann eine nationale Stelle als Gericht im Sinne von Artikel 34 ÜGA qualifiziert werden, wenn sie gerichtliche Funktionen ausübt, nicht aber bei Ausführung anderer Aufgaben, insbesondere administrativer Art (vgl. Rechtssache Hellenic Capital Market Commission, oben erwähnt, Randnr. 32).

28 Der Gerichtshof erinnert daran, dass der Zweck von Artikel 34 ÜGA darin besteht, eine Grundlage für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Gerichtshof und den nationalen Gerichten zur Gewährleistung einer einheitlichen Auslegung des EWR-Rechts zu schaffen sowie die Gerichte der EFTA-Staaten in Rechtssachen zu unterstützen, in denen sie Bestimmungen des EWR-Rechts anzuwenden haben. Diesem Zweck entsprechend ist eine enge Auslegung des Gerichtsbegriffs nicht erforderlich. Gleiches

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The same applies to the question of whether a requesting body exercises a judicial function, in particular when its decisions are not subject to judicial review. The procedure under Article 34 SCA is determined on the basis of EEA law. The Court has no competence to interpret national rules. It must nevertheless include national rules in its assessment of the situation. In case of doubt, it would run counter to the purpose of Article 34 SCA to declare the reference inadmissible (see Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, cited above, paragraphs 33 and 34).

29 When dealing with the applicability of Article 34 SCA, it is incumbent on the EEA States to take the necessary steps to ensure, within their own territory, that the provisions of EEA law are implemented into national law in their entirety. The decision pending before the national court, whether to enter a conviction onto the criminal record, is a task that under Liechtenstein law is assigned to a judge at the Princely Court. EEA law may affect such a decision. If, under the legal system of an EEA State, national courts are assigned such a task, it is imperative, in order to ensure the proper functioning of EEA law, that the Court should have an opportunity to address the issues of interpretation arising out of such proceedings.

30 As a result of the foregoing, the Court finds that, in proceedings pursuant to Section 2(1) of the Criminal Records Act, the Princely Court performs a judicial function for the purposes of Article 34 SCA.

31 The Court notes that national legislation is capable of falling within the scope of the provisions relating to the fundamental freedoms of the EEA Agreement to the extent that it applies to situations connected with trade between EEA States. Even if the factual aspects of a specific situation are confined to one EEA State, an interpretation of EEA law, such as that relating to the fundamental freedoms, may still be useful to the extent that the national legislation at issue is capable of producing effects which are not confined to one EEA State (compare Sokoll-Seebacher, cited above, paragraphs 10 and 11).

32 The question referred seeks to establish whether EEA law imposes an obligation to record a conviction by a criminal court of a legal person.

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gilt für die Frage, ob die um Vorabentscheidung ersuchende Stelle eine Rechtsprechungsfunktion ausübt, insbesondere, wenn ihre Entscheidungen keiner gerichtlichen Überprüfung unterliegen. Das Verfahren nach Artikel 34 ÜGA beruht auf EWR-Recht. Der Gerichtshof ist nicht für die Auslegung nationaler Vorschriften zuständig. Bei seiner Beurteilung der Umstände hat er aber trotzdem nationale Vorschriften miteinzubeziehen. Im Zweifelsfall würde es dem Zweck von Artikel 34 ÜGA zuwiderlaufen, den Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung für unzulässig zu erklären (vgl. Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, oben erwähnt, Randnrn. 33 und 34).

29 Bei der Frage der Anwendbarkeit von Artikel 34 ÜGA obliegt es den EWR-Staaten, die erforderlichen Massnahmen zu treffen, um sicherzustellen, dass die Bestimmungen des EWR-Rechts auf ihrem Hoheitsgebiet zur Gänze in nationales Recht umgesetzt werden. Die vor dem nationalen Gericht anhängige Entscheidung über die Eintragung einer Verurteilung ins Strafregister ist nach liechtensteinischem Recht eine Aufgabe, die einem Einzelrichter des Fürstlichen Landgerichts obliegt. Das EWR-Recht kann sich auf eine solche Entscheidung auswirken. Wenn die Rechtsordnung eines EWR-Staats den nationalen Gerichten eine solche Aufgabe zuweist, muss dem Gerichtshof zur Gewährleistung des reibungslosen Funktionierens des EWR-Rechts die Möglichkeit eingeräumt werden, sich zu Auslegungsfragen zu äussern, die sich im Zuge derartiger Verfahren ergeben.

30 Auf der Grundlage der obigen Erwägungen gelangt der Gerichtshof zu dem Ergebnis, dass das Fürstliche Landgericht in Verfahren gemäss Artikel 2 Absatz 1 des Strafregistergesetzes für die Zwecke von Artikel 34 ÜGA eine Tätigkeit mit Rechtsprechungscharakter ausübt.

31 Der Gerichtshof hält fest, dass die nationale Gesetzgebung in den Geltungsbereich der Bestimmungen über die im EWR-Abkommen verankerten Grundfreiheiten fallen kann, sofern sie auf Situationen Anwendung findet, die den Handel zwischen den EWR-Staaten betreffen. Selbst wenn der Sachverhalt in einer bestimmten Situation auf einen EWR-Staat begrenzt ist, kann die Auslegung des EWR-Rechts, wie jenes zu den Grundfreiheiten, insofern von Nutzen sein, als die gegenständliche nationale Gesetzgebung Wirkungen entfalten kann, die sich nicht auf einen einzelnen EWR-Staat beschränken (vgl. Sokoll-Seebacher, oben erwähnt, Randnrn. 10 und 11).

32 Mit der vorgelegten Frage soll geklärt werden, ob das EWR-Recht eine Verpflichtung enthält, eine strafgerichtliche Verurteilung einer juristischen

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In the present case, the legal person convicted is a company registered

in Liechtenstein. It is not inconceivable that a company registered in

another EEA State could be convicted by a Liechtenstein court. Nor is

it inconceivable that the authorities of another EEA State could request

from Liechtenstein information on the criminal record of legal persons.

Thus, an interpretation of EEA law is useful since the national legislation

at issue is capable of producing effects which are not confined to one

EEA State.

33 Where a national court or tribunal submits a question concerning the

interpretation of EEA law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling.

It follows that questions concerning EEA law enjoy a presumption of

relevance. However, the Court may not rule on a question referred by a

national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EEA law

sought is unrelated to the facts of the main action or its purpose, where

the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before

it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the

questions submitted (see Case E-13/11 Granville Establishment [2012]

EFTA Ct. Rep. 400, paragraphs 19 to 20, and case law cited).

34 In the situation at hand, the national judge has to take a decision whether

to enter a conviction of a legal person onto the criminal record. In doing

so, he is obliged to comply with EEA law. Should EEA law entitle other

EEA States to obtain information about convictions of a legal person, that

information could properly be based on an entry on a criminal record.

The requirements of EEA law must be assessed when deciding whether

to enter convictions onto a criminal record. It follows from this that the

question concerning the decision’s compatibility with EEA law is not

purely hypothetical.

35 The Court therefore concludes that the question referred by the Princely

Court is admissible.

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Person evident zu halten. Im vorliegenden Fall handelt es sich bei der verurteilten juristischen Person um ein in Liechtenstein eingetragenes Unternehmen. Es ist nicht auszuschliessen, dass ein in einem anderen EWR-Staat eingetragenes Unternehmen von einem liechtensteinischen Gericht verurteilt werden könnte. Genauso wenig kann ausgeschlossen werden, dass die Behörden eines anderen EWR-Staats Liechtenstein um Auskünfte über Eintragungen juristischer Personen ins Strafregister ersuchen könnten. Dementsprechend ist die Auslegung des EWR-Rechts von Nutzen, da die gegenständliche nationale Gesetzgebung Wirkungen entfalten kann, die sich nicht auf einen einzelnen EWR-Staat beschränken.

33 Legt ein nationales Gericht eine Frage betreffend die Auslegung von EWR-Recht vor, ist der Gerichtshof grundsätzlich zu einer Entscheidung verpflichtet. Demzufolge wird für EWR-rechtliche Fragen die Entscheidungserheblichkeit vermutet. Die Nichtbeantwortung einer Frage eines nationalen Gerichts ist dem Gerichtshof jedoch möglich, wenn die erbetene Auslegung des EWR-Rechts ganz offensichtlich in keiner Beziehung zum Sachverhalt oder dem Gegenstand des Ausgangsverfahrens steht, wenn das Problem hypothetischer Natur ist oder wenn der Gerichtshof nicht über die tatsächlichen oder rechtlichen Angaben verfügt, die für eine zweckdienliche Beantwortung der ihm vorgelegten Fragen erforderlich sind (vgl. Rechtssache E-13/11 Granville Establishment, EFTA Court Report 2012, S. 400, Randnrn. 19 und 20, und die zitierte Rechtsprechung).

34 Im gegenständlichen Fall muss der nationale Richter über die Eintragung einer Verurteilung einer juristischen Person ins Strafregister entscheiden. Im Zuge dessen ist er zur Beachtung des EWR-Rechts verpflichtet. Sollte das EWR-Recht ein Recht anderer EWR-Staaten auf Auskünfte über Verurteilungen juristischer Personen vorsehen, könnte die Eintragung dieser Informationen in ein Strafregister die Grundlage dafür bilden. Die Anforderungen des EWR-Rechts sind bei der Entscheidung über die Eintragung von Verurteilungen in ein Strafregister zu berücksichtigen. Dementsprechend ist die Frage zur Vereinbarkeit dieser Entscheidung mit EWR-Recht nicht rein hypothetischer Natur.

35 Der Gerichtshof stellt daher fest, dass die vom Fürstlichen Landgericht vorgelegte Frage zulässig ist.

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IV SUBSTANCE


36 The Liechtenstein Government submits that Directive 2004/18 does not require that, where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court, those convictions must also be clearly recorded. This can be seen from Article 45(3)(a) of that directive. Directive 2004/18 leaves it to the national legislature not only to allow for legal persons to be convicted but also to decide whether and, if so, how these convictions will be recorded.

37 According to the Liechtenstein Government, Directive 2006/123 does not require that, where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court, those convictions must also be clearly recorded. Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 merely provides for the exchange of information between the EEA States on the good repute of service providers and leaves it to the individual EEA State to decide upon the type of information on established service providers which it considers necessary to keep available and accessible in conformity with its national law in order to adequately supervise those service providers.

38 According to the Liechtenstein Government, since more specific and clarifying provisions of secondary law governing administrative cooperation lay down no legal obligation to clearly record criminal court convictions of legal persons, it seems highly doubtful that the provisions of primary law may be interpreted to provide for an obligation to clearly record convictions.

39 In relation to primary EEA law, the Netherlands Government does not see how either Article 31 EEA (freedom of establishment) or Article 36 EEA (freedom to provide services) may give rise to an obligation to record. Neither the text nor the rationale of these provisions require that the EEA States record criminal convictions of legal persons.

40 In relation to secondary EEA law, the Netherlands Government considers that Directive 2004/18 does not in itself establish an obligation to record

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IV VORLAGEFRAGE

Dem Gerichtshof vorgelegte Stellungnahmen

36 Der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein zufolge verlangt die Richtlinie 2004/18 nicht, dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen auch evident gehalten werden müssen. Dies geht aus Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a dieser Richtlinie hervor. Richtlinie 2004/18 überlässt es dem nationalen Gesetzgeber, nicht nur die Verurteilung juristischer Personen zu gestatten, sondern auch darüber zu entscheiden, ob und – wenn ja – wie diese Verurteilungen erfasst werden.

37 Laut der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein ist es auch nach der Richtlinie 2006/123 nicht geboten, dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen evident gehalten werden müssen. Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 sieht nur einen Austausch von Informationen über die Zuverlässigkeit von Dienstleistungserbringern zwischen den EWR-Staaten vor und überlässt es den einzelnen EWR-Staaten, bei welchen Arten von Informationen über ansässige Dienstleistungserbringer sie es für erforderlich halten, sie im Einklang mit dem nationalen Gesetz verfügbar und zugänglich zu halten, um diese Dienstleistungserbringer angemessen zu überwachen.

38 Da die spezifischeren und erläuternden Bestimmungen des Sekundärrechts über die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit laut der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein keine gesetzliche Verpflichtung vorsehen, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen evident zu halten, erscheint es höchst zweifelhaft, dass die Vorschriften des Primärrechts dahingehend ausgelegt werden können, dass sie eine Verpflichtung zur Evidenthaltung von Verurteilungen enthalten.

39 Im Hinblick auf das EWR-Primärrecht ist es für die Regierung der Niederlande nicht ersichtlich, wie aus Artikel 31 (Niederlassungsfreiheit) oder Artikel 36 (freier Dienstleistungsverkehr) des EWR-Abkommens eine Eintragungspflicht folgen soll. Weder der Wortlaut noch die Begründung dieser Bestimmungen erfordern die Evidenthaltung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen juristischer Personen durch die EWR-Staaten.

40 In Bezug auf EWR-Sekundärrecht geht die Regierung der Niederlande davon aus, dass die Richtlinie 2004/18 an sich keine Verpflichtung enthält,

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convictions of legal persons convicted by a criminal court. It does however

impose an obligation to provide relevant information on such criminal

convictions without requiring that this should be done through an extract

from the judicial record.

41 The Netherlands Government submits that, although Article 33 of Directive

2006/123 obliges an EEA State to supply information on the good repute

of service providers, it is clear from the wording of that provision that there

is no requirement to record criminal convictions.

42 In the view of the Netherlands Government, furthermore, neither Article

4(2) of Directive 96/71 nor Article 56(2) of Directive 2005/36 requires

EEA States to record criminal convictions of legal persons.

43 ESA fails to see how the general provisions on the freedom of

establishment and the freedom to provide services may have a bearing on

the question whether EEA law entails a duty on States to record criminal

convictions in the context of the present case. If such an obligation does

exist, it would have to follow from secondary law.

44 According to ESA, it cannot be deduced from Directive 2004/18 that

there is an obligation on EEA States to have a criminal record or similar

recording of convictions. It is for national law to decide how information on

the professional conduct of an economic operator may be provided.

45 ESA further contends that Directive 2006/123 does not require that

criminal convictions, such as those at issue in the present case, must be

recorded. Information on criminal sanctions must be provided on the basis

of mechanisms and practices already in place in the EEA States.

46 The Commission submits that, at this stage of the proceedings and on

the basis of the information presented by the referring court, neither the

EEA Agreement’s provisions on the freedom of establishment and the

freedom to provide services nor the provisions of Directive 2006/123

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strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen evident zu halten. Die Richtlinie sieht jedoch eine Verpflichtung zur Übermittlung einschlägiger Informationen über solche strafgerichtlichen Verurteilungen vor, ohne festzulegen, dass dies mittels Strafregisterauszug erfolgen soll.

41 Obwohl Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 einen EWR-Staat zur Bereitstellung von Informationen über die Zuverlässigkeit von Dienstleistungserbringern verpflichtet, so die Regierung der Niederlande, geht aus dem Wortlaut dieser Bestimmung klar hervor, dass keine Verpflichtung besteht, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen evident zu halten.

42 Nach Auffassung der Regierung der Niederlande fordern darüber hinaus weder Artikel 4 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 96/71 noch Artikel 56 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 2005/36 von den EWR-Staaten die Evidenthaltung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen juristischer Personen.

43 Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde kann nicht nachvollziehen, wie sich die allgemeinen Bestimmungen über die Niederlassungsfreiheit und den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr auf die Frage auswirken können, ob EWR-Recht im Zusammenhang mit der gegenständlichen Rechtssache eine Verpflichtung der Staaten, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen evident zu halten, vorsieht. Wenn eine solche Verpflichtung bestünde, müsste sie aus Sekundärrecht abzuleiten sein.

44 Nach der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde kann aus der Richtlinie 2004/18 eine Verpflichtung der EWR-Staaten zur Führung eines Strafregisters oder eines vergleichbaren Verzeichnisses über Verurteilungen nicht abgeleitet werden. Es ist Sache des nationalen Rechts zu entscheiden, wie Informationen über die berufliche Zuverlässigkeit von Wirtschaftsteilnehmern zur Verfügung zu stellen sind.

45 Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde bringt weiter vor, dass Richtlinie 2006/123 nicht erfordert, dass strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen, wie jene im gegenständlichen Fall, evident gehalten werden müssen. Auskünfte über strafrechtliche Sanktionen sind auf der Grundlage von in den EWR-Staaten bereits bestehenden Mechanismen und Abläufe zu erteilen.

46 Die Kommission bringt vor, dass an diesem Punkt des Verfahrens und auf der Grundlage der vom vorlegenden Gericht übermittelten Informationen weder die Bestimmungen des EWR-Abkommens über die Niederlassungsfreiheit und den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr noch die Bestimmungen der Richtlinie 2006/123

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and Directive 2004/18 impose on a State party to the agreement the requirement to establish the same accurate record of legal persons convicted of criminal offences as has been established in an EEA State in relation to natural persons who are service providers.

47 In particular, there is no secondary law which requires EEA States to enter criminal sanctions imposed by criminal courts on legal persons onto their criminal records (an obligation which may exist for criminal sanctions imposed on natural persons).

48 Nevertheless, Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 obliges EEA States to keep, also with respect to providers who are legal persons, some kind of record to enable them to comply with the obligations to exchange information provided for as a matter of administrative cooperation. However, the type of record and its handling remains at the EEA State’s discretion, as long as it ensures that accurate information may be exchanged on an ongoing basis between EEA States.


49 The referring court asks, in essence, whether upon the basis of the EEA Agreement or secondary law, for instance Directive 2006/123 or Directive 2004/18 as incorporated into the EEA Agreement, it is necessary to record in any way whatsoever criminal convictions of legal persons, and, if so, in a particular form, for instance in a criminal record.

50 The Court notes that an obligation to record convictions of legal persons does not follow from Article 31 or 36 EEA. These provisions prohibit unjustified restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. If anything, it would be the recording of such a conviction, and not the failure to record, that could amount to a restriction. Consequently, there is no legal basis for concluding that Article 31 or 36 EEA imposes an obligation to record convictions of legal persons.

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und der Richtlinie 2004/18 einen Staat, der Partei dieses Abkommens ist, dazu verpflichten, ein ebenso genaues Register über strafrechtlich verurteilte juristische Personen zu führen, wie es in einem EWR-Staat für natürliche Personen, die Dienstleistungserbringer sind, besteht.

47 Insbesondere existiert kein Sekundärrecht, das von den EWR-Staaten fordert, von Strafgerichten über juristische Personen verhängte strafrechtliche Sanktionen in ihre Strafregister aufzunehmen (eine Verpflichtung, die für strafrechtliche Sanktionen gegenüber natürlichen Personen vorgesehen sein kann).

48 Trotzdem verpflichtet Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 die EWR-Staaten, auch im Hinblick auf Dienstleistungserbringer, bei denen es sich um juristische Personen handelt, in irgendeiner Form Aufzeichnungen zu machen, die es ihnen ermöglichen, die im Rahmen der Verwaltungszusammenarbeit vorgesehene Verpflichtung zum Austausch von Informationen zu erfüllen. Die Art der Aufzeichnungen und ihre Verwaltung sind Sache des EWR-Staats, solange der Austausch wahrheitsgetreuer Informationen durch die EWR-Staaten laufend sichergestellt ist.

Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs

49 Das vorlegende Gericht fragt im Wesentlichen, ob es auf der Grundlage des EWR-Abkommens oder des Sekundärrechts, beispielsweise der in das EWR-Abkommen übernommenen Richtlinie 2006/123 oder der Richtlinie 2004/18, erforderlich ist, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen in irgendeiner Form zu erfassen und – wenn ja – ob dies in einer bestimmten Form, beispielsweise in einem Strafregister, zu erfolgen hat.

50 Der Gerichtshof hält fest, dass sich aus Artikel 31 oder Artikel 36 des EWR-Abkommens keine Verpflichtung zur Evidenthaltung von Verurteilungen juristischer Personen ableiten lässt. Diese Bestimmungen verbieten ungerechtfertigte Beschränkungen der Niederlassungsfreiheit und des freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs. Wenn überhaupt, wäre es die Evidenthaltung einer solchen Verurteilung, und nicht das Fehlen einer solchen Aufzeichnung, aus der sich eine Beschränkung ergeben könnte. Dementsprechend fehlt es an einer Rechtsgrundlage für die Schlussfolgerung, dass Artikel 31 oder Artikel 36 des EWR-Abkommens eine Verpflichtung zur Evidenthaltung von Verurteilungen juristischer Personen vorsehen.

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51 The requesting court has made reference to Directive 2004/18 and Directive 2006/123 as examples of potentially relevant secondary law. However, these directives do not require EEA States to enter criminal sanctions imposed by criminal courts on legal persons onto their criminal records.

52 Article 45(1) of Directive 2004/18 excludes economic operators convicted of certain criminal offences (participation in a criminal organisation, corruption, fraud and money laundering) from participating in a public contract. Article 45(2)(c) of the same Directive allows EEA States to exclude an economic operator from participation in a contract if he has been convicted by a judgment which has the force of res judicata in accordance with the legal provisions of the country of any offence concerning his professional conduct. Pursuant to Article 45(3)(a) of Directive 2004/18, EEA States shall accept extracts from the judicial record or equivalent documents as sufficient evidence that no such conviction took place.

53 In the case before the referring court, the criminal offence relates to the undertaking’s social security obligations. While Article 45(2)(e) of Directive 2004/18 does refer to failure to comply with obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions as grounds for excluding an economic operator from participation in a contract, Article 45 of Directive 2004/18 does not oblige EEA States to issue extracts from the judicial record or equivalent documents, whether in relation to natural or to legal persons, since the second subparagraph of Article 45(3) of the Directive expressly anticipates the possibility that an EEA State does not issue such documents, providing instead that such evidence may be replaced by a declaration on oath or a solemn declaration. Article 45 of Directive 2004/18 therefore does not oblige an EEA State to keep a record in the case at hand since there is no underlying obligation to supply the information in question.

54 Directive 2006/123 does not require EEA States to establish and keep a criminal record for sanctions, actions and decisions directly relevant

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51 Das ersuchende Gericht hat auf die Richtlinie 2004/18 und die Richtlinie 2006/123 als Beispiele für potenziell massgebliches Sekundärrecht verwiesen. Diese Richtlinien fordern von den EWR-Staaten jedoch nicht, von Strafgerichten über juristische Personen verhängte strafrechtliche Sanktionen in ihre Strafregister aufzunehmen.

52 Artikel 45 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2004/18 schliesst Wirtschaftsteilnehmer, die für bestimmte Delikte (Beteiligung an einer kriminellen Organisation, Bestechung, Betrug und Geldwäsche) verurteilt wurden, von der Teilnahme an einem Vergabeverfahren aus. Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe c dieser Richtlinie erlaubt es den EWR-Staaten, einen Wirtschaftsteilnehmer von der Teilnahme an einem Vergabeverfahren auszuschliessen, wenn er aufgrund eines nach den Rechtsvorschriften des betreffenden Landes rechtskräftigen Urteils wegen eines Deliktes bestraft worden ist, das seine berufliche Zuverlässigkeit in Frage stellt. Gemäss Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a der Richtlinie 2004/18 sollen EWR-Staaten einen Auszug aus dem Strafregister oder eine gleichwertige Urkunde als ausreichenden Nachweis dafür akzeptieren, dass eine solche Verurteilung nicht erfolgt ist.

53 Das Delikt in der vor dem vorlegenden Gericht anhängigen Rechtssache betrifft die Sozialversicherungspflichten des Unternehmens. Während Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe e der Richtlinie 2004/18 die Nichterfüllung der Verpflichtung zur Zahlung der Sozialbeiträge als Grund für den Ausschluss eines Wirtschaftsteilnehmers von der Teilnahme an einem Vergabeverfahren nennt, verpflichtet Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 die EWR-Staaten nicht zur Ausstellung von Auszügen aus dem Strafregister oder gleichwertigen Urkunden – weder für natürliche noch für juristische Personen – da Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Unterabsatz 2 der Richtlinie ausdrücklich die Möglichkeit berücksichtigt, dass ein EWR-Staat keine derartigen Urkunden ausstellt, und stattdessen vorsieht, dass ein solcher Nachweis durch eine eidesstattliche Erklärung oder eine förmliche Erklärung ersetzt werden kann. Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 verpflichtet die EWR-Staaten daher im gegenständlichen Fall nicht zur Führung eines Registers, da es keine entsprechende Anforderung zur Übermittlung der fraglichen Informationen gibt.

54 Nach der Richtlinie 2006/123 obliegt es den EWR-Staaten nicht, ein Strafregister für Sanktionen, Massnahmen und Entscheidungen, die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des

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to the provider’s competence or professional reliability where the

provider is a legal person.

55 Nevertheless, Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 obliges EEA States to

keep, also with respect to providers who are legal persons, some kind

of record of criminal sanctions, disciplinary and administrative actions

and decisions concerning insolvency or bankruptcy involving fraud

taken by their competent authorities, in accordance with national law, in

respect of service providers but only to the extent necessary to comply

with the administrative cooperation obligations specified in relation

to exchange of information. However, these obligations relating to

exchange of information refer only to sanctions, actions and decisions

directly relevant to the provider’s competence or professional reliability,

in order to ensure the supervision of providers and the services they

provide, in so far as these are governed by the Directive.

56 This means that both the type of record and its handling remain at

the discretion of the EEA State in question, so long as this meets the

purpose of ensuring possible future exchanges of information between

EEA States.

57 The answer to the question from the referring court must therefore be that

the EEA Agreement does not require that convictions by a criminal court

of legal persons be clearly recorded. However, provisions such as Article

45 of Directive 2004/18 and Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 require

EEA States to provide information upon request from another EEA State

on convictions relevant to the competence and professional reliability of

legal persons. The framework for the maintenance and handling of such

information is a matter for national law.

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Dienstleistungserbringers sind, einzurichten und zu führen, wenn es sich

beim Dienstleistungserbringer um eine juristische Person handelt.

55 Nichtsdestotrotz sind EWR-Staaten nach Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123

verpflichtet, auch für Dienstleistungserbringer, bei denen es sich um

juristische Personen handelt, in irgendeiner Form Aufzeichnungen über

strafrechtliche Sanktionen, Disziplinar- und Verwaltungsmassnahmen

und Entscheidungen wegen Insolvenz oder Konkurs mit betrügerischer

Absicht, die von den zuständigen Behörden gemäss nationalem Recht

gegen einen Dienstleistungserbringer verhängt wurden, zu führen; dies

jedoch nur in dem Ausmass, das zur Erfüllung der Verpflichtungen zur

Verwaltungszusammenarbeit in Bezug auf den Austausch von Informationen

erforderlich ist. Diese Verpflichtungen im Zusammenhang mit dem Austausch

von Informationen betreffen allerdings nur Sanktionen, Massnahmen und

Entscheidungen, die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche

Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers sind, um so die Kontrolle der

Dienstleistungserbringer und der von ihnen erbrachten Dienstleistungen zu

gewährleisten, soweit sie von der Richtlinie erfasst werden.

56 Dies bedeutet, dass sowohl die Art der Aufzeichnungen als auch ihre

Verwaltung Sache des betreffenden EWR-Staats sind, solange dabei der

Zweck, den möglichen zukünftigen Austausch von Informationen zwischen

den EWR-Staaten zu gewährleisten, erfüllt wird.

57 Die Frage des vorlegenden Gerichts ist daher dahingehend zu

beantworten, dass es das EWR-Abkommen nicht gebietet, dass

strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen evident zu halten

sind. Bestimmungen wie Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 und Artikel 33

der Richtlinie 2006/123 können jedoch erfordern, dass EWR-Staaten auf

Anfrage eines anderen EWR-Staats Auskünfte über Verurteilungen, die

für die Kompetenz und berufliche Zuverlässigkeit juristischer Personen

massgeblich sind, erteilen. Die Schaffung des Rahmens für die Erfassung

und Verwaltung solcher Informationen ist Sache des nationalen Rechts.

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V COSTS

58 The costs incurred by the Liechtenstein, Netherlands and Norwegian Governments, ESA and the Commission, which have all submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are a step in the proceedings pending before the Princely Court, any decision on costs concerning those proceedings is a matter for that court.

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V KOSTEN

58 Die Auslagen der Regierungen des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, der Niederlande und Norwegens, der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde und der Kommission, die vor dem Gerichtshof Erklärungen abgegeben haben, sind nicht erstattungsfähig. Da es sich bei diesem Verfahren um einen Zwischenstreit in einem beim Fürstlichen Landgericht anhängigen Rechtsstreit handelt, ist die Kostenentscheidung betreffend dieses Verfahren Sache dieses Gerichts.

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On those grounds,

THE COURT

in answer to the question referred to it by the Fürstliches Landgericht des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, hereby gives the following Advisory Opinion:

Articles 31 and 36 of the EEA Agreement do not require that a criminal conviction of a legal person be clearly recorded. Provisions such as Article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC and Article 33 of Directive 2006/123/EC may require an EEA State to provide information, upon request from another EEA State, on convictions relevant to the competence and professional reliability of legal persons. However, these Directives leave the maintenance and handling of relevant information to national law.

Carl Baudenbacher Per Christiansen Páll Hreinsson

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 November 2014.

Gunnar Selvik Carl Baudenbacher

Registrar President

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Aus diesen Gründen erstellt

DER GERICHTSHOF

in Beantwortung der ihm vom Fürstlichen Landgericht des Fürstentums Liechtenstein vorgelegten Frage folgendes Gutachten:

Die Artikel 31 und 36 des EWR-Abkommens gebieten es nicht, dass eine strafgerichtliche Verurteilung einer juristischen Person evident zu halten ist. Bestimmungen wie Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18/EG und Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123/EG können jedoch von einem EWR-Staat erfordern, dass er auf Anfrage eines anderen EWR-Staats Auskünfte über Verurteilungen, die für die Kompetenz und berufliche Zuverlässigkeit juristischer Personen massgeblich sind, erteilt. Diese Richtlinien überlassen die Erfassung und Verwaltung der entsprechenden Informationen jedoch dem nationalen Recht.


Verkündet in öffentlicher Sitzung in Luxemburg am 10. November 2014.


Kanzler Präsident

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REPORT FOR THE HEARING

in Case E-9/14

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by the Princely Court of Liechtenstein (Fürstliches Landgericht des Fürstentums Liechtenstein) in the

proceedings concerning

Otto Kaufmann AG

on the interpretation of EEA law with regard to the recording of criminal convictions of legal persons.

I LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law

1. Article 31 EEA reads:

1. Within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be no restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of an EC Member State or an EFTA State in the territory of any other of these States. This shall also apply to the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any EC Member State or EFTA State established in the territory of any of these States.

Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of Article 34, second paragraph, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of Chapter 4.

2. Annexes VIII to XI contain specific provisions on the right of establishment.


1. Within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be no restrictions on freedom to provide services within the territory of the

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SITZUNGSBERICHT

in der Rechtssache E-9/14

ANTRAG des Fürstlichen Landgerichts des Fürstentums Liechtenstein an den Gerichtshof gemäss Artikel 34 des Abkommens der EFTA-Staaten über die Errichtung

einer EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde und eines EFTA-Gerichtshofs in der vor ihm anhängigen Rechtssache

Otto Kaufmann AG

betreffend die Auslegung des EWR-Rechts im Zusammenhang mit der Evidenthaltung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen juristischer Personen.

I RECHTLICHER HINTERGRUND

EWR-Recht

1. Artikel 31 des EWR-Abkommens lautet:

(1) Im Rahmen dieses Abkommens unterliegt die freie Niederlassung von Staatsangehörigen eines EG-Mitgliedstaats oder eines EFTA-Staates im Hoheitsgebiet eines dieser Staaten keinen Beschränkungen. Das gilt gleichermaßen für die Gründung von Agenturen, Zweigniederlassungen oder Tochtergesellschaften durch Angehörige eines EG-Mitgliedstaats oder eines EFTA-Staates, die im Hoheitsgebiet eines dieser Staaten ansässig sind.

Vorbehaltlich des Kapitels 4 umfasst die Niederlassungsfreiheit die Aufnahme und Ausübung selbständiger Erwerbstätigkeiten sowie die Gründung und Leitung von Unternehmen, insbesondere von Gesellschaften im Sinne des Artikels 34 Absatz 2, nach den Bestimmungen des Aufnahmestaats für seine eigenen Angehörigen.

(2) Die besonderen Bestimmungen über das Niederlassungsrecht sind in den Anhängen VIII bis XI enthalten.


(1) Im Rahmen dieses Abkommens unterliegt der freie Dienstleistungsverkehr im Gebiet der Vertragsparteien für Angehörige der EG-Mitgliedstaaten und der EFTA-Staaten, die in einem anderen

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Contracting Parties in respect of nationals of EC Member States and EFTA States who are established in an EC Member State or an EFTA State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.

2. Annexes IX to XI contain specific provisions on the freedom to provide services.


Where cooperation takes the form of an exchange of information between public authorities, the EFTA States shall have the same rights to receive, and obligations to provide, information as EC Member States, subject to the requirements of confidentiality, which shall be fixed by the EEA Joint Committee.

4. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (“Directive 96/71”) (OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1) was incorporated into Annex XVIII to the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 37/98 of 30 April 1998 (“Decision No 37/98”) (OJ 1998 L 310, p. 25, and EEA Supplement No 48, p. 260). Decision No 37/98 entered into force on 1 July 1999. The deadline for transposition in the EEA was on the same day.

5. Article 4(2) of Directive 96/71 reads:

Member States shall make provision for cooperation between the public authorities which, in accordance with national legislation, are responsible for monitoring the terms and conditions of employment referred to in Article 3. Such cooperation shall in particular consist in replying to reasoned requests from those authorities for information on the transnational hiring-out of workers, including manifest abuses or possible cases of unlawful transnational activities.

…

6. Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (“Directive 2004/18”) (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114) was incorporated with certain adaptations into Annex XVI to the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 68/2006 of

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EG-Mitgliedstaat beziehungsweise in einem anderen EFTA-Staat als demjenigen des Leistungsempfängers ansässig sind, keinen Beschränkungen.

(2) Die besonderen Bestimmungen über den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr sind in den Anhängen IX bis XI enthalten.


Unter Beachtung der Erfordernisse der Vertraulichkeit, die vom Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschuß festgelegt werden, haben die EFTA-Staaten im Falle der Zusammenarbeit in Form eines Informationsaustauschs zwischen Behörden das gleiche Informationsrecht und die gleiche Informationspflicht wie die EG-Mitgliedstaaten.

4. Die Richtlinie 96/71/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 16. Dezember 1996 über die Entsendung von Arbeitnehmern im Rahmen der Erbringung von Dienstleistungen („Richtlinie 96/71“) (ABl. 1997 L 18, S. 1) wurde mittels Beschluss des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 37/98 vom 30. April 1998 („Beschluss Nr. 37/98“) (ABl. 1998 L 310, S. 25, und EWR-Beilage Nr. 48, S. 260) in Anhang XVIII des EWR-Abkommens aufgenommen. Der Beschluss Nr. 37/98 trat am 1. Juli 1999 in Kraft. Dieses Datum war auch der Stichtag für die Umsetzung im EWR.

5. Artikel 4 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 96/71 lautet:

Die Mitgliedstaaten sehen die Zusammenarbeit der Behörden vor, die entsprechend den einzelstaatlichen Rechtsvorschriften für die Überwachung der in Artikel 3 aufgeführten Arbeits- und Beschäftigungsbedingungen zuständig sind. Diese Zusammenarbeit besteht insbesondere darin, begründete Anfragen dieser Behörden zu beantworten, die das länderübergreifende Zurverfügungstellen von Arbeitnehmern, einschließlich offenkundiger Verstöße oder Fälle von Verdacht auf unzulässige länderübergreifende Tätigkeiten, betreffen.

…

6. Die Richtlinie 2004/18/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 31. März 2004 über die Koordinierung der Verfahren zur Vergabe öffentlicher Bauaufträge, Lieferaufträge und Dienstleistungsaufträge („Richtlinie 2004/18“) (ABl. 2004 L 134, S. 114) wurde mit bestimmten Anpassungen mittels Beschluss des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 68/2006 vom

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2 June 2006 (“Decision No 68/2006”) (OJ 2006 L 245, p. 22, and EEA Supplement No 44, p. 18). According to information on the EFTA Secretariat website, Decision No 68/2006 entered into force on 18 April 2007. The deadline for transposition in the EEA was on the same day. However, according to Article 2 of the Annex to Decision No 68/2006, the compliance date for Liechtenstein was 18 months later, that is on 18 October 2008.

7. Recital 43 in the preamble to Directive 2004/18 reads:

The award of public contracts to economic operators who have participated in a criminal organisation or who have been found guilty of corruption or of fraud to the detriment of the financial interests of the European Communities or of money laundering should be avoided. Where appropriate, the contracting authorities should ask candidates or tenderers to supply relevant documents and, where they have doubts concerning the personal situation of a candidate or tenderer, they may seek the cooperation of the competent authorities of the Member State concerned. The exclusion of such economic operators should take place as soon as the contracting authority has knowledge of a judgment concerning such offences rendered in accordance with national law that has the force of res judicata. If national law contains provisions to this effect, non-compliance with environmental legislation or legislation on unlawful agreements in public contracts which has been the subject of a final judgment or a decision having equivalent effect may be considered an offence concerning the professional conduct of the economic operator concerned or grave misconduct.

…

8. Article 45(2) to (4) of Directive 2004/18 reads:

2. Any economic operator may be excluded from participation in a contract where that economic operator:

…

(c) has been convicted by a judgment which has the force of res judicata in accordance with the legal provisions of the country of any offence concerning his professional conduct;

…

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2. Juni 2006 („Beschluss Nr. 68/2006“) (ABl. 2006 L 245, S. 22, und EWR-Beilage Nr. 44, S. 18) in Anhang XVI des EWR-Abkommens aufgenommen. Laut den Angaben auf der Website des EFTA-Sekretariats trat der Beschluss Nr. 68/2006 am 18. April 2007 in Kraft. Dieses Datum war auch der Stichtag für die Umsetzung im EWR. Gemäss Artikel 2 des Anhangs zu Beschluss Nr. 68/2006 war das Umsetzungsdatum für Liechtenstein jedoch 18 Monate später, d. h. am 18. Oktober 2008.

7. Erwägungsgrund 43 der Präambel der Richtlinie 2004/18 lautet:

Es sind Vorkehrungen zu treffen, um der Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge an Wirtschaftsteilnehmer, die sich an einer kriminellen Vereinigung beteiligt oder der Bestechung oder des Betrugs zu Lasten der finanziellen Interessen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften oder der Geldwäsche schuldig gemacht haben, vorzubeugen. Die öffentlichen Auftraggeber sollten gegebenenfalls von den Bewerbern/Bietern geeignete Unterlagen anfordern und, wenn sie Zweifel in Bezug auf die persönliche Lage dieser Bewerber/Bieter hegen, die zuständigen Behörden des betreffenden Mitgliedstaates um Mitarbeit ersuchen können. Diese Wirtschaftsteilnehmer sollten ausgeschlossen werden, wenn dem öffentlichen Auftraggeber bekannt ist, dass es eine nach einzelstaatlichem Recht ergangene endgültige und rechtskräftige gerichtliche Entscheidung zu derartigen Straftaten gibt. Enthält das nationale Recht entsprechende Bestimmungen, so kann ein Verstoß gegen das Umweltrecht oder gegen Rechtsvorschriften über unrechtmäßige Absprachen bei öffentlichen Aufträgen, der mit einem rechtskräftigen Urteil oder einem Beschluss gleicher Wirkung geahndet wurde, als Delikt, das die berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Wirtschaftsteilnehmers in Frage stellt, oder als schwere Verfehlung betrachtet werden.

…

8. Die Absätze 2 bis 4 von Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 lauten:

(2) Von der Teilnahme am Vergabeverfahren kann jeder Wirtschaftsteilnehmer ausgeschlossen werden,

…

c) die aufgrund eines nach den Rechtsvorschriften des betreffenden Landes rechtskräftigen Urteils wegen eines Deliktes bestraft worden sind, das ihre berufliche Zuverlässigkeit in Frage stellt;

…

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3. Contracting authorities shall accept the following as sufficient

evidence that none of the cases specified in paragraphs … or 2… (c)…

applies to the economic operator:

(a) as regards paragraphs … 2… (c), the production of an extract from

the ‘judicial record’ or, failing that, of an equivalent document issued

by a competent judicial or administrative authority in the country of

origin or the country whence that person comes showing that these

requirements have been met;

…

Where the country in question does not issue such documents or

certificates, or where these do not cover all the cases specified in

paragraphs … 2… (c), they may be replaced by a declaration on oath

or, in Member States where there is no provision for declarations on

oath, by a solemn declaration made by the person concerned before a

competent judicial or administrative authority, a notary or a competent

professional or trade body, in the country of origin or in the country

whence that person comes.

4. Member States shall designate the authorities and bodies competent

to issue the documents, certificates or declarations referred to in

paragraph 3 and shall inform the Commission thereof. Such notification

shall be without prejudice to data protection law.

9. Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications

(“Directive 2005/36”) (OJ 2005 L 255, p. 22), was incorporated with

certain adaptations into Annex VII to the EEA Agreement by Decision of

the EEA Joint Committee No 142/2007 of 26 October 2007 (“Decision

No 142/2007”) (OJ 2008 L 100, p. 70, and EEA Supplement No 19, p.

70). According to the EFTA Secretariat website, Decision No 142/2007

entered into force on 1 July 2009. The deadline for transposition in the

EEA was on the same day.

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(3) Als ausreichenden Nachweis dafür, dass die in ... Absatz 2 Buchstaben ... c ... genannten Fälle auf den Wirtschaftsteilnehmer nicht zutreffen, akzeptiert der öffentliche Auftraggeber

a) im Fall von ... Absatz 2 Buchstaben ... c einen Auszug aus dem Strafregister oder – in Ermangelung eines solchen – eine gleichwertige Urkunde einer zuständigen Gerichts- oder Verwaltungsbehörde des Ursprungs- oder Herkunftslands, aus der hervorgeht, dass diese Anforderungen erfüllt sind;

…

Wird eine Urkunde oder Bescheinigung von dem betreffenden Land nicht ausgestellt oder werden darin nicht alle in ... Absatz 2 Buchstaben ... c vorgesehenen Fälle erwähnt, so kann sie durch eine eidesstattliche Erklärung oder in den Mitgliedstaaten, in denen es keine eidesstattliche Erklärung gibt, durch eine förmliche Erklärung ersetzt werden, die der betreffende Wirtschaftsteilnehmer vor einer zuständigen Gerichts- oder Verwaltungsbehörde, einem Notar oder einer dafür qualifizierten Berufsorganisation des Ursprungs- oder Herkunftslands abgibt.

(4) Die Mitgliedstaaten benennen die für die Ausgabe der Urkunden, Bescheinigungen oder Erklärungen nach Absatz 3 zuständigen Behörden und Stellen und unterrichten davon die Kommission. Die datenschutzrechtlichen Bestimmungen bleiben von dieser Mitteilung unberührt.

9. Die Richtlinie 2005/36/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates

vom 7. September 2005 über die Anerkennung von Berufsqualifikationen

(„Richtlinie 2005/36“) (ABl. 2005 L 255, S. 22) wurde mit bestimmten

Anpassungen mittels Beschluss des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses

Nr. 142/2007 vom 26. Oktober 2007 („Beschluss Nr. 142/2007“) (ABl.

2008 L 100, S. 70, und EWR-Beilage Nr. 19, S. 70) in Anhang VII des

EWR-Abkommens aufgenommen. Laut den Angaben auf der Website des

EFTA-Sekretariats trat der Beschluss Nr. 142/2007 am 1. Juli 2009 in

Kraft. Dieses Datum war auch der Stichtag für die Umsetzung im EWR.

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10. Article 56(2) of Directive 2005/36 reads:1

The competent authorities of the host and home Member States shall exchange information regarding disciplinary action or criminal sanctions taken or any other serious, specific circumstances which are likely to have consequences for the pursuit of activities under this Directive …

11. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (“Directive 2006/123”) (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36), was incorporated with certain adaptations into Annex X to the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 45/2009 of 9 June 2009 (“Decision No 45/2009”) (OJ 2009 L 162, p. 23, and EEA Supplement No 33, p. 8). According to the EFTA Secretariat website, Decision No 45/2009 entered into force on 1 May 2010. The deadline for transposition in the EEA was on the same day.

12. Recitals 105 and 111 in the preamble to Directive 2006/123 read:

(105) Administrative cooperation is essential to make the internal market in services function properly. Lack of cooperation between Member States results in proliferation of rules applicable to providers or duplication of controls for cross-border activities, and can also be used by rogue traders to avoid supervision or to circumvent applicable national rules on services. It is, therefore, essential to provide for clear, legally binding obligations for Member States to cooperate effectively.

…

(111) The provisions of this Directive concerning exchange of information regarding the good repute of providers should not

1 Directive 2005/36 has been amended several times, most recently by Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 (“Directive 2013/55”). That amendment has consequences for the wording of Article 56(2). However, Directive 2013/55 has not yet been incorporated into the EEA Agreement. Moreover, according to its Article 3, the deadline for transposition of Directive 2013/55 in the EU is 18 January 2016.

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10. Artikel 56 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 2005/36 lautet:1

Die zuständigen Behörden im Aufnahme- und im Herkunftsmitgliedstaat unterrichten sich gegenseitig über das Vorliegen disziplinarischer oder strafrechtlicher Sanktionen oder über sonstige schwerwiegende, genau bestimmte Sachverhalte, die sich auf die Ausübung der in dieser Richtlinie erfassten Tätigkeiten auswirken könnten …

11. Die Richtlinie 2006/123/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 12. Dezember 2006 über Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt („Richtlinie 2006/123“) (ABl. 2006 L 376, S. 36) wurde mit bestimmten Anpassungen mittels Beschluss des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 45/2009 vom 9. Juni 2009 („Beschluss Nr. 45/2009“) (ABl. 2009 L 162, S. 23, und EWR-Beilage Nr. 33, S. 8) in Anhang X des EWR-Abkommens aufgenommen. Laut den Angaben auf der Website des EFTA-Sekretariats trat der Beschluss Nr. 45/2009 am 1. Mai 2010 in Kraft. Dieses Datum war auch der Stichtag für die Umsetzung im EWR.

12. Die Erwägungsgründe 105 und 111 der Präambel der Richtlinie 2006/123 lauten:

(105) Für ein reibungsloses Funktionieren des Binnenmarktes für Dienstleistungen ist eine Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungen unerlässlich. Mangelnde Zusammenarbeit zwischen Mitgliedstaaten führt zu einer Zunahme von Vorschriften für Dienstleistungserbringer oder zu doppelten Kontrollen von grenzüberschreitenden Tätigkeiten und kann auch von unseriösen Geschäftemachern dazu genutzt werden, sich einer Kontrolle zu entziehen oder auf Dienstleistungen anwendbare nationale Vorschriften zu umgehen. Es ist daher unverzichtbar, klare und rechtsverbindliche Verpflichtungen der Mitgliedstaaten zur wirksamen Zusammenarbeit festzulegen.

…

(111) Die sich auf den Austausch von Informationen über die Zuverlässigkeit der Dienstleistungserbringer beziehenden Bestimmungen dieser

1 Richtlinie 2005/36 wurde mehrfach geändert, zuletzt durch Richtlinie 2013/55/EU des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 20. November 2013 („Richtlinie 2013/55“). Diese Änderung wirkt sich auf den Wortlaut von Artikel 56 Absatz 2 aus. Die Richtlinie 2013/55 wurde jedoch noch nicht in das EWR-Abkommen aufgenommen. Zudem ist gemäss Artikel 3 der Stichtag für die Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2013/55 in der EU der 18. Januar 2016.

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pre-empt initiatives in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, in particular on the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities of the Member States and on criminal records.

13. Article 33(1) of Directive 2006/123 reads:

Member States shall, at the request of a competent authority in another Member State, supply information, in conformity with their national law, on disciplinary or administrative actions or criminal sanctions and decisions concerning insolvency or bankruptcy involving fraud taken by their competent authorities in respect of the provider which are directly relevant to the provider’s competence or professional reliability. ...

National law

14. Pursuant to Section 1(1) of the Act of 2 July 1974 on Criminal Records and the Removal of Convictions from the Records (Criminal Records Act, LR 330), a criminal record shall be kept for the purpose of recording criminal convictions. According to Section 1(2), the responsibility for maintaining the record shall be assigned to an individual judge of the Princely Court. According to the request for an advisory opinion, the decision whether a conviction handed down must be entered on the criminal record is regarded as a judicial activity under Liechtenstein law.

15. Section 2(1) of the Criminal Records Act establishes that all convictions handed down by domestic courts in relation to criminal offences or misdemeanours shall be entered on the criminal record. It is unclear, however, whether the conviction of a legal person must be entered on the criminal record.

II FACTS AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT

16. By judgment of 23 January 2014, the Princely Court of Liechtenstein convicted Otto Kaufmann AG, a company registered in Liechtenstein, for not transferring to the pension foundation employee and employer contributions to the occupational pension scheme although such were withheld from wages. The sentence was a fine of CHF 700.

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Richtlinie sollten Initiativen im Bereich der polizeilichen und justiziellen Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen nicht vorgreifen, insbesondere nicht Initiativen zum Austausch von Informationen zwischen den Strafverfolgungsbehörden und über Strafregister der Mitgliedstaaten.

13. Artikel 33 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2006/123 lautet:

Auf Ersuchen einer zuständigen Behörde eines anderen Mitgliedstaats übermitteln die Mitgliedstaaten unter Beachtung ihres nationalen Rechts Informationen über Disziplinar- oder Verwaltungsmaßnahmen oder strafrechtliche Sanktionen und Entscheidungen wegen Insolvenz oder Konkurs mit betrügerischer Absicht, die von ihren zuständigen Behörden gegen einen Dienstleistungserbringer verhängt wurden und die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers sind. ...

Nationales Recht

14. Gemäss Artikel 1 Absatz 1 des Gesetzes vom 2. Juli 1974 über das Strafregister und die Tilgung gerichtlicher Verurteilungen (Strafregistergesetz, LR 330) wird zum Zwecke der Evidenthaltung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen ein Strafregister geführt. Laut Artikel 1 Absatz 2 obliegt die Führung des Strafregisters dem Landgericht durch einen Einzelrichter. Dem Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung zufolge handelt es sich bei der Entscheidung, ob eine ausgesprochene Verurteilung in das Strafregister eingetragen wird, nach liechtensteinischem Recht um eine richterliche Tätigkeit.

15. Artikel 2 Absatz 1 des Strafregistergesetzes sieht vor, dass alle rechtskräftigen Verurteilungen durch inländische Strafgerichte wegen Verbrechens oder Vergehens in das Strafregister aufzunehmen sind. Unklar ist jedoch, ob auch die Verurteilung einer juristischen Person in das Strafregister einzutragen ist.

II SACHVERHALT UND VERFAHREN VOR DEM NATIONALEN GERICHT

16. Mit Urteil des Fürstlichen Landgerichts des Fürstentums Liechtenstein vom 23. Januar 2014 wurde die Otto Kaufmann AG, ein in Liechtenstein eingetragenes Unternehmen, verurteilt, weil sie Arbeitnehmer- und Arbeitgeberbeiträge zur betrieblichen Pensionsvorsorge, obwohl sie diese einbehielt, nicht an die Vorsorgestiftung weitergeleitet hat. Es wurde eine Geldstrafe in Höhe von CHF 700 verhängt.

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17. Subsequently, the judgment was sent for registration to the judge of the Princely Court who maintains the criminal record.

18. The Liechtenstein public prosecutor’s office was invited to submit observations on the proposal to enter the conviction on the criminal record. In its reply of 24 February 2014, the prosecutor’s office stated its opposition to entering the conviction on the criminal record on the basis that Otto Kaufmann AG is a legal person and not a natural person.

19. On 18 March 2014, the Princely Court decided to seek an advisory opinion from the Court, and referred the following question:

Does the EEA Agreement, in particular the provisions on the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment and/or individual acts of secondary law (for example, Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts or Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, which have both been incorporated into EEA law), require that where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court those convictions must also be clearly recorded, for example, in a criminal record?

20. The national court observes that there is no international element to the case. However, in its view, the request for an advisory opinion is nevertheless admissible since the question is capable of producing effects which are not confined to Liechtenstein. In this regard, the national court refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) in Case C367/12 Sokoll-Seebacher.2

III WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS

21. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute of the Court and Article 97 of the Rules of Procedure, written observations have been received from:

2 Reference is made to Case C-367/12 Sokoll-Seebacher, judgment of 13 February 2014, published electronically, paragraphs 10 and 11.

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17. Anschliessend wurde das Urteil zur Eintragung an den für die Führung des Strafregisters zuständigen Landrichter des Fürstlichen Landgerichts übermittelt.

18. Die Liechtensteinische Staatsanwaltschaft wurde um Stellungnahme zur beabsichtigten Eintragung der Verurteilung ins Strafregister ersucht. In ihrer Antwort vom 24. Februar 2014 erklärte die Staatsanwaltschaft, einer Eintragung der Verurteilung in das Strafregister entgegenzutreten, da es sich bei der Otto Kaufmann AG um eine juristische Person und nicht um eine natürliche Person handle.

19. Am 18. März 2014 stellte das Fürstliche Landgericht beim Gerichtshof einen Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung und legte die folgende Frage vor.

Gebietet es das EWR-Abkommen, insbesondere die Bestimmungen über die Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit bzw. einzelne Sekundärrechtsakte (beispielsweise die Richtlinie 2004/18/EG über die Koordinierung der Verfahren zur Vergabe öffentlicher Bauaufträge, Lieferaufträge und Dienstleistungsaufträge oder die Richtlinie 2006/123/EG über Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt, welche beide in den EWR-Rechtsbestand übernommen wurden), dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen auch evident gehalten werden müssen, etwa im Wege eines Strafregisters?

20. Das nationale Gericht hält fest, dass diese Rechtssache keinerlei Auslandsbezug aufweist. Nach der im Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung geäusserten Auffassung des nationalen Gerichts ist die Vorlage jedoch trotzdem zulässig, da diese Fragestellung Wirkungen entfalten kann, die sich nicht auf Liechtenstein beschränken. In diesem Zusammenhang verweist das nationale Gericht auf das Urteil des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union (im Folgenden: EuGH) in der Rechtssache C-367/12 Sokoll-Seebacher.2

III SCHRIFTLICHE ERKLÄRUNGEN

21. Gemäss Artikel 20 der Satzung des Gerichtshofs und Artikel 97 der Verfahrensordnung haben schriftliche Erklärungen abgegeben:

2 Es wird auf die Rechtssache C-367/12 Sokoll-Seebacher, Urteil vom 13. Februar 2014, in elektronischer Form veröffentlicht, Randnrn. 10 und 11, verwiesen.

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– the Liechtenstein Government, represented by Dr Andrea Entner-Koch, Director, and Thomas Bischof, Deputy Director, EEA Coordination Unit, acting as Agents;

– the Norwegian Government, represented by Torje Sunde, advokat, Office of the Attorney General (Civil Affairs), and Ingunn Skille Jansen, Senior Advisor, Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agents;

– the Netherlands Government, represented by Mielle Bulterman, Head, and Charlotte Schillemans, Staff Member, European Law Division, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agents;

– the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”), represented by Xavier Lewis, Director, and Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Temporary Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents; and

– the European Commission (“the Commission”), represented by Adrian Tokar and Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Members of its Legal Service, acting as Agents.

IV SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED

The Liechtenstein Government

22. The Liechtenstein Government focuses on those provisions of primary and secondary law which have been explicitly mentioned by the referring court.

23. The Liechtenstein Government submits that Directive 2004/18 does not require that, where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court, those convictions must also be clearly recorded. This can be seen from Article 45(3)(a), which states that the contracting authority shall accept as evidence that an economic operator has not been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct not only an extract from the judicial record but also an equivalent document, or a declaration on oath or solemn declaration.

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– die Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, vertreten durch Dr. Andrea Entner-Koch, Leiterin, und Thomas Bischof, Stv. Leiter, Stabstelle EWR, als Bevollmächtigte;

– die Regierung Norwegens, vertreten durch Torje Sunde, Advokat, Regierungsadvokat (Zivilsachen), und Ingunn Skille Jansen, Chefberaterin, Rechtsabteilung des Aussenministeriums, als Bevollmächtigte;

– die Regierung der Niederlande, vertreten durch Mielle Bulterman, Leiterin, und Charlotte Schillemans, Mitarbeiterin der Abteilung Europarecht der Rechtsabteilung des Aussenministeriums, als Bevollmächtigte;

– die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, vertreten durch Xavier Lewis, Direktor, und Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Beamtin (befristet), Abteilung Rechts- und Verwaltungsangelegenheiten, als Bevollmächtigte, und

– die Europäische Kommission (im Folgenden: Kommission), vertreten durch Adrian Tokar und Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Mitarbeiter des Juristischen Diensts der Kommission, als Bevollmächtigte.

IV ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER AUSFÜHRUNGEN

Die Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein

22. Die Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein konzentriert sich auf die vom vorlegenden Gericht ausdrücklich genannten primär- und sekundärrechtlichen Bestimmungen.

23. Der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein zufolge wird nach der Richtlinie 2004/18 nicht verlangt, dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen auch evident gehalten werden müssen. Dies geht aus Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a hervor, in dem es heisst, dass der öffentliche Auftraggeber als Nachweis dafür, dass ein Wirtschaftsteilnehmer nicht wegen eines Deliktes bestraft worden ist, das seine berufliche Zuverlässigkeit in Frage stellt, nicht nur einen Auszug aus dem Strafregister, sondern auch eine gleichwertige Urkunde oder eine eidesstattliche Erklärung oder eine förmliche Erklärung akzeptiert.

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24. Directive 2004/18 thus leaves it to the national legislature not only to allow for legal persons to be convicted, but also to decide whether and, if so, how these convictions will be recorded.

25. According to the Liechtenstein Government, Directive 2006/123 also does not require that, where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court, those convictions must also be clearly recorded.

26. Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 provides for the exchange of information between the EEA States on the good repute of service providers. That provision explicitly mentions the exchange of information on criminal sanctions directly relevant to the service provider’s competence or professional reliability. The provision of such information must be in accordance with the national law of the providing EEA State.

27. The Liechtenstein Government submits that, according to the ECJ, the Community legislature has the competence to take measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down in an internal market legal act, such as Directive 2006/123, are fully effective.3 This explains why the EEA/EFTA States have implemented Directive 2006/123 without any adaptation to Article 33 thereof, although justice and home affairs, including criminal law, as a general rule are not covered by the scope of the EEA Agreement.

28. However, the Liechtenstein Government continues, it follows from the wording of Directive 2006/123 that there is no legal obligation to keep available specific types of information. Directive 2006/123 is silent on that point. The Community legislature therefore left it to the Member States to decide upon the type of information on established service providers which it considers necessary to keep available and accessible in conformity with its national law in order to adequately supervise those service providers.

3 Reference is made to Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879, paragraph 48.

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24. Richtlinie 2004/18 überlässt es daher dem nationalen Gesetzgeber, nicht nur die Verurteilung juristischer Personen zu ermöglichen, sondern auch darüber zu entscheiden, ob und – wenn ja – wie diese Verurteilungen erfasst werden.

25. Der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein zufolge ist es auch nach der Richtlinie 2006/123 nicht geboten, dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen evident gehalten werden müssen.

26. Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 sieht einen Austausch von Informationen über die Zuverlässigkeit von Dienstleistungserbringern zwischen den EWR-Staaten vor. In dieser Bestimmung wird ausdrücklich auf den Austausch von Informationen über strafrechtliche Sanktionen, die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers sind, hingewiesen. Die Weitergabe derartiger Informationen muss unter Beachtung der nationalen Gesetze des übermittelnden EWR-Staats erfolgen.

27. Die Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein bringt vor, dass es laut EuGH Aufgabe des Gemeinschaftsgesetzgebers ist, Massnahmen in Bezug auf das Strafrecht der Mitgliedstaaten zu ergreifen, die seiner Meinung nach erforderlich sind, um die volle Wirksamkeit der von ihm in einer auf den Binnenmarkt anwendbaren Vorschrift wie Richtlinie 2006/123 erlassenen Rechtsnormen zu gewährleisten.3 Dies erklärt, warum die EWR-/EFTA-Staaten die Richtlinie 2006/123 ohne Anpassung von deren Artikel 33 in nationales Recht umgesetzt haben, obwohl Justiz und Inneres – einschliesslich Strafrecht – generell nicht in den Geltungsbereich des EWR-Abkommens fallen.

28. Allerdings, so die Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein weiter, ist aus dem Wortlaut der Richtlinie 2006/123 zu entnehmen, dass keine gesetzliche Verpflichtung zur Bereithaltung bestimmter Arten von Informationen besteht. Richtlinie 2006/123 schweigt dazu. Dementsprechend hat der Gemeinschaftsgesetzgeber den Mitgliedstaaten die Entscheidung darüber überlassen, bei welchen Arten von Informationen über ansässige Dienstleistungserbringer sie es für erforderlich halten, sie im Einklang mit dem nationalen Gesetz verfügbar und zugänglich zu halten, um diese Dienstleistungserbringer angemessen zu überwachen.

3 Es wird auf die Rechtssache C-176/03 Kommission ./. Rat, Slg. 2005, I-7879, Randnr. 48, verwiesen.

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29. According to the Liechtenstein Government, since more specific and clarifying provisions of secondary law governing administrative cooperation lay down no legal obligation to clearly record criminal court convictions of legal persons,4 it seems highly doubtful that the provisions of primary law may be interpreted to provide for an obligation to clearly record convictions.

30. In the alternative, should the Court conclude that there is an obligation under EEA law to clearly record convictions where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted, the Liechtenstein Government submits that there is, in any event, no obligation, neither in primary nor in secondary law, governing the form of recording. Therefore, there is no obligation explicitly to record convictions in a criminal record.

31. The Liechtenstein Government proposes that the Court should answer the question as follows:

The EEA Agreement, in particular the provisions on the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment and/or individual acts of secondary law (for example, Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts or Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, which have both been incorporated into EEA law) does not require that where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court those convictions must also be clearly recorded, for example, in a criminal record.

The Netherlands Government

32. In relation to primary EEA law, the Netherlands Government does not see how either Article 31 EEA (freedom of establishment) or Article 36 EEA (freedom to provide services) may give rise to an obligation to record. Neither the text nor the rationale of these provisions requires that the Member States record criminal convictions of legal persons.

4 Reference is made to recitals 5 and 6 in the preamble to Directive 2006/123.

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29. Da die spezifischeren und erläuternden Bestimmungen des Sekundärrechts über die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit laut der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein keine gesetzliche Verpflichtung vorsehen, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen evident zu halten,4 erscheint es höchst zweifelhaft, dass die Vorschriften des Primärrechts dahingehend ausgelegt werden können, dass sie eine Verpflichtung zur Evidenthaltung von Verurteilungen enthalten.

30. Alternativ bringt die Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein für den Fall vor, dass der Gerichtshof zu dem Schluss gelangen sollte, dass das EWR-Recht eine Verpflichtung zur Evidenthaltung von Verurteilungen enthält, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, dass keinesfalls eine Verpflichtung hinsichtlich der Art der Evidenthaltung, und zwar weder im Primär- noch im Sekundärrecht, besteht. Es gibt daher keine ausdrückliche Verpflichtung zur Eintragung von Verurteilungen in ein Strafregister.

31. Die Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein schlägt vor, dass der Gerichtshof die Frage folgendermassen beantwortet:

Das EWR-Abkommen, insbesondere die Bestimmungen über die Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit bzw. einzelne Sekundärrechtsakte (beispielsweise die Richtlinie 2004/18/EG über die Koordinierung der Verfahren zur Vergabe öffentlicher Bauaufträge, Lieferaufträge und Dienstleistungsaufträge oder die Richtlinie 2006/123/EG über Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt, welche beide in den EWR-Rechtsbestand übernommen wurden), gebietet nicht, dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen auch evident gehalten werden müssen, etwa im Wege eines Strafregisters.

Die Regierung der Niederlande

32. Mit Blick auf das EWR-Primärrecht kann die Regierung der Niederlande nicht nachvollziehen, wie entweder aus Artikel 31 (Niederlassungsfreiheit) oder Artikel 36 (freier Dienstleistungsverkehr) des EWR-Abkommens eine Eintragungspflicht abgeleitet werden kann. Weder der Wortlaut noch die Begründung dieser Bestimmungen erfordern die Evidenthaltung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen juristischer Personen.

4 Es wird auf die Erwägungsgründe 5 und 6 der Präambel der Richtlinie 2006/123 verwiesen.

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33. The Netherlands Government observes that Article 83 EEA does contain a reference to cooperation through the exchange of information between public authorities. However, this provision only stipulates that the EFTA States shall have the same rights to receive and obligations to provide information as EU Member States. According to the Netherlands Government, neither the text nor the rationale of either the TEU or the TFEU prescribes an obligation to record.

34. In relation to secondary EEA law, the Netherlands Government submits that recital 43 in the preamble to Directive 2004/18 makes clear that, within the scope of that directive, the exchange of information on criminal convictions is intended to enable contracting authorities to exclude criminals and criminal entities from participating in a tender.

35. According to the Netherlands Government, Article 45 of Directive 2004/18 provides for a clear framework and context whereby such information may be applied in a tendering procedure. However, it cannot be concluded from the wording of Article 45 that it imposes an obligation to record convictions of legal persons. First, it follows from the wording that it depends on the national law of the Member State involved whether information on legal persons must be delivered. Second, the third paragraph of the provision clearly provides for alternatives to an extract from the judicial record, such as a declaration on oath or solemn declaration, which may also suffice.

36. Therefore, the Netherlands Government considers that Directive 2004/18 does not in itself establish an obligation to record convictions of legal persons convicted by a criminal court. It does however impose an obligation to provide relevant information on such criminal convictions without requiring that this should be done through an extract from the judicial record.

37. The Netherlands Government submits that administrative cooperation between Member States is essential to make the internal market in services function properly. This is confirmed by recital 105 in the preamble to Directive 2006/123.

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33. Die Regierung der Niederlande merkt an, dass Artikel 83 des EWR-Abkommens einen Verweis auf eine Zusammenarbeit in Form eines Informationsaustauschs zwischen Behörden enthält. Diese Bestimmung legt jedoch nur fest, dass die EFTA-Staaten das gleiche Informationsrecht und die gleiche Informationspflicht wie die EU-Mitgliedstaaten haben. Der Regierung der Niederlande zufolge sehen weder der Wortlaut noch die Begründung des Vertrags über die Europäische Union oder des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union eine Eintragungspflicht vor.

34. Bezugnehmend auf abgeleitetes EWR-Recht erklärt die Regierung der Niederlande, dass aus Erwägungsgrund 43 der Präambel der Richtlinie 2004/18 hervorgeht, dass – innerhalb des Geltungsbereichs der Richtlinie – der Austausch von Informationen über strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen dazu dient, dass öffentliche Auftraggeber Straftäter und kriminelle Einrichtungen von der Teilnahme an Vergabeverfahren ausschliessen können.

35. Laut der Regierung der Niederlande schafft Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 einen eindeutigen Rahmen und Kontext für die Anwendung derartiger Informationen in einem Vergabeverfahren. Aus dem Wortlaut des Artikels 45 kann jedoch keine Verpflichtung abgeleitet werden, Verurteilungen juristischer Personen evident zu halten. Zum einen ist dem Wortlaut zu entnehmen, dass es vom nationalen Recht des beteiligten Mitgliedstaats abhängt, ob Informationen über juristische Personen vorzulegen sind. Zum anderen gehen aus dem dritten Absatz der Bestimmung klar Alternativen zu Strafregisterauszügen – wie eine eidesstattliche Erklärung oder eine förmliche Erklärung, die ebenfalls ausreichen können – hervor.

36. Infolgedessen geht die Regierung der Niederlande davon aus, dass die Richtlinie 2004/18 an sich keine Verpflichtung enthält, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen evident zu halten. Die Richtlinie sieht jedoch eine Verpflichtung zur Übermittlung einschlägiger Informationen über solche strafgerichtlichen Verurteilungen vor, ohne festzulegen, dass dies mittels Strafregisterauszug erfolgen soll.

37. Die Regierung der Niederlande bringt vor, dass eine Verwaltungszusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten für das reibungslose Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts für Dienstleistungen unerlässlich ist. Dies wird durch Erwägungsgrund 105 der Präambel der Richtlinie 2006/123 bestätigt.

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38. Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 obliges a Member State to supply information on the good repute of service providers. In the view of the Netherlands Government, it is clear from the wording of that provision that there is no requirement to record criminal convictions. As it refers to the supply of information “in conformity with their national law”, it does not require that convictions must be recorded in a criminal record. Consequently, if national law does not provide for the recording of convictions or prohibits it, Directive 2006/123 will respect this.

39. Furthermore, the Netherlands Government submits that it is clear from recital 111 in the preamble to Directive 2006/123 that the exchange of information on criminal records may occur outside the mechanism provided for in the directive. Although police and judicial cooperation in the EU is not part of the EEA Agreement, reference is made to Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States.5 It deals specifically with the issue of exchange of information from the criminal record. However, the obligation of recording and transmitting information is limited to natural persons only.

40. According to the Netherlands Government, it is important to take account of the fact that if the conviction of a legal person has not been noted and registered in a dedicated record, this may hinder the execution of an information request from another Member State. However, it does not make it impossible to supply adequate information. As Article 45(3) of Directive 2004/18 illustrates, there are alternatives to an extract from the judicial record.

41. Article 4(2) of Directive 96/71 concerns cooperation between public authorities in cases of unlawful transnational activities. However, in the view of the Netherlands Government, this provision leaves the level of cooperation to Member States and merely states that certain

5 OJ 2009 L 93, p. 23.

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38. Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 verpflichtet die Mitgliedstaaten zur Bereitstellung von Informationen über die Zuverlässigkeit von Dienstleistungserbringern. Nach Auffassung der Regierung der Niederlande geht aus dem Wortlaut dieser Bestimmung klar hervor, dass keine Verpflichtung besteht, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen evident zu halten. Die Formulierung, dass Mitgliedstaaten Informationen „unter Beachtung ihres nationalen Rechts“ übermitteln, erfordert nicht, dass Verurteilungen in ein Strafregister einzutragen sind. Wenn das nationale Recht also nicht vorsieht, dass Verurteilungen evident gehalten werden müssen, oder dies verbietet, steht Richtlinie 2006/123 dem nicht entgegen.

39. Darüber hinaus hält die Regierung der Niederlande fest, dass Erwägungsgrund 111 der Präambel der Richtlinie 2006/123 klarstellt, dass der Austausch von Strafregisterinformationen auch ausserhalb des in der Richtlinie vorgesehenen Mechanismus erfolgen kann. Obwohl die polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit in der EU nicht Teil des EWR-Abkommens ist, wird auf den Rahmenbeschluss 2009/315/JI des Rates vom 26. Februar 2009 über die Durchführung und den Inhalt des Austauschs von Informationen aus dem Strafregister zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten verwiesen.5 Dieser Beschluss beschäftigt sich ausdrücklich mit dem Thema des Austauschs von Informationen aus dem Strafregister. Die Verpflichtung zur Eintragung und Übermittlung von Informationen ist jedoch auf natürliche Personen beschränkt.

40. Laut der Regierung der Niederlande muss berücksichtigt werden, dass es für die Bearbeitung von Auskunftsersuchen anderer Mitgliedstaaten hinderlich sein kann, wenn die Verurteilung einer juristischen Person nicht in einem dafür vorgesehenen Register eingetragen und evident gehalten wird. Die Übermittlung der entsprechenden Informationen wird dadurch jedoch nicht unmöglich gemacht. Wie Artikel 45 Absatz 3 der Richtlinie 2004/18 illustriert, gibt es Alternativen zu Strafregisterauszügen.

41. Artikel 4 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 96/71 betrifft die Zusammenarbeit der Behörden im Falle von unzulässigen länderübergreifenden Tätigkeiten. Nach Ansicht der Regierung der Niederlande überlässt diese Bestimmung das Ausmass der Zusammenarbeit den Mitgliedstaaten und legt nur fest, dass bestimmte Informationen über mögliche Fälle von unzulässigen

5 ABl. 2009 L 93, S. 23.

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information on possible unlawful transnational activities should be

exchanged. Therefore, it does not require Member States to record

criminal convictions of legal persons.

42. Finally, the Netherlands Government refers to Article 56(2) of Directive

2005/36.6 The Government submits that although this provision relates to

the exchange of information on criminal sanctions, it does not require the

Member States to actively record criminal convictions. Furthermore, it only

applies to natural persons. Therefore, an obligation to record convictions

of legal persons cannot be derived from Directive 2005/36.

43. The Netherlands Government proposes that the Court should answer the

question as follows:

The EEA Agreement, in particular the provisions on the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment and/or individual acts of secondary law (for example, Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts or Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, which have both been incorporated into EEA law), does not require that where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court those convictions must also be clearly recorded, for example, in a criminal record.

However, Directive 2004/18/EC and Directive 2006/123/EC do require competent authorities of the Member States to provide information on the professional reliability of service providers, which may require the exchange of information on criminal convictions of legal persons. This requirement does not in itself entail an obligation to establish a criminal record for legal persons.

6 The Netherlands Government also refers to Article 56a(1) of Directive 2005/36. This provision was added by Directive 2013/55. As mentioned in footnote 1 above, Directive 2013/55 has not yet been incorporated into the EEA Agreement.

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länderübergreifenden Tätigkeiten ausgetauscht werden sollten. Sie verpflichtet die Mitgliedstaaten daher nicht zur Eintragung strafgerichtlicher Verurteilungen juristischer Personen.

42. Abschliessend nimmt die Regierung der Niederlande Bezug auf Artikel 56 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 2005/36.6 Obwohl sich diese Bestimmung auf den Austausch von Informationen über strafrechtliche Sanktionen bezieht, so die Regierung der Niederlande, fordert sie nicht, dass strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen durch die Mitgliedstaaten aktiv evident gehalten werden müssen. Zudem gilt dies nur für natürliche Personen. Somit kann aus der Richtlinie 2005/36 keine Verpflichtung abgeleitet werden, Verurteilungen von juristischen Personen evident zu halten.

43. Die Regierung der Niederlande schlägt vor, dass der Gerichtshof die Frage folgendermassen beantwortet:

Das EWR-Abkommen, insbesondere die Bestimmungen über die Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit bzw. einzelne Sekundärrechtsakte (beispielsweise die Richtlinie 2004/18/EG über die Koordinierung der Verfahren zur Vergabe öffentlicher Bauaufträge, Lieferaufträge und Dienstleistungsaufträge oder die Richtlinie 2006/123/EG über Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt, welche beide in den EWR-Rechtsbestand übernommen wurden), gebietet nicht, dass dann, wenn nationales Recht die Möglichkeit der strafgerichtlichen Verurteilung juristischer Personen vorsieht, diese Verurteilungen auch evident gehalten werden müssen, etwa im Wege eines Strafregisters.

Allerdings verpflichten Richtlinie 2004/18/EG und Richtlinie 2006/123/EG die zuständigen Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten zur Bereitstellung von Informationen über die berufliche Zuverlässigkeit von Dienstleistungserbringern, was einen Informationsaustausch über strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen erforderlich machen kann. Diese Anforderung bedingt nicht an sich eine Verpflichtung zur Führung eines Strafregisters für juristische Personen.

6 Die Regierung der Niederlande bezieht sich darüber hinaus auf Artikel 56a Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2005/36. Diese Bestimmung wurde durch die Richtlinie 2013/55 hinzugefügt. Wie in Fussnote 1 oben erwähnt, wurde die Richtlinie 2013/55 noch nicht in das EWR-Abkommen aufgenommen.

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The Norwegian Government

44. The Norwegian Government confines its observations to the question relating to the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment. In the opinion of the Government, that part of the question must be held inadmissible as hypothetical, since it is clear from the reference for an advisory opinion that there is no cross-border element.

45. The Norwegian Government submits that application of both the chapters of the Agreement on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services requires a cross-border element. This follows both from the wording of the Agreement7 and established case law.8

46. The Norwegian Government observes that the Court has held that it may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EEA law that is sought is unrelated to the facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it.9 On previous occasions, the Court has found hypothetical questions to be inadmissible.10

47. The Norwegian Government submits that, in a case where there is no indication of a cross-border element in the main proceedings, a question related to the interpretation of the freedoms of the Agreement

7 Reference is made to Article 31 (“of an EC Member State or an EFTA State in the territory of any other of these States”) and Article 36 EEA (“in respect of nationals of EC Member States and EFTA States who are established in an EC Member State or an EFTA State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended”).

8 Reference is made, inter alia, to Case 115/78 Knoors [1979] ECR 399, paragraph 24; Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v Debauve [1980] ECR 833, paragraph 9; Case C-60/91 Batista Morais [1992] ECR I-2085, paragraph 7; Joined Cases C-225/95 to C-227/95 Kapasakalis and Others [1998] ECR I-4239, paragraph 22; Joined Cases C-95/99 to C-98/99 and C-180/99 Khalil and Others [2001] ECR I-7413, paragraph 70; and Case C-104/08 Kurt, order of 19 June 2008, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 20 and 21.

9 Reference is made to Case E-13/11 Granville [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 400, paragraph 20; and, in addition, to Case E-17/11 Aresbank [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 916, paragraph 44.

10 Reference is made to Case E-6/96 Wilhelmsen [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 53, paragraph 40.

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Die Regierung Norwegens

44. Die Regierung Norwegens beschränkt sich in ihren Bemerkungen auf die Frage betreffend den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr und die Niederlassungsfreiheit. Nach Auffassung der Regierung Norwegens muss dieser Teil der Frage für unzulässig erklärt werden, da er hypothetischer Natur ist, geht doch aus dem Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung klar hervor, dass kein Auslandsbezug besteht.

45. Die Regierung Norwegens bringt vor, dass die Anwendung der beiden Kapitel des EWR-Abkommens über die Niederlassungsfreiheit und den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr einen Auslandsbezug erfordert. Dies lässt sich sowohl aus dem Wortlaut des Abkommens7 als auch aus der ständigen Rechtsprechung8 ableiten.

46. Die Regierung Norwegens führt aus, dass der Gerichtshof festgehalten hat, er könne das Ersuchen eines nationalen Gerichts nur zurückweisen, wenn die erbetene Auslegung des EWR-Rechts ganz offensichtlich in keiner Beziehung zum Sachverhalt oder zum Gegenstand des Ausgangsverfahrens steht, wenn das Problem hypothetischer Natur ist oder wenn der Gerichtshof nicht über die tatsächlichen oder rechtlichen Angaben verfügt, die für eine zweckdienliche Beantwortung der ihm vorgelegten Fragen erforderlich sind.9 Bei früheren Gelegenheiten hat der Gerichtshof hypothetische Fragen für unzulässig befunden.10

47. Die Regierung Norwegens bringt vor, dass eine Frage im Zusammenhang mit der Auslegung der Freiheiten gemäss Abkommen oder den zu ihrer Umsetzung angenommenen Rechtsvorschriften in einer Rechtssache

7 Es wird auf Artikel 31 („eines EG-Mitgliedstaats oder eines EFTA-Staates im Hoheitsgebiet eines dieser Staaten“) und Artikel 36 („für Angehörige der EG-Mitgliedstaaten und der EFTA-Staaten, die in einem anderen EG-Mitgliedstaat beziehungsweise in einem anderen EFTA-Staat als demjenigen des Leistungsempfängers ansässig sind“) des EWR-Abkommens verwiesen.

8 Es wird u. a. auf die Rechtssache 115/78 Knoors, Slg. 1979, S. 399, Randnr. 24, Rechtssache 52/79 Procureur du Roi ./. Debauve, Slg. 1980, S. 833, Randnr. 9, Rechtssache C-60/91 Batista Morais, Slg. 1992, I-2085, Randnr. 7, die verbundenen Rechtssachen C-225/95 bis C-227/95 Kapasakalis u. a., Slg. 1998, I-4239, Randnr. 22, die verbundenen Rechtssachen C-95/99 bis C-98/99 und C-180/99 Khalil u. a., Slg. 2001, I-7413, Randnr. 70, und Rechtssache C-104/08 Kurt, Beschluss vom 19. Juni 2008, nicht in der Sammlung veröffentlicht, Randnrn. 20 und 21, verwiesen.

9 Es wird auf die Rechtssache E-13/11 Granville, Slg. 2012, EFTA Court Report, S. 400, Randnr. 20, sowie zusätzlich auf Rechtssache E-17/11 Aresbank, Slg. 2012, EFTA Court Report, S. 916, Randnr. 44, verwiesen.

10 Es wird auf die Rechtssache E-6/96 Wilhelmsen, Slg. 1997, EFTA Court Report, S. 53, Randnr. 40, verwiesen.

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or acts adopted to implement them is by its nature hypothetical and therefore should be found inadmissible.

48. Were this not the case, the Norwegian Government continues, requests for an advisory opinion could in principle be made in all cases, also those concerning purely internal situations where any connection to EEA rules is absent. This would go beyond the aim of the advisory opinion procedure, which is to provide an interpretation of the Agreement against a factual background. The Court’s function is to assist in the administration of justice in the EEA States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions which have no bearing on the dispute in the main proceedings.11

49. According to the Norwegian Government, it also follows from the case law of the ECJ that questions of interpretation concerning the fundamental freedoms in cases where there is no cross-border element and thus no link between the relevant freedoms and the legal and factual circumstances in the main proceedings are held inadmissible.12

50. The Norwegian Government acknowledges that the ECJ, in some cases, has admitted a question relating to a case in which there is no cross-border element present in the main proceedings. The referring court has in that respect referred to Sokoll-Seebacher, cited above, paragraphs 10 to 12.

51. However, in the view of the Norwegian Government, the reasoning in Sokoll-Seebacher is based on circumstances that differ from those of the present case. The case law cited in paragraphs 10 and 11 of

11 Reference is made to Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 32; Case C-478/07 Budĕjovický Budvar [2009] ECR I-7721, paragraph 64; Case C-384/08 Attanasio Group [2010] ECR I-2055, paragraph 28; and Case C-197/10 Unió de Pagesos de Catalunya [2011] ECR I-8495, paragraph 18.

12 Reference is made to Case C-445/01 Simoncello and Boerio [2003] ECR I-1807, in particular paragraph 26, Case C-393/08 Sbarigia [2010] ECR I-6337, in particular paragraphs 25, 27 and 28, and Case C-245/09 Omalet [2010] ECR I-13771, paragraph 9. Moreover, as regards the free movement of capital, reference is made to Case C-567/07 Woningstichting Sint Servatius [2009] ECR I-9021, paragraphs 40 to 47. As regards the interpretation of the former Article 6 TEU, reference is made to Case C-328/04 Vajnai [2003] ECR I-8577, in particular paragraph 14. In addition, reference is also made to Case C-27/11 Vinkov, judgment of 7 June 2012, published electronically, and to the early case law of Case C-152/94 van Buynder [1995] ECR I-3981.

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ohne Hinweis auf einen Auslandsbezug im Ausgangsverfahren an sich hypothetischer Natur ist und damit für unzulässig befunden werden sollte.

48. Wäre dies nicht der Fall, fährt die Regierung Norwegens fort, könnten Anträge auf Vorabentscheidung im Grunde in Bezug auf jede Rechtssache gestellt werden, also auch betreffend Rechtssachen, bei denen es sich um rein einzelstaatliche Sachverhalte ohne jegliche Verbindung zum EWR-Recht handelt. Dies würde jedoch über die Zielsetzung des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens – nämlich die Auslegung des EWR-Abkommens vor dem Hintergrund tatsächlicher Sachverhalte – hinausgehen. Aufgabe des Gerichtshofs ist es, zur Rechtspflege in den EWR-Staaten beizutragen, nicht aber Gutachten zu allgemeinen oder hypothetischen Fragen abzugeben, die für den Rechtsstreit im Ausgangsverfahren nicht massgeblich sind.11

49. Auch aus der Rechtsprechung des EuGH, so die Regierung Norwegens, geht hervor, dass Fragen zur Auslegung der Grundfreiheiten in Fällen, in denen kein Auslandsbezug und damit kein Anknüpfungspunkt zwischen den entsprechenden Freiheiten und den rechtlichen und tatsächlichen Gegebenheiten im Ausgangsverfahren besteht, für unzulässig erklärt werden.12

50. Die Regierung Norwegens räumt ein, dass der EuGH in einigen Fällen eine Frage zu einer Rechtssache ohne Auslandsbezug im Ausgangsverfahren zugelassen hat. Das vorlegende Gericht hat in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher, oben erwähnt, Randnrn. 10 bis 12, verwiesen.

51. Nach Ansicht der Regierung Norwegens basiert die Argumentation in der Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher jedoch auf Umständen, die sich von jenen im vorliegenden Fall unterscheiden. Die in den Randnrn. 10 und 11 der

11 Es wird auf die Rechtssache C-112/00 Schmidberger, Slg. 2003, I-5659, Randnr. 32, Rechtssache C-478/07 Budĕjovický Budvar, Slg. 2009, I-7721, Randnr. 64, Rechtssache C-384/08 Attanasio Group, Slg. 2010, I-2055, Randnr. 28, und Rechtssache C-197/10 Unió de Pagesos de Catalunya, Slg. 2011, I-8495, Randnr. 18, verwiesen.

12 Es wird auf die Rechtssache C-445/01 Simoncello und Boerio, Slg. 2003, I-1807, insbesondere Randnr. 26, Rechtssache C-393/08 Sbarigia, Slg. 2010, I-6337, insbesondere Randnrn. 25, 27 und 28, und Rechtssache C-245/09 Omalet, Slg. 2010, I-13771, Randnr. 9, verwiesen. Hinsichtlich des freien Kapitalverkehrs wird darüber hinaus auf die Rechtssache C-567/07 Woningstichting Sint Servatius, Slg. 2009, I-9021, Randnrn. 40 bis 47, verwiesen. Betreffend die Auslegung des ehemaligen Artikels 6 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union wird auf die Rechtssache C-328/04 Vajnai, Slg. 2003, I-8577, insbesondere Randnr. 14, verwiesen. Darüber hinaus wird auch auf die Rechtssache C-27/11 Vinkov, Urteil vom 7. Juni 2012, in elektronischer Form veröffentlicht, und die frühe Rechtsprechung in der Rechtssache C-152/94 van Buynder, Slg. 1995, I-3981, verwiesen.

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Sokoll-Seebacher only concerns the situation where it is reasonably clear that a restriction on intra-EEA trade would be present had only the dispute in the main proceedings concerned a national of another Member State.13 Moreover, the referring court must also show that the question is actually useful for the dispute in the main proceedings, notwithstanding the absence of a cross-border element.14

52. Thus, in the view of the Norwegian Government, it continues to be the main rule that a question related to the interpretation of the freedoms established in the Agreement in a case in which there is no indication of a cross-border element is hypothetical and should be held inadmissible.

53. In the present case, it is clear from the request that there is no cross-border element. Furthermore, according to the Norwegian Government, the referring court has not shown how the national rule in question may constitute a restriction on intra-EEA trade.

54. The Norwegian Government proposes that the Court should answer the question as follows:

The request for an advisory opinion is inadmissible, as regards the question relating to the provisions on the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority

55. As regards admissibility, ESA submits that the question may be raised whether the Princely Court of Justice must be considered a “court or tribunal” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”) when making a decision concerning an entry on the

13 Reference is made to Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12 Venturini, judgment of 5 December 2013, published electronically, which is among the case law the ECJ refers to in Sokoll-Seebacher, cited above. According to the Norwegian Government, the ECJ clearly distinguishes the circumstances of Venturini from those in Sbarigia, cited above. In paragraph 27 the ECJ states that in Sbarigia “there was nothing to indicate how [the measure] might affect economic operators coming from other Member States”.

14 The Norwegian Government contends that paragraph 12 of Sokoll-Seebacher, cited above, should be compared with Omalet, cited above, paragraphs 15 to 17.

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Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher angeführte Rechtsprechung betrifft eine Situation, in der hinreichend klar ist, dass eine Beschränkung des Handels innerhalb des EWR vorläge, wenn der Rechtsstreit im Ausgangsverfahren einen Staatsangehörigen eines anderen Mitgliedstaats betroffen hätte.13 Das vorlegende Gericht muss ausserdem zeigen, dass die Frage für den Rechtsstreit im Ausgangsverfahren trotz des fehlenden Auslandsbezugs tatsächlich massgeblich ist.14

52. Nach Auffassung der Regierung Norwegens lautet die Grundregel daher nach wie vor, dass eine Frage im Zusammenhang mit der Auslegung der Freiheiten gemäss Abkommen in einer Rechtssache ohne Hinweis auf einen Auslandsbezug hypothetischer Natur ist und damit für unzulässig befunden werden sollte.

53. Im vorliegenden Fall geht aus dem Antrag hervor, dass kein Auslandsbezug besteht. Zudem hat, so die Regierung Norwegens, das nationale Gericht nicht gezeigt, inwiefern die fragliche nationale Vorschrift eine Beschränkung des Handels innerhalb des EWR darstellen kann.

54. Die Regierung Norwegens schlägt vor, dass der Gerichtshof die Frage folgendermassen beantwortet:

Der Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung ist hinsichtlich der Frage im Zusammenhang mit den Bestimmungen über den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr und die Niederlassungsfreiheit unzulässig.

Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde

55. Hinsichtlich der Zulässigkeit kann sich, so die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, die Frage stellen, ob das Fürstliche Landgericht bei der Entscheidung über eine Eintragung ins Strafregister als „Gericht“ für die Zwecke von Artikel 34 des Abkommens zwischen den EFTA-Staaten zur Errichtung einer Überwachungsbehörde und eines Gerichtshofs („ÜGA“) betrachtet werden

13 Es wird auf die verbundenen Rechtssachen C-159/12 bis C-161/12 Venturini, Urteil vom 5. Dezember 2013, in elektronischer Form veröffentlicht, verwiesen, die zu der vom EuGH in der Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher, oben erwähnt, zitierten Rechtsprechung zählen. Der Regierung Norwegens zufolge unterscheidet der EuGH eindeutig zwischen den Umständen in der Rechtssache Venturini und jenen in der Rechtssache Sbarigia, oben erwähnt. In Randnr. 27 hält der EuGH fest, dass in Sbarigia „nicht ersichtlich war, inwiefern sich diese [Massnahme] auf Wirtschaftsteilnehmer aus einem anderen Mitgliedstaat hätte auswirken können“.

14 Laut der Regierung Norwegens sollte Randnr. 12 der Rechtssache Sokoll-Seebacher, oben erwähnt, mit der Rechtssache Omalet, oben erwähnt, Randnrn. 15 bis 17, verglichen werden.

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criminal record, and thus, whether it is entitled to a submit a request for an advisory opinion. This question includes an assessment of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent.15

56. However, ESA continues, the Court has held that the purpose of Article 34 SCA – to establish cooperation between the Court and the national courts, to be a means of ensuring a homogenous interpretation of EEA law and to provide assistance to national courts in their application of EEA law – does not require a strict interpretation of Article 34 SCA. Furthermore, if there is doubt whether the national court in question exercises a judicial function in the case at hand, the Court has stated that it would run counter to the purpose of Article 34 to declare the request inadmissible.16

57. ESA thus assumes that the request is admissible.

58. Turning to the substance of the request, ESA fails to see how the general provisions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services may have a bearing on the question whether EEA law entails a duty on States to record criminal convictions in the context of the present case. If such an obligation does exist, it would have to follow from secondary law.

59. ESA observes that, according to Article 45(2)(c) of Directive 2004/18, an economic operator may be excluded from participation in a public contract if he has been convicted of any offence concerning his professional conduct. This provision is a part of the procedures for administrative cooperation and exchange of information between public

15 Reference is made to Case C-96/04 Standesamt Stadt Niebüll [2006] ECR I-3561, paragraph 12 and the case law cited.

16 Reference is made to Case E-23/13 Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, judgment of 9 May 2014, not yet reported, paragraphs 33 and 34.

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muss und in der Folge einen Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung stellen kann. Bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage ist eine Reihe von Gesichtspunkten zu beurteilen, darunter die folgenden: gesetzliche Grundlage der Einrichtung, ständiger Charakter, obligatorische Gerichtsbarkeit, streitiges Verfahren, Anwendung von Rechtsnormen durch die Einrichtung sowie Unabhängigkeit.15

56. Allerdings, so die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde weiter, hat der Gerichtshof festgestellt, dass der Zweck von Artikel 34 ÜGA – die Schaffung einer Grundlage für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Gerichtshof und den nationalen Gerichten und eines Instruments zur Gewährleistung einer einheitlichen Auslegung des EWR-Rechts sowie die Unterstützung der nationalen Gerichte bei der Anwendung des EWR-Rechts – keine enge Auslegung des Artikels 34 ÜGA erfordert. Bestehen Zweifel, ob das fragliche nationale Gericht im gegenständlichen Fall eine richterliche Funktion ausübt, hat der Gerichtshof darüber hinaus festgehalten, es würde dem Zweck von Artikel 34 zuwiderlaufen, den Antrag für unzulässig zu erklären.16

57. Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde geht daher davon aus, dass der Antrag auf Vorabentscheidung zulässig ist.

58. Was den Inhalt des Antrags angeht, so kann die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde nicht nachvollziehen, wie sich die allgemeinen Bestimmungen über die Niederlassungsfreiheit und den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr auf die Frage auswirken können, ob das EWR-Recht vor dem Hintergrund der gegenständlichen Rechtssache eine Verpflichtung der Staaten, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen evident zu halten, vorsieht. Wenn eine solche Verpflichtung bestünde, müsste sie aus dem Sekundärrecht abzuleiten sein.

59. Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde merkt an, dass ein Wirtschaftsteilnehmer gemäss Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe c der Richtlinie 2004/18 von der Teilnahme an einem öffentlichen Vergabefahren ausgeschlossen werden kann, wenn er wegen eines Deliktes bestraft worden ist, das seine berufliche Zuverlässigkeit in Frage stellt. Diese Bestimmung bildet einen Bestandteil der Verfahren für die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit und den Informationsaustausch

15 Es wird auf die Rechtssache C-96/04 Standesamt Stadt Niebüll, Slg. 2006, I-3561, Randnr. 12, und die zitierte Rechtsprechung verwiesen.

16 Es wird auf die Rechtssache E-23/13 Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, Urteil vom 9. Mai 2014, noch nicht in der amtlichen Sammlung veröffentlicht, Randnrn. 33 und 34, verwiesen.

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authorities in order to avoid the award of public contracts to operators who

have participated in criminal organisations or who have been found guilty

of corruption, etc.17 Thus, when an economic operator is participating in

a tender, he may be asked to provide evidence to prove that he has not

been convicted of any offence concerning his professional conduct.

60. In this respect, ESA continues, Directive 2004/18 lists a number of ways

in which an economic operator can provide information on his professional

conduct that must be accepted as sufficient evidence by the contracting

authority. In accordance with Article 45(3)(a) of this directive, a contracting

authority shall accept as sufficient evidence an extract from the judicial

record or of an equivalent document issued by a competent judicial or

administrative authority. In addition, when the country in question does

not issue such documents, a declaration on oath or a solemn declaration

before a competent body will also suffice as evidence of the professional

conduct of the economic operator.

61. Thus, it cannot be deduced from Article 45(3)(a) of Directive 2004/18

that there is an obligation on States to have a criminal record or similar

recording of convictions. This is simply not required in order to produce

sufficient evidence of the professional conduct of the economic

operator.

62. In ESA’s view, nor can such an obligation be deduced from Article 45(4)

of Directive 2004/18. This provision obliges EEA States to designate the

authorities and bodies competent to issue the documents, certificates

or declarations that must be accepted as sufficient evidence of the

economic operator’s personal conduct. However, the designation of

bodies depends in its entirety on the system that the State in question

has chosen. The requirement to designate the authorities and bodies

competent to issue the relevant documents seems to be more of a

17 Reference is made to recital 43 in the preamble to Directive 2004/18 and to the provisions of Chapter VII Section 2 of that directive concerning the criteria for qualitative selection.

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zwischen Behörden zur Vermeidung der Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge an Wirtschaftsteilnehmer, die sich an einer kriminellen Vereinigung beteiligt oder der Bestechung usw. schuldig gemacht haben.17 Daher kann ein Wirtschaftsteilnehmer, wenn er an einem Vergabeverfahren teilnimmt, dazu aufgefordert werden, nachzuweisen, dass er nicht wegen eines Deliktes bestraft worden ist, das seine berufliche Zuverlässigkeit in Frage stellt.

60. In diesem Zusammenhang, so die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde weiter, sind in der Richtlinie 2004/18 mehrere Möglichkeiten angeführt, wie der Wirtschaftsteilnehmer dem öffentlichen Auftraggeber seine wirtschaftliche Zuverlässigkeit ausreichend nachweisen kann. Laut Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a dieser Richtlinie akzeptiert der öffentliche Auftraggeber als ausreichenden Nachweis einen Auszug aus dem Strafregister oder eine gleichwertige Urkunde einer zuständigen Gerichts- oder Verwaltungsbehörde. Überdies ist, wenn das betreffende Land eine solche Urkunde nicht ausstellt, eine eidesstattliche Erklärung oder eine förmliche Erklärung vor einer zuständigen Behörde als Nachweis für die berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Wirtschaftsteilnehmers ausreichend.

61. Dementsprechend kann aus Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a der Richtlinie 2004/18 nicht auf eine Verpflichtung der Staaten zur Führung eines Strafregisters oder eines vergleichbaren Verzeichnisses von Verurteilungen geschlossen werden. Dies ist schlicht nicht erforderlich, um einen ausreichenden Nachweis für die berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Wirtschaftsteilnehmers zu erbringen.

62. Nach Auffassung der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde kann eine solche Verpflichtung auch nicht aus Artikel 45 Absatz 4 der Richtlinie 2004/18 abgeleitet werden. Diese Bestimmung verpflichtet die EWR-Staaten zur Benennung der für die Ausgabe der Urkunden, Bescheinigungen oder Erklärungen, die als ausreichender Nachweis für die wirtschaftliche Zuverlässigkeit des Wirtschaftsteilnehmers zu akzeptieren sind, zuständigen Behörden und Stellen. Die Benennung der Stellen ist in ihrer Gesamtheit jedoch abhängig von dem vom jeweiligen Staat gewählten System. Die Anforderung, die für die Ausgabe der entsprechenden Urkunden zuständigen Behörden und Stellen zu benennen, scheint

17 Es wird auf Erwägungsgrund 43 in der Präambel der Richtlinie 2004/18 und die Bestimmungen in Kapitel VII Abschnitt 2 dieser Richtlinie über Eignungskriterien verwiesen.

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practical nature. The States must make it clear which authorities and

bodies may assist economic operators when they need to provide

evidence of their professional conduct.

63. In conclusion, ESA cannot see that Article 45 of Directive 2004/18 entails

a duty on States to record criminal convictions. It is for national law to

decide how information on the professional conduct of an economic

operator may be provided.

64. ESA contends that Directive 2006/123 contains a number of provisions

on mutual assistance between EEA States,18 one of which requires

the provision of information at the request of another EEA State.

Administrative cooperation between EEA States is essential to make

the internal market in services function properly and effectively.19 In

line with the general obligations to provide mutual assistance, Article

33(1) of Directive 2006/123 states that EEA States have an obligation

to provide information at the request of a competent authority of

another EEA State on criminal sanctions taken vis-à-vis a service

provider. Accordingly, EEA States are required to supply information,

in conformity with their national law, on disciplinary or administrative

actions or criminal sanctions and decisions concerning insolvency or

bankruptcy involving fraud which are directly relevant to the provider’s

competence or professional reliability.

65. However, in ESA’s view, Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 does not

impose substantive obligations regarding the content of national law. As

ESA understands recital 111 in the preamble to Directive 2006/123,

the provisions on exchange of information on the good repute of

service providers should not be understood as anticipating any further

advancement in cooperation in criminal matters, beyond what is already

established. In ESA’s view, this is also the most obvious way

18 Reference is made to Chapter VI of Directive 2006/13 concerning administrative cooperation.19 Reference is made to recital 105 in the preamble to Directive 2006/123.

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eher praktischer Natur zu sein. Die Staaten müssen klarstellen, welche Behörden und Stellen Wirtschaftsteilnehmer dabei unterstützen können, einen Nachweis über ihre berufliche Zuverlässigkeit zu erbringen.

63. Insgesamt geht für die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde aus Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 keine Verpflichtung der Staaten, strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen evident zu halten, hervor. Möglichkeiten zur Bereitstellung von Informationen über die berufliche Zuverlässigkeit von Wirtschaftsteilnehmern sind im nationalen Recht zu verankern.

64. Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde bringt vor, dass Richtlinie 2006/123 eine Reihe von Bestimmungen über die Amtshilfe zwischen den EWR-Staaten enthält,18 von denen eine die Übermittlung von Informationen auf Ersuchen eines anderen Mitgliedstaats vorsieht. Die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungen der EWR-Staaten ist für ein reibungsloses und wirksames Funktionieren des Binnenmarktes für Dienstleistungen unerlässlich.19 In Übereinstimmung mit den allgemeinen Verpflichtungen zur Leistung von Amtshilfe hält Artikel 33 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2006/123 fest, dass EWR-Staaten auf Ersuchen einer zuständigen Behörde eines anderen EWR-Staats Auskunft über strafrechtliche Sanktionen, die über einen Dienstleistungserbringer verhängt wurden, erteilen. Dementsprechend müssen EWR-Staaten unter Beachtung ihres nationalen Rechts Informationen über Disziplinar- oder Verwaltungsmassnahmen oder strafrechtliche Sanktionen und Entscheidungen wegen Insolvenz oder Konkurs mit betrügerischer Absicht, die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers sind, übermitteln.

65. Allerdings, so die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, enthält Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 keine wesentlichen Verpflichtungen hinsichtlich des Inhalts des nationalen Rechts. Nach dem Verständnis der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde von Erwägungsgrund 111 in der Präambel der Richtlinie 2006/123 sind die Bestimmungen zum Austausch von Informationen über die Zuverlässigkeit der Dienstleistungserbringer nicht so zu interpretieren, dass sie eine weitere Vertiefung der Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen vorwegnehmen. Nach Ansicht der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde ist dies auch die naheliegendste Auslegung

18 Es wird auf Kapitel VI der Richtlinie 2006/13 über die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit verwiesen.19 Es wird auf Erwägungsgrund 105 der Präambel der Richtlinie 2006/123 verwiesen.

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to interpret the reservation contained in the phrase “in conformity with their national law”.

66. Accordingly, ESA concludes, Directive 2006/123 does not require that criminal convictions, such as those at issue in the present case, must be recorded. Information on criminal sanctions must be provided on the basis of mechanisms and practices already in place in the EEA States.

67. ESA observes that it has not been able to identify other provisions of EEA law that may be relevant for this case.

68. ESA proposes that the Court should answer the question as follows:

The EEA Agreement does not entail specific requirements as to the recording of convictions in situations where national law allows for legal persons to be convicted by a criminal court.

The Commission

69. The Commission submits that, at this stage of the proceedings and on the basis of the information presented by the referring court, neither the EEA Agreement’s provisions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services nor the provisions of Directives 2006/123 and 2004/18 impose on a State party to the agreement the requirement to establish the same accurate record of legal persons convicted of criminal offences as has been established in a Member State in relation to natural persons who are service providers.

70. In particular, there is no secondary law which requires Member States to enter criminal sanctions imposed by criminal courts on legal persons into their criminal records (an obligation which may exist for criminal sanctions imposed on natural persons).

71. As regards Directive 2004/18, the Commission observes that Article 45(1) requires economic operators convicted of certain criminal offences (participation in a criminal organisation, corruption, fraud

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der in der Formulierung „unter Beachtung ihres nationalen Rechts“ enthaltenen Einschränkung.

66. Somit, so die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde abschliessend, erfordert Richtlinie 2006/123 nicht, dass strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen, wie jene im gegenständlichen Fall, evident gehalten werden müssen. Auskünfte über strafrechtliche Sanktionen sind auf der Grundlage der in den EWR-Staaten bereits praktizierten Mechanismen und Abläufe zu erteilen.

67. Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde merkt an, dass sie nicht in der Lage war, andere Bestimmungen des EWR-Rechts zu finden, die für diese Rechtssache massgeblich sein könnten.

68. Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde schlägt vor, dass der Gerichtshof die Frage folgendermassen beantwortet:

Das EWR-Abkommen enthält keine spezifischen Anforderungen hinsichtlich der Erfassung von Verurteilungen in Situationen, in denen das nationale Recht die Verurteilung juristischer Personen durch ein Strafgericht erlaubt.

Die Kommission

69. Die Kommission bringt vor, dass an diesem Punkt des Verfahrens und auf der Grundlage der vom vorlegenden Gericht übermittelten Informationen weder die Bestimmungen des EWR-Abkommens über die Niederlassungsfreiheit und den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr noch die Bestimmungen der Richtlinien 2006/123 und 2004/18 einen Staat, der dieses Abkommen unterzeichnet hat, dazu verpflichten, dasselbe genaue Register von Delikten mit Verurteilungen juristischer Personen zu führen, wie es in einem Mitgliedstaat für natürliche Personen, bei denen es sich um Dienstleistungserbringer handelt, besteht.

70. Insbesondere existiert kein abgeleitetes Recht, das von den Mitgliedstaaten fordert, von Strafgerichten gegen juristischen Personen verhängte strafrechtliche Sanktionen in ihre Strafregister aufzunehmen (eine Verpflichtung, die für strafrechtliche Sanktionen gegenüber natürlichen Personen vorgesehen sein kann).

71. Im Zusammenhang mit Richtlinie 2004/18 stellt die Kommission fest, dass Artikel 45 Absatz 1 den Ausschluss von Wirtschaftsteilnehmern, die für bestimmte Delikte (Beteiligung an einer kriminellen Organisation,

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and money laundering) to be excluded from participation in public contracts. Moreover, Article 45(2)(c) allows Member States to exclude an economic operator from participation in a contract where that economic operator has been convicted of any offence concerning his professional conduct by a judgment which has the force of res judicata in accordance with national law. In order to implement those exclusions, Article 45(3)(a) obliges Member States to accept extracts from the judicial record or equivalent documents showing no such convictions took place, including convictions of legal persons, if applicable according to the laws of the Member State of establishment.

72. However, Article 45 of Directive 2004/18 does not oblige Member States to issue extracts from the judicial record or equivalent documents, whether in relation to natural or legal persons, since the second subparagraph of Article 45(3) expressly provides for the possibility that a Member State does not issue such documents. By allowing Member States not to issue such evidentiary documents, Article 45 cannot be interpreted as obliging Member States to keep some sort of record of such convictions.

73. For the sake of completeness, the Commission adds that, in the case at hand, the criminal offence at issue concerns neither those criminal offences listed in Article 45(1) of Directive 2004/18 nor the professional conduct of the service provider as mentioned in Article 45(2)(c), but relates instead to its social security obligations. Article 45(2)(e) does refer to failure to comply with obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions as grounds for excluding an economic operator from participation in a contract. However, the second subparagraph of Article 45(3) concerning the issue of evidentiary documents also refers to certificates as regards Article 45(2)(e). Therefore, Article 45 of Directive 2004/18 does not provide for an obligation on the Member State to keep a record in the case at hand since there is no underlying obligation to supply the information in question.

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Bestechung, Betrug und Geldwäsche) verurteilt wurden, von der Teilnahme an einem Vergabeverfahren verlangt. Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe c erlaubt den Mitgliedstaaten darüber hinaus den Ausschluss eines Wirtschaftsteilnehmers von der Teilnahme an einem Vergabeverfahren, wenn dieser Wirtschaftsteilnehmer aufgrund eines nach nationalem Recht rechtskräftigen Urteils wegen eines Deliktes bestraft worden ist, das seine berufliche Zuverlässigkeit in Frage stellt. Um solche Ausschlüsse in die Tat umsetzen zu können, verpflichtet Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a die Mitgliedstaaten dazu, als Nachweis, dass keine solchen Verurteilungen – einschliesslich Verurteilungen juristischer Personen, sofern nach den Gesetzen des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats zulässig – erfolgt sind, einen Auszug aus dem Strafregister oder eine gleichwertige Urkunde zu akzeptieren.

72. Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 verpflichtet die Mitgliedstaaten jedoch nicht zur Ausstellung von Auszügen aus dem Strafregister oder gleichwertigen Urkunden – weder für natürliche noch für juristische Personen – da Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Unterabsatz 2 ausdrücklich die Möglichkeit vorsieht, dass ein Mitgliedstaat keine derartigen Urkunden ausstellt. Da den Mitgliedstaaten eingeräumt wird, keine solchen Nachweise auszustellen, kann Artikel 45 nicht dahingehend ausgelegt werden, dass er die Mitgliedstaaten zur Führung irgendeiner Art von Register über solche Verurteilungen verpflichtet.

73. Der Vollständigkeit halber fügt die Kommission hinzu, dass es sich bei dem Delikt in der gegenständlichen Rechtssache weder um eines der in Artikel 45 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2004/18 angeführten Delikte noch um die berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers im Sinne von Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe c, sondern um die Nichterfüllung von Sozialversicherungsverpflichtungen handelt. Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe e nennt die Nichterfüllung der Verpflichtung zur Zahlung der Sozialbeiträge als Grund für den Ausschluss eines Wirtschaftsteilnehmers von der Teilnahme an einem Vergabeverfahren. Allerdings nimmt Artikel 45 Absatz 3 Unterabsatz 2 über die Ausstellung von Nachweisen auch Bezug auf Bescheinigungen gemäss Artikel 45 Absatz 2 Buchstabe e. Artikel 45 der Richtlinie 2004/18 sieht somit keine Verpflichtung des Mitgliedstaats zur Führung eines Registers im gegenständlichen Fall vor, da einer solchen Anforderung keine Verpflichtung zur Übermittlung der fraglichen Informationen zugrunde liegt.

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74. The Commission observes that Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 obliges

Member States to supply information on criminal sanctions, on disciplinary

and administrative actions and on decisions concerning insolvency or

bankruptcy involving fraud in respect of service providers taken by their

competent authorities. However, the obligation applies only to sanctions,

actions and decisions directly relevant to the provider’s competence or

professional reliability.

75. According to the Commission, Directive 2006/123 does not require

Member States to establish and keep a criminal record for sanctions,

actions and decisions directly relevant to the provider’s competence or

professional reliability where the provider is a legal person.

76. Nevertheless, Article 33 of Directive 2006/123 obliges Member States

to keep, also with respect to providers who are legal persons, some kind

of record to enable them to comply with the obligations to exchange

information provided for as a matter of administrative cooperation.

However, the type of record and its handling remains at the Member

State’s discretion, as long as it ensures that accurate information may be

exchanged on an ongoing basis between Member States.

77. The Commission proposes that the Court should answer the question as

follows:

Neither the EEA Agreement’s provisions on the freedom of establishment

and the freedom to provide services nor the provisions of Directives

2006/123/EC and 2004/18/EC impose on a party to this agreement to

establish the same record of the criminal sanctions of legal persons as

this has been established in a Member State for physical persons being

service providers.

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74. Die Kommission hält fest, dass Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 die

Mitgliedstaaten zur Übermittlung von Informationen über strafrechtliche

Sanktionen, über Disziplinar- oder Verwaltungsmassnahmen oder über

Entscheidungen wegen Insolvenz oder Konkurs mit betrügerischer Absicht,

die von ihren zuständigen Behörden gegen einen Dienstleistungserbringer

verhängt wurden, verpflichtet. Diese Verpflichtung findet jedoch nur

auf Sanktionen, Massnahmen und Entscheidungen Anwendung, die von

direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des

Dienstleistungserbringers sind.

75. Der Kommission zufolge fordert Richtlinie 2006/123 von den

Mitgliedstaaten nicht, ein Strafregister für Sanktionen, Massnahmen und

Entscheidungen, die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder

berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers sind, zu errichten

und zu führen, wenn es sich beim Dienstleistungserbringer um eine

juristische Person handelt.

76. Trotzdem verpflichtet Artikel 33 der Richtlinie 2006/123 die

Mitgliedstaaten, auch im Hinblick auf Dienstleistungserbringer, bei

denen es sich um juristische Personen handelt, in irgendeiner Form

Aufzeichnungen zu machen, die es ihnen ermöglichen, die im Rahmen der

Verwaltungszusammenarbeit vorgesehene Verpflichtung zum Austausch von

Informationen zu erfüllen. Die Art der Aufzeichnung und seine Verwaltung

sind Sache des Mitgliedstaats, solange der Austausch wahrheitsgetreuer

Informationen durch die Mitgliedstaaten langfristig sichergestellt ist.

77. Die Kommission schlägt vor, dass der Gerichtshof die Frage

folgendermassen beantwortet:

Weder die Bestimmungen des EWR-Abkommens über die Niederlassungsfreiheit und den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr noch die Bestimmungen der Richtlinien 2006/123/EG und 2004/18/EG verpflichten eine Vertragspartei, dasselbe Register strafrechtlicher Sanktionen gegenüber juristischen Personen zu führen, wie es in einem Mitgliedstaat für natürliche Personen, bei denen es sich um Dienstleistungserbringer handelt, besteht.

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However, Article 33(1) of Directive 2006/123/EC should be interpreted as obliging Member States to maintain information about criminal convictions of a legal person where national law allows for criminal conviction of a legal person. Such obligation to maintain information only concerns criminal sanctions directly relevant to the provider’s competence or professional reliability. The modality for maintaining such information (type of record, its handling) is a matter for national law.

Per Christiansen

Judge-Rapporteur

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Artikel 33 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2006/123/EG sollte jedoch dahingehend ausgelegt werden, dass die Mitgliedstaaten verpflichtet sind, Informationen über strafgerichtliche Verurteilungen juristischer Personen aufzubewahren, wenn die strafgerichtliche Verurteilung juristischer Personen im nationalen Recht zulässig ist. Eine solche Verpflichtung zur Aufbewahrung von Informationen betrifft nur strafrechtliche Sanktionen, die von direkter Bedeutung für die Kompetenz oder berufliche Zuverlässigkeit des Dienstleistungserbringers sind. Die Modalitäten zur Aufbewahrung solcher Informationen (Art und Verwaltung der Aufzeichnung) sind im nationalen Recht zu regeln.

Per Christiansen

Berichterstatter

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Case E-27/13Sævar Jón Gunnarsson

vLandsbankinn hf.


Book 3

Case E-27/13 Sævar Jón Gunnarsson v Landsbankinn hf.

CASE E-27/13Sævar Jón Gunnarsson

v

Landsbankinn hf.

(Indexation of loans – Directive 87/102/EEC – Consumer credit agreements – Directive 93/13/EEC – Unfair terms – Mandatory terms)

Judgment of the Court, 24 November 2014 ................................................. 1093



1. The Court found that Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 1987 L 42, p. 48) (“the Consumer Credit Directive”) is applicable to a credit agreement linked to the consumer price index (“CPI”). The sole and legitimate purpose of an index clause in a credit agreement is In fact to correct the nominal amount of the consecutive loan instalments in line with CPI developments throughout the term of the loan.

2. Regarding the applicability of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29) (“the Unfair Terms Directive”) to contractual terms on indexation of repayment instalments, the Court underlined that

it examined the question of indexation of consumer mortgage loans in paragraphs 66 to 79 of Case E-25/13 Engilbertsson, judgment of 28 August 2014, not yet reported. The Court found that contractual terms that are optional but, if chosen by the parties, whose substance is not left to the parties to negotiate are considered mandatory within the meaning of the Unfair Terms Directive and thus exempted from its scope. This finding must apply equally to a consumer credit agreement, as in the present case. It is for the national court to ascertain whether the indexation terms relating to the repayment instalments of consumer credit agreements, such as those at issue in the present case, reflect mandatory regulatory or statutory provisions within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive.

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Summary

MÁL E-27/13Sævar Jón Gunnarsson

gegn

Landsbankanum hf.

(Verðtrygging lána – Tilskipun 87/102/EBE – Neytendalánasamningar – Tilskipun 93/13/EBE – Óréttmætir samningsskilmálar – Ófrávíkjanlegir samningsskilmálar)

Dómur EFTA-dómstólsins, 24. nóvember 2014 ............................................. 1093

Skýrsla framsögumanns.............................................................................. 1126

Samantekt

1. EFTA dómstóllinn taldi að tilskipun ráðsins 87/102/EBE frá 22. desember 1986 um samræmingu á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkjanna varðandi neytendalán (Stjtíð. ESB 1987 L 42, bls. 48) („tilskipunin um neytendalán“) eigi við um neytendalánssamninga sem bundnir eru vísitölu neysluverðs. Eini lögmæti tilgangur verðtryggingarskilmála í lánssamningi er að samræma nafnvirði samfelldra afborgana af láni við þróun vísitölu neysluverðs á lánstímanum.

2. Varðandi gildissvið tilskipunar ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum (Stjtíð. ESB 1993 L 95, bls. 29) („tilskipunin um óréttmæta skilmála“) gagnvart samningsskilmálum um verðtryggðar afborganir tók dómstóllinn sérstaklega fram að hann hefði fjallað um álitamál er varða verðtryggingu veðlánasamninga neytenda í efnisgreinum 66. til 79.

óútgefins dóms frá 28. ágúst 2014, í máli E-25/13 Gunnar V. Engilbertsson gegn Íslandsbanka hf. frá 28. ágúst 2014. Dómstóllinn komst að þeirri niðurstöðu að samningsskilmálar sem aðilar eiga val um hvort þeir taki upp í samning en geta að öðru leyti ekki samið sérstaklega um efnislega, verði þeir fyrir valinu, teljist endurspegla lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði í skilningi tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála og falli því utan gildissviðs hennar. Hið sama var einnig talið gilda um samninga um neytendalán eins og þann sem um ræddi í málinu. Það var enn fremur talið vera í verkahring landsdómstólsins að taka afstöðu til þess hvort samningsskilmálar um verðtryggingu afborgana neytendaláns, eins og þess sem um ræddi í málinu, teldist endurspegla lög eða bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði samkvæmt 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála.

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3. In answering the first question, the Court held that the Consumer Credit Directive was adopted with the objectives of establishing a common market in consumer credit (recitals 3 to 5 in the preamble) and protecting consumers taking such credit in that market (recitals 6, 7 and 9 in the preamble). The Consumer Credit Directive is intended to ensure a minimum standard of protection in consumer credit matters.

4. To protect against unfair credit terms and to enable the consumer to have full knowledge of the terms of the loan agreement entered into, Article 4 of the Consumer Credit Directive provides that the borrower at the time of concluding such an agreement must have to hand all relevant information which could have a bearing on the implications of his undertaking.

5. The Consumer Credit Directive provides in Article 4(1) and Article 4(2)(a) and (b) that the credit agreement must be made in writing and that the written agreement must include a statement of the annual percentage rate of charge and the conditions under which it may be amended. Pursuant to Article 1(2)(e) of the Consumer Credit Directive, the term annual percentage rate of charge means “the total cost of the credit to the consumer, expressed as an annual percentage of the amount of the credit granted and calculated in

accordance with Article 1a.” According to Article 1(2)(d), the total cost of credit to the consumer is defined as all the costs, including interest and other charges, which the consumer has to pay for the credit.

6. The Court found that the term “total cost of the credit” comprises all the costs that the consumer is liable to pay under the credit agreement, including both interest charges and charges resulting from the price indexation of the principal. This information contributes to the transparency of the market, as it enables the consumer to compare offers of credit.

7. An assumption that the rate of inflation will be 0% indicated in a loan agreement, at a time when the actual rate of inflation is considerably higher, does not correctly represent the charges resulting from the price indexation and thus the total cost of credit within the meaning of Article 1(2)(d) of the Consumer Credit Directive. Consequently, such a statement does not correctly represent the annual percentage rate of charge defined in Article 1(2)(e) and Article 1a(1)(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive.

8. The Court concluded that when a credit agreement is linked to a CPI and the cost of the credit thus changes in accordance with inflation, it is not compatible with the Consumer Credit Directive to calculate the total cost of

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CASE E-27/13

Summary

3. Í svari sínu við fyrstu spurningunni um neytendalánatilskipunina taldi dómstóllinn markmið hennar vera að koma á sameiginlegum neytendalánamarkaði (skv. 3. til 5. lið formála tilskipunarinnar ) og að vernda neytendur sem tækju slík lán á þeim markaði (skv. 6., 7. og 9. lið formálans ). Neytendalánatilskipuninni væri ætlað að tryggja lágmarksvernd í neytendalánamálum.

4. Til að vernda neytandann gegn óréttmætum lánaskilmálum og gera honum kleift að átta sig fyllilega á skilmálum lánssamningsins sem hann hefur undirgengist, er í 4. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar kveðið á um að lántaki skuli við undirritun samningsins hafa undir höndum allar þær upplýsingar sem máli kunna að skipta og geta haft áhrif á þær skyldur sem hann tekst á hendur.

5. Í 1. mgr. 4. gr. og a- og b-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr. neytenda-lánatilskipunarinnar kemur fram að lánssamningur skuli gerður skriflega og að í samningnum skuli koma fram yfirlýsing um árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar ásamt þeim skilyrðum sem þarf að uppfylla til að gera breytingar á henni. Samkvæmt e-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar merkir hugtakið árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar „heildarkostnaður við neytendalán“, sem er lýst sem „árlegri prósentu af upphæð láns þess sem veitt er og

er reiknuð út í samræmi við 1. gr. a.“ Samkvæmt d-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. felur hugtakið heildarlánskostnaður neytanda í sér allan kostnað, að meðtöldum vöxtum og öðrum kostnaði sem neytandinn þarf að greiða fyrir lánið.

6. Dómstóllinn taldi að hugtakið „heildarlánskostnaður“ fæli í sér allan kostnað sem neytanda ber skylda til að greiða samkvæmt lánssamningnum, að meðtöldum vöxtum og kostnaði sem leiðir af verðtryggingu höfuðstólsins. Þessar upplýsingar stuðla að gagnsæi á markaðnum, þar sem þær gera neytandanum kleift að bera saman mismunandi lánatilboð.

7. Lánssamningur sem gerir ráð fyrir að verðbólgustig haldist í 0%, á tímapunkti þar sem raunveruleg verðbólga er töluvert hærri, gefur ekki rétta mynd af þeim kostnaði sem leiðir af verðtryggingu og þar með heildarlántökukostnaði í skilningi d-liðar 2. mgr. 1. gr. Slík yfirlýsing veitir því ekki ekki raunhæfa mynd af árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar eins og hún er skilgreind í e-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. og a-lið 1. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar.

8. Dómstóllinn komst að þeirri niðurstöðu að þegar lánssamningur er bundinn við vísitölu neysluverðs og lántökukostnaðurinn tekur þar af leiðandi breytingum í samræmi við verðbólgu, samrýmist það ekki

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the credit and the annual percentage rate of charge on the basis of 0% inflation if the known rate of inflation at the time of the credit agreement is not 0%. It is for the national court to assess, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, the legal consequences of and the remedies for such incorrect information, provided that the level of protection established by the Consumer Credit Directive, as interpreted by the Court, is not compromised.

9. To assist the national court in the event that it finds the Unfair Terms Directive applicable to the index-linked

consumer credit, the Court addressed the five remaining questions. These questions were in substance identical to the questions examined in Engilbertsson. The Court had no relevant information in the present case that could lead to a different assessment of the legal issues raised in Engilbertsson. It held therefore that, with regard to the substance of these questions, there was no reason to make a distinction between a mortgage credit, as in Engilbertsson, and a consumer credit loan, as in the present case. The answers provided were therefore substantially identical.

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CASE E-27/13

Summary

neytendalánatilskipuninni að miðað sé við 0% verðbólgu við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, ef þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi er ekki 0%. Það sé landsdómstólsins að meta, að teknu tilliti til allra atvika málsins, hvaða áhrif röng upplýsingagjöf af þessu tagi hefur og hvaða úrræðum er hægt að beita af því tilefni, að því gefnu að þeirri vernd sem neytendalánatilskipunin veitir samkvæmt túlkun dómstólsins sé ekki stefnt í hættu.

9. Í því skyni að aðstoða landsdómstólinn frekar, ef hann skyldi komast að þeirri niðurstöðu að tilskipunin

um óréttmæta samningsskilmála ætti við um hið verðtryggða neytendalán, taldi dómurinn rétt að víkja að þeim fimm spurningum sem eftir stóðu. Spurningarnar voru efnislega samhljóða þeim spurningum sem fjallað var um í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar. Dómstóllinn hafði engar upplýsingar undir höndum í þessu máli sem gætu leitt til annars mats á þeim lagalegu álitaefnum sem á reyndi í fyrra málinu. Að því er varðaði efni spurninganna var því engin ástæða til að greina á milli veðlána, sem fyrra málið snerist um, og neytendalána, eins og þetta mál laut að. Svörin voru því efnislega samhljóða í báðum málum.

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24 November 2014*

(Indexation of loans – Directive 87/102/EEC – Consumer credit agreements – Direc-tive 93/13/EEC – Unfair terms – Mandatory terms)

In Case E-27/13,

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice from Reykjavík District Court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur), in the case between

Sævar Jón Gunnarsson

and

Landsbankinn hf.

concerning the interpretation of Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 on consumer credit and Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts,

THE COURT,

composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President and Judge-Rapporteur, Per Christiansen and Páll Hreinsson, Judges,


having considered the written observations submitted on behalf of:

– Sævar Jón Gunnarsson (“the Plaintiff”), represented by Bragi Dór Hafþórsson,District Court Attorney, acting as Counsel, and Björn Þorri Viktorsson, SupremeCourt Attorney, acting as Co-Counsel;

– Landsbankinn hf. (“the Defendant”), represented by Hulda Árnadóttir, DistrictCourt Attorney, Lead Counsel, and Helgi Þór Þorsteinsson, District CourtAttorney, Co-Counsel;

* Language of the request: Icelandic.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

DÓMUR DÓMSTÓLSINS

24. nóvember 2014*

(Verðtrygging lána – Tilskipun 87/102/EBE – Neytendalánasamningar – Tilskipun 93/13/EBE – Óréttmætir samningsskilmálar – Ófrávíkjanlegir samningsskilmálar)

Mál E-27/13,

BEIÐNI, samkvæmt 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTA-ríkjanna um stofnun eftirlitsstofnunar og dómstóls, um ráðgefandi álit EFTA-dómstólsins, frá Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur, í máli sem þar er rekið


gegn

Landsbankanum hf.

um túlkun á tilskipun ráðsins 87/102/EBE frá 22. desember 1986 um samræmingu á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkjanna varðandi neytendalán og tilskipun ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum.

DÓMSTÓLLINN,

skipaður dómurunum Carl Baudenbacher, forseta og framsögumanni, Per Christiansen og Páli Hreinssyni,

dómritari: Gunnar Selvik,

hefur, með tilliti til skriflegra greinargerða frá:

– Stefnanda, Sævari Jóni Gunnarssyni, í fyrirsvari er Bragi Dór Hafþórsson, hdl., sem nýtur aðstoðar Björns Þorra Viktorssonar, hrl.

– Stefnda, Landsbankanum hf., í fyrirsvari er Hulda Árnadóttir, hdl., sem nýtur aðstoðar Helga Þórs Þorsteinssonar, hdl.

* Beiðni um ráðgefandi álit á íslensku.

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– the Icelandic Government, represented by Kristján Andri Stefánsson, Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent, Eiríkur Áki Eggertsson, Legal Officer, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, acting as Co-Agent, Andri Árnason, Supreme Court Attorney, Lead Counsel, and Stefán Andrew Svensson, Supreme Court Attorney, Co Counsel;

– the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”), represented by Xavier Lewis, Director, Markus Schneider, Deputy Director, and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents; and

– the European Commission (“the Commission”), represented by Marta Owsiany-Hornung and Nicola Yerrell, Members of the Legal Service, acting as Agents,


having heard oral argument of the Plaintiff, represented by Bragi Dór Hafþórsson; the Defendant, represented by Hulda Árnadóttir; the Government of Iceland, represented by Stefán Andrew Svensson; ESA, represented by Markus Schneider; and the Commission, represented by Nicola Yerrell, at the hearing on 11 June 2014,

gives the following

JUDGMENT

I LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law


The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Agreement.

They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement.

Moreover, they shall facilitate cooperation within the framework of this Agreement.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

– Ríkisstjórn Íslands, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Kristján Andri Stefánsson, sendiherra í utanríkisráðuneytinu og Eiríkur Áki Eggertsson, lögfræðingur hjá fjármála- og efnahagsráðuneytinu, auk Andra Árnasonar, hrl., sem nýtur aðstoðar Stefáns Andrews Svenssonar, hrl.

– Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA (ESA), í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Xavier Lewis, framkvæmdastjóri lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviðs, Markus Schneider og Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir fulltrúar á lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviði.

– Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópusambandsins, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Marta Owsiany-Hornung og Nicola Yerrell, hjá lagaskrifstofu framkvæmdastjórnarinnar,

með tilliti til skýrslu framsögumanns,

og munnlegs málflutnings lögmanns stefnanda, Braga Þórs Hafþórssonar, lögmanns stefnda, Huldu Árnadóttur, umboðsmanns ríkisstjórnar Íslands, Stefáns Andrews Svenssonar, fulltrúa ESA, Markus Schneider, og fulltrúa framkvæmdastjórnarinnar, Nicola Yerrell, sem fram fór 11. júní 2014,

kveðið upp svofelldan

DÓM

I LÖGGJÖF

EES-réttur

1 Í 3. gr. EES-samningsins segir:

Samningsaðilar skulu gera allar viðeigandi almennar eða sérstakar ráðstafanir til að tryggja að staðið verði við þær skuldbindingar sem af samningi þessum leiðir.

Þeir skulu varast ráðstafanir sem teflt geta því í tvísýnu að markmiðum samnings þessa verði náð.

Þeir skulu enn fremur auðvelda samvinnu innan ramma samnings þessa.

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Acts referred to or contained in the Annexes to this Agreement or in decisions of the EEA Joint Committee shall be binding upon the Contracting Parties and be, or be made, part of their internal legal order as follows:

(a) an act corresponding to an EEC regulation shall as such be made part of the internal legal order of the Contracting Parties;

(b) an act corresponding to an EEC directive shall leave to the authorities of the Contracting Parties the choice of form and method of implementation.

Directive 87/102/EEC – The Consumer Credit Directive

3 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 1987 L 42, p. 48) (“the Consumer Credit Directive”) was included as point 4 of Annex XIX to the EEA Agreement. That point was deleted with effect from 12 May 2010 by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 16/2009 of 5 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 73, p. 53, and EEA Supplement 2009 No 16, p. 24). By that same decision, Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66) was incorporated as point 7h of Annex XIX to the EEA Agreement.

4 The present case concerns a credit agreement entered into while the Consumer Credit Directive (Directive 87/102) was in force.

5 Recitals 5, 6, 9, 10 and 25 in the preamble to the Consumer Credit Directive read:

Whereas, given the increasing volume of credit granted in the Community to consumers, the establishment of a common market in consumer credit would benefit alike consumers, grantors of credit, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of goods and providers of services;

Whereas the programmes of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy … provide, inter alia, that the consumer should be protected against unfair credit terms and that a

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment


Gerðir sem vísað er til eða er að finna í viðaukum við samning þennan, eða ákvörðunum sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar, binda samningsaðila og eru þær eða verða teknar upp í landsrétt sem hér segir:

(a) gerð sem samsvarar reglugerð EBE skal sem slík tekin upp í landsrétt samningsaðila;

(b) gerð sem samsvarar tilskipun EBE skal veita yfirvöldum samningsaðila val um form og aðferð við framkvæmdina.

Tilskipun 87/102/EBE – Neytendalánatilskipunin

3 Tilskipun 87/102/EBE frá 22. desember 1986 um samræmingu á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkjanna varðandi neytendalán (Stjtíð. ESB 1987 L 42, bls. 48) („neytendalánatilskipunin“ eða „tilskipunin um neytendalán“) var tekin upp í 4. lið XIX. viðauka við EES-samninginn. Sá liður var felldur úr gildi frá og með 12. maí 2010 með ákvörðun sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 16/2009 frá 5. febrúar 2009 (Stjtíð. ESB 2009 L 73, bls. 53, og EES-bætir 2009 nr. 16, bls. 24). Með sömu ákvörðun var tilskipun Evrópuþingsins og ráðsins 2008/48/EB frá 23. apríl 2008 um lánasamninga fyrir neytendur og um niðurfellingu tilskipunar ráðsins 87/102/EBE (Stjtíð. ESB 2008 L 133, bls. 66) tekin upp í lið 7h í XIX. viðauka við EES-samninginn.

4 Málið sem rekið er fyrir héraðsdómi varðar lánssamning sem undirritaður var á meðan neytendalánatilskipunin (tilskipun 87/102) var í gildi.

5 Í 5., 6., 9., 10. og 25. lið formálsorða neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir:

Með tilliti til sívaxandi lánveitinga til neytenda innan bandalagsins yrði sameiginlegur neytendalánamarkaður til hagsbóta jafnt fyrir neytendur, lánveitendur, framleiðendur, heildsala og smásala sem og þjónustuaðila.

Í áætlunum Efnahagsbandalags Evrópu um stefnumörkun að því er varðar neytendavernd og miðlun upplýsinga til neytenda er meðal annars kveðið á um að vernda skuli neytendur gegn óréttmætum lánskjörum og að hafist

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harmonization of the general conditions governing consumer credit should be undertaken as a priority;

…

Whereas the consumer should receive adequate information on the conditions and cost of credit and on his obligations; whereas this information should include, inter alia, the annual percentage rate of charge for credit, or, failing that, the total amount that the consumer must pay for credit; whereas, pending a decision on a Community method or methods of calculating the annual percentage rate of charge, Member States should be able to retain existing methods or practices for calculating this rate, or failing that, should establish provisions for indicating the total cost of the credit to the consumer;

Whereas the terms of credit may be disadvantageous to the consumer; whereas better protection of consumers can be achieved by adopting certain requirements which are to apply to all forms of credit;

…

Whereas, since this Directive provides for a certain degree of approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit and for a certain level of consumer protection, Member States should not be prevented from retaining or adopting more stringent measures to protect the consumer, with due regard for their obligations under the Treaty;

6 Article 1(2) of the Consumer Credit Directive reads:

For the purpose of this Directive:

(a) ‘consumer’ means a natural person who, in transactions covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which can be regarded as outside his trade or profession;

(b) ‘creditor’ means a natural or legal person who grants credit in the course of his trade, business or profession, or a group of such persons;

(c) ‘credit agreement’ means an agreement whereby a creditor grants or promises to grant to a consumer a credit in the form of a deferred payment, a loan or other similar financial accommodation.

...

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

skuli handa um samhæfingu á almennum skilyrðum um neytendalán og það mál skuli hafa forgang.

...

Rétt er að neytendur fái fullnægjandi upplýsingar um lánsskilyrði, lánskostnað og um skuldbindingar sínar. Upplýsingar þessar ættu meðal annars að taka til árlegrar hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar eða, sé því ekki til að dreifa, heildarupphæðarinnar sem neytandinn þarf að greiða fyrir lánið. Þar til ákvörðun er tekin um aðferð eða aðferðir er beita skuli innan bandalagsins við útreikning á árlegri hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar ættu aðildarríki að geta haldið sig við gildandi aðferðir eða viðteknar venjur um útreikning þessa hlutfalls eða, sé slíku ekki til að dreifa, að setja ákvæði um hvernig neytendur skuli upplýstir um heildarkostnað við lántöku.

Lánsskilmálar kunna að vera neytandanum í óhag. Unnt er að veita neytendum betri vernd með því að samþykkja tilteknar kröfur er gilda skuli um hvers konar lán.

...

Ákvæði í tilskipun þessari um tiltekið stig samræmingar á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum og tiltekið stig neytendaverndar skulu ekki koma í veg fyrir að aðildarríki hafi áfram í gildi eða taki upp strangari ráðstafanir til verndar neytendum, með tilhlýðilegu tilliti til skuldbindinga ríkjanna samkvæmt sáttmálanum.

6 Í 2. mgr. 1. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir:

Í þessari tilskipun merkir:

a) „neytandi“: einstaklingur sem í viðskiptum er tilskipunin tekur til kemur fram í augnamiði sem telja má óskylt starfi hans;

b) „lánveitandi“: einstaklingur eða lögaðili sem veitir lán innan ramma starfsemi sinnar eða hópur slíkra einstaklinga;

c) „lánssamningur“: samkomulag þar sem lánveitandi veitir eða heitir að veita neytanda lán í formi greiðslufrests, láns eða svipaðrar fjárhagslegrar fyrirgreiðslu;

...

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(d) ‘total cost of the credit to the consumer’ means all the costs, including interest and other charges, which the consumer has to pay for the credit;

(e) ‘annual percentage rate of charge’ means the total cost of the credit to the consumer, expressed as an annual percentage of the amount of the credit granted and calculated in accordance with Article 1a.

7 Article 1a(1)(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive reads:

The annual percentage rate of charge, which shall be that equivalent, on an annual basis, to the present value of all commitments (loans, repayments and charges), future or existing, agreed by the creditor and the borrower, shall be calculated in accordance with the mathematical formula set out in Annex II.

8 Article 1a(4) of the Consumer Credit Directive reads:

(a) The annual percentage rate of charge shall be calculated at the time the credit contract is concluded ….

(b) The calculation shall be made on the assumption that the credit contract is valid for the period agreed and that the creditor and the consumer fulfil their obligations under the terms and by the dates agreed.

9 Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive reads:

In the case of credit contracts containing clauses allowing variations in the rate of interest and the amount or level of other charges contained in the annual percentage rate of charge but unquantifiable at the time when it is calculated, the annual percentage rate of charge shall be calculated on the assumption that interest and other charges remain fixed and will apply until the end of the credit contract.

10 Article 4 of the Consumer Credit Directive reads:

1. Credit agreements shall be made in writing. The consumer shall receive a copy of the written agreement.

2. The written agreement shall include:

(a) a statement of the annual percentage rate of charge;

(b) a statement of the conditions under which the annual percentage rate of charge may be amended.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

d) „heildarlánskostnaður neytandans“ allan kostnað, að meðtöldum vöxtum og öðrum kostnaði sem neytandinn þarf að greiða fyrir lánið.“

e) „árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar“ heildarkostnað við neytendalán, lýst sem árlegri prósentu af upphæð láns þess sem veitt er og reiknuð út í samræmi við 1. gr. a.“

7 Í a-lið 1. mgr. 1. gr. a neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir:

Árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar skal vera það sem svarar til núvirðis allra skuldbindinga (lána, endurgreiðslna og kostnaðar), er til kann að koma eða þegar eru fyrir hendi og lánveitandi og lántakandi hafa samið um, og skal reiknað út í samræmi við þá stærðfræðiformúlu sem sett er fram í II. viðauka.

8 Í 4. mgr. 1. gr. a neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir:

a) Árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar skal reiknuð út á þeim tíma sem lánssamningur er gerður ...

b) Við útreikning skal gengið út frá því að lánssamningur gildi umsaminn tíma og að lánveitandi og neytandi standi við skuldbindingar sínar samkvæmt umsömdum skilmálum og á umsömdum gjalddögum.

9 Í 6. mgr. 1. gr. a neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir:

Þegar um er að ræða lánssamninga, sem í eru ákvæði er heimila breytingar á vaxtagjöldum og upphæð eða stigi annars kostnaðar er fellur undir árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar en ekki er unnt að meta hverju nemi á þeim tíma sem útreikningur er gerður, skal reikna út árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar á þeirri forsendu að vextir og annar kostnaður verði óbreytanlegur og gildi fram til loka lánssamnings.

10 Í 4. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir:

1. Lánssamningar skulu gerðir skriflega. Neytandinn skal fá eintak af slíkum skriflegum samningi.

2. Í skriflega samningnum skal eftirfarandi koma fram:

a) yfirlýsing um árlega hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar;

b) yfirlýsing um það við hvaða aðstæður megi breyta árlegri hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar.

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In cases where it is not possible to state the annual percentage rate of charge, the consumer shall be provided with adequate information in the written agreement. This information shall at least include the information provided for in the second indent of Article 6(1);

(c) a statement of the amount, number and frequency or dates of the payments which the consumer must make to repay the credit, as well as of the payments for interest and other charges; the total amount of these payments should also be indicated where possible;

(d) a statement of the cost items referred to in Article 1a(2) with the exception of expenditure related to the breach of contractual obligations which were not included in the calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge but which have to be paid by the consumer in given circumstances, together with a statement identifying such circumstances. Where the exact amount of those items is known, that sum is to be indicated; if that is not the case, either a method of calculation or as accurate an estimate as possible is to be provided where possible.

...

11 Article 15 of the Consumer Credit Directive reads:

This Directive shall not preclude Member States from retaining or adopting more stringent provisions to protect consumers consistent with their obligations under the Treaty.

Directive 93/13/EEC – The Unfair Terms Directive

12 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29) (“the Unfair Terms Directive”) was included as point 7a of Annex XIX to the EEA Agreement.

13 Recitals 6, 13, 20 and 24 in the preamble to the Unfair Terms Directive read:

Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and to safeguard the citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under contracts which are governed by the laws of Member States other than his own, it is essential to remove unfair terms from those contracts;

…

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

Í því tilviki að ekki er unnt að gefa yfirlýsingu um árlega hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar, skal veita neytandanum nægjanlegar upplýsingar í skriflega samningnum. Upplýsingar þessar skulu a.m.k. taka til þess sem kveðið er á um í öðrum undirlið 1. mgr. 6. gr.;

c) tilgreining upphæðar, fjölda og tíðni eða gjalddaga greiðslna er neytandinn verður að inna af hendi til að endurgreiða lánið, sem og um greiðslur fyrir vexti og annan kostnað. Heildarupphæð þessara greiðslna ætti einnig að tilgreina þar sem unnt er;

d) yfirlýsing um þá kostnaðarliði sem segir í 2. mgr. 1. gr. a, að undanteknum kostnaði er tengist því að ekki er staðið við skyldur samkvæmt samningnum, er ekki voru reiknaðar með í árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar en neytandinn verður að greiða við tilteknar aðstæður, ásamt yfirlýsingu um þær aðstæður. Sé nákvæm upphæð þessara liða þekkt skal tilgreina upphæðina en sé ekki um það að ræða skal tilgreina aðferð til útreiknings hennar eða eins nákvæma ágiskun og unnt er.

...

11 Í 15 gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir:

Tilskipun þessi skal ekki koma í veg fyrir að aðildarríki viðhaldi eða taki upp strangari ákvæði til að vernda neytendur og samrýmast skuldbindingum þeirra samkvæmt sáttmálanum.

Tilskipun 93/13/EBE – Tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála

12 Tilskipun ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum (Stjtíð. ESB 1993 L 95, bls. 29) (tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála) var tekin upp í XIX. viðauka við EES-samninginn, í lið 7a.

13 Í 6., 13., 20. og 24. lið formálsorða tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála segir:

Til að greiða fyrir stofnun innri markaðar og tryggja rétt borgarans í hlutverki neytanda við kaup á vöru og þjónustu samkvæmt samningum sem lög annarra aðildarríkja en hans eigin gilda um er mikilvægt að nema burt óréttmæta skilmála úr slíkum samningum.

…

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Whereas the statutory or regulatory provisions of the Member States which directly or indirectly determine the terms of consumer contracts are presumed not to contain unfair terms; whereas, therefore, it does not appear to be necessary to subject the terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the principles or provisions of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party; whereas in that respect the wording ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ in Article 1(2) also covers rules which, according to the law, shall apply between the contracting parties provided that no other arrangements have been established;

…

Whereas contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail;

…

Whereas the courts or administrative authorities of the Member States must have at their disposal adequate and effective means of preventing the continued application of unfair terms in consumer contracts.

14 Article 1 of the Unfair Terms Directive reads:

1. The purpose of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer.

2. The contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party, particularly in the transport area, shall not be subject to the provisions of this Directive.


For the purposes of this Directive:

(a) ‘unfair terms’ means the contractual terms defined in Article 3;

(b) ‘consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

Talið er að lög og stjórnsýsluákvæði aðildarríkjanna, sem beint eða óbeint ákvarða skilmála neytendasamninga, feli ekki í sér óréttmæta skilmála. Það virðist því ekki nauðsynlegt að láta ákvæði þessarar tilskipunar ná til skilmála sem endurspegla lög eða bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði og meginreglur eða ákvæði alþjóðasamninga sem aðildarríkin eða bandalagið er aðili að. Orðalagið „lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði“ í 2. mgr. 1. gr. á einnig við um reglur sem samkvæmt lögum gilda í samskiptum samningsaðila, nema samið hafi verið um aðra skipan.

...

Samningar skulu orðaðir á eðlilegu, skiljanlegu máli, neytandi skal fá tækifæri til þess að skoða alla skilmála og í vafamálum gildir sú túlkun sem neytandanum kemur best.

...

Dómstólar og stjórnvöld aðildarríkjanna verða að eiga tiltækar réttar og árangursríkar leiðir til að hindra áframhaldandi notkun óréttmætra skilmála í neytendasamningum.

14 Í 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála segir:

1. Tilgangurinn með þessari tilskipun er að samræma lög og stjórnsýslufyrirmæli aðildarríkjanna um óréttmæta skilmála í samningum milli seljanda eða veitanda og neytanda.

2. Þessi tilskipun nær ekki til samningsskilmála sem endurspegla lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði og ákvæði eða meginreglur í alþjóðasamningum sem aðildarríkin eða bandalagið eiga aðild að, m.a. á sviði flutningamála.


Í þessari tilskipun er merking eftirfarandi hugtaka sem hér segir:

(a) „óréttmætir skilmálar“: samningsskilmálar samkvæmt skilgreiningu í 3. gr.;

(b) „neytandi“: einstaklingur sem í samningum, er þessi tilskipun nær til, á viðskipti í öðru skyni en vegna starfs síns;

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(c) ‘seller or supplier’ means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned.


1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.

2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.

The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract.

Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.

3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair.


1. Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.

2. Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

(c) „seljandi eða veitandi“: einstaklingur eða lögpersóna sem í samningum, er þessi tilskipun nær til, á viðskipti vegna starfs síns, hvort sem það er opinbert starf eða ekki.


1. Samningsskilmáli sem hefur ekki verið samið um sérstaklega telst óréttmætur ef hann, þrátt fyrir skilyrðið um „góða trú“, veldur umtalsverðu ójafnvægi réttinda og skyldna samningsaðila samkvæmt samningnum, neytanda til tjóns.

2. Ekki telst hafa verið samið sérstaklega um samningsskilmála ef hann hefur verið saminn fyrirfram og neytandi því ekki haft tækifæri til að hafa áhrif á efni skilmálans, einkum þegar um er ræða fastorðaða staðalsamninga.

Þó samið hafi verið sérstaklega um einstök atriði samningsskilmála eða einn tiltekinn samningsskilmála, þá gildir þessi grein áfram um afganginn af samningnum ef heildarmat á samningnum sýnir að hann er þrátt fyrir það fastorðaður staðalsamningur.

Ef seljandi eða veitandi heldur því fram að samið hafi verið sérstaklega um staðalskilmála er sönnunarbyrðin hans.

3. Í viðaukanum er skrá, leiðbeinandi en ekki tæmandi, yfir samnings-skilmála sem teljast óréttmætir.


1. Með fyrirvara um 7. gr. skal við mat á því hvort samningsskilmáli er óréttmætur taka tillit til þess um hvers konar vörur eða þjónustu samningurinn er og hafa hliðsjón af öllum aðstæðum á þeim tíma sem samningurinn er gerður og öllum öðrum skilmálum samningsins eða annars samnings sem hann hangir saman við.

2. Matið á því hvort samningsskilmálar séu óréttmætir nær hvorki til skilgreiningar á aðalefni samningsins né samræmis milli verðs og vara eða þjónustu og greiðslu fyrir hana ef þessir skilmálar eru orðaðir á eðlilegu, skiljanlegu máli.

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In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail. This rule on interpretation shall not apply in the context of the procedures laid down in Article 7(2).

19 Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive reads:

Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.

20 The Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive “Terms referred to in Article 3(3)” reads:

1. Terms which have the object or effect of:

…

(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded;

...

2. Scope of subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l)

…

(c) Subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l) do not apply to:

– transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments and other products or services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index or a financial market rate that the seller or supplier does not control;

– …

(d) Subparagraph (l) is without hindrance to price-indexation clauses, where lawful, provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment


Í samningum þar sem allir eða tilteknir skilmálar sem neytanda eru boðnir eru skriflegir skulu skilmálarnir ávallt orðaðir á eðlilegu, skiljanlegu máli. Í vafamálum um túlkun skilmála gildir sú túlkun sem neytandanum kemur best. Þessi túlkunarregla gildir ekki í tengslum við málsmeðferð samkvæmt 2. mgr. 7. gr.

19 Í 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála segir:

Aðildarríkin skulu mæla svo fyrir um að óréttmætir skilmálar í samningi seljanda eða veitanda við neytanda séu ekki samkvæmt landslögum þeirra bindandi fyrir neytandann og að samningurinn verði áfram bindandi fyrir samningsaðila ef hann getur haldið gildi sínu að öðru leyti án óréttmætu skilmálanna.

20 Í viðauka tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála segir undir liðnum „Samningsskilmálar sem um getur í 3. mgr. 3. gr.“

1. Samningsskilmálar sem hafa að markmiði eða þau áhrif:

...

l) að gera ráð fyrir að vöruverð sé ákveðið við afhendingu eða heimila seljanda vöru eða veitanda þjónustu að hækka verðið án þess, í báðum tilvikum, að veita neytandanum tilsvarandi rétt til að ógilda samning ef endanlegt verð er of hátt samanborið við umsamið verð við gerð samnings;

...

2. Gildissvið g-, j- og l-liðar:

...

(c) Ákvæði g-, j- og l-liðar gilda ekki um:

– viðskipti með framseljanleg verðbréf, fjármálapappíra og aðrar vörur eða þjónustu ef verðið er bundið breytingum á vísitölu, markaðsverði verðbréfa eða vöxtum á fjármagnsmarkaði sem seljandinn eða veitandinn hefur ekki áhrif á;

– ...

d) Ákvæði l-liðar koma ekki í veg fyrir löglega vísitölubindingu ef aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga er útskýrð rækilega í samningi.

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21 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22) (“the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”) was incorporated into Annexes IX and XIX of the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 93/2006 of 7 July 2006 (OJ 2006 L 289, p. 34, and EEA Supplement 2006 No 52, p. 27).

National law

Act No 121/1994

22 At the time the credit agreement in question was concluded, Act No 121/1994 on Consumer Credit (“the Consumer Credit Act”) was in force. This legislation transposed the Consumer Credit Directive into Icelandic law. In a similar manner to the Consumer Credit Directive, the Consumer Credit Act originally excluded from its scope agreements for the purchase of real estate. This exclusion was later removed. Since 2001 the Consumer Credit Act has applied to a broader group of consumer credit agreements than the Consumer Credit Directive itself.

23 Article 5 of the Consumer Credit Act requires credit agreements to be made in writing and to contain the information described in Articles 6 and 8. According to the first paragraph of Article 6, this includes information on the principal (the credit granted without any charges), the rate of interest, the total cost of the credit calculated in accordance with Article 7, the annual percentage rate of charge, which is the total cost of the credit expressed as an annual percentage of the principal and calculated according to the provisions of Articles 10 to 12, as well as the total amount to be repaid, the number of payments, amounts and payment dates, and the validity and conditions of termination. The second paragraph of Article 6 further states that if charges, repayments or other credit terms may be amended during the contract period, the consumer must be informed of the conditions applicable to such amendments.

24 Article 7 goes on to define the total cost of the credit, while Article 9 states that, although the Consumer Credit Act “provides for consumer

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

21 Tilskipun Evrópuþingsins og ráðsins 2005/29 frá 11. maí 2005 um óréttmæta viðskiptahætti gagnvart neytendum á innri markaðnum og um breytingu á tilskipun ráðsins 84/450/EBE, tilskipunum Evrópuþingsins og ráðsins 97/7/EB, 98/27/EB og 2002/65/EB og reglugerð Evrópuþingsins og ráðsins (EB) nr. 2006/2004 (Stjtíð. ESB 2005 L 149, bls. 22) (Tilskipun um óréttmæta viðskiptahætti) var tekin upp í IX. og XIX. viðauka við EES-samninginn með ákvörðun sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 93/2006 frá 7. júlí 2006 (Stjtíð. ESB 2006 L 289, bls. 34 og EES-viðbætir 2006 nr. 52, bls. 27.).

Landsréttur

Lög nr. 121/1994

22 Þegar gengið var frá lánssamningnum sem málið varðar voru í gildi lög nr. 121/1994 um neytendalán (neytendalánalög). Lögin leiddu neytenda-lánatilskipunina í íslenskan rétt. Fasteignakaup voru upphaflega undanþegin bæði gildissviði laganna og tilskipunarinnar. Undanþágunni var síðar aflétt og frá árinu 2001 hafa íslensku lögin gilt um fleiri tegundir neytendalána en tilskipunin.

23 Í 5. gr. neytendalánalaganna er gerð krafa um að lánssamningur skuli gerður skriflega og fela í sér þær upplýsingar sem tilgreindar eru í 6. og 8. gr. laganna. Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 6. gr. skal upplýsa um höfuðstólinn (lánsfjárhæð án kostnaðar), vexti, heildarlántökukostnað reiknaðan út skv. 7. gr., árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, þ.e. heildarlántökukostnað, lýst sem árlegri prósentu af upphæð höfuðstólsins og reiknaðri út skv. 10. til 12. gr., auk þeirrar heildarupphæðar sem greiða ber, fjölda einstakra greiðslna, fjárhæðar þeirra og gjalddaga, gildistíma lánssamnings og skilyrða fyrir uppsögn hans. Í 2. mgr. 6. gr. segir jafnframt að ef breyta megi lánskostnaði, afborgunum eða öðrum atriðum lánskjara á samningstímanum skuli lánveitandi greina neytanda frá því við hvaða aðstæður breytingarnar geti orðið.

24 Í 7. gr. er heildarlántökukostnaður skilgreindur, og í 9. gr. segir að þó neytendalánalögin kveði á um að „neytandi skuli fá upplýsingar um vexti

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information on interest rates or sums including interest rates, the parties concerned are not prevented from reaching an agreement on variable interest rates, either to some extent or altogether.”

25 Articles 10 to 12 lay down more detailed provisions concerning the calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge. Article 10 defines this charge as “the rate which balances the present value of the payment obligation of the creditor on the one hand and the consumer on the other according to their credit agreement.” Article 11 states that the annual percentage rate of charge “shall be calculated when the credit agreement is concluded.”

26 Article 12 of the Consumer Credit Act deals with “credit agreements containing clauses allowing indexation or variations in the rate of interest and the amount or level of other charges contained in the annual percentage rate of charge but unquantifiable at the time when it is calculated.” In these cases, the annual percentage rate of charge “shall be calculated on the assumption that the price level, interest rate and other charges will remain unchanged until the end of the credit agreement.”

27 According to the referring court, it follows from the preparatory materials to the Consumer Credit Act that Article 12 of that Act is intended to implement into Icelandic law the provisions of Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive. It covers information to be given by the creditor in the case of credit contracts containing clauses allowing variations in the rate of interest and the amount or level of other charges contained in the annual percentage rate of charge but unquantifiable at the time when the calculation is made.

Act No 7/1936

28 In Iceland, Act No 14/1995 implemented the Unfair Terms Directive by amending Article 36 and inserting Articles 36a to 36d into Act No 7/1936 on Contracts, Agency and Void Legal Instruments (“the Contracts Act”).

29 The first paragraph of Article 36 states that, subject to Article 36c, a contract may be set aside, in full or in part, or amended, if it would be considered unfair or contrary to good business practice to invoke it. It states also that the same applies to other legal instruments. It provides further that, in assessments made under the first paragraph, consideration shall be given to the substance of the contract, the position of the parties, the circumstances when the contract was made and subsequent circumstances, cf. the second paragraph.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

eða fjárhæðir þar sem vextir eru meðtaldir, komi það ekki í veg fyrir að aðilar geti samið um að vextir séu að nokkru eða öllu leyti breytilegir.“

25 Í 10. til 12. gr. eru ítarlegri ákvæði um útreikning árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar. Hún er skilgreind í 10. gr. sem „það vaxtaígildi sem jafnar núvirðið af greiðsluskuldbindingum lánveitanda annars vegar og neytanda hins vegar samkvæmt lánssamningi þeirra.“ Samkvæmt 11. gr. skal reikna hana út „á þeim tíma sem lánssamningur er gerður“.

26 Ákvæði 12. gr. neytendalánalaganna varða lánssamninga sem heimila „verðtryggingu eða breytingu á vöxtum eða öðrum gjöldum sem teljast hluti árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, en ekki er unnt að meta hverju nemi á þeim tíma sem útreikningur er gerður“. Í slíkum tilvikum skal reikna út árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar „miðað við þá forsendu að verðlag, vextir og önnur gjöld verði óbreytt til loka lánstímans“.

27 Samkvæmt landsdómstólnum leiðir það af lögskýringargögnum neytendalánalaga að 12. gr. var ætlað að leiða 6. mgr. 1. gr. a neytendalánatilskipunarinnar í íslensk lög. Hún tekur til upplýsinga sem lánveitanda ber að veita þegar um er að ræða lánssamninga, sem í eru ákvæði er heimila breytingar á vaxtagjöldum og upphæð eða stigi annars kostnaðar er fellur undir árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar en ekki er unnt að meta hverju nemi á þeim tíma sem útreikningur er gerður.

Lög nr. 7/1936

28 Tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála var innleidd í íslenskan rétt með lögum nr. 14/1995 sem breyttu 36. gr. laga nr. 7/1936 um samningsgerð, umboð og ógilda löggerninga (samningalög) og bættu við greinum 36 a. til 36 d.

29 Í 1. mgr. 36. gr. samningalaga segir að samningi megi víkja til hliðar í heild eða að hluta, eða breyta, ef það yrði talið ósanngjarnt eða andstætt góðri viðskiptavenju að bera hann fyrir sig, sbr. þó 36. gr. c. Hið sama á við um aðra löggerninga. Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 36. gr. skal við mat samkvæmt 1. mgr. líta til efnis samnings, stöðu samningsaðila, atvika við samningsgerðina og atvika sem síðar komu til.

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30 Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 36a, Articles 36a to 36d “apply to contracts, including contract terms, which have not been individually negotiated, provided that the contracts form part of the business activities of one of the parties, the business operator, but do not form part of the activities of the other party, the consumer; cf., however, Article 36d.”

31 Article 36b requires that “[w]ritten contracts offered by a business operator to consumers shall be phrased in plain and intelligible language. In the event of any doubts concerning the meaning of a contract referred to in the first paragraph of Article 36a, the contract shall be construed in the consumer’s favour.”

32 According to the first paragraph of Article 36c, Article 36 shall “apply to contracts pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 36a, but with the changes resulting from the second and third paragraphs.” Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 36c, “[i]n assessing whether a contract pursuant to the first paragraph is unfair, account should be taken of the factors and circumstances referred to in the second paragraph of Article 36, including the terms of other linked contracts. However, no account shall be taken of circumstances that arose subsequently, to the disadvantage of the consumer.” The third paragraph of Article 36c states that “[a] contract is unfair if it is contrary to good business practices and materially distorts the balance between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, to the disadvantage of the consumer. If a term of this kind is set aside, either in full or in part, or amended, the contract shall, at the request of the consumer, remain valid in other respects without change if it can be performed without the term.”

Act No 38/2001

33 The Icelandic Act No 13/1979 on Economic Policy generally permits indexation of savings and credit. Provisions on the matter have existed in Icelandic legislation ever since. Chapter VI of Act No 38/2001 on Interest and Indexation (“the Indexation Act”) sets out the provisions on indexation currently in force. Except to the extent permitted by Article 2 of the Indexation Act, the provisions of that chapter are mandatory in relation to all indexed savings and loans.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

30 Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 36. gr. a. gilda ákvæði 36. gr. a til d um samninga, „m. a. samningsskilmála, sem ekki hefur verið samið um sérstaklega enda séu samningarnir liður í starfsemi annars aðilans, atvinnurekanda, en í meginatriðum ekki liður í starfsemi hins aðilans, neytanda, sbr. þó 36. gr. d.“

31 36. gr. b. kveður á um að „skriflegur samningur, sem atvinnurekandi gefur neytanda kost á, skuli vera á skýru og skiljanlegu máli. Komi upp vafi um merkingu samnings sem nefndur er í 1. mgr. 36. gr. a. skal túlka samninginn neytandanum í hag.“

32 Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 36. gr. c. gilda ákvæði 36. gr. „um samninga skv. 1. mgr. 36. gr. a, þó með þeim breytingum sem leiðir af 2. og 3. mgr. 36. gr. c.“ Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 36. gr. c. skal við mat á því hvort samningur skv. 1. mgr. sé ósanngjarn „líta til atriða og atvika sem nefnd eru í 2. mgr. 36. gr., m.a. skilmála í öðrum samningi sem hann tengist. Þó skal eigi taka tillit til atvika sem síðar komu til, neytanda í óhag.“ Í 3. mgr. 36. gr. c. segir að samningur teljist ósanngjarn stríði hann „gegn góðum viðskiptaháttum og raski til muna jafnvægi milli réttinda og skyldna samningsaðila, neytanda í óhag. Ef slíkum skilmála er vikið til hliðar í heild eða að hluta, eða breytt, skal samningurinn að kröfu neytanda gilda að öðru leyti án breytinga verði hann efndur án skilmálans.“

Lög nr. 38/2001

33 Verðtrygging sparifjár og lánsfjár er almennt heimil samkvæmt lögum nr. 13/1979 um stjórn efnahagsmála o.fl. Ákvæði um það efni hafa verið í lögum allar götur síðan. Núgildandi reglur um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár er að finna í VI. kafla laga nr. 38/2001 um vexti og verðtryggingu. Ákvæði kaflans eru ófrávíkjanleg og eiga við um allt verðtryggt sparifé og lánsfé, ef frá eru taldar þær undanþágur sem kveðið er á um í 2. gr. laganna.

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34 Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Indexation Act, the provisions of Chapter VI “shall apply to obligations concerning savings and loans in Icelandic krónur (ISK) where the debtor promises to pay money and it has been agreed or stipulated that the payments should be price-indexed. Price indexation as referred to in this Chapter shall mean changes in line with a domestic price index. Authorisation for price indexation shall be as provided for in Article 14 of this Act unless otherwise provided for by law.”

35 Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 14, “[s]avings and loans may be price-indexed in accordance with Article 13 if the basis of the price indexation is the consumer price index [“CPI”] as calculated by Statistics Iceland in accordance with legislation applicable to the index and published monthly in the Legal Gazette. An index which is calculated and published in a specific month shall apply to the indexation of savings and loans from the first day of the second month thereafter.” The second paragraph of Article 14 states that “a loan agreement may be based on a share price index, domestic or foreign, or a set of such indices which do not measure changes in general price levels.”

36 The first paragraph of Article 15 states that “[t]he Central Bank may, subject to the approval of the Minister [of Business Affairs], decide on a minimum maturity for indexed deposits and loans. The Bank may also, subject to the approval of the Minister, decide that the interest rates on indexed deposits and loans should be fixed during the period of the loan.” The second paragraph of that article states that “[t]he Central Bank shall adopt further rules on the indexation of savings and loans.”

Rules of the Central Bank No 492/2001

37 On the basis of Article 15 of the Indexation Act, the Central Bank adopted Rules No 492/2001 on Price Indexation of Savings and Loans (“the Rules”).

38 Article 1 of the Rules states that domestic price indexation of savings and loans shall be based on the CPI as announced monthly by Statistics Iceland, cf. the provisions of Chapter VI of Act No 38/2001, unless otherwise stipulated by law.

39 Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Rules, provisions for indexing the principal of a loan against the CPI are only permitted if the loan

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

34 Í 1. mgr. 13. gr. laga nr. 38/2001 segir að ákvæði VI. kafla þeirra skuli „gilda um skuldbindingar sem varða sparifé og lánsfé í íslenskum krónum þar sem skuldari lofar að greiða peninga og þar sem umsamið eða áskilið er að greiðslurnar skuli verðtryggðar. Með verðtryggingu er í þessum kafla átt við breytingu í hlutfalli við innlenda verðvísitölu. Um heimildir til verðtryggingar fer skv. 14. gr. nema lög kveði á um annað.“.

35 Í 1. mgr. 14. gr. segir: „Heimilt er að verðtryggja sparifé og lánsfé skv. 13. gr. sé grundvöllur verðtryggingarinnar vísitala neysluverðs sem Hagstofa Íslands reiknar samkvæmt lögum sem um vísitöluna gilda og birtir mánaðarlega í Lögbirtingablaði. Vísitala sem reiknuð er og birt í tilteknum mánuði gildir um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár frá fyrsta degi þar næsta mánaðar.“ Í 2. mgr. 14 gr. segir: „Í lánssamningi er þó heimilt að miða við hlutabréfavísitölu, innlenda eða erlenda, eða safn slíkra vísitalna sem ekki mæla breytingar á almennu verðlagi.“

36 Í 1. mgr. 15. gr. segir: „Seðlabankinn getur að fengnu samþykki ráðherra ákveðið lágmarkstíma verðtryggðra innstæðna og lána. Bankinn getur jafnframt að fengnu samþykki ráðherra ákveðið að vextir verðtryggðra innstæðna og lána skuli vera óbreytanlegir á lánstímanum.“ Í 2. mgr. 15. gr. segir: „Seðlabankinn setur nánari reglur um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár.“

Reglur Seðlabanka Íslands nr. 492/2001

37 Á grundvelli 15. gr. laga nr. 38/2001 setti Seðlabankinn reglur nr. 492/2001 um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár (reglurnar).

38 Fyrsta grein reglnanna kveður á um að verðtrygging sparifjár og lánsfjár miðað við innlenda verðvísitölu skuli miðast við vísitölu neysluverðs eins og Hagstofa Íslands auglýsir hana mánaðarlega, sbr. ákvæði VI. kafla laga nr. 38/ 2001, nema lög kveði á um annað.

39 Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglnanna er verðtrygging láns með ákvæði um að höfuðstóll þess miðist við vísitölu neysluverðs því aðeins heimil að

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is for a minimum term of five years. The second paragraph of that article provides that “[t]he principal changes in proportion to changes in the CPI from the base index to the first due date, and then in proportion to changes in the index between due dates. The principal of a loan shall change on each due date before interest and instalments are calculated. The base index shall be the index that is in effect when the loan is furnished, unless otherwise determined by an agreement or the nature of the case.”

40 The third paragraph of Article 4 of the Rules states that all the due dates of a loan shall be on the same day of the month, so that the interval between them is counted in whole months. If the due date of a loan is on a different day of the month from that on which the loan is furnished, a daily interest rate with special indexation shall be calculated for the purpose of adjusting for deviations within the month of the loan (to a maximum of 29 days). Upon disbursement of a loan, the borrower pays daily interest if the due date is later in the month than the granting of the loan, while the lender shall pay if the due date is earlier. The fourth paragraph of that article provides that in financial instruments, listed on a regulated market, it may be stipulated that, on the day of the deposit of the loan and on the date of the payment of instalments and interest, the price indexation within a month shall be based on a daily linear change in the CPI, that is between its value on the first day of the month and its value on the first day of the following month. Finally, the fifth paragraph of that article provides that receipts shall state in detail the calculation of payments and accrued indexation.

Act No 12/1995

41 Act No 12/1995 on the CPI contains provisions concerning the methods for calculating the CPI. It provides that Statistics Iceland shall calculate and publish the index on a monthly basis. The index is to be compiled on a base determined by Statistics Iceland according to the results of the household budget survey. As far as possible, the index shall reflect average prices in Iceland. A special Advisory Committee on the CPI monitors Statistics Iceland’s monthly calculations of the CPI.

II FACTS AND PROCEDURE

42 By order of 17 December 2013, registered at the Court on the same day, Reykjavík District Court requested an Advisory Opinion in a case pending before it between Sævar Jón Gunnarsson and Landsbankinn hf.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

lánið sé til fimm ára hið minnsta. Í 2. mgr. segir: „Höfuðstóll láns breytist í hlutfalli við breytingar á vísitölu neysluverðs frá grunnvísitölu til fyrsta gjalddaga og síðan í hlutfalli við breytingar á vísitölunni milli gjalddaga. Skal höfuðstóll láns breytast á hverjum gjalddaga, áður en vextir og afborgun eru reiknuð út. Grunnvísitala skal vera vísitala sú, sem í gildi er þegar lán er veitt, nema samningur eða eðli máls leiði til annars.“

40 Í 3. mgr. 4. gr. reglnanna segir að gjalddagar láns skulu allir vera á sama degi mánaðar, þannig að tímabilið milli gjalddaga teljist í heilum mánuðum. Sé gjalddagi láns á einhverjum öðrum degi mánaðar en lánveiting á sér stað, skal til leiðréttingar reikna dagvexti með sérstökum verðbótum, fyrir frávikið innan lánveitingarmánaðar (mest 29 dagar). Við útborgun láns greiðir lánþegi dagvextina, ef gjalddagi er síðar í mánuði en lánveiting, en lánveitandi greiðir, ef gjalddagi er fyrr. Í 4. mgr. er veitt heimild til að semja svo um í fjármálagerningum, sem skráðir eru á skipulegum verðbréfamarkaði, að á útborgunardegi láns og greiðsludegi afborgana og vaxta miðist verðbætur innan mánaðar við daglega línulega breytingu á vísitölu neysluverðs, það er milli gildis hennar á fyrsta degi mánaðar og gildis hennar á fyrsta degi næsta mánaðar þar á eftir. Loks segir í 5. mgr. að á kvittunum skuli jafnan gera nákvæma grein fyrir útreikningi greiðslu og áföllnum verðbótum.

Lög nr. 12/1995

41 Í lögum nr. 12/1995 um vísitölu neysluverðs er að finna ákvæði um aðferðir við útreikning vísitölu neysluverðs. Þar segir að Hagstofa Íslands skuli reikna og birta vísitöluna mánaðarlega. Skal hún reist á grunni sem Hagstofan ákveður samkvæmt niðurstöðum neyslukönnunar. Vísitalan skal svo sem kostur er miðast við meðalverðlag í landinu. Sérstök nefnd er Hagstofunni til ráðgjafar um gerð vísitölunnar og fylgist með reglubundnum útreikningi hennar.

II MÁLAVEXTIR OG MEÐFERÐ MÁLSINS

42 Með bréfi dagsettu 17. desember 2013, sem skráð var samdægurs í málaskrá dómstólsins, óskaði Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur eftir ráðgefandi áliti í máli sem rekið er fyrir dómstólnum milli Sævars Jóns Gunnarssonar og Landsbankans hf.

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43 On 19 November 2008, Sævar Jón Gunnarsson took a loan in the amount of ISK 630 000 from Landsbankinn hf. A bond was issued for the debt. The bond contains standardised contractual terms prepared by Landsbankinn. The bond’s header states that it is a “Bond with in solidum personal guarantee – loan to an individual.” It further states that the bond is indexed, with a variable interest rate. The bond also defines the overall loan period, the number of instalments and the index base.

44 The first paragraph of the main text of the bond states that the loan is to be repaid in equal payments of instalments on the principal together with the interest thereon (an annuity loan arrangement), which means that each instalment and interest rate payment is the same throughout the loan period, unless the interest rate is changed. Then the bond states that:

[f]or indexation purposes, the loan is linked to the [CPI] and the debt changes in accordance with changes in the index from the index base until the payment date on any given occasion. Thus, the issuer [debtor] shall pay, in addition to each individual payment of instalments and interest, an indexation adjustment on each due date, based on the rise in the index from the base index figure.

45 On 20 November 2008, when the bond was issued, the Plaintiff also signed an “Annex to a bond – Repayment schedule”. The schedule contains an itemisation of the repayments of the loan on each of the planned due dates (64 payments in total) together with a calculation of the outstanding balance, instalment repayment on the principal, interest payment and the costs pertaining to each payment. The schedule concludes with the following statement:

Note that this is an estimate. The estimate is based on 0% inflation, current interest rates and the bank’s tariff of charges, which may change (cf. the provisions of the bond).

46 The nominal repayment burden of the loan turned out to be considerably higher than was indicated in the repayment schedule. According to the referring court, it may be assumed that the rise in the repayments was caused by the index-linked revision of the loan on each due date. The index-linked revision resulted in higher instalments than those set out in the repayment schedule.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

43 Þann 19. nóvember 2008 tók stefnandi lán hjá stefnda að fjárhæð

630.000 ISK gegn útgáfu skuldabréfs. Skuldabréfið innihélt staðlaða

samningsskilmála sem stefnandi samdi. Í fyrirsögn skuldabréfsins

segir að það sé: „Skuldabréf með óskiptri sjálfsskuldarábyrgð — lán til

einstaklings.“ Er þar jafnframt tekið fram að skuldabréfið sé verðtryggt

með breytilegum vöxtum. Auk þess er heildarlánstíminn skýrður, fjöldi

afborgana og við hvaða grunnvísitölu er miðað.

44 Í fyrstu málsgrein meginmáls skuldabréfsins kemur fram að um sé að ræða

lán með jöfnum greiðslum afborgana og vaxta (jafngreiðslulán). Það þýðir

að afborgun og vextir séu ávallt sama upphæðin nema vextir breytist. Þá

segir eftirfarandi í skuldabréfinu:

Lánið er bundið vísitölu neysluverðs til verðtryggingar og breytist skuldin í

samræmi við breytingar á vísitölunni [vísitölu neysluverðs] frá grunnvísitölu

til gjalddaga á hverjum tíma. Þannig skal útgefandi [skuldari] greiða til

viðbótar hverri einstakri greiðslu afborgana og vaxta, verðuppbót á hverjum

gjalddaga, sem miðast við hækkun vísitölu frá grunnvísitölunni.

45 Á útgáfudegi skuldabréfsins, 20. nóvember 2008, undirritaði stefnandi

einnig „Fylgiskjal skuldabréfs – greiðsluáætlun“. Í henni er að finna

sundurliðun greiðslna af láninu á hverjum áætluðum gjalddaga (alls

64 talsins), auk útreiknings á eftirstöðvum, afborgun, greiðslu

vaxta og kostnaðar miðað við hverja greiðslu. Þá segir eftirfarandi í

greiðsluáætluninni:

Athugið að um áætlun er að ræða. Áætlunin er byggð á 0% verðbólgu,

núgildandi vöxtum, og gjaldskrá bankans, sem geta tekið breytingum sbr.

ákvæði í skuldabréfi.

46 Nafnvirði greiðslubyrðar lánsins reyndist talsvert hærra en ráð var fyrir

gert í greiðsluáætluninni. Af beiðni héraðsdóms má ráða að hækkun

afborgananna umfram greiðsluáætlun hafi orsakast af verðbótauppreikningi

lánsins á hverjum gjalddaga. Hann hafði þau áhrif að afborganir hækkuðu

umfram þær fjárhæðir sem gert var ráð fyrir í áætluninni.

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47 It appears from the documents of the case that the actual rate of inflation reported at the time of conclusion of the loan agreement was higher than the 0% rate of inflation indicated in the bond. It is also clear from the case file that Iceland was experiencing an economic crisis at the time.

48 The Plaintiff brought proceedings against the Defendant before Reykjavík District Court. He argued that the indexation arrangement in the loan agreement was in violation of the Consumer Credit Act and the Consumer Credit Directive, and that it constituted an unfair consumer contract term. The Plaintiff contended that this was contrary to Articles 36 and 36a to 36d of the Contracts Act and the Unfair Terms Directive. On this basis, the term in question should be considered not binding. In particular, the Plaintiff argued that the payment schedule should have been based on an unchanged rate of inflation throughout the loan period and not a 0% rate of inflation, which had also caused the annual percentage rate of charge to appear too low.

49 The Defendant rejected this view. Reference was made to Article 12 of the Consumer Credit Act and the Consumer Credit Directive, which both allow provisions on variable rates of interest or other costs in a credit agreement to be calculated on the premise that no change will take place in the rate of interest and in costs during the term of the credit agreement. Accordingly, the Defendant argued that it was required, when calculating the estimated total cost of the credit, to assume that price levels would remain unchanged throughout the loan period, and similarly that it was correct to assume a 0% rate of inflation. Furthermore, the Defendant considered that price indexation was permitted by law and that the loan complied with all relevant legal requirements. In particular, the original document clearly stated that the loan was to be revised in line with changes to the CPI. The Defendant had no responsibility for the fixing of this index and the calculation method was clearly explained.

50 In the view of Reykjavík District Court, there is doubt about the proper interpretation and effect of the Consumer Credit Directive and the Unfair Terms Directive and whether, when calculating the total cost of credit to the consumer, it is permissible completely to ignore the rate of inflation as it is at the time when the loan is agreed and to assume instead an inflation rate of 0%.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

47 Af gögnum málsins má ráða að verðbólga sem mældist á undirritunartíma lánssamningsins hafi verið hærri en þau 0% sem miðað var við í skuldabréfinu. Það er einnig ljóst af málsgögnunum að á Íslandi ríkti fjármálakreppa á umræddum tíma.

48 Stefnandi höfðaði mál á hendur stefnda fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur. Hann hélt því fram að fyrirkomulagið í lánssamningnum hafi brotið bæði gegn íslensku lögunum um neytendalán og tilskipuninni um sama efni, og að í því hafi falist óréttmætur skilmáli í neytendasamningi. Stefnandi hélt því fram að fyrirkomulagið væri andstætt 36. gr. og 36 gr. a. til 36 gr. d. samningalaga og tilskipuninni um óréttmæta samningsskilmála. Á þeim grundvelli bæri að telja að umræddur skilmáli væri ekki skuldbindandi. Stefnandi benti sérstaklega á að greiðsluáætlunin hefði átt að gera ráð fyrir óbreyttu verðbólgustigi á öllum lánstímanum, en ekki 0% verðbólgustigi. Það hafi einnig valdið því að árleg hlutfallstala lánskostnaðar hafi virst of lág.

49 Stefndi mótmælti þessu sjónarmiði. Hann vísaði til 12. gr. neytendalánalaganna og neytendalánatilskipunarinnar, sem heimila að skilmálar um breytilega vexti eða önnur breytileg gjöld byggist á útreikningum sem miðast við þá forsendu að vextir og kostnaður verði óbreytt til loka lánstímans. Í samræmi við það taldi stefndi að sér hafi borið að leggja þá forsendu til grundvallar við útreikning á áætluðum heildarlántökukostnaði að verðlag myndi haldast óbreytt á öllum lánstímanum, og með sömu röksemdafærslu, að hann hafi mátt gera ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu. Stefndi telur jafnframt að verðtryggingin hafi verið heimil samkvæmt lögum og að lánið hafi uppfyllt allar lagalegur kröfur sem við áttu. Hann leggur áherslu á að skýrt hafi verið tekið fram í upprunalega skjalinu að lánið skyldi endurskoðast í samræmi við breytingar á vísitölu neysluverðs. Stefndi hafi ekki átt neinn þátt í ákvörðun vísitölunnar og reikningsaðferðin hafi verið rækilega útskýrð.

50 Að mati Héraðsdóms Reykjavíkur liggur ekki ljóst fyrir hvernig túlka beri tilskipunina um neytendalán sem og tilskipunina um óréttmæta samningsskilmála, hvaða áhrif þær hafa, og hvort heimilt sé að líta alveg framhjá verðbólgustiginu á undirritunartíma lánsins og gera þess í stað ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu við útreikning heildarlántökukostnaðar neytanda.

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51 In light of the above, Reykjavík District Court referred the following questions to the Court for an Advisory Opinion:

1. Is it compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit, as amended by Directive 90/88/EEC and Directive 98/7/EC, that when a credit agreement is made, which is linked to the consumer price index in accordance with an authorisation in enacted legislation, and the sum loaned therefore changes in accordance with inflation, the calculation of the total cost of the credit, and of the annual percentage rate of charge, which is shown to the consumer when the agreement is made, is based on 0% inflation, and not on the known rate of inflation on the date when the loan is taken?

2. Is it compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts if the legislation in an EEA State permits the inclusion of provisions in a consumer contract, stating that repayments of the loan are to be linked to a predetermined index?

3. If the answer to the second question is that the index-linking of repayments of consumer loans is compatible with the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC, then the third question is: Does the Directive limit the latitude of the EEA State in question to determine, through legislation or by means of administrative regulations, the factors that are to cause changes in the predetermined index and the methods by which these changes are to be measured?

4. If the answer to the third question is that Directive 93/13/EEC does not restrict the latitude of the Member State referred to in that question, then the fourth question is: Is a contractual term regarded as having been individually negotiated within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive when a) it is stated in the bond which the consumer signs when taking the loan that his obligation is index-linked and the base index to be used when calculating price-changes is specified in the bond, b) the bond is accompanied by a repayment schedule showing estimated and itemised repayments to be made on the due dates of the loan, and it is stated in the schedule that these estimates may change in accordance with the indexation provision of the bond, and c) both the consumer and the grantor of credit sign the repayment schedule at the same time and in conjunction with the signature of the bond by the consumer?

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Judgment

51 Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur beindi eftirfarandi spurningum til EFTA-dómstólsins:

1. Samrýmist það ákvæðum tilskipunar nr. 87/102/EBE um neytendalán, eins og tilskipuninni var breytt með tilskipun nr. 90/88/EBE og tilskipun nr. 98/7/EB, að við gerð lánssamnings, sem bundinn er vísitölu neysluverðs samkvæmt heimild í settum lögum og tekur því breytingum í samræmi við verðbólgu, sé við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, sem birtur er lántaka við samningsgerðina, miðað við 0% verðbólgu en ekki þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi?

2. Samrýmist það ákvæðum tilskipunar ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum ef löggjöf í ríki sem aðild á að EES-samningnum heimilar að samningur um neytendalán hafi að geyma ákvæði þess efnis að greiðslur af láninu skuli verðtryggðar samkvæmt fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu?

3. Ef svarið við annarri spurningunni er á þann veg að verðtrygging greiðslna af neytendaláni sé samrýmanleg ákvæðum tilskipunar 93/13/EBE þá er í þriðja lagi spurt hvort tilskipunin takmarki svigrúm viðkomandi samningsríkis til þess að ákveða með lögum eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmælum hvaða þættir skuli valda breytingum á hinni fyrir fram ákveðnu vísitölu og eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar.

4. Ef svarið við þriðju spurningunni er að tilskipun 93/13/EBE takmarki ekki það svigrúm samningsríkis sem nefnt er í þeirri spurningu þá er í fjórða lagi spurt hvort samningsskilmáli teljist hafa verið sérstaklega umsaminn í skilningi 1. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar þegar a) tekið er fram í skuldabréfì sem neytandi undirritar í tilefni lántöku að skuldbinding hans sé verðtryggð og tilgreint er í skuldabréfinu við hvaða grunnvísitölu verðbreytingar skuli miðast, b) skuldabréfinu fylgir yfirlit sem sýnir áætlaðar og sundurliðaðar greiðslur á gjalddögum lánsins og tekið er fram í yfirlitinu að áætlunin geti tekið breytingum í samræmi við verðtryggingarákvæði lánssamningsins, og c) neytandi og veitandi undirrita báðir greiðsluyfirlitið samtímis og samhliða því að neytandi undirritar skuldabréfið?

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5. Is the method of calculation of price changes applying to a loan contract regarded as having been explicitly explained to the consumer within the meaning of paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to Directive 93/13/EEC when the circumstances are as described in the fourth question?

6. Does a State that is party to the EEA Agreement have the option, when adopting Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, of either prescribing in domestic legislation that unfair contract terms within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Directive may be declared non-binding on the consumer or prescribing in domestic legislation that such terms shall at all times be non-binding on the consumer?


III ANSWERS OF THE COURT

Preliminary remarks

53 Reykjavík District Court has referred six questions to the Court. The first question concerns the requirements of the Consumer Credit Directive with regard to the information to be provided to a consumer before entering into a price-indexed credit agreement. Questions 2 to 6 concern the interpretation of the Unfair Terms Directive in the context of contractual terms on indexation of credit repayment instalments. These last questions are in substance identical to the five questions examined by the Court in Case E-25/13 Engilbertsson, judgment of 28 August 2014, not yet reported. In answering these questions in the present case, the Court will therefore refer to its findings and conclusions in the previous judgment. The first question, on the other hand, was not addressed in Engilbertsson.

Applicability of the Consumer Credit Directive to credit agreements linked to the consumer price index


54 Both in their written observations and at the oral hearing, the Defendant and the Icelandic Government questioned whether the contractual terms at issue fall within the scope of the Consumer Credit Directive. In their view,

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5. Telst aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga í lánssamningi hafa verið útskýrð rækilega fyrir neytanda í skilningi d-liðar 2. gr. viðauka við tilskipun 93/13/EBE þegar atvik eru með þeim hætti sem nánar greinir í fjórðu spurningunni?

6. Á ríki sem er aðili að EES-samningnum val milli þess við innleiðingu 1 mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE, annars vegar að mæla svo fyrir í landsrétti að heimilt sé að lýsa óskuldbindandi fyrir neytanda óréttmæta skilmála í skilningi 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar, eða hins vegar að mæla svo fyrir í landsrétti að slíkir skilmálar skuli ávallt vera óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann?

52 Vísað er til skýrslu framsögumanns um frekari lýsingu löggjafar, málsatvika, meðferðar málsins og skriflegra greinargerða sem dómstólnum bárust. Verða þau ekki rakin frekar nema að því leyti sem forsendur dómsins krefjast.

III SVÖR DÓMSINS

Almennar athugasemdir

53 Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur hefur beint sex spurningum til EFTA-dómstólsins. Fyrsta spurningin snýr að kröfum neytendalánatilskipunarinnar um upplýsingagjöf til neytanda áður en hann undirritar verðtryggðan lánssamning. Spurningar tvö til sex varða túlkun á tilskipuninni um óréttmæta samningsskilmála í tengslum við verðtryggðar afborganir lána. Þessar síðustu fimm spurningar eru efnislega samhljóða þeim fimm spurningum sem dómstóllinn fjallaði um í óútgefnum dómi frá 28. ágúst 2014, í máli E-25/13 Gunnar V. Engilbertsson gegn Íslandsbanka hf. Í máli þessu mun dómstóllinn því vísa til rökstuðnings og niðurstaðna í fyrra málinu. Fyrsta spurningin kom á hinn bóginn ekki til álita í því máli.

Gildissvið neytendalánatilskipunarinnar í tengslum við lánasamninga sem bundnir eru vísitölu neysluverðs

Athugasemdir sem lagðar voru fyrir dómstólinn

54 Stefndi og ríkisstjórn Íslands hafa borið brigður á, bæði í skriflegum athugasemdum og við munnlegan málflutning fyrir dómstólnum, að samningsskilmálarnir sem um ræðir falli undir gildissvið neytendalána-

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this Directive is a minimum harmonisation instrument, which provides for the approximation of laws and regulations relating to consumer credit. As such, the EEA States have a margin of appreciation for enacting legislation regarding those issues not addressed by the Consumer Credit Directive.

55 According to the Defendant and the Icelandic Government, the Consumer Credit Directive does not regulate price indexation of consumer credit agreements or contain any provisions governing indexation in general. In the absence of EEA legislation concerning the treatment of indexation in consumer credit agreements, it is for the national legal order of each EEA State to establish such rules.

56 ESA, on the other hand, submits that the Consumer Credit Directive is applicable both ratione temporis and materiae. The parties and the credit agreement itself fulfil the definitions specified in the Consumer Credit Directive, while price indexation constitutes a separate charge that has to be reflected, in principle, in the annual percentage rate of charge.


57 Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Consumer Credit Directive, the Directive applies to consumer credit agreements. Credit agreements are defined in the first subparagraph of Article 1(2)(c) as agreements whereby “a creditor grants or promises to grant to a consumer a credit in the form of a deferred payment, a loan or other similar financial accommodation.” That broad understanding of the notion is supported by recital 10 in the preamble to the Consumer Credit Directive, according to which “better protection of consumers can be achieved by adopting certain requirements which are to apply to all forms of credit.”

58 Article 2 of the Consumer Credit Directive provides that certain credit agreements and types of transaction are or may be excluded in part or in full from the Directive’s scope. Indexation of credit agreements is not specifically addressed. However, the Court notes that the credit agreement at issue in the main proceedings does not correspond to any of the types exempted from the scope of this Directive.

59 Moreover, the Consumer Credit Directive was adopted with the aim of ensuring both the creation of a common consumer credit market and the protection of consumers who avail themselves of such credit in that

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tilskipunarinnar. Að þeirra mati er tilskipuninni ætlað að stuðla að lágmarkssamræmingu laga og stjórnsýslufyrirmæla um neytendalán. EES-ríkin hafi því svigrúm til að setja lög um þau atriði sem ekki er fjallað um í neytendalánatilskipuninni.

55 Samkvæmt stefnda og ríkisstjórn Íslands tekur neytendalánatilskipunin hvorki til verðtryggingar neytendalána, né inniheldur hún ákvæði um verðtryggingu almennt. Þar sem engin EES-löggjöf fjalli um meðferð verðtryggingar í neytendalánasamningum, er það aðildarríkjanna að setja reglur á því sviði.

56 ESA telur aftur á móti að neytendalánatilskipunin taki bæði til sakarefnisins sem og tímabilsins sem mál þetta snýst um. Bæði aðilar lánssamningsins og sjálfur samningurinn falli undir þær skilgreiningar sem settar eru fram í neytendalánatilskipuninni. Þá teljist verðtrygging til kostnaðar sem árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar verði almennt séð að endurspegla.

Álit dómstólsins

57 Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar um neytendalán tekur hún til samninga um neytendalán. Í fyrsta málslið c-liðar 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar eru slíkir samningar skilgreindir sem „samkomulag þar sem lánveitandi veitir eða heitir að veita neytanda lán í formi greiðslufrests, láns eða svipaðrar fjárhagslegrar fyrirgreiðslu.“ 10. liður formálsorða neytendalánatilskipunarinnar rennir frekari stoðum undir þennan víðtæka skilning hugtaksins en þar segir: „Unnt er að veita neytendum betri vernd með því að samþykkja tilteknar kröfur er gilda skuli um hvers konar lán.“

58 Í 2. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar segir að ákveðna lánasamninga eða annars konar samninga megi undanskilja gildissviði hennar að fullu eða hluta. Verðtrygging lánasamninga er ekki tiltekin sérstaklega. Dómstóllinn bendir þó á að lánssamningurinn í málinu er ekki meðal þeirra samninga sem eru undanþegnir gildissviði tilskipunarinnar.

59 Neytendalánatilskipunin var enn fremur sett til að tryggja að sameiginlegum neytendalánamarkaði yrði komið á og til að vernda neytendur sem taka lán á slíkum markaði (sjá til samanburðar varðandi það atriði, mál

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market (compare, to that effect, Case C-429/05 Rampion and Godard [2007] ECR I8050, paragraph 59, and case law cited).

60 Consequently, the aim of the Consumer Credit Directive also militates against excluding a credit agreement linked to a CPI from its scope. It is the sole and legitimate purpose of an index clause in a credit agreement to correct the nominal amount of the consecutive loan instalments in line with CPI developments throughout the term of the loan.

61 It must therefore be held that the Consumer Credit Directive applies to the loan agreement at issue in the main proceedings.

Applicability of the Unfair Terms Directive

62 The Defendant, the Icelandic Government and ESA have questioned whether the contractual terms on indexation of repayment instalments at issue in the main proceedings fall within the scope of the Unfair Terms Directive to the extent they reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions that are exempted from the scope of the Unfair Terms Directive pursuant to Article 1(2) of that Directive.

63 The Court examined the question of indexation of consumer mortgage loans in paragraphs 66 to 79 of Engilbertsson. The Court found that contractual terms that are optional but, if chosen by the parties, whose substance is not left to the parties to negotiate are considered mandatory within the meaning of the Unfair Terms Directive and thus exempted from its scope. This finding must apply equally to a consumer credit agreement, as in the present case. It is for the national court to ascertain whether the indexation terms relating to the repayment instalments of consumer credit agreements, such as those at issue in the present case, reflect mandatory regulatory or statutory provisions within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive.

The first question


64 The Plaintiff considers that indexation is a cost of credit and, as such, must be disclosed ex ante through mandatory information. He notes that

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C-429/05 Rampion and Godard [2007] ECR I8050, 59. mgr., og þá dómaframkvæmd sem þar er vitnað til).

60 Af framangreindu leiðir að markmið tilskipunarinnar um neytendalán mæla gegn því að lánssamningur sem bundinn er vísitölu neysluverðs sé tekinn undan gildissviði hennar. Eini lögmæti tilgangur verðtryggingarskilmála í lánssamningi er að samræma nafnvirði samfelldra afborgana af láni við þróun vísitölu neysluverðs á lánstímanum.

61 Samkvæmt framansögðu verður að telja að neytendalánatilskipunin eigi við um lánssamninginn í málinu sem rekið er fyrir héraðsdómi.

Gildissvið tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála

62 Stefndi, ríkisstjórn Íslands og ESA telja vafamál hvort samningsskilmálarnir um verðtryggingu afborgana sem deilt er um í málinu fyrir héraðsdómi falli undir gildissvið tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála að því marki sem þeir endurspegla lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði sem undanþegin eru gildissviði tilskipunarinnar samkvæmt 2. mgr. 1. gr. hennar.

63 Dómstóllinn hefur þegar fjallað um verðtryggingu fasteignalána til neytenda í 66. til 79. mgr. í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar sem vitnað er til hér að ofan. Þar komst dómurinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að samningsskilmálar sem aðilar eiga val um hvort þeir taki upp í samning en geta að öðru leyti ekki samið sérstaklega um efnislega, verði þeir fyrir valinu, teljist endurspegla lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði í skilningi tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála og falli því utan gildissviðs hennar. Sú niðurstaða verður einnig að gilda um samning um neytendalán eins og þann sem hér um ræðir. Það er í verkahring landsdómstólsins að taka afstöðu til þess hvort samningsskilmálar um verðtryggingu afborgana neytendaláns, eins og þess sem um ræðir í máli þessu, teljist endurspegla lög eða bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði samkvæmt 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála.

Fyrsta spurningin


64 Stefnandi telur verðtrygginguna vera hluta lántökukostnaðar, og því verði að gera grein fyrir henni fyrirfram í þeim upplýsingum sem skylt er að veita

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indexation affects regularly not only the outstanding repayments of the credit, but, most importantly, the principal of the loan.

65 The Plaintiff claims that not including the known change in the CPI at the time of concluding the loan agreement constitutes a misleading practice as this has a dramatic impact on the annual percentage rate of charge and the total cost of credit. Further, the repayment schedule accompanying the bond does not mention the effect of changes in the CPI on the total amount to be paid. This omission has to be interpreted as misleading since it leads to the assumption that changes in the CPI do not affect the total amount to be paid. On the contrary, the repayment schedule fixes a nominal amount to be repaid, based on an unchanged interest rate.

66 The Plaintiff further observes that the bond does not state how inflation may change or which factors may have an effect on inflation, nor is there an explanation on the relation between inflation and the CPI or the base index of the bond. In his view, this implies that the provisions of the bond on the total cost of credit are both opaque and misleading.

67 The Plaintiff also argues that Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive, interpreted in conjunction with Article 4(2)(b), cannot be interpreted as allowing the annual percentage rate of charge and the total cost of credit to be calculated on the assumption that inflation will be 0% throughout the lifetime of the loan in question. The Defendant’s method of calculation has the effect of making the loan appear to be a normal, non-indexed, variable interest rate loan, which is likely to have the effect that the consumer will take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.

68 The Defendant submits that the assumption of 0% inflation, or an unchanged price level, when calculating the annual percentage rate of charge was in fact mandatory under Article 12 of the Consumer Credit Act. In its view, it is clear that this provision was intended to implement into Icelandic law Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive. The provisions of Article 12(1) referring to indexation and the assumption of the price level remaining unchanged are specific to Icelandic law, and thus go beyond the minimum harmonisation requirements set out in Article 1a(6). The references to indexation thus reflect the common Icelandic arrangement of loan obligations being indexed.

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lögum samkvæmt. Hann bendir á að verðtryggingin hafi almennt ekki aðeins áhrif á útistandandi afborganir láns, heldur aðallega á höfuðstól þess.

65 Stefnandi heldur því fram að ef þekkt breyting á vísitölu neysluverðs er ekki tekin fram við gerð lánasamnings verði það að teljast villandi viðskiptahættir þar sem slíkt hafi veruleg áhrif á árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar og heildarlántökukostnað. Þá sé ekki minnst á þau áhrif sem breytingar á vísitölu neysluverðs hafi á heildarupphæð lánsins í greiðsluáætluninni sem fylgdi skuldabréfinu. Þá vanrækslu beri að túlka sem villandi þar sem hún leiði til ályktunar um að breytingar á vísitölu neysluverðs hafi engin áhrif á heildarupphæð lánsins. Þvert á móti geri greiðsluáætlunin ráð fyrir að nafnvirði heildarupphæðarinnar byggist á óbreyttu vaxtastigi.

66 Stefnandi bendir jafnframt á að hvorki sé minnst á það í skuldabréfinu hvernig verðbólga geti breyst eða hvaða þættir geti haft áhrif á verðbólgu, né sé þar að finna skýringu á tengslum verðbólgu og vísitölu neysluverðs, eða á grunnvísitölu skuldabréfsins. Að mati stefnanda bendir þetta til þess að skilmálar skuldabréfsins séu bæði ógagnsæir og villandi.

67 Stefnandi telur jafnframt að 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalána-tilskipunarinnar, með hliðsjón af b-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr., verði ekki túlkuð með þeim hætti að útreikningur á árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar og heildarlántökukostnaði megi gera ráð fyrir að verðbólga verði 0% út lánstímann. Aðferð stefnda við útreikninginn gefi þá mynd af láninu að það sé venjulegt, óverðtryggt lán með breytilegum vöxtum, sem sé til þess fallin að neytandinn taki viðskiptaákvörðun sem hann hefði ekki tekið að öðrum kosti.

68 Stefndi telur að áætlun sem gerir ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu, eða óbreyttu verðlagi, við útreikning árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar hafi verið í samræmi við bindandi fyrirmæli 12. gr. neytendalánalaga. Að mati stefnda er ljóst að umrætt ákvæði hafi verið ætlað að leiða 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar í íslensk lög. Ákvæði 1. mgr. 12. gr. þar sem vísað er til verðtryggingar og gert ráð fyrir að verðlag haldist óbreytt séu séríslensk og gangi því skrefinu lengra en þær kröfur um lágmarkssamræmingu sem gerðar eru í 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. Vísanir til verðtryggingar endurspegli því almenna íslenska skipun um verðtryggingu lána.

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69 The Defendant observes further that while the English translation “price level” for the Icelandic term “verðlag” may appear somewhat vague, in Icelandic, the term has a clear meaning and refers to pricing as affected by inflation. Hence, according to the Defendant, the reference in Article 12(1) of the Consumer Credit Act to the price level remaining unchanged is, in Icelandic, a clear reference to the object not being adjusted for inflation. As such, the Defendant submits that the requirement in the Consumer Credit Act for the annual percentage rate of charge to be calculated on the assumption of the price level remaining unchanged, unequivocally requires that the calculation does not factor in any adjustments for inflation, fixing the inflation level at 0%.

70 The Defendant observes that in cases where contractual terms on price indexation involve a consumer being required to pay on each due date, in addition to each instalment of principal and interest, an indexation adjustment based on the rise in the index from the base index figure, the indexation adjustment might be considered to fall within the scope of the consumer’s total cost of credit. The effects of such indexation on the total cost of credit and the annual percentage rate of charge are, however, variable and impossible to quantify at the time of the calculation. In relation to those variable costs, Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive applies, which provides for the assumption of an unchanged pricing level, that is with no changes due to inflation.

71 In the view of the Icelandic Government, the Consumer Credit Directive did not fully harmonise the cost factors to be taken into account when calculating the annual percentage rate of charge. In particular, the Consumer Credit Directive does not explicitly mention the indexation of loans in any form and thus does not explicitly require changes in the nominal amount or repayments as a result of indexation to be taken into account when calculating the total cost of credit and the annual percentage rate of charge. Nor does the Consumer Credit Directive explicitly provide that the annual percentage rate of charge and the total cost of the credit must be the nominal annual percentage rate of charge and the nominal total cost of the credit rather than the real annual percentage rate of charge and the real total cost of the credit. Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that the Consumer Credit Directive requires the calculation of a nominal annual percentage rate of charge in respect of indexed loans

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

69 Stefndi bendir jafnframt á að þótt enska þýðingin „price level“ yfir

íslenska hugtakið „verðlag“ geti virst nokkuð óljós, hafi hugtakið skýra

merkingu á íslensku og vísi til áhrifa verðbólgu á verð. Stefndi telur því

að tilvísunin í 1. mgr. 12. gr. neytendalánalaga um að verðlag haldist

óbreytt, sé, á íslensku, skýr tilvísun til þess að andlag samningsins

sé ekki leiðrétt með tilliti til verðbólgu. Telur stefndi því að í kröfu

neytendalánalaganna um að árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar skuli reikna út

miðað við þá forsendu að verðlag verði óbreytt felist ótvíræð krafa um

að útreikningurinn taki ekki tillit til leiðréttingar vegna verðbólgu, og að

miðað sé við 0% verðbólgu.

70 Stefndi bendir á að í málum þar sem samningsskilmálar um

verðtryggingu kveða á um að neytanda sé skylt að greiða af láninu,

á hverjum gjalddaga, leiðréttingu í samræmi við hækkun vísitölunnar,

ofan á hverja afborgun af höfuðstóli og vöxtum, megi telja að leiðrétting

vísitölunnar falli innan heildarlántökukostnaðar neytandans. Áhrif

slíkrar verðtryggingar á heildarlántökukostnað og árlega hlutfallstölu

kostnaðar eru hins vegar breytileg og ómögulegt að mæla þegar

útreikningur fer fram. Um þennan breytilega kostnað gildir 6. mgr. 1.

gr. a. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar, en samkvæmt henni er gert ráð fyrir

óbreyttu verðlagi, þ.e. án tillits til verðbólgu.

71 Að mati ríkisstjórnar Íslands voru kostnaðarþættirnir sem taka ber

mið af við útreikning árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar ekki samræmdir

að fullu með neytendalánatilskipuninni. Nánar tiltekið sé ekki minnst á

nokkurs konar verðtryggingu lána með beinum hætti í tilskipuninni og

ekki sé því beinlínis gerð krafa um að tekið sé mið af breytingum á

nafnvirði eða afborgunum sem tilkomnar eru vegna verðtryggingar við

útreikning heildarlántökukostnaðar og árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar.

Sömuleiðis sé ekki gerð krafa um að árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar og

heildarlántökukostnaður séu miðuð við nafnvirði frekar en raunvirði. Þar

af leiðandi sé ekki unnt að draga þá ályktun að neytendalánatilskipunin

krefjist útreiknings árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar á nafnvirði vegna

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(based on current rates of inflation) rather than the calculation of the real annual percentage rate of charge.

72 Having regard to Articles 1a(6), 4(2) and 6(1) of the Consumer Credit Directive and to the Commission’s Staff Working Document on Directive 2008/48/EC, the Icelandic Government submits that future costs that are unascertainable and cannot be estimated with a reasonable degree of certainty should be disregarded. Accordingly, even if, notwithstanding the above, changes to the nominal amounts payable as a result of indexation could fall within the definition of total cost of credit to the consumer, and the Consumer Credit Directive were to require a nominal annual percentage rate of charge, such changes should nonetheless not be included in the calculation of the total cost of credit and the annual percentage rate of charge.

73 Knowing the real annual percentage rate of charge will enable the consumer to make a rational, informed choice, whereas informing a consumer that he may have to pay a certain nominal sum at a date distant in the future, based on the current rate of inflation, is likely to be meaningless and may tend to make decision making irrational. Also, if the nominal annual percentage rate of charge and total cost of credit to be provided to the consumer were to be based on the known rate of inflation at the time the annual percentage rate of charge is calculated, it would almost certainly not reflect the actual nominal annual percentage rate of charge or cost of credit payable, as the actual average rate of inflation over the duration of the loan is unlikely to be the same as the spot rate of inflation when the annual percentage rate of charge is calculated. This is particularly the case in a country like Iceland which has historically suffered high and volatile inflation.

74 In ESA’s view, it is for the national court to decide whether the repayment schedule should have been based on the known rate of inflation at the date when the loan was taken, and not on the assumption of an inflation rate of 0%, as was done in this case.

75 ESA submits that it is of critical importance to inform the consumer of the total cost of credit calculated and expressed by means of the annual percentage rate of charge according to a single mathematical formula. Whether the annual percentage rate of charge was so calculated in the main proceedings is for the national court to establish, but ESA argues

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

verðtryggðra lána (á grundvelli gildandi verðbólgustigs) frekar en útreiknings árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar á raunvirði.

72 Með vísan til 6. mgr. 1. gr. a, 2. mgr. 4. gr. og 1. mgr. 6. gr., neytenda-lánatilskipunarinnar, auk minnisblaðs framkvæmdastjórnarinnar um tilskipun 2008/48/EB, telur ríkisstjórn Íslands að líta beri framhjá kostnaði sem síðar komi til, óvissa ríki um og ekki sé hægt að áætla með hæfilegri vissu. Jafnvel þótt breytingar á nafnvirði greiðslna vegna verðtryggingar myndu falla innan skilgreiningarinnar á heildarlántökukostnaði neytandans og neytendalánatilskipunin krefðist þess að árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar væri miðuð við nafnvirði, ætti engu að síður, að teknu tilliti til þess sem segir hér að framan, að líta framhjá slíkum breytingum við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar.

73 Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur að ef neytandinn þekkti hina raunverulegu árlegu hlutfallstölu kostnaðar myndi það gera honum kleift að taka skynsamlega, upplýsta ákvörðun. Ef neytandinn væri hins vegar upplýstur um að hann ætti, á ákveðnum degi í fjarlægri framtíð, að greiða nafnvirði tiltekinnar fjárhæðar, sem miðaðist við gildandi verðbólgustig, væru slíkar upplýsingar líklega þýðingarlausar og gætu leitt til órökréttrar ákvarðanatöku. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur enn fremur að ef árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar á nafnvirði og heildarkostnaður láns sem veita á neytanda ætti að grundvallast á þekktu verðbólgustigi á þeim tíma sem árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar er reiknuð út myndi það næstum örugglega hvorki endurspegla raunverulega árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar á nafnvirði né lántökukostnaðinn sem greiða þyrfti þar sem ólíklegt sé að raunverulegt meðalverðbólgustig á lánstímanum yrði hið sama og verðbólgustigið á þeim tíma sem árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar væri reiknuð út. Þetta eigi sérstaklega við um lönd eins og Ísland, sem hefur í gegnum tíðina glímt við hátt og óstöðugt verðbólgustig.

74 Að mati ESA er það landsdómstólsins að meta hvort greiðsluáætlunin hefði átt að miða við þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi, í stað þess að gera ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu eins og gert var í máli þessu.

75 ESA segir afar mikilvægt að neytandinn sé upplýstur um heildarlántökukostnað í formi árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar samkvæmt einni stærðfræðiformúlu. Það sé landsdómstólsins að skera úr um það hvort aðferðin sem notuð var við útreikning árlegrar hlutfallstölu

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that an average consumer, who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, would expect an annual percentage rate of charge relating to a consumer credit that is indexed according to national inflation in Iceland to be calculated on a certain assumption about what that rate of inflation might be in the future.

76 Moreover, taking into account the economic situation in Iceland at the time when the contract at issue was concluded, ESA finds it difficult to envisage that an average consumer would expect that the forecast for the rate of inflation would amount to zero. In ESA’s view, such information is misleading for the purpose of describing the total cost of a consumer credit. In this regard, ESA refers to the wording of Article 19(4) of Directive 2008/48/EC, the provision corresponding to Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive, but which refers more clearly to the initial level of the relevant rate and charges than Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive does.

77 ESA submits further that the Consumer Credit Directive requires creditors to provide consumers with adequate information in order to give them a fair idea of the cost of the credit, even if the total cost of that credit is subject to future changes that can only be predicted. In its view, although different methods of calculation may be permissible, the test must be that, where the total cost of the credit cannot be strictly calculated, any estimate of total cost must be based on realistic assumptions.

78 ESA therefore takes the view that it is, in principle, incompatible with the provisions of the Consumer Credit Directive to base a repayment schedule on a hypothetical rate of inflation of 0%, with the effect that the total cost of the credit appears significantly lower than the one calculated on realistic assumptions as regards future inflation. However, it is for the national court to assess whether the Plaintiff in the main proceedings was provided with sufficient information about the annual percentage rate of charge for the loan at the time when the contract was signed as to allow him to form a fair idea of the total cost of the loan.

79 Were the national court to find that the method used by the Defendant to calculate the total cost of the credit is precluded by the Consumer Credit Directive, that court would have to address of its own motion possible remedies for such an infringement.

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

kostnaðar uppfylli þá kröfu, en ESA telur að almennur neytandi sem er ágætlega upplýstur, athugull og forsjáll myndi búast við því að árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar vegna neytendaláns sem er vísitölubundið og helst í hendur við verðbólgu á Íslandi yrði reiknað út á grundvelli áætlunar um verðbólgustig í framtíðinni.

76 ESA telur jafnframt, að teknu tilliti til efnahagsástandsins á Íslandi á þeim tíma sem hinn umdeildi samningur var gerður, að erfitt sé að ímynda sér að almennur neytandi hefði búist við að verðbólguspá sem gerði ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu gengi eftir. Að mati ESA er slíkur útreikningur misvísandi sem lýsing á heildarkostnaði neytendaláns. Varðandi það atriði vísar ESA til orðalags 4. mgr. 19. gr. tilskipunar 2008/48/EB sem svarar til 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalána-tilskipunarinnar en vísar með skýrari hætti til upphafsstöðu viðeigandi vaxta og kostnaðar en gert er í 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. í neytendalánatilskipuninni.

77 ESA telur enn fremur að neytendalánatilskipunin geri lánveitendum skylt að sjá neytendum fyrir nægilegum upplýsingum til að þeir geti gert sér í hugarlund hversu hár lántökukostnaðurinn verði jafnvel þótt viðbúið sé að heildarkostnaðurinn taki síðar breytingum sem einungis sé hægt að spá fyrir um. Þótt ólíkar aðferðir við útreikning geti verið heimilar, telur ESA að mælikvarðinn verði að vera sá að þegar ekki er hægt að reikna heildarlántökukostnaðinn út með nákvæmum hætti verði hvers konar mat á kostnaðinum að byggjast á raunhæfum áætlunum.

78 Því telur ESA að það samrýmist í grundvallaratriðum ekki ákvæðum neytendalánatilskipunarinnar að greiðsluyfirlit sem fylgir lánssamningi miðist við áætlun um 0% verðbólgu með þeim afleiðingum að heildarlántökukostnaður virðist umtalsvert lægri en ef hann væri reiknaður út frá raunhæfri áætlun um verðbólgu í framtíðinni. Það sé þó landsdómstólsins að meta, að teknu tilliti til allra málsatvika, hvort stefnandi, í málinu sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum, hafi fengið nægilegar upplýsingar varðandi árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar lánsins, á undirritunartíma samningsins, til að geta gert sér í hugarlund hver heildarlántökukostnaðurinn yrði.

79 Komist landsdómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að aðferð stefnda við útreikning heildarkostnaðar lánsins sé ekki í samræmi við tilskipunina um neytendalán telur ESA að landsdómstóllinn verði þá að taka afstöðu til þess að eigin frumkvæði hvaða úrræðum sé unnt að beita til að ráða bót á slíku broti.

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80 The Consumer Credit Directive does not specify any particular remedies for an infringement of the obligation to provide adequate information in a consumer credit contract. Article 14 of the Consumer Credit Directive requires EEA States to ensure that credit agreements do not derogate, to the detriment of the consumer, from the provisions of national law implementing the Directive and that the provisions adopted in implementation of the Directive are not circumvented as a result of the way in which agreements are formulated.

81 ESA submits that, once a breach of the consumer protection rules has been established, the national authorities must take the measures appropriate to ensure that the adverse effects of that breach do not subsist throughout the entire performance of the contract. It may appear that Article 36 of the Contracts Act, as well as the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act, may provide for an answer in that regard. However, it is for the national court to apply the remedies provided for under national legislation in the event that it concludes that the Plaintiff did not receive adequate information about the consumer loan.

82 In the Commission’s view, it follows from the plain wording of Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive that the calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge in this type of situation is to be made on the basis of the relevant charges fixed at the same level as apply when the calculation is made. Any other interpretation would permit a creditor to remove certain charges entirely from the calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge, providing a misleading impression of the final cost to the consumer. Such a result would undermine one of the primary objectives of the Consumer Credit Directive, namely to improve consumer protection by means of enhanced information and transparency. A crucial aspect of such protection consists in informing the consumer of the total cost of credit, which allows the consumer to compare different offers of credit on a similar basis and to assess the extent of his liability.

83 The Commission argues that it is precisely with a view to protecting the consumer against unfair credit terms and enabling him to have full knowledge of the future performance of a credit agreement that Article 4 of the Consumer Credit Directive obliges a creditor to provide the consumer with all information that could have a bearing on the implications of the agreement. Moreover, the Commission observes that the annual

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

80 Tilskipunin um neytendalán tiltekur engin sérstök úrræði vegna brota á skyldu til að veita viðunandi upplýsingar í samningi um slíkt lán. ESA heldur því hins vegar fram að 14. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar skyldi EES-ríki til að tryggja að lánssamningar víki ekki frá þeim ákvæðum landslaga sem ætlað er að innleiða tilskipunina svo að það sé neytandanum í óhag og að þau hlutist til um að ekki sé unnt fara á svig við ákvæðin sem innleiða tilskipunina með því að haga orðalagi samninga með tilteknum hætti.

81 ESA telur að þegar búið sé að slá því föstu að reglur um neytendavernd hafi verið brotnar verði yfirvöld aðildarríkis að grípa til viðeigandi ráðstafana til að tryggja að hinar neikvæðu afleiðingar brotsins nái ekki til annarra þátta í framkvæmd samningsins. Svo virðist sem 36. gr. samningalaga og ákvæði neytendalánalaga hafi að geyma úrræði til að leysa úr því álitamáli. ESA telur þó að það sé landsdómstólsins að beita þeim úrræðum sem tiltæk eru samkvæmt landslögum ef hann kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu að stefnandi hafi ekki fengið nægilegar upplýsingar um neytendalán.

82 Að mati framkvæmdastjórnarinnar leiðir það af skýru orðalagi 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar að við aðstæður eins og þær sem eru til staðar í þessu máli beri að reikna út árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar miðað við allan þann kostnað sem liggur fyrir og við á þegar útreikningurinn fer fram. Öll önnur túlkun myndi heimila lánveitanda að undanskilja ákveðin gjöld með öllu útreikningi á árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, og veita neytandanum þar með villandi upplýsingar um heildarlántökukostnaðinn. Sú niðurstaða myndi grafa undan einu aðalmarkmiði neytendalánatilskipunarinnar: að auka neytendavernd með því að auka upplýsingaflæði og gagnsæi. Lykilatriði slíkrar verndar sé að veita neytanda upplýsingar um heildarlántökukostnað sem geri honum kleift að bera saman ólík lánstilboð á sömu forsendum og meta umfang skuldbindinga sinna.

83 Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að það sé einmitt til að vernda neytanda gegn óréttmætum samningsskilmálum, og til að honum sé gert kleift að hafa fulla vitneskju um þróun samningsins til framtíðar, sem sú skylda er lögð á herðar lánveitanda, samkvæmt 4. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar, að hann veiti neytanda allar þær upplýsingar sem gætu haft áhrif á framkvæmd samningsins. Framkvæmdastjórnin bendir enn fremur á að árleg

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percentage rate of charge is a crucial tool in enabling the consumer to decide whether or not to sign up to a particular credit agreement.

84 According to the Commission, the calculation must give a reasonable indication of the total cost of the credit, which can only be achieved using existing relevant rates and values applicable at the time the credit agreement is concluded. The Commission also underlines that Article 1a(1)(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive expressly links the annual percentage rate of charge to the present value of all commitments.

85 The Commission finally adds that Article 19(4) of Directive 2008/48/EC, which reproduces the former Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive, expressly provides that the annual percentage rate of charge is to be calculated on the assumption that the borrowing rate and other charges will remain fixed in relation to the initial level and will remain applicable until the end of the credit agreement.


86 By its first question, the national court asks in essence whether the terms “total cost of the credit” and “annual percentage rate of charge” contained in Article 1(2)(d) and (e) and Article 1a(1)(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive should be interpreted as meaning that, where a credit agreement is made that is linked to the CPI, it is permissible to omit the rate of inflation as it is at the time when the loan agreement is concluded, or, alternatively, whether such information must be provided to the consumer in accordance with Article 4 of the Directive.

87 The Consumer Credit Directive was adopted with the objectives of establishing a common market in consumer credit (recitals 3 to 5 in the preamble) and protecting consumers taking such credit in that market (recitals 6, 7 and 9 in the preamble). The Consumer Credit Directive is intended to ensure a minimum standard of protection in consumer credit matters.

88 To protect against unfair credit terms and to enable the consumer to have full knowledge of the terms of the loan agreement entered into, Article 4 of the Consumer Credit Directive provides that the borrower at the time of concluding such an agreement must have to hand all relevant information which could have a bearing on the implications of his undertaking

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CASE E-27/13

Judgment

hlutfallstala kostnaðar sé mikilvægt tæki við að gera neytandanum kleift að ákveða hvort hann gangist undir tiltekinn lánssamning.

84 Að mati framkvæmdastjórnarinnar verður útreikningurinn að gefa skynsamlega vísbendingu um heildarlántökukostnaðinn, en slíkt sé einungis hægt ef miðað er við kostnað og verðgildi sem liggja fyrir og eiga við þegar lánasamningur er undirritaður. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur einnig á það áherslu að a-liður 1. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar tengi árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar með skýrum hætti við núvirði allra skuldbindinga.

85 Loks bætir framkvæmdastjórnin því við að 4. mgr. 19. gr. tilskipunar 2008/48/EB, sem er samhljóða ákvæði 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalána-tilskipunarinnar, kveði sérstaklega á um að ganga skuli út frá þeirri forsendu við útreikning árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar að útlánsvextir og annar kostnaður séu fastur kostnaður miðað við upphafsstöðu og gildi þar til lánssamningurinn falli úr gildi.

Álit dómstólsins

86 Með fyrstu spurningunni leitar landsdómstóllinn í aðalatriðum svars við því hvort hugtökin „heildarlántökukostnaður“ og „árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar“, sem koma fyrir í d- og e-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. og a-lið 1. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytenda-lánatilskipunarinnar beri að skýra með þeim hætti að heimilt sé við gerð lánssamnings sem bundinn er vísitölu neysluverðs að undanskilja verðbólgustigið á undirritunartíma lánssamningsins, eða hvort skylt sé að veita neytanda þær upplýsingar í samræmi við 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar.

87 Markmið neytendalánatilskipunarinnar var að koma á sameiginlegum neytenda-lánamarkaði (3. til 5. liður formálsorða) og að vernda neytendur sem tækju lán á slíkum markaði (6., 7. og 9. liður formálsorða). Neytendalánatilskipuninni er ætlað að tryggja lágmarksvernd í neytendalánamálum.

88 Til að vernda neytandann gegn óréttmætum lánaskilmálum og gera honum kleift að átta sig fyllilega á skilmálum lánssamningsins sem hann hefur undirgengist, er kveðið á um að lántaki skuli við undirritun samningsins hafa með höndum allar þær upplýsingar sem máli skipta og geta haft áhrif á þær skyldur sem hann tekst á hendur (sjá til

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(compare Case C-76/10 Pohotovost’ [2010] ECR I-11557, paragraph 68, and case law cited).

89 The Consumer Credit Directive provides in Article 4(1) and Article 4(2)(a) and (b) that the credit agreement must be made in writing and that the written agreement must include a statement of the annual percentage rate of charge and the conditions under which it may be amended.

90 Pursuant to Article 1(2)(e) of the Consumer Credit Directive, the term annual percentage rate of charge means “the total cost of the credit to the consumer, expressed as an annual percentage of the amount of the credit granted and calculated in accordance with Article 1a.” According to Article 1(2)(d), the total cost of credit to the consumer is defined as all the costs, including interest and other charges, which the consumer has to pay for the credit.

91 It follows that the term “total cost of the credit” comprises all the costs that the consumer is liable to pay under the credit agreement, including both interest charges and charges resulting from the price indexation of the principal. This information contributes to the transparency of the market, as it enables the consumer to compare offers of credit.

92 The Court notes that Article 1a(6) of the Consumer Credit Directive takes account of the fact that interest charges or other charges may be variable. It provides that where a charge is unquantifiable at the time when the annual percentage rate of charge is calculated, this annual percentage rate must be calculated on reasonable assumptions and that the charge in question remains fixed and will apply until the end of the credit contract.

93 An assumption that the rate of inflation will be 0% indicated in a loan agreement, at a time when the actual rate of inflation is considerably higher, does not correctly represent the charges resulting from the price indexation and thus the total cost of credit within the meaning of Article 1(2)(d). Consequently, such a statement does not correctly represent the annual percentage rate of charge defined in Article 1(2)(e) and Article 1a(1)(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive.

94 Provided that the level of protection established by the Consumer Credit Directive, as interpreted by the Court, is not compromised, it is for the national court to assess, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the legal consequences of and the remedies for such incorrect

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samanburðar mál C-76/10 Pohotovost’ [2010] ECR I-11557, 68. mgr., og dómaframkvæmd sem þar er vitnað til).

89 Í 1. mgr. 4. gr. og a- og b-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar kemur fram að lánssamningur skuli gerður skriflega og að í samningnum skuli koma fram yfirlýsing um árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar ásamt þeim skilyrðum sem þarf að uppfylla til að gera breytingar á henni.

90 Samkvæmt e-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar merkir hugtakið árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar „heildarkostnaður við neytendalán“, sem er lýst sem „árlegri prósentu af upphæð láns þess sem veitt er og reiknuð út í samræmi við 1. gr. a.“ Samkvæmt d-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. felur hugtakið heildarlánskostnaður neytanda í sér allan kostnað, að meðtöldum vöxtum og öðrum kostnaði sem neytandinn þarf að greiða fyrir lánið.

91 Af framansögðu leiðir að hugtakið „heildarlánskostnaður“ felur í sér allan kostnað sem neytanda ber skylda til að greiða samkvæmt lánssamningnum, að meðtöldum vöxtum og kostnaði sem leiða af verðtryggingu höfuðstólsins. Þessar upplýsingar stuðla að gagnsæi á markaðnum, þar sem þær gera neytandanum kleift að bera saman mismunandi lánatilboð.

92 Dómurinn áréttar að 6. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar gerir ráð fyrir að vaxtagjöld og annar kostnaður geti verið breytilegur. Þar kemur fram að ef ekki er unnt að meta hverju kostnaðurinn nemur á þeim tíma sem árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar er reiknuð út, skuli reikna út árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar á þeirri forsendu að vextir og annar kostnaður verði óbreytanlegur og gildi fram til loka lánssamningsins.

93 Lánssamningur sem gerir ráð fyrir að verðbólgustig haldist í 0%, á tímapunkti þar sem raunveruleg verðbólga er töluvert hærri, gefur ekki rétta mynd af þeim kostnaði sem leiðir af verðtryggingu og þar með heildarlántökukostnaði í skilningi d-liðar 2. mgr. 1. gr. Slík yfirlýsing veitir því ekki ekki raunhæfa mynd af árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar eins og hún er skilgreind í e-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. og a-lið 1. mgr. 1. gr. a. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar.

94 Að því gefnu að þeirri vernd sem neytendalánatilskipunin veitir samkvæmt túlkun dómstólsins sé ekki stefnt í hættu, er það landsdómstólsins að meta, að teknu tilliti til allra atvika málsins, hvaða áhrif röng upplýsingagjöf af þessu tagi hefur og hvaða úrræðum er hægt að bæta af því tilefni. Við

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information. In that assessment, the national court should take into account whether the consumer in question is an average consumer, who is reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect (see Case E-1/05 ESA v Norway [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 234, paragraph 41).

95 The Court adds that a failure by a credit institution to provide the consumer with full information regarding the total cost of credit and the annual percentage rate of charge specified in Article 3 and Article 4(2)(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive may, depending on the circumstances, also qualify as an unfair business-to-consumer commercial practice under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. In the event that the national court finds the Unfair Terms Directive applicable to the indexation term at issue, a finding that a business-to-consumer commercial practice is unfair is one element among others on which the national court may base its assessment of the unfairness of that particular term (compare Case C-453/10 Perenicová and Perenic, judgment of 1 March 2012, reported electronically, paragraph 43).

96 Accordingly, the answer to the first question must be that, when a credit agreement is linked to a CPI and the cost of the credit thus changes in accordance with inflation, it is not compatible with the Consumer Credit Directive to calculate the total cost of the credit and the annual percentage rate of charge on the basis of 0% inflation if the known rate of inflation at the time of the credit agreement is not 0%. It is for the national court to assess, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, the legal consequences of and the remedies for such incorrect information, provided that the level of protection established by the Consumer Credit Directive, as interpreted by the Court, is not compromised.

The second to sixth questions

97 To assist the national court in the event that it finds the Unfair Terms Directive applicable to the index-linked consumer credit, the Court will address the five remaining questions. These questions are in substance identical to the questions examined in Engilbertsson. The Court has no relevant information in the present case that could lead to a different assessment of the legal issues raised in Engilbertsson. With regard to the substance of the present questions, there is therefore no reason to

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slíkt mat verður landsdómstóllinn að hafa hliðsjón af því hvort viðkomandi neytandi geti talist almennur neytandi, sem er ágætlega upplýstur, athugull og forsjáll (sjá til samanburðar mál E-1/05 ESA gegn Noregi [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 234, 41. mgr.).

95 Dómurinn bætir við að vanræki lánastofnun að upplýsa viðskiptavin sinn fyllilega um heildarlántökukostnað og árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, eins og nánar er tilgreint í 3. gr. og a-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr. neytendalánatilskipunarinnar, getur það, að teknu tilliti til atvika, einnig talist til óréttmætra viðskiptahátta gagnvart neytendum samkvæmt tilskipuninni um óréttmæta viðskiptahætti. Komist landsdómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála eigi við um verðtryggingarskilmálann sem deilt er um, er sú niðurstaða, að tilteknir viðskiptahættir séu óréttmætir gagnvart neytanda, einn þeirra þátta sem landsdómstóllinn getur lagt til grundvallar mati sínu um hvort tiltekinn skilmáli sé óréttmætur (sjá til samanburðar mál C-453/10 Perenicová and Perenic, dómur frá 1. mars 2012, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 43. mgr.).

96 Fyrstu spurningunni verður því að svara þannig, að þegar lánssamningur er bundinn við vísitölu neysluverðs og lántökukostnaðurinn tekur þar af leiðandi breytingum í samræmi við verðbólgu, samrýmist það ekki neytendalána-tilskipuninni að miðað sé við 0% verðbólgu við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar ef þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi er ekki 0%. Það er landsdómstólsins að meta, að teknu tilliti til allra atvika málsins, hvaða áhrif röng upplýsingagjöf af þessu tagi hefur og hvaða úrræðum er hægt að beita af því tilefni, að því gefnu að þeirri vernd sem neytendalánatilskipunin veitir samkvæmt túlkun dómstólsins sé ekki stefnt í hættu.

Spurningar tvö til sex

97 Komist landsdómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála eigi við um hið verðtryggða neytendalán, telur dómurinn rétt að víkja að þeim spurningum sem eftir standa í því skyni að landsdómstóllinn fái þá aðstoð við úrlausn þess hluta málsins. Þessar spurningar eru efnislega samhljóða spurningunum sem fjallað var um í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar. Dómstóllinn hefur engar upplýsingar undir höndum í þessu máli sem þýðingu hafa þannig að þær geti leitt til annars

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make a distinction between a mortgage credit, as in Engilbertsson, and a consumer credit loan, as in the present case. The answers must therefore be substantially identical.

98 By its second question, the national court asks, in essence, whether the Unfair Terms Directive generally prohibits contractual terms on the indexation of loans in contracts with a consumer.

99 This question was assessed in paragraphs 87 to 98 of Engilbertsson. The Court found in paragraph 99 that the Unfair Terms Directive does not generally prohibit contractual terms on the indexation of loans in contracts between a supplier and a consumer. It is for the referring court to assess whether the term at issue is unfair. In this assessment the national court should take account of the fact that, under an indexed loan, the interest rate is normally lower than it would have been under a non-indexed loan, as was held by the Court in paragraph 92 of Engilbertsson.

100 By its third question, if the indexation of loans is not generally prohibited under the Unfair Terms Directive, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the Unfair Terms Directive limits the discretion of an EEA State to determine, through legislation or administrative regulations, the factors that may cause changes in a pre-determined index, such as the CPI, as well as the methods for measuring those changes.

101 This question was assessed in paragraphs 108 and 109 of Engilbertsson. The Court responded that the Unfair Terms Directive does not limit the discretion of an EEA State to determine in legislation or administrative regulation the factors that may cause changes in a pre-determined index, such as the Icelandic CPI, as well as the methods for measuring those changes, provided that they are explicitly described in the contract, as was held by the Court in paragraph 110 of Engilbertsson.

102 By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether a contractual term must be regarded as having been individually negotiated within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive when (a) it is stated in the bond which the consumer signs when taking out the loan that his obligation is index-linked and the base index to be used when calculating price-changes is specified in the bond; (b) the bond is accompanied by a payment schedule showing estimated and itemised payments to be made

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mats á þeim lagalegu álitaefnum sem á reyndi í fyrra málinu. Að því er varðar efni spurninganna er engin ástæða til að greina á milli veðláns, sem fyrra málið snerist um, og neytendaláns, eins og þetta mál lýtur að. Svörin verða því efnislega samhljóða í báðum málum.

98 Með annarri spurningunni leitar landsdómstóllinn í aðalatriðum svars við því hvort tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála leggi almennt bann við notkun samningsskilmála um verðtryggingu neytendalána.

99 Fjallað er um þessa spurningu í 87. til 98. mgr. dómsins í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar. Í 99. mgr. þess dóms kemur fram að tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála leggi ekki almennt bann við skilmálum um verðtryggingu veðlána í samningum milli veitanda og neytanda. Það sé landsdómstólsins að leggja mat á það hvort umræddur skilmáli sé óréttmætur. Landsdómstólnum ber þá einnig að taka tillit til þess að vextir af verðtryggðu láni eru alla jafna lægri en þeir væru ef um óverðtryggt lán væri að ræða, eins og bent er á í 92. mgr. dómsins í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar.

100 Inntak þriðju spurningar landsdómstólsins er í aðalatriðum hvort, ef gert er ráð fyrir að tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála leggi ekki almennt bann við verðtryggingu lána, hvort tilskipunin takmarki svigrúm EES-ríkis til þess að ákveða með lögum eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmælum hvaða þættir geti valdið breytingum á fyrirfram ákveðinni vísitölu, á borð við vísitölu neysluverðs, og eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar.

101 Tekin var afstaða til þessarar spurningar í 108. og 109. mgr. dómsins í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar. Var spurningunni svarað með þeim hætti að tilskipunin um óréttmæta samningsskilmála takmarkaði ekki svigrúm EES-ríkis til þess að ákveða með lögum eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmælum hvaða þættir gætu valdið breytingum á fyrirfram ákveðinni vísitölu, á borð við hina íslensku vísitölu neysluverðs, og eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skyldu mældar, að því gefnu að þeim sé lýst með skýrum hætti í samningnum, líkt og fram kemur í 110. mgr. dómsins í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar.

102 Inntak fjórðu spurningar landsdómstólsins er í aðalatriðum hvort samningsskilmáli teljist hafa verið sérstaklega umsaminn í skilningi 1. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála þegar (a) tekið er fram í skuldabréfi sem neytandi undirritar í tilefni lántöku að skuldbinding hans sé verðtryggð og tilgreint er í skuldabréfinu við hvaða grunnvísitölu

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on the due dates of the loan, and it is stated in the schedule that these estimates may change in accordance with the indexation provision of the bond; and (c) both the consumer and the lender sign the payment schedule at the same time as the consumer signs the bond.

103 This question was assessed in paragraphs 120 to 125 of Engilbertsson. The Court found that it is for the competent national court to establish whether a particular contract term has been negotiated individually within the meaning of Article 3 of the Unfair Terms Directive, as was held by the Court in paragraph 126 of Engilbertsson.

104 By its fifth question, the referring court seeks to establish, in essence, whether, under the circumstances described in the previous question, the method of calculation of price changes in loan contracts must be regarded as having been explicitly described to the consumer within the meaning of point 2(d) of the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive.

105 This question was examined in paragraphs 138 to 145 of Engilbertsson. The Court found that it is for the national court to establish whether a contract term relating to the indexation of repayment instalments of a loan must be regarded as having been explicitly and comprehensibly described to the consumer. Such an assessment must take into account the precise wording of the relevant contract terms and all other relevant circumstances, as was held out by the Court in paragraph 146 of Engilbertsson.

106 The sixth question is construed as asking, in essence, which obligations follow from Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive where a national court finds that a given term is unfair.

107 This question was examined in paragraphs 158 to 164 of Engilbertsson. The Court found that Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, where a national court considers that a given term is unfair within the meaning of that directive, the national court must ensure that such a clause is not binding on the consumer provided that the contract is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term, in so far as such continuity of the contract is legally possible under the rules of domestic law, as was held by the Court in paragraph 165 of Engilbertsson.

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verðbreytingar skuli miðast, (b) skuldabréfinu fylgir yfirlit sem sýnir áætlaðar og sundurliðaðar greiðslur á gjalddögum lánsins og tekið er fram í yfirlitinu að áætlunin geti tekið breytingum í samræmi við verðtryggingarákvæði lánssamningsins, og (c) neytandi og veitandi undirrita báðir greiðsluyfirlitið samtímis og samhliða því að neytandi undirritar skuldabréfið.

103 Dómstóllinn fjallaði um þessa spurningu í 120. til 125. mgr. dómsins í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar. Var talið að það væri landsdómstólsins að taka afstöðu til þess hvort samið hafi verið sérstaklega um tiltekinn samningsskilmála í skilningi 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála, eins og fram kom í 126. mgr. dómsins.

104 Inntak fimmtu spurningar landsdómstólsins er í aðalatriðum hvort telja beri að aðferðinni við útreikning verðbreytinga í lánssamningi hafi verið lýst rækilega fyrir neytanda í skilningi d. liðar 2. gr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála þegar atvik eru með þeim hætti sem nánar greinir í fjórðu spurningunni.

105 Um þá spurningu var fjallað í 138. til 145. mgr. dómsins í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar. Þar var talið að það væri landsdómstólsins að meta hvort samningsskilmála um verðtryggingu afborgana hefði verið lýst fyrir neytandanum með skýrum og skiljanlegum hætti. Slíkt mat yrði að taka mið af nákvæmu orðalagi viðeigandi samningsskilmála og öllum öðrum aðstæðum, eins og fram kom í 146. mgr. dómsins.

106 Inntak sjöttu spurningarinnar er í aðalatriðum hvaða skyldur leiði af 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála í tilvikum þar sem landsdómstóll kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu að tiltekinn samningsskilmáli teljist óréttmætur.

107 Um þá spurningu var fjallað í 158. til 164. mgr. í máli Gunnars V. Engilbertssonar. Var talið að 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar um óréttmæta samningsskilmála yrði að túlka með þeim hætti að í þeim tilvikum þar sem landsdómstóll kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu að tiltekinn samningsskilmáli sé óréttmætur samkvæmt tilskipuninni beri þeim dómstóli að tryggja að slíkur skilmáli sé óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann, að því gefnu að samningurinn geti haldið gildi sínu að öðru leyti án hins óréttmæta samningsskilmála, að því marki sem reglur landsréttar leyfa, eins og fram kemur í 165. mgr. dómsins.

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IV COSTS

108 The costs incurred by the Icelandic Government, ESA and the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are a step in the proceedings pending before Reykjavík District Court, any decision on costs for the parties to those proceedings is a matter for that court.

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IV MÁLSKOSTNAÐUR

108 Ríkisstjórn Íslands, Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA og framkvæmdastjórn Evrópusambandsins, sem skilað hafa greinargerðum til EFTA-dómstólsins, skulu hver bera sinn málskostnað. Þar sem um er ræða mál sem er hluti af málarekstri fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur kemur það í hlut þess dómstóls að kveða á um kostnað málsaðila.

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On those grounds,

THE COURT

in answer to the questions referred to it by Reykjavík District Court hereby gives the following Advisory Opinion:

1. When a credit agreement is linked to a consumer price index, it is not compatible with Directive 87/102/EEC to calculate the total cost of the credit and the annual percentage rate of charge on the basis of 0% inflation if the known rate of inflation at the time of the credit agreement is not 0%. It is for the national court to assess, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, the legal consequences of and the remedies for such incorrect information, provided that the level of protection established by Directive 87/102/EEC, as interpreted by the Court, is not compromised.

For the situation that the referring court does not consider the contractual terms on the indexation of repayment instalments of the consumer loan in question to be mandatory regulatory or statutory provisions within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC, the answers to the subsequent questions are as follows:

2. Directive 93/13/EEC does not generally prohibit contractual terms on the indexation of loans in contracts between a supplier and a consumer. It is for the referring court to assess whether the term at issue is unfair. The assessment must take account of the Court’s interpretation of the concept of “unfair term”.

3. Directive 93/13/EEC does not limit the discretion of an EEA State to determine, whether through legislation or by means of administrative regulation, the factors that may cause changes in a pre-determined index, such as the Icelandic consumer price index, as well as the methods for measuring those changes, provided that they are explicitly described in the contract.

4. It is for the competent national court to establish whether a particular contract term has been negotiated individually within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 93/13/EEC.

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Með vísan til framangreindra forsendna lætur,

DÓMSTÓLLINN

uppi svohljóðandi ráðgefandi álit um spurningar þær sem Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur beindi til dómstólsins:

1. Þegar lánssamningur er bundinn við vísitölu neysluverðs, samrýmist það ekki tilskipun 87/102/EBE að miðað sé við 0% verðbólgu við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar ef þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi er ekki 0%. Það er landsdómstólsins að meta, að teknu tillit til allra atvika málsins, hvaða áhrif röng upplýsingagjöf af þessu tagi hefur og hvaða úrræðum er hægt að beita af því tilefni, að því gefnu að þeirri vernd sem tilskipun 87/102/EBE veitir, eins og dómurinn skýrir hana, sé ekki stefnt í hættu.

Að því gefnu að landsdómstóllinn telji samningsskilmála um verðtryggingu afborgana neytendalánsins sem um ræðir ekki endurspegla lög eða bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði samkvæmt 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE eru svörin við eftirfarandi spurningum svohljóðandi:

2. Tilskipun 93/13/EBE leggur ekki almennt bann við skilmálum um verðtryggingu lána í samningum milli veitanda og neytanda. Það er landsdómstólsins að meta hvort umræddur skilmáli sé óréttmætur. Matið verður að taka mið af skýringu dómstólsins á hugtakinu „óréttmætur skilmáli“.

3. Tilskipun 93/13/EBE takmarkar ekki svigrúm EES-ríkis til þess að ákveða með lögum eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmælum hvaða þættir geti valdið breytingum á fyrirfram ákveðinni vísitölu, á borð við hina íslensku vísitölu neysluverðs, og eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar, að því gefnu að þeim sé lýst með skýrum hætti í samningnum.

4. Það er landsdómstólsins að taka afstöðu til þess hvort samið hafi verið sérstaklega um tiltekinn samningsskilmála í skilningi 3. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE.

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5. It is for the competent national court to establish whether a contract term relating to the indexation of repayment instalments of a loan must be regarded as having been explicitly and comprehensibly described to the consumer. Such an assessment must take into account the precise wording of the relevant contract terms and all other relevant circumstances, including the circumstances set out in points (a) and (b) of the fourth question posed by the national court, as well as the national legislation on price indexation.

6. Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC is to be interpreted as meaning that, where a national court considers that a given term is unfair within the meaning of Directive 93/13/EEC, that court must ensure that such a clause is not binding on the consumer provided that the contract is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term, in so far as, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, such continuity of the contract is legally possible.


Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 24 November 2014.


Registrar President

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5. Það er landsdómstólsins að meta hvort samningsskilmála um verðtryggingu afborgana af láni skuli teljast hafi verið lýst fyrir neytandanum með skýrum og skiljanlegum hætti. Slíkt mat verður að taka mið af nákvæmu orðalagi viðeigandi samningsskilmála og öllum öðrum aðstæðum, þar á meðal þeirra sem vísað er til í a- og b-hluta fjórðu spurningar landsdómstólsins, auk ákvæða landsréttar um verðtryggingu.

6. 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE verður að túlka með þeim hætti að í þeim tilvikum þar sem landsdómstóll kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu að tiltekinn samningsskilmáli sé óréttmætur samkvæmt tilskipuninni beri þeim dómstól að tryggja að slíkur skilmáli sé óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann að því gefnu að samningurinn geti haldið gildi sínu að öðru leyti án hins óréttmæta skilmála að því marki sem reglur landsréttar leyfa.


Kveðið upp í heyranda hljóði í Lúxemborg 24. nóvember 2014.


Dómritari Forseti

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in Case E-27/13

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice from the Reykjavík

District Court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur), in the case between


and

Landsbankinn hf.

concerning the interpretation of Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 on consumer credit, as well as Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.

I INTRODUCTION

1. The parties to the main proceedings pending before Reykjavík District Court are in dispute about the lawfulness of an indexation clause in a bond. Sævar Jón Gunnarsson (“the Plaintiff”) received a loan from Landsbankinn hf. (“the Defendant”) in return for the issuing of a bond. The loan is linked to the Consumer Price Index and the loan capital is increased in proportion to changes in the index.

2. In the proceedings before the Reykjavík District Court, the parties are, inter alia, in dispute about whether the indexation arrangement in the bond is non-binding. In addition, it is disputed whether Article 12 of Act No 121/1994 complied with Directive 87/102/EEC.

II LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law

3. Article 3 EEA reads as follows:


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SKÝRSLA FRAMSÖGUMANNS

í máli E-27/13

BEIÐNI Héraðsdóms Reykjavíkur um ráðgefandi álit EFTA-dómstólsins samkvæmt 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTA-ríkjanna um stofnun eftirlitsstofnunar og dómstóls, í máli

Sævars Jóns Gunnarssonar

og

Landsbankans hf.

um túlkun á tilskipunum nr. 87/102/EBE frá 22. desember 1986 um samræmingu á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkjanna varðandi neytendalán og nr. 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum.

I INNGANGUR

1. Ágreiningur aðila í málinu sem rekið er fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur lýtur að lögmæti verðtryggingarákvæðis í skuldabréfi. Sævar Jón Gunnarsson (stefnandi) fékk lán frá Landsbankanum hf. (stefnda) gegn útgáfu skuldabréfs. Lánið er tengt við vísitölu neysluverðs og höfuðstóll lánsins hækkar í hlutfalli við hana.

2. Í málinu sem rekið er fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur greinir aðila, meðal annars, á um það hvort verðtryggingarákvæði skuldabréfsins sé óskuldbindandi. Auk þess greinir þá á um hvort 12. gr. laga nr. 121/1994 samrýmist tilskipun nr. 87/102/EBE.

II. LÖGGJÖF

EES-réttur

3. Í 3. gr. EES-samningsins segir:

Samningsaðilar skulu gera allar viðeigandi almennar eða sérstakar ráðstafanir til að tryggja að staðið verði við þær skuldbindingar sem af samningi þessum leiðir.

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They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement.

Moreover, they shall facilitate cooperation within the framework of this Agreement

4. Article 7 EEA reads as follows:



(b) an act corresponding to an EEC directive shall leave to the authorities of the Contracting Parties the choice of form and method of implementation.

Directive 87/102/EEC

5. Directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit was included under point 4 to Annex XIX to the EEA Agreement before that point was deleted with effect from 12 May 2010.1 For the sake of completeness, it is noted that Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC was incorporated into Annex XIX of the EEA Agreement at point 7h.2

6. Recital 9 to the Directive reads:

Whereas the consumer should receive adequate information on the conditions and cost of credit and on his obligations; whereas this information should include, inter alia, the annual percentage rate of charge for credit, or, failing that, the total amount that the consumer must pay for credit; whereas, pending a decision on a Community method or methods of calculating the annual percentage rate of charge, Member States should be able to retain existing methods or practices for calculating this rate, or failing that, should establish provisions for indicating the total cost of the credit to the consumer.

1 Point 4 was deleted with effect from 12 May 2010 by Article 1(2) of Decision No 16/2009, OJ L 73, p. 53.2 Point inserted by Decision No 16/2009 (OJ L 73, 19.3.2009, p. 53 and EEA Supplement No 16,

19.3.2009, p. 24), e.i.f. 1.11.2011.

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Þeir skulu varast ráðstafanir sem teflt geta því í tvísýnu að markmiðum samnings þessa verði náð.

Þeir skulu enn fremur auðvelda samvinnu innan ramma samnings þessa.

4. Í 7. gr. EES-samningsins segir:



(b) gerð sem samsvarar tilskipun EBE skal veita yfirvöldum samningsaðila val um form og aðferð við framkvæmdina.

Tilskipun 87/102/EBE

5. Tilskipun nr. 87/102/EBE um samræmingu á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkjanna varðandi neytendalán var tekin upp í 4. lið XIX. viðauka EES-samningsins, en sá liður var felldur úr gildi frá og með 12. maí 2010.1 Til að veita fulla yfirsýn skal það tekið fram að Tilskipun Evrópuþingsins og ráðsins nr. 2008/48/EB frá 23. apríl 2008 um lánssamninga fyrir neytendur og um niðurfellingu á tilskipun ráðsins nr. 87/102/EBE var tekin upp í lið 7h í XIX. viðauka EES-samningsins.2

6. Í 9. lið formálsorða tilskipunarinnar segir:

Rétt er að neytendur fái fullnægjandi upplýsingar um lánsskilyrði, lánskostnað og um skuldbindingar sínar. Upplýsingar þessar ættu meðal annars að taka til árlegrar hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar eða, sé því ekki til að dreifa, heildarupphæðarinnar sem neytandinn þarf að greiða fyrir lánið. Þar til ákvörðun er tekin um aðferð eða aðferðir er beita skuli innan bandalagsins við útreikning á árlegri hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar ættu aðildarríki að geta haldið sig við gildandi aðferðir eða viðteknar venjur um útreikning þessa hlutfalls eða, sé slíku ekki til að dreifa, að setja ákvæði um hvernig neytendur skuli upplýstir um heildarkostnað við lántöku.

1 4. liður var felldur úr gildi frá og með 12. maí 2010 samkvæmt 2. mgr. 1. gr. ákvörðunar nr. 16/2009, Stjtíð. ESB L 73, bls. 53.

2 Kveðið var á um upptöku þessa liðar í ákvörðun nr. 16/2009 (Stjtíð ESB L 73, bls. 53 og EES viðbætir nr. 16, 19. mars 2009, bls. 24), tók gildi 1. nóvember 2011.

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7. Article 1(2) of the Directive reads:

For the purpose of this Directive:

[…]

(d) “total cost of the credit to the consumer” means all the costs, including interest and other charges, which the consumer has to pay for the credit;

(e) “annual percentage rate of charge” means the total cost of the credit to the consumer, expressed as an annual percentage of the amount of the credit granted and calculated in accordance with Article 1a.

8. Article 1a (1)(a) of the Directive reads:

The annual percentage rate of charge which shall be that rate, on an annual basis which equalises the present value of all commitments (loans, repayments and charges), future or existing, agreed by the creditor and the borrower, shall be calculated in accordance with the mathematical formula set out in Annex II.

9. Article 1a (6) of the Directive reads:

In the case of credit contracts containing clauses allowing variations in the rate of interest and the amount or level of other charges contained in the annual percentage rate of charge but unquantifiable at the time when it is calculated, the annual percentage rate of charge shall be calculated on the assumption that interest and other charges remain fixed and will apply until the end of the credit contract.

10. Article 4 of the Directive reads:

1. Credit agreements shall be made in writing. The consumer shall receive a copy of the written agreement.

2. The written agreement shall include:

(a) a statement of the annual percentage rate of charge;

(b) a statement of the conditions under which the annual percentage rate of charge may be amended.

In cases where it is not possible to state the annual percentage rate of charge, the consumer shall be provided with adequate information in the

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7. Í 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar segir:

Í þessari tilskipun merkir:

[...]

d) „heildarlánskostnaður neytandans“ allan kostnað, að meðtöldum vöxtum og öðrum kostnaði sem neytandinn þarf að greiða fyrir lánið.

e) „árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar“ heildarkostnað við neytendalán, lýst sem árlegri prósentu af upphæð láns þess sem veitt er og reiknuð út í samræmi við 1. gr. a.

8. Í a-lið 1. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunarinnar segir:

Árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar skal vera það sem svarar til núvirðis allra skuldbindinga (lána, endurgreiðslna og kostnaðar), er til kann að koma eða þegar eru fyrir hendi og lánveitandi og lántakandi hafa samið um, og skal reiknað út í samræmi við þá stærðfræðiformúlu sem sett er fram í II. viðauka.

9. Í 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunarinnar segir:

Þegar um er að ræða lánssamninga, sem í eru ákvæði er heimila breytingar á vaxtagjöldum og upphæð eða stigi annars kostnaðar er fellur undir árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar en ekki er unnt að meta hverju nemi á þeim tíma sem útreikningur er gerður, skal reikna út árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar á þeirri forsendu að vextir og annar kostnaður verði óbreytanlegur og gildi fram til loka lánssamnings.

10. Í 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar segir:

1. Lánssamningar skulu gerðir skriflega. Neytandinn skal fá eintak af slíkum skriflegum samningi.

2. Í skriflega samningnum skal eftirfarandi koma fram:

a) yfirlýsing um árlega hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar;

b) yfirlýsing um það við hvaða aðstæður megi breyta árlegri hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar.

Í því tilviki að ekki sé unnt að gefa yfirlýsingu um árlega hlutfallstölu lánskostnaðar, skal veita neytandanum nægjanlegar upplýsingar í

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written agreement. This information shall at least include the information provided for in the second indent of Article 6 (1);

(c) a statement of the amount, number and frequency or dates of the payments which the consumer must make to repay the credit, as well as of the payments for interest and other charges; the total amount of these payments should also be indicated where possible;

(d) a statement of the cost items referred to in Article 1a (2) with the exception of expenditure related to the breach of contractual obligations which were not included in the calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge but which have to be paid by the consumer in given circumstances, together with a statement identifying such circumstances. Where the exact amount of those items is known, that sum is to be indicated; if that is not the case, either a method of calculation or as accurate an estimate as possible is to be provided where possible.

Directive 93/13/EEC

11. Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (“the Directive”) was incorporated into Annex XIX to the EEA Agreement at point 7a.3

12. Article 1(2) of the Directive reads:

The contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party, particularly in the transport area, shall not be subject to the provisions of this Directive.


For the purposes of this Directive:

(a) “unfair terms” means the contractual terms defined in Article 3;

(b) “consumer” means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;

3 Inserted by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 7/1994 (OJ 1994 L 160, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 17, 28.6.1994, p. 1), entered into force on 1 July 1994.

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skriflega samningnum. Upplýsingar þessar skulu a.m.k. taka til þess sem kveðið er á um í öðrum undirlið 1. mgr. 6. gr.

c) tilgreining upphæðar, fjölda og tíðni eða gjalddaga greiðslna er neytandinn verður að inna af hendi til að endurgreiða lánið, sem og um greiðslur fyrir vexti og annan kostnað. Heildarupphæð þessara greiðslna ætti einnig að tilgreina þar sem unnt er;

d) yfirlýsing um þá kostnaðarliði sem segir í 2. mgr. 1. gr. a, að undanteknum kostnaði er tengist því að ekki er staðið við skyldur samkvæmt samningnum, er ekki voru reiknaðar með í árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar en neytandinn verður að greiða við tilteknar aðstæður, ásamt yfirlýsingu um þær aðstæður. Sé nákvæm upphæð þessara liða þekkt skal tilgreina upphæðina en sé ekki um það að ræða skal tilgreina aðferð til útreiknings hennar eða eins nákvæma ágiskun og unnt er.

Tilskipun 93/13/EBE

11. Tilskipun 93/13/EBE um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum (tilskipunin) var tekin upp í XIX. viðauka EES-samningsins, í lið 7a.3

12. Í 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar segir:

Þessi tilskipun nær ekki til samningsskilmála sem endurspegla lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði og ákvæði eða meginreglur í alþjóðasamningum sem aðildarríkin eða bandalagið eiga aðild að, m.a. á sviði flutningamála.


Í þessari tilskipun er merking eftirfarandi hugtaka sem hér segir:

(a) „óréttmætir skilmálar“: samningsskilmálar samkvæmt skilgreiningu í 3. gr.;

(b) „neytandi“: einstaklingur sem í samningum, er þessi tilskipun nær til, á viðskipti í öðru skyni en vegna starfs síns;

3 Bætt við samkvæmt ákvörðun sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 7/1994 (Stjtíð. ESB 1994 L 160, bls. 1 og EES-viðbætir nr. 17, 28.6.1994, bls. 1), tók gildi 1. júlí 1994.

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(c) “seller or supplier” means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned.


1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.

2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.

The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract.

Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.

3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair.

15. Article 4 of the Directive reads as follows:

1. Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.

2. Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language.

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(c) „seljandi eða veitandi“: einstaklingur eða lögpersóna sem í samningum, er þessi tilskipun nær til, á viðskipti vegna starfs síns, hvort sem það er opinbert starf eða ekki.


1. Samningsskilmáli sem hefur ekki verið samið um sérstaklega telst óréttmætur ef hann, þrátt fyrir skilyrðið um „góða trú“, veldur umtalsverðu ójafnvægi réttinda og skyldna samningsaðila samkvæmt samningnum, neytanda til tjóns.

2. Ekki telst hafa verið samið sérstaklega um samningsskilmála ef hann hefur verið saminn fyrir fram og neytandi því ekki haft tækifæri til að hafa áhrif á efni skilmálans, einkum þegar um er ræða fastorðaða staðalsamninga.

Þótt samið hafi verið sérstaklega um einstök atriði samningsskilmála eða einn tiltekinn samningsskilmála, þá gildir þessi grein áfram um afganginn af samningnum ef heildarmat á samningnum sýnir að hann er þrátt fyrir það fastorðaður staðalsamningur.

Ef seljandi eða veitandi heldur því fram að samið hafi verið sérstaklega um staðalskilmála er sönnunarbyrðin hans.

3. Í viðaukanum er skrá, leiðbeinandi en ekki tæmandi, yfir samningsskilmála sem teljast óréttmætir.


1. Með fyrirvara um 7. gr. skal við mat á því hvort samningsskilmáli er óréttmætur taka tillit til þess um hvers konar vörur eða þjónustu samningurinn er og hafa hliðsjón af öllum aðstæðum á þeim tíma sem samningurinn er gerður og öllum öðrum skilmálum samningsins eða annars samnings sem hann hangir saman við.

2. Matið á því hvort samningsskilmálar séu óréttmætir nær hvorki til skilgreiningar á aðalefni samningsins né samræmis milli verðs og vara eða þjónustu og greiðslu fyrir hana ef þessir skilmálar eru orðaðir á eðlilegu, skiljanlegu máli.

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In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail. This rule on interpretation shall not apply in the context of the procedures laid down in Article 7 (2).


1. Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.

2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close connection with the territory of the Member States.

18. The Annex to the Directive reads as follows:

Terms referred to in Article 3(3)

1. Terms which have the object or effect of:

(a) …

(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded;

2. Scope of subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l)

(a) …

c) Subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l) do not apply to:

– transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments and other products or services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index or a financial market rate that the seller or supplier does not control

– …

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Í samningum þar sem allir eða tilteknir skilmálar sem neytanda eru boðnir eru skriflegir skulu skilmálarnir ávallt orðaðir á eðlilegu, skiljanlegu máli. Í vafamálum um túlkun skilmála gildir sú túlkun sem neytandanum kemur best. Þessi túlkunarregla gildir ekki í tengslum við málsmeðferð samkvæmt 2. mgr. 7. gr.


1. Aðildarríkin skulu mæla svo fyrir um að óréttmætir skilmálar í samningi seljanda eða veitanda við neytanda séu ekki samkvæmt landslögum þeirra bindandi fyrir neytandann og að samningurinn verði áfram bindandi fyrir samningsaðila ef hann getur haldið gildi sínu að öðru leyti án óréttmætu skilmálanna.

2. Aðildarríkin skulu gera nauðsynlegar ráðstafanir til að tryggja að neytandinn sé ekki sviptur þeirri vernd sem þessi tilskipun veitir honum við það að lög lands utan bandalagsins eru valin sem gildandi lög fyrir samninginn ef hann tengist náið yfirráðasvæði aðildarríkjanna.

18. Í viðauka tilskipunarinnar segir:

Samningsskilmálar sem um getur í 3. mgr. 3. gr.

1. Samningsskilmálar sem hafa að markmiði eða þau áhrif:

(a) ...

(l) að gera ráð fyrir að vöruverð sé ákveðið við afhendingu eða heimila seljanda vöru eða veitanda þjónustu að hækka verðið án þess, í báðum tilvikum, að veita neytandanum tilsvarandi rétt til að ógilda samning ef endanlegt verð er of hátt samanborið við umsamið verð við gerð samnings;

2. Gildissvið g-, j- og l-liðar:

(a) ...

(c) Ákvæði g-, j- og l-liðar gilda ekki um:

– viðskipti með framseljanleg verðbréf, fjármálapappíra og aðrar vörur eða þjónustu ef verðið er bundið breytingum á vísitölu, markaðsverði verðbréfa eða vöxtum á fjármagnsmarkaði sem seljandinn eða veitandinn hefur ekki áhrif á;

– ...

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(d) Subparagraph (l) is without hindrance to price-indexation clauses, where lawful, provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described

National law

Act No 7/1936

19. In Iceland, the Directive has been transposed by Act No 14/1995 amending Act No 7/1936 on Contracts, Agency and Void Legal Instruments by adding four new articles, Articles 36(a) to (d), to the latter Act and by amending Article 36.

20. The first paragraph of Article 36 states that a contract may be set aside, in full or in part, or amended, if it would be considered unfair or contrary to good business practice to invoke it, subject to Article 36(c). It is also stated that the same applies to other legal instruments.

21. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 36, in any assessment made under paragraph 1 of that Article, consideration is to be given to the substance of the contract, the position of the parties, the circumstances when the contract was made and subsequent circumstances.

22. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 36(a), Articles 36(a) to (d) apply to contracts, including contract terms that have not been individually negotiated, provided that the contracts form part of the activities of one of the business activities of one of the parties, the business operator, but do not form part of the activities of the other party, the consumer. Moreover, reference is made to Article 36(d).

23. It is required under Article 36(b) that written contracts offered by a business operator shall be phrased in plain and intelligible language. In the event of any doubts concerning the meaning of a contract referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 36, the contract shall be construed in the consumer’s favour.

24. According to Article 36(c), Article 36 shall apply to contracts pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 36(a), but with the changes resulting from the second and third paragraphs of Article 36(c).

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CASE E-27/13

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(d) Ákvæði l-liðar koma ekki í veg fyrir löglega vísitölubindingu ef aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga er útskýrð rækilega í samningi.

Landsréttur

Lög nr. 7/1936

19. Tilskipunin var leidd í lög á Íslandi með lögum nr. 14/1995, sem breyttu lögum nr. 7/1936 um samningsgerð, umboð og ógilda löggerninga (samningalög) með því að bæta fjórum greinum við þau, 36. gr. atil dd. og breyta 36. gr.

20. Í 1. mgr. 36. gr. samningalaga segir að samningi megi víkja til hliðar í heild eða að hluta, eða breyta, ef það yrði talið ósanngjarnt eða andstætt góðri viðskiptavenju að bera hann fyrir sig, sbr. þó 36. gr. c. Hið sama eigi við um aðra löggerninga.

21. Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 36. gr. skal við mat samkvæmt 1. mgr. líta til efnis samnings, stöðu samningsaðila, atvika við samningsgerðina og atvika sem síðar komu til.

22. Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 36. gr. a. gilda ákvæði 36. gr. a–d um samninga, meðal annars samningsskilmála, sem ekki hefur verið samið um sérstaklega enda séu samningarnir liður í starfsemi annars aðilans, atvinnurekanda, en í meginatriðum ekki liður í starfsemi hins aðilans, neytanda, samanber þó 36. gr. d.

23. 36. gr. b. kveður á um að skriflegur samningur, sem atvinnurekandi gefur neytanda kost á, skuli vera á skýru og skiljanlegu máli. Komi upp vafi um merkingu samnings sem nefndur er í 1. mgr. 36. gr. a skal túlka samninginn neytandanum í hag.

24. Samkvæmt 36. gr. c. gilda ákvæði 36. gr. um samninga samkvæmt 1. mgr. 36. gr. a, þó með þeim breytingum sem leiðir af 2. og 3. mgr. 36. gr. c.

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25. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 36(c), account should be taken of the factors and circumstances referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 36, including the terms of other linked contracts. However, no consideration is to be given to circumstances that arose subsequently, to the disadvantage of the consumer.

26. The third paragraph of Article 36(c) states that a contract is to be considered unfair if it is contrary to good business practices and substantially disturbs the balance between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties to the disadvantage of the consumer. If a term of this kind is set aside, either in full or in part, or amended, the contract shall, at the consumer’s request, remain valid in other respects without change if it can be performed without the term.

Act No. 38/2001

27. Indexation of savings and credit was first generally permitted in Iceland by Act No 13/1979 on Economic Policy, and provisions on the matter have existed in Icelandic legislation ever since. Chapter VI of Act No 38/2001 on Interest and Indexation sets out the provisions currently in force in respect of indexation. Except to the extent permitted by Article 2 of the Act, the provisions of that chapter are mandatory in relation to all indexed savings and loans.

28. Pursuant to Article 13, the provisions of Chapter VI shall apply to obligations concerning savings and credits in Icelandic krónur where the debtor promises to pay money and it has been agreed or stipulated that the payments are to be price-indexed. It also states that the price indexation as referred to in the Chapter shall mean changes in line with a domestic price index, and that authorisation for price indexation shall be as provided for in Article 14 of this Act unless otherwise provided for by law.

29. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 14, savings and loans may be price-indexed in accordance with Article 13 if the basis of the price indexation is the consumer price index (“CPI”) as calculated by Statistics Iceland in accordance with legislation applicable to the index and published monthly in the Legal Gazette. An index that is calculated and published in a specific month shall apply to the indexation of savings and loans from the first day of the second month thereafter. In paragraph 2, it is stated that a

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25. Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 36. gr. c. skal líta til atriða og atvika sem nefnd eru í 2. mgr. 36. gr., meðal annars skilmála í öðrum samningi sem hann tengist. Þó skal eigi taka tillit til atvika sem síðar komu til, neytanda í óhag.

26. Í 3. mgr. 36. gr. c. segir að samningur teljist ósanngjarn stríði hann gegn góðum viðskiptaháttum og raski til muna jafnvægi milli réttinda og skyldna samningsaðila, neytanda í óhag. Ef slíkum skilmála er vikið til hliðar í heild eða að hluta, eða breytt, skal samningurinn að kröfu neytanda gilda að öðru leyti án breytinga verði hann efndur án skilmálans.

Lög nr. 38/2001

27. Verðtrygging sparifjár og lánsfjár var fyrst heimiluð á Íslandi með lögum nr. 13/1979 um stjórn efnahagsmála o.fl. og hafa ákvæði um það efni verið í lögum síðan. Núgildandi reglur um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár er að finna í VI. kafla laga nr. 38/2001 um vexti og verðtryggingu. Ákvæði kaflans eru ófrávíkjanleg, ef frá eru taldar þær undanþágur sem kveðið er á um í 2. gr.

28. Samkvæmt 13. gr. laganna gilda ákvæði VI. kafla þeirra um skuldbindingar sem varða sparifé og lánsfé í íslenskum krónum þar sem skuldari lofar að greiða peninga og þar sem umsamið eða áskilið er að greiðslurnar skuli verðtryggðar. Þar kemur einnig fram að með verðtryggingu sé í þessum kafla laganna átt við breytingu í hlutfalli við innlenda verðvísitölu og að um heimildir til verðtryggingar fari samkvæmt 14. gr. nema lög kveði á um annað.

29. Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 14. gr. er heimilt að verðtryggja sparifé og lánsfé samkvæmt 13. gr. ef grundvöllur verðtryggingarinnar er vísitala neysluverðs sem Hagstofa Íslands reiknar samkvæmt lögum sem um vísitöluna gilda og birtir mánaðarlega í Lögbirtingablaði. Vísitala sem reiknuð er og birt í tilteknum mánuði gildir um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár frá fyrsta degi þar næsta mánaðar. Í 2. mgr. segir að í lánssamningi sé þó heimilt að miða

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loan agreement may be based on a share price index, domestic or foreign, or a set of such indices that do not measure changes in general price levels.

30. In the first paragraph of Article 15, it is stated that the Central Bank may, subject to the approval of the Minister of Business Affairs, decide on a minimum maturity for indexed deposits and loans. The Bank may also, subject to the approval of the Minister, decide that the interest rates on indexed deposits and loans should be fixed during the period of the loan. Pursuant to the second paragraph, the Central Bank shall adopt further rules on the indexation of savings and loans.

Rules of the Central Bank No 492/2001

31. On the basis of Article 15 of Act No 38/2001, Rules No 492/2001 on Price Indexation of Savings and Loans were adopted by the Central Bank.

32. In Article 1, it is stated that domestic price indexation of savings and loans shall be based on the CPI as announced monthly by Statistics Iceland, cf. the provisions of Chapter VI of Act No 38/2001, unless otherwise stipulated by law.

33. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 4, provisions for indexing the principal of a loan against the CPI are only permitted if the loan is for a minimum term of five years. In the second paragraph, it is stated that the principal changes in proportion to changes in the CPI from the base index to the first due date, and then in proportion to changes in the index between due dates. The principal of a loan shall change on each due date before interest and instalments are calculated. The base index shall be the index that is in effect when the loan is furnished, unless otherwise determined by an agreement or by the nature of the case.

34. The third paragraph of Article 4 states that all the due dates of a loan shall be on the same day of the month, so that the interval between them is counted in whole months. If the due date of a loan is on a different day of the month from that on which the loan is furnished, a daily interest rate with special indexation shall be calculated for the purpose of adjusting for deviations within the month of the loan (to a maximum of 29 days). Upon disbursement of a loan, the borrower pays daily interest if the due date is later in the month than the date on which the loan is furnished, while the lender shall pay if the due date is earlier. In the fourth paragraph, it

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CASE E-27/13

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við hlutabréfavísitölu, innlenda eða erlenda, eða safn slíkra vísitalna sem ekki mæla breytingar á almennu verðlagi.

30. 1. mgr. 15. gr. laga nr. 38/2001 kemur fram að Seðlabanki Íslands geti að fengnu samþykki ráðherra ákveðið lágmarkstíma verðtryggðra innstæðna og lána. Bankinn getur jafnframt að fengnu samþykki ráðherra ákveðið að vextir verðtryggðra innstæðna og lána skuli vera óbreytanlegir á lánstímanum. Þá setur seðlabankinn nánari reglur um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár, sbr. 2. mgr. sömu lagagreinar.

Reglur Seðlabanka Íslands nr. 492/2001

31. Á grundvelli 15. gr. laga nr. 38/2001 setti Seðlabankinn reglur nr. 492/2001 um verðtryggingu sparifjár og lánsfjár.

32. Fyrsta grein reglnanna kveður á um að verðtrygging sparifjár og lánsfjár miðað við innlenda verðvísitölu skuli miðast við vísitölu neysluverðs eins og Hagstofa Íslands auglýsir hana mánaðarlega, sbr. ákvæði VI. kafla laga nr. 38/ 2001, nema lög kveði á um annað.

33. Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglnanna er verðtrygging láns með ákvæði um að höfuðstóll þess miðist við vísitölu neysluverðs því aðeins heimil að lánið sé til fimm ára hið minnsta. Í 2. mgr. segir að höfuðstóll láns breytist í hlutfalli við breytingar á vísitölu neysluverðs frá grunnvísitölu til fyrsta gjalddaga og síðan í hlutfalli við breytingar á vísitölunni milli gjalddaga. Skal höfuðstóll láns breytast á hverjum gjalddaga, áður en vextir og afborgun eru reiknuð út. Grunnvísitala skal vera vísitala sú, sem í gildi er þegar lán er veitt, nema samningur eða eðli máls leiði til annars.

34. Í 3. mgr. 4. gr. reglnanna segir að gjalddagar láns skulu allir vera á sama degi mánaðar, þannig að tímabilið milli gjalddaga teljist í heilum mánuðum. Sé gjalddagi láns á einhverjum öðrum degi mánaðar en lánveiting á sér stað, skal til leiðréttingar reikna dagvexti með sérstökum verðbótum, fyrir frávikið innan lánveitingarmánaðar (mest 29 dagar). Við útborgun láns greiðir lánþegi dagvextina, ef gjalddagi er síðar í mánuði en lánveiting, en lánveitandi greiðir, ef gjalddagi er fyrr.

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is stipulated that it is also permissible to conclude financial instruments, listed on a regulated market, cf. Act No 110/2007 on Stock Exchanges, provided that, on the day of the deposit of the loan and on the date of the payment of instalments and interest, the price indexation within a month shall be based on a daily linear change in the consumer price index, i.e. between its value on the first day of the month and its value on the first day of the month thereafter. Finally, the fifth paragraph states that receipts shall state in detail the calculation of payments and accrued indexation.

Act No 12/1995

35. Act No 12/1995 on the CPI contains provisions concerning the methods used when the CPI is calculated. It provides that Statistics Iceland shall calculate and publish the index on a monthly basis. The index is to be compiled from a base determined by Statistics Iceland based on the results of the household budget survey. Insofar as possible, the index shall reflect average prices in Iceland. A special Advisory Committee on the CPI is tasked with advising Statistics Iceland about the CPI and with monitoring its monthly calculations, cf. paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Act No 12/1995.

Act No 121/1994

36. At the time when the credit agreement at issue was concluded, Act No 121/1994 on Consumer Credit was in force. The Act transposed Directive 87/102/EEC into Icelandic law. On 1 November 2013, it was replaced by Act No 33/2013, which implements Directive 2008/48/EC.

37. Article 5 of the Act requires credit agreements to be made in writing and to contain the information described in Articles 6-8. This includes the principal, i.e. the credit granted without any charges (Article 6(1)), the rate of interest (Article 6(3)), the total cost of the credit calculated in accordance with Article 7 (Article 6(4)), the annual percentage rate of charge, which is the total cost of the credit expressed as an annual percentage of the principal and calculated according to the provisions of Articles 10-12 (Article 6(5)), as well as the total amount to be repaid (Article 6(6)), the number of payments, amounts and payment dates (Article 6(7)), and the validity and conditions of termination (Article 6(8)). The second paragraph of Article 6 further states that, where charges, repayments or other credit terms can be amended during the contract period, the consumer must be informed of the conditions surrounding such amendments.

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CASE E-27/13

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Í 4. mgr. er veitt heimild til að semja svo um í fjármálagerningum, sem skráðir eru á skipulegum verðbréfamarkaði samanber lög nr. 110/2007 um kauphallir, að á útborgunardegi láns og greiðsludegi afborgana og vaxta miðist verðbætur innan mánaðar við daglega línulega breytingu á vísitölu neysluverðs, það er milli gildis hennar á fyrsta degi mánaðar og gildis hennar á fyrsta degi næsta mánaðar þar á eftir. Loks segir í 5. mgr. að á kvittunum skuli jafnan gera nákvæma grein fyrir útreikningi greiðslu og áföllnum verðbótum.

Lög nr. 12/1995

35. Í lögum nr. 12/1995 um vísitölu neysluverðs er að finna ákvæði um aðferðir við útreikning vísitölu neysluverðs. Þar segir að Hagstofa Íslands skuli reikna og birta vísitöluna mánaðarlega. Skal hún reist á grunni sem Hagstofan ákveður samkvæmt niðurstöðum neyslukönnunar. Vísitalan skal svo sem kostur er miðast við meðalverðlag í landinu. Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 1. gr. laganna er sérstök nefnd Hagstofunni til ráðgjafar um gerð vísitölunnar og fylgist með reglubundnum útreikningi hennar.

Lög nr. 121/1994

36. Þegar gengið var frá lánssamningnum sem um er deilt voru í gildi lög nr. 121/1994 um neytendalán. Lögin leiddu tilskipun 87/102/EBE í íslenskan rétt. Í þeirra stað eru nú komin lög nr. 33/2013 frá 1. nóvember 2013 sem innleiddu tilskipun 2008/48/EB.

37. Í 5. gr. laganna er gerð krafa um að lánssamningur skuli gerður skriflega og fela í sér upplýsingar þær sem tilgreindar eru í 6. og 8. gr. Meðal þess sem upplýsa skal um er höfuðstóll, þ.e. lánsfjárhæð án nokkurs kostnaðar (1. tl. 1. mgr. 6. gr.), vextir (3. tl. 1. mgr. 6. gr.), heildarlántökukostnaður í krónum, reiknaður út skv. 7. gr. (4. tl. 1. mgr. 6. gr.), árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar, þ.e. heildarlántökukostnaður, lýst sem árlegri prósentu af upphæð höfuðstólsins og reiknaðri út skv. 10.–12. gr. (5. tl. 1. mgr. 6. gr.), heildarupphæð sú sem greiða skal (6. tl. 1. mgr. 6. gr.), fjöldi einstakra greiðslna, fjárhæð þeirra og gjalddaga (7. tl. 1. mgr. 6. gr.) og gildistími lánssamnings og skilyrði uppsagnar hans (8. tl. 1. mgr. 6. gr.). Í 2. mgr. 6. gr. segir jafnframt að ef breyta megi lánskostnaði, afborgunum eða öðrum atriðum lánskjara á samningstímanum skuli lánveitandi greina neytanda frá því við hvaða aðstæður breytingarnar geti orðið.

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38. Article 7 goes on to define the total cost of the credit, while Article 9 states that, although the Act ‘’provides for consumer information on interest rates or sums including interest rates, the parties concerned are not prevented from reaching an agreement on variable interest rates, either to some extent or altogether”.

39. Articles 10-12 then lay down more detailed provisions concerning the calculation of the APR. APR is defined as “the rate which balances the present value of the payment obligation of the creditor on the one hand and the consumer on the other according to their credit agreement” (Article 10), and it is to be calculated at the time the agreement is concluded (Article 11).

40. Article 12 of the Act deals with credit agreements containing clauses allowing indexation or variations in the rate of interest and the amount or level of other charges contained in the annual percentage rate of charge, but unquantifiable at the time when it is calculated. In these cases, the annual percentage rate of charge shall be calculated on the assumption that the price level, interest rate and other charges will remain unchanged until the end of the credit agreement.

III FACTS AND PROCEDURE

41. By letter of 17 December 2013 registered at the EFTA Court on the same day, Reykjavík District Court requested an Advisory Opinion in a case pending before it between Sævar Jón Gunnarsson and Landsbankinn hf.

42. On 19 November 2008, the Plaintiff took out a loan of ISK 630,000 from the Defendant in return for the issue of a bond, which contained standardised contractual terms. Its header stated that it is a “Bond with in solidum personal guarantee – loan to an individual”, and that the bond was indexed, with a variable interest rate and equal repayment instalments. It also defined the overall loan period, the number of instalments and the index base.

43. According to the first paragraph of the main text of the bond, the loan was to be repaid in equal payments of the principal and of interest (i.e. the instalment and the interest were to be the same sum unless the interest rate changed). It went on to state that “for indexation purposes, the loan

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38. Í 7. gr. er heildarlántökukostnaður skilgreindur, og í 9. gr. segir að þó lögin kveði á um að neytandi skuli fá upplýsingar um vexti eða fjárhæðir þar sem vextir eru meðtaldir, komi það ekki í veg fyrir að aðilar geti samið um að vextir séu að nokkru eða öllu leyti breytilegir.

39. Í 10. til 12. gr. eru svo nánari ákvæði um útreikning árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar (ÁHK). ÁHK er skilgreind í 10. gr. sem „það vaxtaígildi sem jafnar núvirðið af greiðsluskuldbindingum lánveitanda annars vegar og neytanda hins vegar samkvæmt lánssamningi þeirra.” Samkvæmt 11. gr. skal reikna hana út á þeim tíma sem lánssamningur er gerður.

40. 12. gr. laga nr. 121/1994 varðar lánssamninga sem heimila verðtryggingu eða breytingu á vöxtum eða öðrum gjöldum sem teljast hluti árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, en ekki er unnt að meta hverju nemi á þeim tíma sem útreikningur er gerður. Í slíkum tilvikum skal reikna út árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar miðað við þá forsendu að verðlag, vextir og önnur gjöld verði óbreytt til loka lánstímans.

III MÁLAVEXTIR OG MEÐFERÐ MÁLSINS

41. Með bréfi dagsettu 17. desember 2013, sem skráð var samdægurs í málaskrá dómstólsins, óskaði Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur eftir ráðgefandi áliti í máli sem rekið er fyrir dómstólnum milli Sævars Jóns Gunnarssonar og Landsbankans hf.

42. Þann 19. nóvember 2008 tók stefnandi lán hjá stefnda að fjárhæð 630.000 ISK gegn útgáfu skuldabréfs með staðlaða samningsskilmála. Í fyrirsögn skuldabréfsins segir að það sé: „Skuldabréf með óskiptri sjálfsskuldarábyrgð — lán til einstaklings.“ Er þar jafnframt tekið fram að skuldabréfið sé verðtryggt með breytilegum vöxtum og jöfnum greiðslum (annuitet). Auk þess er heildarlánstíminn skýrður, fjöldi afborgana og við hvaða grunnvísitölu er miðað.

43. Í fyrstu málsgrein meginmáls bréfsins kemur fram að um sé að ræða lán með jöfnum greiðslum afborgana og vaxta (það er afborgun og vextir séu ávallt sama upphæðin nema vextir breytist). Þá segir eftirfarandi: „Lánið er bundið vísitölu neysluverðs til verðtryggingar og breytist skuldin í samræmi við breytingar á vísitölunni frá grunnvísitölu til gjalddaga á hverjum tíma. Þannig skal útgefandi greiða til viðbótar hverri einstakri greiðslu afborgana

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is linked to the consumer price index and the debt changes in accordance with changes in the index from the index base until the payment date on any given occasion. Thus the issuer shall pay, in addition to each individual payment of instalments and interest, an indexation adjustment on each due date, based on the rise in the index from the base index figure.”

44. The bond was accompanied by a repayment schedule signed by both parties on 20 November 2008. It set out 64 due dates of the bond, with information about the individual instalments, broken down into an instalment on the principal, interest and costs, as well as a calculation of the outstanding balance. Finally, the schedule concludes with the following statement: “Note that this is an estimate. The estimate is based on 0% inflation, current interest rates and the bank’s tariff of charges, which may change (cf. the provisions of the bond).”

45. The repayment burden of the loan turned out to be considerably higher than was indicated in the repayment schedule, even though the variable interest rate fell after the first instalments were paid. It is assumed that the rise in the repayment figures was caused by the index-linked revision of the loan on each due date, which resulted in both the principal and the interest increasing to more than the figures set out in the repayment schedule.

46. The Plaintiff then brought proceedings against the Defendant before Reykjavík District Court. In the view of Reykjavík District Court, there is doubt about the interpretation of Article 12 of Act 121/1994 and about whether, when calculating the total cost of credit to the consumer, it is permissible to completely ignore the inflation rate as it is at the time when the loan is negotiated, but to assume instead an inflation rate of 0%. In light of all the above, the District Court found it appropriate to seek an Advisory Opinion from the Court.

IV QUESTIONS REFERRED

47. Reykjavík District Court referred the following questions to the Court:

1. Is it compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit, as amended by Directive 90/88/EEC and Directive 98/7/EC, that when a credit agreement is made, which is linked to the consumer price index in accordance with an authorisation in enacted legislation, and the sum loaned therefore changes in accordance with

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og vaxta, verðuppbót á hverjum gjalddaga, sem miðast við hækkun vísitölu frá grunnvísitölunni.“

44. Skuldabréfinu fylgdi greiðsluáætlun, sem undirrituð var af báðum aðilum þann 20. nóvember 2008. Í henni er að finna sundurliðun greiðslna af láninu á hverjum áætluðum gjalddaga, alls 64 talsins, auk útreiknings á eftirstöðvum, afborgun, greiðslu vaxta og kostnaðar miðað við hverja greiðslu. Þá segir eftirfarandi í greiðsluáætluninni: „Athugið að um áætlun er að ræða. Áætlunin er byggð á 0% verðbólgu, núgildandi vöxtum, og gjaldskrá bankans, sem geta tekið breytingum sbr. ákvæði í skuldabréfi.“

45. Greiðslubyrði lánsins reyndist talsvert hærri en ráð var fyrir gert í greiðsluáætluninni jafnvel þótt hinir breytilegu vextir af láninu hafi lækkað í kjölfar þess að byrjað var að greiða afborganir. Má ganga út frá því að hækkun afborganna umfram greiðsluáætlun hafi orsakast af verðbótauppreikningi lánsins á hverjum gjalddaga sem hafði þau áhrif að bæði höfuðstóll og vextir hækkuðu umfram þær fjárhæðir sem gert var ráð fyrir í áætluninni.

46. Stefnandi höfðaði mál á hendur stefnda fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur. Að mati héraðsdómsins leikur vafi á því hvernig skýra beri 12. gr. laga nr. 121/1994 og hvort heimilt sé, við útreikning heildarlántökukostnaðar neytanda, að líta alfarið fram hjá verðbólgu, eins og hún er á þeim tíma þegar samið er um lán, og miða þess í stað við 0% verðbólgu. Samkvæmt framansögðu taldi héraðsdómur rétt að leita ráðgefandi álits hjá EFTA-dómstólnum.

IV SPURNINGARNAR SEM BEINT VAR TIL DÓMSTÓLSINS

47. Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur beindi eftirfarandi spurningum til EFTA-dómstólsins:

1. Samrýmist það ákvæðum tilskipunar nr. 87/102/EBE um neytendalán, eins og tilskipuninni var breytt með tilskipun nr. 90/88/EBE og tilskipun nr. 98/7/EB, að við gerð lánssamnings, sem bundinn er vísitölu neysluverðs samkvæmt heimild í settum

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inflation, the calculation of the total cost of the credit, and of the annual percentage rate of charge, which is shown to the consumer when the agreement is made, is based on 0% inflation, and not on the known rate of inflation on the date when the loan is taken?

2. Is it compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts if the legislation in an EEA State permits the inclusion of provisions in a consumer contract, stating that repayments of the loan are to be linked to a predetermined index?

3. If the answer to the second question is that the index-linking of repayments of consumer loans is compatible with the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC, then the third question is: Does the Directive limit the latitude of the EEA State in question to determine, through legislation or by means of administrative regulations, the factors that are to cause changes in the predetermined index and the methods by which these changes are to be measured?

4. If the answer to the third question is that Directive 93/13/EEC does not restrict the latitude of the Member State referred to in that question, then the fourth question is: Is a contractual term regarded as having been individually negotiated within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive when a) it is stated in the bond which the consumer signs when taking the loan that his obligation is index-linked and the base index to be used when calculating price-changes is specified in the bond, b) the bond is accompanied by a repayment schedule showing estimated and itemised repayments to be made on the due dates of the loan, and it is stated in the schedule that these estimates may change in accordance with the indexation provision of the bond, and c) both the consumer and the grantor of credit sign the repayment schedule at the same time and in conjunction with the signature of the bond by the consumer?

5. Is the method of calculation of price changes applying to a loan contract regarded as having been explicitly explained to the consumer within the meaning of paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to Directive 93/13/EEC when the circumstances are as described in the fourth question?

6. Does a State that is party to the EEA Agreement have the option, when adopting Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, of either prescribing in domestic legislation that unfair contract terms within

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lögum og tekur því breytingum í samræmi við verðbólgu, sé við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, sem birtur er lántaka við samningsgerðina, miðað við 0% verðbólgu en ekki þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi?

2. Samrýmist það ákvæðum tilskipunar ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum ef löggjöf í ríki sem aðild á að EES-samningnum heimilar að samningur um neytendalán hafi að geyma ákvæði þess efnis að greiðslur af láninu skuli verðtryggðar samkvæmt fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu?

3. Ef svarið við annarri spurningunni er á þann veg að verðtrygging greiðslna af neytendaláni sé samrýmanleg ákvæðum tilskipunar 93/13/EBE þá er í þriðja lagi spurt hvort tilskipunin takmarki svigrúm viðkomandi samningsríkis til þess að ákveða með lögum eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmælum hvaða þættir skuli valda breytingum á hinni fyrir fram ákveðnu vísitölu og eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar.

4. Ef svarið við þriðju spurningunni er að tilskipun 93/13/EBE takmarki ekki það svigrúm samningsríkis sem nefnt er í þeirri spurningu þá er í fjórða lagi spurt hvort samningsskilmáli teljist hafa verið sérstaklega umsaminn í skilningi 1. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar þegar a) tekið er fram í skuldabréfì sem neytandi undirritar í tilefni lántöku að skuldbinding hans sé verðtryggð og tilgreint er í skuldabréfinu við hvaða grunnvísitölu verðbreytingar skuli miðast, b) skuldabréfinu fylgir yfirlit sem sýnir áætlaðar og sundurliðaðar greiðslur á gjalddögum lánsins og tekið er fram í yfirlitinu að áætlunin geti tekið breytingum í samræmi við verðtryggingarákvæði lánssamningsins, og c) neytandi og veitandi undirrita báðir greiðsluyfirlitið samtímis og samhliða því að neytandi undirritar skuldabréfið?

5. Telst aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga í lánssamningi hafa verið útskýrð rækilega fyrir neytanda í skilningi d-liðar 2. gr. viðauka við tilskipun 93/13/EBE þegar atvik eru með þeim hætti sem nánar greinir í fjórðu spurningunni?

6. Á ríki sem er aðili að EES-samningnum val milli þess við innleiðingu 1 mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE, annars vegar að mæla svo fyrir í landsrétti að heimilt sé að lýsa óskuldbindandi fyrir neytanda

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the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Directive may be declared non-binding on the consumer or prescribing in domestic legislation that such terms shall at all times be non-binding on the consumer?

V WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS


– the Plaintiff, represented by Bragi Dór Hafþórsson, District Court Attorney, acting as Counsel, and Björn Þorri Viktorsson, Supreme Court Attorney, acting as Co-Counsel;

– the Defendant, represented by Hulda Árnadóttir, District Court Attorney, as Lead Counsel, and Helgi Þór Þorsteinsson, District Court Attorney, as Co-Counsel;

– the Icelandic Government, represented by Kristján Andri Stefánsson, Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent, Eiríkur Áki Eggertsson, Legal Officer, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, acting as Co-agent, Andri Árnason, Supreme Court Attorney as Lead Counsel, and Stefán Andrew Svensson, Supreme Court Attorney as Co Counsel;

– the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter “ESA”), represented by Xavier Lewis, Director, Markus Schneider, Deputy Director, and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents; and

– the European Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”), represented by Marta Owsiany-Hornung and Nicola Yerrell, Members of the Legal Service, acting as Agents.

VI SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED

The Plaintiff

49. The Plaintiff argues that it follows from the judgment in Jana Perenicová and Vladislav Perenic v SOS financ spol. s r. o that a commercial practice that consists of indicating in a credit agreement an annual percentage rate of charge lower than the real rate must be regarded as misleading within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 2005/29/EC insofar as it causes

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óréttmæta skilmála í skilningi 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar, eða hins vegar að mæla svo fyrir í landsrétti að slíkir skilmálar skuli ávallt vera óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann?

V SKRIFLEGAR GREINARGERÐIR

48. Í samræmi við 20. gr. stofnsamþykktar EFTA-dómstólsins og 97. gr. starfsreglna hans hafa skriflegar greinargerðir borist frá eftirtöldum aðilum:

– Stefnanda, í fyrirsvari er Bragi Dór Hafþórsson, hdl., sem nýtur aðstoðar Björns Þorra Viktorssonar, hrl.

– Stefnda, í fyrirsvari er Hulda Árnadóttir, hdl., sem nýtur aðstoðar Helga Þórs Þorsteinssonar, hdl.

– Ríkisstjórn Íslands, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Kristján Andri Stefánsson, sendiherra hjá utanríkisráðuneytinu og Eiríkur Áki Eggertsson, lögfræðingur hjá fjármála- og efnahagsráðuneytinu auk Andra Árnasonar, hrl., sem nýtur aðstoðar Stefáns Andrew Svensson, hrl.

– Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA (ESA), í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Xavier Lewis, framkvæmdastjóri lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviðs, Markus Schneider og Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir lögfræðingar á lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviði.

– Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópusambandsins, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Marta Owsiany-Hornung og Nicola Yerrell, hjá lagaskrifstofu framkvæmdastjórnarinnar

VI SAMANTEKT YFIR MÁLSÁSTÆÐUR OG RÖK AÐILA

Stefnandi

49. Stefnandi heldur því fram að það leiði af dómsniðurstöðu í máli Jana Perenicová and Vladislav Perenic v SOS financ spol. s r. o. að viðskiptahættir sem fela í sér að gefið sé til kynna í lánasamningi að árlegir vextir séu lægri en raunvextir verði að teljast misvísandi í skilningi 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 2005/29/EB að svo miklu leyti sem hún leiðir eða líklegt

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or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.4

50. The Plaintiff is of the view that the European “fairness test” should, when the protection of consumers is at stake, apply to both private and public practices anchored in domestic legislation.

51. With respect to the specific situation in Iceland, the Plaintiff submits that indexation clauses are never individually negotiated between the parties, and that the method of calculation of the cost of credit is never explicitly described, while the indexation to inflation is usually referred to in just two standard sentences.

The first question

52. With reference to case law, the Plaintiff submits that it is of major importance to the consumer, prior to or at the time he enters into the contract, to be duly informed of all the factors that can have a bearing on the implications of his undertaking.5

53. The Plaintiff submits that, at the time of the calculation of the APR, the change in the CPI that would affect the first payment of the loan was known to the Defendant. The effect the indexation of the capital and interest has on the calculation of the APR and the total cost of the credit is enormous. After only four months, a cost of credit of 6.1% has been added to the capital.

54. The Plaintiff further argues that the repayment schedule accompanying the bond does not mention the effect of changes in the CPI on the total amount to be paid. On the contrary, it states that “the total amount to be paid, based on an unchanged interest rate”, is said to be ISK 847,454. The Plaintiff therefore argues that this practice must be considered to be misleading and opaque.

55. The Plaintiff further argues that Article 1a(6) of Directive 87/102/EEC, interpreted in conjunction with Article 4(2)(b), cannot be interpreted as

4 Case C-453/10 Jana Perenicová and Vladislav Perenic v SOS, judgment of 15 March 2012, published electronically, paragraph 47.

5 Case C-76/10 Photovost, Order of the Court, [2010] ECR I-11557, paragraph 68; Case C-226/12 Constructoria Principado SA v José lgnacio Menéndez Álvorez, judgment of l6 January 2014, published electronically, paragraph 26.

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sé að hún leiði til þess að hinn almenni neytandi taki viðskiptaákvörðun sem hann hefði ekki tekið að öðrum kosti. 4

50. Stefnandi telur að þegar vernd neytenda sé í húfi skuli hið evrópska ,,sanngirnispróf“ bæði eiga við um aðgerðir einkaaðila og hins opinbera sem stoð eiga í innlendri löggjöf.

51. Stefnandi heldur því fram að þær sérstöku aðstæður séu fyrir hendi á Íslandi að aðilar semji aldrei sérstaklega um verðtryggingarákvæði og að aðferð við útreikning sé aldrei sérstaklega lýst heldur sé einungis vísað til verðtryggingar og verðbólgu í tveimur stöðluðum setningum.

Fyrsta spurningin

52. Með vísan til dómaframkvæmdar, telur stefnandi afar mikilvægt fyrir neytandann að hann sé vel upplýstur áður en hann gerir samninginn um alla þá þætti sem geta haft áhrif á skuldbindinguna sem hann undirgengst. 5

53. Stefnandi heldur því fram að á þeim tímapunkti sem útreikningur árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar (ÁHK) var gerður hafi stefnda verið kunnugt um breytinguna á vísitölu neysluverðs sem hefði áhrif á fyrstu afborgun lánsins. Áhrif verðtryggingar höfuðstólsins og vaxtanna á útreikning ÁHK og heildarlántökukostnað séu gríðarleg. Einungis fjórum mánuðum eftir lántökuna hafi 6,1% lántökukostnaður lagst ofan á höfuðstólinn.

54. Stefnandi heldur því enn fremur fram að í greiðsluyfirlitinu sem fylgdi skuldabréfinu komi ekkert fram um áhrif breytinga á vísitölu neysluverðs á fjárhæðina sem endurgreiða skuli. Þvert á móti segir að ,,heildarupphæð sem greiða á miðað við óbreytta vexti“ sé 847.454 ISK. Stefnandi telur því að þessi aðferð verði að teljast misvísandi og ógagnsæ.

55. Stefnandi telur jafnframt að 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunar 87/102/EBE, með hliðsjón af b-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr., sé ekki hægt að túlka með þeim

4 Vísað er til máls C-453/10 Jana Perenicová and Vladislav Perenic v SOS financ spol. s r. o., dómur frá 15. mars 2012, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 47. mgr.;

5 Vísað er til máls C-76/10 Photovost, úrskurður dómsins, [2010] ECR I-11557, 68 mgr.; máls C-226/12 Constructoria Principado SA v José lgnacio Menéndez Álvorez, dómur frá l6. janúar 2014, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 26. mgr.

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allowing the APR and the total cost of credit to be calculated on the assumption that inflation will be 0% throughout the lifetime of the loan. The Defendant’s method of calculation of the cost of the credit and the APR has the effect of making the loan appear to be a normal, non-indexed, variable interest rate loan, which is likely to have the effect that the consumer will take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.

56. The Plaintiff therefore suggests that the first question be answered as follows:

It is not compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 87/102/EEC, as amended by Directive 90/88/EEC and Directive 98/7/EC, that when a credit agreement is made, which is linked to the consumer price index in accordance with an authorisation in enacted legislation, and the sum loaned therefore changes in accordance with inflation, the calculation of the total cost of the credit, and of the annual percentage rate of charge, which is shown to the consumer when the agreement is made, is based on 0% inflation, and not on the known rate of inflation on the date when the loan is taken.

The second question

57. The Plaintiff submits that Directive 93/13/EEC does not, as such, preclude a price-indexation clause. This is illustrated by Article 3(3) read together with the Annex of that directive. Although the Annex is purely indicative, point 1(1), read together with point 2(d), confirms that a price indexation clause may be permitted on condition that the method by which prices may vary is explicitly described.

58. The Plaintiff submits that the CPI price-indexation clause cannot be regarded as reflecting a “mandatory statutory or regulatory provision” within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC and therefore be excluded from the Directive’s scope. In Iceland, the inclusion of a price indexation clause remains merely a possibility, but it is not compulsory. Article 14 of Act No 38/2001 allows for a variety of indexes to be used in connection with a loan agreement. Thus, the Plaintiff submits that the CPI indexation cannot be considered a mandatory provision within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Directive.

59. With reference to case law, the Plaintiff submits that the price indexation term in the bond and in the repayment schedule should have

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hætti að ÁHK og heildarlántökukostnað megi reikna út með því að gera ráð fyrir að verðbólga verði 0% út lánstímann. Aðferð stefnda við útreikning lántökukostnaðar og ÁHK gefur þá mynd af láninu að það sé venjulegt, óverðtryggt lán með breytilegum vöxtum, sem er til þess fallið að neytandinn taki viðskiptaákvörðun sem hann hefði ekki tekið að öðrum kosti.

56. Stefnandi leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari fyrstu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Það samrýmist ekki ákvæðum tilskipunar nr. 87/102/EBE, eins og henni var breytt með tilskipun nr. 90/88/EBE og tilskipun nr. 98/7/EB, að við gerð lánssamnings, sem bundinn er vísitölu neysluverðs samkvæmt heimild í settum lögum og tekur því breytingum í samræmi við verðbólgu, sé við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, sem birtur er lántaka við samningsgerðina, miðað við 0% verðbólgu en ekki þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi.

Önnur spurningin

57. Stefnandi bendir á að tilskipun 93/13/EBE girði ekki fyrir notkun verðtryggingarákvæðis. Það megi ráða af 3. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar með hliðsjón af viðauka hennar. Þótt viðaukinn sé eingöngu leiðbeinandi er í l-lið 1. mgr., ef hann er lesinn með hliðsjón af d-lið 2. mgr., að finna staðfestingu á því, að heimila megi verðtryggingarákvæði með því skilyrði að slíkur skilmáli innihaldi rækilega útskýringu á aðferðinni sem beitt er við útreikning verðbreytinga.

58. Stefnandi telur að ekki megi líta svo á að verðtryggingarákvæðið sem tengt er við vísitölu neysluverðs endurspegli ,,lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði“ í skilningi 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE og því verði það ekki undanskilið gildissviði tilskipunarinnar. Á Íslandi er notkun verðtryggingarákvæðis einungis valkostur en ekki skylda. 14. gr. laga nr. 38/2001 heimilar notkun mismunandi tegunda verðtryggingar við gerð lánssamnings. Stefnandi telur því að verðtrygging sem tengd er vísitölu neysluverðs geti ekki talist bindandi ákvæði í skilningi 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar.

59. Með vísan til dómaframkvæmdar telur stefnandi að verðtryggingarákvæði skuldabréfsins og greiðsluáætlunarinnar hefði

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referred to any legislative or regulatory act determining the rights and obligations of the parties.6

60. The Plaintiff also submits that it follows from case law that, if a Member State extends the scope of a directive, such provisions must be interpreted uniformly.7

61. The Plaintiff finally notes that the Defendant has not fulfilled its obligations to calculate and disclose the cost of credit to the Plaintiff, which results in an unfair term under Directive 93/13/EEC.

62. The Plaintiff suggests that the second question be answered as follows:

Directive 93/13/EEC does not prohibit provisions in contracts between consumers and suppliers for loans that link repayments of the loan to a pre-determined index, if the method by which prices vary is explicitly described in the consumer credit contract.

The third question

63. The Plaintiff submits that the third question should be answered in the negative, simply because Directive 93/13/EEC cannot have a bearing on the methods or factors determining the CPI, although point 2(d) of the Annex states that, in order to be considered fair, a term of a contract providing for indexation should explicitly describe the method by which prices vary.

64. The Plaintiff therefore suggests that the third question be answered as follows:

The provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC do not limit the discretion of EEA states to determine the factors causing changes to a pre-determined index such as Icelandic CPI or the methods by which it is measured.

6 Case C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., judgment of 21 March 2013, published electronically, paragraph 50; Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, judgment of 26 April 2012, published electronically, paragraph 29.

7 Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem [1997] ECR I-04161, paragraph 27; Case C-130/95 Giloy [1997] ECR I-4291, paragraph 28; and Case C-602/10 Volksbank Romania, judgment of 12 July 2012, published electronically, paragraph 87.

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átt að vísa til einhvers laga- eða stjórnsýsluákvæðis sem kvæði á um réttindi og skyldur samningsaðilanna.6

60. Stefnandi telur einnig að það leiði af dómaframkvæmd að ef aðildarríki rýmkar gildissvið tilskipunar beri að túlka slík ákvæði með samræmdum hætti. 7

61. Að lokum bendir stefnandi á að stefndi hafi ekki fullnægt skyldu sinni til að reikna út og birta stefnanda lántökukostnaðinn sem telst þar með óréttmætur skilmáli í skilningi tilskipunar 93/13/EBE.

62. Stefnandi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari annarri spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun 93/13/EBE útilokar ekki ákvæði í samningum á milli neytenda og veitenda lána þess efnis að greiðslur af láninu skuli verðtryggðar samkvæmt fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu ef aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga er útskýrð rækilega í samningi.

Þriðja spurningin

63. Stefnandi telur að þriðju spurningunni beri að svara neitandi af þeirri einföldu ástæðu að tilskipun 93/13/EBE geti ekki haft áhrif á aðferðir við útreikning vísitölu neysluverðs eða þætti hennar þótt d-liður 2. gr. viðaukans kveði á um að aðferðina við útreikning verðbreytinga verði að útskýra rækilega til að verðtryggingarákvæði samnings teljist réttmætt.

64. Stefnandi leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari þriðju spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Ákvæði tilskipunar 93/13/EBE takmarka ekki svigrúm EES-ríkja til þess að ákveða hvaða þættir skuli valda breytingum á fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu, á borð við hina íslensku vísitölu neysluverðs, eða eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar.

6 Vísað er til máls C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, dómur frá 21. mars 2013, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 50. mgr. og máls C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, dómur frá 26. apríl 2012, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 29. mgr.

7 Vísað er til máls C-28/95 Leur-Bloem [1997] ECR I-04161, 27. mgr.; máls C-130/95 Giloy [1997] ECR I-4291, 28. mgr.; og máls C-602/10 Volksbank Romania, dómur frá 12. júlí 2012, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 87. mgr.

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The fourth question

65. As a preliminary point, the Plaintiff notes that this question is to be answered by the national court, taking into account all the circumstances. However, pursuant to the wording of Article 3(2) of the Directive, a term must not be regarded as individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.

66. The Plaintiff submits that Reykjavik District Court has indicated in its request that the bond contained standardised contractual terms and was drafted by the Defendant’s employees. If the Defendant nevertheless argues that the term in question was individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect would be rest with him pursuant to the third subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC.

67. The Plaintiff suggests that the fourth question be answered as follows:

An answer to the question should be that it is for the national court to assess the matter, taking into account all the circumstances.

The fifth question

68. The Plaintiff submits that, when assessing whether the price indexation has been explicitly described, account must be taken not only of the factors listed in Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 93/13/EEC, but also of the transparency requirements laid down in Article 5 of the Directive.

69. The Plaintiff submits that it is of fundamental importance that it is possible for the consumer to foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the changes that are likely to occur during the contract period as a result of the indexation. For that to be the case, everything of importance would have had to be written into the contract in a clear and unambiguous fashion. The Plaintiff adds that the information given to him was opaque and not transparent.

70. The Plaintiff suggests that the fifth question be answered as follows:

It is for the national court to establish whether a contract term relating to the indexation of repayment instalments and interest of a consumer credit loan contract is to be regarded as having been explicitly and comprehensibly explained to the consumer. Such assessment should take into account the

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Fjórða spurningin:

65. Í upphafi vill stefnandi taka fram að það sé landsdómstólsins að svara spurningunni að teknu tilliti til allra kringumstæðna. Þó verður ekki talið að sérstaklega hafi verið samið um samningsskilmála, samkvæmt 2. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar, ef hann hefur verið saminn fyrir fram og neytandi því ekki haft tækifæri til að hafa áhrif á efni skilmálans. Á þetta einkum við um fastorðaða staðalsamninga.

66. Stefnandi telur að Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur hafi í beiðni sinni gefið til kynna að starfsmenn stefnda hafi samið skilmála skuldabréfsins og að í því sé að finna staðlaða samningsskilmála. Haldi stefndi því engu að síður fram að sérstaklega hafi verið samið um skilmálann sem um ræðir hvíli sönnunarbyrðin um það atriði á honum, í samræmi við 3.-lið 2. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE.

67. Stefnandi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fjórðu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti.:

Svara ber spurningunni með þeim hætti að það sé landsdómstólsins að meta það atriði að teknu tilliti til allra kringumstæðna.

Fimmta spurningin

68. Stefnandi telur að við mat á því hvort verðtryggingin hafi verið rækilega útskýrð verði ekki aðeins að skoða þá þætti sem útlistaðir eru í 3. og 4. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE heldur einnig skilyrði 5. gr. um gagnsæi.

69. Stefnandi telur að það sé aðalatriði að neytandanum sé kleift að sjá fyrir, á grundvelli skýrra og skiljanlegra forsendna, þær breytingar sem líklegt er að verði á samningstímanum vegna verðtryggingarinnar. Til þess að svo geti orðið verði allt sem talist geti mikilvægt að vera skráð í samninginn með skýrum og ótvíræðum hætti. Stefnandi tekur fram að þær upplýsingar sem hann fékk hafi ekki verið gagnsæjar.

70. Stefnandi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fimmtu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Það er landsdómstólsins að meta hvort samningsskilmáli um verðtryggingu afborgana og vaxta af neytendaláni teljist hafa verið útskýrður rækilega og með skýrum hætti fyrir neytandanum. Slíkt mat beri að taka mið af nákvæmu orðalagi viðeigandi samningsákvæðis og

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precise wording of the relevant contract term and how the contract fulfils the obligation of transparency as set out in Directive 87/102/EEC.

The sixth question

71. The Plaintiff submits that it follows expressly from the wording of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC that unfair terms in a consumer contract shall not be binding on the consumer. That conclusion can be drawn from the findings in Banco Español de Credito.8

72. It also follows from that judgment that Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 requires Member States to provide for adequate and effective means of preventing the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers. Moreover, it is found in that decision that, if it were open to the national court to revise the content of unfair terms included in such contracts, such a power would be liable to compromise attainment of the long-term objective of Article 7 of Directive 93/13. 9

73. The Plaintiff therefore suggests that the sixth question be answered as follows:

Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which allows a national court, in the case where it finds that an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is void, to modify that contract by revising the content of that term.

The Defendant

74. The Defendant notes that the questions referred to the Court relate to the treatment of Icelandic mandatory rules regarding indexation. As such, the Defendant submits, the indexation system and legislation relating thereto fall entirely outside the scope of the EEA Agreement on the basis of Article 125 EEA.

75. The Defendant argues that Annex XIX, and the EEA Acts falling thereunder, are not intended to address issues relating to economic policy or

8 Reference is made to Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Credito, judgment of 14 June 2012, published electronically, paragraphs 62 to 63.

9 Reference is made to Banco Español de Credito, cited above, paragraphs 68 to 69.

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því með hvaða hætti samningurinn uppfylli gagnsæiskröfur sem gerðar eru í tilskipun 87/102/EBE.

Sjötta spurningin

71. Stefnandi segir það leiða af skýru orðalagi 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE að óréttmætir skilmálar í neytendasamningum séu óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann. Þá ályktun megi draga af niðurstöðum í máli Banco Español de Credito.8

72. Af dómi í því máli megi einnig ráða að aðildarríkjum beri, samkvæmt 1. mgr. 7. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE, að grípa til réttra og árangursríkra leiða til að hindra áframhaldandi notkun óréttmætra skilmála í samningum seljenda eða veitenda við neytendur. Enn fremur hafi niðurstaða málsins verið sú að ef landsdómstóllinn hefði vald til að endurskoða óréttmæta skilmála slíkra samninga væri það til þess fallið að grafa undan langtímamarkmiðum 7. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE.9

73. Stefnandi leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari sjöttu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

1 mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13 verður að skýra með þeim hætti að hún girði fyrir löggjöf aðildarríkis sem heimilar landsdómstól að breyta samningi með því að endurskoða efni samningsskilmála í málum þar sem landsdómstóllinn hefur komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að óréttmætur skilmáli í samningi á milli seljanda eða veitanda og neytanda sé ógildur.

Stefndi

74. Stefndi bendir á að spurningarnar sem beint hafi verið til dómstólsins varði meðferð bindandi reglna um verðtryggingu að íslenskum rétti. Verðtryggingarkerfið og löggjöf þar að lútandi falli, að mati stefnda, að öllu leyti utan gildissviðs EES-samningsins á grundvelli 125. gr. hans.

75. Stefndi heldur því fram að XIX. viðauka samningsins og EES-reglum sem falla undir hann sé ekki ætlað að taka til atriða sem varða efnahagsstefnu

8 Vísað er til máls C-618/10 Banco Español de Credito, dómur frá 14. júní 2012, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 62. og 63. mgr.

9 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Banco Español de Credito, 68.-69. mgr.

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financial stability. As such, the Defendant submits, the EEA Acts cannot be considered to be related to or restrict a Member State’s authority to regulate such issues on its own. With reference to the EFTA Court’s case law, the Defendant submits that the EEA States enjoy a wide margin of discretion when making fundamental choices of economic policy.10

76. In light of the above, the Defendant suggests that the Court answer all of the referred questions in the following manner:

The Icelandic system of price indexation, and legislation and rules relating thereto, was implemented in response to a financial crisis in Iceland resulting from a rapid rise in inflation. The system is a tool designed by the Icelandic legislature and the Central Bank of Iceland to ensure domestic economic and financial stability and seeks to preserve the current and future value of property, in the form of capital, when affected by inflation. As such, the indexation system, and legislation relating thereto, does not fall within the ambit of the EEA Agreement and cannot be addressed by the EFTA Court.

77. Should the Court conclude that the subject matter of the questions referred to it falls within the ambit of the EEA Agreement and EEA law in general, the Defendant wishes to submit observations on the referred questions.

The first question

78. The Defendant submits that Directive 87/102/EEC only provides for minimum harmonisation of the provisions of national law relating to consumer credit.

79. Since loan indexation is not governed by Directive 87/102/EEC, and in the absence of any other EEA legislation concerning the treatment of indexation in consumer credit agreements, it is for the Member States to establish rules in that field. 11

80. The Defendant suggests that the Court answer the first question as follows:

10 Reference is made to Case E-16/11 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland [2013] EFTA Ct. Rep. 5, paragraph 227.

11 Case C-470/12 Pohotovost’s. r. o. v Miroslav Vasuta, judgment of 27 February 2014, published electronically, paragraph 46.

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og fjárhagslegan stöðugleika. Að mati stefnda geti EES-reglur ekki talist tengjast eða takmarka forræði aðildarríkja til að setja sjálf reglur um slík atriði. Með vísan til dómaframkvæmdar EFTA-dómstólsins telur stefndi að EES-ríki njóti víðtæks svigrúms við ákvarðanatöku um grundvallarþætti efnahagsstefnu sinnar. 10

76. Í ljósi framangreindra röksemda leggur stefndi til að dómstóllinn svari öllum spurningunum sem vísað var til hans með eftirfarandi hætti:

Íslenska verðtryggingarkerfið og sú löggjöf sem að því lýtur var innleitt sem viðbragð við fjármálakreppu á Íslandi sem til kom vegna mikillar verðbólgu. Kerfið er tæki sem íslenski löggjafinn hannaði ásamt Seðlabanka Íslands til að tryggja efnahagslegan og fjárhagslegan stöðugleika og með því er reynt að vernda nú- og framtíðarvirði eigna í formi fjármagns fyrir aðstæðum sem skapast vegna verðbólgu. Verðtryggingarkerfið sem slíkt og löggjöfin sem að því lýtur fellur utan gildissviðs EES-samningsins og lögsögu EFTA-dómstólsins.

77. Komist dómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að spurningarnar sem beint var til hans falli efnislega undir gildissvið EES-samningsins og heyri almennt undir EES-rétt vill stefndi gera eftirfarandi athugasemdir við spurningarnar.

Fyrsta spurningin

78. Stefndi telur að tilskipun 87/102/EBE geri einungis ráð fyrir lágmarkssamhæfingu reglna landsréttar er varða neytendalán.

79. Þar sem verðtrygging lána fellur ekki undir gildissvið tilskipunar 87/102/EBE og engin önnur EES-löggjöf fjallar um meðferð verðtryggingar í neytendalánasamningum er það aðildarríkjanna að setja reglur á því sviði.11

80. Stefndi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fyrstu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

10 Vísað er til máls E-16/11 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland [2013] EFTA Ct. Rep. 5, 227. mgr.11 Vísað er til máls C-470/12 Pohotovost’s. r. o. v Miroslav Vasuta, dómur frá 27. febrúar 2014, birtur

með rafrænum hætti, 46. mgr.

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Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, does not, according to its substance, apply to indexation of credit agreements. As such, the authorization and implementation of such indexation, including the manner in which such indexation is presented to a consumer creditor, is an issue to be decided by national law.

81. In the event that the Court does not conclude that the first question falls entirely outside the scope of Directive 87/102/EEC, the Defendant submits that the national legislature was not prohibited from enacting specific legislation providing for an assumption of 0% inflation when calculating the annual percentage rate of charge pursuant to Article 1a(6) of that Directive.

82. The Defendant, alternatively, proposes that the first question be answered as follows:

Council Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit, as amended by Directive 90/88/EEC and Directive 98/7/EC, does not prohibit the enactment of national legislation providing for the method in which indexation is treated for the purposes of calculating the total cost of the credit and of the annual percentage rate of charge, shown to the consumer when the agreement is made.

Second to sixth questions

Scope of Directive 93/13/EEC

83. Firstly, the Defendant submits that the Directive provides for harmonised secondary EEA legislation with regard to the terms used in consumer contracts.

84. The Defendant argues that it follows from Article 1(2) of the Directive that contractual terms that reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions of national law are excluded from the provisions of the Directive. Pursuant to the 13th recital of the Directive, statutory or regulatory provisions of the Member States that directly or indirectly determine the terms of consumer contracts are presumed not to contain unfair terms. The Defendant notes, in this regard, that the ECJ has considered this exclusion justified, since it may

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Tilskipun ráðsins 87/102/EBE frá 22. desember 1986 um samræmingu á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkjanna varðandi neytendalán gildir ekki efnislega um verðtryggingu lánasamninga. Heimild til beitingar slíkrar verðtryggingar, þar með talin hvaða aðferð notuð er við kynningu hennar fyrir neytendalántaka, fellur undir landsrétt.

81. Komist dómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að fyrsta spurningin falli ekki að öllu leyti utan við gildissvið tilskipunar 87/102/EBE telur stefndi að löggjafa aðildarríkisins hafi verið heimilt að setja sérstök lög þar sem gert sé ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu við útreikning árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar í samræmi við 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunarinnar.

82. Til vara leggur stefndi til að dómstóllinn svari fyrstu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun ráðsins 87/102/EBE um neytendalán, eins og henni var breytt með tilskipun 90/88/EBE og tilskipun 98/7/EB, girðir ekki fyrir setningu laga sem mæla fyrir um aðferð við framkvæmd verðtryggingar þar sem heildarkostnaður láns er reiknaður út og árleg hlutfallstala kostnaðar kynnt neytenda við samningsgerðina.

Önnur til sjötta spurning

Gildissvið tilskipunar 93/13/EBE

83. Í fyrsta lagi tekur stefndi fram að með tilskipuninni sé stefnt að samhæfingu afleiddrar EES-löggjafar hvað varðar skilmála í neytendasamningum.

84. Stefndi heldur því fram að það leiði af 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar að samningsskilmálar sem endurspegla lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði landsréttar falli utan gildissviðs tilskipunarinnar. Samkvæmt 13. tl. formálsorða tilskipunarinnar sé gert ráð fyrir því að lög og stjórnsýsluákvæði aðildarríkjanna, sem beint eða óbeint ákvarða skilmála neytendasamninga, feli ekki í sér óréttmæta skilmála. Stefndi bendir í þessu sambandi á að Evrópudómstóllinn hafi talið þá undanþágu

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legitimately be supposed that the national legislature has struck a balance between all the rights and obligations of the parties to certain contracts.12 The ECJ has further stated that contractual terms are excluded from the scope of that directive if they reflect provisions of national legislation governing a certain category of contracts, not only if the contract concluded by the parties is within that category, but also with respect to other contracts to which that legislation applies pursuant to national law.13

85. The Defendant submits that the indexation of credit agreements is not mandatory under Icelandic law. However, should the parties agree on an indexed loan, the execution of the indexation provision in the agreement is mandatorily provided for by law. Thus, the indexation provision clearly reflects mandatory and regulatory provisions of national law and, as such, falls outside the scope of the Directive.

86. Secondly, the Defendant notes that it is for the national court to decide whether the indexation provision in the parties’ agreement can be considered to reflect mandatory or statutory regulatory provisions of national law.

87. In light of the above, the Defendant suggests that the Court answer questions 2 to 6 as follows:

The scope of Directive 93/13/EC on unfair terms in consumer contracts does not extend to contractual terms which reflect mandatory [statutory] or regulatory provisions of national law such as those applying to the parties’ dispute in the main proceedings.

88. In the alternative to the submissions made above, the Defendant submits observations on each specific question.

The second question

89. The Defendant submits that the Directive is generally intended to safeguard citizens in their role as consumers, when acquiring goods and services under contracts, against the abuse of power by the seller or

12 Reference is made to RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., cited above, paragraph 28.

13 Reference is made to RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., cited above, paragraph 27; reference is made to AG Trstenjak’s Opinion in RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., cited above, paragraph 50.

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réttlætanlega þar sem með réttu megi gera ráð fyrir að löggjafi aðildarríkis hafi þegar leitað jafnvægis milli allra réttinda og skyldna aðila að ákveðnum tegundum samninga.12 Þá hafi Evrópudómstóllinn einnig komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að samningsskilmálar séu undanþegnir gildissviði tilskipunarinnar ef þeir endurspegla ákvæði landslaga sem lúta að tilteknum tegundum samninga. Það eigi ekki aðeins við falli samningur aðilanna undir slíka tegund heldur einnig ákvæði landslaga taka til annarra samninga. 13

85. Stefndi bendir á að ekki sé skylt að verðtryggja lánasamninga að íslenskum rétti. Sammælist aðilar um verðtryggt lán sé þó framkvæmd verðtryggingarákvæðis í samningi lögbundin. Verðtryggingarákvæðið endurspegli því með skýrum hætti lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði landsréttar og falli utan gildissviðs tilskipunarinnar.

86. Í öðru lagi telur stefndi að það sé landsdómstólsins að ákveða hvort verðtryggingarákvæðið í samningi aðilanna geti talist endurspegla lög eða bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði landsréttar.

87. Samkvæmt framansögðu leggur stefndi til að dómstóllinn svari spurningum 2 til 6 með eftirfarandi hætti:

Gildissvið tilskipunar 93/13/EB um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum nær ekki til samningsskilmála sem endurspegla lög eða bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði landsréttar eins og þau sem eiga við um ágreining aðila í málinu sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum.

88. Til vara við framangreinda tillögu gerir stefndi athugasemdir við hverja spurningu fyrir sig.

Önnur spurningin

89. Stefndi telur að tilskipunin eigi almennt séð að vernda borgara gegn misbeitingu valds af hálfu seljanda eða veitanda þegar þeir geri samninga um kaup á vörum og þjónustu sem neytendur.

12 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs mál RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, 28. mgr.

13 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., 27. mgr. og álits Trstenjaks aðallögusmanns í því máli, 50. mgr.

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supplier.

90. The Defendant argues that statutory provisions of national law that directly or indirectly determine the terms of consumer contracts are presumed not to result in unfair terms, as it may be legitimately supposed that the national legislature has already balanced the rights and obligations of the contracting parties.14 As such, any national legislation permitting certain provisions in consumer contracts will be deemed not to be unfair. Moreover, it is for the national court to decide whether the term at issue is of an unfair nature or not.15

91. Without prejudice to the above, the Defendant notes that Articles 3(1) and 4(1) of the Directive contain certain criteria for whether contractual terms can be considered unfair. Subparagraph l of paragraph (1) of the Annex to the Directive does not apply to the bond, and, pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of the Annex, subparagraph (l) of paragraph (1) of the Annex does not preclude price-indexation terms, where lawful, provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described.

92. The Defendant also notes that Directive 2008/48/EC specifically provides for the indexation of credit agreements affecting the borrowing rate.

93. The Defendant submits that the answer to the second question should be as follows:

Legislation in an EEA State permitting the inclusion of provisions in consumer contracts, stating that repayment of the loan are to be linked to a predetermined index is compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1983 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. Whether such provisions would be considered unfair in the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive is an assessment to be made solely by the national court.

The third question

94. The Defendant submits that Article 1(2) of the Directive specifically excludes contractual terms that reflect mandatory and regulatory


15 Case C-478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I-4147, paragraph 11; Case C-226/12 Constructora Principado S.A., cited above, paragraph 20.

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90. Stefndi heldur því fram að gert sé ráð fyrir því að ákvæði landsréttar, sem beint eða óbeint ákvarði skilmála neytendasamninga, feli ekki í sér óréttmæta skilmála þar sem með réttu megi gera ráð fyrir að löggjafi aðildarríkis hafi þegar leitað jafnvægis milli allra réttinda og skyldna samningsaðila.14 Hvers kyns ákvæði landsréttar, sem heimili tiltekna skilmála í neytendasamningum, verði því að telja réttmæt. Það sé jafnframt landsdómstólsins að skera úr um hvort skilmálinn sem um ræðir teljist óréttmætur eða ekki. 15

91. Með fyrirvara um ofangreint, telur stefndi að 1. mgr. 3. gr. og 1. mgr. 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar feli í sér tiltekin skilyrði fyrir því að telja megi samningsskilmála óréttmæta. 1. liður 1. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar eigi ekki við um skuldabréfið og d-liður 2. mgr. og l. liður 1. mgr. viðaukans komi ekki í veg fyrir löglega vísitölubindingu ef aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga er útskýrð rækilega í samningi.

92. Stefndi bendir einnig á að sérstaklega sé gert ráð fyrir áhrifum verðtryggingar á útlánsvexti í tilskipun 2008/48/EB.

93. Stefndi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari annarri spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Löggjöf EES-ríkis sem heimilar að samningur um neytendalán hafi að geyma ákvæði þess efnis að greiðslur af láninu skuli verðtryggðar samkvæmt fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu samrýmist ákvæðum tilskipunar ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum. Hvort slík ákvæði skuli teljast óréttmæt í skilningi 1. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar er eingöngu landsdómstólsins að meta.

Þriðja spurningin

94. Stefndi bendir á að 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar útiloki sérstaklega samningsskilmála sem endurspegli lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði. Stefndi bætir við að tilskipunin, sem hafi takmarkað efnislegt gildissvið,

14 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., 28. mgr.

15 Vísað er til máls C-478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I-4147, 11. mgr.; áður tilvitnaðs máls C-226/12 Constructora Principado S.A., 20. mgr.

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provisions. The Defendant adds that the Directive, with its limited material scope, cannot be considered to have any effect on the latitude of Member States to enact national legislation relating to factors affecting the calculation and the measurement of indexation. The Directive does not limit the latitude of the national legislature of an EEA Member State to determine the factors that are to cause changes in the predetermined index and the methods by which these changes are to be measured.

95. The Defendant submits that the answer to the third question should be as follows:

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts does not limit the latitude of the EEA State in question to determine, through legislation or by means of administrative regulation, the factors that are to cause changes in the predetermined index and the methods by which these changes are measured.

The fourth question

96. The Defendant submits that the national court must determine whether a contractual term is deemed to be individually negotiated, based on the clear criteria set out in Article 3(2) of the Directive. The Defendant notes, in this respect, that the contractual terms at issue complied with the Icelandic law on indexation and that an obligation to negotiate contractual terms individually does not exist under Icelandic law. Article 36 of Act No 7/1936 does not limit the unfairness review to contractual terms that have been individually negotiated.

97. The Defendant submits that the answer to the fourth question should be as follows:

The issue of whether a particular contractual term can be considered individually negotiated, in the sense that whether it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term is an issue which is solely for the referring court to determine.

The fifth question

98. The Defendant submits that it is not necessary to implement the Annex to Directive 93/13/EEC into national law since it does not give the

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geti ekki talist hafa áhrif á svigrúm aðildarríkja til að setja lög varðandi þá þætti sem hafa áhrif á útreikning og mælingu verðtryggingar. Tilskipunin takmarki ekki svigrúm löggjafa EES-ríkja til að ákveða hvaða þættir skuli hafa áhrif á fyrir fram ákveðna vísitölu og hvaða aðferðum beri að beita við mælingu hennar.

95. Stefndi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari þriðju spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum takmarkar ekki svigrúm viðkomandi samningsríkis til þess að ákveða með lögum eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmælum hvaða þættir skuli valda breytingum á hinni fyrir fram ákveðnu vísitölu og eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar.

Fjórða spurningin

96. Stefndi telur að það sé landsdómstólsins að skera úr um hvort samningsskilmáli teljist hafa verið sérstaklega umsaminn á grundvelli þeirra skilyrða sem talin eru upp í 2. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar. Í þessu sambandi bendir stefndi á að samningsskilmálarnir sem um ræðir væru í samræmi við íslensk lög um verðtryggingu og að ekki sé skylt að semja sérstaklega um samningsskilmála samkvæmt íslenskum rétti. 36. gr. laga nr. 7/1936 takmarki ekki athugun á því hvort skilmálar séu óréttmætir við skilmála sem sérstaklega hafi verið samið um.

97. Stefndi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fjórðu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Hvort tiltekinn samningsskilmáli teljist hafa verið sérstaklega umsaminn það er hvort hann hafi verið saminn fyrir fram og hvort neytandanum hafi gefist kostur á að hafa áhrif á efni skilmálans er álitamál sem er einungis landsdómstólsins að skera úr um.

Fimmta spurningin

98. Stefndi telur ekki nauðsynlegt að leiða viðaukann við tilskipun 93/13/EBE í landslög þar sem hann veiti neytandanum engin sérstök réttindi umfram þau sem honum eru veitt í tilskipuninni. Þó beri að taka mið af

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consumer an independent right over and above what is provided for in the Directive itself. However, the Annex shall be taken into consideration when interpreting the provisions of the Directive. As such, the mere fact that a contractual term had not been explicitly explained to the consumer would not automatically result in such term being considered unfair.

99. The Defendant notes that it is for the referring court to determine whether the indexation clause had been explicitly explained to the consumer and whether the clause would be deemed unfair.16 The general criteria for that fairness test are set out in Articles 3(1) and 4(1) of the Directive.17

100. The Defendant submits that the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court only extends to the interpretation of the provisions of the applicable directives and to the criteria that the referring court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in light of those provisions.18

101. Without prejudice to the above, the Defendant submits that, in Iceland, price indexation has been common practice in loan agreements for a long period of time, and that the Plaintiff therefore has to be considered as a reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer.19

102. The Defendant notes that the price-indexation clause in the bond was set out in a clear and concise manner and that the repayment schedule clearly stipulated that the estimate was based on the assumption of 0% inflation, as provided for by law, which might change, as outlined in the terms of the bond.

103. The Defendant submits that the answer to the fifth question should be as follows:

The issue of whether a particular contractual term can be considered explicitly explained is an issue for the referring court to rule on.

16 Reference is made to Constructora Principado, cited above, paragraph 20.17 Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v Asociacion de Usarios de Servicios

Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2010] ECR 1-0475, para 33; Case C-478/99 Commission of the European Communities v the Kingdom of Sweden [2002] ECR I-04147, para 11 and 17; Case C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Cp. KG v Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR 1-03403, para 18-19, 21.


19 Case C-356/04, Lidl v Colruyt [2006], ECR 1-08501, paragraph 78.

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viðaukanum þegar ákvæði tilskipunarinnar eru túlkuð. Sú staðreynd að samningsskilmáli hafi ekki verið rækilega útskýrður fyrir neytandanum leiði ekki sjálfkrafa til þess að slíkur skilmáli teljist óréttmætur.

99. Stefndi bendir á að það sé landsdómstólsins að skera úr um hvort verðtryggingarákvæðið hafi verið rækilega útskýrt fyrir neytandanum og hvort skilmálinn teljist óréttmætur.16 Kveðið sé á um hin almennu viðmið athugunar á réttmæti í 1. mgr. 3. gr. og 1. mgr. 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar. 17

100. Stefndi heldur því fram að lögsaga EFTA-dómstólsins nái einungis til túlkunar ákvæða hinna viðeigandi tilskipanna og þeirra viðmiða sem landsdómstólnum sé heimilt eða skylt að beita þegar hann skoði samningsskilmála með hliðsjón af þeim ákvæðum. 18

101. Að framansögðu gættu telur stefndi að verðtrygging lánssamninga hafi verið almenn um langt skeið á Íslandi. Því verði stefnandi að teljast ágætlega upplýstur og forsjáll neytandi. 19

102. Stefndi bendir á að verðtryggingarákvæði skuldabréfsins hafi verið skýrt og gagnort og að skýrlega hafi komið fram í greiðsluyfirlitinu að gert væri ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu í áætluninni, eins og lögboðið væri, og að sá þáttur gæti tekið breytingum í samræmi við skilmála skuldabréfsins.

103. Stefndi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fimmtu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Það er landsdómstólsins að skera úr um hvort tiltekinn samningsskilmáli teljist hafa verið rækilega útskýrður.

16 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Constructora Principado, 20. mgr. 17 Mál C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v Asociacion de Usarios de Servicios

Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2010] ECR 1-0475, 33. mgr.; mál C-478/99 Commission of the European Communities v the Kingdom of Sweden [2002] ECR I-04147, 11. og 17. mgr.; mál C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Cp. KG v Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR 1-03403, 18.,19. og 21. mgr.

18 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., 48. mgr. 19 Mál C-356/04, Lidl v Colruyt [2006], ECR 1-08501, 78. mgr.

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The sixth question

104. The Defendant submits that Member States must be considered to have discretion as to how the provisions of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC are implemented, insofar as national courts are vested with the authority to invalidate unfair contractual terms.

105. The Defendant submits that Article 6 of the Directive requires Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that unfair terms in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier are not binding on the consumer. With reference to case law and to Article 7 EEA, the Defendant notes that the authorities of the Member States have a choice as regards the form and method of implementation.20 In this regard, the Defendant submits that, while it is sufficient to grant a court power to annul unfair contractual terms, the national court must exercise that power in relation to contractual terms that it finds to be unfair pursuant to the Directive.21

106. The Defendant submits that Article 36 of Act No 7/1936 actually has a wider scope than contemplated by Directive 93/13/EEC, in that it even applies to contractual terms that have been individually negotiated. It is therefore clear, in the Defendant’s view, that the national courts have the power to annul unfair contractual terms. The Defendant further submits that, in cases where contractual terms fall within the scope of Directive 93/13/EEC and the national court finds that such terms are unfair, the national court will be obliged to exercise its power to ensure that the consumer is not bound by the unfair provisions.

107. The Defendant submits that the answer to the sixth question should be as follows:

A Member State of the EEA Agreement has discretion in the implementation of national legislation regarding the annulment of unfair contract terms, insofar as the courts are granted power to annul such contract terms and find them non-binding on the consumer.

20 Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. and Akcros Chemicals Ltd. v the Commission, [2007] ECR 11-3523, paragraph 113.

21 Case C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, judgment of 30 May 2013, published electronically, paragraph 51.

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Sjötta spurningin

104. Stefndi telur að aðildarríki verði að hafa svigrúm til að ákveða hvernig það innleiði ákvæði 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE að því gættu að landsdómstólum sé veitt heimild til að ógilda óréttmæta samningsskilmála.

105. Stefndi telur að í 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar sé gerð krafa um að aðildarríkin grípi til nauðsynlegra aðgerða til að tryggja að óréttmætir skilmálar í samningi sem seljandi eða veitandi gerir við neytanda séu óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann. Með vísan til dómaframkvæmdar og 7. gr. EES-samningsins bendir stefndi á að yfirvöld aðildarríkis hafi val um form og aðferð innleiðingar.20 Stefndi telur, varðandi þetta atriði, að þótt nægilegt sé að veita dómstólum heimild til að ógilda óréttmæta samningsskilmála verði landsdómstóll að beita því valdi þegar reyni á samningsskilmála sem hann telji óréttmæta í skilningi tilskipunarinnar.21

106. Stefndi telur að gildissvið 36. gr. laga nr. 7/1936 sé rýmra en gert sé ráð fyrir í tilskipun 93/13/EBE þar sem ákvæðið taki meira að segja til samningsskilmála sem sérstaklega hafi verið samið um. Það er því ljóst, að mati stefnda, að íslenskir dómstólar hafi heimild til að ógilda óréttmæta samningsskilmála. Stefndi bendir jafnframt á að í málum þar sem samningsskilmálar falla undir gildissvið tilskipunar 93/13/EBE og landsdómstóll telur slíka skilmála óréttmæta sé honum skylt að beita valdi sínu til að tryggja að neytandinn sé óskuldbundinn af hinum óréttmætu skilmálum.

107. Stefndi leggur til að dómstóllinn svari sjöttu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Við innleiðingu í landsrétt hafa aðildarríki EES-samningsins svigrúm hvað varðar ógildingu óréttmæta samningsskilmála að því leyti er dómstólum er veitt heimild til að ógilda slíka samningsskilmála og dæma þá óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann.

20 Mál C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. and Akcros Chemicals Ltd. v Commission, [2007] ECR 11-3523, 113. mgr.

21 Mál C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, dómur frá 30. maí 2013, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 51. mgr.

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The Government of Iceland

The first question

108. The Government of Iceland understands the first question as asking whether calculating the APR and total cost of a loan indexed to the consumer price index based on 0% inflation is necessarily incompatible with Directive 87/102/EEC.

109. The Government of Iceland submits that indexation is a key feature of the Icelandic economy, and that it must therefore be assumed that consumers in the Icelandic market understand the key characteristics of an indexed loan, namely that the agreement is to repay the real value plus interest, but that the nominal amounts payable can increase or decrease with inflation, and that, in return, the rate of interest is lower than on a non-indexed loan.

110. The Government of Iceland submits that Directive 87/102/EEC did not explicitly mention the indexation of loans in any form. Thus, the Directive did not explicitly require that changes in the nominal amount or repayments as a result of indexation be taken into account when calculating the total cost of credit and the APR, and nor did it explicitly require the APR to be a nominal APR rather than the real APR. Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that Directive 87/102/EEC required the calculation of a nominal APR in respect of indexed loans (based on current inflation rates) rather than the calculation of the real APR.

111. With reference to Articles 4(2), 6(1), 1a(6) of Directive 87/102/EEC and the Commission’s Staff Working Document on Directive 2008/48/EC, the Government of Iceland submits that future costs that are uncertain and cannot be estimated with a reasonable degree of certainty should be disregarded. Accordingly, even if, notwithstanding the above, Directive 87/102/EEC were to require the APR and the total cost of credit to be calculated on a nominal basis, the effects of inflation should not be included in the APR or the total cost of credit.

112. The Government of Iceland further submits that the purpose of the requirements in Directive 87/102/EEC, namely to inform the consumer of the total cost of credit, is to protect the consumer by enabling him/her to

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Ríkisstjórn Íslands

Fyrsta spurningin

108. Ríkisstjórn Íslands skilur fyrstu spurninguna þannig að með henni sé leitað svars við því hvort útreikningur ÁHK og heildarkostnaðar láns sem bundið er vísitölu neysluverðs þar sem gert er ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu stangist óhjákvæmilega á við tilskipun 87/102/EBE.

109. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur að verðtrygging sé lykilþáttur íslensks efnahagslífs og því verði að gera ráð fyrir að neytendur á íslenskum markaði skilji þann grundvallarþátt verðtryggðs láns að samið sé um endurgreiðslu raunvirðis lánsins að viðbættum vöxtum en að nafnvirði fjárhæðanna sem komi til greiðslu geti hækkað eða lækkað vegna verðbólgu og að því séu vextirnir lægri en á óverðtryggðu láni.

110. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur að ekki sé minnst verðtryggingu lána með beinum hætti í tilskipun 87/102/EBE. Ekki sé því beinlínis gerð krafa um að tekið sé mið af breytingum á nafnvirði eða afborgunum sem tilkomnar eru vegna verðtryggingar við útreikning heildarlántökukostnaðar og ÁHK. Sömuleiðis sé ekki gerð krafa um að ÁHK sé ÁHK miðað við nafnvirði frekar en ÁHK miðað við raunvirði. Þar af leiðandi sé ekki unnt að draga þá ályktun að tilskipun 87/102/EBE krefjist útreiknings ÁHK á nafnvirði vegna verðtryggðra lán (á grundvelli gildandi verðbólgustigs) frekar en útreiknings ÁHK á raunvirði.

111. Með vísan til 2. mgr. 4. gr., 1. mgr. 6. gr., 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunar 87/102/EBE og minnisblaðs framkvæmdastjórnarinnar um tilskipun 2008/48/EB telur ríkisstjórn Íslands að líta beri framhjá kostnaði sem síðar komi til sem óvissa ríki um og ekki sé hægt að áætla með hæfilegri vissu. Að teknu tilliti til framansagðs ætti þar af leiðandi ekki að gera ráð fyrir áhrifum verðbólgu í ÁHK eða heildarlántökukostnaði jafnvel þótt sú krafa væri gerð í tilskipun 87/102/EBE að ÁHK og heildarlántökukostnaður væru reiknaðir út á nafnvirði.

112. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur jafnframt að tilgangur þeirra krafna sem gerðar séu samkvæmt tilskipun 87/102/EBE, að neytandinn sé upplýstur um heildarlántökukostnað, sé að vernda neytandann með því að gefa honum

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assess the extent of his/her liability.22 If the consumer is provided with the real APR rather than the nominal APR, the consumer is in a better position to make a rational, informed choice based on his/her known current income and the value of his/her assets.

113. Furthermore, the Government of Iceland submits that, if the nominal APR and total cost of credit to be provided to the consumer were to be based on the known rate of inflation at the time the APR is calculated, it would most certainly not reflect the actual nominal APR or cost of credit that would be payable, since the actual average rate of inflation over the duration of the loan would be unlikely to be the same as the spot rate of inflation when the APR was calculated. If the nominal APR was calculated at a time of deflation, the nominal APR and costs of credit could, instead, mislead the consumer by causing him or her to believe that the real rate of interest on the loan is lower than the actual real rate of interest. It could also make it more difficult for consumers to compare offers of credit.

114. Finally, the Government of Iceland requests the Court, in the event that it decides that it was incompatible with Directive 87/102/EEC for the APR and the total cost of credit for indexed loans to be calculated on a real basis rather than on the basis of the known rate of inflation on the day the loan was taken out, to limit the temporal effects of its judgment in line with the principles developed by the ECJ.23 Both the criteria for the limitation of the temporal effects of a decision, namely that those concerned must have acted in good faith and that, secondly, there must be a risk of serious difficulties, are satisfied in the case at hand.24

115. In this regard, the Government of Iceland submits that it is clear from the above that, objectively, it is not legally certain that, in a situation where a consumer took out an indexed loan, Directive 87/102/EEC required the provision of the nominal APR based on the rate of inflation at the time the loan was taken out. The Government of Iceland further submits that ESA may have contributed to uncertainty by not taking issue with

22 Reference is made to Case C-264/102 Coftnoga Merignac SA v Sylvain Sachithanathan, ECR 1-02157, paragraph 26.

23 Reference is made to Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Societe anonyme belge de navigation aerienne Sabena [1976] ECR 455.

24 Reference is made to Case C-525/11 Mednis SIA v Valsts ienemumu dienests, published electronically, paragraphs 42-43; Case C-24/86 Vincent Blaizot v University of Liege and others [1988] ECR 379, paragraph 28.

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tækifæri til að leggja mat á umfang þeirrar skuldbindingar sem hann tekst á hendur.22 Ef neytandinn er upplýstur um ÁHK á raunvirði frekar en á nafnvirði sé hann í betri aðstöðu til að taka skynsamlega, upplýsta ákvörðun á grundvelli tekna sinna og eignastöðu á þeirri stundu.

113. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur enn fremur að ef ÁHK á nafnvirði og heildarkostnaður láns sem veita á neytanda ætti að grundvallast á þekktu verðbólgustigi á þeim tíma sem ÁHK er reiknuð út myndi það örugglega hvorki endurspegla raunverulega ÁHK á nafnvirði né lántökukostnaðinn sem greiða þyrfti þar sem ólíklegt sé að raunverulegt meðalverðbólgustig á lánstímanum yrði hið sama og verðbólgustigið á þeim tíma sem ÁHK væri reiknuð út. Ef ÁHK á nafnvirði væri reiknuð út á tíma verðhjöðnunar gæti ÁHK á nafnvirði og lántökukostnaður þvert á móti villt um fyrir neytandanum sem gæti þá haldið að raunvaxtastig lánsins væri lægra en það reynist. Það gæti einnig gert neytendum erfiðara fyrir að bera saman lánstilboð.

114. Komist dómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að það samrýmist ekki tilskipun 87/102/EBE að ÁHK og heildarkostnaður verðtryggðra lána séu reiknaðir út á raunvirði í stað þess að miðað sé við þekkt verðbólgustig við dagsetningu lántökunnar fer ríkisstjórn Íslands þess loks á leit við dómstólinn að hann takmarki tímabundin áhrif dómsniðurstöðunnar í samræmi við þær meginreglur sem Evrópudómstóllinn hefur mótað.23 Bæði skilyrðin fyrir takmörkun tímabundinna áhrifa ákvörðunar, annars vegar að hlutaðeigandi hafi verið í góðri trú og hins vegar að hætta sé á alvarlegum vandkvæðum vegna dómsniðurstöðunnar, séu uppfyllt í málinu.24

115. Hvað þetta varðar telur ríkisstjórn Íslands að af framansögðu megi leiða að lögfræðilega vissu skorti um það atriði hvort gerð sé krafa, samkvæmt tilskipun 87/102/EBE, um að ÁHK á nafnverði miðað við verðbólgu á lántökutímanum sé tekin fram í skilmálum þegar neytandi hefur tekið verðtryggt lán. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur jafnframt að ESA kunni að hafa ýtt undir þessa óvissu með því að gera engar

22 Vísað er til máls C-264/102 Coftnoga Merignac SA v Sylvain Sachithanathan, ECR I-02157, 26. mgr. 23 Vísað er til máls 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Societe anonyme belge de navigation aerienne Sabena

[1976] ECR 455.24 Vísað er til máls C-525/11 Mednis SIA v Valsts ienemumu dienests,birtur með rafrænum hætti, 42.-

43. mgr. og máls C-24/86 Vincent Blaizot v University of Liege and others [1988] ECR 379, 28. mgr.

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Iceland’s implementation of Directive 87/102/EEC. Nor did it commence proceedings against Iceland in this regard.

116. With respect to the second condition and with reference to case law, the Government of Iceland submits that there would be a risk of significant and serious economic repercussions if it were incompatible with Directive 87/102/EEC for borrowers to be provided with a real APR and the total cost of credit.25 In particular, the Government of Iceland raises concerns about retroactive reimbursement and recalculation, which would have serious economic effects on Iceland’s financial markets and institutions.

117. The Government of Iceland therefore submits that the answer to the first question should be as follows:

It is compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit, as amended by Directive 90/88/EEC and Directive 98/7/EC, that a credit agreement indexed, in accordance with national law, to the consumer price index bases the calculation of the total cost of the credit and the annual percentage rate of charge on 0% inflation and not on the current rate of inflation on the date the loan is taken.

The second question

118. The Government of Iceland understands the second question as asking, in the abstract, whether national legislation that permits contracts between consumers and suppliers to contain provisions stating that instalment repayments are to be linked to a predetermined index is necessarily incompatible with the Directive.

119. The Government of Iceland submits that the contractual terms at issue do not fall within the scope of the Directive, since the Directive does not apply to contractual provisions that reflect applicable provisions of national legislation.26 As can be derived from recital 13 to the Directive,

25 Reference is made to Case C-308/93 Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank v M. Cabanis-Issarte [1996] ECR I-02097, paragraphs 47-48; Case C-163/90 Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Leopold Legros and others [1992] ECR I-04625, paragraphs 32 and 34; Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission Wien and Wein & Co. HandelsgesmbH v Oberosterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECR I-01157, paragraph 59; Vincent Blaizot v University of Liege a. o., cited above, paragraph 43.

26 Reference is made to RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., cited above, paragraph 27; and the Opinion in that case, point 50.

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athugasemdir við innleiðingu Íslands á tilskipun 87/102/EBE og hefja ekki málsmeðferð gegn Íslandi af þessu tilefni.

116. Varðandi annað skilyrðið og með vísan til dómaframkvæmdar telur ríkisstjórn Íslands að hætt væri við umtalsverðum og alvarlegum efnahagslegum afleiðingum ef það reynist ekki samrýmast tilskipun 87/102/EBE að lántakar fái upplýsingar um ÁHK og heildarlántökukostnað á raunvirði. 25 Ríkisstjórn Íslands vill sérstaklega lýsa áhyggjum sínum yfir afturvirkum endurgreiðslum og endurreikningi sem gætu haft alvarlegar efnahagslegar afleiðingar fyrir fjármálamarkaði og –stofnanir Íslands.

117. Samkvæmt framansögðu leggur ríkisstjórn Íslands til að dómstóllinn svari fyrstu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Það samrýmist ákvæðum tilskipunar nr. 87/102/EBE um neytendalán, eins og tilskipuninni var breytt með tilskipun nr. 90/88/EBE og tilskipun nr. 98/7/EB, að lánssamningur sem bundinn er vísitölu neysluverðs samkvæmt heimild í settum lögum miði við 0% verðbólgu en ekki þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar.

Önnur spurningin

118. Ríkisstjórn Íslands skilur aðra spurninguna þannig að með henni sé leitað svars við því, almennt séð, hvort ákvæði landsréttar sem heimili að samningar neytanda og veitanda hafi að geyma skilmála þess efnis að greiðslur af láni skuli verðtryggðar samkvæmt fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu séu ósamrýmanleg tilskipuninni.

119. Ríkisstjórn Íslands bendir á að samningsskilmálarnir sem um ræðir falli ekki undir gildissvið tilskipunarinnar þar sem tilskipunin taki ekki til samningsskilmála sem endurspegli viðeigandi ákvæði landsréttar. 26 Leiða megi af 13. tl. formálsorða tilskipunarinnar gert sé ráð fyrir því í 2. mgr.

25 Vísað er til máls C-308/93 Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank v M. Cabanis-Issarte [1996] ECR I-02097, 47.og 48. mgr; máls C-163/90 Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Leopold Legros and others [1992] ECR I-04625, 32. og 34. mgr.; máls C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission Wien og Wein & Co. HandelsgesmbH v Oberosterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECR I-01157, 59. mgr. og áður tilvitnaðs máls Vincent Blaizot v University of Liege a. o., 43. mgr.

26 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., 27. mgr.; og séráliti í sama máli, 50. liður.

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Article 1(2) of the Directive is based on the presumption that national statutes do not contain unfair terms.27 The same recital clarifies that the wording “mandatory or regulatory provisions” extends to derogable default contractual provisions.

120. The Government of Iceland also argues that it is for the national court to assess whether the terms at issue reflect applicable statutory or regulatory provisions and thereby fall outside of the scope of the Directive.28

121. The Icelandic Government argues that, notwithstanding the above, even if contractual terms that are permitted by legislation were to fall within the scope of the Directive, such provisions would not be unfair in terms of the Directive.

122. The Icelandic Government submits that it is not stated in the Directive that a category of terms shall automatically be considered unfair per se. Nor is any category of contractual terms banned as such; instead, it is for the competent national authority to assess the terms at issue.29 One criterion in the national court’s assessment is to establish which set of national rules would apply in the absence of an agreement between the parties, and whether the consumer is put in a less favourable position than that provided for by the applicable national law. Therefore, national legislation that permits the use of certain clauses in contracts, in this context the indexation of loans, cannot be incompatible with the provisions of the Directive.

123. Even if it were for the Court to assess whether the content of the applicable national legislation is “unfair” and “contrary to good faith”, the Government observes that the Icelandic legislation permitting the indexation of loans has been considered several times by the Iceland Parliament, which has repeatedly determined that loan agreements, including consumer loans, may be linked to the consumer price index. The provisions of the Interest and Indexation Act apply mandatorily to price-indexed loans in Icelandic currency and can only be derogated from

27 As regards the historical background, reference is made to AG Trstenjak’s Opinion of 13 September 2012 in Case C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., published electronically, points 42 to 43.

28 Reference is made to Case C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, cited above, paragraph 33.

29 Reference is made to Case C-478/99 Commission v Sweden [2000] ECR I-4170, paragraph 11; and Case C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter, cited above, paragraphs 21 to 25.

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1. gr. hennar að ákvæði landsréttar feli ekki í sér óréttmæta skilmála.27 Sami liður skýri að orðalagið ,,lög og bindandi stjórnsýsluákvæði“ taki einnig til skilmála sem samkvæmt lögum gildi í samskiptum samningsaðila nema samið hafi verið um aðra skipan.

120. Ríkisstjórnin telur einnig að það sé landsdómstólsins að meta hvort hinir umdeildu skilmálar endurspegli ákvæði laga eða stjórnsýslufyrirmæla landsréttar og falli þar með utan gildissviðs tilskipunarinnar.28

121. Ríkisstjórnin heldur því fram að jafnvel þótt samningsskilmálar sem heimilir væru lögum samkvæmt gætu fallið undir gildissvið tilskipunarinnar geti slíkir skilmálar ekki talist óréttmætir í skilningi tilskipunarinnar.

122. Ríkisstjórn Íslands bendir á að í tilskipuninni komi hvorki fram að flokkur samningsskilmála skuli sjálfkrafa teljast óréttmætur, í sjálfu sér, né að ákveðinn flokkur samningsskilmála sé bannaður sem slíkur. Þess í stað sé það undir þar til bærum stjórnvöldum aðildarríkis komið að leggja mat á skilmálana sem um ræðir.29 Eitt viðmið í mati landsdómstólsins sé að slá föstu hvaða reglur landsréttar ættu við ef aðilar hefðu ekki samið sérstaklega um skilmálana og hvort neytandinn sé verr settur en reglur landsréttar kveða á um. Ákvæði landsréttar sem heimili notkun ákveðinna skilmála í samningi, verðtryggingarákvæði lánasamnings í þessu tilviki, geti því ekki verið ósamrýmanleg ákvæðum tilskipunarinnar.

123. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur að jafnvel þótt það væri EFTA-dómstólsins að meta hvort inntak viðeigandi ákvæða landsréttar séu óréttmæt og andstæð góðri viðskiptavenju hafi íslensk löggjöf, sem heimili verðtryggingu lána, oftsinnis verið tekin til umfjöllunar á Alþingi og þingið ítrekað komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að lánssamninga megi tengja við neysluvísitölu og að það eigi einnig við um neytendalán. Ekki megi víkja frá ákvæðum laga nr. 38/2001 þegar um verðtryggð lán í íslenskum krónum er að ræða nema

27 Varðandi sögulegan bakgrunn, er vísað til álits Trstenjaks aðallögsögumanns frá 13. september 2012 í máli C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., enn óbirtur, 42. og 43. liðir.

28 Vísað er til máls C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, dómur frá 30. maí 2013, enn óbirtur, 33. mgr.

29 Vísað er til máls C-478/99 Commission v Sweden [2000] ECR I-4170, 11. mgr.; og áður tilvitnaðs máls C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter, 21. til 25. mgr.

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in the borrower’s interest. That Act and its predecessors were passed with the aim of improving economic stability, and thereby promoting the interests of society in general, including those of consumers, as well as reducing the interest burden on borrowers. Thus, the Icelandic Parliament has considered the appropriate balance to have been struck between the interests of various parties to loan contracts and the terms that may be included in such contracts. Moreover, the Icelandic Government contends that, over time, real interest rates on indexed loans are generally lower than those on non-indexed loans, which has also been the case in Iceland.

124. The Icelandic Government also argues that, in any event, price-indexation terms are not, by their nature, incompatible with the Directive.30

125. The Government of Iceland submits that the answer to the second question should be as follows:

As provisions of national legislation fall outside the scope of Directive 93/13/EEC, it is compatible with the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC for legislation in an EEA State to permit contracts between consumers and suppliers for loans to finance real estate purchases to contain provisions stating that instalment repayments are to be linked to a predetermined index.

The third question

126. The Government of Iceland submits that the Directive does not impose any limits on an EEA State determining, through national legislation, the factors that may cause changes in a predetermined index such as the CPI or the methods by which these changes are to be measured, since the terms at issue do not fall within the scope of the Directive.

127. Moreover, the national law referred to in the question from Reykjavík District Court, i.e. the operation of the index, does not relate to contractual terms per se and would therefore not be covered or limited by the Directive in any event.

128. Secondly, and notwithstanding the above, the Icelandic Government submits that, since the national law of the EEA State will be a benchmark in the national court’s assessment of whether contractual terms are to be considered fair, changes to the index as a result of factors and methods

30 Reference is made to paragraphs 2(c) and 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive.

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frávikin séu lántaka í hag. Markmiðið með setningu þeirra laga og forvera þeirra hafi verið að auka efnahagslegan stöðugleika og þar með stuðla að almannahag, þar á meðal hag neytenda, og að minnka vaxtabyrði lántakenda. Alþingi hafi því leitað jafnvægis milli hagsmuna margra aðila að lánssamningum til fjármögnunar fasteignakaupa og þeirra skilmála sem setja megi í slíka samninga. Ríkisstjórnin telur jafnframt að raunvextir verðtryggðra lána séu almennt lægri en óverðtryggðra lána til langs tíma litið og að sú hafi einnig verið raunin á Íslandi.

124. Ríkisstjórnin telur í öllu falli að verðtryggingarákvæði séu ekki í eðli sínu ósamrýmanleg tilskipuninni.30

125. Ríkisstjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari annarri spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Þar sem ákvæði landsréttar falla utan gildissviðs tilskipunar 93/13/EBE samrýmist það ákvæðum tilskipunar 93/13/EBE að löggjöf í ríki sem aðild á að EES-samningnum heimili að samningar neytanda og lánveitanda til fjármögnunar fasteignakaupa hafi að geyma ákvæði þess efnis að greiðslur af láninu skuli verðtryggðar samkvæmt fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu.

Þriðja spurningin

126. Ríkisstjórn Íslands bendir á að tilskipunin takmarki ekki svigrúm EES-ríkja til að ákveða í landsrétti hvaða þættir geti valdið breytingum á fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu á borð við vísitölu neysluverðs eða eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar þar sem skilmálarnir sem um ræðir í máli þessu falli ekki innan gildissviðs tilskipunarinnar.

127. Enn fremur varði þau ákvæði landsréttar sem vísað er til í spurningu Héraðsdóms Reykjavíkur, það eru ákvæði sem lúta að vísitölunni, ekki samningsskilmálana sem slíka. Af því leiðir að þessi ákvæði landsréttar falla hvorki undir tilskipunina né takmarkast af henni.

128. Í öðru lagi, þrátt fyrir ofangreint, telur ríkisstjórn Íslands að þar sem landsréttur EES-ríkis þjóni sem viðmið landsdómstólsins við mat á því hvort samningsskilmálarnir teljist réttmætir geti breytingar á vísitölunni vegna þeirra þátta og aðferða sem kveðið er á um í ákvæðum landsréttar

30 Vísað er til c- og d-liðar 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar.

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prescribed by national law cannot in and of themselves give rise to a finding that contractual terms referencing that index are unfair. National law, such as the one in question, cannot be limited by the Directive in practice.

129. Accordingly, the Directive cannot, de jure or de facto, limit the EEA States’ discretion to determine the factors that may cause changes in a predetermined index to which consumer loans are referenced or the methods by which these changes are to be measured. Moreover, even if the Directive could limit that discretion, the Government of Iceland fails to see how this could cause changes in the manner in which Statistics Iceland compiles the CPI, since the index is compiled independently by it and in accordance with European standards.

130. The Government of Iceland submits that the answer to the third question should be as follows:

Directive 93/13/EEC does not limit the discretion of an EEA State to determine the factors that may cause changes in a predetermined index to which consumer loans are referenced or the methods by which these changes are to be measured.

The fourth question

131. The Icelandic Government submits that a contractual term that reflects national law applicable to such contracts is outside the scope of the Directive. On the other hand, contractual terms that do not reflect the provisions of Articles 13 and 14 of Act No 38/2001, will, as a matter of national law, be void – unless they are to the advantage of the borrower. Whether or not an indexation clause is individually negotiated within the meaning of the Directive cannot affect its validity under Icelandic law.

132. On this basis, the Government of Iceland argues that the question is hypothetical and therefore inadmissible, since, in light of the answers to the previous questions, the answer to this question cannot have any effect on the determination of the national court in the case before it.31

133. Without prejudice to the above, and to the extent that the Court declares the question admissible, the Icelandic Government submits that, pursuant

31 Reference is made to Case E-6/96 Tore Wilhelmsen AS v Oslo kommune [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 64, paragraph 40.

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ekki einar og sér stutt þá niðurstöðu að samningsskilmálarnir sem vísa til vísitölunnar séu óréttmætir. Í framkvæmd geti tilskipunin ekki takmarkað ákvæði landsréttar á borð við þau sem hér eru til umfjöllunar.

129. Þar af leiðandi geti tilskipunin ekki takmarkað svigrúm EES-ríkja til að ákveða hvaða þættir skuli valda breytingum í fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu sem vísað er til í neytendalánum eða eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar, hvorki lagalega né í reynd. Jafnvel þótt tilskipunin gæti takmarkað þetta svigrúm sér ríkisstjórnin ekki hvernig slíkt gæti haft áhrif á óháðan útreikning Hagstofu Íslands á vísitölu neysluverðs sem unninn er í samræmi við evrópska staðla.

130. Ríkisstjórn Íslands leggur til að dómstóllinn svari þriðju spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun 93/13/EBE takmarkar ekki svigrúm EES-ríkis til þess að ákveða hvaða þættir skuli valda breytingum á fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu sem notuð er til verðtryggingar neytendalána og eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar.

Fjórða spurningin

131. Íslenska ríkisstjórnin telur að samningsskilmáli sem endurspegli ákvæði landréttar sem við eigi um slíka samninga falli utan gildissviðs tilskipunarinnar. Hins vegar teljist samningsskilmálar sem endurspegli ekki ákvæði 13. og 14. gr. laga nr. 38/2001 ógildir að landsrétti – nema þeir séu lántaka til hagsbóta. Hvort sérstaklega hafi verið samið um verðtryggingarákvæði í skilningi tilskipunarinnar geti ekki haft áhrif á gildi þess að íslenskum rétti.

132. Á þeim forsendum telur ríkisstjórn Íslands að spurningin sé fræðilegs eðlis og því ekki dómtæk þar sem svarið við henni geti, í ljósi svara við fyrri spurningunum, ekki haft nokkur áhrif á mat landsdómstólsins sem málið er rekið fyrir.31

133. Að framansögðu virtu og að því marki sem spurningin telst dómtæk heldur ríkisstjórnin því fram að í samræmi við 2. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar sé það landsdómstólsins að meta hvort samið hafi verið sérstaklega um

31 Vísað er til máls E-6/96 Tore Wilhelmsen AS v Oslo kommune [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 64, 40. mgr.

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to Article 3(2) of the Directive, it is for the national court to assess whether the indexation clause has been individually negotiated. Moreover, even if a contractual term has not been individually negotiated, it is for the national court to assess, pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Directive, whether that term is actually unfair, having regard to all the circumstances.

134. The Government of Iceland submits that the answer to the fourth question should be as follows:

The question is inadmissible as it cannot have any effect on the determination of the national court in the case before it.

The fifth question

135. The Icelandic Government refers to its observations referred to in paragraphs 131 to 132 above and submits that, as a matter of Icelandic law, the question is hypothetical.

136. Without prejudice to the aforesaid and to the extent that the Court decides that the question is admissible, the Icelandic Government submits that paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive, which is to be considered a limitation of paragraph 1(l) of the Annex to the Directive, is not relevant to the issue before the national court. Indexation of a loan principal does not represent a change in the price of goods or services over the duration of the contract. It is intended, rather, to ensure that the principal of the loan remains consistent over the period of repayment of the credit and that it is not reduced by inflation during that period. The indexation of a loan principal therefore fulfils the same function, albeit in a different manner, as a component of the interest charged for the granting of credit in respect of a non-indexed loan, and it is far removed from the situation envisaged by paragraph 1(l) of the Annex to the Directive. Moreover, Icelandic law only permits loans to be indexed to the publicly maintained CPI. Therefore, lenders cannot unilaterally change the amount owed by borrowers.

137. If, the Government of Iceland continues, the Court, notwithstanding all the above, were to find the question admissible and that paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive applies to the indexation terms at issue, the Icelandic Government submits that the information provided could be regarded as an explicit description of the method by which prices may vary, in particular since information about the consumer price index is publicly available.

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verðtryggingarákvæðið. Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 4. gr. verði landsdómstóll jafnframt að meta samningsskilmáli sé í raun réttmætur, með hliðsjón af öllum aðstæðum,þótt ekki hafi verið samið sérstaklega um hann.

134. Ríkisstjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fjórðu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Vísa ber spurningunni frá dómi þar sem hún getur ekki haft áhrif á mat landsdómstólsins í málinu sem rekið er fyrir honum.

Fimmta spurningin

135. Ríkisstjórn Íslands vísar til þeirra athugasemda sem settar voru fram í 131. og 132. mgr. að framan og telur að frá íslenskum rétti séð sé spurningin fræðilegs eðlis.

136. Með vísan til þess sem fram er komið og að því marki sem spurningin telst dómtæk heldur íslenska ríkisstjórnin því fram að d-liður 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar, sem ætlað er að afmarka gildissvið l-liðs 1. mgr. viðaukans, hafi ekki áhrif á málið sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum. Verðtrygging á höfuðstóli láns teljist ekki breyting á verði vöru eða þjónustu á samningstímabilinu. Henni sé fremur ætlað að tryggja að höfuðstóll lánsins haldist stöðugur á uppgreiðslutíma þess og lækki ekki vegna verðbólgu á því tímabili. Verðtrygging á höfuðstóli láns þjóni því sama tilgangi, þótt með öðrum hætti sé, og hluti þeirra vaxta sem lagðir séu á óverðtryggð lánog sé því fjarri þeim aðstæðum sem l-liður 1. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar tekur til. Þar að auki heimili íslensk löggjöf eingöngu verðtryggingu lána í tengslum við hina opinberu vísitölu neysluverðs. Þar af leiðandi geti lánveitendur ekki einhliða breytt þeirri fjárhæð sem lántakar skuldi.

137. Telji dómstóllinn, þrátt fyrir framansagt, spurninguna dómtæka og að d-liður 2. mgr. viðaukans við tilskipunina eigi við um verðtryggingarákvæðin sem um ræðir telur ríkisstjórn Íslands að líta megi á upplýsingarnar sem veittar hafi verið sem rækilega útskýringu á aðferðinni við útreikning verðbreytinga, sérstaklega þar sem

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A reference was made to the base index on the date the loan was taken out, and a payment schedule was provided that contained an illustrative example of estimated payments based on a given set of presumptions. In the Icelandic Government’s view, however, it is not possible to determine in the abstract whether or not a hypothetical document explicitly describes the method by which prices may vary. Accordingly, it is for the national court, having regard to the actual document, all the circumstances and the knowledge of the parties, to determine this.

138. The Government of Iceland submits that the answer to the fifth question should be as follows:

The question is inadmissible as it cannot have any effect on the determination of the national court in the case before it.

The sixth question

139. The Icelandic Government submits that Article 6 of the Directive requires EEA States to take the necessary measures to ensure that unfair terms in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier are not binding on the consumer.32 Moreover, provided that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer, EEA States have autonomy to decide the legal arrangements applicable to unfair terms.

140. In this respect, the Icelandic Government submits that EEA States have the choice of form and method of implementation under Article 7 EEA, which corresponds to the principle of national procedural autonomy, as limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.33 Accordingly, it is sufficient for a State to empower its national courts to annul unfair contractual terms as long as they are obliged to exercise that power with respect to terms they find unfair pursuant to the Directive.34

141. As regards the situation in Icelandic law, the Icelandic Government submits, with reference to Articles 36(a) and 36(c) of Act No 7/1936, that Article 36 of that Act relates to both contractual terms that may be unfair

32 Reference is made to Commission v Sweden, cited above, paragraph 16.33 Reference is made to Case C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006]

ECR I-10421, paragraph 24.34 Reference is made to Case C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v

Jahani BV, cited above, paragraphs 11 and 51.

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upplýsingar um vísitölu neysluverðs séu aðgengilegar öllum almenningi. Vísað hafi verið til grunnvísitölunnar á undirritunardegi lánsins og láninu fylgdi greiðsluáætlun með lýsandi dæmi um áætlaðar afborganir sem byggðist á tilgreindum forsendum. Að mati ríkisstjórnarinnar er þó ekki hægt að slá því almennt föstu hvort slíkt skjal með dæmum lýsi aðferðinni við útreikning verðbreytinga. Það sé landsdómstólsins að meta hvort svo sé með hliðsjón af hinu raunverulega skjali, öllum aðstæðum og vitneskju samningsaðila.

138. Ríkisstjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fimmtu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Vísa ber spurningunni frá dómi þar sem hún getur ekki haft áhrif á mat landsdómstólsins í málinu sem rekið er fyrir honum.

Sjötta spurningin

139. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur að samkvæmt 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar sé EES-ríkjum skylt að gera nauðsynlegar ráðstafanir til að tryggja að óréttmætir skilmálar í samningi sem seljandi eða veitandi gerir við neytanda séu ekki bindandi fyrir neytandann.32 Að því gefnu að hin óréttmætu samningsákvæði séu ekki bindandi fyrir neytanda sé EES-ríkjum í sjálfsvald sett hvernig þau útfæri þær lagareglur sem eigi við um óréttmæta skilmála.

140. Ríkisstjórnin telur að EES-ríki hafi val um form og aðferð við innleiðingu samkvæmt 7. gr. EES-samningsins, í samræmi við meginregluna um forræði á réttarfari, með þeim takmörkunum sem af meginreglunum um jafnræði við málsmeðferð og um skilvirka framkvæmd EES-réttar leiði.

33 Það sé því nægilegt að ríki veiti dómstólum þess vald til að ógilda óréttmæta samningsskilmála sé þeim gert skylt að beita því valdi vegna skilmála sem þeir telja óréttmæta samkvæmt tilskipuninni.34

141. Hvað íslenskan rétt varðar telur ríkisstjórn Íslands með vísan til 36. gr. a og 36. gr. c laga nr. 7/1936 að 36. gr. laganna taki jafnt til samningsskilmála sem talist geti óréttmætir samkvæmt tilskipuninni og

32 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Commission v Sweden, 16. mgr. 33 Vísað er til máls C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR

I-10421, 24. mgr.34 Vísað er til máls C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV,

dómur frá 30. maí 2013, enn óbirtur, 11. og 51. mgr.

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pursuant to the Directive and terms that may be invalid or unfair purely as a matter of national law. Pursuant to Article 3 of Act No 2/1993, Icelandic courts are obliged to interpret national law in line with Iceland’s obligations stemming from the EEA Agreement. Following these obligations, national courts acting within the constitutional scope of that power must annul contractual terms where they find that a contractual term is unfair within the meaning and scope of the provisions implementing the Directive.

142. The Icelandic Government argues that the end-result for the consumer is thereby effectively the same whether national law explicitly requires national courts to annul unfair contractual terms or simply empowers them to do so.

143. The Government of Iceland submits that the answer to the sixth question should be as follows:

EEA States have discretion as to how the provisions of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC are implemented provided that the national courts are empowered to annul unfair contractual terms.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority

The first question

Applicability of Directive 87/102/EEC

144. ESA notes that the information set out in the Request raises no particular doubts that Directive 87/102/EEC applies to the main proceedings ratione temporis and ratione materiae.

145. In ESA’s view, the price indexation of the principal of a consumer credit constitutes a separate charge that, in principle, must be reflected in the APR, since the APR is designed to represent the total cost of the credit to the consumer.

146. ESA further notes that the fact that the present case does not concern a credit for a real estate transaction distinguishes it from the situation in pending case E-25/13 Engilbertsson.

147. ESA submits that the dual aim of Directive 87/102/EEC was to ensure both the creation of a common market in consumer credit and the protection of consumers who avail themselves of a credit. Thus, at the time the credit agreement is entered into, the consumer should receive

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skilmála sem einvörðungu geti talist ógildir eða óréttmætir á grundvelli ákvæða landslaga. Samkvæmt 3. gr. laga nr. 2/1993 er íslenskum dómstólum skylt að skýra lög og reglur landslaga til samræmis við samningsskuldbindingar Íslands samkvæmt EES-samningnum. Samkvæmt þeirri skyldu og í samræmi við stjórnskipuleg takmörk þess valds verði íslenskir dómstólar að ógilda samningsskilmála sem þeir telja óréttmæta í skilningi þeirra lagaákvæða sem innleiddu tilskipunina.

142. Íslenska ríkisstjórnin heldur því fram að útkoman fyrir neytandann sé þar með sú sama í reynd óháð því hvort landsréttur skyldi dómstóla til að ógilda óréttmæta samningsskilmála eða veiti þeim aðeins vald til þess.

143. Ríkisstjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari sjöttu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

EES-ríki hafa val um aðferð við innleiðingu 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE að því gefnu að dómstólar þess hafi vald til að ógilda óréttmæta samningsskilmála.

Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA

Fyrsta spurningin


144. ESA bendir á að upplýsingarnar sem koma fram í beiðninni gefi ekki tilefni til sérstakra efasemda um að tilskipun 87/102/EBE taki til málsins sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum, bæði hvað varðar efni og tíma.

145. Að mati ESA felur verðtrygging höfuðstóls neytendaláns í sér aukagjöld sem ÁHK verði að endurspegla þar sem ÁHK sé ætlað að sýna neytandanum heildarlántökukostnaðinn.

146. ESA bendir enn fremur á að þetta mál varði ekki lán til fasteignakaupa og sé því frábrugðið þeim aðstæðum sem eru uppi í máli E-25/13 Gunnars V. Engilbertsson ar sem beðið er dóms í.

147. ESA telur að markmið tilskipunar 87/102/EBE hafi verið tvenns konar, að koma á fót sameiginlegum neytendalánamarkaði og að tryggja vernd neytenda sem taka lán. Á þeim tímapunkti sem lánssamningurinn er

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adequate and comprehensive information in writing about the conditions and cost of any credit offered to him, as follows in more detail from Article 4 of Directive 87/102/EEC, as well as from case law.

148. ESA submits that it is for the national court, in the main proceedings, to establish and appraise whether the Defendant has lived up to its obligations.

Calculation of the APR

149. ESA notes that it remains for the national court to decide whether the method used by the Defendant to calculate the APR was incompatible with Directive 87/102/EEC.

150. ESA submits that it follows from case law that it is of critical importance to inform the consumer of the total cost of credit calculated and expressed by means of the APR according to a single mathematical formula.35

151. ESA submits that an “average consumer”, who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, would expect an APR for a consumer credit that is indexed to national inflation in Iceland to be calculated on the basis of a certain assumption about what that inflation rate might be in the future.36

152. However, taking into account the economic situation in Iceland at the time when the contract at issue was concluded, ESA submits that it has difficulty envisaging that an average consumer would expect that this forecast for the rate of inflation would amount to zero. In ESA’s view, such a calculation is misleading for the purpose of describing the total cost of a consumer credit. In this regard, ESA refers to the wording of Article 19(4) of Directive 2008/48/EC, the provision corresponding to Article 1a(6) of Directive 87/102/EEC, but which refers more clearly to the initial level of the relevant rate and charges than Article 1a(6) of Directive 87/102/EEC.

153. According to the Commission Staff Working Document on the application of Directive 2008/48/EC, the assumptions made when calculating the APR are intended to ensure that the APR is calculated in a consistent way to promote the comparability of different offers.37

35 Reference is made to Coftnoga Merignac, cited above, paragraph 26.36 Reference is made to Lidl v Colruyt, cited above, paragraph 78.37 Commission Staff Working Document: Guidelines on the application of Directive 2008/48/EC (Consumer

Credit Directive) in relation to the costs and the Annual Percentage Rate of charge (SWD (2012) 128 final) .

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gerður beri því að veita neytandanum nægilegar og víðtækar skriflegar upplýsingar um skilmála og kostnað láns sem honum býðst eins og nánar sé útlistað í 4. gr. tilskipunar 87/102/EBE og í dómaframkvæmd.

148. ESA telur að það sé landsdómstólsins, sem málið er rekið fyrir, að skera úr um hvort stefndi hafi fullnægt skyldum sínum.

Útreikningur ÁHK

149. ESA bendir á að það sé landsdómstólsins að skera úr um það hvort aðferðin sem stefndi notaði við útreikning á ÁHK samrýmist tilskipun 87/102/EBE.

150. ESA segir það leiða af dómaframkvæmd að afar mikilvægt sé að neytandinn sé upplýstur um heildarlántökukostnað í formi ÁHK samkvæmt einni stærðfræðiformúlu.35

151. ESA telur að ,,almennur neytandi“ sem er ágætlega upplýstur, eftirtektarsamur og forsjáll myndi búast við því að ÁHK vegna neytendaláns sem er vísitölubundið og helst í hendur við verðbólgu á Íslandi yrði reiknað út á grundvelli áætlunar um verðbólgustig í framtíðinni.36

152. ESA telur þó, að teknu tilliti til efnahagsástandsins á Íslandi á þeim tíma sem hinn umdeildi samningur var gerður, að erfitt sé að ímynda sér að almennur neytandi hefði búist við að verðbólguspá sem gerði ráð fyrir 0% verðbólgu gengi eftir. Að mati ESA er slíkur útreikningur misvísandi sem lýsing á heildarkostnaði neytendaláns. Varðandi það atriði vísar ESA til orðalags 4. mgr. 19. gr. tilskipunar 2008/48/EB sem svarar til 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunar 87/102/EBE en vísar með skýrari hætti til upphafsstöðu viðeigandi vaxta og kostnaðar en gert er í 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunar 87/102/EBE.

153. Samkvæmt minnisblaði framkvæmdastjórnarinnar um framkvæmd tilskipunar 2008/48/EB sé áætlunum sem gerðar eru við útreikning ÁHK ætlað að tryggja að ÁHK sé reiknuð út með samræmdum hætti til að auðvelda samanburð ólíkra tilboða.37

35 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Coftnoga Merignac, 26. mgr. 36 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Lidl v Colruyt, 78. mgr. 37 Minnisblað framkvæmdastjórnarinnar: Viðmiðunarreglur um beitingu tilskipunar 2008/48/EB (tilskipun

um neytendalán) varðandi kostnað og árlega hlutfallstölu kostnaðar (SWD (2012) 128 final).

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154. By reference to recital 2 of Directive 90/88/EEC,38 ESA argues that only consistency across the EEA as regards the calculation of the APR enables consumers to compare different offers from different operators.

155. ESA submits that Directive 87/102/EEC requires creditors to provide consumers with adequate information in order to give them a fair idea of the costs of the credit, even if the total costs of that credit are subject to future changes that can only be predicted.

156. ESA further submits that different methods of calculation may be permissible, but that the test must be that, where the total cost of the credit cannot be strictly calculated, any estimate thereof must be based on realistic assumptions.

157. Finally, ESA notes that it is for the national court to assess whether the Plaintiff in the main proceedings has been provided with sufficient information about the APR for the loan at the time when the contract was signed to be able to form a fair idea of the total costs of the loan. It follows from the request that both the bond and the repayment schedule contain information about the conditions and the cost of credit, including explanations that the principal of the debt will be revised in proportion to changes in the CPI before the interest and the instalment on the debt are calculated, and also that the repayment schedule was an estimate based on 0% inflation, which may change.

Right to pursue remedies

158. ESA notes that, if the national court were to find that the method used by the Defendant to calculate the total cost of the credit is precluded by Directive 87/102/EEC, it would then have to address possible remedies for such an infringement on its own motion. 39

159. ESA submits that, in the absence of specific EEA rules governing remedies, it is for the domestic system of the EEA states to regulate the legal procedure for safeguarding the rights which individuals

38 Council Directive 90/88/EEC of 22 February 1990 amending Directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, OJ L 061, 10/03/1990 pp. 14-18 .

39 Reference is made to Case C-429/05 Rampion [2007] ECR I-08017, paragraphs 60 to 63.

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154. ESA heldur því fram, með vísan til 2. liðs formálsorða tilskipunar 90/88/EBE38, að aðeins sé hægt að gera neytendum kleift að bera saman tilboð ólíkra aðila með því að útreikningur ÁHK sé samræmdur innan EES.

155. ESA telur að tilskipun 87/102/EBE geri lánveitendum skylt að sjá neytendum fyrir nægilegum upplýsingum til að þeir geti gert sér í hugarlund hversu hár lántökukostnaðurinn verði jafnvel þótt viðbúið sé að heildarkostnaðurinn taki síðar breytingum sem einungis sé hægt að spá fyrir um.

156. ESA telur jafnframt að ólíkar aðferðir við útreikning geti verið heimilar en mælikvarðinn verði að vera sá að þegar ekki er hægt að reikna heildarlántökukostnaðinn út með nákvæmum hætti verði hvers konar mat á kostnaðinum að byggjast á raunhæfum áætlunum.

157. Loks telur ESA að það sé landsdómstólsins að meta hvort stefnandi í málinu sem rekið er fyrir honum hafi fengið nægilegar upplýsingar um ÁHK lánsins á undirritunartíma samningsins til að geta gert sér í hugarlund hver heildarlántökukostnaðurinn yrði. Af beiðninni um ráðgefandi álit megi ráða að bæði skuldabréfið og greiðsluyfirlitið innihaldi upplýsingar um skilmála og kostnað lánsins þar á meðal útskýringar á því hvernig höfuðstóll skuldarinnar endurskoðist í samræmi við breytingar á vísitölu neysluverðs áður en vextir og afborganir skuldarinnar séu reiknuð. Þar komi einnig fram að greiðsluyfirlitið sé áætlun sem miði við 0% verðbólgu sem geti breyst.

Rétturinn til að leita úrræða

158. ESA bendir á að komist landsdómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu að aðferðin sem stefndi notaði við útreikning heildarlántökukostnaðarins sé óheimil samkvæmt tilskipun 87/102/EBE þá verði landsdómstóllinn að fjalla um möguleg úrræði vegna slíks brots að eigin frumkvæði. 39

159. ESA telur að þegar EES-reglur taki ekki sérstaklega til úrræða þurfi að setja reglur að landsrétti EES-ríkjanna um þá málsmeðferð sem einstaklingum standi til boða til að tryggja réttindi sem þeir leiða af EES-rétti. Slík

38 Tilskipun ráðsins 90/88/EEC frá 22. febrúar 1990 til breytingar á tilskipun 87/102/EBE um samræmingu á lögum og stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkjanna varðandi neytendalán, OJ L 061, 10/03/1990, bls. 14-18.

39 Vísað er til máls C-429/05 Rampion [2007] ECR I-08017, 60. til 63. mgr.

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derive from EEA law. Such procedures must respect the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.40

160. ESA argues that Article 14 of Directive 87/102/EEC requires EEA States to ensure that credit agreements do not derogate, to the detriment of the consumer, from the provision of national law that implements the provision of the Directive, and to also ensure that the provisions that are adopted in implementation of the Directive are not circumvented as a result of the way in which agreements are formulated.

161. ESA submits that, once a breach of the consumer protection rules has been established, the national authorities must take the measures appropriate to ensure that the adverse effects of that breach do not subsist throughout the entire performance of the contract. 41

162. Finally, ESA submits, however, that it is for the national court to apply the relevant remedies provided for under national legislation in the event that it decides that the Plaintiff has not received adequate information about the consumer loan.

163. In light of the above, ESA suggests that the answer to the first question should be as follows:

It is in principle incompatible with the provisions of Council Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit to base a repayment schedule accompanying a credit agreement on a hypothetical inflation rate of 0%, with the effect that the total costs of the credit appear to be significantly lower than those calculated on realistic assumptions as regards future inflation.

It is however for the national court to assess, taking into account all the relevant facts of the case, whether information such as that provided by the creditor to the consumer at the time when the contract was signed in situations such as in the main proceedings satisfies the conditions set out in Council Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit, in particular as regards the total cost of the credit as expressed by the annual percentage rate of charge (“APR”).

40 Reference is made to Case C-91/08 Wall [2010] ECR I-02815, paragraph 64.41 Reference is made to Rampion, cited above, paragraph 63; Case C-503/04 Commission v Germany

[2007] ECR 1-6183, paragraphs 28 to 30.

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málsmeðferð verði að gæta meginreglnanna um jafnræði við málsmeðferð

og um skilvirka framkvæmd EES-réttar.40

160. ESA heldur því fram að 14. gr. tilskipunar 87/102/EBE skyldi EES-ríki til að

tryggja að lánssamningar víki ekki frá þeim ákvæðum landslaga sem ætlað

er að innleiða tilskipunina svo að það sé neytandanum í óhag og einnig að

þau tryggi að orðalag samninga fari ekki á svig við ákvæðin sem innleiða

tilskipunina.

161. ESA telur að þegar búið sé að slá því föstu að reglur um neytendavernd

hafi verið brotnar verði yfirvöld aðildarríkis að grípa til viðeigandi ráðstafana

til að tryggja að hinar neikvæðu afleiðingar brotsins nái ekki til annarra

þátta í framkvæmd samningsins. 41

162. ESA bendir að lokum á að það sé þó landsdómstólsins að beita viðeigandi

úrræðum sem tiltæk eru samkvæmt landslögum ef hann kemst að

þeirri niðurstöðu að stefnandi hafi ekki fengið nægilegar upplýsingar um

neytendalán.

163. Samkvæmt framansögðu leggur ESA til að dómstóllinn svari fyrstu

spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Í grundvallaratriðum samrýmist það ekki ákvæðum tilskipunar nr. 87/102/EBE um neytendalán að greiðsluyfirlit sem fylgir lánssamningi miðist við áætlun um 0% verðbólgu með þeim afleiðingum að heildarlántökukostnaður virðist umtalsvert lægri en ef hann væri reiknaður út frá raunhæfri áætlun um verðbólgu í framtíðinni.

Það er þó landsdómstólsins að meta, að teknu tilliti til allra málsatvika, hvort þær upplýsingar sem lánveitandi veitir neytanda á undirritunartíma samnings þegar aðstæður eru með sambærilegum hætti og í málinu sem rekið er fyrir honum uppfylli skilyrði tilskipunar ráðsins 87/102/EBE um neytendalán, sérstaklega hvað varðar heildarlántökukostnaðar eins og hann birtist í formi árlegrar hlutfallstölu kostnaðar (ÁHK).

40 Vísað er til máls C-91/08 Wall [2010] ECR I-02815, 64. mgr.41 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Rampion, 63. mgr.; máls C-503/04 Commission v Germany [2007]

ECR 1-6183, 28. til 30. mgr.

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Where the national court finds that such is not the case, it is for the national court to take, on its own motion, appropriate measures under the national legal order to remedy the infringement.

Second to sixth questions

Applicability of Directive 93/13/EEC

164. ESA contends that the scope of the Directive has not been addressed in the questions referred to the Court, despite the fact that the Defendant has referred to the fact that it is clear from the preamble to Directive 93/13/EEC that it does not apply to contract terms that follow from law or regulatory provisions.

165. ESA submits that the aim of Directive 93/13/EEC is to address the behaviour of private operators as sellers of goods or suppliers of services to consumers, with the objective of safeguarding the rights of the consumer, who is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier. It is not the aim of the Directive to influence statutory or regulatory provisions that regulate contract terms under certain circumstances. Pursuant to the 13th recital of the preamble to the Directive, terms of contract that are determined directly or indirectly by such provisions are presumed not to contain unfair terms.

166. As regards the indexation of consumer loans such as the one at issue, ESA argues that the indexation and the calculation of the underlying CPI are largely covered by detailed provisions of national law, i.e. Articles 13 and 14 of Act No 38/2001 and the provisions of Act No 12/1995. These statutory rules are not to be considered mandatory in the sense that consumers are obliged to enter into indexed loan agreements. However, if private parties choose to do so, the terms of that indexation as stipulated in national law are mandatory. Thus, in ESA’s view, the terms of bonds and payment schedules such as the ones at issue are at least indirectly determined on the basis of the aforementioned provisions.

167. ESA submits, with reference to case law, that contractual terms that reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions set out in national law are prima

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Ef landsdómstóllinn kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu að sú sé ekki raunin er það hans að grípa til, að eigin frumkvæði, viðeigandi úrræða samkvæmt landsrétti til að ráða bót á brotinu.

Önnur til sjötta spurningin


164. ESA telur að spurningarnar sem beint var til dómstólsins varði ekki gildissvið tilskipunarinnar þrátt fyrir að stefndi haldi því fram að ljóst sé af 93/13/EBE eigi ekki við um samningsskilmála sem leiði af lögum eða bindandi stjórnvaldsfyrirmælum.

165. ESA telur að tilskipuninni sé ætlað að taka til atferlis þeirra einkaaðila sem eru seljendur vöru eða veitendur þjónustu til neytenda með það fyrir augum að tryggja réttindi neytenda sem séu í veikri stöðu gagnvart seljanda eða veitanda. Tilskipuninni sé ekki ætlað að hafa áhrif á ákvæði laga eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmæla sem gildi um samningsskilmála undir ákveðnum kringumstæðum. Af 13. tl. formálsorða tilskipunarinnar leiði að samningsskilmálar sem beint eða óbeint séu ákvarðaðir af slíkum ákvæðum landslaga teljist ekki óréttmætir.

166. Hvað verðtryggingu neytendalána eins og þess sem hér um ræðir varðar telur ESA að nákvæm ákvæði landsréttar, það er 13. og 14. gr. laga nr. 38/2001 og ákvæði laga nr. 12/1995, taki til flests sem við kemur verðtryggingunni og útreikningi á vísitölu neysluverðs sem hún er tengd við. Þessar lagareglur teljist ekki bindandi í þeim skilningi að neytendum sé skylt að gangast undir verðtryggða lánssamninga. Ef einkaaðilar ákveða hins vegar að gera það séu skilmálar verðtryggingarinnar eins og kveðið er á um þá í landsrétti bindandi. Að mati ESA ráðast því skilmálar skuldabréfa og greiðsluáætlana, eins og þeirra sem um ræðir í máli þessu, að minnsta kosti óbeint af áðurnefndum ákvæðum.

167. ESA telur, með vísan til dómaframkvæmdar, að samningsskilmálar sem endurspegla bindandi ákvæði laga og stjórnsýslufyrirmæli landsréttar séu,

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facie excluded from the scope of the Directive.42 It is not useful to distinguish between stipulations that, pursuant to national law, must be included in a contract and clauses whose inclusion is optional, but where the content is mandatory. In neither case does the inequality of bargaining power influence the content of the stipulation to the detriment of the consumer. In the case of a clause that must be included, the interests of the weaker contracting party must be presumed to have been taken into account by the national legislature. In the case of a clause that is optional but whose content is determined by the national authorities, the national legislature must also be presumed to have balanced the interests of the parties. In any case, the bargaining strength of one party has had no influence on the content of the stipulation.

168. ESA submits that it follows from case law43 that contractual terms are excluded from the scope of that Directive if they reflect provisions of national legislation governing a certain category of contracts, and it argues that this applies to the terms at issue.

169. On the basis of the above, ESA contends that the terms of bonds and payment schedules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, fall outside the scope of the Directive. Consequently, it is not necessary to provide the national courts with answers to the referred questions. ESA submits that this conclusion is not altered by the judgment of the ECJ in NFH,44 where the situation that gave rise to those proceedings concerned the assessment of whether a contract term should be considered unfair within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 93/13/EC, rather than the issue of the scope of that Directive.

170. ESA suggests, therefore, that the answer to the second to sixth questions should be as follows:

The scope of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts as laid down in its Article 1(2) does not extend to contractual terms such as are at issue in the main proceedings insofar as they reflect national rules on the index-linking of instalment repayments of consumer loans.

42 Reference is made to Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, cited above, paragraphs 32 to 34.

43 Reference is made to RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, cited above, paragraph 25. As regards further observations on the application of Article 1(2) of the Directive, reference is also made to the Opinion of AG Trstenjak in the same case, paragraphs 34 to 58.

44 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt., cited above, paragraph 29.

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fljótt á litið, undanskildir gildissviði tilskipunarinnar.42 Ekki sé gagnlegt að greina á milli samningsskilmála sem skylt er, samkvæmt ákvæðum landslaga, að taka upp í samning og þeirra skilmála sem eru valkvæðir þótt efni þeirra sé lögboðið. Í hvorugu tilfellinu hafi ójöfn samningsstaða aðila áhrif á efni skilmálanna neytanda í óhag. Í tilfelli skilmála sem skylt er að taka upp í samningi verði að ætla að löggjafinn hafi haft hagsmuni veikari samningsaðilans í huga. Í þeim tilfellum þar sem skilmálarnir eru umsemjanlegir en efni þeirra lögbundið verði einnig að telja að löggjafinn hafi reynt að jafna aðstöðu samningsaðila. Í hvorugu tilfellinu hafi sterkari samningsstaða annars aðilans áhrif á efni skilmálans.

168. ESA telur að af dómaframkvæmd43 leiði að samningsskilmálar sem endurspegla ákvæði laga eða stjórnvaldsfyrirmæla sem eiga við um ákveðna flokka samninga séu undanskildir gildissviði tilskipunarinnar og að sú sé raunin í máli þessu.

169. Samkvæmt framansögðu telur ESA að skilmálar skuldabréfa og greiðsluáætlana, eins og þeirra sem um ræðir í málinu sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum, falli utan gildissviðs tilskipunarinnar. Þar af leiðandi sé ekki nauðsynlegt að veita svar við þeim spurningum sem landsdómstóllinn hefur beint til EFTA-dómstólsins. ESA telur að niðurstaða Evrópudómstólsins í máli NFH,44 breyti engu um þá ályktun. Aðstæðurnar sem deilt var um í tilvitnuðu máli hafi snúist um það hvort telja bæri samningsskilmála óréttmætan í skilningi 3. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EB en ekki um gildissvið tilskipunarinnar.

170. ESA leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari annarri til sjöttu spurningu með eftirfarandi hætti:

Gildissvið tilskipunar ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum eins og það er skýrt í 2. mgr. 1. gr. nær ekki til samningsskilmála eins og þeirra sem málið sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum snýst um að svo miklu leyti sem þeir endurspegla reglur landsréttar um verðtryggingu afborgana af neytendalánum.

42 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, 32. til 34. mgr.

43 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, 25. mgr. Varðandi frekari athugasemdir um beitingu 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar er einnig vísað til sérálits Trstenjak, aðallögsögumanns í sama máli 34. til 58. mgr.

44 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt., 29. mgr.

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The second question

171. In the alternative to the submissions made above and for the sake of good order, ESA submits observations on the second to sixth questions referred by the national court.

172. As regards the criteria for the general assessment of unfairness pursuant to the Directive and the relationship between the European courts and national courts, ESA refers in particular to settled case law.45

173. With respect to the situation in the case at hand, ESA argues that the Directive does not set out a general prohibition on financial service providers having price-indexation clauses in consumer mortgage contracts. On the contrary, paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive explicitly provides that price-indexation clauses do not, in and of themselves, amount to terms that may be regarded as unfair, where these clauses are lawful and the method by which prices vary is explicitly described. The emphasis is thus placed on the clarity and quality of the information about the price indexation which the seller or supplier gave the consumer at the time when the contract was concluded.

174. ESA submits that the two conditions in paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive are fulfilled. Firstly, the conclusion of price-indexation clauses is explicitly permitted pursuant to Chapter VI of Act No 38/2001 and Rules No 492/2001. Secondly, it follows from the information given by the national court in its referral that it is specifically explained in the bond that the principal of the debt will be revised in proportion to changes in the CPI on each due date before the interest and the instalment to be paid are calculated.

175. ESA therefore suggests that the answer to the second question should be as follows:

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts does not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in

45 As regards the above-mentioned assessments, reference is made to Sweden v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 11 and 17; Freiburger Kommunalbauten, cited above, paragraphs 18, 19 and 21; Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-478/99 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden [2002] ECR I-4147, point 29; Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/ 98 Océano Grupo [2000] ECR I-4941, paragraphs 22 to 24; see also Case C-226/12 Constructora Principado S, cited above, paragraphs 20 to 23 and case law cited; Joined Cases C-537/12 and C-116/13, Banco Popular Español, v Maria Teodolinda Rivas Quichimbo a.o., order of the court of 14 November 2013, published electronically, paragraph 22 and case law cited.

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Önnur spurningin

171. Til vara við ofangreint svar og til hagræðis gerir ESA eftirtaldar athugasemdir við aðra til sjöttu spurningu landsdómstólsins.

172. Varðandi forsendur almenns mats á óréttmæti samkvæmt tilskipuninni og samspils Evrópudómstólsins og EFTA-dómstólsins við dómstóla aðildarríkjanna vísar ESA til dómvenju.45

173. Varðandi þá stöðu sem uppi er í þessu máli heldur ESA því fram að í tilskipuninni sé ekki að finna almennt bann við því að fjármálafyrirtæki notist við verðtryggingarákvæði í veðlánum til neytenda. Þvert á móti komi skýrlega fram í d-lið 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar að verðtryggingarákvæði teljist ekki óréttmætir skilmálar, í sjálfu sér, ef vísitölubindingin er lögleg og aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga er útskýrð rækilega í samningi. Áherslan sé því á skýrleika og gæði þeirra upplýsinga sem seljandi eða veitandi lét neytandanum í té um verðtrygginguna við samningsgerðina.

174. ESA telur bæði skilyrði d-liðar 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar uppfyllt. Í fyrsta lagisé skýr heimild fyrir því í VI. kafla laga nr. 38/2001 og reglum nr. 492/2001 að lán séu verðtryggð. Í öðru lagimegiráða af þeim upplýsingum sem landsdómstóllinn hefur veitt í beiðninni um ráðgefandi álit að sérstaklega sé útskýrt í skuldabréfinu að höfuðstóll skuldarinnar breytist á hverjum gjalddaga, fyrir útreikning vaxta og afborgana, í samræmi við vísitölu neysluverðs.

175. ESA leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari annarri spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum girðir ekki fyrir ákvæði landsréttar, eins og þau sem

45 Varðandi ofangreindar athugasemdir er vísað til áður tilvitnaðs máls Sweden v Commission, 11. og 17. mgr.; áður tilvitnaðs máls Freiburger Kommunalbauten, 18., 19. og 21. mgr.; Álits Geelhoed, aðallögsögumanns í máli C-478/99 Commission v Kingdom of Sweden [2002] ECR I-4147, 29.-liður; sameinaðra mála C-240/98 til C-244/ 98 Océano Grupo [2000] ECR I-4941, 22. til 24. mgr.; sjá einnig mál C-226/12 Constructora Principado S, dómur frá 16. janúar 2014, enn óbirtur, 20. til 23. mgr. og þeirra dóma sem þar er vísað til; sameinuð mál C-537/12 og C-116/13, Banco Popular Español v Maria Teodolinda Rivas Quichimbo a.o., úrskurður dómstólsins frá 14. nóvember 2013, birtur með rafrænum hætti, 22. mgr. og þeirra dóma sem þar er vísað til.

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the main proceedings, which authorises the parties to a loan agreement to agree on a price indexation method set out under national legislation provided that the terms thereof are explicitly described in plain and intelligible language in the contract.

The third question

176. ESA argues that paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive only requires that the method of calculation for the price indexation be explicitly described in the contract, given that price-indexation clauses are lawful under national rules. There are no rules specifying the factors that may or may not be used when the amendments to a predetermined index are calculated.

177. ESA reiterates that the purpose of the Directive is to safeguard the rights of the consumer, who is often in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier. The Directive is not designed to fetter the powers of national authorities to regulate contract terms. The national authorities are therefore free to regulate which factors may cause changes in the predetermined index and the methods by which these changes are to be measured.

178. ESA adds that the fact that Article 1(2) of the Directive explicitly excludes mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions from its scope further strengthens the conclusion that the Directive is not intended to address the powers of national authorities to regulate terms in consumer contracts.

179. ESA therefore suggests that the answer to the third question should be as follows:

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts does not create any ground for assessing the factors that may cause changes in the predetermined index and the methods by which these changes are to be measured.

The fourth question

180. ESA submits that, in principle, it is for the national court to assess whether the contractual terms at issue have been individually negotiated within the

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til álita koma í málinu sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum, þar sem aðilum lánssamnings er heimilað að semja um verðtryggingu í samræmi við ákvæði landsréttar að því gefnu að skilmálarnir séu rækilega útskýrðir á skýru og eðlilegu máli í samningnum.

Þriðja spurningin

176. ESA heldur því fram að samkvæmt d-lið 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar sé þess einungis krafist að aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga sé útskýrð rækilega í samningnum að því gefnu að verðtryggingarákvæðið sé löglegt samkvæmt reglum landsréttar. Engar reglur séu fyrir hendi þar sem tekið er fram hvaða þætti megi eða megi ekki taka mið af við útreikning breytinga á fyrir fram ákveðinni vísitölu.

177. ESA ítrekar að tilgangur tilskipunarinnar sé að standa vörð um réttindi neytandans sem stendur oft höllum fæti gagnvart seljandanum eða veitandanum. Tilskipuninni sé ekki ætlað að takmarka vald stjórnvalda aðildarríkis til að setja reglur um samningsskilmála. Stjórnvöldum ríkisins sé því frjálst að setja reglur um það hvaða þættir geti valdið breytingum á hinni fyrir fram ákveðnu vísitölu og hvaða aðferðir skulu notaðar til að mæla þær breytingar.

178. ESA bætir við að sú staðreynd, að bindandi lög og stjórnsýsluákvæði séu í 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar sérstaklega undanskilin gildissviði hennar renni stoðum undir þá niðurstöðu að tilskipuninni sé ekki ætlað að taka til valds stjórnvalda aðildarríkis til að setja reglur um skilmála í neytendasamningum.

179. ESA leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari þriðju spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum veitir ekki stoð til að meta þá þætti sem valdið geta breytingum á hinni fyrir fram ákveðnu vísitölu og hvaða aðferðir skulu notaðar til að mæla þær breytingar.

Fjórða spurningin

180. ESA telur að það sé landsdómstólsins að meta hvort samið hafi verið sérstaklega um samningsskilmálana sem um ræðir, í skilningi 2. mgr. 3. gr.

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meaning of Article 3(2) of the Directive.46 However, the Court can provide guidance concerning when contractual terms may be considered to have been individually negotiated.

181. ESA submits that it is difficult to see the relevance of that question in the context of the present case. According to the Request for an advisory opinion, there is no dispute about the facts of the case and the bond at issue contained standardised contractual terms and was drafted by the Defendant’s employees. Consequently, the parties agree that it has not been individually negotiated.

182. Moreover, as noted in its 2001 Report on the Application of Directive 93/13/EEC,47 Iceland has not limited the unfairness review of consumer contracts available under Article 36 of Act No 7/1936 to terms that have not been individually negotiated; that provision applies to any term in a consumer contract. This higher level of protection is explicitly permitted pursuant to Article 8 of the Directive.

183. As regards letter (a) of the question, ESA submits that no contracting parties could have individually negotiated the base index or its calculation, since that is regulated by national law, and the contracting parties cannot have any influence on the base index agreed or on its future calculation. Accordingly, they cannot be considered to have been individually negotiated.

184. As regards letter (b) of the question, ESA submits that the fact that the bond was accompanied by a payment schedule itemising estimated payments to be made on the agreed due dates does not change the outcome of the assessment at issue. ESA adds that it is expressly stated in the schedule that they are only estimates, which may change in accordance with the indexation provision of the bond. Moreover, the information given is in accordance with the relevant national legislation, i.e. Act No 38/2001 and Rules No 492/2001.

185. As regards letter (c) of the question, ESA argues that the fact that both parties have signed the payment schedule does not alter the assessment.

46 Reference is made to Constructora Principado S, cited above, paragraph 19; as regards the burden of proof, reference is made to the last sentence of Article 3(2) of the Directive.

47 EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Report on the Application of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (“the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Report on the Application of Directive 93/13/EEC”), adopted on 6 December 2001. Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/public-documents/108301.PDF.

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tilskipunarinnar.46 Þó geti dómurinn veitt leiðbeiningar um það hvenær telja megi að sérstaklega hafi verið samið um samningsskilmála.

181. ESA fær ekki séð að þessi spurning skipti máli við úrlausn málsins sem rekið er fyrir héraðsdómi. Samkvæmt beiðninni um ráðgefandi álit er engin ágreiningur milli aðila um málsatvik eða um það atriði, að skuldabréfið sem um ræðir innihaldi staðlaða samningsskilmála sem samdir voru af starfsmönnum stefnda. Aðilar eru því sammála um að ekki hafi verið sérstaklega samið um þá.

182. Enn fremur, eins og fram komi í skýrslu stofnunarinnar um beitingu tilskipunar 93/13/EBE, frá 2001,47 hafi Ísland ekki takmarkað athugun á því hvort skilmálar í neytendasamningum séu óréttmætir samkvæmt 36. gr. laga nr. 7/1936 við skilmála sem sérstaklega hefur verið samið um. Sú lagagrein eigi við um hvers kyns skilmála í neytendasamningum. Slík aukin vernd sé sérstaklega heimiluð í 8. gr. tilskipunarinnar.

183. Varðandi a-lið spurningarinnar telur ESA að samningsaðilar geti ekki samið sérstaklega um grunnvísitöluna eða útreikning á henni þar sem þau atriði séu lögbundin og samningsaðilum því ófært að hafa nokkur áhrif á grunnvísitöluna eða útreikning á henni í framtíðinni. Þar af leiðandi teljist skilmálarnir ekki sérstaklega umsamdir.

184. Varðandi b-lið spurningarinnar telur ESA að sú staðreynd að greiðsluáætlun hafi fylgt skuldabréfinu sem sýni sundurliðaðar áætlaðar greiðslur á gjalddögum lánsins breyti ekki niðurstöðu mats á því atriði. ESA bætir við að sérstaklega sé tekið fram í greiðsluáætluninni að hún sé aðeins áætlun sem geti tekið breytingum í samræmi við verðtryggingarákvæði lánssamningsins. Enn fremur telur hún að upplýsingarnar sem veittar voru séu í samræmi við viðeigandi ákvæði landslaga, það eru ákvæði laga nr. 38/2001 og reglna nr. 492/2001

185. Varðandi c-lið spurningarinnar tekur ESA fram að sú staðreynd að báðir aðilar hafi undirritað greiðsluáætlunina breyti ekki mati á því atriði.

46 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Constructora Principado S, 19. mgr. Varðandi sönnunarbyrði er vísað til síðustu setningar 2. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar.

47 Skýrsla Eftirlitsstofnunar EFTA um beitingu tilskipunar ráðsins 93/13/EBE frá 5. apríl 1993 um óréttmæta skilmála í neytendasamningum (“the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Report on the Application of Directive 93/13/EEC”), útgefin 6. desember 2001. Hér má nálgast skýrsluna: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/public-documents/108301.PDF.

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The substance of the payment schedule cannot be negotiated, as it is based on projections of future payments of the bond that depend on the CPI as it is calculated each month.

186. ESA therefore suggests that the answer to the fourth question should be as follows:

It is for the relevant national court to establish whether a particular contract term has been negotiated individually, in the sense that the consumer was able to influence whether or not the term would be included, within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 93/13/EEC.

The fifth question

187. As a preliminary point, ESA notes that the Icelandic version of the relevant provision of the Annex to the Directive differs from the English version. The latter uses the term “explicitly described” instead of “explicitly explained” (in Icelandic: “útskýrð rækilega”). Other language versions are: FR: «explicitement décrit»; DE: «ausdrücklich beschrieben»; IT «siano esplicitamente descritte»; ES «se describa explícitamentre»; DA «udfoerligt beskrevet»; SV «beskrivs tydligt». The term must be interpreted in line with the above-mentioned language versions of the Directive; in other words, the method by which prices vary must be explicitly described.48

188. ESA submits that, pursuant to the Directive, it is for the national court to assess whether the price-indexation clause has been explicitly described in the relevant documents within the meaning of paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive.49 ESA adds that Article 5 of the Directive must be taken into account when making that assessment and that the fairness or unfairness of a commercial practice must be assessed in relation to the “average consumer”, who must be “reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect”, taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors.50 If there is any doubt concerning the meaning of a term, the interpretation which is most favourable to the consumer must prevail.

48 Reference is made to Case E-18/11 Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd v Kaupþing hf [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 592, paragraph 86.

49 Reference is made to Constructora Principado S, cited above, paragraph 20.50 Reference is made to Lidl v Colruy, cited above, paragraph 78.

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Efni greiðsluáætlunarinnar sé ekki umsemjanlegt þar sem hún byggi á spá um væntanlegar afborganir samkvæmt skuldabréfinu á grundvelli mánaðarlegra útreikninga vísitölu neysluverðs.

186. ESA leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari fjórðu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Það er landsdómstólsins að meta hvort samið hafi verið sérstaklega um tiltekinn samningsskilmála þannig að neytandinn hafi getað haft áhrif á það hvort skilmálinn yrði settur í samninginn í skilningi 3. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE.

Fimmta spurningin

187. Í upphafi vill ESA taka fram að íslensk útgáfa viðeigandi ákvæðis viðauka tilskipunarinnar sé frábrugðin ensku útgáfu textans. Í ensku útgáfunni sé notað orðalagið ,,explicitly described“ í stað hins íslenska ,,útskýrð rækilega“. Á öðrum tungumálum eru útgáfurnar með eftirfarandi hætti: á frönsku ,,explicitement décrit“; á þýsku ,,ausdrücklich beschrieben“; á ítölsku ,,siano esplicitamente descritte“; á spænsku ,,se describa explícitamentre“; á dönsku ,,udførligt beskrevet“; og á sænsku ,,beskrivs tydligt“. ESA telur að hugtakið beri að skýra í samræmi við fyrrnefndar útgáfur tilskipunarinnar. Með öðrum orðum, að aðferðina við útreikning verðbreytinga verði að útskýra með skýrum hætti. 48

188. ESA telur að af tilskipuninni leiði að það sé landsdómstólsins að meta hvort verðtryggingarákvæði hafi verið útskýrt með nægilega skýrum hætti í viðeigandi skjölum í skilningi d-liðs 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar.49 Stofnunin bætir því við að hafa verði hliðsjón af 5. gr. tilskipunarinnar þegar metið er hvort svo sé og jafnframt að meta beri réttmæti viðskiptavenju með tilliti til hins ,,almenna neytanda“ sem er ,,sæmilega vel upplýstur og sæmilega athugull og forsjáll“ að félagslegum, menningarlegum og málfræðilegum þáttum virtum.50 Sé vafi um túlkun skilmála skuli sú túlkun gilda sem kemur neytandanum best.

48 Vísað er til máls E-18/11 Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd v Kaupþing hf [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 592, 86. mgr.

49 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Constructora Principado S, 20. mgr. 50 Vísað er til máls C-356/04 Lidl v Colruyt [2006] ECR I-8501, 78. mgr.

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189. As regards the assessment of whether a contract term is unfair, ESA makes reference to case NFH, mentioning that the circumstances that gave rise to the proceedings in NHF differ from the situation in the case at hand. In NFH, it was held that the possibility for the consumer to foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the amendments, by a seller or supplier, of the general business conditions with regard to the fees connected to the service to be provided is of fundamental importance. In this assessment, in light of the terms of the contract and also in light of the relevant national legislation, it must be taken into account whether the reasons or the method for the amendment of the contested provision have been set out in plain, intelligible language and whether the consumer has a right to terminate the contract.51

190. ESA submits that the circumstances as described in the request suggest that, technically speaking, the methods of calculation of price changes in consumer contracts have been described to the consumer in a sufficiently clear manner, in order for him to be able to foresee possible amendments to the contract. In particular, it appears to reflect the method of calculation as explicitly described in Chapter VI of Act No 38/2001 and Rules No 492/2001.

191. ESA submits that it follows from the request that the information given about the linking of the loan to the CPI, the changing of the debt and the necessity of paying the indexation adjustment based on the increase in the index from the index base, and the accompanying payment schedule, is sufficient in terms of the Directive.

192. ESA therefore suggests that the answer to the fifth question should be as follows:

It is for the relevant national court to establish whether a particular price-indexation clause has been explicitly described within the meaning of paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to Directive 93/13/EEC in the relevant documentation.

Sixth question

193. ESA submits that the question is only of a hypothetical nature in a case such as the present one, since it is obvious from the information provided in the request from Reykjavík District Court that the Icelandic legislator has

51 Reference is made to Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt., cited above, paragraphs 21 to 31.

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189. Um mat á því hvort samningsskilmáli teljist óréttmætur vísar ESA til máls NFH, en tekur fram að aðstæðurnar í því máli séu frábrugðnar þeim sem hér séu til umfjöllunar. Í máli NFH hafi verið talið að grundvallarþýðingu hefði að neytandinn ætti kost á að sjá fyrir, á grundvelli skýrra og skiljanlegra viðmiða, þær breytingar sem seljandi eða veitandi gerir á almennum viðskiptaskilmálum varðandi gjöld sem tengjast þjónustunni sem veitt er. Með hliðsjón af samningsskilmálum og viðeigandi ákvæðum landslaga verði við slíkt mat að taka mið af því hvort ástæða breytingar eða aðferð við breytingu hins umdeilda skilmála hafi verið útskýrð á skýru og skiljanlegu máli og því hvort neytandinn geti rift samningnum. 51

190. ESA telur að aðstæðurnar sem lýst sé í beiðninni um ráðgefandi álit gefi til kynna að formlega séð hafi aðferðin við útreikning verðbreytinga í neytendasamningum verið útskýrð fyrir neytandanum með nægilega skýrum hætti til þess að gera honum kleift að sjá fyrir mögulegar breytingar á samningnum. Sér í lagi virðist samningurinn endurspegla þá aðferð við útreikning sem vísað sé til með beinum hætti í VI. kafla laga nr. 38/2001 og reglum 492/2001.

191. ESA telur það leiða af beiðninni að upplýsingarnar sem veittar hafi verið um verðtryggingu lánsins við vísitölu neysluverðs, breytingar á skuldinni og nauðsyn þess að greiða verðbætur í samræmi við hækkun vísitölunnar frá grunnvísitölunni og um greiðsluáætlunina sem lánssamningnum fylgdi uppfylli skilyrði tilskipunarinnar.

192. ESA leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari fimmtu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Það er landsdómstólsins að meta hvort tiltekið verðtryggingarákvæði hafi verið útskýrt með skýrum hætti í skilningi d-liðar 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunar 93/13/EBE í samningsskjölum.

Sjötta spurningin

193. ESA telur að spurningin sé einungis fræðilegs eðlis, í máli sem þessu, þar sem ljóst sé af upplýsingum sem fylgt hafi beiðni Héraðsdóms Reykjavíkur að íslenski löggjafinn hafi þegar valið aðferð við innleiðingu 1. mgr. 6.

51 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt., 21. til 31. mgr.

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already made its choices as regards how to implement Article 6(1) of the Directive. In any event, detailed guidance on the scope of discretion that national legislators enjoy under the EEA Agreement when implementing directives can be found in Jan Anfinn Wahl.52 The Court is competent, however, to reformulate the question53 if it were to consider it appropriate to advise the national court on the obligation that follows from Article 6(1) of the Directive when a national court finds that a given term before it is unfair within the meaning of the Directive.

194. As regards the duty of national courts to interpret national law in conformity with EEA law, ESA recalls that Article 3 EEA requires the EEA States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of EEA law. Consequently, they must, as far as possible, apply the methods of interpretation recognised by national law in order to achieve the result sought by the relevant rule of EEA law.54 ESA also notes in that respect that it is now settled case law that a national court that is considering a case in which the Directive applies must carry out the assessment of the fairness of the contractual terms of its own motion.55

195. On that basis, ESA submits that Article 6(1) of the Directive requires that, where a national court considers that a given term before it is unfair within the meaning of that Directive, that court must (i) make a finding accordingly, and (ii) draw the necessary conclusions; that is, ensure that such a clause is not binding on the consumer; and make a decision as to whether “the contract is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms”; (only) in which case that contract “shall continue to bind the parties”.

196. ESA finally submits that Article 4(1) of the Directive sets out that the relevant point in time to examine whether a given term is unfair within the meaning of the Directive is when the agreement at issue is concluded. In other words, a term that is fair at that time cannot, under the Directive, be

52 Reference is made to Case E-15/12 Jan Anfinn Wahl v the Icelandic State, judgment of 22 July 2013, published electronically, paragraphs 49 to 56.

53 Reference is made to Case C-140/12 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, judgment of 19 September 2013, published electronically, paragraph 31 and the case law cited.

54 Reference is made to Case E-6/13 Metacom AG v Rechtsanwälte Zipper & Collegen, judgment of 27 November 2013, published electronically, paragraph 69, and case law cited.

55 Reference is made to Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA [2000] ECR I-4941, paragraphs 26 to 28.

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gr. tilskipunarinnar. Hvað sem því líður megi í máli Jan Anfinn Wahl52

finna nákvæmar leiðbeiningar um takmarkanir á því vali sem löggjafar aðildarríkjanna hafi samkvæmt EES-samningnum við innleiðingu tilskipana. Dómstóllinn sé þó bær til þess að endurorða spurninguna53 telji hann ráðlegt að leiðbeina landsdómstólnum um þær skyldur sem leiði af 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar í þeim tilvikum þar sem dómstóll aðildarríkis kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu í máli sem rekið er fyrir honum að tiltekinn samningsskilmáli sé óréttmætur í skilningi tilskipunarinnar.

194. Varðandi skyldu dómstóla aðildarríkjanna til að skýra ákvæði landsréttar til samræmis við EES-rétt bendir ESA á að 3. gr. EES-samningsins mæli fyrir um að EES-ríki skuli gera allar viðeigandi ráðstafanir til að tryggja beitingu og virkni EES-réttar. Þeir verði þar af leiðandi að beita viðurkenndum lögskýringaraðferðum landsréttar til að ná fram þeirri niðurstöðu sem viðeigandi regla EES-réttar stefnir að.54 Í þessu sambandi bendir ESA einnig á að samkvæmt dómvenju verði landsdómstóll sem mál er varðar tilskipunina er rekið fyrir að meta réttmæti samningsskilmálanna að eigin frumkvæði. 55

195. Samkvæmt framansögðu telur ESA að í 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar sé gerð krafa um að í þeim tilvikum þar sem landsdómstóllinn kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu að tiltekinn samningsskilmáli sé óréttmætur samkvæmt tilskipuninni beri þeim dómstól að (i) kveða upp úrskurð í samræmi við það og (ii) sjá til þess að afleiðingarnar séu þær að tryggt sé að slíkur skilmáli sé óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann og taka ákvörðun um það hvort samningurinn geti ,,haldið gildi sínu að öðru leyti án óréttmætu skilmálanna“ og (aðeins) ef svo er að ,,samningurinn verði áfram bindandi fyrir samningsaðila.“

196. Loks telur ESA að 1. mgr. 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar kveði á um að viðeigandi tímapunktur til að skoða hvort tiltekinn skilmáli sé óréttmætur í skilningi tilskipunarinnar sé undirritunartími samningsins sem um ræðir. Með öðrum orðum geti skilmáli sem telst réttmætur á þeim tímapunkti ekki talist verða

52 Vísað er til máls E-15/12 Jan Anfinn Wahl v the Icelandic State, dómur frá 22. júlí 2013, enn óbirtur, 49. til 56. mgr.

53 Vísað er til máls C-140/12 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, dómur frá 19. september 2013, enn óbirtur, 31. mgr., og þeirra mála sem þar er vísað er til. .

54 Vísað e til máls E-6/13 Metacom AG v Rechtsanwälte Zipper & Collegen, dómur frá 27. nóvember 2013, enn óbirtur, 69. mgr., og þeirra dóma sem þar er vísað til.

55 Vísað er til sameinaðra mála C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA [2000] ECR I-4941, 26. til 28. mgr.

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considered to become unfair at a later stage of the contract’s duration. Nor can an unfair term become fair due to the lapse of time or changes that take place subsequent to the conclusion of the contract.

197. ESA therefore suggests that the answer to the sixth question should be as follows:

Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that where a national court considers that a given term before it is unfair within the meaning of that Directive, that court must ensure that such a clause is not binding on the consumer; and take a decision as to whether the contract is or is not capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term.

The European Commission

The first question

198. The Commission understands this question to be linked to the repayment schedule attached to the Plaintiff’s loan agreement and the statement that the estimated repayments were “based on 0% inflation”.

199. In the Commission’s view, it follows from the plain wording of Article 1a(6) of Directive 87/102/EEC that the calculation of APR in this type of situation is to be made on the basis of the relevant charges fixed at the same level as when the calculation is made. The calculation must be made using existing relevant rates and values applicable at the time the credit agreement is concluded and must give a reasonable indication of the total cost of the credit. The Commission also underlines that Article 1a(1)(a) of Directive 87/102 expressly links APR to the “present” value of all commitments.

200. The Commission further points out that any other interpretation would undermine one of the primary objectives of Directive 87/102, namely to improve consumer protection by means of enhanced information and transparency. A crucial aspect of the latter consists of informing the consumer of the total cost of credit, which allows the consumer to compare different offers of credit on a similar basis and to assess the extent of his liability.56

56 Reference is made to Cofinoga Merignac, cited above, paragraph 26.

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óréttmætur samkvæmt tilskipuninni síðar á gildistíma samningsins. Eins geti óréttmætur skilmáli ekki talist réttmætur með tímanum eða vegna breytinga sem eiga sér stað eftir undirritun samningsins.

197. ESA leggur því til að dómstóllinn svari sjöttu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE verður að túlka með þeim hætti að í þeim tilvikum þar sem landsdómstóll kemst að þeirri niðurstöðu að tiltekinn samningsskilmáli sé óréttmætur samkvæmt tilskipuninni beri þeim dómstól að tryggja að slíkur skilmáli sé óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann og taka ákvörðun um það hvort samningurinn geti haldið gildi sínu að öðru leyti, án hins óréttmæta skilmála.

Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópusambandsins

Fyrsta spurningin

198. Framkvæmdastjórnin skilur fyrstu spurninguna með þeim hætti að hún tengist greiðsluáætluninni sem fylgdi lánasamningi stefnanda og þeirri staðhæfingu að hinar áætluðu afborganir skyldu miðaðar við 0% verðbólgu.

199. Að mati framkvæmdastjórnarinnar leiðir það af skýru orðalagi 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunar 87/102/EBE að við þessar aðstæður beri að reikna út ÁHK á grundvelli viðeigandi kostnaðar miðað við stig þess tíma sem útreikningurinn er gerður. Við útreikninginn beri að miða við fyrirliggjandi gjöld og gildi sem við eiga á undirritunartíma lánasamningsins og verði að gefa skynsamlega vísbendingu um heildarlántökukostnaðinn. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur einnig á það áherslu að a-liður 1. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunar 87/102 tengi ÁHK með skýrum hætti við ,,núvirði“ allra skuldbindinga.

200. Framkvæmdastjórnin bendir jafnframt á að önnur túlkun myndi grafa undan einu aðalmarkmiði tilskipunar 87/102: að auka neytendavernd með því að auka upplýsingaflæði og gagnsæi. Lykilatriði hins síðarnefnda sé að veita neytanda upplýsingar um heildarlántökukostnað sem geri honum kleift að bera saman ólík lánstilboð á sömu forsendum og meta umfang skuldbindingar sinnar. 56

56 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Cofinoga Merignac, 26. mgr.

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201. With reference to Pohotovost, the Commission argues that it is precisely with a view to protecting the consumer against unfair credit terms and enabling him to have full knowledge of the future performance of a credit agreement that Article 4 of Directive 87/102 obliges a creditor to provide the consumer with all information that could have a bearing on the implications of the agreement.57 Moreover, the Commission observes that the APR is a critically important tool in enabling the consumer to decide whether or not to sign up to a particular credit agreement.58

202. The Commission finally adds that Article 19(4) of Directive 2008/48, which reproduces the former Article 1a(6) of Directive 87/102, expressly provides that the APR is to be calculated on the assumption that the borrowing rate and other charges will remain fixed in relation to the initial level and will remain applicable until the end of the credit agreement.

203. The Commission submits that the answer to the first question should be as follows:

In circumstances where a credit agreement is linked to the consumer price index and the cost of the credit therefore changes in accordance with inflation, Articles 1a(6) and Article 4 of Directive 87/102/EEC must be interpreted as precluding the calculation of the total cost of the credit and of the annual percentage rate of charge from being based on a 0% rate of inflation instead of the known rate of inflation at the date the credit agreement was concluded.

The second question

204. The Commission submits that Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive lay down general principles for the assessment of whether a particular contractual term is unfair, but do not as such preclude a price-indexation clause. This is further illustrated by the terms of Article 3(3) of the Directive read together with the Annex. Not only does this confirm that the list of terms set out in point 1 of the Annex is purely indicative, but paragraph 1(1) read together with paragraph 2(d) also goes on to provide express confirmation that a price-indexation clause may be permitted – subject only to the condition that, in order to be considered fair, such a clause should explicitly describe the method by which prices vary.

57 Case C-76/10 Pohotovost, Order of the Court, cited above, paragraph 68. 58 Case C-76/10 Pohotovost, Order of the Court, cited above, paragraph 70; Cofingoa Merignac, cited

above, paragraph 26.

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201. Með vísan til máls Pohotovost telur framkvæmdastjórnin að það sé einmitt til að vernda neytanda gegn óréttmætum samningsskilmálum og til að honum sé gert kleift að hafa fulla vitneskju um þróun samningsins til framtíðar sem sú skylda er lögð á herðar lánveitanda, samkvæmt 4. gr. tilskipunar 87/012, að hann veiti neytanda allar þær upplýsingar sem gætu haft áhrif á framkvæmd samningsins.57 Framkvæmdastjórnin bendir enn fremur á að ÁHK sé afar mikilvægt tæki við að gera neytandanum kleift að ákveða hvort hann gangist undir tiltekinn lánssamning.58

202. Loks bætir framkvæmdastjórnin því við að 4. mgr. 19. gr. tilskipunar 2008/48, sem er samhljóða fyrrum ákvæði 6. mgr. 1. gr. a tilskipunar 87/102, kveði sérstaklega á um að ganga skuli út frá þeirri forsendu við útreikning ÁHK að útlánsvextir og annar kostnaður séu fastur kostnaður miðað við upphafsstöðu og gildi þar til lánssamningurinn falli úr gildi.

203. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fyrstu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Við aðstæður þar sem lánssamningur er bundinn vísitölu neysluverðs og tekur því breytingum í samræmi við verðbólgu verður að túlka 6. mgr. 1. gr. a og 4. gr. tilskipunar nr. 87/102/EBE með þeim hætti að þær girði fyrir að við útreikning á heildarlántökukostnaði og árlegri hlutfallstölu kostnaðar, sem birtur er lántaka við samningsgerðina, sé miðað við 0% verðbólgu en ekki þekkt verðbólgustig á lántökudegi.

Önnur spurningin

204. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að 3. og 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar mæli fyrir um meginreglur við mat á því hvort tiltekinn samningsskilmáli sé óréttmætur en útiloki ekki notkun verðtryggingarákvæðis. Þetta sé einnig skýrt af 3. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar með hliðsjón af viðauka hennar sem staðfesti ekki aðeins að listi skilmálanna í 1. mgr. viðaukans sé eingöngu leiðbeinandi heldur sé l-liður 1. mgr., ef hann er lesinn með hliðsjón af d-lið 2. mgr., einnig skýr staðfesting á því að heimila megi verðtryggingarákvæði – með því eina skilyrði að slíkur skilmáli verði að innihalda rækilega útskýringu á aðferðinni sem beitt er við útreikning verðbreytinga.

57 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls C-76/10 Pohotovost, úrskurður dómstólsins, 68. mgr. 58 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðra mála C-76/10 Pohotovost, úrskurður dómstólsins, 70. mgr. og Cofingoa

Merignac, 26. mgr.

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205. The Commission submits that the answer to the second question should be as follows:

Directive 93/13/EEC does not, in principle, prohibit provisions in contracts between consumers and suppliers for loans to finance real estate purchases which link the repayments of the loan to a predetermined index.

The third question

206. In the Commission’s view, the question should be answered in the negative since Directive 93/13 is silent in that regard. In particular, paragraph 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive lays down no specific conditions or criteria for the choice of factors to be taken into account, or the method of calculation.

207. The Commission submits that the answer to the third question should be as follows:

Directive 93/13/EEC does not limit the discretion of the EEA States to determine the factors causing changes to such a predetermined index, nor the methods for their calculation.

The fourth question

208. The Commission submits that it is for the national court to assess whether the price-indexation clause should be regarded as having been individually negotiated, taking all circumstances into account. In that assessment, the legal presumption stipulated in Article 3(2) of Directive 93/13 is of particular importance.

209. The Commission adds that, at first sight, the information provided in the request from Reykjavík District Court would tend to suggest that the price-indexation clause was both a standard term used by the bank and part of a pre-drafted document. Further, the Commission continues, if the bank were to argue that such a term were nevertheless individually negotiated, it would need to prove this in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 3(2) of the Directive.

210. The Commission submits that the answer to the fourth question should be as follows:

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205. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari annarri spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun 93/13/EBE leggur, í grundvallaratriðum, ekki bann við skilmálum í samningum neytenda og veitenda um lán til fjármögnunar fasteignakaupa sem tengja afborganir við fyrir fram ákveðna vísitölu.

Þriðja spurningin

206. Að mati framkvæmdastjórnarinnar ætti að svara spurningunni neitandi þar sem ekkert kemur fram í tilskipun 93/13/EBE um það efni. Þannig sé, í d-lið 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar, ekki kveðið á um nein sérstök skilyrði eða forsendur fyrir þeim þáttum sem taka beri mið af eða aðferð við útreikning.

207. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari þriðju spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Tilskipun 93/13/EBE takmarkar ekki svigrúm EES-ríkja til að þess að ákveða með lögum hvaða þættir skuli valda breytingum á hinni fyrir fram ákveðnu vísitölu eða eftir hvaða aðferðum þær breytingar skuli mældar.

Fjórða spurningin

208. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að það sé landsdómstólsins að meta hvort telja beri að samið hafi verið sérstaklega um verðtryggingarákvæði að teknu tilliti til allra aðstæðna. Við slíkt mat verði að taka sérstakt tillit til 2. mgr. 3. gr tilskipunarinnar 93/13/EBE.

209. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur einnig að, við fyrstu sýn, virðist þær upplýsingar sem fylgja beiðni Héraðsdóms Reykjavíkur benda til þess að verðtryggingarákvæði hafi bæði verið staðlaður skilmáli hjá bankanum og hluti af stöðluðu skjali. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur jafnframt að ef bankinn haldi því engu að síður fram að samið hafi verið sérstaklega um samningsákvæðið beri hann sönnunarbyrði fyrir því að svo sé í samræmi við þriðja málslið 2. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunarinnar.

210. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fjórðu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

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It is for the relevant national court to establish whether a particular contract term has not been negotiated individually in accordance with Article 3(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC.

The fifth question

211. The Commission argues that a preliminary issue that arises is whether the price-indexation clause could be said to reflect a mandatory statutory or regulatory provision within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13, and, as such, be excluded from its application. The 13th recital of the preamble to the Directive explains this exclusion as being intended to cover contractual terms determined by provisions of national law, or default terms that are deemed to apply when the parties make no other specific arrangements. The rationale behind Article 1(2) of the Directive is that it may legitimately be supposed that the national legislature has already struck an appropriate balance between all the rights and obligations of the parties to certain types of contract.59

212. The Commission submits that price indexation is governed by the terms of Act No 38/2001, which, pursuant to its Article 14, permit savings and loans to be price-indexed if the basis for that indexation is the consumer price index as calculated by Statistics Iceland. In this way, the Icelandic legislator has clearly weighed up the various interests of the parties to loan agreements and provided for the possibility of price indexing, under certain strictly defined conditions.

213. The Commission argues that, in the case at hand, the inclusion of a price-indexation clause appears to remain purely a possibility: it is authorised by national law, but is not compulsory and does not apply as a default rule in the absence of any specific contractual arrangement on this point. It follows that it cannot be a mandatory provision within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Directive. Such a conclusion is further reinforced by the general consideration that derogations from EEA consumer protection law must be interpreted strictly.60

59 Reference is made to RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, cited above, paragraph 28.

60 Reference is made to Case C-481/99 Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG [2001] ECR I-9945, paragraph 31.

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Það kemur í hlut landsdómstóls að ákveða hvort samið hafi verið sérstaklega um tiltekinn samningsskilmála samkvæmt 2. mgr. 3. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE.

Fimmta spurningin

211. Framkvæmdastjórnin heldur því fram að sú spurning vakni fyrst hvort segja megi að verðtryggingarákvæðið endurspegli „bindandi lög eða stjórnsýslufyrirmæli“ í skilningi 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar og sé því undanskilið gildissviði hennar. Í 13. tl. formálsorða tilskipunarinnar sé sú takmörkun útskýrð með þeim hætti að henni sé ætlað að ná til samningsskilmála sem stjórnist af ákvæðum landsréttar eða staðalskilmála sem gildi þegar aðilarnir hafi ekki samið sérstaklega um annað. Rökin að baki 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar séu þau að með réttu megi gera ráð fyrir því löggjafi aðildarríkis hafi þegar leitað jafnvægis milli allra réttinda og skyldna aðila ákveðinna tegunda samninga.59

212. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að verðtryggingin falli undir ákvæði laga nr. 38/2001. Samkvæmt 14. gr. þeirra laga sé verðtrygging sparifjár og lánsfjár heimil ef grundvöllur verðtryggingarinnar er vísitala neysluverðs sem Hagstofa Íslands reiknar. Þannig hafi löggjafinn með skýrum hætti vegið hagsmuni aðila lánssamninga og gefið kost á verðtryggingu með ákveðnum skýrt afmörkuðum skilyrðum.

213. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að í þessu máli virðist notkun verðtryggingarákvæðis einungis vera valkostur: það sé heimilt samkvæmt landsrétti en ekki skylt og gildi ekki sjálfkrafa í tilvikum þar sem ekki hafi verið samið sérstaklega um það. Þar af leiðandi geti það ekki talist endurspegla bindandi lög í skilningi 2. mgr. 1. gr. tilskipunarinnar. Almenn sjónarmið um að túlka beri ákvæði EES-réttar sem miða að neytendavernd þröngt styðji þá niðurstöðu.60

59 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs mál RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, 28. mgr.

60 Vísað er til máls C-481/99 Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG [2001] ECR I-9945, 31. mgr.

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214. Also by way of preliminary comment at the outset, the Commission submits that the exclusion mentioned in Article 4(2) of the Directive cannot apply to a term relating to a mechanism for amending the prices of the services provided to the consumer.61

215. As regards the substance of the price-indexation clause, the Commission submits that it is for the national court to assess whether a specific contract term is unfair or not, taking into account not only the factors listed in Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive, but also transparency requirements laid down in its Article 5. This is of particular importance when the fairness of contracts permitting price changes is assessed.62 Moreover, the Commission observes that the possibility for the consumer to foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the changes that are likely to occur is of particular importance in this type of situation.63

216. The Commission argues that the answer to the question of whether the price-indexation clause contained an explicit and comprehensible description of the method by which prices vary, as also required by point 2(d) of the Annex to the Directive, is a crucial element in the case at hand. It allows the consumer to make an informed choice before signing the contract. Relevant factors will include those set out in points a) and b) of the third question referred by the national court, taken together with the precise drafting of the clause as a whole, as well as all other relevant circumstances, including the compliance of the clause with the national law provisions on price indexation.

217. The Commission adds that, where interest payments under a loan are indexed, it is clear that the payment schedule cannot, by its very nature, predict the exact instalments to be paid in future. However, an explicit and clear statement to the effect that those instalments might change in accordance with a defined index, as well as a specific reference to the price index method used, normally satisfies the transparency requirements discussed above.

61 Reference is made to Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, cited above, paragraph 23.

62 Reference is made to RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, cited above, paragraphs 49 to 55.

63 Reference is made to Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, cited above, paragraph 28.

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214. Framkvæmdastjórnin bendir einnig á að undanþága 2. mgr. 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar geti ekki náð til skilmála sem vísar til aðferðar sem ætlað er að breyta verði þeirrar þjónustu sem neytandanum er látin í té.61

215. Varðandi efni verðtryggingarákvæðisins tekur framkvæmdastjórnin fram að það sé landsdómstólsins að meta hvort tiltekinn samningsskilmáli sé óréttmætur ekki aðeins að teknu tilliti til þeirra atriða sem útlistuð eru í 3. og 4. gr. tilskipunarinnar heldur einnig kröfu 5. gr. um gagnsæi. Þetta sé sérstaklega mikilvægt þegar réttmæti samninga sem heimila verðbreytingar er metið.62 Framkvæmdastjórnin bendir enn fremur á að möguleikar neytandans til að sjá fyrir, á grundvelli skýrra og skiljanlegra forsendna, þær breytingar sem orðið geta séu sérstaklega mikilvægir við slíkar aðstæður. 63

216. Framkvæmdastjórnin heldur því fram að svarið við spurningunni um hvort verðtryggingarákvæðið hafi innihaldið rækilega útskýringu á aðferðinni við útreikning verðbreytinga, eins og krafa er gerð um í d-lið 2. mgr. viðauka tilskipunarinnar, sé afgerandi þáttur þessa máls. Slíkt geri neytandanum kleift að taka upplýsta ákvörðun áður en hann undirritar samninginn. Meðal viðeigandi þátta séu þau atriði sem vísað er til í a- og b-hluta þriðju spurningarinnar í beiðni landsdómstólsins ásamt tildrögum skilmálans í heild sinni auk allra annarra aðstæðna sem skipt geta máli þar með talið hvort skilmálinn sé í samræmi við ákvæði landsréttar um verðtryggingu.

217. Þá segir framkvæmdastjórnin að í þeim tilfellum þar sem vaxtagreiðslur af lánum eru verðtryggðar sé ljóst að greiðsluáætlun geti, eðli málsins samkvæmt, ekki sagt til um nákvæmar afborganir í framtíðinni. Þó uppfylli skýr og afdráttarlaus yfirlýsing um að afborganirnar kunni að breytast í samræmi við tilgreinda vísitölu ásamt sérstakri tilvísun til þeirrar verðtryggingaraðferðar sem notast er við yfirleitt framangreind skilyrði um gagnsæi.

61 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, 23. mgr. 62 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V, 49.

til 55. mgr.63 Vísað er til áður tilvitnaðs máls Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, 28. mgr.

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218. The Commission submits that the answer to the fifth question should be as follows:

It is for the relevant national court to establish whether a contract term relating to the indexation of repayment instalments of a loan to finance real estate purchases is to be regarded as having been explicitly and comprehensibly explained to the consumer. Such an assessment should take into account the precise wording of the relevant contract terms and all other relevant circumstances, including the circumstances set out in points a) and b) of the third question posed by the national court, as well as the applicable national legislation on price indexation.

The sixth question

219. The Commission submits that the sixth question queries the effects to be attributed to a finding that a contract term is unfair, and, more specifically, whether national law is obliged to make such a term non-binding on the consumer. In this regard, the Commission merely submits that Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 plainly states that unfair terms in a contract “shall not” be binding on the consumer.64

220. The Commission submits that the answer to the sixth question should be as follows:

Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC should be interpreted as requiring unfair contract terms within the meaning of its Article 3(1) not to be binding on the consumer.

Carl Baudenbacher

Judge-Rapporteur

64 Reference is made to Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino, cited above, paragraphs 62 to 63.

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218. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari fimmtu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Það er landsdómstólsins að meta hvort samningsskilmáli um verðtryggingu afborgana af láni til fjármögnunar á fasteignakaupum skuli teljast hafa verið útskýrður fyrir neytanda með skýrum og skiljanlegum hætti. Slíkt mat verður að taka mið af nákvæmu orðalagi viðeigandi samningsskilmála og allra annarra aðstæðna, þar á meðal þeirra sem vísað er til í a- og b-hluta þriðju spurningar landsdómstólsins, auk viðeigandi ákvæða landsréttar um verðtryggingu.

Sjötta spurningin

219. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að með sjöttu spurningunni sé leitað svars við því hvaða áhrif sú niðurstaða að samningsskilmáli teljist óréttmætur hefði og sérstaklega hvort skylt sé, að landsrétti, að sjá til þess að slíkur skilmáli teljist óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann. Hvað þetta varðar telur framkvæmdastjórnin að í 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunarinnar sé skýrt kveðið á um að óréttmætir samningsskilmálar „séu ekki“ bindandi fyrir neytandann. 64

220. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur til að dómstóllinn svari sjöttu spurningunni með eftirfarandi hætti:

Skýra ber 1. mgr. 6. gr. tilskipunar 93/13/EBE með þeim hætti að gerð sé krafa um að óréttmætir samningsskilmálar í skilningi 1. mgr. 3. gr. séu óskuldbindandi fyrir neytandann.

Carl Baudenbacher

Framsögumaður

64 Vísað er til máls C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino, dómur frá 14. júní 2012, enn óbirtur, 62 og 63. mgr.

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Case E-4/13Schenker North AB

Schenker Privpak AB Schenker Privpak AS

vEFTA Surveillance Authority


Book 3

Case E-4/13 DB Schenker IV

CASE E-4/13Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB, Schenker Privpak AS

v

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Admissibility – Article 38 SCA – ESA’s Rules on public access to

documents 2012)

Order of the Court, 25 November 2014 ....................................................... 1182

Order of the President, 30 April 2013 .......................................................... 1202

Order of the President, 30 May 2013 .......................................................... 1211


Summary of the Order

1. Under Article 33(5)(b) RoP, an application made by a legal person governed by private law is to be accompanied by proof that the authority granted to the applicant’s lawyer has been properly conferred on him by someone authorised for the purpose. Pursuant to Article 33(6) RoP, if an application does not comply with the aforementioned requirement, the Registrar shall prescribe a reasonable period within which the applicant is to comply with it whether by putting the application itself in order or by producing any of the abovementioned documents. If the applicant fails to put the application in order or to produce the required documents within the time prescribed, the Court will decide whether the non-compliance with these

conditions renders the application formally inadmissible.

2. In this regard it must be noted that the present action concerns the applicants’ requests to access the case file in a particular ESA investigation which has subsequently been the subject of those previous actions in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 246, Case E-14/11 DB Schenker I [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1178, and Case E-7/12 DB Schenker II [2013] EFTA Ct. Rep. 356 and Case E-8/12 DB Schenker III, order of 12 May 2014, not yet reported. Moreover, the applicants have repeatedly stated in their correspondence with ESA that the objective of the access requests at issue in the present case is to gain evidence to support their claim in the

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Summary

national courts for damages, which is alleged to arise from the same actions of Norway Post that were at issue in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA.

3. As such, the case is inextricably linked to Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA. For those reasons, ESA’s proposition that the authority is defective must be rejected.

4. Procedural rules are generally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force, whereas substantive rules are usually interpreted as not applying to situations existing before their entry

into force. Pursuant to its Article 13, RAD 2012 entered into force on 6 September 2012 and thus is applicable.

5. The system established under Article 7 RAD 2012 makes refusal to grant access to documents subject to a two-step procedure, in which only the confirmatory decision pursuant to Article 7(6) RAD 2012 constitutes the final statement of position.

6. Therefore as the application has been brought against ESA’s initial decision and not against any confirmatory decision, it is inadmissible.

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ORDER OF THE COURT

25 November 2014

(Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Admissibility – Article 38 SCA – ESA’s Rules on public access to

documents 2012)

In Case E-4/13,

Schenker North AB, established in Gothenburg, Sweden,

Schenker Privpak AB, established in Borås, Sweden,

Schenker Privpak AS, established in Oslo, Norway,

represented by Jon Midthjell, advokat,

applicants,

v

EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Markus Schneider, Deputy Director, Gjermund Mathisen, Officer, and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by Posten Norge AS, established in Oslo, Norway, represented by Beret Sundet, advokat,

intervener,

APPLICATION for annulment of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s (“ESA”) Decision of 7 February 2013 to deny access to the inspection documents in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak after the Court annulled ESA’s first decision on 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11. The contested decision was made under the new rules on public access to documents that ESA enacted on 5 September 2012 by way of Decision No 300/12/COL (“RAD 2012”) (not published in the Official Journal), which was given retroactive effect to DB Schenker’s access request of 3 August 2010.

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Order

THE COURT,



having regard to the written pleadings of the applicants, the defendant and the intervener,


having heard oral argument of the applicants, represented by Jon Midthjell, the defendant, represented by Gjermund Mathisen, and the intervener, represented by Beret Sundet, at the hearing on 5 December 2013,

makes the following

ORDER

I INTRODUCTION

1 Schenker North AB and Schenker Privpak AB, both established in Sweden, and Schenker Privpak AS, established in Norway, (“the applicants” or, collectively, “DB Schenker”) are part of the DB Schenker group. The group is a large European freight forwarding and logistics undertaking. It combines all the transport and logistics activities of Deutsche Bahn AG except passenger transport. All three applicants operate in that sector.

2 Following a complaint received from DB Schenker on 24 June 2002 concerning the agreements made by Posten Norge AS (“Norway Post”) establishing Post-in-Shops in retail outlets, ESA initiated an anti-trust investigation. In the course of the investigation, ESA conducted an inspection of Norway Post’s premises between 21 and 24 June 2004 and seized various documents (“the inspection documents”).

3 By its decision of 14 July 2010, ESA found that Norway Post had committed an infringement of Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (“EEA”) in abusing its dominant position in the business-to-consumer parcel market in Norway between 2000 and 2006. Norway Post applied to the

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Court to have ESA’s decision annulled. The Court gave judgment in those proceedings on 18 April 2012 (Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 246 (“Norway Post”)).

4 The present case is a follow-up to Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1178 (“DB Schenker I”) in which the same applicants sought the annulment of ESA’s Decision in Case No 68736 of 16 August 2011 denying DB Schenker access to certain documents relating to Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak on the basis of the Rules on Access to Documents (“RAD 2008”) established by the College of the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 27 June 2008.

5 In its judgment of 21 December 2012 in DB Schenker I, the Court annulled ESA’s decision of 16 August 2011 “Norway Post/Privpak – Access to documents” insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak.

6 On 5 September 2012, ESA took Decision No 300/12/COL to adopt revised Rules on public access to documents (“RAD 2012”), and repealing Decision No 407/08/COL.

7 In its contested decision of 7 February 2013, ESA denied access to 229 of the inspection documents in full, granted partial access to 23 documents and granted full access to 91.

8 The application is based on four pleas, namely (i) that there has been an infringement of the principles of legal certainty and effective judicial protection insofar as the RAD 2012 have been given retroactive effect that is prejudicial to the rights that DB Schenker enjoyed under the RAD 2008; (ii) an infringement of the commercial interest exception in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”); (iii) an infringement of the overriding public interest rule in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA; and (iv) an infringement of the right to partial access in Article 4(9) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA.

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Order

II LEGAL BACKGROUND


The representatives, delegates and experts of the Contracting Parties, as well as officials and other servants acting under this Agreement shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.

10 Article 16 SCA reads:

Decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall state the reasons on which they are based.


The EFTA Court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought by an EFTA State against a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, or infringement of this Agreement, of the EEA Agreement or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.

Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings before the EFTA Court against a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority addressed to that person or against a decision addressed to another person, if it is of direct and individual concern to the former.

The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.

If the action is well founded the decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be declared void.


If a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority has been declared void or if it has been established that the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in infringement of this Agreement or of the provisions of the EEA Agreement, has failed to act, the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment.

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This obligation shall not affect any obligation which may result from the application of Article 46, second paragraph.

13 Article 28 of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA on professional secrecy reads:

1. Without prejudice to Article 9 of Protocol 23 to the EEA Agreement and Articles 12 and 15 of this Chapter, information collected pursuant to Articles 17 to 22 or of Article 58 of the EEA Agreement and Protocol 23 thereto, shall be used only for the purpose for which it was acquired.

2. Without prejudice to the exchange and to the use of information foreseen in Articles 11, 12, 14, 15 and 27, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the competition authorities of the EFTA States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities of the EFTA States shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to this Chapter or Article 58 of the EEA Agreement and Protocol 23 thereto and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This obligation also applies to all representatives and experts of EFTA States attending meetings of the Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 14.

This obligation shall also apply to the representatives of the EC Commission and of the EC Member States who participate in the Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 14(2) of this Chapter and in the hearing pursuant to Article 14(3) of Chapter III.

RAD 2012

14 The introduction and recitals 1 to 3 in the preamble to Decision No 300/12/COL read as follows:

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY.

HAVING REGARD to the agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, in particular its Article 13,

Whereas:

Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a

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democratic system based on democracy and human rights, as referred to in recital 1 of the preamble of the EEA Agreement,

The purpose of these Rules is to ensure openness and transparency at the Authority, while still showing due concern for the necessary limitations due to protection of professional secrecy, legal proceedings and internal deliberations, where this is deemed necessary in order to safeguard the Authority’s ability to carry out its tasks,

The Authority should take the necessary measures to inform the public of the new Rules on public access to documents and to train its staff to assist citizens to exercise their rights. In order to facilitate the exercise by citizens of their rights, the Authority should provide access to a register of documents.

15 Article 1 of the RAD 2012 reads as follows:

Purpose

The purpose of these Rules is:

(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the right of access to documents held by the Authority,

(b) to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right, and

(c) to promote good administrative practice relating to access to documents.


Exceptions

Under these Rules:

…

4. The Authority shall refuse access to a document, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure, where disclosure would undermine the protection of:

– commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property,

– court proceedings and legal advice,

– the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits.

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5. …

6. The Authority shall refuse access to Authority internal memos or notes and Authority internal communication except if such memos, notes or communication set out a final decision unavailable in any other form or if there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

7. …

8. As regards third-party documents, the Authority shall consult the third party with a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 3 or 4 is applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall not be disclosed or, when the document does not originate from an EFTA State, it is clear that the document shall be disclosed.

9. If only parts of the requested document are covered by any of the exceptions, the remaining parts of the document shall be released.

10. The exceptions as laid down in paragraphs 1 to 7 shall only apply for the period during which protection is justified on the basis of the content of the document. The exceptions may apply for a maximum period of 30 years. In the case of documents covered by the exceptions relating to privacy or commercial interests and in the case of sensitive documents, the exceptions may, if necessary, continue to apply after this period.


Processing of Applications

1. …

2. An application for access to a document shall be handled as quickly as possible. An acknowledgement of receipt shall be sent to the applicant. As a main rule, the Authority shall either grant access to the document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 8 or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal within l0 working days from registration of the application.

3. In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a long document or to a large number of documents, the time-limit provided for in paragraph 2 may be extended by 30 working days. The Authority shall notify the applicant thereof as quickly as possible.

4. In cases where the Authority consults third parties in accordance with Article 4(8) of these Rules, the time-limit provided for in paragraph 2 or 3

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above may be suspended, for the documents concerned and for as long as the consultation is pending. The Authority shall inform the applicant of any such suspension as quickly as possible, and the Authority shall endeavour to complete any such consultation within a reasonable time.

5. Failure by the Authority to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall entitle the applicant to make a confirmatory application under paragraph 6 below.

6. In the event of total or partial refusal the applicant may, within 30 working days of receiving the Authority’s reply, make a confirmatory application asking the Authority to reconsider its position. Paragraphs 1 to 4 above apply. The Decision of the Authority shall be adopted by the College Member responsible for public access to documents. In the event of confirmation of the total or partial refusal, the Authority shall inform the applicant of the remedies open to him or her by instituting court proceedings against the Authority under the conditions laid down in Article 36 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. Failure by the Authority to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall be considered as a negative reply and thus also entitle the applicant to institute such court proceedings.


Entry into force, publication and repeal of Decision 407/08/COL

These Rules shall enter into force on the day following the adoption of the present Decision and shall be applicable to all access requests decided upon from that date onwards. From the same time, Decision 407/08/COL of 27 June 2008 to adopt new Rules on Public Access to documents, is repealed.

The Authority shall make these Rules available on its website.

III PRE-LITIGATION PROCEDURE

19 On 3 August 2010, DB Schenker sent an email to ESA requesting access to the file in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak), in preparation of its damages claim against Norway Post in the Norwegian courts.

20 DB Schenker was granted access to documents in Case No 34250 on 30 August 2010, 5 November 2010, 16 February 2011 and 16 August 2011.

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21 ESA’s letter of 16 August 2011 denied access to 352 of 354 inspection documents in the case file obtained during the inspection of Norway Post’s premises in June 2004.

22 By application lodged with the Court on 19 October 2011, DB Schenker brought an action seeking the annulment of the contested decision of 16 August 2011 insofar as it denied access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak).

23 On 5 September 2012, ESA adopted the new RAD 2012 by College Decision No 300/12/COL.

24 By judgment of 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker V EFTA Surveillance Authority [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1178, the Court annulled ESA’s decision of 16 August 2011 “Norway Post/Privpak – Access to documents” insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak.

25 On 9 January 2013, ESA wrote to and emailed Norway Post (Event No 658190) inviting the company to identify any confidential information and justification for any refusal of public access to the inspection documents. ESA made clear that if Norway Post made no substantiated claims of confidentiality within 10 working days, i.e. by 23 January 2013, ESA would assume that it had no objections to full disclosure of the documents concerned and would proceed accordingly without further delay.

26 On 21 January 2013, Norway Post requested an extension of the deadline by three working days (Event No 660973).

27 On 23 January 2013, ESA granted Norway Post’s request so that the deadline was extended to 28 January 2013 (Event No 660974).

28 By emails of 28 January 2013, Norway Post replied to ESA’s letter of 9 January 2013 (Event Nos. 660977 and 660978) with both a confidential (Event No 660976) and non-confidential version (Event No 660982) of its reply.

29 On 29 January 2013, ESA informed DB Schenker that it had received Norway Post’s reply the previous day and was “now re-assessing the file against the background of the reply” and would “get back to you

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shortly” (Event No 661007). This included a copy of the non-confidential version of Norway Post’s reply.

30 On 30 January 2013, ESA granted public access to 86 inspection documents in full by email (Event No 661256). ESA stated in this email “[t]o be clear, the present e-mail does not entail that a position has been taken on the remaining inspection documents at issue and does not imply a refusal, in whole or in part, of public access to those documents. The Authority is now re-assessing those documents in light of the abovementioned letter from Norway Post and the EFTA Court’s judgment of 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker. The Authority will take a position and address a decision to you shortly.”

31 On 31 January 2013, DB Schenker wrote to (Event No 661364) and emailed (Event No 661362) the President of ESA asserting that the time limit for ESA to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment in DB Schenker I, pursuant to Article 38 SCA, expired on 30 January 2013. DB Schenker noted that “since your staff has already overrun ESA’s extended time limit, DB Schenker expects to see only a minor delay before a final decision is made, in full compliance with the reasoning of the Court”.

32 On 1 February 2013, ESA responded to DB Schenker’s letter of the previous day (Event No 661442). ESA stated that it would take a decision on public access to the remaining inspection documents, and communicate the decision to DB Schenker by 7 February 2013.

33 On 5 February 2013, Norway Post sent an email (Event No 661841) to ESA concerning three inspection documents that it had failed to address in its emails of 28 January 2013.

34 By a letter of 7 February 2013, ESA adopted the contested decision. This decision states that it is to finalise ESA’s follow-up of the Court’s judgment of 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11 by taking a position on the remaining 262 documents with respect to public access and thus adopting a decision to replace the one contained in ESA’s letter of 16 August 2011, and annulled by the judgment.

35 The decision was adopted under ESA’s revised rules on public access (RAD 2012), which replaced ESA’s previous rules on the same matter, under which the annulled decision was adopted.

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36 By its decision, ESA granted partial access to 23 inspection documents. However, ESA found that disclosure of certain information in the documents would undermine the commercial interests of Norway Post within the meaning of the first indent of Article 4(4) RAD 2012, which entailed that full access could not be granted to these documents.

37 ESA found that, even having regard to the age of the documents, full public access to the information requested on Norway Post’s business activities could result in a serious harm to Norway Post. Therefore, ESA considered that the information constitutes business secrets; that the information is of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 122 EEA (corresponding to Article 339 TFEU), the fourth paragraph of Article 14 SCA and Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA; and that it is covered by the commercial interests exception specified in the first indent of Article 4(4) RAD 2012. Moreover, ESA did not find that there was any overriding public interest in the disclosure of these documents.

38 In its decision, ESA also refused access to 229 other inspection documents, finding that the information contained therein constituted business secrets and was of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 122 EEA (corresponding to Article 339 TFEU), the fourth paragraph of Article 14 SCA and Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA, as well as being covered by the commercial interests exception specified in the first indent of Article 4(4) RAD 2012. Furthermore, ESA found that there was no overriding public interest in the disclosure of these documents.

39 In the decision, the applicants were informed that the refusal of access to documents entitled them to make a confirmatory application asking ESA to reconsider its position, pursuant to Article 7(6) of the RAD 2012. Moreover, if they made a confirmatory application, the ESA decision would be adopted by the College Member responsible for public access to documents (the President).

IV PROCEDURE AND FORMS OF ORDER SOUGHT

40 By application lodged at the Court on 6 April 2013, DB Schenker brought an action seeking the annulment of the defendant’s decision of 7 February 2013, denying access to the inspection documents in ESA Case No

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34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) following the annulment of ESA’s first decision on 21 December 2012 in DB Schenker I. On the same day, DB Schenker separately lodged an application pursuant to Article 59a of the Rules of Procedure (“RoP”) that the case be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure.

41 The applicants, DB Schenker, request the Court to:

(i) annul ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013 in Case No 73038 (DB Schenker – access to documents) in so far as it denies access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak);

(ii) order the defendant (and any intervener) to bear the costs.

42 On 16 April 2013, ESA submitted comments on the application for an expedited procedure.

43 On 24 April 2013, Posten Norge AS sought leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the defendant.

44 On 30 April 2013, by an Order of the President, the application for Case E-4/13 to be determined pursuant to Article 59a RoP was denied. However, the application that the case at hand be given priority during the oral procedure, pursuant to Article 42(1) RoP, was granted.

45 On 8 May 2013, ESA lodged its written observations on the application to intervene at the Court’s Registry.

46 On 15 May 2013, DB Schenker lodged its written observations on the application to intervene at the Court’s Registry.

47 On 30 May 2013, by an Order of the President, Posten Norge AS was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the defendant.

48 On 10 June 2013, ESA submitted its defence.

49 The defendant, the EFTA Surveillance Authority, requests the Court to:

(i) dismiss the application as inadmissible; and

(ii) order the applicants to bear the costs.

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50 In the alternative, the defendant requests the Court to:

(i) dismiss the application as unfounded; and

(ii) order the applicants to bear the costs.

51 On 3 July 2013, Norway Post submitted its statement in intervention.

52 On 17 July 2013, DB Schenker submitted its reply.

53 On 29 July 2013, ESA requested an extension of the deadline to lodge the rejoinder to 29 August 2013.

54 On 30 July 2013, the President, pursuant to Article 36 RoP, granted an extension of the time limit for submitting a rejoinder until 29 August 2013.

55 On the same day, ESA submitted written observations on Norway Post’s statement in intervention.

56 On 31 July 2013, DB Schenker submitted written observations on Norway Post’s statement in intervention.

57 On 29 August 2013, ESA submitted its rejoinder.

58 The parties presented oral argument and answered questions put to them by the Court at the hearing on 5 December 2013.

59 Reference is made to the Report for the Hearing for a fuller account of the facts, the procedure and the pleas and arguments of the parties, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only in so far as is necessary for the reasoning of the Court.

V LAW

Admissibility

Arguments of the parties

60 ESA raises two pleas of inadmissibility challenging DB Schenker’s application. ESA submits that the application for annulment is inadmissible as DB Schenker failed to submit a confirmatory application prior to bringing its action before the Court. In its rejoinder, ESA contends that, whilst substantive rules only exceptionally apply to situations existing

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before their entry into force, procedural rules generally do apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force.

61 In any event, ESA submits that the applicants’ alternative contention that their letter of 31 January 2013 constitutes a confirmatory application is equally flawed as it was not in time. In its rejoinder, ESA further submits that its decision of 7 February 2013 was adopted within the relevant time limits as it was not until Thursday 10 January 2013 that the Court served that judgment on ESA pursuant to Article 61(2) RoP by a letter of 8 January 2013. This was the first and only signed and authenticated copy of the judgment that ESA received and ESA had not indicated that service could be effected electronically. ESA submits that nothing different follows from Article 62 RoP, according to which the Court’s judgments are binding from the date of delivery. Accordingly, ESA submits that the present application seeks the partial annulment of what constitutes but a preparatory act and is therefore inadmissible.

62 Second, ESA argues that the applicants have failed to produce the necessary documentation evidencing that they are duly represented by a lawyer as required pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Statute of the Court. The powers of attorney granted by the applicants on 11 November 2010 and 20 December 2010 as well as the additional power of attorney subsequently granted by the applicants’ ultimate parent company, Deutsche Bahn AG, on 29 April 2013 to the lawyer representing DB Schenker do not appear to meet the requirements set out in Article 33(5)(b) RoP. In ESA’s view, the three applicants have failed to establish that any of them has individually conferred any valid authority on their counsel to represent them in the present case.

63 According to ESA, it remains questionable whether the formal defects can be rectified under Article 33(6) RoP.

64 DB Schenker submits that the application is admissible under the second paragraph of Article 36 SCA. The contested decision is addressed to DB Schenker, and ESA has specifically confirmed that the contested decision replaced the decision that was annulled by the Court in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker I. DB Schenker submits that ESA was legally obliged to replace the annulled decision with a new and final decision to comply with the Court’s judgment in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker I pursuant to Article 38

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SCA and paragraph 283 of that judgment. It contends that ESA did not contest the legal basis for DB Schenker’s complaint or the fact that it had overrun the time limit for a final decision. Consequently, in the applicants’ view, the contested decision is actionable.

65 DB Schenker adds that Article 7 RAD 2012, which provides that access to documents requests submitted after 5 September 2012 are subject to a two-step administrative procedure, has no effect on the admissibility of the present action. It avers that it did not file an access to documents request pursuant to the new rules. Further, in its view, Article 7 RAD 2012 does not apply to cases where the Court has annulled ESA’s final decision on an access request as the Court did in Case E-14/11. Moreover, for the sake of completeness, DB Schenker asserts in its reply that ESA’s correspondence and actions demonstrate that it did not process the access request as a new request subject to the two-step administrative procedure established in Article 7 RAD 2012.

66 In its reply, DB Schenker responds to ESA’s submissions concerning the scope of the applicants’ power of attorney. The powers of attorney cover by their wording “any application” relating to Case E-15/10 Norway Post, which is also made clear in the last paragraph which explicitly refers, in the plural, to “proceedings for and on behalf of us”. The present action is directly connected to the investigation of Norway Post, and the evidence belonging to the Norway Post case file or files. DB Schenker therefore regards the inadmissibility plea to be without merit. The mechanism set out in Article 33(6) RoP makes the inadmissibility plea clearly ineffective.


Authority granted to the applicants’ lawyer

67 ESA contends that the application does not satisfy the obligations resulting from Article 33(5)(b) RoP.

68 Under Article 33(5)(b) RoP, an application made by a legal person governed by private law is to be accompanied by proof that the authority granted to the applicant’s lawyer has been properly conferred on him by someone authorised for the purpose. Pursuant to Article 33(6) RoP, if an application does not comply with the aforementioned requirement, the Registrar shall prescribe a reasonable period within which the applicant

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is to comply with it whether by putting the application itself in order or by producing any of the abovementioned documents. If the applicant fails to put the application in order or to produce the required documents within the time prescribed, the Court will decide whether the noncompliance with these conditions renders the application formally inadmissible.

69 Counsel for the applicants originally submitted two powers of attorney. The first was granted by Schenker North AB. The second was granted by Schenker Privpak AB and Schenker Privpak AS. Both documents are similarly worded.

70 These powers of attorney refer in particular to Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, cited above. However, the use of the words “the right to take such steps as may be necessary for the commencement and presentation of the intervention including (without limitation) the … lodging … of any application or submission of any kind” and “at any hearings in relation to the proceedings” in the powers of attorney makes clear that they did not concern solely the conduct of the proceedings seeking annulment of ESA Decision 322/10/COL.

71 In this regard it must be noted that the present action concerns the applicants’ requests to access the case file in a particular ESA investigation which has subsequently been the subject of those previous actions in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, Case E-14/11 DB Schenker I, both cited above, and Case E-7/12 DB Schenker II [2013] EFTA Ct. Rep. 356 and Case E-8/12 DB Schenker III, order of 12 May 2014, not yet reported. Moreover, the applicants have repeatedly stated in their correspondence with ESA that the objective of the access requests at issue in the present case is to gain evidence to support their claim in the national courts for damages, which is alleged to arise from the same actions of Norway Post that were at issue in Case E15/10 Posten Norge v ESA.

72 As such, the case is inextricably linked to Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA. For those reasons, ESA’s proposition that the authority is defective must be rejected.

73 For the sake of order, the Court notes that the applicants’ lawyer additionally provided three “affirmations of power of attorney” on behalf

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of Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB and Schenker Privpak AS on 12 November 2013. According to the substance of those affirmations, the applicants’ lawyer “has been duly authorized to represent [their] affairs in proceedings with and concerning ESA and/or Norway Post from 2010 and onwards (namely in Cases E-5/13, E-4/13, E-8/12, E-7/12, E-14/11 and E-15/10), and any future proceedings with and concerning ESA and/or Norway Post”. The attached “Articles of Association” of the three applicants provide that the signatories – all board members – were authorised by the applicants for that purpose.

74 Accordingly, the applicants have presented sufficient proof to the Court that the authority granted to the applicants’ lawyer has been properly conferred on him by someone authorised for the purpose. Moreover, ESA’s contention that the obligations specified in Article 33(5)(b) RoP cannot be fulfilled in the course of the proceedings must be rejected since that possibility is provided for in Article 33(6) RoP.

75 The action cannot therefore be declared inadmissible on this basis.

Assessment of the application

76 Procedural rules are generally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force, whereas substantive rules are usually interpreted as not applying to situations existing before their entry into force (see, inter alia, Joined Cases 212/80 to 217/80 Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others [1981] ECR 2735, paragraph 9; Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto [2007] ECR I-5557, paragraph 48; and Case C-296/08 PPU Santesteban Goicoechea [2008] ECR I-6307, paragraph 80). Pursuant to its Article 13, RAD 2012 entered into force on 6 September 2012 and thus is applicable.

77 In the present case, because ESA’s previous decision had been annulled by the Court, the date of the “registration of the application”, upon which the time limits are calculated pursuant to Article 7(2) RAD 2012, must be the date of the delivery of the Court’s judgment in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker I, that is Friday 21 December 2012.

78 Article 7(2) RAD 2012 provides that “as a main rule” ESA shall either grant access or state the reasons for the total or partial refusal within 10 working days from registration of the application. In “exceptional cases”

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this time limit “may be extended by 30 working days”. If ESA decides to extend the time limit in this way it shall notify the applicant thereof as quickly as possible.

79 Article 7(4) RAD 2012 provides that where ESA consults with third parties in accordance with Article 4(8) RAD 2012 the time limit provided for in Article 7(2) or (3) RAD 2012 may be suspended for the documents concerned and for as long as the consultation is pending. ESA shall inform the applicant of any such suspension as quickly as possible, and it shall endeavour to complete any such consultation within a reasonable time.

80 On 9 January 2013, ESA emailed and wrote to Norway Post inviting it to make substantiated confidentiality claims to the remaining inspection documents at issue. ESA stated that if Norway Post did not make substantiated claims of confidentiality within 10 working days, it would assume that the undertaking had no objections to full disclosure of the documents concerned, and ESA would proceed accordingly without further delay. The applicants were copied into these communications by ESA, with copies transmitted to the applicants’ lawyer.

81 On that basis, while not made explicit, it could be seen that ESA had suspended the time limit provided for in Article 7(2) RAD 2012, pursuant to Article 7(4) RAD 2012, because the deadline set for Norway Post to submit confidentiality claims would exceed the prescribed deadline of 10 working days.

82 Although the time limit pursuant to Article 7(2) RAD 2012 expired on 30 January 2013, DB Schenker accepted that it expected “to see only a minor delay before a final decision is made” in its email and letter to ESA of 31 January 2013. On that basis alone, it appears reasonable that ESA issued the contested decision on 7 February 2013.

83 The system established under Article 7 RAD 2012 makes refusal to grant access to documents subject to a two-step procedure, in which only the confirmatory decision pursuant to Article 7(6) RAD 2012 constitutes the final statement of position (see Case E-5/13 DB Schenker V, judgment of 7 July 2014, not yet reported, paragraph 95).

84 Therefore as the application has been brought against ESA’s initial decision and not against any confirmatory decision, it is inadmissible.

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VI COSTS

85 Under Article 66(2) RoP, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the defendant has requested that the applicants be ordered to pay the costs and the latter have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay their costs and those of the defendant. Posten Norge AS shall bear its own costs.

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On those grounds,

THE COURT

Hereby orders:

1. The application is dismissed as inadmissible;

2. The applicants are to bear their own costs and the costs incurred by the EFTA Surveillance Authority;

3. Posten Norge AS is to bear its own costs.


Luxembourg, 25 November 2014.


Registrar President

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ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT

30 April 2013

(Expedited procedure – Priority in the oral procedure)

In Case E-4/13,

Schenker North AB, established in Gothenburg (Sweden),

Schenker Privpak AB, established in Borås (Sweden),

Schenker Privpak AS, established in Oslo (Norway),


applicants,

v

EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Markus Schneider, Deputy Director; and Gjermund Mathisen and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officers, Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents, Brussels, Belgium,

defendant,

APPLICATION seeking, by way of an expedited procedure, the annulment of ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013 to deny, for a second time, access to the inspection documents in Case No. 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) after the Court annulled ESA’s first decision on 2l December 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker. The contested decision was made under the new rules on public access to documents that ESA enacted on 5 September 2012 by way of Decision No. 300/12/COL (not published in the Official Journal), which was given retroactive effect to DB Schenker’s access request of 3 August 2010,

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THE PRESIDENT

makes the following

ORDER

I BACKGROUND

1 Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB and Schenker Privpak AS (hereinafter ‘the applicants’ or, collectively, “DB Schenker”) are part of the DB Schenker group. The group is a large European freight forwarding and logistics undertaking. It combines all transport and logistics activities of Deutsche Bahn AG except passenger transport. Schenker Privpak AS, a limited liability company incorporated under Norwegian law, has handled DB Schenker’s domestic business-to-consumer (hereinafter “B-to-C”) parcel service in Norway. Schenker Privpak AB is a company incorporated in Sweden. Both Schenker Privpak AB and Schenker Privpak AS have handled international customers seeking B-to-C distribution in Norway.

2 The present case is a follow-up to Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA in which the same applicants sought the annulment of ESA’s Decision in Case No 68736 of 16 August 2011 denying DB Schenker access to certain documents relating to Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak on the basis of the Rules on Access to Documents (“RAD”) established by the College of the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 27 June 2008.

3 Judgment in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA was handed down on 21 December 2012. The Court annulled ESA’s decision of 16 August 2011 ‘Norway Post/Privpak – Access to documents’ insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak.


4 On 6 April 2013, DB Schenker made an application pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”) and separately lodged an application pursuant to Article 59a of the Rules of Procedure (“RoP”) that the case be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure.

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5 DB Schenker seeks the annulment of ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013, denying access to the inspection documents in Case No. 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) following the Court’s judgment of 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA.


III OBSERVATIONS OF THE PARTIES

7 DB Schenker notes that an expedited procedure may be granted pursuant to Article 59a RoP “where the particular urgency of the case requires the Court to give its ruling with the minimum of delay”. DB Schenker asserts that the application for annulment concerns, in essence, whether ESA has lawfully complied with the Court’s judgment in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA. The applicants argue that the case is particularly well suited for an expedited procedure because the Court has extensive and recent knowledge of the subject matter, and has previously reviewed the contested inspection documents.

8 DB Schenker submits further that Article 59a RoP must be interpreted in light of the fundamental rights in EEA law (see Case E-18/11 Irish Bank, judgment of 28 September 2012, not yet reported, paragraph 63; and Case E-3/11 Sigmarsson, [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 432, paragraph 29). This includes the fundamental right to an effective remedy that must be afforded within a reasonable time (the principle of effective judicial protection) in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 6(1) and 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which have been given equal effect in EEA law (see Case E-15/10 Norway Post, judgment of 18 April 2012, not yet reported, paragraph 86).

9 DB Schenker submits that the Court has specifically confirmed that the principle of effective judicial protection extends to ESA’s decisions taken pursuant to the Rules on Access to Documents (see Case E-14/11 DB Schenker, cited above, paragraph 123). Therefore, the applicants assert that where there has already been an infringement of the fundamental right to an effective remedy within a reasonable time, or where such a situation is about to occur, there will be a ‘particular urgency’

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under Article 59a RoP for a ruling with the minimum of delay to prevent, or at least mitigate, the infringement of that right.

10 DB Schenker recalls that ESA’s investigation in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) of 14 July 2010 was initiated following a complaint from DB Schenker received on 24 June 2002 concerning the agreements made by Posten Norge AS, a state-owned company (“Norway Post”), establishing Post-in-Shops in retail outlets.

11 In its decision of 14 July 2010, ESA found that Norway Post had infringed Article 54 EEA by abusing its dominant position in the B-to-C parcel market in Norway between 2000 and 2006. Norway Post applied to the Court to have ESA’s decision annulled. The Court gave judgment in those proceedings in Case E-15/10 Norway Post on 18 April 2012.

12 DB Schenker contends that as a consequence of Norway Post’s infringement of Article 54 EEA and ESA’s failure to provide timely and adequate protection against it, the applicants are seeking damages from Norway Post for the losses caused by the infringement. The applicants state that they informed ESA of their follow-on damages claim before the national courts on 16 March 2009.

13 DB Schenker contends that it is seeking access to the inspection documents in order to establish the full extent of its damages claim. DB Schenker’s first request seeking access to those inspection documents was made on 3 August 2010. ESA’s Decision on that request of 16 August 2011 ‘Norway Post/Privpak – Access to documents’ was annulled by the Court insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak in its judgment of 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker.

14 DB Schenker notes that its damages claim before the Oslo District Court was originally stayed upon the request Norway Post until the Court had handed down its judgment in Case E-15/10 Norway Post. While that stay was lifted, the case has been stayed again, this time upon DB Schenker’s request, on 29 October 2012 while it seeks access to additional evidence.

15 DB Schenker asserts that it has no effective means to gain access to the inspection documents, including petitioning the Oslo District Court to ask ESA for a transmission of the contested documents according to the

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‘Zwartveld procedure’, other than through access to documents requests. It contends that the European Commission finds itself unable to transmit evidence any faster under the Zwartveld procedure than under the rules on public right of access to documents.

16 DB Schenker submits that while the Oslo District Court’s order states that “neither party will suffer substantial loss, whether financial or otherwise” as a result of the stay in national proceedings, it does not absolve the Court from the obligation to protect the applicants’ fundamental right to an effective remedy within a reasonable time, which is an autonomous right under EEA law, in proceedings where the Court has exclusive jurisdiction.

17 DB Schenker concludes that there is, therefore, a particular urgency justifying an expedited procedure in the present case pursuant to Article 59a RoP. Alternatively, the applicants request that the case be granted priority pursuant to Article 42(2) RoP.

18 ESA in its observations states that it would not object to the procedure being expedited, whether pursuant to Article 59a RoP or Article 42(2) RoP, but does not urge the choice of one or the other.

19 ESA notes that the General Court has recently stayed similar proceedings in at least four cases brought in 2012 in which German insurers seek the annulment of European Commission decisions refusing requests for public access under Regulation 1049/2001 to certain documents of the Commission’s investigation of the car glass cartel. Those cases have been stayed until the judgment is rendered in the pending appeal in Case C-365/12 P Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg. ESA further notes that the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) in his Order of 19 February 2013 in Case C-365/12 P Commission v EnBW Energie Baden- Württemberg rejected, for the purposes of an application for leave to intervene, the arguments based on the fundamental right to effective judicial review (Article 47 EU Charter) and that the swift handling of the proceedings in the European Courts is essential for the effectiveness of their actions for damages and interest lodged in a national court.

20 ESA submits that the Zwartveld procedure is a fully operational EEA law instrument which the national court has an EEA law right to use.

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ESA has a corresponding EEA law obligation pursuant to the Zwartveld procedure. The applicants have not sought to petition the national court to make use of that procedure despite lodging their damages action on 24 June 2010.

IV LAW

21 Pursuant to Article 59a RoP, upon application by the applicant or the defendant, the President may exceptionally decide, on the basis of a recommendation by the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the other party, that a case is to be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure derogating from the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, where the particular urgency of the case requires the Court to give its ruling with the minimum of delay.

22 DB Schenker has essentially contended that the Court’s ruling in the present case must be given with the minimum of delay on the basis that the period since it filed its complaint with ESA regarding Norway Post’s abuse of its dominant position, and its presently stayed follow-on damages action before the national court, is such that any further delay negatively impacts upon its fundamental rights under EEA law.

23 The Court has recognised the principle of procedural homogeneity and held that the homogeneity cannot be restricted to the interpretation of provisions whose wording is identical in substance to parallel provisions of EU law (see Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA, cited above, paragraphs 77-78; Order of the President of 23 April 2012 in Case E-16/11 ESA v Iceland (“Icesave”), paragraph 32). The need to apply that principle, namely in order to ensure equal access to justice for individuals and economic operators throughout the EEA, is less urgent with regard to rules concerning the modalities of the procedure, when they relate mainly to the proper administration of the Court’s own functioning. Nonetheless, for reasons of expediency and in order to enhance legal certainty for all parties concerned, the Court considers it also in such cases appropriate, as a rule, to take the reasoning of the European Union courts into account when interpreting expressions of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure which are identical in substance to expressions in the equivalent provisions of Union law.

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24 The Rules of Procedure of the ECJ as last amended on 24 May 2011 (“ECJ RoP 2011”) were repealed and replaced by new Rules of Procedure adopted on 25 September 2012 (“ECJ RoP 2012”) which entered into force on 1 November 2012. Article 59a RoP and Article 62a ECJ RoP 2011 are identical in substance. Article 133 ECJ RoP 2012 constitutes the refreshed procedural rule, and its interpretation remains of relevance in construing the same procedural notion.

25 In applying Article 59a(1) RoP, fundamental rights must be respected (see DB Schenker v ESA, cited above, paragraph 78 and Norway Post v ESA, cited above, paragraph 110). This includes the general principle of effective judicial protection (see Norway Post v ESA, cited above, paragraph 86). In the present case, DB Schenker seeks the annulment of ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013 which ESA adopted following the Court’s annulment of its previous decision concerning access to the inspection documents in Case no. 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) on 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11.

26 DB Schenker seeks access to the inspection documents ESA seized at Norway Post’s premises in 2004 in order to provide evidence for its follow-on damages claim against Norway Post in national proceedings. The Court has recognised the importance of private enforcement of competition law as having the ability to make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the EEA (see DB Schenker, cited above, paragraph 132 and with regard to the parallel rules in EU law, Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 paragraphs 26 to 28). While pursuing his private interest, a plaintiff in such proceedings contributes at the same time to the protection of the public interest and thereby also benefits consumers (see DB Schenker, cited above, paragraph 132; compare the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-681/11 Schenker and Co. AG and Others, Opinion of 28 February 2013, not yet reported, footnote 78).

27 The applicants have acknowledged that the national court stayed its proceedings in the follow-on damages case before it on 29 October 2012. In its respective decision, the national court held that it was a “reasonable consequence” that DB Schenker requested the stay on account of the EFTA Court proceedings in order to obtain access to the evidence seized at Norway Post in 2004, and that such “evidence may be of major importance for the final result of the case”.

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28 The national court also noted that “[t]he case is already old however, neither party will suffer substantial loss, whether financial or otherwise, should the case be stayed again.” The national court concluded by finding ‘that compelling reasons speak in favour of staying the case until the extent of the evidence disclosure obligation is clarified.’

29 In the light of the above, the applicants have not demonstrated to a sufficient extent that there is a particular urgency in the case at hand within the meaning of Article 59a(1) RoP, having regard to the general principles of EEA law (compare Order of the President of the ECJ of 23 October 2009 in Case C-69/09 P, Makhteshim-Agan, paragraph 10). The application is consequently denied.

30 Nevertheless, given the particular circumstances of the case at hand, and the Court’s familiarity with the underlying subject matter of the proceedings it is appropriate to give the case priority in the oral procedure pursuant to Article 42(2) RoP.

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On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT

hereby orders:

1. The application for Case E-4/13 to be determined pursuant to Article 59a RoP is denied.

2. The application that Case E-4/13 be given priority during the oral procedure pursuant to Article 42(1) RoP is granted.

3. Costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 30 April 2013.


Registrar President

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30 May 2013

(Intervention –Interest in the result of the case)

In Case E-4/13,

Schenker North AB, established in Gothenburg (Sweden),

Schenker Privpak AB, established in Borås (Sweden),

Schenker Privpak AS, established in Oslo (Norway),


applicants,

v

EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Markus Schneider, Deputy Director;

and Gjermund Mathisen and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officers, Legal & Executive

Affairs, acting as Agents, Brussels, Belgium,

defendant,

APPLICATION seeking the annulment of ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013 to deny,

for a second time, access to the inspection documents in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) after the Court annulled ESA’s first decision on 2l December 2012

in Case E-14/11. The contested decision was made under the new rules on public

access to documents that ESA enacted on 5 September 2012 by way of Decision

No 300/12/COL (not published in the Official Journal), which was given retroactive

effect to DB Schenker’s access request of 3 August 2010,

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THE PRESIDENT

makes the following

ORDER

I BACKGROUND

1 Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB and Schenker Privpak AS (hereinafter ‘the applicants’ or, collectively, ‘DB Schenker’) are part of the DB Schenker group. The group is a large European freight forwarding and logistics undertaking. It combines all the transport and logistics activities of Deutsche Bahn AG except passenger transport. Schenker Privpak AS, a limited liability company incorporated under Norwegian law, has handled DB Schenker’s domestic business-to-consumer (hereinafter ‘B-to-C’) parcel service in Norway. Schenker Privpak AB is a company incorporated in Sweden. Both Schenker Privpak AB and Schenker Privpak AS have handled international customers seeking B-to-C distribution in Norway.

2 The present case is a follow-up of Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA, in which the same applicants sought the annulment of ESA’s Decision in Case No 68736 of 16 August 2011 denying DB Schenker access to certain documents relating to Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak on the basis of the Rules on Access to Documents (‘RAD’) established by the College of the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 27 June 2008.

3 Judgment in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA was handed down on 21 December 2012. The Court annulled ESA’s decision of 16 August 2011 ‘Norway Post/Privpak – Access to documents’ insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak.


4 On 6 April 2013, DB Schenker lodged an application pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘SCA’) and separately lodged an application pursuant to Article 59a of the Rules of Procedure (‘RoP’) that the case be decided pursuant to an expedited procedure.

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5 DB Schenker seeks the annulment of ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013 denying access to the inspection documents in Case No. 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) following the Court’s judgment of 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA.


7 On 24 April 2013, Posten Norge AS (‘Norway Post’ or ‘applicant intervener’) sought leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the defendant. The application to intervene was served on the parties in accordance with Article 89(2) RoP.

8 On 8 May 2013, ESA lodged its written observations on the application to intervene at the Court’s Registry.

9 On 15 May 2013, DB Schenker lodged its written observations on the application to intervene at the Court’s Registry.

10 DB Schenker’s application for Case E-4/13 to be decided by way of an expedited procedure was denied, but the application that the case be given priority during the oral procedure was granted by Order of the President on 30 April 2013.

III OBSERVATIONS OF THE PARTIES

11 Norway Post submits that the application was lodged within the time limit set in Article 89(1) RoP, since notice of the application in Case E-4/13 has not yet been published in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal. Norway Post submits further that it has a direct and existing interest in the result of the case since DB Schenker’s application concerns a request for access to documents obtained by ESA during its inspection of Norway Post’s premises. Those documents were also at issue in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA. Norway Post notes that it was granted leave to intervene in that case. Furthermore, it submits that ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013 refused access to the contested documents because access would undermine the protection of Norway Post’s commercial interests.

12 The applicant intervener therefore contends that it should be granted leave to intervene pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Statute and Article 89(1) RoP.

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13 ESA states that the documents at issue in the present case continue to be the inspection documents seized from Norway Post’s premises in ESA Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak). ESA contends that Norway Post has a direct and existing interest in the form of order sought and refers in this connection to the Order of the President of 8 April 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA, not yet reported, paragraph 16.

14 Further, ESA submits that the applicant intervener enjoys a fundamental right to the protection of its professional secrets under EEA law, and, accordingly, to effective judicial protection as regards possible public access granted by the EFTA institutions to documents allegedly containing such professional secrets. ESA refers in this connection to the Order of the President of the General Court of 11 March 2013, in Case T-462/12 R Pilkington Group v Commission, not yet reported, paragraph 45. ESA submits that the application is timely and that the Court should grant the application to intervene.

15 DB Schenker submits that Norway Post was granted leave to intervene in the preceding Case E-14/11 in support of ESA, which essentially concerned the same subject matter as Case E-4/13. It therefore does not object to the application.

IV LAW

16 Under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute, any person establishing an interest in the result of any case submitted to the Court, save in cases between EFTA States or between EFTA States and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, may intervene in that case. Article 36(3) of the Statute provides that an application to intervene shall be limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the parties.

17 The Court has recognised the principle of procedural homogeneity and held that homogeneity cannot be restricted to the interpretation of provisions whose wording is identical in substance to parallel provisions of EU law (see Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA, cited above, paragraphs 77-78; Order of the President of 23 April 2012 in Case E-16/11 ESA v Iceland (‘Icesave’), paragraph 32). The need to apply that principle, namely in order to ensure equal access to justice for individuals and economic operators throughout the EEA, is less urgent with regard to

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rules concerning the modalities of the procedure when they mainly relate to the proper administration of the Court’s own functioning. Nonetheless, for reasons of expediency and in order to enhance legal certainty for all parties concerned, it is also in such cases appropriate, as a rule, to take the reasoning of the European Union courts into account when interpreting expressions of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure that are identical in substance to expressions in the equivalent provisions of Union law (see Order of the President of 30 April 2013 in Case E-4/13 DB Schenker v ESA, paragraph 24).

18 Article 36 of the Statute is essentially identical in substance to Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Accordingly, the principle of procedural homogeneity must also apply to the assessment of whether an applicant for intervention has established an interest in the result of the case (see the Orders of the President of 29 February 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA, paragraph 14, and of 15 February 2011 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, paragraph 9).

19 An interest in the result of a case within the sense of the Statute is to be understood as meaning that a person must establish a direct and existing interest in the grant of the form of order sought by the party whom it intends to support and, thus, in the ruling on the specific act whose annulment is sought (see Orders of the President of 29 February 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA, paragraph 15, of 25 March 2011 in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v ESA, paragraph 10, and of 15 February 2011 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, paragraph 9).

20 The contested decision of 7 February 2013 is a follow-up of the Court’s judgment of 2l December 2012 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA, in which the Court annulled ESA’s decision of 16 August 2011 ‘Norway Post/Privpak – Access to documents’ insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak. The inspection documents at issue were obtained during ESA’s inspections of Norway Post’s premises conducted between 21 and 24 June 2004. Consequently, Norway Post has established a direct and existing interest in supporting the defendant in the case pursuant to Article 36(2) SCA.

21 The Rules of Procedure of the ECJ as last amended on 24 May 2011 (‘ECJ RoP 2011’) were repealed and replaced by new Rules of Procedure

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adopted on 25 September 2012 (‘ECJ RoP 2012’), which entered into force on 1 November 2012. Article 89 RoP and Article 93 ECJ RoP 2011 are identical in substance. Articles 129 to 132 ECJ RoP 2012 constitute the refreshed procedural rules, and their interpretation remains of relevance in construing the same procedural notion (see, for comparison, Order of the President of 30 April 2013 in Case E-4/13 DB Schenker v ESA, paragraph 24).

22 Article 89(1) RoP provides that an application to intervene must be made within six weeks of the publication of the notice referred to in Article 14(6) RoP. Notice of the action is yet to appear in the EEA Section of the Official Journal of the European Union. Consequently, the time period in Article 89(1) RoP is yet to run and the present application to intervene, which was lodged at the Court’s Registry on 24 April 2013, is timely.

23 In light of the above, Posten Norge AS is granted leave to intervene in the case in support of the form of order sought by the defendant.

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On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT

hereby orders:

1. Posten Norge AS is granted leave to intervene in Case E-4/13 in support of the form of order sought by the defendant.

2. Costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 30 May 2013.


Registrar President

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in Case E-4/13

APPLICATION to the Court pursuant to Article 36 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice in the

case between

Schenker North AB, established in Gothenburg, Sweden,

Schenker Privpak AB, established in Borås, Sweden, and

Schenker Privpak AS, established in Oslo, Norway,

and

EFTA Surveillance Authority

seeking the annulment of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s (“ESA”) Decision of 7 February 2013 to deny, for a second time, access to the inspection documents in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) after the Court annulled ESA’s first decision on 21 December 2012 in Case E-14/11. The contested decision was made under the new rules on public access to documents that ESA enacted on 5 September 2012 by way of Decision No 300/12/COL (not published in the Official Journal), which was given retroactive effect to DB Schenker’s access request of 3 August 2010.

I INTRODUCTION

1. Schenker North AB and Schenker Privpak AB, both established in Sweden, and Schenker Privpak AS, established in Norway, (“the applicants” or, collectively, “DB Schenker”) are part of the DB Schenker group. The group is a large European freight forwarding and logistics undertaking. It combines all the transport and logistics activities of Deutsche Bahn AG except passenger transport. All three applicants operate in that sector.

2. By its decision of 14 July 2010, Decision No 322/10/COL, ESA found that Posten Norge AS (“Norway Post”) had committed an infringement of Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (“EEA”) in abusing its dominant position in the B-to-C parcel market with over-the-counter delivery in Norway between 2000 and 2006. ESA’s investigation in that case was initiated following

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a complaint received from DB Schenker on 24 June 2002 concerning the agreements made by Norway Post establishing Post-in-Shops in retail outlets. In the course of the investigation, ESA conducted an unannounced inspection of Norway Post’s premises between 21 and 24 June 2004 and seized various documents (“the inspection documents”).

3. Norway Post applied to the Court to have ESA’s decision annulled. The Court gave judgment in those proceedings on 18 April 2012 (Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 246 “Norway Post”).

4. The present case is a follow-up to Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1178 (“DB Schenker I”) in which the same applicants sought the annulment of ESA’s Decision in Case No 68736 of 16 August 2011 denying DB Schenker access to the inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak on the basis of the Rules on Access to Documents (“RAD”) established by the College of the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 27 June 2008.

5. In its judgment in DB Schenker I of 21 December 2012, the Court annulled ESA’s decision of 16 August 2011 “Norway Post/Privpak – Access to documents” insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak.

6. On 5 September 2012, ESA took Decision No 300/12/COL to adopt revised Rules on public access to documents (“RAD 2012”), and repealing Decision No 407/08/COL.

7. In its contested decision of 7 February 2013, ESA denied access to 229 of the inspection documents in full, granted partial access to 23 documents and granted full access to 91.

8. The application is based on four pleas, namely (i) that there has been an infringement of the principles of legal certainty and effective judicial protection insofar as the RAD 2012 have been given retroactive effect that is prejudicial to the rights that DB Schenker enjoyed under the RAD; (ii) an infringement of the commercial interest exception in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA; (iii) an infringement of the overriding public interest rule in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA; and, (iv) an infringement of the right to partial access in Article 4(9) RAD 2012

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and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA. As a consequence, DB Schenker also submits that ESA has infringed Article 38 SCA.

II LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law


1. The aim of this Agreement of association is to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Contracting Parties with equal conditions of competition, and the respect of the same rules, with a view to creating a homogeneous European Economic Area, hereinafter referred to as the EEA.

2. In order to attain the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the association shall entail, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement:

(a) the free movement of goods;

(b) the free movement of persons;

(c) the free movement of services;

(d) the free movement of capital;

(e) the setting up of a system ensuring that competition is not distorted and that the rules thereon are equally respected; as well as

(f) closer cooperation in other fields, such as research and development, the environment, education and social policy.


1. The representatives, delegates and experts of the Contracting Parties, as well as officials and other servants acting under this Agreement shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.

11. Article 2 of the Act referred to at point 6 of Annex XVI to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods,

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dates and time limits), as adapted to the Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto reads as follows:

1. For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘public holidays’ means all days designated as such in the Member State or in the Community institution in which action is to be taken.

To this end, each Member State shall transmit to the Commission the list of days designated as public holidays in its laws. The Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the European Communities the lists transmitted by the Member States, to which shall be added the days designated as public holidays in the Community institutions.

2. For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘working days’ means all days other than public holidays, Sundays and Saturdays.

12. Article 13 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”) reads:

The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

13. Article 14 SCA reads:

The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall appoint officials and other servants to enable it to function.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority may consult experts or decide to set up such committees and other bodies as it considers necessary to assist it in accomplishing its tasks.

In the performance of their duties, officials and other servants of the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall neither seek nor accept instructions from any Government or from any body external to the EFTA Surveillance Authority.

Members of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, officials and other servants thereof as well as members of committees shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.


Decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall state the reasons on which they are based.

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If a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority has been declared void or if it has been established that the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in infringement of this Agreement or of the provisions of the EEA Agreement, has failed to act, the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment.

This obligation shall not affect any obligation which may result from the application of Article 46, second paragraph.

16. Article 28 of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA on professional secrecy reads:

1. Without prejudice to Article 9 of Protocol 23 to the EEA Agreement and Articles 12 and 15 of this Chapter, information collected pursuant to Articles 17 to 22 or of Article 58 of the EEA Agreement and Protocol 23 thereto, shall be used only for the purpose for which it was acquired.

2. Without prejudice to the exchange and to the use of information foreseen in Articles 11, 12, 14, 15 and 27, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the competition authorities of the EFTA States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities of the EFTA States shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to this Chapter or Article 58 of the EEA Agreement and Protocol 23 thereto and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This obligation also applies to all representatives and experts of EFTA States attending meetings of the Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 14.

This obligation shall also apply to the representatives of the EC Commission and of the EC Member States who participate in the Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 14(2)of this Chapter and in the hearing pursuant to Article 14(3) of Chapter III.

Protocol 5 on the Statute of the EFTA Court

17. The first and second paragraphs of Article 17 of Protocol 5 on the Statute of the EFTA Court read:

The EFTA States, the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the Community and the EC Commission shall be represented before the Court by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer.

Other parties must be represented by a lawyer.

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Rules of Procedure of the EFTA Court

18. Article 33 (5) and (6) of the Rules of Procedure of the EFTA Court (“RoP”) reads:

5. An application made by a legal person governed by private law shall be accompanied by:

(a) the instrument or instruments constituting or regulating that legal person or a recent extract from the register of companies, firms or associations or any other proof of its existence in law;

(b) proof that the authority granted to the applicant’s lawyer has been properly conferred on him by someone authorized for the purpose.

6. If an application does not comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of this Article, the Registrar shall prescribe a reasonable period within which the applicant is to comply with them whether by putting the application itself in order or by producing any of the above-mentioned documents. If the applicant fails to put the application in order or to produce the required documents within the time prescribed, the Court shall decide whether the non-compliance with these conditions renders the application formally inadmissible.

19. Article 61 RoP reads:

1. The judgment shall be delivered in open court; the parties shall be given notice to attend to hear it.

2. The original of the judgment, signed by the President, by the Judges who took part in the deliberations and by the Registrar, shall be sealed and deposited at the Registry; the parties shall be served with certified copies of the judgment.

3. The Registrar shall record on the original of the judgment the date on which it was delivered.

20. Article 62 RoP reads:

The judgment shall be binding from the date of its delivery.

21. The Court has complied a synopsis of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (“Regulation No 1049/2001”), EFTA Surveillance Authority

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Decision of 27 June 2008 to adopt new Rules on Public Access to documents, Decision 407/08/COL (“RAD”), and EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision of 5 September 2012 to adopt revised Rules on public access to documents, and repealing Decision 407/08/COL, Decision 300/12/COL (“RAD 2012”).

Regulation 1049/2001 RAD RAD 2012

Preamble Preamble PreambleTHE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE

AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

(1) The second subparagraph of Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union enshrines the concept of openness, stating that the Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.

(2) Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective

Whereas openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system, based on democracy and human rights, as referred to in recital 1 of the preamble of the EEA Agreement,

Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system based on democracy and human rights, as referred to in recital 1 of the preamble of the EEA Agreement,

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PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. Openness contributes to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights as laid down in Article 6 of the EU Treaty and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.(4) The purpose of this Regulation is to give the fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents and to lay down the general principles and limits on such access in accordance with Article 255(2) of the EC Treaty.

(11) In principle, all documents of the

Whereas the purpose of these Rules is to ensure the highest degree possible of openness and transparency at the Authority, while still showing due concern to the necessary limitations due to protection of professional secrecy, legal proceedings and internal deliberations, where this is deemed

The purpose of these Rules is to ensure openness and transparency at the Authority, while still showing due concern for the necessary limitations due to protection of professional secrecy, legal proceedings and internal deliberations, where this is deemed necessary in order to safeguard the

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

institutions should be accessible to the public. However, certain public and private interests should be protected by way of exceptions. The institutions should be entitled to protect their internal consultations and deliberations where necessary to safeguard their ability to carry out their tasks. In assessing the exceptions, the institutions should take account of the principles in Community legislation concerning the protection of personal data, in all areas of

necessary in order to safeguard the Authority’s ability to carry out its tasks,

Authority’s ability to carry out its tasks,

(14) Each institution should take the measures necessary to inform the public of the new provisions in force and to train its staff to assist citizens

Whereas the Authority wishes, to adopt rules on access to documents substantively similar to Regulation 1049/2001 of the

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

exercising their rights under this Regulation. In order to make it easier for citizens to exercise their rights, each institution should provide access to a register of documents.

European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents,

Whereas the Authority will in the application of the rules strive to achieve a homogeneous interpretation with that of the Community Courts and the European Ombudsman when interpreting a provision of these which is identical to a provision in Regulation 1049/2001 so as to ensure at least the same degree of openness as provided for by the Regulation,

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

Whereas the EFTA Surveillance Authority should take the necessary measures to inform the public of the new Rules on access to documents and to train its staff to assist citizens to exercise their rights. In order to facilitate for citizens to exercise their rights, the Authority should provide access to a register of documents,

The Authority should take the necessary measures to inform the public of the new Rules on public access to documents and to train its staff to assist citizens to exercise their rights. In order to facilitate the exercise by citizens of their rights, the Authority should provide access to a register of documents,

Article 1.

Purpose

The purpose of this Regulation is:

Article 1.

Purpose


Article 1.

Purpose


(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the right of access to European Parliament, Council

(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the right of access to EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter

(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the right of access to documents held by the Authority,

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

and Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the institutions”) documents provided for in Article 255 of the EC Treaty in such a way as to ensure the widest possible access to documents,

“the Authority”) documents produced or held by the Authority in such a way as to ensure the widest possible access to documents,


(b) to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right,


(c) to promote good administrative practice on access to documents.

(c) and to promote good administrative practice on access to documents.

(c) to promote good administrative practice relating to access to documents.

Article 2.

Beneficiaries and scope

Article 2.


Article 2.


1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the

1. Any citizen of an EEA State, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in an EEA State, has a right of access to documents of the

1. Any natural or legal person has a right to request access to documents of the Authority, subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in these Rules.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

institutions, subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in this Regulation.

Authority, subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in these Rules.

2. The institutions may, subject to the same principles, conditions and limits, grant access to documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a Member State.

2. The Authority may, subject to the same principles, conditions and limits, grant access to documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in an EEA State.

3. This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union.

3. These Rules shall apply to all documents held by the Authority, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the Authority.

2. These Rules shall apply to documents drawn up or received by the Authority and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the Authority.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

4. Without prejudice to Articles 4 and 9, documents shall be made accessible to the public either following a written application or directly in electronic form or through a register. In particular, documents drawn up or received in the course of a legislative procedure shall be made directly accessible in accordance with Article 12.

4. Without prejudice to Article 4, documents shall be made accessible to the public either following a written application or directly in electronic form or through a register.

3. Without prejudice to Article 4, documents shall be made accessible to the public either following a written application or directly in electronic form or through a register.

6. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to rights of public access to documents held by the institutions which might follow from instruments of international law or acts of the institutions implementing them.

5. These Rules shall be without prejudice to rights of public access to documents held by the Authority which might follow from instruments of international or EEA law.

4. These Rules shall be without prejudice to rights of public access to documents held by the Authority which might follow from instruments of international or EEA law.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

Article 3.

Definitions

For the purpose of this Regulation:

Article 3.

Definitions

For the purpose of these Rules:

Article 3.

Definitions

For the purpose of these Rules:

(a) “document” shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution’s sphere of responsibility;

(a) ‘document’ shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the Authority’s sphere of responsibility;

(a) ‘document’ shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the Authority’s sphere of responsibility, except unfinished documents or drafts of documents;

(b) “third party” shall mean any natural or legal person, or any entity outside the institution concerned, including the Member States, other Community or non-Community institutions and bodies and third countries.

(b) ‘third party’ shall mean any natural or legal person, or any entity other than the Authority, including the EFTA States, EFTA and European Community institutions and bodies and third countries.

(b) ‘third party’ shall mean any natural or legal person, or any entity other than the Authority, including the EFTA States, EFTA and institutions and bodies of the European Union and third countries.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

Article 4.

Exceptions

Article 4.

Exceptions

Article 4.

Exceptions2. Unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure, the Authority shall refuse access to a document:

(a) relating to any pending proceedings or open investigation conducted by the Authority pursuant to its powers laid down in Protocols 3 and 4 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. Proceedings are pending and investigations are open within the meaning of this provision until such time as the Authority can no longer be called upon to recommence them;

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

(b) relating to gathering, obtaining or receiving information from natural or legal persons in the framework of investigations conducted by the Authority pursuant to its powers laid down in Protocols 3 and 4 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice;

1. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of:

…

1. The Authority shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of:

…


…

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data.

(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with EEA legislation regarding the protection of personal data.

(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with EEA legislation regarding the protection of personal data.

2. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of:



– the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,

unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.





unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

4. Authority shall refuse access to a document, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure, where disclosure would undermine the protection of:




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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

3. Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

3. Access to a document, drawn up by the Authority for internal use or received by the Authority, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the Authority, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the Authority’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure

5. The Authority shall refuse access to a document which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the Authority, if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the Authority’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would

4. Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the Authority concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

the document would seriously undermine the Authority’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

6. The Authority shall refuse access to Authority internal memos or notes and Authority internal communication, except if such memos, notes or communication set out a final decision unavailable in any other form, or if there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

7. The Authority shall refuse access to its internal manuals, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

4. As regards third-party documents, the institution shall consult the third party with a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed.






7. The exceptions as laid down in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall only apply for the period during which protection is



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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

justified on the basis of the content of the document. The exceptions may apply for a maximum period of 30 years. In the case of documents covered by the exceptions relating to privacy or commercial interests and in the case of sensitive documents, the exceptions may, if necessary, continue to apply after this period.



Article 7.

Processing of initial applications

Article 7.

Processing of applications

Article 7.

Processing of applications

1. An application for access to a document shall be handled promptly. An acknowledgement of receipt shall be sent to the applicant. Within 15 working days from registration of the application, the

1. An application for access to a document shall be handled as quickly as possible. An acknowledgement of receipt shall be sent to the applicant. As a main rule, the Authority shall either grant access to the

2. An application for access to a document shall be handled as quickly as possible. An acknowledgement of receipt shall be sent to the applicant. As a main rule, the Authority shall either grant access to the

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

institution shall either grant access to the document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 10 within that period or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal and inform the applicant of his or her right to make a confirmatory application in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.

document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 8 or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal within 5 working days from registration of the application.

document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 8 or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal within 10 working days from registration of the application.

3. In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a very large number of documents, the time-limit provided for in paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working days, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given.

2. In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a very large number of documents, the time-limit provided for in paragraph 1 may be extended by 20 working days, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given.

3. In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a long document or to a large number of documents, the time-limit provided for in paragraph 2 may be extended by 30 working days. The Authority shall notify the applicant thereof as quickly as possible.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

4. In cases where the Authority consults third parties in accordance with Article 4(8) of these Rules, the time-limit provided for in paragraph 2 or 3 above may be suspended, for the documents concerned and for as long as the consultation is pending. The Authority shall inform the applicant of any such suspension as quickly as possible, and the Authority shall endeavour to complete any such consultation within a reasonable time.

4. Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall entitle the applicant to make a confirmatory application.

5. Failure by the Authority to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall entitle the applicant to make a confirmatory application under paragraph 6 below.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

2. In the event of a total or partial refusal, the applicant may, within 15 working days of receiving the institution’s reply, make a confirmatory application asking the institution to reconsider its position.

6. In the event of total or partial refusal, the applicant may, within 30 working days of receiving the Authority’s reply, make a confirmatory application asking the Authority to reconsider its position. Paragraphs 1 to 4 above apply. The Decision of the Authority shall be adopted by the College Member responsible for public access to documents. In the event of confirmation of the total or partial refusal, the Authority shall inform the applicant of the remedies open to him or her by instituting court proceedings against the Authority under the conditions laid down

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

in Article 36 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. Failure by the Authority to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall be considered as a negative reply and thus also entitle the applicant to institute such court proceedings.

Article 15.

Administrative practice in the

institutions

Article 11.

Administrative practice of the

Authority

Article 11.

Administrative practice of the

AuthorityThe institutions shall develop good administrative practices in order to facilitate the exercise of the right of access guaranteed by this Regulation.

The Authority shall develop good administrative practices in order to facilitate the exercise of the right of access guaranteed by these Rules.

The Authority shall develop good administrative practices in order to facilitate the exercise of the right of access guaranteed by these Rules.

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UNION,


AUTHORITY,


AUTHORITY,

Article 19.

Entry into force

Article 13.

Entry into force

Article 13.

Entry into forceThis Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

These Rules shall be applicable from 30 June 2008 and apply to requests for access to documents submitted to the Authority after that date.

These Rules shall enter into force on the day following the adoption of the present Decision and shall apply to all access requests decided upon from that date onwards. From the same time, Decision 407/08/COL of 27 June 2008 to adopt new Rules on Public Access to documents, is repealed.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

The Authority shall publish these Rules in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union.

The Authority shall make these Rules available on its website.

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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)

22. Article 8 ECHR reads:

Right to respect for private and family life

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

EU law referred to by the parties

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)

23. Article 15(3) TFEU reads:

Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph.

24. Article 339 TFEU reads:

The members of the institutions of the Union, the members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

25. Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) reads as follows:

Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.

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26. Article 42 of the Charter reads:

Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, whatever their medium.

III FACTS AND PRE-LITIGATION PROCEDURE

27. In the course of the investigation concerning Norway Post’s behaviour under Article 54 EEA, ESA conducted inspections of Norway Post’s premises between 21 and 24 June 2004. On 14 July 2010, ESA adopted Decision No 322/10/COL in which it found that Norway Post had abused its dominant position in the B-to-C parcel market with over-the-counter delivery in Norway between 20 September 2000 and 31 March 2006. ESA ordered Norway Post, insofar as it had not already done so, to bring the infringement to an end and to refrain from further abusive conduct, and imposed a fine of EUR 12 890 000 on Norway Post.

28. On 14 September 2010, Norway Post lodged an application with the Court under the second paragraph of Article 36 SCA seeking annulment of Decision No 322/10/COL. In a judgment handed down on 18 April 2012, the Court in Norway Post reduced the fine imposed by ESA on Norway Post to EUR 11 112 000 due to the excessive duration of ESA’s investigation, and dismissed the remainder of the application.

29. DB Schenker Is pursuing a follow-on damages claim against Norway Post in the Norwegian courts for losses allegedly caused by the infringement of Article 54 EEA.

30. On 27 June 2008, ESA adopted Decision No 407/08/COL on Rules on Access to Documents. These rules essentially reproduce the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. While the contents of the RAD and Regulation No 1049/2001 are essentially the same, the RAD does not include the recitals to the Regulation.

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31. On 3 August 2010, DB Schenker sent an email to ESA requesting access to the file in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak), in preparation of its damages claim against Norway Post in the Norwegian courts.

32. Subsequently, there were numerous communications between DB Schenker and ESA concerning the scope of the request for access to the file, the deadline for completion of the request and delays. DB Schenker contacted ESA by email on 4 August 2010, 11 August 2010, 30 August 2010, 6 September 2010, 14 September 2010, 17 September 2010 and 18 February 2011, and by letter on 9 November 2010, 6 January 2011 and 17 February 2011. ESA replied to DB Schenker by email on 4 August 2010, 10 August 2010, 18 August 2010, 30 August 2010, 1 September 2010 and 17 September 2010, and by letter on 5 November 2010, 10 November 2010, 16 February 2011, 18 February 2011 and 16 August 2011.

33. DB Schenker was granted access to documents in Case No 34250 on 30 August 2010, 5 November 2010, 16 February 2011 and 16 August 2011.

34. ESA’s letter of 16 August 2011 denied access to 352 of 354 inspection documents in the case file obtained during the inspection of Norway Post’s premises in June 2004. This decision was challenged before the Court in DB Schenker I. In that case, on 21 December 2012, the Court annulled ESA’s decision of 16 August 2011 “Norway Post/Privpak–Access to documents” insofar as it denied full or partial access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 Norway Post/Privpak which had been obtained by the ESA during an inspection of the premises of Norway Post between 21 and 24 June 2004.

35. The Court stated that it required ESA “in the interests of justice, transparency and good administration ESA to adopt a new decision within the time limits contained in Article 7 RAD on access to the inspection documents by the applicant” (see DB Schenker I, paragraph 283).

36. On 9 January 2013, ESA wrote to and emailed Norway Post (Event No 658190) inviting the company to identify any confidential information and justification for any refusal of public access to the inspection documents. ESA made clear that if Norway Post made no substantiated claims of confidentiality within 10 working days, i.e. by 23 January 2013, ESA

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would assume that it had no objections to full disclosure of the documents concerned and would proceed accordingly without further delay. The letter included instructions as to how to submit confidentiality claims.

37. On 21 January 2013, Norway Post requested an extension of the deadline by three working days (Event No 660973).

38. On 23 January 2013, ESA granted Norway Post’s request so that the deadline was extended to 28 January 2013 (Event No 660974).

39. By emails of 28 January 2013, Norway Post replied to ESA’s letter of 9 January 2013 (Event Nos. 660977 and 660978) with both a confidential (Event No 660976) and non-confidential version (Event No 660982) of its reply.

40. On 29 January 2013, ESA informed DB Schenker that it had received Norway Post’s reply the previous day and was “now re-assessing the file against the background of the reply” and would “get back to you shortly” (Event No 661007). This included a copy of the non-confidential version of Norway Post’s reply.

41. On 30 January 2013, ESA granted public access to 86 inspection documents in full by email (Event No 661256): “CKO 1, 22-28; COD 1, 2; PAB 1, 3-5, 9-10, 16,18, 21, 24, 25; KBJ 2-3, 9, 14, 19 -35, 43, 53, 54, 57, 60, 71-75, 77, 80, 85; TJO 3, 62, 69, 70, 72-77, 79, 81-83, 85-89, 95, 99, 100; LKP 19, 20; MH 18; JMJ 2-6, 8”. ESA stated in this email “[t]o be clear, the present e-mail does not entail that a position has been taken on the remaining inspection documents at issue and does not imply a refusal, in whole or in part, of public access to those documents. The Authority is now re-assessing those documents in light of the abovementioned letter from Norway Post and the EFTA Court’s judgment of 21 December 2013 in Case E-14/11 DB Schenker. The Authority will take a position and address a decision to you shortly”.

42. On 31 January 2013, DB Schenker wrote to (Event No 661364) and emailed (Event No 661362) the President of ESA asserting that the time limit for ESA to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment in DB Schenker I, pursuant to Article 38 SCA, expired on 30 January 2013. DB Schenker noted that “since your staff has already overrun ESA’s extended time limit, DB Schenker expects to see only a

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minor delay before a final decision is made, in full compliance with the reasoning of the Court.”

43. On 1 February 2013, ESA responded to DB Schenker’s letter of the previous day (Event No 661442). ESA stated that it would take a decision on public access to the remaining inspection documents, and communicate the decision to DB Schenker by 7 February 2013.

44. On 5 February 2013, Norway Post sent an email (Event No 661841) to ESA concerning three inspection documents that it had failed to address in its emails of 28 January 2013.

45. On 7 February 2013, ESA adopted the contested decision.

46. By application lodged at the Court on 6 April 2013, DB Schenker brought an action seeking the annulment of the decision insofar as it denied access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak).

IV THE CONTESTED DECISION

47. The relevant paragraphs at issue in the contested decision are set out in full below.

“2 DECISION UNDER THE AUTHORITY’S REVISED RULES OF 2012 ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS

(14) As the Schenker judgment annulled the decision contained in the Authority’s letter of 16 August 2011, insofar as it had denied full or partial public access to the inspection documents related to the Authority’s case no 34250 (Norway Post /Privpak), that decision must be replaced. Whereas the annulled decision was adopted under the Authority’s previous Rules on public access to documents (Decision 407/08/COL; ‘RAD’), the new decision replacing it is hereby adopted under the Authority’s revised Rules on public access to documents (Decision 300/12/COL; ‘RAD 2012’).

(15) As from 6 September 2012, the RAD 2012 replaced the RAD 2008: according to Article 13 of the RAD 2012, the RAD 2008 were ‘repealed’ and the RAD 2012 ‘shall be applicable to all access requests decided upon from that date onwards’. The Schenker judgment did not re-enact the RAD 2008 and did not invalidate the RAD 2012. The Authority must, therefore, apply its RAD 2012.

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(16) However, when applying the RAD 2012 in adopting a new decision to replace the annulled decision, it follows from the judgment delivered in this case that it is no longer open to the Authority in the present case to ‘raise arguments based on the applicability of a general presumption’ against public access. More specifically, this is because the EFTA Court found that the annulled decision in this case made ‘no reference ... to a general presumption’ and, ‘in as many words, states that ESA conducted a concrete, individual assessment of the content of all the documents’ (para. 190 of the judgment). Accordingly, in order to abide by its obligation under Article 38 SCA to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment, the Authority finds that, in the present case, it also cannot rely on Article 4(2)(b) of the RAD 2012, which foresees that, as a rule, access to inspection documents shall be refused. This provision is equally a form of presumption against public access that, in the present case, it is no longer open to the Authority to rely on. Whereas the Authority would otherwise be obliged to apply this provision, it follows from Article 38 SCA that, when adopting a new decision in the present case, the provision must be left unapplied.”

…

“4. PUBLIC ACCESS IS GRANTED IN PART TO 23 INSPECTION DOCUMENTS

Protection of commercial interests

(19) The Authority considers that the 23 inspection documents addressed in this section contain information that would undermine the protection of commercial interests of Norway Post’s within the meaning of Article 4(4) first indent of the RAD 2012.

For the sake of good order the Authority notes that the exception now set out in Article 4(4) first indent of the RAD 2012, which is relied upon here, remains the same as Article 4(2) first indent of the RAD 2008 and Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

(20) The 23 inspection documents at issue may be addressed in three groups, of respectively 11, 2 and 10 documents.

(21) For the first group Norway Post claims that the 11 documents identified and described below contain, on the pages indicated, certain

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information on Norway Post’s strategic business policies, priorities, plans and/or practices - information that Norway Post regards as core business secrets. According to Norway Post, full public access to these documents would cause significant and irreparable harm to its commercial interests. The sensitive information contained in the documents could, inter alia, be misused by Norway Post’s competitors to predict, and adapt to Norway Post’s market behaviour. The information could, moreover, be misused by Norway Post’s customers for instance in relation to contractual negotiations with Norway Post. Norway Post has submitted redacted versions of the documents accordingly.

– CKO 5 (pp. 2, 4): Internal strategy document concerning joint promotion with B2C customers, as well as certain information on Norway Post’s assessment of specific customers and suggested test customers.

– COD 3 (p. 2), COD 4 (p. 2): Information on price developments/assessment of price increases to certain customers.

– PAB 6 (pp. 6 – 15): Internal presentation on consumer strategy.

– PAB 7 (pp. 6 – 8): Internal presentation. Certain slides contain analyses of competitors.

– PAB 8 (pp. 7 – 9): Internal presentation concerning consignee strategies.

– KBJ 67 (p. 2): Internal strategy document. Information on/assessment of possible alliance partner.

– KBJ 81 (p. 3): Internal report. Detailed information on specific customers of competitors, as well as assessment of volumes and the prospects of concluding a commercial agreement.

– TJO 46 (p. 1): Internal agenda for a leader meeting. Strategic assessments of competitors and customers.

– TJO 47 (pp. 8 – 26): Internal report. Information on/assessment of Norway Post’s discount model which constitutes the basis for the current discount model.

– KBJ 1 (pp. l, 2, 4, 7, 14, 15): Internal status report to Norway Post’s board of directors. Information on/assessment of various customer relations as well as a specific arbitration case.

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(22) The Authority has reassessed the documents and sees that the information that Norway Post has proposed to redact is indeed information on the undertaking’s strategic business policies, priorities, plans and/or practices; and that this is information that Norway Post may justifiably regard as its core business secrets, even today. It is clear that the information contained in the documents could, inter alia, be exploited by Norway Post’s competitors to predict, and adapt to its market behaviour; and that the information could be exploited by Norway Post’s customers for instance in relation to contractual negotiations.

(23) Whilst the documents are all more than five years old (cf. the Schenker judgment, para. 277), the Authority takes the view that the information at issue can still be considered sensitive today. Whereas according to the Authority’s Notice on ‘Access to file’ (to be distinguished from public access to documents) point 23, ‘[a]s a general rule’, the Authority ‘presumes that information pertaining to the parties’ turnover, sales, market-share data and similar information which is more than 5 years old is no longer confidential’, information may remain sensitive for longer.1 The presumption in the Notice on Access to file is not without exception and does not squarely fit the specific circumstances of the present case. In particular, the present case concerns a market that is still very much the same today as it was at the time the documents were produced. Largely the same services and products are offered, and to largely the same customers. Against this background, and in light of Norway Post’s submissions, the Authority is satisfied that the information, despite its age, still constitutes essential elements of Norway Post’s commercial position.

(24) Accordingly, public access to this information about Norway Post’s business activity could result in a serious harm to Norway Post, even considering the age of the documents. The Authority therefore

1 The Authority’s Notice on the rules for access to the EFTA Surveillance Authority file in Cases pursuant to Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement, OJ 2007 C 250, p. 16 and EEA Supplement to the OJ 2007 No 50, p. 1, point 23. The corresponding EU document is the Commission’s Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ 2005 C 325, p. 7, point 23.

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considers that the information constitutes business secrets; 2 that the information is of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 122 EEA (corresponding to Article 339 TFEU), Article l4 fourth paragraph SCA and Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA; and that it is covered by the protection of commercial interests under Article 4(4) first indent of the RAD 2012.

(25) For the second group Norway Post claims that the 2 documents identified and described below contain, on the pages indicated, information on specific discounts in two distribution agreements with Norway Post’s customers. According to Norway Post, this information is still sensitive today as it reveals Norway Post’s bargaining range, either if viewed in isolation or if such information is publicly available and aggregated across several customers. This information may be misused by customers in negotiations with Norway Post, by Norway Post’s customers in their competitive relations with other customers or by Norway Post’s competitors. Norway Post has submitted redacted versions of the documents accordingly.

– KBJ 48 (pp. 1 – 4): Internal document concerning overview of agreements. The list includes discounts to specific customers. The discounts are redacted.

– KBJ 78 (pp. 1 – 2): Internal document concerning overview of agreements. The list includes discounts to specific customers. The discounts are redacted.

(26) The Authority has reassessed the documents and sees that the information that Norway Post has proposed to redact is indeed information on specific discounts in two distribution agreements with the undertaking’s customers. The Authority also sees that the information remains sensitive, even today, as it reveals Norway Post’s bargaining range, either if viewed in isolation or if publicly available and aggregated across several customers. To the Authority it is clear that the information may be exploited by customers of Norway Post’s

2 Compare the Authority’s Notice on the rules for access to the EFTA Surveillance Authority file in Cases pursuant to Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement, cited, above, point 18. The corresponding EU document is the Commission’s Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 8l and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, cited above, point 18.

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in negotiations with the undertaking, by customers in their competitive relations with other customers or by Norway Post’s competitors.

(27) Whilst the documents are all more than five years old (cf. the Schenker judgment, para. 277), the Authority takes the view that the information at issue can still be considered sensitive today; the same considerations apply as set out in para. 23 above.

(28) Accordingly, public access to this information about Norway Post’s business activity could result in a serious harm to Norway Post, even considering the age of the documents. The Authority therefore considers that the information constitutes business secrets; that the information is of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 122 EEA (corresponding to Article 339 TFEU), Article 14 fourth paragraph SCA and Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA; and that it is covered by the protection of commercial interests under Article 4(4) first indent of the RAD 2012.

(29) For the third group Norway Post claims that the 10 documents identified and described below contain, on the pages indicated, various information on volumes, prices, names of important customers, prices for various weight groups and zones, etc. The information is very detailed, and is still considered very sensitive by Norway Post. The sensitive information contained in the documents could, inter alia, be misused by Norway Post’s competitors to predict, and adapt to Norway Post’s market behaviour. The information could, moreover, be misused by Norway Post’s customers for instance in relation to contractual negotiations with Norway Post.

– CKO 7 (pp. 9 – 12): Detailed information on volumes, prices, and revenue related to specific product groups. The names of certain product groups have been deleted.

– KBJ 52 (p. 3; and 4): Detailed information on revenues from certain product groups; and top l0 customers’ turnover vs. budget.

– KBJ 55 (p. 9): Name of top ten customers within a specified segment and information on number of parcels/cash on delivery by post and ratio.

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– KBJ 61 (pp. 2 – 4) and KBJ 62 (pp. 4 – 7): Internal strategy documents. Assessment of per cent number of future price increase, per cent number of parcels/zone ratio, price effect per cent number.

– KBJ 65 (pp. 4, 7, 8): Internal strategy document. Detailed information on customers within a certain product segment.

– KBJ 70 (pp. 3 – 6) and KBJ 76 (pp. 3 – 6): Internal strategy documents. Top 10 customers’ turnover vs. budget, name of customers and top 10 customers within logistics (budget vs. sales).

– KBJ 83 (pp. 1 – 5): Detailed information on price developments showing volumes and prices divided by weight groups and zones.

– KBJ 4 (p. 22): Internal report. Information on 10 largest customers.

(30) The Authority has reassessed the documents and sees that the information that Norway Post has proposed to redact is indeed information on volumes, prices, names of important customers, prices for various weight groups and zones, etc. Moreover, the information is very detailed, and the Authority sees how the information can still be very sensitive to Norway Post. The information could, inter alia, be exploited by Norway Post’s competitors to predict, and adapt to its market behaviour. Also, the information could clearly be exploited by customers e.g. in relation to contractual negotiations with Norway Post.


(32) Accordingly, public access to this information about Norway Post’s business activity could result in a serious harm to Norway Post, even considering the age of the documents. The Authority therefore considers that the information constitutes business secrets; that the information is of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 122 EEA (corresponding to Article 339 TFEU), Article 14 fourth paragraph SCA and Article 28(2) of Chapter

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II of Protocol 4 SCA; and that it is covered by the protection of commercial interests under Article 4(4) first indent of the RAD 2012.

No overriding public interest

(33) Next, the Authority must assess whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

(34) As set out above, the Authority considers the information at issue to be of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy under Article 122 EEA, which corresponds to Article 339 TFEU. Accordingly, the members and officials of the Authority are obliged not to disclose such information. A corresponding obligation is laid down in Article 14 fourth paragraph SCA, and in Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA. Whereas these provisions cannot be read in isolation (cf. para. 27l of the Schenker judgment), it must follow that any public interest would have to be very strong in order to override this obligation, and accordingly justify disclosure of the information to the public in general, with no restrictions on the use of the information. The Authority recalls that when granting public access to documents pursuant to the RAD 2012, as under the RAD 2008 and equally Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, no restrictions can be placed on the use of the information.

(35) In the Schenker judgment, para. 240, the EFTA Court held that transparency ‘may constitute an overriding public interest by enabling the public to ensure that ESA is acting in an adequate and proper manner in the light of the principle of good administration’; and in the Schenker judgment, para. 24l, the EFTA Court held that the private enforcement of competition law ‘may constitute an overriding public interest and should be encouraged, since it can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the EEA’. Given that transparency and private enforcement of competition must thus be considered public interests, the issue in the present case is whether these interest override the obligations to protect the commercial interests at issue.

(36) Accordingly, the Authority has in particular assessed whether the interest in transparency and/or the interest in private enforcement of competition law in this case may override the protection of the commercial interests at issue, and justify unrestricted disclosure of

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the information to the public in general. However, the Authority finds this not to be the case here, even taking particular account of the age of the documents. In the present case, the Authority cannot see that the interests in transparency and private enforcement of competition law could be considered strong enough, individually or together, to override the protection of the commercial interests at issue.

(37) As to transparency, this conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the Authority’s handling of case no 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) has already been reviewed by the EFTA Court, namely in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, judgment of 18 April 2012, not yet reported.

(38) As to the private enforcement of competition law, the conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that public enforcement has taken place (see again Case E- 15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, judgment of 18 April 2012, not yet reported).

(39) Also the existence of the so-called Zwartveld procedure further strengthens the conclusion in this respect. This procedure is a more proportionate means of aiding private enforcement of competition law, than granting access to the information to the public in general, with no restrictions on use. Your clients may avail themselves of their EEA right to request the Norwegian courts to be provided, under the rules on sincere cooperation between national courts and the Authority, with case specific pieces of evidence from the Authority’s case file. This so-called Zwartveld procedure grants privileged access to such information, and under certain circumstances even to business secrets.3 The right exists in the EFTA pillar of the EEA Agreement pursuant to Article 6 EEA.

(40) The Authority adds that public access to the information at issue in the present case could entail a risk of undermining competition: first, public access to the information could possibly allow competitors

3 Order of the Court of Justice of 13 July 1990 in Case C-2/88--IMM Zwartveld a.o. [1990] ECR I-3365 and the Authority’s Notice on the co-operation between the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the courts of the EFTA States in the application of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, OJ 2006 C 305, p. 19 and EEA Supplement to the OJ 2006 No 62, p. 21 points 15 and 21 – 26. The corresponding EU document is the Commission’s Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 54, points 15 and 21 – 26.

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(potential and actual) to align their practices, with a collusive effect on the market in result, or, second, provide competitors with an unfair advantage in the competition with Norway Post. Such effects would be contrary to the objective of the EEA Agreement to provide for a system ensuring that competition is not distorted, see Article 1(2)(e) EEA.

(41) Finally, the Authority has assessed whether any other public interest could justify public access in the present case. However, the Authority has not been able to identify any such public interest.

Conclusion

(42) In accordance with the above, the Authority grants partial access to the said 23 documents, in accordance with Article 4(9) of the RAD 2012, and as proposed by Norway Post. Copies of the redacted versions of the documents are annexed to the present letter.

For the sake of good order the Authority notes that the rule now set out in Article 4(9) of the RAD 2012, which is relied upon here, remains the same as Article 4(6) of the RAD 2008 and Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

5. PUBLIC ACCESS IS REFUSED TO 229 INSPECTION DOCUMENTS

Protection of commercial interests

(43) The Authority considers that the 229 inspection documents addressed in this section contain information that would undermine the protection of commercial interests of Norway Post’s within the meaning of Article 4(4) first indent of the RAD 2012. The 229 inspection documents at issue may be addressed in three groups, of respectively 61, 124 and 42 documents.

(44) For the first group Norway Post claims that the 61 documents identified and described below contain information on its strategic business policies, processes, priorities, plans and/or practices – information that Norway Post regards as its core business secrets. According to Norway Post, public access to these documents would cause significant and irreparable harm to its commercial interests. The sensitive information contained in the documents could, inter alia, be misused by Norway Post’s competitors to predict, and adapt to

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Norway Post’s market behaviour. The information could, moreover, be misused by Norway Post’s customers for instance in relation to contractual negotiations with Norway Post. By consequence, Norway Post claims, the Authority should refuse public access to these documents to prevent the infliction of serious harm to its business operations.

– CKO 2: An internal presentation concerning volume calculations for ready-to wear clothing customers. The presentation contains assessments of different methods for calculation of volumes/prices. The presentation also includes information on volumes and prices to specific customers.

– CKO 3, 4: Two internal presentations concerning business cases of two specific B2B customers of Norway Post’s. The presentations contain strategic internal assessments of alternative logistic solutions and offers, as well as detailed information about costs, volumes, prices, and profit margins.

– CKO 6: An internal presentation concerning the discount scheme of a specific service. The presentation contains detailed information and assessments about the structure of the discount scheme.

– CKO 15 – 21: Internal customer plans. Contain detailed assessments on different aspects of the relationship between Norway Post and Norway Post’s customers, strengths and weaknesses as well as prices, discounts, volumes.

– PAB 19, 20: Internal minutes from meetings between Norway Post and a customer of Norway Post’s. Evaluation of the negotiations, strengths and weaknesses, plans for the future etc. Detailed information about pricing, volumes and discounts.

– KBJ 56, 63: Internal business cases concerning the assessment of volumes. Detailed information about how Norway Post assesses volumes, different strategies, future plans, market evaluation, competitive and economic analysis etc.

– KBJ 58, 59: Internal business cases concerning the assessment of volumes. Detailed information about how Norway Post assesses volumes, different strategies, future plans, market evaluation, competitive and economic analysis etc.

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– KBJ 64: Internal report containing detailed assessment of current and possible future prices, price-setting factors, price strategy, volumes, income etc.

– KBJ 84: Product accounts. Contains detailed information and assessments concerning revenues, costs, prospects for the future etc.

– TJO 5: Internal user guidance concerning discount scheme. Detailed information about different elements and structure of the discount scheme.

– TJO 45: Internal document concerning strategic processes. Strategic assessment of competitors.

– TJO 52, 53: Internal reports concerning Post-in-Shop concept. Strategic assessment of strengths and weaknesses of concept and detailed assessment of different products.

– TJO 54: Internal strategy plan concerning the segmentation of the logistics market.

– TJO 56, 57: Internal reports concerning strategic assessment of price level, competitive edge, customer loyalty, profitability analysis etc.

– TJO 68: Assessment of individualised discounts to customers and specific criteria for discounts.

– TJO 66, 101: Internal strategy documents concerning a specific project/service.

– MH 12 – 15: Documents including various internal strategic assessments of Post-in-Shop concept and agreements.– KBJ 15, 16: Documents with internal strategic assessment concerning the establishment of new Post-in-Shops.

– KBJ 36 – 42, 46, 47: Internal documents concerning negotiation strategies, evaluation of strengths and weaknesses etc.

– LKP 2: Internal document concerning negotiation strategies in relation to Post-in-Shop, evaluation of strengths and weaknesses.

– KBJ 5 – 8, 10 – 13: Various internal strategy documents and a consultancy report concerning inter alia the Post-in-Shop concept.

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– PAB 11 – 15, 17: Internal strategy documents of various nature.

– LKP 1: Internal strategy document concerning Post-in-Shop.

– KBJ 82: Minutes from an internal meeting regarding discounts.

(45) The Authority has reassessed the documents and sees that the documents indeed contain information on Norway Post’s strategic business policies, processes, priorities, plans and/or practices; and that this is information that Norway Post may justifiably regard as its core business secrets. It is clear that the information contained in the documents could, inter alia, be exploited by Norway Post’s competitors to predict, and adapt to its market behaviour. The information could, moreover, be exploited by Norway Post’s customers for instance in relation to contractual negotiations with Norway Post.



(48) For the second group Norway Post claims that 124 documents (CKO 9 – 14; COD 5 – 16, 18 – 38; PAB 22, 23, 26 – 29; KBJ 68, 79; TJO 1, 2, 6 – 44, 48, 50, 58 – 61, 63 – 65, 67, 78, 80, 84, 90 – 94, 96 – 98, 102 – 106) contain various concluded distribution agreements with Norway Post’s customers, as well as related documents such as offers, settling of accounts, correspondence with customers and internal correspondence concerning the agreement, internal minutes from meetings with customers and lists of volumes and rebates to specific customers. Most of the agreements include customer specific discounts. In some agreements, Norway Post’s contracting parties are not afforded

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discounts. This information is sensitive today as it reveals Norway Post’s bargaining range, either if viewed in isolation or if such information is made publicly available and aggregated across several customers. This information may be misused by customers in negotiations with Norway Post, by customers in their competitive relations with other customers or by competitors. By consequence, Norway Post claims, the Authority should refuse public access to these documents to prevent the infliction of serious harm to its business operations.

(49) The Authority has reassessed the documents and sees that the documents indeed contain distribution agreements with Norway Post’s customers, as well as related documents such as offers, settling of accounts, correspondence with customers and internal correspondence concerning the agreement, internal minutes from meetings with customers and lists of volumes and rebates to specific customers. Most of the agreements include customer specific discounts. In some agreements, Norway Post’s contracting parties are not afforded discounts. The Authority also sees how this information can still be sensitive today: it reveals Norway Post’s bargaining range, either if viewed in isolation or if made publicly available and aggregated across several customers. It is clear that this information may be exploited by customers in negotiations with Norway Post, by Norway Post’s customers in their competitive relations with other customers or by Norway Post’s competitors.



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(52) For the third group Norway Post claims that 42 documents (TJO 51; LKP 3 – 18, 23 – 26; MH 1 – 11, 16, 17, 19 – 22; KBJ 17, 18, 44, 45) relate to Norway Post’s Post-in-Shop agreements. The documents include concluded agreements, letters of intent, summaries from meetings between Norway Post and its contracting parties as well as possible future and actual Post-in-Shop partners, correspondence, evaluations of the agreements etc. This information can be misused by Norway Post’s contracting parties or competitors in future negotiations. By consequence, Norway Post claims, the Authority should refuse public access to these documents to prevent the infliction of serious harm to its business operations.

(53) The Authority has reassessed the documents and sees that the documents indeed relate to Norway Post’s Post-in-shop agreements. The documents are constituted by concluded agreements, letters of intent, summaries from meetings between Norway Post and its contracting parties as well as possible future and actual Post-in-shop partners, correspondence, evaluations of the agreements, etc. The Authority does see that this information can be exploited by Norway Post’s contracting parties or competitors in future negotiations.



No overriding public interest

(56) Next, the Authority must assess whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

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(57) As set out above, the Authority considers the information at issue to be of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy under Article 122 EEA, which corresponds to Article 339 TFEU. Accordingly, the members and officials of the Authority are obliged not to disclose such information. A corresponding obligation is laid down in Article 14 fourth paragraph SCA, and in Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA. Whereas these provisions cannot be read in isolation (cf. para. 271 of the Schenker judgment), it must follow that any public interest would have to be very strong in order to override this obligation, and accordingly justify disclosure of the information to the public in general, with no restrictions on the use of the information. The Authority recalls that when granting public access to documents pursuant to the RAD 2012, as under the RAD 2008 and equally Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, no restrictions can be placed on the use of the information.

(58) In the Schenker judgment, para. 240, the EFTA Court held that transparency “may constitute an overriding public interest by enabling the public to ensure that ESA is acting in an adequate and proper manner in the light of the principle of good administration”; and in the Schenker judgment, para. 241, the EFTA Court held that the private enforcement of competition law “may constitute an overriding public interest and should be encouraged, since it can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the EEA”. Given that transparency and private enforcement of competition must thus be considered public interests, the issue in the present case is whether these interest override the obligations to protect the commercial interests at issue.

(59) Accordingly, the Authority has in particular assessed whether the interest in transparency and/or the interest in private enforcement of competition law in this case may override the protection of the commercial interests at issue, and justify unrestricted disclosure of the information to the public in general. However, the Authority finds this not to be the case here, even taking particular account of the age of the documents. In the present case, the Authority cannot see that the interests in transparency and private enforcement of competition law could be considered strong enough, individually or together, to override the protection of the commercial interests at issue.

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(60) As to transparency, this conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the Authority’s handling of case no 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) has already been reviewed by the EFTA Court, namely in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, judgment of 18 April 2012, not yet reported.

(61) As to the private enforcement of competition law, the conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that public enforcement has taken place (see again Case E-15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, judgment of 18 April 2012, not yet reported).

(62) Also the existence of the so-called Zwartveld procedure further strengthens the conclusion in this respect; see para. 39 above.

(63) The Authority adds that public access to the information at issue in the present case could entail a risk of undermining competition: first, public access to the information could possibly allow competitors potential and actual) to align their practices, with a collusive effect on the market in result, or, second, provide competitors with an unfair advantage in the competition with Norway Post. Such effects would be contrary to the objective of the EEA Agreement to provide for a system ensuring that competition is not distorted, see Article 1(2)(e) EEA.

(64) Finally, the Authority has assessed whether any other public interest could justify public access in the present case. However, the Authority has not been able to identify any such public interest.

No partial access

(65) The Authority has assessed whether partial access could be given to some or all of these documents, pursuant to Article 4(9) of the RAD 2012, but finds that they would have to be redacted so severely as to leave no meaningful content. Whereas meaningful redacting is feasible for the 23 documents dealt with under section 4 above, the Authority finds this not to be the case for the 229 documents at issue in the present section.

Conclusion

(66) In accordance with the above, the Authority refuses access to the abovementioned 229 inspection documents.”

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V PROCEDURE AND FORMS OF ORDER SOUGHT BY THE PARTIES

48. By application lodged at the Court on 6 April 2013, DB Schenker brought an action seeking the annulment of the defendant’s decision of 7 February 2013, denying for a second time, access to the inspection documents in ESA Case No. 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak) following the annulment of ESA’s first decision on 21 December 2012 in DB Schenker I. On the same day, DB Schenker separately lodged an application pursuant to Article 59a RoPthat the case be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure.

49. The applicants, DB Schenker, request the Court to:

(i) annul the ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013 in Case No. 73038 (DB Schenker – access to documents) in so far as it denies access to inspection documents in Case No 34250 (Norway Post/Privpak);

(ii) order the defendant (and any intervener) to bear the costs.

50. On 16 April 2013, ESA submitted comments on the application for an expedited procedure.

51. On 24 April 2013, Posten Norge AS sought leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the defendant.

52. On 30 April 2013, by an Order of the President the application for Case E-4/13 to be determined pursuant to Article 59a RoP was denied. However, the application that the case at hand be given priority during the oral procedure, pursuant to Article 42(1) RoP, was granted.

53. On 8 May 2013, ESA lodged its written observations on the application to intervene at the Court’s Registry.

54. On 15 May 2013, DB Schenker lodged its written observations on the application to intervene at the Court’s Registry.

55. On 30 May 2013, by an Order of the President, Posten Norge AS was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the defendant.

56. On 10 June 2013, ESA submitted its defence.

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57. The defendant, the EFTA Surveillance Authority, requests the Court to:

(i) Dismiss the application as inadmissible; and

(ii) Order the applicants to bear the costs.

58. In the alternative, the defendant requests the Court to:

(i) Dismiss the application as unfounded; and

(ii) Order the applicants to bear the costs.

59. On 3 July 2013, Norway Post submitted its statement in intervention.

60. On 17 July 2013, DB Schenker submitted its reply.

61. On 29 July 2013, ESA requested an extension of the deadline to lodge the rejoinder to 29 August 2013.

62. On 30 July 2013, the President, pursuant to Article 36 RoP, granted an extension of the time-limit for submitting a rejoinder until 29 August 2013.

63. On the same day, ESA submitted written observations on Norway Post’s statement in intervention.

64. On 31 July 2013, DB Schenker submitted written observations on Norway Post’s statement in intervention.

65. On 29 August 2013, ESA submitted its rejoinder.

VI WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS

66. Pleadings have been received from:

– the applicants, represented by Jon Midthjell, advokat;

– the defendant, represented by Markus Schneider, Deputy Director, Gjermund Mathisen and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officers, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as agents; and

– the intervener, represented by Beret Sundet, advokat.

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Admissibility

DB Schenker

67. DB Schenker submits that the application is admissible under the second

paragraph of Article 36 SCA. It notes that the contested decision is

addressed to DB Schenker and asserts, referring to paragraphs 13 to

14 of the contested decision, that ESA has specifically confirmed that the

decision replaces the decision annulled in DB Schenker I.

68. To comply with the Court’s judgment in DB Schenker I, ESA was under a

legal obligation pursuant to Article 38 SCA to replace the annulled decision

with a new and final decision.4 As regards the findings in paragraph 283

of that judgment, DB Schenker asserts that the Court intended to refer

to the time limits set out in Article 7 RAD and not those in Article 7 RAD

2012.5 Moreover, DB Schenker submits that, in ESA’s response to the

applicants’ letter to the President of ESA of 31 January 2013 complaining

that the time limit had expired and calling on ESA to take a ‘final decision’,

ESA did not contest the legal basis for the complaint or contend that it had

not overrun the time limit for a final decision. In DB Schenker’s view, the

contested decision is therefore actionable.

69. For the sake of completeness DB Schenker contends that the two-step

administrative procedure established in Article 7 RAD 2012 (requiring

an initial application followed by a confirmatory application prior to a

final decision being made on an access request) has no effect on the

admissibility of the present action. This is not only because the applicants

had not filed a request for the contested documents pursuant to the RAD

2012 but also because Article 7 RAD 2012 by its very wording does not

apply to cases where the Court has annulled ESA’s final decision on an

access request. In such cases, it follows from Article 38 SCA that ESA is

4 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 283.5 Ibid., paragraph 99.

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legally obliged to replace its annulled decision with a new and final decision as paragraphs 13 to 14 of the contested decision indeed set out to do.

70. Moreover, had a new access request for the inspection documents been filed for the inspection documents pursuant to the RAD 2012, the contested decision would still have been actionable because ESA’s time limit for replying under the first step of its administrative procedures expired on 8 January 2013 pursuant to Article 7(2) RAD 2012 without having been extended by ESA under Article 7(3) RAD 2012. Once DB Schenker had requested a ‘final decision’ on 31 January 2013, ESA could only take such a decision as the second and final step of its administrative procedure pursuant to Article 7(5) and (6) RAD 2012. DB Schenker asserts that ESA has overlooked this point in the contested decision.

71. The contested decision was received by email on 7 February 2013. DB Schenker notes, therefore, that the time limit for bringing the present action was 8 April 2013. Consequently, the application is timely.

72. In its reply, DB Schenker contends that ESA’s inadmissibility plea rests on the premise that Article 7 RAD 2012 controls the legal effects of a judgment of the Court. In DB Schenker’s view, however, Article 7 RAD 2012 does not, even on its wording, apply to a situation where a final decision on an access request has been annulled by the Court pursuant to Article 36 SCA. Nor do any other provisions in RAD 2012. In addition, Article 7 RAD 2012 does not require that a confirmatory application be reasoned, which, in DB Schenker’s view, the defence has already conceded. Moreover, ESA lacks the competence to regulate the legal effects of judgments of the Court. It follows from Article 38 SCA that ESA had a legal obligation to replace the annulled decision with a final decision in compliance with the judgment in DB Schenker I and within the time limits that the Court had laid down. According to the applicants, that is what the contested decision explicitly set out to do in paragraphs 13 and 14.6 The inadmissibility plea is therefore without merit.

73. For the sake of completeness, DB Schenker asserts in its reply that ESA’s correspondence and actions demonstrate that it did not process the access request as a new request subject to the two-step administrative

6 Reference is made to Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission [2010] ECR I-669, paragraphs 53 and 60.

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procedure established in Article 7 RAD 2012. This would have required that ESA send an acknowledgement of receipt to the applicants pursuant to Article 7(2) RAD 2012, which it did not. DB Schenker contends that this notification is important because it confirms from which date the time limits in Article 7 RAD 2012 will be calculated. Second, ESA would have had to send the contested decision to the applicants before midnight 8 January 2012, when the time limit of ten working days provided for in Article 7(2) RAD 2012 expired, without having been extended. In that connection, DB Schenker contends that the first and second annexes to the defence are internal documents, which have been submitted “without explaining what the documents contain and what [ESA] seeks to demonstrate.” In DB Schenker’s view, it is questionable whether the documents may be considered admissible.7

74. In its reply, DB Schenker notes all the same that the titles of the two documents refer to ‘Staff Rule 39.6’ and appear to set out internal arrangements with regard to holidays and working hours. However, pursuant to Article 2(2) regard in conjunction with Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1182/71 on the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits, only the published list of holidays in the Official Journal is relevant. According to the Official Journal, ESA was not closed during the Christmas period with the exception of 25 and 26 December 2012, and 2 January 2013.8

75. Consequently, the time limit for the defendant to provide an initial reply had, expired and, in any event, the applicants were entitled to submit a confirmatory application pursuant to Article 7(5) RAD 2012. According to DB Schenker, in the circumstances, its email of 31 January 2013 to the President of ESA would constitute, at any rate, a confirmatory application for a final decision.

76. In its reply, DB Schenker responds to ESA’s submissions concerning the scope of the applicants’ power of attorney. DB Schenker expresses surprise to see this particular challenge to the admissibility of the action. The powers of attorney cover by their wording “any application” relating to Case E-15/10 Norway Post, which is also made clear in the last paragraph

7 Reference is made to Norway Post, cited above, paragraph 112.8 Reference is made to OJ 2012 C 10/, p.7 and OJ 2013 C 42, p.4. Further reference is made to

Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 53 and 60.

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which explicitly refers, in the plural, to “proceedings for and on behalf of us” As is evident from the subject matter of the case, the present action is directly connected to the investigation of Norway Post, and the evidence belonging to the Norway Post case file or files. DB Schenker therefore regards the inadmissibility plea to be without merit. The mechanism set out in Article 33(6) RoP makes the inadmissibility plea clearly ineffective. Moreover, DB Schenker stresses, that the EU courts use a similar mechanism.9

ESA

77. ESA submits that the application for annulment is inadmissible because the applicants failed to submit a confirmatory application. In addition, ESA has serious doubts that the present application conforms to a number of formal requirements, in particular Article 17 of the Court’s Statute and Article 33(5) RoP. ESA submits in its rejoinder that silence on any point in the defence or rejoinder cannot be interpreted as ESA concurring with the applicants.

78. ESA notes that the RAD 2012 provides for a two-stage procedure allowing an applicant for public access to make a confirmatory application if he remains dissatisfied with any refusal by ESA to grant public access. This confirmatory application procedure corresponds to that of Regulation No 1049/2001 and helps the proper administration of justice in the case of judicial review of ‘refusal of access situations’.10

79. ESA notes that the contested decision in the present case was received by the applicants on 7 February 2013. The time limit for submitting a confirmatory application therefore expired on 21 March 2013. However, the applicants failed to submit such an application despite being individually and explicitly informed of this fact in the contested decision.

80. ESA submits that, according to settled case law concerning the corresponding EU provision in Regulation No 1049/2001, an applicant must make a confirmatory application before he can challenge by way of an action for annulment any refusal by EU institutions to

9 Reference is made to Article 44(6) RoP of the General Court and Article 119 and where appropriate, also 168(4) RoP of the Court of Justice.

10 Reference is made to Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds, cited above, paragraph 54.

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disclose documents to the general public.11 For reasons of procedural homogeneity, the same applies in the present case, under the two-stage procedure established by the RAD 2012.12 ESA asserts there is no reason why the procedure set out in Article 7(6) RAD 2012 should not apply in the present case. In its view, a decision on a confirmatory application could not have been less favourable to the applicants, stating that a confirmatory application “would in all likelihood have triggered a further consultation of Norway Post” and in any event a reassessment of ESA’s decision of 7 February 2013.

81. ESA asserts that, instead, the applicants chose to seise the Court with an inadmissible action for annulment and with an action in which the Court cannot positively order the disclosure to the public of specific documents.13 In its rejoinder, ESA submits that the applicants’ reference to Case C-208/11 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission cannot alter this conclusion and distinguishes that judgment from the present case.14

82. ESA submits that, in light of the final paragraph of the contested decision, it is clear that this decision cannot be equated to a confirmatory decision adopted following a confirmatory application.15 Moreover, there is nothing wrong in initially replacing an annulled decision with an intermediate measure (the contested decision), in preparation for a definitive one (the confirmatory decision) that would have been adopted had the applicants lodged a confirmatory application. The two-stage procedure constitutes a measure of general benefit both to applicants for public access and the judicial process, if legal proceedings are brought.

83. As the RAD was repealed on 6 September 2012, the RAD 2012 were the only rules in force when the contested decision was adopted. Consequently, according to ESA in its rejoinder, “[p]ractically speaking,

11 Reference is made to Case C-208/11 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, order of 15 February 2012, not yet reported, paragraph 30, referring to Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds, cited above, paragraphs 53 and 54, and Case T-392/07 Strack v Commission, judgment of 15 January 2013, not yet reported, paragraphs 41 to 43.

12 Reference is made by comparison to Norway Post, cited above, paragraph 110.13 Reference is made to Strack, cited above, paragraph 90 and case law cited. 14 Reference is made to Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds, cited above, paragraphs 53, 58

and 60. Additional reference is made to Case C-208/11 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds cited above, paragraphs 29 to 31.

15 Reference is made to Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds, cited above, paragraphs 51 and 52, and DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraphs 80 and 81.

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[ESA] was obliged to adopt a fresh decision on public access to the documents at issue.”

84. ESA continues, “in a situation such as the present one, the general EEA principle of legal certainty even obliges [ESA] to avail itself of the relevant (two-stage) procedure set out in its RAD 2012”.16 It asserts that the matter concerned the public right to access documents, the implementation of a judgment, and, at the same time, Norway Post’s fundamental right to the protection of its professional secrets under EEA law.17 “In those circumstances, [ESA] could not act lawfully otherwise than by applying the relevant rules governing the subject-matter; and this in particular as the EFTA Court has found the preceding version of [ESA’s] public access rules to form part of EEA law; and as the Court has done so in the very judgment whose implementation was the object of the administrative follow-up procedure in which [ESA] adopted the contested decision (Article 38 SCA).”18

85. In its rejoinder, ESA contends that, whilst substantive rules only exceptionally apply to situations existing before their entry into force,19 procedural rules generally do apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force.20 It asserts that “Decision No 300/12/COL, which established the RAD 2012, makes no provision for any transitional scheme. Thus, the rule that public access to documents held by [ESA] must be granted under the procedure set out in the RAD 2012 is unconditional.”21 It refers in that regard to the Court’s finding that in an action for annulment based on Article 36 SCA the lawfulness of the measure concerned must be assessed in the light of the matters

16 Reference is made to Case E-9/11 ESA v Norway [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 442, paragraph 99 and case law cited.

17 Reference is made by comparison to the order of the President of the General Court of 11 March 2013 in Case T-462/12 R Pilkington Group v Commission, not yet reported, paragraph 45 (the appeal against this order was dismissed by the Vice-President of the Court of Justice in his order of 10 September 2013 in Case C278/13 P(R) Commission v Pilkington), DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 166.

18 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 118. 19 Reference is made to Case C-369/09 P ISD Polska and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-2011,

paragraph 98 and case law cited.20 Reference is made to Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, judgment of 26 February

2013, not yet reported and case law cited.21 Reference is made to Case C-129/12 Magdeburger Mühlenwerke GmbH v Finanzamt Magdeburg,

judgment of 21 March 2013, not yet reported, paragraph 38.

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of fact and of law existing at the time when that measure was adopted.22 Moreover, it notes that in DB Schenker I the Court did indeed “urge” ESA to adopt a new decision on public access within the applicable time limits.23 ESA avers that this is what it did, respecting the time limits in Article 7 RAD 2012. In its view, contrary to what the applicants suggest, what the Court required in DB Schenker I cannot be understood as an obligation on ESA to apply a set of procedural rules from the RAD that are no longer in force or to apply a special procedure flowing from Article 38 SCA and the judgment, to the exclusion of the existing procedure under the RAD 2012.

86. ESA submits in its rejoinder that the Court’s judgment is not declaratory but “merely orders annulment”24 and that it is for the institution concerned to take the measures necessary to comply with the judgment.25

87. ESA contends that “[t]he applicants’ criticism that the RAD 2012 were applied ‘retroactively’ to a request for public access initially lodged under the RAD does not change this”. It continues: “[i]n accordance with established case law, the procedural changes brought about by the RAD 2012 took immediate effect.26 Further, the contested decision was carefully drafted in light of [ESA’s] duty under Article 38 SCA to implement the Court’s judgment, … so as to apply the same substantive rules as would have been under the RAD, if those rules were still in force; or as would have been the situation under the EU Transparency Regulation No 1049/2001, if that Regulation were part of EEA law. It follows that the contested decision neither put ‘DB Schenker’, nor the applicants in a less favourable position as regards the right to seek public access to the inspection documents under the since repealed [RAD].”

22 Reference is made to Case E-9/12 Iceland v ESA, judgment of 22 July 2013, not yet reported, paragraph 100, Case E-17/11 Aresbank [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 916, paragraph 79, and Case E-11/12 Koch and Others v Swiss Life (Liechtenstein) AG, judgment of 13 June 2013, not yet reported, paragraph 42. Further reference is made to Case C-501/11 P Schindler Holding Ltd and Others v Commission, judgment of 18 July 2013, not yet reported, paragraph 13.

23 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 283.24 Reference is made to Case T-135/09 Nexans France and Others v Commission, judgment of

14 November 2012, not yet reported, paragraph 136 and case law cited (under appeal in Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans France v Commission) and Strack, cited above, paragraph 90 (under appeal in Case C-127/13 P Strack v Commission).

25 Reference is made to Joined Cases T-339/10 and T-532/10 Cosepuri v European Food Safety Authority, judgment of 29 January 2013, not yet reported, paragraph 77 and case law cited.

26 Reference is made by comparison to Case C-296/08 PPU Santesteban Goicoechea [2008] ECR I-6307, paragraph 80 and the case law cited.

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88. ESA submits that the applicants’ alternative argument that, in effect, they lodged a confirmatory application on 31 January 2013 is flawed. The two cumulative preconditions under Article 7(6) RAD 2012 are not met in the present case: the time limit for ESA to adopt a first decision had not expired prior to 31 January 2013, nor did the applicants’ complaint of that day constitute a confirmatory application.

89. As regards the time limit, ESA contends that Friday 4 January 2013 was the first working day at ESA following delivery of the judgment in DB Schenker I on Friday 21 December 2012. The judgment was delivered on the very last working day before ESA’s Christmas closure from Monday 24 December 2012. ESA asserts that it was only four days into the period within which to respond when it initiated the consultation with Norway Post on 9 January 2013 and that, accordingly, the time limit was suspended pursuant to Article 7(4) RAD 2012 pending the outcome of the consultation.

90. ESA submits in its rejoinder that, as “has been demonstrated in the defence … based on the implicit assumption that the judgment in [DB Schenker I] was formally served on [ESA] on Friday 21 December 2012,” its decision of 7 February 2013 was adopted within the relevant time limits. It contends, however, that it “is obvious from the Court file” that it was not until Thursday 10 January 2013 that the Court served that judgment on ESA pursuant to Article 61(2) RoP by a letter of 8 January 2013. This was the first and only signed and authenticated copy of the judgment that ESA received, and, “in any case [ESA], unlike the applicants, had not indicated during the procedure in Case E-14/11 [DB Schenker I] that service could be effected electronically”.27 ESA asserts that, as these facts concern a matter of public policy, it no longer seeks to maintain its “initial (but mistaken) hypothesis” that it was already four days into the time limit on Wednesday 9 January 2013. Instead, the relevant time limit prescribed by Article 7 RAD 2012 was triggered by “ESA’s formal notification of the judgment, on Thursday 10 January 2013.” Thus, according to ESA, the contested decision of 7 February 2013 was within the relevant deadlines.

27 Reference is made to Article 33(2) RoP and point B.5.b. of the Court’s Notes for the guidance of Counsel 2012.

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91. In its rejoinder, ESA submits that nothing different follows from Article 62 RoP according to which the Court’s judgments are binding from the date of delivery. In its view, the fact that the judgment was not served on ESA pursuant to Article 61(2) RoP “before the New Year” renders moot the applicants’ submission that the days over Christmas must be counted as working days. Consequently, according to ESA, “there is no need for the Court to address the issue of any discrepancy between the information provided on [ESA’s] website and in the contested decision itself, on the one hand, and the information published in the EEA supplement to the EU Official Journal, on the other”.

92. As regards the applicants’ letter to ESA’s President of 31 January 2013, ESA asserts that this “complaint” was not phrased as a confirmatory application and could not be interpreted as one even if it were in time, which ESA denies. Moreover, ESA contends that the contested decision was adopted within 25 working days of the delivery of DB Schenker I. Accordingly, in its view, the present application seeking the partial annulment of “what constitutes but a preparatory act within the relevant administrative procedure” is inadmissible.

93. ESA argues that the applicants have failed to produce the necessary documentation to demonstrate that they are duly represented by a lawyer as required pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Statute of the Court.28

94. In ESA’s view, the powers of attorney granted by the applicants on 11 November 2010 and 20 December 2010 as well as the additional power of attorney subsequently granted by the applicants’ ultimate parent company, Deutsche Bahn AG, on 29 April 2013 does not appear to meet the requirements set out in Article 33(5)(b) RoP. The three applicants have failed to establish that any of them has individually conferred any valid authority on their counsel to represent them in the present case.

95. ESA submits that the powers of attorney issued by the applicants in 2010 were unambiguously limited to representation of the three companies in their intervention in support of ESA in Norway Post. It notes, moreover, that Deutsche Bahn AG is not an applicant in the present proceedings nor

28 Reference is made by way of comparison to Article 19(2) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

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are staff members of Deutsche Bahn AG publically registered as being authorised to act in the name of any of the three companies that have lodged the present application.

96. In ESA’s view, it remains questionable whether these and other formal defects can still be rectified under Article 33(6) RoP.29 In footnote 27 of its defence, ESA gives the following example for another formal defect. It states: “[f]or instance, the pre-litigation procedure was carried out on behalf of ‘DB Schenker’ ..., a large international group of companies that consists of numerous legal entities most of which are not incorporated in Scandinavia ... Yet so far, none of the three Norwegian and Swedish applicants has made clear in the present application why it is directly and individually concerned by the contested confirmatory decisions on public access to documents on behalf of the DB Schenker Group.”30

97. ESA stresses that admissibility is a matter of public policy that concerns legal certainty as well as equal access to justice in the EEA. Procedural homogeneity calls for a concurring interpretation of corresponding EU and EFTA rules on judicial procedure.31

Substance

98. In the alternative, ESA submits that the application should be dismissed as not well founded. Since the applicants have not challenged the part of the contested decision explaining that nine document numbers are unused, ESA notes that the scope of the application is limited.

29 Reference is made to Case E-6/94 Helmers v ESA [1994-1995] EFTA Ct. Rep. 97, paragraphs 2 to 8; Case E-6/94 REV Helmers v ESA, order of 27 April 1995, paragraphs 3 to 8; Case E-5/08 Bergling v ESA [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 316, paragraph 7; and Order of the President of 5 June 2012 in Case E-16/11 ESA v Iceland, paragraph 31. Reference is also made to Case C-581/11 P Muhamad Mugraby v Council and Commission, judgment of 12 July 2012, not yet reported, paragraph 36; Case C-69/12 P Noscira SA v OHIM, order of 21 September 2012, not yet reported, paragraphs 23 and 33 and case law cited; Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C426/10 P Bell & Ross v OHIM [2011] ECR I-8849, point 51; and the judgment in the same case, paragraph 42.

30 Reference is made to Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds, cited above, paragraph 51. In its rejoinder, ESA made additional reference to Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa Group plc v Commission, judgment of 12 July 2012, not yet reported, paragraphs 37 and 39 and case law cited.

31 Reference is made to Norway Post, cited above, paragraph 110.

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First plea: concerning the legal status of the new rules on public access to documents and the lawfulness of their retroactive applicability to DB Schenker’s access request in the contested decision

DB Schenker

99. DB Schenker submits that while the annulled decision was adopted pursuant to the RAD, the contested decision has been adopted pursuant to the RAD 2012. Article 13 RAD 2012 gives the RAD 2012 retroactive effect to access requests submitted pursuant to the RAD.

100. The RAD 2012 contain a new set of exceptions and a new definition of a “document” which restricts the public right of access significantly beyond what was permitted under the RAD and what is permitted in EU law under Regulation No 1049/2001. Article 4(2)(b) RAD 2012, which encompasses all documents “relating to gathering, obtaining or receiving information from natural or legal persons in the framework of investigations”, appears on its wording to cover the inspection documents at issue.

101. DB Schenker submits that the RAD 2012, like the RAD, must be considered part of EEA law and subject to the principle of homogeneous interpretation.32 The public right of access must also be considered a fundamental right in EEA law as it is in EU law pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

102. On that basis, DB Schenker submits, the retroactive effect of the new rules would not prejudice the rights enjoyed by the applicants under the RAD because the outcome of the present case would be the same as if the contested decision had been made in accordance with the RAD.

103. DB Schenker submits that, in contrast, ESA has taken an unlawful starting point by considering the RAD 2012 not to be part of EEA law and not subject to the principle of homogeneous interpretation. According to DB Schenker, in the contested decision, ESA has, de facto, given retroactive effect to Article 4(2)(b) RAD 2012, which by itself must lead to an annulment.

104. If, contrary to DB Schenker’s submission, the Court were to agree with ESA’s reasoning that the RAD 2012 are not part of EEA law and not subject

32 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraphs 118 and 121.

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to the principle of homogeneous interpretation, DB Schenker contends that any retroactive effect given to the RAD 2012 negatively affecting the applicants’ rights would infringe the principle of legal certainty and the right to an effective remedy.33 In that regard, were the rules to be given such retroactive effect, DB Schenker submits that ESA’s failure to properly publish the RAD 2012 in itself leads to an infringement of the principle of legal certainty. The RAD 2012 were adopted without any prior public notice or consultation and have been published only on ESA’s website. The RAD – which, in any event, ESA had omitted to publish in the Official Journal – were immediately removed from ESA’s website. In DB Schenker’s view, a further infringement of the principle of legal certainty would follow from the lack of explanation proffered concerning the need to give the RAD 2012 retroactive effect, prejudicial to the rights previously enjoyed by the public.

105. In its reply, DB Schenker submits that the defence takes the erroneous position that, unless an action for annulment has been brought in good time against an EEA law that has been given retroactive effect, any retroactive effect that flows from that law must be accepted. According to DB Schenker, the correct position is that the Court has a legal duty under Article 36 SCA to annul any decision insofar as ESA has given unlawful retroactive effect to EEA law, on the same basis as it must in relation to any other infringement of EEA law.

106. In its reply, DB Schenker stresses that it seeks the annulment of the contested decision insofar as “the unlawful retroactive effects have adversely affected DB Schenker’s rights”.

ESA

107. ESA submits that the first plea is “rather unclear” as there is no form of order sought. Paragraphs 14 to 16 of the contested decision clarify the relationship between the judgment in DB Schenker I, the RAD, Article 38 SCA and the RAD 2012 which, according to ESA, “have since 6 September been the only rules on public access that [ESA] can apply; there are no other rules after the express repeal, in full, of the [RAD])”. ESA emphasises that, in paragraph 16 of the contested decision, it specifically stated that the judgment in DB Schenker I and Article 38 SCA oblige ESA “to leave

33 Ibid., paragraph 98.

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unapplied the one provision in the RAD 2012 – its Article 4(2)(b) – that could have lead [sic] to granting less public access than under the [RAD]”.

108. ESA avers that the contested decision takes great care to show that any refusal of public access is based on rules that remain the same under the RAD 2012, the RAD and Regulation No 1049/2001. Homogeneity is thus ensured. In its view, the decision would have been the same had Regulation No 1049/2001 been [ESA’s] legal basis. It contends, therefore, that the result is “a decision that substantively is precisely the same as it would have been under the [RAD] if those rules were still in force…”. In its rejoinder, ESA submits that even had it wrongly applied the rule established in Article 4(2)(b) RAD 2012, which it denies, such a mistake would not involve any unlawful retroactive effect but would, instead, be a matter of misinterpretation or misapplication.

109. ESA contends that nothing adduced in the first plea has any bearing on the present action for partial annulment. In its view, the applicants’ “many complaints and speculations about potential implications” of applying the RAD 2012 are outside the scope of the present action. According to ESA, those complaints belong in an action for annulment of the RAD 2012, although, in the case of the present applicants, they would be out of time to bring such a plea in the current application on the basis that they have been aware of Decision No 300/12/COL “for the very least since 14 September 2012”.34

110. In its rejoinder, ESA submits – as regards both the first and the third plea – that Norway Post enjoys a fundamental right to the protection of its professional secrets and that there may well be a “conflict of fundamental rights in the present case”. ESA asserts that in EU law, a fundamental right to the protection of a company’s professional secrets is enshrined in Article 339 TFEU (corresponding to Article 122 EEA), Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter. In its view, Norway Post should have no lesser protection in the EEA legal order. In keeping with the principle of homogeneity, Norway Post must enjoy, as a matter of EEA law, a fundamental right to the protection of its professional secrets

34 Ibid., paragraphs 67 to 68.

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in both administrative and court proceedings.35 ESA contends that the “legal status as a fundamental right must have a significant impact in the assessment of whether there are other public interests at issue that may override the protection of Norway Post’s professional secrets”.

Second plea: infringement of the commercial interests exception in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA

DB Schenker

111. According to DB Schenker, Article 4(4) RAD 2012 establishes an exception from the public right of access in Article 2(1) RAD 2012 where disclosures would undermine the protection of commercial interests of a natural or legal person. A similar exception existed in Article 4(2) RAD.

112. DB Schenker submits that, in relying on this exception, ESA’s decision to grant only partial access to 23 inspection documents and deny complete access to 229 inspection documents infringes Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and contains manifest errors of assessment in addition to the breach of Articles 16 and 38 SCA.

113. DB Schenker submits, first, in relation to the annulled decision, that ESA has still not recorded each individual inspection document on its file and continues to default on the principle of good administration.36

114. DB Schenker submits, second, that the contested decision has not meaningfully improved upon the level of information provided in relation to the inspection documents.37 Instead, the contested decision has “deferentially imported” Norway Post’s own description of the documents in its letter to ESA of 28 January 2013. The inspection documents have only been identified and separated by the initials of the ESA officer who seized them in 2004 followed by a number. Nor does the contested decision contain any information about the age of any of the documents.

35 Reference is made to the order of the President of the General Court of 25 April 2013 in Case T-44/13 R AbbeVie v European Medicines Agency, not yet reported, paragraphs 47, 48, 52 and 66; the order of the President of the General Court of 25 April 2013 in Case T-73/13 R InterMune v European Medicines Agency, not yet reported, paragraphs 35 to 37 and 41, and case law cited; and the order in Pilkington Group v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 44 and 45 (the appeal against this order was dismissed in Commission v Pilkington, also cited above).


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115. Third, DB Schenker submits that, in the contested decision, ESA has bundled the inspection documents into six groups thus producing only six “group explanations” as to why the documents cannot be released. Moreover, those groupings were taken from Norway Post’s letter to ESA of 28 January 2013. This means, DB Schenker submits, that Norway Post has been permitted to depart from the standard instructions sent by ESA on 9 January 2013, which required individual confidentiality claims, and also from the reasoning in DB Schenker I.38

116. In DB Schenker’s view, the contested decision contains no explanation as to why these six groups were found appropriate by ESA for a complete assessment of the present harm that disclosure of any individual documents would have for Norway Post. DB Schenker contends that ESA has departed from its obligation to conduct an individual review of the documents.39 Although it concedes that case law allows for certain exceptions from the obligation to conduct an individual review, it asserts that none has been invoked in the contested decision.40 Instead, the contested decision repeatedly states that ESA had “reassessed the documents” and reached a conclusion as to the protection warranted for the “information contained in the documents”. The applicants contend that the groupings made by Norway Post contain very different categories of document. By relying on these wide groups, the contested decision has, in effect, turned a narrow case law based exception into the main rule. DB Schenker submits that, in essence, Norway Post reduced its business documents into only three categories: internal documents, contact with customers, and contact with suppliers. ESA adopted Norway Post’s groupings and shaped its decision around them.

117. Fourth, DB Schenker asserts that the contested decision does not provide any information about the dates of the individual documents and has, therefore, not determined their age.41 The applicants assert that “the passage of time”, which in their view was the central issue in DB Schenker I, has only been given superficial consideration. ESA’s explanations as to why disclosure would undermine the commercial interests of Norway Post, even today, are brief,

38 Ibid., paragraph 280.39 Ibid., paragraph 127.40 Ibid., paragraphs 128 and 135.41 Ibid., paragraphs 192, 193 and 278.

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vague and general, and are also, for the most part, mere restatements of assertions made in Norway Post’s letter to ESA of 28 January 2013.42 The applicants note that whether the group consists of 124 documents, or only of two, ESA’s explanations consist of three paragraphs. According to the applicants, ESA’s claims that it “can see” or that it “is clear” what harm would befall Norway Post were not substantiated by Norway Post itself in its letter of 28 January 2013. Instead of conducting an independent and critical review of the inspection documents, ESA has readily accepted Norway Post’s non-substantiated confidentiality claim.

118. Fifth, the contested decision states that the inspection documents fall under the professional secrecy obligation in Article 122 EEA, the fourth paragraph of Article 14 SCA, and Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA. According to the applicants, no explanation has been given for the relationship between the commercial interest exception in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the professional secrecy obligation. This reflects the lack of any such explanation in the standard instructions sent to Norway Post on 9 January 2013 where there was not even a reference to the rules on public access to documents. However, as ESA stated in those instructions, professional secrecy only extends to information that is objectively “worthy of protection”. The contested decision fails to provide any explanations as to why the inspection documents all meet that requirement. In the applicants’ view, this is a serious flaw as the documents to which access is refused are the by-product of an extensive antitrust investigation. DB Schenker contends that ESA has failed to critically consider whether, in denying access to these documents, in reality, it has assisted Norway Post in committing price discrimination in violation of Article 54 EEA.

119. For those reasons, individually and collectively, DB Schenker contends that the contested decision must be annulled insofar as it denies access to any of the inspection documents.

120. In its reply, DB Schenker stresses that it does indeed recognise that case law allows for certain exceptions from the obligation to conduct an individual review. What it contests, however, is the fact that ESA allowed Norway Post to depart from the standard instruction it was sent which required individual confidentiality claims and that was “demanded in the

42 Reference is made to the contested decision, paragraphs 22, 26, 30, 45, 49, and 53.

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judgment”.43 In the applicants’ view, the contested decision contains no explanation as to why the six groups were found appropriate for a complete assessment of the present harm that full disclosure of any of the 252 inspection documents would have for Norway Post. In doing so, ESA departed from its obligation to conduct an individual review of the documents.

ESA

121. ESA considers that the second plea consists of one substantive and one procedural part.

122. The substantive part alleges an infringement of the commercial interests exception laid down in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 in conjunction with an infringement of Article 38 SCA. ESA submits that the alleged infringement of Article 38 SCA is simply the contention that the contested decision is not “lawful”. ESA asserts that the relevant rule under Article 4(4) RAD 2012 “is not merely ‘similar’; it remains the same as under Article 4(2) RAD, and also Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001”. It avers that this was expressly stated in the contested decision.

123. ESA submits that the lists of the inspection documents attached to the contested decision provide the date of each inspection document (“except, of course, for any documents that bear no date”), a brief description of each document, and give the number of pages of each document. These lists assist in substantiating the fact that the different groups of documents assessed in the contested decision contain documents that belong to the same category or contain the same type of information.

124. ESA avers that the contested decision explicitly addresses whether “the information at issue”, despite its age, can still be considered sensitive today and explains why ESA was satisfied that “the information, despite its age, still constitutes essential elements of Norway Post’s commercial position”.44

125. ESA submits that “[t]he fact that the contested decision refuses public access to agreements that are no longer in force ..., or to agreements that have been amended, does not change the fact that the information

43 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 280.44 Reference is made to the order in Pilkington v Commission, cited above, paragraph 70 and case law

cited (the appeal against this order was dismissed in Commission v Pilkington, also cited above).

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in these agreements nonetheless ‘reveals Norway Post’s bargaining range, either if viewed in isolation or if made publicly available and aggregated across several customers’ and that it ‘can be exploited by Norway Post’s contracting parties or competitors in future negotiations’” (paragraphs 49 and 53 of the contested decision). ESA also emphasises the fact “that the present case concerns a market that is still very much the same today as it was at the time the documents were produced. Largely the same services and products are offered, and to largely the same customers” (paragraph 23 of the contested decision, referred to in paragraphs 50 and 54).

126. ESA stresses that where reference was made in the contested decision to the obligation of professional secrecy in Article 122 EEA, the fourth paragraph of Article 14 SCA and Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA (“obligation of professional secrecy”) it concluded that the documents or passages at issue fell within the scope of those provisions and with the exception provided for in the first indent of Article 4(4) RAD 2012. While not excluding the possibility that the first indent of Article 4(4) RAD 2012 might have a greater scope than the obligation of professional secrecy, for the purposes of adopting the contested decision, it did not prove necessary, according to ESA, to discuss the relationship between those provisions more generally.

127. The obligation of professional secrecy is pertinent to the assessment of whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. ESA contends that such public interest “would have to be very strong” in order to “override” both the first indent of Article 4 RAD 2012 and the obligation of professional secrecy. In its view, disclosure of the undisclosed documents “could cause serious (additional) harm” both to the public EEA interest in maintaining undistorted competition and to Norway Post’s private interest, that is, unrelated to any harm that it could suffer in private damages actions. ESA asserts that it has not taken account of the latter kind of harm.45

45 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 189 and Case T-344/08 Energie Baden-Württemberg, judgment of 22 May 2012, not yet reported, paragraphs 147 and 148 (under appeal in pending Case C-365/12 P Commission v Energie Baden-Württemberg).

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128. ESA stresses that the mere fact that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a ground for criticism.46 That the documents were seized during an inspection does not imply that their commercially sensitive content would be wholly, or “as such, illegitimate”. Consequently, ESA submits that “the present circumstances cannot be compared to a situation where, for instance, an unannounced inspection would have focused on evidence for the existence of a specific, suspected cartel agreement”.

129. As regards the procedural part of the plea, the alleged failure to state reasons in breach of Article 16 SCA, ESA refers to the criteria laid down in Hurtigruten.47 ESA asserts that its duty to state reasons for a refusal to disclose documents or parts of them cannot go so far as to reveal the confidential content concerned. In its view, the reasoning in the contested decision has enabled the applicants to defend their rights and for the Court to exercise its power of review.

130. ESA submits that the applicants’ assertions regarding the individual identification of the inspection documents are erroneous. It avers that the applicants have been provided with this information in the 26 lists of documents enclosed with the contested decision. It contends, further, that, when giving reasons for refusing public disclosure, it is permitted to group documents together that belong together. ESA submits that the groups of documents addressed in the contested decision are appropriate. There are three groups of two documents each; a group of 10 documents; a group of 11 documents; a group of 61 documents; a group of 124 documents and a final group of 42 documents. Each grouping is properly made on the substance. ESA also avers that it provided “numerous individual descriptions of the documents within each group”.

131. ESA asserts that, contrary to the “applicants’ implied, yet wholly unsubstantiated accusation of Norway Post of a further infringement”,48 the contested decision does indeed consider the implications of “releasing

46 Reference is made to Case C-209/10 Post Danmark v Konkurrencerådet, judgment of 27 March 2012, not yet reported, paragraph 21 et seq.

47 Reference is made to Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten and Norway v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, paragraphs 252, 254, 255, and 261. Further reference is made to Joined Cases E-17/10 and E-6/11 Liechtenstein and VTM v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 114, paragraph 165.

48 Reference is made to Post Danmark, cited above, paragraph 21 et seq.

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the information concerned” to the general public. Public access to the “information at issue” in the present case “could entail a risk of undermining competition. First, public access to the information could possibly allow competitors (potential or actual) to align their practices, with a collusive effect on the market in result. Second, it could provide competitors with an unfair advantage in the competition with Norway Post. Such effects would be contrary to the objective of the EEA Agreement to provide for a system ensuring that competition is not distorted.” In that regard, ESA refers to Article 1(2) EEA.

Third plea: infringement of the overriding public interest rule in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA

DB Schenker

132. DB Schenker argues that the exception to the right of public access for commercial interests provided for in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 does not apply when there is an “overriding public interest” in disclosure. A similar provision existed in Article 4(2) RAD. It contends that, in the contested decision, ESA has denied that there are any overriding public interests in the disclosure of the inspection documents. DB Schenker asserts that ESA adopted the same reasoning whether no or only partial access has been granted.

133. DB Schenker submits that those parts of the decision (paragraphs 33 to 41 and 56 to 64) infringe Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and contain manifest errors of assessment, in addition to breaching the duty to state reasons under Article 16 SCA. Moreover, ESA has breached its duty resulting from Article 38 SCA to take “the necessary measures to comply with the judgment” in DB Schenker I.

134. First, DB Schenker asserts, the contested decision rests on the premise that all the inspection documents fall under the professional secrecy obligation provided for in Article 122 EEA, the fourth paragraph of Article 14 SCA, and Article 28(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA. On that basis, ESA has implicitly claimed that the inspection documents therefore belong to a higher grade of protectable material than documents that fall “only” under the commercial interests exception in Article 4(4) RAD 2012. DB Schenker notes that, on that basis, according to ESA’s analysis, “it must

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follow that any public interest would have to be very strong in order to override this obligation …”.49 In DB Schenker’s view, the premises for that conclusion are without foundation. ESA has not explained the relationship between those rules. Moreover, the standard instruction sent to Norway Post did not mention Article 4(4) RAD 2012. Consequently, according to DB Schenker, the contested decision has failed to explain how ESA has distinguished between “high grade” and “low grade” material. In any event, Norway Post had only claimed that some of the inspection documents contain “core business secrets”. Furthermore, DB Schenker alleges, ESA has failed to explain why each document at issue satisfies the legal requirements for professional secrecy. In addition, it continues, ESA failed to demonstrate that the inspection documents “are worthy of protection”.

135. Therefore, the applicants contend that the foundation for ESA’s review of the overriding public interest rule contains manifest errors of assessment, and in addition conflicts with the duty to state reasons.

136. Second, DB Schenker observes that the contested decision states that neither institutional transparency nor the private enforcement of competition law represents an overriding public interest in disclosure. It contends that ESA has failed to state reasons for that conclusion. As regards institutional transparency, ESA has not taken into consideration the alleged nexus between its former President, Norway Post and “the owner of the company represented by the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communication” during the infringement. In DB Schenker’s view, the failure to take this into consideration only strengthens the interest in institutional transparency.

137. As regards the interest in private enforcement of competition law, DB Schenker asserts that the contested decision has ignored the reality that follow-on actions necessarily occur subsequent to public enforcement.50 Moreover, the contested decision has overlooked the fact that the inspection documents contain evidence which could potentially be relied upon in order to claim damages from Norway Post in relation to the rebate scheme investigation. In its reply, DB Schenker challenges ESA’s interpretation of Article 4(4) RAD 2012 evidenced in the defence,

49 Reference is made to the contested decision, paragraphs 34 and 57.50 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 241.

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erroneous in the view of DB Schenker, to the effect that it will only consider a public interest that has been specifically invoked by an applicant. DB Schenker contends, however, that Article 6(1) RAD 2012 does not require an applicant to state reasons for an access request and it remains ESA’s responsibility to consider the public interests involved of its own initiative.

138. Moreover, DB Schenker notes that ESA has sought to argue that the Zwartveld procedure weakens the public interest in disclosure of the contested documents.51 DB Schenker firmly disagrees with such a view.

139. For those reasons, both individually and collectively, DB Schenker contends that the contested decision must be annulled insofar as it denies access to any of the inspection documents on the basis that no overriding public interest exists.

140. In its reply, DB Schenker submits that the defence remains silent on whether ESA agrees that Article 4(4) RAD 2012 forms part of EEA law and is, thus, subject to the principle of homogeneous interpretation.

141. DB Schenker contends that the defence fails to address the absence of explanation in the contested decision as regards the relationship between the obligation of professional secrecy derived from Article 122 EEA and the commercial interest exception and the RAD 2012. Moreover, it observes that ESA did not refer to the commercial interest exception and the RAD 2012 when it invited confidentiality claims from Norway Post on 9 January 2013. In those circumstances, according to the applicants, ESA cannot seriously contend that its failure to clarify the relationship between those different rules and their different effects on the public interest rule have not affected the confidentiality claims that Norway Post submitted and ESA’s assessment of such.

142. According to DB Schenker, the defence appears to be under a misconception that the two separate requirements necessary to demonstrate that an individual document falls under the professional secrecy obligation are not separate. In its view, this contradicts ESA’s

51 Reference is made to the order of the President of the General Court of 29 November 2012 in Case T-164/12 R Alstom v Commission, not yet reported, and the order of the President of the General Court of 16 November 2012 in Case T-345/12 R Akzo Nobel v Commission, not yet reported.

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previous position adopted in the standard instructions sent to Norway Post on 9 January 2013 and the case law referred to in those instructions.

143. In DB Schenker’s view, ESA has proposed a line of reasoning in the defence which was not included in the contested decision and which is therefore irrelevant for the assessment of its legality. It contends that the premise for ESA’s argument in the defence is a speculative extrapolation from the ECJ’s judgments in Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie52 concerning access requests under national law. In contrast, DB Schenker notes that, in the European Commission’s proposal for a directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union,53 the Commission states that “to date most victims of infringements of the EU competition rules in practice do not obtain compensation for the harm suffered”54 and that “obtaining the evidence needed to prove a case”55 remains an obstacle. In particular, the Commission notes that “a claim under the law of one Member State may lead to full recovery of the claimant’s loss, while a claim for an identical infringement in another Member State may lead to a significantly lower award or even no award at all”.56 On the other hand, in DB Schenker’s view, the defence appears to contend that access to ESA’s evidence, and by extension that of the Commission, concerning their “central investigations and infringement decisions” should be subject to national court procedures. It rejects that position as flawed.

ESA

144. ESA considers that the third plea consists of one substantive and one procedural part.

145. The substantive part alleges an infringement of the overriding public interest rule in Article 4(4) RAD 2012 in conjunction with an infringement of Article 38 SCA. ESA submits that the alleged infringement of Article 38 SCA is simply the contention that the contested decision is not “lawful”.

52 Reference is made to Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie and Others, judgment of 6 June 2013, not yet reported, paragraphs 25 to 27.

53 Reference is made to COM(2013) 404 final.54 Ibid., p. 4.55 Ibid., p. 4.56 Ibid., p. 11.

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ESA avers that the contested decision does give several reasons why it concluded that although the case “does involve public interests (relating to institutional transparency and private enforcement), speaking in favour of disclosure, these public interests cannot, in the present case, override the protection of the commercial interests at issue and professional secrecy”.

146. ESA submits that the application does not take issue with the contested decision insofar as it concludes at paragraphs 40 and 63 that in the present case unfettered public access to the “information at issue” could entail a risk of undermining competition. In that regard, ESA refers to Article 1(2) EEA.

147. ESA relies on the argument made in the contested decision, namely, that the existence of the Zwartveld procedure strengthens the conclusion that there is no overriding public interest in unconditional disclosure to the public on the basis that such procedure is “an appropriate procedure, a better targeted framework and a more proportionate measure than public access to support private enforcement of the EEA competition rules”.57 Moreover, it contends that the Court must not “disregard the national rules governing the follow-on action in the Oslo District Court”.

148. ESA makes reference to ECJ case law on the right to obtain damages in competition law. It acknowledges that those private actions before national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition.58 At the same time, it refers also to ECJ case law on the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of cartel leniency programmes.59 In ESA’s view, it would not serve the purpose of a uniform application of EEA law were that law to oblige the Contracting Parties to design their relevant laws on discovery and disclosure in conformity with EEA competition law and, at the same time, ignore the existence of appropriately balanced national rules when appraising the proportionality of making commercially sensitive information available to the public at large and not simply to potential claimants under national procedures that conform to the requirements laid down in Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie.

57 Reference is made to ESA’s Notice on the co-operation between the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the courts of the EFTA States in the application of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, OJ 2006 C 305, p. 19, points 22 and 24.

58 Reference is made to Donau Chemie and Others, cited above, paragraphs 20 and 21, and Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161, paragraph 28 and case law cited.

59 Reference is made to Pfleiderer, cited above, paragraphs 25 to 27 and 29 to 31 and case law cited, and Donau Chemie and Others, cited above, paragraphs 24, 44 to 48 and case law cited.

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149. ESA refers to the national rules on discovery in the Norwegian Dispute Act. It asserts that in Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie the ECJ essentially applied proportionality considerations. ESA notes that the principle of proportionality is a general principle of EEA law60 that applies if different means to achieve the same public interest objective have to be weighed. ESA contends that the principle is no less relevant where different public interest objectives must be balanced.

150. ESA contends that “it is precisely for reasons of proportionality that the Authority disagrees that the public interest in private enforcement in the present case overrides the protection of the commercial interests at issue and professional secrecy. As set out in the contested decision, unrestricted disclosure of documents containing commercially sensitive information to the general public at large would lead to disproportionate effects. Disproportionate, as measures exist that are less deleterious to the professional secrecy and the maintenance of undistorted competition; but which are, for the very least, equally well suited to serve the specific information interest of those who claim to have suffered loss and damages as a consequence of a breach of the EEA competition rules.”

151. ESA contends that, “as in the present abuse investigation concerning an industrial services market” that gave rise to the inspection in question, those capable of pursuing private enforcement will “always be a small group of potential litigants. And indeed a very small one compared to the unlimited number of addressees of [ESA’s] RAD 2012.”

152. In ESA’s view, the application presupposes an additional infringement of the EEA competition rules notwithstanding the absence of any public competition authority or court decision to that extent.61 It contends that there is nothing in the contested decision to support the assertion that ESA failed to take account of the fact that the “information in the remaining inspection documents” might also be relevant to other cases, actual or potential, aside from the follow-on action pending before the Oslo District Court. In its view, the application is the first time that DB Schenker has raised this argument.

60 Reference is made to Case E-4/04 Pedicel AS v Sosial- og helsedirektoratet [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, paragraphs 55 and 56.

61 Reference is made to Post Danmark, cited above, paragraph 21 et seq.

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153. As regards the procedural part of the plea, the duty to state reasons under Article 16 SCA, ESA makes reference to its earlier arguments, summarised in paragraph 129 above. ESA contends that, contrary to the argument advanced in the application, it is not required to adduce additional explanations on the “general relationship” between Article 4(4) RAD 2012 and the obligation of professional secrecy. While not excluding the possibility that the first indent of Article 4(4) RAD 2012 might have a greater scope than professional secrecy, for the purposes of adopting the contested decision, it was unnecessary, according to ESA, to discuss the relationship between those provisions more generally.

154. Moreover, in ESA’s assessment, the contested decision does not fail to set out why the documents concerned are covered by professional secrecy. It demonstrates, in addition, that the documents concerned are worthy of protection. The contested decision describes each document, both individually on the attached lists of documents, and as part of groups of documents. Moreover, the contested decision explains that the “non-disclosed information”, despite its age, still constitutes essential elements of Norway Post’s “commercial position”. ESA asserts that, on its understanding, it requires “no further elaboration than already provided in the decision that current essential elements of a company’s commercial position are worthy of protection”.

155. Finally, ESA contends that the contested decision, in paragraphs 33 to 41 and 56 to 64, specifically addresses the issue of whether the public interests involved in the present case could override the protection of the commercial interests at issue and professional secrecy.

156. In its rejoinder, ESA contends that the European Ombudsman has stated that the “existence of a public interest in private enforcement does not mean that, in every case, this public interest would be an ‘overriding’ public interest”.62 The European Ombudsman also considered that the existence of an alternative channel of private enforcement of EU competition law through Article 15 of Regulation No 1/2003 “diminishes significantly the weight of the need to grant public access in the context of the balancing exercise”.63 According to ESA, the need to protect documents containing

62 Reference is made to Decision of the European Ombudsman 3699/2006/ELB, paragraph 55.63 Ibid., paragraphs 106 and 113.

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confidential information and business secrets weighs heavily on the “other side of the scales” because the “protection of professional secrets is a fundamental right”.64

157. As for the European Commission’s proposed directive on the disclosure of evidence, ESA observes in its rejoinder that this remains only a proposal and that, in any event, the EEA Joint Committee would need to incorporate it into the EEA Agreement.65

Fourth plea: infringement of the right to partial access in Article 4(9) RAD 2012 and the duty to state reasons in Article 16 SCA

158. DB Schenker submits that Article 4(9) RAD 2012 grants a right to partial access to those parts of a document that are not covered by any exception (“the remaining parts of the documents shall be released”). In its view, ESA’s refusal to grant partial access to the documents dealt with in section 5 of the decision infringes the public’s right to partial access under Article 4(9) RAD 2012 and contains manifest errors of assessment in addition to the breach of Articles 16 and 38 SCA.

159. First, DB Schenker contests ESA’s conclusion that “redacting is feasible” only in relation to the documents that Norway Post provided in its letter of 28 January 2013.

160. Second, DB Schenker notes that in the annulled decision – in which ESA claimed to have reviewed all of the inspection documents – ESA did not argue that partial access could not provide access to “any meaningful” part of the documents but rather that the “burden of work” would be unreasonable and disproportionate. The applicants contend, therefore, that ESA thus contradicted itself in the contested decision.

161. Third, according to DB Schenker, the contested decision contains no explanation of what ESA regards as “no meaningful content”. In DB Schenker’s view, to allow ESA to set aside the right to partial access whenever it claims that the right would not yield any “meaningful content” would in reality deprive that statutory right of substance. DB Schenker notes that the right to partial access is a manifestation of the principle of

64 Reference is made to Case T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921, paragraph 90, and to Decision of the European Ombudsman 3699/2006/ELB, paragraph 106.

65 Reference is made to Wahl, cited above, paragraph 73.

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proportionality in EEA law and that the Court has previously held that an exception to that right must be interpreted exceptionally narrowly.66 ESA’s interpretation must therefore be held unlawful.

162. For those reasons, individually and collectively, DB Schenker contends that the contested decision must be annulled insofar as it denies partial access to any of the inspection documents.

ESA

163. ESA considers that the fourth plea consists of one substantive and one procedural part.

164. The substantive part alleges an infringement of the overriding public interest rule in Article 4(9) RAD 2012 in conjunction with an infringement of Article 38 SCA. ESA submits that the alleged infringement of Article 38 SCA is simply the contention that the contested decision is not “lawful”. ESA avers that the contested decision does give several reasons why it concluded that although the case “does involve public interests (relating to institutional transparency and private enforcement), speaking in favour of disclosure, these public interests cannot, in the present case, override the protection of the commercial interests at issue and professional secrecy”.

165. ESA rejects the view that, in its implementation of the judgment in DB Schenker I, there is any breach of Article 38 SCA and refers to its earlier arguments summarised above in paragraph 84. ESA states that it understands the plea as relating only to the 229 inspection documents to which access was refused in full.

166. ESA contends that, in the context of plea concerning an alleged failure to grant partial access, it fails to understand the relevance of the complaint that it had not individually registered the inspection documents in its case file. It avers that, in any event, the contested decision identifies the inspection documents individually and that the lists attached to the contested decision describe “each individual document in further detail”.

167. ESA states that it registered all the inspection documents in Case 34250 by scanning each page of the documents copied during the inspection.

66 Reference is made to DB Schenker I, cited above, paragraph 264.

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Document (“event”) numbers were not assigned to individual documents, but to batches of documents as listed per inspector, by the inspectors and during the inspections.

168. ESA asserts that it is “living up to its obligation to ensure the EEA rights of all private companies involved in the matter”. It acknowledges that the Court previously found that “the burden of work” could not be relied upon in the circumstances.67 As a consequence, following that ruling, it did not allow “the burden of work implied to stand in the way of granting public access, in part or in full”. ESA asserts that there has been nothing inconsistent in its approach.68

169. As regards the procedural part of the plea, the duty to state reasons under Article 16 SCA, ESA makes reference to its earlier arguments, summarised in paragraph 129 above. ESA reiterates that, contrary to the argument advanced in the application, it did not contradict itself in the contested decision. Furthermore, in paragraph 65 of the contested decision, it clarified that the documents at issue would have to be “redacted so severely as to leave no meaningful content”. When read in the context of the reasons for refusing public access, as it must, ESA asserts that this reasoning suffices for the purposes of Article 16 SCA. In its view, it cannot be decisive in and of itself that the specific reasoning on partial access is “brief” if it is sufficiently clear when read in light of the decision as a whole.

170. In its rejoinder, ESA observes that, pursuant to Article 66(2) RoP, the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.69 It contends that none of the exceptions specified in Article 66(3) RoP are applicable in the present case.

Statement in intervention

Norway Post

171. Norway Post fully supports the form of order sought by ESA. Norway Post stresses the fact that no limitations on use may be placed on documents released pursuant to the RAD 2012.

67 Ibid., paragraph 270.68 Ibid., paragraph 263.69 Reference is made to point A.4.a., second paragraph, second sentence, of the Court’s Notes for the

guidance of Counsel 2012.

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172. Norway Post submits that as the “owner of the inspection documents” it has a profound interest in preventing general access by all to an even greater scope of its commercial information and its business relations than has already been provided for in the contested decision. Further disclosure would undermine the protection of its commercial interests by enabling the exploitation of strategic information and subsequent market adaptations. Moreover, its interest in the non-disclosure of the contested documents coincides with the public interests in professional secrecy and undistorted competition.

173. Norway Post contends that ESA is correct in maintaining that the level of access granted in the contested decision is appropriate and, furthermore, “in accordance with RAD 2012 and thus lawful”.

First plea in intervention: the action for annulment is inadmissible due to the applicants’ failure to submit a confirmatory application

174. Norway Post fully supports ESA’s contention that, in accordance with the case law of the ECJ concerning Regulation No 1049/2001 and the principle of homogeneity, DB Schenker’s failure to submit a confirmatory application, as required by Article 7(6) RAD 2012, prior to initiating proceedings before the Court renders the application for annulment inadmissible.

175. Norway Post notes that the relevant provision of the RAD 2012 applies to all access requests “decided upon” after its entry into force in September 2012. Consequently, even though the initial request was made under the RAD, and even though the contested decision replaces the original annulled decision, in Norway Post’s view, the confirmatory application procedure nevertheless remains applicable in relation to the contested decision.

176. Irrespective of the applicability of the material provisions of the RAD 2012 to the contested decision, the requirement that the applicants comply with the relevant procedural rules of the RAD 2012 in no way jeopardises their established rights of legitimate expectations. According to Norway Post, the “purported controversy” regarding the material provisions of RAD 2012 is “merely theoretical” as the relevant provisions forming the basis for the contested decision remain the same as under the RAD. Consequently,

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the application of the confirmatory application procedure in Article 7(6) RAD 2012 does not constitute an illegal retroactive application capable of adversely affecting the applicants’ established legal position.

177. Norway Post contends that to disregard the procedural requirements of RAD 2012 would place it in an unreasonably adverse position when compared with any EU national counterparts seeking to ensure their corresponding interest in avoiding excessive document disclosure under the relevant EU rules.

Second plea in intervention: disclosure of the exempt documents would undermine the protection of Norway Post’s commercial interests

178. Norway Post asserts that further disclosure of the inspection documents would undermine the protection of its commercial interests. Not only the potential harm resulting from the disclosure of individual documents should be considered; due consideration should also be given to the potential collective impact of granting access to numerous commercial documents that may together provide a comprehensive information as to the “inner workings” of Norway Post’s business.

179. Norway Post contends that “[to] a large extent, the [inspection documents] were never liable to substantiate [ESA’s] case against Norway Post”. Norway Post alleges that the disclosure to its competitors of information contained in the inspection documents may well constitute an illegal exchange of information. Moreover, it would amount to a violation of Norway Post’s contractual obligations to maintain confidentiality. Further disclosure than has already been provided for would “easily amount to a disproportionate intrusion on its and its business [partners’] private commercial affairs”.

180. Norway Post asserts that the general nature of the RAD 2012 calls for a restrictive approach to extensive disclosure of an undertaking’s private commercial information particularly where the “relevant information is only peripherally related to [ESA’s] governance”.

181. Norway Post submits that the “exempt information” in the inspection documents consisting of strategies, reviews, analyses and agreements does not constitute information “similar” to that referred to in DB Schenker

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I that is presumed no longer to be confidential when over 5 years old.70 Norway Post stresses that the relevant market remains largely the same as it was when the documents in question were produced.

182. According to Norway Post, the disclosure “of further information contained in the partially or wholly exempt inspection documents” may unreasonably harm Norway Post in providing its competitors with an unfair advantage, enabling them to predict and adapt to Norway Post’s market behaviour, and enabling Norway Post’s customers to exploit the information in contractual negotiations.

183. The inspection documents may appropriately be grouped according to their content.71 According to Norway Post, the applicants have been provided with an appropriately detailed “explanation of the documents” in the contested decision and in the 26 document lists annexed to it.

Third plea in intervention: there is no overriding public interest warranting more extensive document disclosure than provided for in the contested decision

184. Norway Post stresses that, pursuant to Article 4(4) RAD 2012 (compare Article 4(2) RAD), a refusal to provide access to documents in order to protect commercial interests may only be upheld if there is no overriding public interest in disclosure. Institutional transparency and the facilitation of private competition law enforcement constitute relevant public interests. Norway Post notes that private enforcement of competition law must always be pursued before national courts. A private action seeking to enforce competition law will therefore always be subject to national litigation rules as well as any relevant EEA-related procedural measures, and in particular the Zwartveld procedure.

185. Norway Post emphasises that national litigation rules and any relevant EEA-related measures are not primarily an alternative to rules on access to documents but, in relation to ensuring the public interest in facilitating private competition law enforcement, the rules concerned have a supplementary function capable of meeting a potential claimant’s needs at different stages of the procedure. Norway Post considers that, prior to the initiation of any private competition law


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action before a national court, an access to documents request may indeed serve to facilitate private competition law enforcement. Pursuant to Article 16 of Chapter II of Protocol 4 SCA and section 8 of the Norwegian EEA Competition Law, a Norwegian court is bound by ESA’s finding of an infringement of Article 53 EEA. Accordingly, the existence of an ESA infringement decision and subsequent Court judgment would disburden potential claimants from the obligation to substantiate a breach of the competition rules as part of its claim for damages. Norway Post submits that this should be taken into account in balancing the opposing interests under Article 4(4) RAD 2012. Norway Post submits that the fact that the applicants lodged their application for damages before the Oslo District Court on 24 June 2010 supports this contention.

186. Norway Post contends that it would be wholly inappropriate for a claimant to rely upon the RAD 2012 to substantiate a damages claim. It considers that the applicants have placed “unreasonably excessive reliance on the RAD 2012, the primary objective of which is to ensure transparency” of ESA’s “administrative governance”. Moreover, an interpretation “compliant” with the applicants’ “apparent expectations” would likely lead to an excessively wide scope of application of the public interest reservation “implied by Article 4(4) RAD 2012 (cf. Article 4(2) [RAD])”. This is further supported by the existence of national litigation rules aimed precisely at enabling a claimant to sufficiently substantiate his claim. However, as a national court would be able to restrict the subsequent use of the “information in question” beyond the purposes of a damages action, the national court could still be able to afford any third party concerned appreciable protection of their private information in comparison with a situation of general public disclosure. Thus, the availability of more suitable national disclosure provisions constitutes an important consideration when determining the level of access to be granted under the RAD 2012. Therefore, Norway Post contends that there is no overriding public interest in the present case that would justify a wider scope of access to Norway Post’s commercial information than has already been provided for in the contested decision.

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CASE E-4/13

Report

Written observations on the statement in intervention

DB Schenker

187. The applicants have contested all of Norway Post’s pleas. DB Schenker asserts that Norway Post has not adduced any support for its claim that its “legitimate interests” as “the owner” of the inspection documents would have led the EU courts to rule the action inadmissible and that, consequently, the Court should do the same on the basis of homogeneity. Norway Post is not the “owner” of the documents, as these were lawfully copied by ESA during its inspection. These copies belong to ESA but have the status of “third-party documents” pursuant to Article 4(8) RAD 2012.

188. DB Schenker contends that, pursuant to Article 4(8) RAD 2012, the responsibility for “vetting” third-party documents rests with ESA. Noting that Norway Post was consulted three times by ESA, DB Schenker submits that it was open to Norway Post to bring an action for annulment in order to prevent disclosure.72

189. According to DB Schenker, Norway Post has not sought to substantiate its “group claims” for confidentiality. In addition, Norway Post did not put forward any support for its contention that the disclosure of the inspection documents may well constitute “an illegal information exchange”.

ESA

190. ESA expresses its surprise on learning that the applicants have petitioned Oslo District Court in their follow-on action for disclosure of evidence. ESA contends that it only became aware of such a petition on reading paragraph 35 of the Statement in Intervention. It notes that this petition was made prior to the applicants’ initial access to documents request of 3 August 2010.

Carl Baudenbacher

Judge-Rapporteur

72 Reference is made to the order in Alstom v Commission, cited above, the order in Akzo Nobel v Commission, cited above.

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Book 3

Case E-18/14Wow air ehf.

v The Icelandic

Competition Authority, Isavia ohf. and Icelandair ehf.


Book 3

Case E-18/14 Wow air ehf. v The Icelandic Competition Authority, Isavia ohf. and Icelandair ehf.

CASE E-18/14Wow air ehf.

v

The Icelandic Competition Authority, Isavia ohf. and Icelandair ehf.

(Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 - Allocation of time slots at EEA airports – Intervention by competition authorities - Accelerated procedure)

Judgment of the Court, 10 December 2014 ................................................. 1305

Order of the President, 30 September 2014 ................................................ 1330



1. Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports requires EEA States responsible for a coordinated airport to ensure the appointment of a qualified airport coordinator, and that the coordinator must be independent, both legally and factually, and functionally separated from all interested parties. As long as these conditions are fulfilled, an EEA State has discretion in determining the status of the coordinator.

2. The complaint procedure prescribed in the Regulation cannot be considered mandatory or exhaustive. The Regulation expressly states that this procedure is without prejudice to rights of appeal under national law, and also that the Regulation shall not affect the powers of public authorities

to require the transfer of time slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to national or EEA competition law. Therefore, complaints based on competition law considerations may be submitted directly to national competition authorities.

3. Instructions from public authorities as to the reallocation of time slots may be addressed to air carriers, but not to the coordinator or the airport managing body. Unlike the initial allocation of time slots, which is the sole responsibility of the coordinator, the Regulation does not prohibit a transfer of time slots afterwards. Consequently, the authorities of an EEA State may instruct the undertakings concerned, if such a remedy is necessary under applicable national or EEA competition law.

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CASE E-18/14


MÁL E-18/14Wow air ehf.

gegn

Samkeppniseftirlitinu, Isavia ohf. og Icelandair ehf.

(Reglugerð (EBE) nr. 95/93 – Úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á flugvöllum innan EES – Afskipti samkeppnisyfirvalda – Flýtimeðferð)

Dómur EFTA-dómstólsins, 10. desember 2014 ............................................. 1305

Fyrirmæli forseta, 30. september 2014 ....................................................... 1330

Skýrsla framsögumanns.............................................................................. 1335

Samantekt

1. Reglugerð ráðsins (EBE) nr. 95/93 frá 18. janúar 1993 um sameiginlegar reglur um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á bandalagsflugvöllum gerir kröfu um að EES-ríki skipi hæfan einstakling eða lögaðila í stöðu samræmingarstjóra flugvallar. Skal hlutverk samræmingarstjóra vera gert þannig úr garði að hann sé óháður öllum hagsmunaaðilum, bæði lagalega og í reynd. Svo framarlega sem þessum kröfum er fullnægt er það á forræði EES-ríkjanna að ákveða hvaða stöðu samræmingarstjórinn hefur að landsrétti.

2. Kvörtunarferlið sem mælt er fyrir um í reglugerð (EBE) nr. 95/93 er hvorki ófrávíkjanlegt né er því lýst með tæmandi hætti. Í reglugerðinni er kveðið sérstaklega á um að ákvæðið sjálft sé með fyrirvara um málskot samkvæmt landslögum. Einnig skuli reglugerðin ekki hafa áhrif á heimildir opinberra yfirvalda til að krefjast þess að afgreiðslutímar

séu færðir á milli flugrekenda og til að stjórna hvernig þeim er úthlutað í samræmi við innlend samkeppnislög eða samkeppnisreglur EES-réttar. Af þeim sökum má beina kvörtunum á grundvelli samkeppnissjónarmiða beint til innlendra samkeppnisyfirvalda.

3. Fyrirmælum opinberra yfirvalda um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á að beina til flugrekenda en ekki til samræmingastjóra eða framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallar. Ólíkt því sem við á um upphaflega úthlutun afgreiðslutíma, sem samræmingastjórinn ber einn ábyrgð á, leggur reglugerðin ekki bann við að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir eftir upphaflega úthlutun, ef innlend samkeppnislöggjöf eða samkeppnislöggjöf EES-réttar krefst þess. Þar af leiðandi er yfirvöldum EES-ríkis heimilt að beina fyrirmælum til þeirra fyrirtækja sem hlut eiga að máli, ef það telst nauðsynlegt samkvæmt samkeppnisreglum landsréttar eða EES-samningsins.

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10 December 2014*

(Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 – Allocation of time slots at EEA airports – Intervention by competition authorities – Accelerated procedure)

In Case E-18/14,

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice from Reykjavík District Court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur), in the case between

Wow air ehf.

and

The Icelandic Competition Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið), Isavia ohf., and Icelandair ehf.

concerning the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports,

THE COURT,

composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President, Per Christiansen (Judge-Rapporteur) and Páll Hreinsson, Judges,



– the Icelandic Competition Authority (“the Competition Authority”), represented by Gizur Bergsteinsson, Attorney at Law;

– Isavia ohf. (“Isavia”), represented by Hlynur Halldórsson, Supreme Court Attorney;

– Icelandair ehf. (“Icelandair”), represented by Helga Melkorka Óttarsdóttir, Supreme Court Attorney;

* Language of the request: Icelandic.

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

DÓMUR DÓMSTÓLSINS

10. desember 2014*

(Reglugerð (EBE) nr. 95/93 – Úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á flugvöllum innan EES – Afskipti samkeppnisyfirvalda – Flýtimeðferð)

Mál E-18/14,

BEIÐNI, samkvæmt 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTA-ríkjanna um stofnun

eftirlitsstofnunar og dómstóls, um ráðgefandi álit EFTA-dómstólsins, frá Héraðsdómi

Reykjavíkur, í máli sem þar er rekið

Wow air ehf.

gegn

Samkeppniseftirlitinu, Isavia ohf., og Icelandair ehf.

um túlkun á reglugerð ráðsins (EBE) nr. 95/93 frá 18. janúar 1993 um

sameiginlegar reglur um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á bandalagsflugvöllum.

DÓMSTÓLLINN,

skipaður dómurunum Carl Baudenbacher, forseta, Per Christiansen, framsögumanni,

og Páli Hreinssyni,

dómritari: Gunnar Selvik,

hefur, með tilliti til skriflegra greinargerða frá:

– Stefnda, Samkeppniseftirlitinu, í fyrirsvari er Gizur Bergsteinsson, hrl.;

– Stefnda, Isavia ohf. („Isavia“), í fyrirsvari er Hlynur Halldórsson, hrl.;

– Stefnda, Icelandair ehf. („Icelandair“), í fyrirsvari er Helga Melkorka

Óttarsdóttir, hrl.;

* Beiðni um ráðgefandi álit á íslensku.

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– the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”), represented by Xavier Lewis, Director, Markus Schneider, Deputy Director, and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents; and

– the European Commission (“the Commission”), represented by Teresa Vecchi, Folkert Wilman and Nicola Yerrell, members of its Legal Service, acting as Agents,


having heard oral argument of the Competition Authority, represented by Gizur Bergsteinsson; Isavia, represented by Hlynur Halldórsson; Icelandair, represented by Helga Melkorka Óttarsdóttir; ESA, represented by Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir; and the Commission, represented by Nicola Yerrell, at the hearing on 27 October 2014,

gives the following

JUDGMENT

I LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law

1 Article 1(1) and (2)(e) EEA read:

1. The aim of this Agreement of association is to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Contracting Parties with equal conditions of competition, and the respect of the same rules, with a view to creating a homogeneous European Economic Area, hereinafter referred to as the EEA.

2. In order to attain the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the association shall entail, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement:

…

(e) the setting up of a system ensuring that competition is not distorted and that the rules thereon are equally respected; …

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

– Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA („ESA“), í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Xavier Lewis, framkvæmdastjóri lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviðs, Markus Schneider og Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir lögfræðingar á lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviði;

– Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópusambandsins, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Teresa Vecchi, Folkert Wilman og Nicola Yerrell, hjá lagaskrifstofu framkvæmdastjórnarinnar;

með tilliti til skýrslu framsögumanns,

og munnlegs málflutnings lögmanns Samkeppniseftirlitsins, Gizurar Bergsteinssonar, lögmanns Isavia, Hlyns Halldórssonar, lögmanns Icelandair, Helgu Melkorku Óttarsdóttur, fulltrúa ESA, Auðar Ýrar Steinarsdóttur og fulltrúa framkvæmdastjórnar Evrópusambandsins, Nicola Yerrell, sem fram fór 27. október 2014,

kveðið upp svofelldan

DÓM

I LÖGGJÖF

EES-réttur

1 Í 1. mgr. og e-lið 2. mgr. 1. gr. EES-samningsins segir:

1. Markmið þessa samstarfssamnings er að stuðla að stöðugri og jafnri eflingu viðskipta- og efnahagstengsla samningsaðila við sömu samkeppnisskilyrði og eftir sömu reglum með það fyrir augum að mynda einsleitt Evrópskt efnahagssvæði sem nefnist hér á eftir EES.

2. Til að ná þeim markmiðum sem sett eru í 1. mgr. skal samstarfið í samræmi við ákvæði samnings þessa fela í sér:

...

(e) að komið verði á kerfi sem tryggi að samkeppni raskist ekki og að reglur þar að lútandi verði virtar af öllum; ...

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…

3 Article 53(1) EEA reads:

The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Contracting Parties and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the territory covered by this Agreement …

4 The first paragraph of Article 54 EEA reads:

Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the territory covered by this Agreement or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between Contracting Parties.

Regulation (EEC) No 95/93

5 Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports (OJ 1993 L 14, p. 1) (“the Regulation”) was incorporated into point 64b of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement by Joint Committee Decision No 7/94 of 28 June 1994 (OJ 1994 L 160, p. 1, and EEA Supplement 1994 No 17, p. 1). The Regulation was amended by Regulation (EC) No 793/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 (OJ 2004 L 138, p. 50) (“Regulation 793/2004”), which was incorporated into the same point by Joint Committee Decision No 154/2004 of 21 April 2005 (OJ 2005 L 102, p. 33, and EEA Supplement 2005 No. 20, p. 21).

6 The purpose of the Regulation is to ensure that where airport capacity is scarce, the available landing and take-off slots are used efficiently and

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment




...

3 Í 1. mgr. 53. gr. EES-samningsins segir:

Eftirfarandi skal bannað og talið ósamrýmanlegt framkvæmd samnings þessa: allir samningar milli fyrirtækja, ákvarðanir samtaka fyrirtækja og samstilltar aðgerðir sem geta haft áhrif á viðskipti milli samningsaðila og hafa að markmiði eða af þeim leiðir að komið sé í veg fyrir samkeppni, hún sé takmörkuð eða henni raskað á því svæði sem samningur þessi tekur til [...].

4 Í 1. mgr. 54. gr. EES-samningsins segir:

Misnotkun eins eða fleiri fyrirtækja á yfirburðastöðu á svæðinu sem samningur þessi tekur til, eða verulegum hluta þess, er ósamrýmanleg framkvæmd samnings þessa og því bönnuð að því leyti sem hún kann að hafa áhrif á viðskipti milli samningsaðila.

Reglugerð (EBE) nr. 95/93

5 Reglugerð ráðsins (EBE) nr. 95/93 frá 18. janúar 1993 um sameiginlegar reglur um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á bandalagsflugvöllum (Stjtíð. ESB 1993 L 14, bls. 1) („reglugerðin eða reglugerð 95/93) var tekin upp í lið 64b XIII. viðauka við EES-samninginn samkvæmt ákvörðun sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 7/94 frá 28. júní 1994 (Stjtíð. ESB L 160, bls. 1 og EES-viðbætir 1994 nr. 17, bls. 1). Reglugerðinni var breytt með reglugerð Evrópuþingsins og ráðsins (EB) nr. 793/2004 frá 21. apríl 2004 (Stjtíð. ESB 2004 L 138, bls. 50) („reglugerð 793/2004“) sem tekin var upp í sama lið ákvörðunar sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 154/2004 frá 21. apríl 2005 (Stjtíð. 2005 L 102, bls. 33 og EES-viðbætir 2005 nr. 20, bls. 21).

6 Markmið reglugerðarinnar er að tryggja að úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á flugvöllum þar sem umferðarþröng er mikil byggist á reglum sem eru

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distributed in an equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent manner. On the basis of objective criteria laid down in the Regulation, an airport can be designated as coordinated on the grounds that its capacity is insufficient.

7 Recitals 2, 5, 8 to 10, 12 and 15 in the preamble to the Regulation read:

(2) Whereas the allocation of slots at congested airports should be based on neutral, transparent and non-discriminatory rules;

…

(5) Whereas the Member State responsible for the coordinated airport should ensure the appointment of a coordinator whose neutrality should be unquestioned;

…

(8) Whereas it is Community policy to facilitate competition and to encourage entrance into the market …;

(9) Whereas the existing system makes provision for grandfather rights;

(10) Whereas there should also be provisions to allow new entrants into the Community market;

…

(12) Whereas it is also necessary to avoid situations where, owing to a lack of available slots, the benefits of liberalization are unevenly spread and competition is distorted;

…

(15) Whereas the application of the provisions of this Regulation shall be without prejudice to the competition rules on the Treaty, in particular Articles 85 and 86;

8 Recitals 6 and 17 in the preamble to Regulation 793/2004 read:

(6) … At coordinated airports the coordinator plays a central role in the coordinating process. Therefore, coordinators should be in a fully independent position and their responsibilities should be specified in detail.

…

(17) For the avoidance of doubt, it should be specified that the application of the provisions of this Regulation is to be without prejudice to

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

hlutlausar, skýrar og án mismununar. Á grundvelli hlutlægra skilyrða sem mælt er fyrir um í reglugerðinni má flokka flugvöll sem samræmdan flugvöll á grundvelli þess að afgreiðslugetan sé ófullnægjandi.

7 Í 2., 5., 8. til 10., 12. og 15. lið formálsorða reglugerðarinnar segir:

(2) Úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á flugvöllum þar sem umferðarþröng er mikil ætti að byggjast á reglum sem eru hlutlausar, skýrar og án mismununar.

...

(5) Aðildarríki sem ber ábyrgð á samræmdum flugvelli ber að sjá til þess að skipaður sé samræmingarstjóri og að hlutleysi hans sé ótvírætt.

...

(8) Stefna bandalagsins er að auðvelda samkeppni og stuðla að þátttöku í markaðinum [...]

(9) Í núverandi kerfi er tekið tillit til hefðbundinna réttinda.

(10) Þegar fram í sækir ætti enn fremur að setja ákvæði um að heimila nýjum aðilum aðgang að markaði bandalagsins.

...

(12) Einnig er nauðsynlegt að forðast aðstæður þar sem ávinningur af auknu frjálsræði dreifist með misjöfnum hætti og samkeppni raskast vegna þess að ekki eru nægilega margir afgreiðslutímar fyrir hendi.

...

(15) Reglugerð þessari skal beitt með fyrirvara um samkeppnisreglur sáttmálans, einkum 85. og 86. gr.

8 Í 6. og 17. lið formálsorða reglugerðar 793/2004 segir:

(6) [...] Á flugvöllum með skammtaðan afgreiðslutíma gegnir samræmingarstjóri lykilhlutverki í samræmingarferlinu. Samræmingarstjórar skulu því vera algjörlega sjálfstæðir og skyldur þeirra tíundaðar nákvæmlega.

...

(17) Til að taka af allan vafa er rétt að taka fram að beiting ákvæða þessarar reglugerðar er með fyrirvara um samkeppnisreglur

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the competition rules of the Treaty, in particular Articles 81 and 82 thereof and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings.

9 Article 2(a), (g) and (j) of the Regulation read:

(a) ‘slot’ shall mean the permission given by a coordinator in accordance with this Regulation to use the full range of airport infrastructure necessary to operate an air service at a coordinated airport on a specific date and time for the purpose of landing or take-off as allocated by a coordinator in accordance with this Regulation;

…

(g) ‘coordinated airport’ shall mean any airport where, in order to land or take off, it is necessary for an air carrier or any other aircraft operator to have been allocated a slot by a coordinator, with the exception of State flights, emergency landings and humanitarian flights;

…

(j) ‘managing body of an airport’ shall mean the body which, in conjunction with other activities or otherwise, has the task under national laws or regulations of administering and managing the airport facilities and coordinating and controlling the activities of the various operators present at the airport or within the airport system concerned;

10 Article 4(1), (2) and (5) of the Regulation read:

The … coordinator

1. The Member State responsible for a … coordinated airport shall ensure the appointment of a qualified natural or legal person as … airport coordinator … after having consulted the air carriers using the airport regularly, their representative organisations and the managing body of the airport and the coordination committee, where such a committee exists. The same … coordinator may be appointed for more than one airport.

2. The Member State responsible for a … coordinated airport shall ensure:

…

(b) the independence of the coordinator at a coordinated airport by separating the coordinator functionally from any single interested

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

sáttmálans, einkum 81. og 82. gr., og reglugerð ráðsins (EBE) nr. 4064/89 frá 21. desember 1989 um eftirlit með samfylkingum fyrirtækja.

9 Í a-, g- og j-lið 2. gr. reglugerðarinnar segir um merkingu hugtaka:

(a) „afgreiðslutími“: leyfi, sem samræmingarstjóri veitir í samræmi við þessa reglugerð, til að nota alla fyrirliggjandi aðstöðu flugvallar til að starfrækja flugþjónustu á flugvelli með skömmtuðum afgreiðslutíma, á tilgreindum degi og tíma, til lendingar eða flugtaks, eftir úthlutun samræmingarstjóra í samræmi við þessa reglugerð,

...

(g) „flugvöllur með skammtaðan afgreiðslutíma“: flugvöllur þar sem samræmingarstjóri verður að úthluta flugrekanda eða umráðanda loftfars afgreiðslutíma til lendingar eða flugtaks nema um sé að ræða ríkisflug, nauðlendingu eða flug í mannúðarskyni,“

...

(j) „framkvæmdastjórn flugvallar“: framkvæmdastjórn sem hefur það hlutverk auk annarrar starfsemi, samkvæmt innlendum lögum eða reglum, að stjórna og hafa umsjón með flugvallarmannvirkjum ásamt því að samræma og stjórna starfsemi flugrekenda sem starfa á flugvellinum eða innan flugvallarkerfisins sem um ræðir.

10 Í 1., 2. og 5. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar segir:

Samræmingarstjóri

1. Aðildarríki sem ber ábyrgð á [...] flugvelli með skammtaðan afgreiðslutíma skal sjá til þess að hæfur einstaklingur eða lögaðili verði skipaður sem [...] samræmingarstjóri flugvallarins, að höfðu samráði við flugrekendur sem nota flugvöllinn reglulega, fulltrúa samtaka þeirra og framkvæmdastjórn flugvallarins og samræmingarnefndina ef hún hefur verið skipuð. Skipa má sama samráðs- eða samræmingarstjóra fyrir fleiri en einn flugvöll.

2. Aðildarríkið, sem ber ábyrgð á [...] flugvelli með skammtaðan afgreiðslutíma, skal tryggja:

...

b) sjálfstæði samræmingarstjóra á flugvelli með skammtaðan afgreiðslutíma með því að gera hlutverk samræmingarstjóra

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party. The system of financing the coordinators’ activities shall be such as to guarantee the coordinator’s independent status;

(c) that the coordinator acts according to this Regulation in a neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent way.

…

5. The coordinator shall be the sole person responsible for the allocation of slots. He shall allocate the slots in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation and shall make provision so that, in an emergency, slots can also be allocated outside office hours.

11 Article 5(1) of the Regulation reads:

Coordination committee

1. At a coordinated airport, the Member State responsible shall ensure that a coordination committee is set up. The same coordination committee may be designated for more than one airport. Membership of this committee shall be open at least to the air carriers using the airport(s) in question regularly and their representative organisations, the managing body of the airport concerned, the relevant air traffic control authorities and the representatives of general aviation using the airport regularly.

The tasks of the coordination committee shall be:

(a) to make proposals concerning or advise the coordinator and/or the Member State on:

…

– local guidelines for the allocation of slots or the monitoring of the use of allocated slots, taking into account, inter alia, possible environmental concerns, as provided for in Article 8(5);

…

– serious problems encountered by new entrants, as provided for in Article 10(9);

…

(b) to mediate between all parties concerned on complaints on the allocation of slots, as provided for in Article 11.

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

óháð hagsmunaaðilum. Fyrirkomulag við fjármögnun starfsemi samræmingarstjóra skal vera þannig að sjálfstæði hans sé tryggt,

c) að samræmingarstjóri ræki starf sitt í samræmi við þessa reglugerð á hlutlausan og skýran hátt og án mismununar.

...

5. Samræmingarstjóri skal einn bera ábyrgð á úthlutun afgreiðslutíma. Hann skal úthluta afgreiðslutímum í samræmi við ákvæði þessarar reglugerðar og sjá til þess að í neyð sé hægt að úthluta afgreiðslutímum utan skrifstofutíma.

11 Í 1. mgr. 5. gr. reglugerðarinnar segir:

Samræmingarnefnd

1. Aðildarríkið, sem ber ábyrgð á flugvelli með skammtaðan afgreiðslutíma, skal tryggja að samræmingarnefnd sé skipuð. Skipa má sömu samræmingarnefnd fyrir fleiri en einn flugvöll. Aðild að nefndinni skal opin a.m.k. þeim flugrekendum, sem nota viðkomandi flugvöll eða flugvelli reglulega, og samtökum fulltrúa þeirra, framkvæmdastjórn viðkomandi flugvallar, viðkomandi yfirstjórn flugstjórnarþjónustu og fulltrúum almannaflugs sem nota flugvöllinn reglulega.

Verkefni samræmingarnefndarinnar skulu vera:

a) að leggja fram tillögur um eða veita samræmingarstjóra og/eða aðildarríkinu ráðgjöf varðandi:

…

– staðbundnar leiðbeiningar um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma eða eftirlit með nýtingu afgreiðslutíma, m.a. að teknu tilliti til hugsanlegra umhverfissjónarmiða eins og kveðið er á um í 5. mgr. 8. gr.,

...

– alvarleg vandamál sem nýir aðilar standa frammi fyrir, eins og kveðið er á um í 9. mgr. 10. gr.,

...

b) að miðla málum milli allra viðkomandi aðila vegna kvartana um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma eins og kveðið er á um í 11. gr.

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12 Article 8(1) to (3) and (5) of the Regulation read:

Process of slot allocation

1. Series of slots are allocated from the slot pool to applicant carriers as permissions to use the airport infrastructure for the purpose of landing or take-off for the scheduling period for which they are requested, at the expiry of which they have to be returned to the slot pool as set up according to the provisions of Article 10.

2. Without prejudice to Articles 7, 8a, 9, 10(1) and 14, paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply when the following conditions are satisfied:

– a series of slots has been used by an air carrier for the operation of scheduled and programmed non-scheduled air services, and

– that air carrier can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the coordinator that the series of slots in question has been operated, as cleared by the coordinator, by that air carrier for at least 80 % of the time during the scheduling period for which it has been allocated.

In such case that series of slots shall entitle the air carrier concerned to the same series of slots in the next equivalent scheduling period, if requested by that air carrier within the time-limit referred to in Article 7(1).

3. Without prejudice to Article 10(2), in a situation where all slot requests cannot be accommodated to the satisfaction of the air carriers concerned, preference shall be given to commercial air services and in particular to scheduled services and programmed non-scheduled air services. In the case of competing requests within the same category of services, priority shall be given for year round operations.

…

5. The coordinator shall also take into account additional rules and guidelines established by the air transport industry world-wide or Community-wide as well as local guidelines proposed by the coordination committee and approved by the Member State or any other competent body responsible for the airport in question, provided that such rules and guidelines do not affect the independent status of the coordinator, comply with Community law and aim at improving the efficient use of airport capacity. These rules shall be communicated by the Member State in question to the Commission.

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

12 Í 1. til 3. og 5. mgr. 8. gr. reglugerðarinnar segir:

Úthlutun afgreiðslutíma

1. Röðum afgreiðslutíma er úthlutað úr heildarskrá afgreiðslutíma til flugrekenda, sem sækja um þær, sem heimildum til að nota aðstöðu flugvallarins til lendingar eða flugtaks á áætlunartímabilinu sem sótt er um og við lok tímabilsins skulu þær færðar aftur í heildarskrána í samræmi við ákvæði 10. gr.

2. Með fyrirvara um 7. gr., 8. gr. a, 9. gr., 10. gr. (1. mgr.) og 14. gr., skal 1. mgr. þessarar greinar ekki gilda ef eftirfarandi skilyrði eru uppfyllt:

– flugrekandi hefur notað röð afgreiðslutíma til að starfrækja reglubundið áætlunarflug og skipulagt leiguflug, og

– flugrekandi getur sýnt samræmingarstjóra fram á, svo honum þyki fullnægjandi, að hann hafi nýtt a.m.k. 80% viðkomandi raðar afgreiðslutíma, samkvæmt fyrirmælum samræmingarstjóra, á áætlunartímabilinu sem henni var úthlutað fyrir.

Í því tilviki skal þessi röð afgreiðslutíma veita viðkomandi flugrekanda rétt á sömu röð afgreiðslutíma á næsta samsvarandi áætlunartímabili, ef flugrekandinn óskar eftir því innan þeirra tímamarka sem um getur í 1. mgr. 7. gr.

3. Þegar ekki er unnt að verða við öllum umsóknum viðkomandi flugrekenda um afgreiðslutíma skal atvinnuflug njóta forgangs, einkum reglubundið áætlunarflug og skipulagt leiguflug, sbr. þó 2. mgr. 10. gr. Ef um er að ræða umsóknir sem keppa hver við aðra innan sama þjónustuflokks skal starfsemi sem fer fram allt árið njóta forgangs.

...

5. Samræmingarstjóri skal einnig taka tillit til viðbótarreglna og –leiðbeininga sem settar eru í loftflutningageiranum á heimsvísu eða í öllu Bandalaginu sem og staðbundinna leiðbeininga sem samræmingarnefndin leggur til og aðildarríkið eða til þess bær aðili, sem ber ábyrgð á viðkomandi flugvelli, samþykkir að því tilskildu að slíkar reglur og leiðbeiningar hafi ekki áhrif á sjálfstæði samræmingarstjórans, samræmist lögum Bandalagsins og hafi það að markmiði að bæta skilvirkni í nýtingu á afkastagetu flugvallarins. Hlutaðeigandi aðildarríki skal senda framkvæmdastjórninni þessar reglur.

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13 Article 8a(1) and (2) of the Regulation read:

Slot mobility

1. Slots may be:

(a) transferred by an air carrier from one route or type of service to another route or type of service operated by that same air carrier;

(b) transferred:

(i) between parent and subsidiary companies, and between subsidiaries of the same parent company,

(ii) as part of the acquisition of control over the capital of an air carrier,

(iii) in the case of a total or partial take-over when the slots are directly related to the air carrier taken over;

(c) exchanged, one for one, between air carriers.

2. The transfers or exchanges referred to in paragraph 1 shall be notified to the coordinator and shall not take effect prior to the express confirmation by the coordinator. …

14 Article 8b of the Regulation reads:

Exclusion of compensation claims

… This Regulation shall not affect the powers of public authorities to require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to national competition law or to Articles 81 or 82 of the Treaty or Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. These transfers can only take place without monetary compensation.

15 Article 10(1), (6) and (9) of the Regulation read:

Slot pool

1. The coordinator shall set up a pool, which shall contain all the slots not allocated on the basis of Article 8(2) and 8(4). …

…

6. Without prejudice to Article 8(2) of this Regulation and without prejudice to Article 8(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92, slots placed in the pool shall be distributed among applicant air carriers. 50 % of these

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

13 Í 1. og 2. mgr. 8. gr. a. reglugerðarinnar segir:

Hreyfanleiki afgreiðslutíma

1. Afgreiðslutíma má:

a) flugrekandi færa frá einni leið eða tegund þjónustu til annarrar leiðar eða tegundar þjónustu sem hann starfrækir,

b) færa:

i) milli móður- og dótturfélaga og milli dótturfélaga sama móðurfélags,

ii) sem hluta af yfirtöku eigin fjár flugrekanda,

iii) við yfirtöku að hluta eða í heild þegar afgreiðslutímarnir tengjast beint flugrekandanum sem er yfirtekinn,

c) skipta fyrir annan á milli flugrekenda.

2. Færslan eða skiptin, sem um getur í 1. mgr., skulu tilkynnt samræmingarstjóra og þau skulu ekki taka gildi fyrr en skýrt samþykki samræmingarstjóra fæst....

14 Í 8. gr. b reglugerðarinnar segir:

Útilokun bótakrafna

[...]Þessi reglugerð skal ekki hafa áhrif á vald opinberra yfirvalda til að krefjast færslu afgreiðslutíma milli flugrekenda og til að stjórna hvernig þeim er úthlutað í samræmi við innlend samkeppnislög eða 81. eða 82. gr. sáttmálans eða reglugerð ráðsins (EBE) nr. 4064/89 frá 21. desember 1989 um eftirlit með samfylkingum fyrirtækja. Þessar færslur mega ekki fara fram gegn greiðslu.

15 Í 1., 6. og 9. mgr. 10. gr. reglugerðarinnar segir:

Heildarskrá afgreiðslutíma

1. Samræmingarstjóri skal setja saman heildarskrá yfir alla afgreiðslutíma sem ekki er úthlutað á grundvelli 2. og 4. mgr. 8. gr. [...]

...

6. Með fyrirvara um 2. mgr. 8. gr. þessarar reglugerðar og 1. mgr. 8. gr. reglugerðar (EBE) nr. 2408/92 skal afgreiðslutímum, sem færðir eru inn í heildarskrána, deilt niður á flugrekendur sem hafa sent inn umsóknir. Fyrst

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slots shall first be allocated to new entrants unless requests by new entrants are less than 50 %. The coordinator shall treat the requests of new entrants and other carriers fairly, in accordance with the coordination periods of each scheduling day.

…

9. If serious problems continue to exist for new entrants, the Member State shall ensure that a meeting of the airport coordination committee is convened. The purpose of the meeting shall be to examine possibilities for remedying the situation. The Commission shall be invited to that meeting.

16 Article 11(1) of the Regulation reads:

Complaints and rights of appeal

1. Without prejudice to rights of appeal under national law, complaints regarding the application of Articles 7(2), 8, 8a, 10 and 14(1) to (4) and (6) shall be submitted to the coordination committee. The committee shall, within a period of one month following submission of the complaint, consider the matter and if possible make proposals to the coordinator in an attempt to resolve the problem. If the complaint cannot be settled, the Member State responsible may, within a further two month period, provide for mediation by an air carriers’ or airports’ representative organisation or other third party.

National law

17 Regulation No 1050/2008 of 30 October 2008 on the allocation of time slots at airports (Reglugerð um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma flugvalla), adopted on the basis of the Aviation Act No 60/1998 of 10 June 1998 (Lög um loftferðir), was intended to implement the Regulation into Icelandic law.

18 In March 2014, ESA informed Iceland that some of the provisions of the Regulation seemed not to have been correctly implemented into Icelandic law. In particular, ESA was concerned that Icelandic law did not safeguard the coordinator’s independence from the airport managing body, as required.

19 Following communication between ESA and Iceland on this subject, Regulation No 1050/2008 was replaced by Regulation No 858/2014 of 30 September 2014 on the allocation of time slots at airports. According to Article 5 of Regulation No 858/2014, the Regulation, along with

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

skal 50% afgreiðslutímanna úthlutað til nýrra aðila nema hlutfall umsókna frá nýjum aðilum nái ekki 50%. Samræmingarstjóri skal meðhöndla umsóknir nýrra aðila og annarra flugrekenda af sanngirni og í samræmi við samræmingartímabil hvers áætlunardags.

...

9. Ef alvarleg vandamál halda áfram að koma upp hjá nýjum aðilum skal aðildarríkið sjá til þess að boðað verði til fundar í samræmingarnefnd flugvallarins. Tilgangur fundarins skal vera að kanna möguleika til úrbóta. Framkvæmdastjórninni skal boðið að sitja fundinn.

16 Í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar segir:

Kvartanir og áfrýjunarréttur

1. Með fyrirvara um áfrýjunarrétt samkvæmt landslögum skulu kvartanir varðandi beitingu 7. gr. (2. mgr.), 8. gr., 8. gr. a, 10. gr. og 14. gr. (1. til 4. mgr. og 6. mgr.) sendar samræmingarnefndinni. Nefndin skal taka málið til athugunar innan mánaðar frá því að kvörtunin er lögð fram og, ef því verður við komið, leggja tillögur fyrir samræmingarstjórann um úrbætur. Ef vandinn verður ekki leystur getur ábyrga aðildarríkið leitað eftir milligöngu samtaka fulltrúa flugrekenda eða flugvalla eða annars þriðja aðila innan tveggja mánaða til viðbótar.

Landsréttur

17 Reglugerð nr. 1050/2008 frá 30. október 2008 um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma flugvalla var sett með stoð í lögum um loftferðir, nr. 60/1998 og var ætlað að leiða evrópsku reglugerðina í íslensk lög.

18 Í mars 2014 upplýsti ESA íslensk stjórnvöld um að stofnunin teldi að misfellur væru á innleiðingu reglugerðarinnar í íslensk lög. ESA hafði einkum áhyggjur af því að íslensk lög stæðu ekki vörð um sjálfstæði samræmingarstjóra gagnvart framkvæmdastjórn flugvallarins, eins og skylt er.

19 Í kjölfar samskipta ESA og íslenskra stjórnvalda þess efnis var reglugerð nr. 1050/2008 felld úr gildi með reglugerð nr. 858/2014 frá 30. september 2014 um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma flugvalla. Samkvæmt 5. gr.

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amendments and additions, was implemented as such into the Icelandic legal order. Moreover, Regulation No 858/2014 contains a section on temporary provisions which states that the nomination of a coordinator in accordance with Regulation No 1050/2008 shall continue to be valid, and that the Icelandic Transport Authority is authorised to take over the rights and obligations according to the current contract with the coordinator.

20 The first and second paragraphs of Article 16 of the Competition Act No 44/2005 of 19 May 2005 (Samkeppnislög) read:

The Competition Authority may take measures against:

a. agreements, terms and any actions constituting infringement of the prohibition provisions of this Act, settlements or decisions that have been made pursuant to this Act;

b. acts of public entities to the extent that they may have detrimental effects on competition, provided that no special legislation contains any specific provisions regarding authorisation or obligation for such acts;

c. circumstances or conduct which prevents, limits or affects competition to the detriment of the public interest. Circumstances means among other things, factors connected to the attributes of the market concerned, including the organisation or development of companies that operate in it. Conduct means all forms of behaviour, including failure to act, that are in some way detrimental to market competition without being in violation of the Act’s ban provisions.

The actions of the Competition Authority may include any measure that is necessary to enhance competition, put an end to violations or respond to actions of public entities that may adversely affect competition. The Competition Authority can apply necessary remedies to amend conduct or structure relating to the issues specified in the first paragraph that are proportionate to the violation that has been committed or to the circumstances or conduct concerned. However, structural remedies may only be imposed if it is shown that no effective behavioural remedy exists or if an equally effective behavioural remedy will be more burdensome for the party in question than a structural remedy.

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

reglugerðar nr. 858/2014 var reglugerð 95/93, með breytingum og viðbótum, innleidd í íslenskan rétt. Enn fremur inniheldur reglugerð nr. 858/2014 ákvæði til bráðabirgða, þar sem mælt er fyrir um að tilnefning samræmingarstjóra samkvæmt reglugerð nr. 1050/2008 skuli teljast gild tilnefning og að Samgöngustofu sé heimilt að yfirtaka réttindi og skyldur samkvæmt núgildandi samningi við samræmingarstjóra.

20 Í 1. og 2. mgr. 16. gr. samkeppnislaga nr. 44/2005 frá 19. maí 2005 segir:

Samkeppniseftirlitið getur gripið til aðgerða gegn:

a. samningum, skilmálum og hvers konar athöfnum sem brjóta í bága við bannákvæði laga þessara, sáttir eða ákvarðanir sem teknar hafa verið samkvæmt þessum lögum,

b. athöfnum opinberra aðila að því marki sem þær kunna að hafa skaðleg áhrif á samkeppni að því tilskildu að sérlög hafi ekki að geyma sérstakar reglur um heimild eða skyldu til slíkra athafna,

c. aðstæðum eða háttsemi sem kemur í veg fyrir, takmarkar eða hefur skaðleg áhrif á samkeppni almenningi til tjóns. Með aðstæðum er m.a. átt við atriði sem tengjast eiginleikum viðkomandi markaðar, þ.m.t. skipulag eða uppbyggingu fyrirtækja sem á honum starfa. Með háttsemi er átt við hvers konar atferli, þ.m.t. athafnaleysi, sem á einhvern hátt hefur skaðleg áhrif á samkeppni á markaði þrátt fyrir að ekki sé brotið gegn bannákvæðum laganna

Aðgerðir Samkeppniseftirlitsins geta falið í sér hverjar þær ráðstafanir sem nauðsynlegar eru til að efla samkeppni, stöðva brot eða bregðast við athöfnum opinberra aðila sem kunna að hafa skaðleg áhrif á samkeppni. Samkeppniseftirlitið getur beitt nauðsynlegum úrræðum bæði til breytingar á atferli og skipulagi vegna þeirra atriða sem tilgreind eru í 1. mgr. í réttu hlutfalli við það brot sem framið hefur verið eða þær aðstæður eða háttsemi sem um ræðir. Þó er einungis heimilt að beita úrræðum til breytingar á skipulagi ef sýnt þykir að ekki sé fyrir hendi árangursríkt úrræði til breytingar á atferli eða þar sem jafnárangursríkt úrræði til breytingar á atferli væri meira íþyngjandi fyrir hlutaðeigandi aðila en úrræði til breytingar á skipulagi.

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21 The plaintiff and Icelandair are both air carriers which operate scheduled flight services to and from Iceland. Icelandair is the incumbent flagship air carrier. It holds the leading position on the market for commercial air transport and has had that position for a long time. The plaintiff only entered the market in 2012. Isavia is a public limited company established pursuant to Act No 153/2009 of 29 December 2009 on the merger of the public companies operating Keflavík International Airport and Leifur Eiríksson Air Terminal (Lög um samruna opinberu hlutafélaganna Flugstoða og Keflavíkurflugvallar). Following this merger, the provisions of Act No 76/2008 of 11 June 2008 on the establishment of a public company for the operation for Keflavík International Airport etc. (Lög um stofnun opinbers hlutafélags um rekstur Keflavíkurflugvallar o.fl.) became applicable to Isavia.

22 In April 2006, Keflavík International Airport was designated a coordinated airport in accordance with Article 2(g) of the Regulation. On 11 September 2007, Frank Holton, Managing Director of Airport Coordination Denmark, was appointed coordinator of Keflavík International Airport. The coordinator seems to have been reappointed in the context of the implementation of the Regulation by Regulation No 858/2014. It is not clear from the case file whether the procedure specified in Article 4(1) of the Regulation for such appointments was followed.

23 In March 2013, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Competition Authority regarding the allocation of time slots at Keflavík International Airport. In November 2013, the Competition Authority decided that the allocation procedure had a detrimental impact on competition and instructed Isavia to provide certain time slots to the plaintiff for the summer schedule of 2014. The Competition Authority also instructed Isavia to adopt guidelines for the coordinator’s allocation of time slots.

24 Isavia and Icelandair appealed against the Competition Authority’s decision. In February 2014 the Competition Appeals Board annulled the decision. The Appeals Board found that the contested decision should not have been addressed to Isavia, since independent administrative powers in the field of time slot allocation had been given to the coordinator. The Competition Appeals Board found that:

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

II MÁLAVEXTIR OG MEÐFERÐ MÁLSINS

21 Stefnandi, Wow air ehf., og stefndi, Icelandair ehf., reka flugfélög sem

bæði stunda áætlunarflug til og frá Íslandi. Icelandair er leiðandi fyrirtæki í

flugrekstri á Íslandi. Fyrirtækið hefur ráðandi stöðu á markaði flugreksturs

til flutninga og hefur haft þá stöðu um langt skeið. Stefnandi kom fyrst

inn á markaðinn árið 2012. Isavia er opinbert hlutafélag sem stofnað

var á grundvelli laga nr. 153/2009 frá 29. desember 2009 um samruna

opinberu hlutafélaganna Flugstoða og Keflavíkurflugvallar. Í kjölfar þess

samruna giltu um Isavia lög nr. 76/2008 frá 11. júní 2008 um stofnun

opinbers hlutafélags um rekstur Keflavíkurflugvallar o.fl.

22 Í apríl 2006 var Keflavíkurflugvöllur gerður að flugvelli með skammtaðan

afgreiðslutíma í samræmi við g-lið 2. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Þann 11.

september 2007 var Frank Holton, framkvæmdastjóri Airport Coordination

Denmark útnefndur samræmingarstjóri Keflavíkurflugvallar. Svo virðist sem

samræmingarstjórinn hafi verið endurskipaður í tengslum við innleiðingu

reglugerðar 95/93 með reglugerð 858/2014. Ekki er ljóst af gögnum

málsins hvort þeirri aðferð sem 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar mælir fyrir

um varðandi slíkar ráðningar var fylgt.

23 Í mars 2013 sendi stefnandi Samkeppnisyfirlitinu erindi þar sem

hann kvartaði yfir fyrirkomulaginu við úthlutun á afgreiðslutímum á

Keflavíkurflugvelli. Í ákvörðun Samkeppniseftirlitsins frá nóvember 2013

sagði að fyrirkomulag við úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á Keflavíkurflugvelli hefði

skaðleg áhrif á samkeppni. Beindi Samkeppniseftirlitið þeim fyrirmælum til

Isavia að stefnanda yrðu veittir tilteknir afgreiðslutímar fyrir sumaráætlun

2014. Samkeppniseftirlitið lagði einnig fyrir Isavia að útbúa leiðbeiningar

fyrir samræmingarstjóra um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma.

24 Isavia og Icelandair kærðu ákvörðun Samkeppniseftirlitsins til

áfrýjunarnefndar samkeppnismála sem felldi ákvörðunina úr gildi í febrúar

2014. Áfrýjunarnefndin taldi að málinu yrði ekki beint að Isavia þar sem

sjálfstæðar valdheimildir til úthlutunar afgreiðslutíma hefðu verið settar í

hendur samræmingarstjóra. Í úrskurði áfrýjunarnefndarinnar segir:

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Although under Article 4 of Act No 76/2008 the objectives of [Isavia] are defined as including ‘functions that are directly related to air services, the operation of airports and an air terminal and other activities’, and although the responsibilities of the managing body of an airport include ‘the coordination and direction of the functions of air carriers operating at the airport’ (cf. item j of Article 2 of Regulation No 1050/2008), the Appeals Board is unable, for the same reason, to concur with the view that these provisions can be interpreted in such a way that the appellant is to some extent responsible for the coordinator’s task of allocating slots and that it is able, relying on such a responsibility or its administrative authority, to instruct the coordinator to transfer slots between air carriers. Such a conclusion would be completely incompatible with the aforementioned provisions of Regulation No 1050/2008 and the European Regulations discussed above. The Competition Authority’s reference to Article 10 of the Regulation is of no significance in this regard as it does not provide that the appellant should have an intermediary role in transferring slots following government intervention on the basis of competition provisions. Nor is it of any significance that the appellant is entrusted, under the aforementioned Regulation, with ensuring that an airport coordinator is appointed and that the appellant is obliged to pay him a remuneration for his work. The board finds that if the appellant was to have a role such as the one the Competition Authority maintains that it does have in the present case, the authority to intervene directly in slot allocations by the coordinator, then the legislature, and the minister by issuing Regulation No 1050/2008, should have included clear provisions to this effect.

25 In March 2014, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants before Reykjavík District Court, seeking the annulment of the Competition Appeals Board’s decision. The District Court granted a request for an accelerated procedure in accordance with national rules.

26 In May 2014, Reykjavík District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action. However, in June 2014 the Supreme Court of Iceland (Hæstiréttur Íslands) quashed this judgment and the case was remitted to the District Court. Isavia and Icelandair requested Reykjavík District Court to seek an advisory opinion from the Court in accordance with Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”). This request was rejected in July 2014. In August 2014, on appeal from Icelandair and Isavia, the Supreme Court

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

Þótt 4. gr. laga nr. 76/2008 kveði á um að tilgangur áfrýjanda [stefnda Isavia ohf.] sé m.a. að annast „starfsemi sem er í beinum tengslum við flugrekstur, rekstur flugvalla og flugstöðvar og aðra starfsemi“, svo og að hlutverk framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallar sé m.a. „að samræma og stjórna starfsemi flugrekenda sem starfa á flugvellinum“, sbr. j-liður 2. gr. reglugerðar nr. 1050/2008, getur áfrýjunarnefndin af sömu ástæðu ekki fallist á að þau ákvæði verði skýrð með þeim hætti að í þeim felist að áfrýjandi beri að einhverju leyti ábyrgð á starfi samræmingarstjóra við úthlutun afgreiðslutíma og geti í krafti þess eða stjórnunarheimilda beint fyrirmælum til hans um færslu á afgreiðslutímum milli flugrekenda. Slík niðurstaða væri í fullu ósamræmi við fyrrgreind ákvæði reglugerðar nr. 1050/2008 og þau ákvæði evrópskra reglugerða sem hér hafa verið rakin. Tilvísun Samkeppniseftirlitsins til 10. gr. reglugerðarinnar breytir engu í þessu efni, enda segir þar ekkert um að áfrýjanda sé falið að hafa milligöngu um færslu afgreiðslutíma í kjölfar afskipta opinberra yfirvalda á grundvelli samkeppnisákvæða. Engu breytir heldur þótt áfrýjanda sé falið það hlutverk samkvæmt fyrrnefndri reglugerð að sjá til þess að samræmingarstjóri flugvallarins verði skipaður og áfrýjanda beri að greiða honum þóknun fyrir starf hans. Hafi ætlunin verið að fela áfrýjanda slíkt hlutverk sem Samkeppniseftirlitið telur að hann hafi í máli þessu, og með því heimild til beinna afskipta af úthlutun samræmingarstjóra á afgreiðslutímum, telur nefndin að löggjafanum, og ráðherra með setningu reglugerðar nr. 1050/2008, hefði borið að taka það skýrlega fram.

25 Í mars 2014 höfðaði stefnandi mál á hendur stefndu fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur þar sem krafist var ógildingar á ákvörðun áfrýjunarnefndar samkeppnismála. Héraðsdómur féllst á að málið yrði tekið til flýtimeðferðar í samræmi við reglur landsréttar.

26 Í maí 2014 vísaði Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur málinu frá. Hæstiréttur sneri hins vegar frávísunarúrskurðinum við og vísaði málinu aftur í hérað. Isavia og Icelandair fóru fram á að leitað yrði ráðgefandi álits EFTA-dómstólsins í samræmi við 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTA-ríkjanna um stofnun eftirlitsstofnunar og dómstóls. Í júlí 2014 var þeirri beiðni hafnað. Eftir kæru Icelandair og Isavia ákvað Hæstiréttur, í ágúst 2014,

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decided that certain questions of interpretation should be addressed to the Court. The case was then remitted to Reykjavík District Court.

27 By letter of 4 September 2014, Reykjavík District Court referred the following questions to the Court:

1. Does Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports oblige the Member States to ensure that a coordinator appointed under the provisions of the Regulation is, as regards the execution of his tasks, granted independent administrative power under domestic legislation as part of the executive of the Member State, or does the Member State have discretion to decide the status of the coordinator under domestic legislation?

2. Is it assumed, in the instructions on the handling of complaints concerning the allocation of slots in Articles 8(7) and 8(8) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, that all complaints, including complaints based on competition considerations, will be subject to the procedure prescribed therein, or is recital 15 of the preamble to the Regulation to be understood as meaning that the Regulation is to be applied without prejudice to the competition rules of the Treaty, in particular Articles 85 and 86, in such a way that complaints based on competition considerations shall be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the competition authorities in the relevant Member State and are therefore to be submitted directly to them?

3. If the competition authority of a Member State issues instructions on the basis of domestic competition legislation, and with reference to Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, with the intention of encouraging competition, is it assumed in the Regulation that these instructions will be issued to the managing body of an airport/competent authority or should these instructions be issued to the coordinator?

28 On 22 September 2014, Reykjavík District Court submitted a revised version of its request. However, the questions referred remained the same.

29 The revised reference from Reykjavík District Court was accompanied by a request to apply an accelerated procedure pursuant to Article 97a of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. Having regard, in particular, to the potential effects on competition between air carriers in the near future caused by

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Judgment

að tilteknum spurningum um túlkun ætti að beina til EFTA-dómstólsins. Málinu var því næst vísað aftur í hérað.

27 Með bréfi dagsettu 4. september 2014 beindi Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur eftirfarandi spurningum til EFTA-dómstólsins:

1. Leggur reglugerð ráðsins (EBE) nr. 95/1993 frá 18. janúar 1993 um sameiginlegar reglur um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á bandalagsflugvöllum þá skyldu á herðar aðildarríkjunum að samræmingarstjóra, sem skipaður er samkvæmt ákvæðum reglugerðarinnar, sé við framkvæmd starfa sinna með reglum landsréttar fengið í hendur sjálfstætt stjórnsýsluvald, sem sé hluti af framkvæmdavaldi aðildarríkisins, eða hefur aðildarríkið frjálsar hendur um hver staða samræmingarstjóra er að þessu leyti samkvæmt reglum landsréttar?

2. Er við það miðað í 7. og 8. mgr. 8. gr. reglugerðar nr. 95/1993, þar sem eru fyrirmæli um meðferð kvartana vegna úthlutunar afgreiðslutíma, að allar kvartanir, þar með taldar kvartanir sem reistar eru á samkeppnissjónarmiðum, fari í þann farveg sem þar er mælt fyrir um, eða ber að skilja þau orð 15. liðar aðfararorða reglugerðarinnar að henni skuli beitt með fyrirvara um samkeppnisreglur sáttmálans, einkum 85. og 86. gr., á þann veg að kvartanir reistar á samkeppnissjónarmiðum lúti alfarið lögsögu samkeppnisyfirvalda í viðkomandi aðildarríki og skuli því beint til þeirra?

3. Ef samkeppnisyfirvald í aðildarríki beinir á grundvelli innlendra samkeppnislaga og með vísan til reglugerðar nr. 95/1993 fyrirmælum í því skyni að efla samkeppni, er þá við það miðað í reglugerðinni að þeim fyrirmælum sé beint til þess aðila sem samkvæmt henni fer með flugvallarstjórn (managing body of an airport/competent authority) eða skal þeim fyrirmælum beint til samræmingarstjóra?

28 Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur lagði þann 22. september 2014 fram endurskoðaða útgáfu beiðninnar um ráðgefandi álit. Spurningarnar sem hann beindi til dómsins héldust þó óbreyttar.

29 Hinni endurskoðuðu útgáfu Héraðsdóms Reykjavíkur fylgdi beiðni um flýtimeðferð samkvæmt 97. gr. a starfsreglna EFTA-dómstólsins. Þegar horft væri sérstaklega til hugsanlegra áhrifa á samkeppni milli flugrekenda í náinni framtíð vegna þeirrar úthlutunar afgreiðslutíma sem deilt væri um

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the disputed time slot allocation, the Court’s President granted the request for an accelerated procedure by order of 30 September 2014.


III ANSWERS OF THE COURT

The first question


31 All those who have submitted observations agree that the airport coordinator appointed pursuant to Article 4(1) and (2) of the Regulation shall be a qualified natural or legal person and perform his tasks in an independent, neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent way. They also agree in the main that, as long as these requirements are met, the determination of the legal form and status of the coordinator remains at the discretion of each EEA State. The Competition Authority and ESA specifically refer to the fact that the EEA States have different arrangements for the appointment of coordinators, ranging from natural persons and non-profit organisations to private and public limited liability companies.


32 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the Regulation requires that an appointed coordinator should be granted independent administrative power under domestic legislation as part of the executive of the EEA State.

33 Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Regulation, an EEA State responsible for a coordinated airport shall ensure the appointment of a qualified natural or legal person as airport coordinator. The coordinator must be appointed by the EEA State, after having consulted the air carriers using the airport regularly, their representative organisations, the managing body of the airport and the coordination committee, where such a committee exists.

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Judgment

kvað forseti dómsins upp úrskurð 30. september 2014 þess efnis að orðið yrði við beiðninni um flýtimeðferð.

30 Vísað er til skýrslu framsögumanns um frekari lýsingu löggjafar, málsatvika, meðferðar málsins og skriflegra greinargerða sem dómstólnum bárust. Verða þau ekki rakin frekar nema að því leyti sem forsendur dómsins krefjast.

III SVÖR DÓMSINS

Fyrsta spurningin


31 Allir sem skilað hafa greinargerðum í málinu eru sammála um að samræmingarstjórinn sem skipaður er samkvæmt 1. og 2. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar skuli vera hæfur einstaklingur eða lögaðili og vinna starf sitt með óháðum, hlutlausum, skýrum hætti og án mismununar. Þá er í aðalatriðum enginn ágreiningur um að svo framarlega sem þeim kröfum sé fullnægt þá sé það á forræði hvers EES-ríkis að ákveða í hvaða mynd samræmingarstjóri starfar og hver staða hans er. Í því sambandi vísa Samkeppniseftirlitið og ESA sérstaklega til þeirrar staðreyndar að EES-ríki hafi mismunandi hátt á um skipun samræmingarstjóra, og þeir geti verið allt frá einstaklingum og stofnunum sem ekki eru reknar í hagnaðarskyni, til einkarekinna sem og opinberra hlutafélaga.

Álit dómstólsins

32 Með fyrstu spurningunni leitar landsdómstóllinn í aðalatriðum svars við því hvort þess sé krafist samkvæmt reglugerðinni að skipuðum samræmingarstjóra séu fengnar sjálfstæðar valdheimildir að landsrétti sem hluta af framkvæmdarvaldi EES-ríkis.

33 Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar skal EES-ríki sem ber ábyrgð á flugvelli með skammtaðan afgreiðslutíma sjá til þess að hæfur einstaklingur eða lögaðili verði skipaður sem samræmingarstjóri flugvallar. EES-ríkinu ber þá að skipa samræmingarstjórann að höfðu samráði við flugrekendur sem nota flugvöllinn reglulega, fulltrúa samtaka þeirra og framkvæmdastjórn flugvallarins og samræmingarnefndina ef hún hefur verið skipuð.

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34 Article 4(2)(b) of the Regulation requires the EEA State to ensure the independence of the coordinator by separating the coordinator functionally from any single interested party. Moreover, the system of financing the coordinators’ activities shall be such as to guarantee his independent status. Furthermore, according to Article 4(2)(c), the EEA State shall ensure that the coordinator acts according to the Regulation in a neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent way.

35 Pursuant to Article 4(5) of the Regulation, the coordinator is the sole person responsible for the allocation of time slots. The coordinator shall allocate the time slots in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation.

36 The Regulation does not lay down specific requirements as to the legal form or status of the coordinator. Both natural and legal persons may be appointed as coordinator.

37 In order for the system to be effective, the coordinator has to be independent from any vested interests and has to have the necessary financial resources to accomplish the tasks assigned to him by the Regulation. It must be ensured that neither the authorities of the EEA State concerned nor any other party can unduly influence the coordinator before, during and after the allocation process.

38 There must therefore be a clear separation of tasks between the coordinator, the coordination committee and the EEA State so as to avoid any conflict of interest at any time in the allocation and monitoring procedure. In other words, the coordinator must have the expertise and the integrity necessary to contribute to the objectivity, transparency and efficiency of time slot allocation.

39 Consequently, Article 4(1) of the Regulation requires an EEA State to appoint a qualified natural or legal person as airport coordinator after having consulted the parties indicated therein. Under Article 4(2) of the Regulation, the coordinator must be independent, both legally and factually, from all interested parties from which he must also be functionally separated. As long as these conditions are fulfilled, EEA States have discretion in determining the status of the coordinator. On the basis of those findings, it is for the national court to draw the necessary conclusions in order to ensure the effectiveness of the Regulation.

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Judgment

34 Samkvæmt b-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar ber EES-ríki að tryggja sjálfstæði samræmingarstjóra með því að gera hlutverk hans óháð hagsmunaaðilum. Jafnframt skal fyrirkomulag við fjármögnun starfsemi samræmingarstjóra vera þannig að sjálfstæði hans sé tryggt. Enn fremur segir í c-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr. að EES-ríki beri að tryggja að samræmingarstjóri ræki starf sitt í samræmi við reglugerðina á hlutlausan og skýran hátt og án mismununar.

35 Samkvæmt 5. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar skal samræmingarstjóri einn bera ábyrgð á úthlutun afgreiðslutíma. Skal hann úthluta afgreiðslutímum í samræmi við ákvæði reglugerðarinnar.

36 Í reglugerðinni eru ekki sett nein sérstök skilyrði um lagalegan búning eða stöðu samræmingarstjóra. Skipa má jafnt einstaklinga og lögaðila í stöðu samræmingarstjóra.

37 Til að tryggja skilvirkni kerfisins, verður samræmingarstjóri að vera óháður hvers kyns sérhagsmunum og búa yfir nægilegum fjármunum til að geta sinnt þeim verkefnum sem honum er úthlutað samkvæmt reglugerðinni. Tryggja verður að hvorki yfirvöld þess EES-ríkis sem í hlut á né nokkur annar aðili geti haft ómálefnaleg áhrif á samræmingarstjórann, bæði fyrir og eftir úthlutun afgreiðslutíma, og á meðan hún stendur yfir.

38 Af þeim sökum verður að greina ótvírætt á milli verkefna samræmingarstjórans, samræmingarnefndarinnar og EES-ríkisins til að girða megi fyrir hvers kyns hagsmunaárekstra í úthlutunar- eða eftirlitsferlinu. Með öðrum orðum, verður samræmingarstjórinn að búa yfir þeirri sérþekkingu og þeim heilindum sem nauðsynleg eru til að stuðla að því að úthlutun afgreiðslutíma sé skilvirk og gagnsæ og fari fram á grundvelli málefnalegra sjónarmiða.

39 Samkvæmt framansögðu er þess krafist í 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar að EES-ríki skipi hæfan einstakling eða lögaðila í stöðu samræmingarstjóra flugvallar, að höfðu samráði við þá aðila sem nefndir eru í greininni. Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar skal hlutverk samræmingarstjóra gert þannig úr garði að hann sé óháður öllum hagsmunaaðilum, bæði lagalega og í reynd. Svo framarlega sem þessum kröfum er fullnægt er það á forræði EES-ríkjanna að ákveða hvaða stöðu samræmingarstjórinn hefur að landsrétti. Landsdómstóllinn verður á grundvelli þessara sjónarmiða að taka afstöðu til þeirra atriða sem nauðsynlegt er til að tryggja skilvirkni reglugerðar 95/93.

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The second question


40 The Competition Authority submits that the procedure described in Article 11(1) of the Regulation does not prevent national competition authorities from exercising their powers under national competition law to require the transfer of time slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated. When competition authorities decide to exercise their powers under national law, these powers substitute for the coordinator’s role and exclude the complaint procedure described in Article 11(1). In the Competition Authority’s view, this interpretation is supported by the explicit competition law reservation in Article 8b of the Regulation.

41 The Competition Authority also contends that in the Commission’s proposal for Regulation 793/2004, the right to appeal against the coordinator’s decision depended on the exhaustion of the complaints procedure specified in Article 11(1) of the Regulation. However, this aspect of the proposal was not included in the final version of Regulation 793/2004.

42 Isavia submits that there is no indication that domestic competition rules are to be taken into account in the process of allocating time slots under the Regulation. Thus, an EEA State cannot allow its competition authorities to interfere with the allocation process or change the allocation of time slots to air carriers. According to Isavia, this would contradict the aim of the Regulation. The Regulation contains balanced provisions that directly address competition matters, for example the provisions concerning new entrants.

43 However, Isavia observes that Article 8b of the Regulation allows national competition authorities to intervene after time slots have been allocated to an air carrier, on the basis that the air carrier in question is operating in breach of competition rules. This implies in effect that competition authorities could require the air carrier to return time slots allocated to it by the coordinator to the slot pool established in accordance with Article 10 of the Regulation and, possibly, to transfer allocated time slots to another air carrier negatively affected by the anti-competitive behaviour.

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Judgment

Önnur spurningin


40 Samkeppniseftirlitið telur að ferlið sem lýst er í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar komi ekki í veg fyrir að innlend samkeppnisyfirvöld beiti valdheimildum sínum samkvæmt innlendri samkeppnislöggjöf til að krefjast þess að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir á milli flugrekenda og segja til um hvernig þeim skuli úthlutað. Þegar samkeppnisyfirvöld ákveða að beita valdheimildum sínum í landsrétti koma þær heimildir í stað hlutverks samræmingarstjóra og útiloka kvörtunarferlið sem lýst er í 1. mgr. 11. gr. Að mati Samkeppniseftirlitsins er sú túlkun studd skýrum fyrirvara um reglur samkeppnislaga í 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni.

41 Samkeppniseftirlitið heldur því einnig fram að í frumvarpi framkvæmdastjórnarinnar til reglugerðar 793/2004 hafi rétturinn til að áfrýja úrskurði samræmingarstjórans verið háður því að öll önnur úrræði sem minnst er á í 1. mgr. 11. gr. hafi verið tæmd. Sá hluti frumvarpsins hafi þó ekki verið tekinn upp í lokagerð reglugerðar 793/2004.

42 Isavia telur ekkert benda til þess að taka beri mið af innlendum samkeppnisreglum við úthlutun afgreiðslutíma samkvæmt reglugerðinni. EES-ríki geti því ekki leyft innlendum samkeppnisyfirvöldum að hafa afskipti af úthlutunarferlinu eða breyta úthlutun afgreiðslutíma til flugrekenda. Að mati Isavia væri slíkt andstætt markmiðum reglugerðarinnar. Isavia telur að reglugerðin hafi að geyma almenn ákvæði sem taki með beinum hætti til samkeppnismála. Sem dæmi í því sambandi nefnir Isavia ákvæðin um nýja aðila.

43 Isavia bendir þó á að samkvæmt 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni séu afskipti innlendra samkeppnisyfirvalda heimil eftir að afgreiðslutímum hefur verið úthlutað til flugrekanda, ef viðkomandi flugrekandi brýtur gegn samkeppnisreglum. Það feli í raun í sér að samkeppnisyfirvöld geti skyldað flugrekanda til að skila afgreiðslutímum sem samræmingarstjórinn hefur látið honum í té þannig að þeir verði aftur hluti af heildarskrá afgreiðslutíma eins og henni er lýst í 10. gr. reglugerðarinnar, og hugsanlega einnig til að færa afgreiðslutíma sem þegar hefur verið úthlutað til annars flugrekanda sem orðið hefur fyrir neikvæðum áhrifum af hegðun sem er skaðleg samkeppni.

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44 Isavia contends that the Regulation’s complaint procedure clearly indicates that the coordination committee’s function is not to address competition issues. The coordination committee can only make proposals to the coordinator and/or try to mediate between parties involved. The coordination committee may not instruct the coordinator or change allocations.

45 In Icelandair’s view, the procedure provided for in the Regulation is established, inter alia, with a view to protecting competition. Although the Regulation does not prevent public authorities from intervening in the time slot allocation on the basis of competition law, Icelandair contends that such intervention may not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to the coordinator.

46 Icelandair claims that the special procedure for time slot allocation laid down in the Regulation prevails over national competition law. An air carrier disputing the coordinator’s time slot allocation on the basis of national competition law must therefore exhaust all reasonable possibilities to obtain the necessary time slots through the general time slot allocation process provided for in the Regulation. According to Icelandair, national competition authorities should not intervene unless there is clear and factual evidence that the coordinator has not fulfilled his obligations.

47 Icelandair submits further that a general concern about an alleged lack of competition, without the identification of a particular breach of national or EEA competition law, cannot serve as basis for overriding the harmonised time slot allocation process. Any intervention by national public authorities, such as competition authorities, must be in line with EEA law and the parameters for allocation of time slots set out in the Regulation, and also respect the principle of proportionality.

48 ESA contends that the complaint procedure set out in Article 11(1) of the Regulation should be considered neither mandatory nor exhaustive. The provision does not provide for any binding dispute resolution mechanism and expressly states that the complaint procedure is without prejudice to rights of appeal under national law. ESA also refers to recital 15 in the preamble to the Regulation, which must be read in conjunction with Article 8b of the Regulation.

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CASE E-18/14

Judgment

44 Isavia telur að kvörtunarferli reglugerðarinnar gefi ótvírætt til kynna að samkeppnismál falli utan verkahrings samræmingarnefndarinnar. Nefndin geti einungis lagt tillögur fyrir samræmingarstjórann og/eða reynt að miðla málum milli aðilanna sem eiga hlut að máli. Samræmingarnefndinni sé óheimilt að leiðbeina samræmingarstjóranum eða breyta úthlutunum.

45 Að mati Icelandair er ferlinu sem mælt er fyrir um í reglugerðinni meðal annars ætlað að standa vörð um samkeppni. Þótt reglugerðin leggi ekki bann við íhlutun stjórnvalda um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma á grundvelli samkeppnislaga, telur Icelandair að slík íhlutun megi hvorki að lögum né í reynd hindra samræmingarstjóra í að rækja það hlutverk sem honum er treyst fyrir.

46 Icelandair heldur því fram að hið sérstaka ferli við úthlutun afgreiðslutíma, sem mælt er fyrir um í reglugerðinni, gangi innlendum samkeppnislögum framar. Flugrekandi sem mótmælir úthlutun samræmingarstjóra á afgreiðslutímum með vísun til innlendrar samkeppnislöggjafar verði því að tæma öll raunhæf úrræði hins almenna úthlutunarferlis reglugerðarinnar til að hljóta nauðsynlega afgreiðslutíma. Samkvæmt Icelandair á ekki að koma til íhlutunar innlendra samkeppnisyfirvalda nema fyrir liggi skýr og raunveruleg sönnunargögn um að samræmingarstjórinn hafi vanrækt skyldur sínar.

47 Icelandair telur jafnframt að almennar áhyggjur af meintum skorti á samkeppni, án þess að bent sé á tiltekið brot á samkeppnislögum, samkvæmt landsrétti eða EES-rétti, geti ekki verið grundvöllur þess að gripið sé inn í samræmt úthlutunarferli afgreiðslutíma. Hvers kyns íhlutun innlendra stjórnvalda, svo sem samkeppnisyfirvalda, verði að fylgja reglum EES-réttar og skilyrðunum sem reglugerðin mælir fyrir um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma. Þá verði jafnframt að gæta meðalhófsreglunnar.

48 ESA telur að hvorki beri að líta á kvörtunarferlið í 1. mgr. 11. gr. sem ófrávíkjanlegt né tæmandi. Í 1. mgr. 11. gr sé ekki kveðið á með tæmandi hætti um hvernig leysa skuli úr ágreiningi og í ákvæðinu sé sérstaklega tekið fram að kvörtunarferlið gildi með fyrirvara um áfrýjunarrétt samkvæmt landslögum. ESA vísar einnig til 15. liðar formálsorða reglugerðarinnar, sem verði að skýra með hliðsjón af 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni.

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49 The Commission submits that the procedure prescribed in Article 11(1) of the Regulation is not intended to be exhaustive. As is expressly stated in the introductory phrase of that provision, the complaints procedure is without prejudice to rights of appeal under national law. The Commission also refers to recital 15 in the preamble to the Regulation, recital 17 in the preamble to Regulation 793/2004 and Article 8b of the Regulation.

50 In further support of this conclusion, the Commission argues, first, that under the complaints procedure specified in Article 11(1) of the Regulation, the coordination committee is not competent to make a definite ruling on competition law issues. Second, compliance with the rules of the Regulation does not preclude a breach of competition rules by an undertaking. Third, there is no obligation under EEA competition law for potential complainants to have first exhausted all other remedies available.


51 The second question of the national court refers to the complaint procedure laid down in Article 8(7) and (8) of the Regulation. However, following amendment by Regulation 793/2004, those provisions became Article 11(1) of the Regulation. The Court will therefore read the question as referring to Article 11(1) of the Regulation, as suggested by those who have submitted observations. By this question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the procedure for the handling of complaints on the allocation of time slots specified in Article 11(1) of the Regulation is mandatory or whether complaints based on competition considerations may be submitted directly to national competition authorities.

52 As follows from Article 1(1) and (2) EEA, one of the principal aims of the EEA Agreement is to provide for the setting up of a system ensuring that competition is not distorted and that the rules thereon are equally respected within the whole EEA. In this way, the internal market established within the European Union is extended to the EEA/EFTA States.

53 Article 10(6) and (9) of the Regulation seek to facilitate the allocation of time slots to new entrants, in particular by requiring that 50% of the time slots in the slot pool are reserved for them. On the other hand, Article 8(2) gives an air carrier an entitlement to the same series of time slots in the next equivalent scheduling period, on condition that it has used

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Judgment

49 Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að þau úrræði sem lýst er í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar séu ekki talin með tæmandi hætti. Eins og sérstaklega sé tekið fram í aðfararorðum þess ákvæðis gildi kvörtunarferlið með fyrirvara um áfrýjunarrétt samkvæmt landslögum. Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar einnig til 15. liðar formálsorða reglugerðarinnar, 17. liðar formálsorða reglugerðar 793/2004 og 8. gr. b reglugerðarinnar.

50 Til frekari stuðnings þeirri niðurstöðu telur framkvæmdastjórnin í fyrsta lagi að samræmingarnefndin sé ekki bær, samkvæmt þeim reglum sem mælt er fyrir um í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar, til að kveða upp endanlegan úrskurð um mál sem varða samkeppnisrétt. Í öðru lagi telur framkvæmdastjórnin ekki útilokað að fyrirtæki geti brotið gegn samkeppnisreglum þótt það hafi fylgt ákvæðum reglugerðarinnar. Í þriðja lagi sé ekki nein krafa gerð um það í EES-rétti að þeir sem hyggjast bera fram kvörtun þurfi fyrst að hafa tæmt öll önnur tiltæk úrræði.

Álit dómstólsins

51 Í annarri spurningunni vísar landsdómstóllinn til kvörtunarferlisins sem kveðið er á um í 7. og 8. mgr. 8. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Eftir þær breytingar sem gerðar voru með reglugerð 793/2004 voru þau ákvæði færð í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Dómurinn mun því líta svo á að spurningin vísi til 1. mgr. 11. gr., eins og þeir sem hafa lagt athugasemdir fyrir dómstólinn hafa gert. Með þessari spurningu leitar landsdómstóllinn í aðalatriðum svars við því hvort ferlið við meðferð kvartana vegna úthlutunar afgreiðslutíma, eins og því er lýst í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar, sé ófrávíkjanlegt, eða hvort kvörtunum sem reistar eru á samkeppnissjónarmiðum megi beina til innlendra samkeppnisyfirvalda.

52 Af 1. og 2. mgr. 1. gr. EES-samningsins leiðir að eitt meginmarkmið samningsins er að koma á kerfi sem tryggir að samkeppni sé ekki raskað og að reglur sem um hana gilda séu virtar á öllu EES-svæðinu. Með það að leiðarljósi var innri markaður Evrópusambandsins rýmkaður þannig að hann tæki einnig til EES-/EFTA-ríkja.

53 Með 6. og 9. mgr. 10. gr. reglugerðarinnar er leitast við að auðvelda úthlutun afgreiðslutíma til nýrra aðila, sérstaklega með því að krefjast þess að 50% afgreiðslutímanna séu fráteknir þeim til handa. Flugrekanda er á hinn bóginn tryggður réttur til sömu raðar afgreiðslutíma á næsta

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the allocated time slot series for at least 80% of the time (so-called grandfather rights). This provision hinders new entrants from competing for those time slots. Consequently, the fact that the Regulation contains provisions relevant to competition does not eliminate the possibility of breaches of competition rules by an undertaking.

54 Article 11(1) of the Regulation provides for a procedure for the handling of complaints on the allocation of time slots. According to this provision, such a complaint may be submitted to the coordination committee. In that case, the committee shall consider the matter and make proposals to the coordinator in an attempt to resolve the problem. If the complaint cannot thus be settled, the EEA State responsible may provide for a system of mediation by an air carriers’ or airports’ representative organisation or other third party.

55 It must be deduced from this provision that the coordination committee does not have the authority to intervene in the allocation of time slots or to require a transfer of allocated time slots. The coordination committee’s role in this respect is merely of an advisory nature.

56 Moreover, Article 11(1) of the Regulation states expressly that the procedure prescribed is without prejudice to rights of appeal under national law. This must be seen in the context of Article 8b of the Regulation, which provides that the latter shall not affect the powers of public authorities to require the transfer of time slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to national or EEA competition law. Thus, the complaint procedure prescribed in Article 11(1) cannot be considered mandatory or exhaustive.

57 The purpose of the Regulation is to establish a fair time slot allocation system throughout the EEA. This purpose suggests that any intervention by public authorities must be supported by a decision raising specific competition concerns based on restrictive practices, abuse of a dominant position or merger rules.

58 Reference has been made in the questions and in the written observations to recital 15 in the preamble to the Regulation and recital 17 in the preamble to Regulation 793/2004. According to Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the EEA Agreement, the preambles of acts referred to in the Annexes to the Agreement do not form part of binding EEA law. However, they

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Judgment

áætlunartímabili, samkvæmt 2. mgr. 8. gr. að því skilyrði uppfylltu að hann hafi nýtt a.m.k. 80% viðkomandi raðar afgreiðslutíma (svokölluð hefðbundin réttindi). Þetta ákvæði útilokar nýja aðila frá samkeppni um þá afgreiðslutíma. Sú staðreynd að reglugerðin inniheldur skilyrði sem varða samkeppnismál kemur ekki í veg fyrir að fyrirtæki sem fellur undir hana geti engu að síður talist brotlegt gegn samkeppnisreglum.

54 Í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar er kveðið á um tiltekið ferli við meðferð kvartana vegna úthlutunar afgreiðslutíma. Samkvæmt ákvæðinu má leggja slíka kvörtun fram við samræmingarnefndina. Sé það gert ber nefndinni að taka málið til athugunar og leggja tillögur um úrbætur fyrir samræmingarstjórann. Ef vandinn verður ekki leystur með þeim hætti getur EES-ríkið sem ábyrgð ber á framkvæmdinni leitað eftir milligöngu samtaka fulltrúa flugrekenda eða flugvalla eða annars þriðja aðila.

55 Af ákvæðinu leiðir að samræmingarnefndin hefur ekki valdheimildir til að hafa afskipti af úthlutun afgreiðslutíma eða til að krefjast þess að afgreiðslutímar sem þegar hefur verið úthlutað séu færðir á milli aðila. Að þessu leyti er hlutverk samræmingarnefndarinnar aðeins ráðgefandi.

56 Enn fremur segir berum orðum í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar að ferlið gildi með fyrirvara um reglur landsréttar varðandi áfrýjunarrétt. Við athugun þessa atriðis verður að hafa hliðsjón af 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni, sem kveður á um að reglugerðin skuli ekki hafa áhrif á heimildir opinberra yfirvalda til að krefjast þess að afgreiðslutímar séu færðar á milli flugrekenda og til að stjórna hvernig þeim er úthlutað í samræmi við innlend samkeppnislög eða samkeppnisreglur EES-réttar. Kvörtunarferlið, eins og því er lýst í 1. mgr. 11. gr., getur því ekki talist ófrávíkjanlegt eða tæmandi.

57 Markmið reglugerðarinnar er að koma á sanngjörnu kerfi til þess að úthluta afgreiðslutímum á öllu EES-svæðinu. Sá tilgangur gefur til kynna að hvers kyns íhlutun opinberra yfirvalda verði að vera studd ákvörðun þar sem bent er á tiltekin áhyggjuefni á grundvelli samkeppnishamla, misnotkunar á markaðsráðandi stöðu eða reglna um samruna fyrirtækja.

58 Í spurningunum og skriflegum athugasemdum hefur verið vísað til 15. liðar formálsorða reglugerðarinnar og 17. liðar formálsorða reglugerðar 793/2004. Samkvæmt 1. gr. bókunar 1 við EES-samninginn eru inngangsorð gerða sem vísað er til í viðaukum við samninginn ekki hluti

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are relevant to the extent necessary for the proper interpretation and application, within the framework of the EEA Agreement, of the provisions of such acts. In the present case, the recitals do not correspond to the wording of Article 8b of the Regulation, in that they only refer to EU competition law, whereas Article 8b also refers to national competition law. The interpretative value of the recitals in this case is thus limited.

59 The answer to the second question must be that the complaint procedure laid down in Article 11(1) of the Regulation is not mandatory. Therefore, this complaints procedure does not preclude the possibility that complaints based on competition law considerations may be submitted directly to national competition authorities.

The third question


60 All those who have submitted observations agree that instructions addressed directly or indirectly to the coordinator in the time slot allocation process are incompatible with the requirement for the independence of the coordinator. They also agree that instructions to transfer allocated time slots must be addressed to the air carrier who is in possession of the time slots.

61 However, the Competition Authority and the others disagree whether instructions to allocate new time slots may be issued to the airport managing body. The others take the view that this is not possible. The Competition Authority submits that Article 8b of the Regulation allows it to give instructions on the initial time slot allocation. Since the independence requirement established by the Regulation prevents the coordinator from complying with such instructions and having regard to the tasks of the airport managing body identified in Article 2(j) of the Regulation, it follows that instructions must be given to the airport managing body.

62 Isavia claims that Article 8b of the Regulation must be interpreted as referring only to time slots already allocated. Thus, if a competition authority issues instructions based on domestic legislation, such instructions must be addressed to the relevant air carrier and must not interfere with the coordinator’s allocation of time slots. Nor can such instructions be directed to the airport managing body, as the latter neither

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Judgment

af bindandi EES-rétti. Þau hafa þó þýðingu að því marki sem þau eru nauðsynleg fyrir rétta túlkun og beitingu ákvæða slíkra gerða, innan ramma EES-samningsins. Í málinu sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum svara liðir formálsorðanna ekki til orðalags 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni, þar sem þar er einungis vísað til samkeppnislaga ESB, en í 8. gr. b er einnig vísað til innlendra samkeppnislaga. Formálsorðin hafa því takmarkaða þýðingu við túlkun þeirra ákvæða sem á reynir í máli þessu.

59 Svara verður annarri spurningunni þannig að kvörtunarferlið, eins og því er lýst í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðarinnar, sé ekki ófrávíkjanlegt. Þar af leiðandi útilokar það ekki að beina megi kvörtunum á grundvelli samkeppnisréttar til innlendra samkeppnisyfirvalda.

Þriðja spurningin


60 Allir sem skilað hafa greinargerðum í málinu eru sammála um að fyrirmæli sem komið er beint eða óbeint á framfæri við samræmingarstjórann í úthlutunarferli afgreiðslutímanna, brjóti gegn skilyrðinu um sjálfstæði samræmingarstjórans. Þeir eru einnig sammála um að fyrirmælum um að færa afgreiðslutíma sem þegar hefur verið úthlutað skuli beint til flugrekandans sem þá hlaut.

61 Samkeppniseftirlitið greinir þó á við aðra aðila málsins um hvort beina megi fyrirmælum um að úthluta nýjum afgreiðslutímum til framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallarins en hinir aðilarnir telja slíkt ófært. Samkeppniseftirlitið heldur því fram að samkvæmt 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni sé heimilt að veita fyrirmæli um upphaflega úthlutun afgreiðslutíma. Í ljósi þess að skilyrði reglugerðarinnar um sjálfstæði komi í veg fyrir að samræmingarstjórinn geti farið að slíkum fyrirmælum og með hliðsjón af hlutverki framkvæmdastjórnarinnar, eins og því er lýst í j-lið 2. gr. reglugerðarinnar, verði að beina fyrirmælunum til framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallarins.

62 Isavia heldur því fram að 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni verði að skýra með þeim hætti að ákvæðið vísi einungis til afgreiðslutíma sem þegar hefur verið úthlutað. Því verði að beina fyrirmælum samkeppnisyfirvalda til viðkomandi flugrekanda en þau megi ekki hafa áhrif á úthlutun samræmingarstjóra á afgreiðslutímum. Ekki megi heldur beina slíkum fyrirmælum til framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallarins þar sem framkvæmdastjórnin úthlutar

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allocates time slots under the Regulation nor has any authority to instruct the coordinator in this respect.

63 Icelandair submits that any intervention by the airport managing body in relation to the coordinator’s tasks appears to conflict with the principles of functional separation, neutrality and non-discrimination, set out in Article 4(2)(b) and (c) of the Regulation. Therefore, guidelines or decisions on time slot allocation by the national competition authorities should not be directed to the managing body of an airport.

64 According to ESA, Article 8b of the Regulation permits a competition authority to require, pursuant to national law, the transfer of time slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated. However, ESA argues that this provision must be interpreted to the effect that any action of that kind should not interfere with the independence of the coordinator.

65 ESA further claims that it would be incompatible with the coordinator’s role and independence if instructions or decisions regarding time slot allocation were addressed to the airport managing body or to the coordinator save for the situation where the coordinator, acting as an undertaking, has infringed competition rules and the instructions are therefore specifically meant to address that particular infringement.

66 The Commission interprets Article 8b of the Regulation to the effect that there is nothing to preclude a transfer of time slots being required as a matter of competition law. This must be distinguished from the primary allocation under Article 8 of the Regulation. Further, if such a remedy is found necessary by the competition authorities, this should properly take the form of instructions addressed to the air carriers concerned and not to the coordinator.

67 The Commission adds that there is nothing in the Regulation to preclude a competition authority from addressing a decision based on a breach of EEA competition law to a coordinator, provided that the coordinator is an undertaking and as such has committed a specific breach of competition rules.

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hvorki afgreiðslutímum samkvæmt reglugerðinni né hefur valdheimildir til að veita samræmingarstjóra fyrirmæli um það atriði.

63 Icelandair telur að hvers kyns íhlutun framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallar í störf samræmingarstjóra stangist á við meginreglurnar um að hlutverk hans skuli vera óháð hagsmunaaðilum, hann ræki störf sín á skýran hátt og bannið við mismunun, sem fram koma í b- og c-lið 2. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Því eigi ekki að beina fyrirmælum eða ákvörðunum innlendra samkeppnisyfirvalda um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma til framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallar.

64 Að mati ESA er heimilt samkvæmt 8. gr. b reglugerðarinnar að samkeppnisyfirvöld krefjist þess að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir milli flugrekenda og mæli fyrir um úthlutun þeirra í samræmi við reglur landsréttar. ESA telur þó að skýra beri umrætt ákvæði með þeim hætti að þess háttar aðgerð hafi ekki áhrif á sjálfstæði samræmingarstjórans.

65 ESA telur jafnframt að það væri ósamrýmanlegt hlutverki og sjálfstæði samræmingarstjórans ef fyrirmælum eða ákvörðunum um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma væri beint til framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallar eða samræmingarstjórans, nema í tilvikum þar sem samræmingarstjórinn, sem lögaðili, hefur brotið gegn samkeppnisreglum og fyrirmælunum sé því sérstaklega ætlað að taka á því tiltekna broti.

66 Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að skýra beri 8. gr. b reglugerðarinnar með þeim hætti að hún hindri að engu leyti að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir á grundvelli samkeppnissjónarmiða. Greina verði á milli þess og upphaflegrar úthlutunar samkvæmt 8. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur enn fremur að ef samkeppnisyfirvöld telja nauðsynlegt að grípa til slíks úrræðis skuli það birtast í formi fyrirmæla sem beint er til þess flugfélags sem í hlut á en ekki til samræmingarstjóra.

67 Framkvæmdastjórnin bætir við að ekkert í reglugerðinni hindri samkeppnisyfirvöld í að gera athugasemdir við samræmingarstjóra vegna ákvörðunar sem talin er brjóta gegn samkeppnislögum, svo framarlega sem samræmingarstjórinn sé fyrirtæki og hafi sem slíkur framið tiltekið brot gegn samkeppnisreglum.

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68 By its third question, the national court asks, in essence, which parties may be the addressee of national competition authorities’ instructions on time slot allocations.

69 According to Article 4(5) of the Regulation, the coordinator shall be the sole person responsible for the allocation of time slots. Pursuant to Article 8(5), account must be taken, inter alia, of local guidelines proposed by the coordination committee and approved by the EEA State or any other competent body responsible for the airport in question. Such rules and guidelines must respect the independent status of the coordinator, comply with EEA law and aim at improving the efficient use of airport capacity.

70 Pursuant to Article 8b of the Regulation, public authorities may require the transfer of time slots between air carriers and direct how these time slots are allocated. This must also apply when initial allocations are based on grandfather rights. However, public authorities may not intervene in the coordinator’s initial time slot allocation.

71 Moreover, it would serve no purpose to issue instructions to the airport managing body in this context. The airport managing body does not allocate time slots.

72 Article 8b of the Regulation thus entails that, unlike the situation in relation to the initial allocation of time slots, which is the sole responsibility of the coordinator, the Regulation does not prohibit the transfer of time slots after the initial time slot allocation, if required under national or EEA competition law. Consequently, the authorities of an EEA State have the right to instruct the undertakings concerned if such a remedy is found to be necessary under applicable national or EEA competition law.

73 In light of the above, the answer to the third question must be that, pursuant to Article 8b of the Regulation, national public authorities’ instructions on time slot allocation to encourage competition may be addressed to air carriers, but may not be directed to a coordinator. Moreover, it would serve no purpose to issue instructions to the airport managing body. Unlike the primary allocation of time slots, which is the

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Álit dómstólsins

68 Með þriðju spurningunni leitar landsdómstóllinn í aðalatriðum svars við því til hverra innlend samkeppnisyfirvöld megi beina fyrirmælum um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma.

69 Samkvæmt 5. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar skal samræmingarstjóri einn bera ábyrgð á úthlutun afgreiðslutíma. Samkvæmt 5. mgr. 8. gr. ber meðal annars að taka tillit staðbundinna leiðbeininga sem samræmingarnefndin leggur til og aðildarríkið eða til þess bær aðili sem ber ábyrgð á viðkomandi flugvelli samþykkir. Slíkar reglur og tilmæli skulu ekki hafa áhrif á sjálfstæði samræmingarstjórans, auk þess sem þær verða að samrýmast reglum EES-réttar og hafa það að markmiði að bæta skilvirkni í nýtingu á afkastagetu flugvallarins.

70 Samkvæmt 8. gr. b reglugerðarinnar geta opinber yfirvöld krafist þess að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir á milli flugrekenda og stjórnað úthlutun þeirra. Þetta verður einnig að eiga við þegar upphafleg úthlutun byggir á hefðbundnum réttindum. Opinber yfirvöld mega þó ekki hafa afskipti af upphaflegri úthlutun samræmingarstjóra á afgreiðslutímum.

71 Það myndi enn fremur ekki þjóna neinum tilgangi að beina fyrirmælum til framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallar í því samhengi, enda úthlutar hún ekki afgreiðslutímum.

72 Ólíkt því sem við á um upphaflega úthlutun afgreiðslutíma, sem samræmingarstjórinn ber einn ábyrgð á, er ekki í 8. gr. b reglugerðarinnar lagt bann við að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir eftir upphaflega úthlutun, ef innlend samkeppnislöggjöf eða samkeppnislöggjöf EES-réttar krefst þess. Af þeim sökum er yfirvöldum EES-ríkis heimilt að veita fyrirtækjum sem hlut eiga að máli fyrirmæli, ef það telst nauðsynlegt samkvæmt þeim reglum samkeppnisréttar sem við eiga.

73 Í ljósi þess sem að framan greinir verður að svara þriðju spurningunni með þeim hætti að samkvæmt 8. gr. b í reglugerðinni megi innlend samkeppnisyfirvöld beina fyrirmælum um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma til flugrekenda, í því skyni að efla samkeppni, en ekki til samræmingarstjóra. Þá myndi það engum tilgangi þjóna að beina fyrirmælum til framkvæmdastjórnar flugvallar. Ólíkt því sem við á um upphaflega úthlutun afgreiðslutíma, sem samræmingarstjórinn ber einn ábyrgð

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sole responsibility of the coordinator, the Regulation does not prohibit the transfer of time slots after the time slot allocation if required under competition law. Consequently, the competition authorities of an EEA State may instruct the undertakings concerned if such a remedy is found to be necessary under applicable national or EEA competition law.

IV COSTS

74 The costs incurred by ESA and the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are a step in the proceedings pending before Reykjavík District Court, any decision on costs for the parties to those proceedings is a matter for that court.

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Judgment

á, leggur reglugerðin ekki bann við að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir eftir upphaflega úthlutun á grundvelli samkeppnislöggjafar. Þar af leiðandi er samkeppnisyfirvöldum EES-ríkis heimilt að beina fyrirmælum til þeirra fyrirtækja sem hlut eiga að máli ef slíkt úrræði telst nauðsynlegt samkvæmt þeim reglum samkeppnisréttar sem við eiga.

IV MÁLSKOSTNAÐUR

74 Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA og framkvæmdastjórn Evrópusambandsins, sem skilað hafa greinargerðum til EFTA-dómstólsins, skulu hvor bera sinn málskostnað. Þar sem um er ræða mál sem er hluti af málarekstri fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur kemur það í hlut þess dómstóls að kveða á um kostnað málsaðila.

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On those grounds,

THE COURT

in answer to the questions referred to it by Reykjavík District Court hereby gives the

following Advisory Opinion:

1. Article 4(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 requires an EEA State to

appoint a qualified natural or legal person as airport coordinator

after having consulted the parties indicated therein. Article 4(2)

of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 requires the coordinator to be

independent, both legally and factually, from all interested parties

from which he must also be functionally separated. As long as these

conditions are fulfilled, EEA States have discretion in determining

the status of the coordinator. On the basis of those findings, it is

for the national court to draw the necessary conclusions in order to

ensure the effectiveness of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93.

2. The complaint procedure laid down in Article 11(1) of Regulation

(EEC) No 95/93 is not mandatory. Therefore, this procedure does

not preclude the possibility that complaints based on competition

law considerations may be submitted directly to national competition

authorities.

3. Pursuant to Article 8b of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, public authorities’

instructions on time slot allocation to encourage competition may be

addressed to air carriers, but may not be directed to a coordinator.

Moreover, it would serve no purpose to issue instructions to the airport

managing body. Unlike the primary allocation of time slots, which is the

sole responsibility of the coordinator, Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 does

not prohibit the transfer of time slots after the time slot allocation,

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Með vísan til framangreindra forsendna lætur,

DÓMSTÓLLINN

uppi svohljóðandi ráðgefandi álit um spurningar þær sem Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur

beindi til dómstólsins

1. Í 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðar (EBE) nr. 95/93 er þess krafist að EES-

ríki skipi hæfan einstakling eða lögaðila í stöðu samræmingarstjóra

flugvallar, að höfðu samráði við þá aðila sem nefndir eru í greininni.

Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðar (EBE) nr. 95/93 skal hlutverk

samræmingarstjóra vera gert þannig úr garði að hann sé óháður

öllum hagsmunaaðilum, bæði lagalega og í reynd. Svo framarlega

sem þessum kröfum er fullnægt er það á forræði EES-ríkjanna

að ákveða hvaða stöðu samræmingarstjórinn hefur að landsrétti.

Landsdómstóllinn verður á grundvelli þessara sjónarmiða að taka

afstöðu til þeirra atriða sem nauðsynlegt er til að tryggja skilvirkni

reglugerðar (EBE) nr. 95/93.

2. Kvörtunarferlið sem lýst er í 1. mgr. 11. gr. reglugerðar (EBE) nr.

95/93 er ekki ófrávíkjanlegt. Þar af leiðandi útilokar það ekki að

beina megi kvörtunum á grundvelli samkeppnisréttar til innlendra

samkeppnisyfirvalda.

3. Samkvæmt 8. gr. b reglugerðar (EBE) nr. 95/93 mega opinber yfirvöld

beina fyrirmælum um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma til flugrekenda í því

skyni að efla samkeppni, en ekki til samræmingarstjóra. Þá myndi það

engum tilgangi þjóna að beina fyrirmælum til framkvæmdastjórnar

flugvallar. Ólíkt því sem við á um upphaflega úthlutun afgreiðslutíma,

sem samræmingarstjórinn ber einn ábyrgð á, leggur reglugerð (EBE)

nr. 95/93 ekki bann við að afgreiðslutímar séu færðir eftir upphaflega

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if required under competition law. Consequently, the competition authorities of an EEA State may instruct the undertakings concerned if such a remedy is found to be necessary under applicable national or EEA competition law.


Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 December 2014.


Registrar President

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Judgment

úthlutun á grundvelli samkeppnislöggjafar. Þar af leiðandi er samkeppnisyfirvöldum EES-ríkis heimilt að beina fyrirmælum til þeirra fyrirtækja sem hlut eiga að máli ef slíkt úrræði telst nauðsynlegt samkvæmt þeim reglum samkeppnisréttar sem við eiga.


Kveðið upp í heyranda hljóði í Lúxemborg 10. desember 2014.


Dómritari Forseti

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30 September 2014

(Accelerated Procedure)

In Case E-18/14,

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Reykjavík District Court), in the case of

Wow air ehf.

and

Samkeppniseftirlitið (Icelandic Competition Authority),

Isavia ohf.,

and Icelandair ehf.

concerning the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports, as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Decision No 7/94 of 28 June 1994 of the EEA Joint Committee (OJ 1994 L 160, p. 1 and EEA Supplement 1994 No 17, p. 1),

THE PRESIDENT

makes the following

ORDER

1. By letter of 4 September 2014, received on 10 September 2014, Reykjavík District Court requested an Advisory Opinion in a case pending before it between Wow air ehf. and Samkeppniseftirlitið (Icelandic Competition Authority), Isavia ohf. and Icelandair ehf. The case before the national court concerns the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports, as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Decision No

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7/94 of 28 June 1994 of the EEA Joint Committee (OJ 1994 L 160, p. 1 and EEA Supplement 1994 No 17, p. 1) in the allocation of landing and take-off slots at Keflavík International Airport for the year 2014.

2. The plaintiff claims that competition is distorted at Keflavík International Airport, because the most sought-after slots are allocated to Icelandair. In November 2013, the Icelandic Competition Authority decided that the allocation procedure had a detrimental impact on competition and instructed Isavia to provide certain slots to the plaintiff for the summer schedule of 2014. In February 2014, on appeal from Isavia, the Competition Appeals Board annulled the decision.

3. In March 2014, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants before Reykjavík District Court. The District Court granted an accelerated procedure under national rules. The plaintiff has sought the annulment of the Appeals Board’s decision. In May 2014 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action. However, in June 2014 the Supreme Court of Iceland quashed this decision and the case was resumed. The defendants asked the District Court to seek an advisory opinion from the Court. This request was rejected in July 2014. In August 2014, on appeal from Icelandair and Isavia, the Supreme Court of Iceland decided that certain questions of interpretation were to be addressed to the Court. In essence, the questions seek to clarify requirements of EEA law with regard to the independence of a coordinator in charge of allocating slots, procedures for complaints on slot allocations, and the relationship between the airport operator and the coordinator.

4. The request for an Advisory Opinion was registered at the Court on 4 September 2014. On 22 September 2014, Reykjavík District Court submitted a revised request and, making reference to Article 97a of the Rules of Procedure (“RoP”), asked the Court to apply an expedited procedure to this request.

5. The national court, in its revised request, notes that the case concerns the allocation of slots at Keflavík International Airport for the year 2014. During the national proceedings, the plaintiff declared that were it to be allocated the slots in question before the summer of 2014 or before the end of the summer, it would make use of them. The plaintiff in the national proceedings also considers that the allocation would confer upon it a right

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according to precedent in connection with subsequent slot allocations. The proceedings in the Reykjavík District Court are being accelerated under Chapter XIX of the Icelandic Act on Civil Procedure No. 91/1991. With regard to these considerations, the referring court states that it must be assumed that the swift resolution of this case is of particular importance to the plaintiff. Moreover, a swift resolution to this case would also be in the general interest of consumers and competition.

6. Article 97a(1) RoP provides that at the request of the national court, the President may exceptionally decide, on a proposal from the Judge Rapporteur, to apply an accelerated procedure derogating from the provisions of these Rules to a reference for an advisory opinion, where the circumstances referred to establish that a ruling on the question put to the Court is a matter of exceptional urgency. In that event, the President may immediately fix the date for the hearing, which shall be notified to the parties in the main proceedings and to the other persons referred to in Article 20 of the Statute when the decision making the reference is served.

7. Having heard the proposal of the Judge-Rapporteur, the President, pursuant to Article 97a(1) RoP, has decided to apply an accelerated procedure, on the basis that the circumstances referred establish that a ruling on the questions referred is a matter of exceptional urgency, in particular because of the economic sensitivity of the present case. As a matter of principle, the spirit of cooperation between the Court and the national court speaks in favour of granting the request. In the case at hand, however, the plaintiff’s contention that if it were allocated the slots in question before the end of the summer of 2014, it would make use of them is obviously obsolete given that the summer of 2014 is over. Nevertheless, the potential effects on slot allocations in the near future are such as to constitute a matter of exceptional urgency. To guarantee fair and effective competition is one of the most important goals of the EEA Agreement. Effective competition benefits both consumers and competitors and contributes to the common good. In the case at hand, Iceland’s special geographic situation must be taken into account with Keflavík essentially being the only international airport in the country. The President also notes that the proceedings before the national court are subject to an accelerated procedure.

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Order

8. The President takes cognisance that the dispute regarding the allocation of slots for 2014 has been pending in Iceland since November 2013. Reykjavík District Court was seised in March 2014, and the request for an advisory opinion was registered at the Court on 4 September 2014. These facts do not, however, speak against the application of an accelerated procedure.

9. On that basis, and pursuant to Article 97a(1) RoP, the date for the hearing is fixed for 27 October 2014.

10. The parties in the main proceedings, and those persons referred to in Article 20 of the Statute may lodge statements of case or written observations by 17 October 2014. Those parties and other interested persons are requested to restrict the matters addressed in their statement of case or their written observations to the essential points of law raised by the questions referred by Reykjavík District Court.

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On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT

hereby orders:

1. An accelerated procedure derogating from the provisions of the Rules of Procedure to a reference for an advisory opinion is applied. The date for the hearing is fixed for 27 October 2014.

2. The parties in the main proceedings, and those persons referred to in Article 20 of the Statute may lodge statements of case or written observations by 17 October 2014.

3. The parties and other interested persons are requested to restrict the matters addressed in their statement of case or their written observations to the essential points of law raised by the questions referred by Reykjavík District Court.


Registrar President

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in Case E-18/14

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”) by

Reykjavík District Court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) in the case between

Wow air ehf.

and

The Icelandic Competition Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið), Isavia ohf., and Icelandair ehf.

concerning the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports.

I INTRODUCTION

1. By letter of 4 September 2014, revised on 22 September 2014, Reykjavík District Court requested an Advisory Opinion in a case pending before it between Wow air ehf. (“the plaintiff”), and the Icelandic Competition Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið) (“the Competition Authority”), Isavia ohf. (“Isavia”) and Icelandair ehf. (“Icelandair”) (collectively “the defendants”).

2. The case before the national court concerns an action for annulment of a decision of 27 February 2014 by the Competition Appeals Board (Áfrýjunarnefnd samkeppnismála), whereby a decision of the Competition Authority instructing Isavia to provide to the plaintiff certain slots for take-off and landing at Keflavík International Airport for the summer schedule of 2014, was annulled.

II LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law

3. Article 3(1) EEA reads:


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4. Article 7(a) EEA reads:



5. Article 47(2) EEA reads:

2. Annex XIII contains specific provisions on all modes of transport.

6. Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports (OJ 1993 L 14, p. 1) (“the Regulation”) was incorporated into point 64b of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement by Joint Committee Decision No 7/94 of 28 June 1994 (OJ 1994 L 160, p. 1 and EEA Supplement 1994 No 17, p. 1). The Regulation was amended by Regulation (EC) No 793/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 (OJ 2004 L 138, p. 50) (Regulation 793/2004), which was incorporated into the same point by Joint Committee Decision No 154/2004 of 21 April 2005 (OJ 2005 L 102, p. 33 and EEA Supplement 2005 No. 20, p. 21).

7. Recitals 2, 5, 12 and 15 in the preamble to the Regulation read:

Whereas the allocation of slots at congested airports should be based on neutral, transparent and non-discriminatory rules;

…

Whereas the Member State responsible for the coordinated airport should ensure the appointment of a coordinator whose neutrality should be unquestioned;

…

Whereas it is also necessary to avoid situations where, owing to a lack of available slots, the benefits of liberalization are unevenly spread and competition is distorted;

…

Whereas the application of the provisions of this Regulation shall be without prejudice to the competition rules on the Treaty, in particular Articles 85 and 86;

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8. Recitals 6 and 17 in the preamble to Regulation 793/2004 read:

(6) At schedules facilitated airports the schedules facilitator should act in an independent manner. At coordinated airports the coordinator plays a central role in the coordinating process. Therefore, coordinators should be in a fully independent position and their responsibilities should be specified in detail.

…

(17) For the avoidance of doubt, it should be specified that the application of the provisions of this Regulation is to be without prejudice to the competition rules of the Treaty, in particular Articles 81 and 82 thereof and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings.

9. Article 2(a), (g) and (j) of the Regulation reads:

(a) ‘slot’ shall mean the permission given by a coordinator in accordance with this Regulation to use the full range of airport infrastructure necessary to operate an air service at a coordinated airport on a specific date and time for the purpose of landing or take-off as allocated by a coordinator in accordance with this Regulation;

…

(g) ‘coordinated airport’ shall mean any airport where, in order to land or take off, it is necessary for an air carrier or any other aircraft operator to have been allocated a slot by a coordinator, with the exception of State flights, emergency landings and humanitarian flights;

…

(j) ‘managing body of an airport’ shall mean the body which, in conjunction with other activities or otherwise, has the task under national laws or regulations of administering and managing the airport facilities and coordinating and controlling the activities of the various operators present at the airport or within the airport system concerned;

10. Article 4(1), (2), (5) and (8) of the Regulation reads:

The schedules facilitator and the coordinator

1. The Member State responsible for a schedules facilitated or coordinated airport shall ensure the appointment of a qualified natural or legal person as

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schedules facilitator or airport coordinator respectively after having consulted the air carriers using the airport regularly, their representative organisations and the managing body of the airport and the coordination committee, where such a committee exists. The same schedules facilitator or coordinator may be appointed for more than one airport.

2. The Member State responsible for a schedules facilitated or coordinated airport shall ensure:

(a) that at a schedules facilitated airport, the schedules facilitator acts under this Regulation in an independent, neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent manner;

(b) the independence of the coordinator at a coordinated airport by separating the coordinator functionally from any single interested party. The system of financing the coordinators’ activities shall be such as to guarantee the coordinator’s independent status;

(c) that the coordinator acts according to this Regulation in a neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent way.

…

5. The coordinator shall be the sole person responsible for the allocation of slots. He shall allocate the slots in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation and shall make provision so that, in an emergency, slots can also be allocated outside office hours.

…

8. The coordinator shall on request and within a reasonable time make available free of charge for review to interested parties, in particular to members or observers of the coordination committee, either in written form or in any other easily accessible form, the following information:

(a) historical slots by airline, chronologically, for all air carriers at the airport,

(b) requested slots (initial submissions), by air carriers and chronologically, for all air carriers,

(c) all allocated slots, and outstanding slot requests, listed individually in chronological order, by air carriers, for all air carriers,

(d) remaining available slots,

(e) full details on the criteria being used in the allocation.

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11. Article 5 of the Regulation reads:

Coordination committee

1. At a coordinated airport, the Member State responsible shall ensure that a coordination committee is set up. The same coordination committee may be designated for more than one airport. Membership of this committee shall be open at least to the air carriers using the airport(s) in question regularly and their representative organisations, the managing body of the airport concerned, the relevant air traffic control authorities and the representatives of general aviation using the airport regularly.

The tasks of the coordination committee shall be:

(a) to make proposals concerning or advise the coordinator and/or the Member State on:

– the possibilities for increasing the capacity of the airport determined in accordance with Article 3 or for improving its usage;

– the coordination parameters to be determined in accordance with Article 6;

– the methods of monitoring the use of allocated slots;

– local guidelines for the allocation of slots or the monitoring of the use of allocated slots, taking into account, inter alia, possible environmental concerns, as provided for in Article 8(5);

– improvements to traffic conditions prevailing at the airport in question;

– serious problems encountered by new entrants, as provided for in Article 10(9);

– all questions relating to the capacity of the airport;

(b) to mediate between all parties concerned on complaints on the allocation of slots, as provided for in Article 11.

2. Member State representatives and the coordinator shall be invited

to the meetings of the coordination committee as observers.

3. The coordination committee shall draw up written rules of procedure covering, inter alia participation, elections, the frequency of meetings, and language(s) used. Any member of the coordination committee may

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propose local guidelines as provided for in Article 8(5). At the request of the coordinator, the coordination committee shall discuss suggested local guidelines for the allocation of slots as well as those suggested for the monitoring of the use of allocated slots. A report of the discussions in the coordination committee shall be submitted to the Member State concerned with an indication of the respective positions stated within the committee.

12. Article 8(1), (2) and (5) of the Regulation reads:

Process of slot allocation

1. Series of slots are allocated from the slot pool to applicant carriers as permissions to use the airport infrastructure for the purpose of landing or take-off for the scheduling period for which they are requested, at the expiry of which they have to be returned to the slot pool as set up according to the provisions of Article 10.

2. Without prejudice to Articles 7, 8a, 9, 10(1) and 14, paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply when the following conditions are satisfied:

– a series of slots has been used by an air carrier for the operation of scheduled and programmed non-scheduled air services, and

– that air carrier can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the coordinator that the series of slots in question has been operated, as cleared by the coordinator, by that air carrier for at least 80 % of the time during the scheduling period for which it has been allocated.

In such case that series of slots shall entitle the air carrier concerned to the same series of slots in the next equivalent scheduling period, if requested by that air carrier within the time-limit referred to in Article 7(1).

…

5. The coordinator shall also take into account additional rules and guidelines established by the air transport industry world-wide or Community-wide as well as local guidelines proposed by the coordination committee and approved by the Member State or any other competent body responsible for the airport in question, provided that such rules and guidelines do not affect the independent status of the coordinator, comply with Community law and aim at improving the efficient use of airport capacity. These rules shall be communicated by the Member State in question to the Commission.

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13. Article 8a(1) and (2) of the Regulation reads:

Slot mobility

1. Slots may be:

(a) transferred by an air carrier from one route or type of service to another route or type of service operated by that same air carrier;

(b) transferred:

(i) between parent and subsidiary companies, and between subsidiaries of the same parent company,

(ii) as part of the acquisition of control over the capital of an air carrier,

(iii) in the case of a total or partial take-over when the slots are directly related to the air carrier taken over;

(c) exchanged, one for one, between air carriers.

2. The transfers or exchanges referred to in paragraph 1 shall be notified to the coordinator and shall not take effect prior to the express confirmation by the coordinator. The coordinator shall decline to confirm the transfers or exchanges if they are not in conformity with the requirements of this Regulation and if the coordinator is not satisfied that:

(a) airport operations would not be prejudiced, taking into account all technical, operational and environmental constraints;

(b) limitations imposed according to Article 9 are respected;

(c) a transfer of slots does not fall within the scope of paragraph 3.

14. Article 8b of the Regulation reads:

Exclusion of compensation claims

The entitlement to series of slots referred to in Article 8(2) shall not give rise to any claims for compensation in respect of any limitation, restriction or elimination thereof imposed under Community law, in particular in application of the rules of the Treaty relating to air transport. This Regulation shall not affect the powers of public authorities to require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to national competition law or to Articles 81 or 82 of the Treaty or Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. These transfers can only take place without monetary compensation.

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15. Article 10(1), (2), (6) and (9) of the Regulation reads:

Slot pool

1. The coordinator shall set up a pool, which shall contain all the slots not allocated on the basis of Article 8(2) and 8(4). All new slot capacity determined pursuant to Article 3(3) shall be placed in the pool.

2. A series of slots that has been allocated to an air carrier for the operation of a scheduled or a programmed non-scheduled air service shall not entitle that air carrier to the same series of slots in the next equivalent scheduling period if the air carrier cannot demonstrate to the satisfaction of the coordinator that they have been operated, as cleared by the coordinator, by that air carrier for at least 80 % of the time during the scheduling period for which they have been allocated.

…

6. Without prejudice to Article 8(2) of this Regulation and without prejudice to Article 8(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92, slots placed in the pool shall be distributed among applicant air carriers. 50 % of these slots shall first be allocated to new entrants unless requests by new entrants are less than 50 %. The coordinator shall treat the requests of new entrants and other carriers fairly, in accordance with the coordination periods of each scheduling day.

Among requests from new entrants, preference shall be given to air carriers qualifying for new entrant status under both Article 2(b)(i) and (ii) or Article 2(b)(i) and (iii).

…

9. If serious problems continue to exist for new entrants, the Member State shall ensure that a meeting of the airport coordination committee is convened. The purpose of the meeting shall be to examine possibilities for remedying the situation. The Commission shall be invited to that meeting.

16. Article 11 of the Regulation reads:

Complaints and rights of appeal

1. Without prejudice to rights of appeal under national law, complaints regarding the application of Articles 7(2), 8, 8a, 10 and 14(1) to (4) and (6) shall be submitted to the coordination committee. The committee shall, within a period of one month following submission of the complaint, consider

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the matter and if possible make proposals to the coordinator in an attempt to resolve the problem. If the complaint cannot be settled, the Member State responsible may, within a further two month period, provide for mediation by an air carriers’ or airports’ representative organisation or other third party.

2. Member States shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with national law, to protect coordinators with regard to claims for damages relating to their functions under this Regulation, save in cases of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

National law

17. Regulation No 1050/2008 of 30 October 2008 on the allocation of slots at airports (Reglugerð um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma flugvalla) (“Icelandic Regulation 1050/2008”) was adopted to implement the Regulation into Icelandic law. The legal basis for Icelandic Regulation 1050/2008 is Articles 57c(3), 76(3) and 145 of the Aviation Act No 60/1998 of 10 June 1998 (Lög um loftferðir).

18. In March 2014, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”) informed Iceland that some of the provisions of the Regulation seemed not to have been fully or correctly implemented into Icelandic law. In particular, ESA was concerned that Icelandic Regulation 1050/2008 did not safeguard the coordinator’s independence from the airport managing body, as required by the Regulation.

19. Following the communication between ESA and Iceland on this subject, Icelandic Regulation 1050/2008 was replaced by Regulation No 858/2014 of 30 September 2014 on the allocation of slots at airports (“Icelandic Regulation 858/2014”), which entered into force on the same day. By Article 5 of Icelandic Regulation 858/2014, the Regulation (as amended by Regulation 793/2004) was incorporated into Icelandic law.

20. Article 16(1) and (2) of the Competition Act No 44/2005 of 19 May 2005 (Samkeppnislög) reads:

The Competition Authority may take measures against:

a. agreements, terms and any actions constituting infringement of the prohibition provisions of this Act, settlements or decisions that have been made pursuant to this Act;

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b. acts of public entities to the extent that they may have detrimental effects on competition, provided that no special legislation contains any specific provisions regarding authorisation or obligation for such acts;

c. circumstances or conduct which prevents, limits or affects competition to the detriment of the public interest. Circumstances means among other things, factors connected to the attributes of the market concerned, including the organisation or development of companies that operate in it. Conduct means all forms of behaviour, including failure to act, that are in some way detrimental to market competition without being in violation of the Act’s ban provisions.

The actions of the Competition Authority may include any measure that is necessary to enhance competition, put an end to violations or respond to actions of public entities that may adversely affect competition. The Competition Authority can apply necessary remedies to amend conduct or structure relating to the issues specified in the first paragraph that are proportionate to the violation that has been committed or to the circumstances or conduct concerned. However, structural remedies may only be imposed if it is shown that no effective behavioural remedy exists or if an equally effective behavioural remedy will be more burdensome for the party in question than a structural remedy.


21. The plaintiff and Icelandair are both air carriers operating scheduled flight services to and from Iceland. Isavia is a public limited company established pursuant to Act No 153/2009 of 29 December 2009 on the merger of the public companies operating Keflavík International Airport and Leifur Eiríksson Air Terminal (Lög um samruna opinberu hlutafélaganna Flugstoða og Keflavíkurflugvallar).

22. On 1 April 2006, Keflavík International Airport was designated as a coordinated airport in accordance with Article 2(g) of the Regulation. ACD/Frank Holton, Managing Director of ACD was appointed as coordinator of Keflavík International Airport by an agreement of 11 September 2007 between Keflavík International Airport and Airport Coordination Denmark.

23. In March 2013, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Competition

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Authority regarding the allocation of slots at Keflavík International Airport. In November 2013, the Competition Authority decided that the allocation procedure had a detrimental impact on competition and instructed Isavia to provide certain slots to the plaintiff for the summer schedule of 2014. The Competition Authority also instructed Isavia to adopt guidelines for the coordinator’s allocation of slots.

24. The decision from the Competition Authority was appealed by Isavia and in February 2014 the Competition Appeals Board annulled the decision. The Appeals Board found that the contested decision should not have been addressed to Isavia, since independent administrative powers in the field of slot allocation had been given to the coordinator. The Appeals Board gave the following reasons for this view:

Although under Article 4 of Act No. 76/2008 the objectives of [Isavia] are defined as including “functions that are directly related to air services, the operation of airports and an air terminal and other activities”, and although the responsibilities of the managing body of an airport include “the coordination and direction of the functions of air carriers operating at the airport” (cf. item j of Article 2 of Regulation No. 1050/2008), the Appeals Board is unable, for the same reason, to concur with the view that these provisions can be interpreted in such a way that the appellant is to some extent responsible for the coordinator’s task of allocating slots and that it is able, relying on such a responsibility or its administrative authority, to instruct the coordinator to transfer slots between air carriers. Such a conclusion would be completely incompatible with the aforementioned provisions of Regulation No. 1050/2008 and the European Regulations discussed above. The Competition Authority’s reference to Article 10 of the Regulation is of no significance in this regard as it does not provide that the appellant should have an intermediary role in transferring slots following government intervention on the basis of competition provisions. Nor is it of any significance that the appellant is entrusted, under the aforementioned Regulation, with ensuring that an airport coordinator is appointed and that the appellant is obliged to pay him a remuneration for his work. The board finds that if the appellant was to have a role such as the one the Competition Authority maintains that it does have in the present case, the authority to intervene directly in slot allocations by the coordinator, then the legislature, and the minister by issuing Regulation No. 1050/2008, should have included clear provisions to this effect.

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25. In March 2014, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants before Reykjavík District Court, seeking the annulment of the Appeals Board’s decision. The District Court granted an accelerated procedure under national rules. In May 2014 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action. However, in June 2014 the Supreme Court of Iceland (Hæstiréttur Íslands) quashed this decision and the case was resumed.

26. The defendants asked the District Court to seek an advisory opinion from the Court according to Article 34 SCA. This request was rejected in July 2014. In August 2014, on appeal from Icelandair and Isavia, the Supreme Court decided that certain questions of interpretation nevertheless were to be addressed to the Court. The case was then remitted to the District Court.

27. By letter of 4 September 2014, revised on 22 September 2014, Reykjavik District Court referred the following questions to the Court:

1. Does Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, of 18 January 1993, on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports, oblige the Member States to ensure that a coordinator appointed under the provisions of the Regulation is, as regards the execution of his tasks, granted independent administrative power under domestic legislation as part of the executive of the Member State, or does the Member State have discretion to decide the status of the coordinator under domestic legislation?

2. Is it assumed, in the instructions on the handling of complaints concerning the allocation of slots in Articles 8(7) and 8(8) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, that all complaints, including complaints based on competition considerations, will be subject to the procedure prescribed therein, or is recital 15 of the preamble to the Regulation to be understood as meaning that the Regulation is to be applied without prejudice to the competition rules of the Treaty, in particular Articles 85 and 86, in such a way that complaints based on competition considerations shall be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the competition authorities in the relevant Member State and are therefore to be submitted directly to them?

3. If the competition authority of a Member State issues instructions on the basis of domestic competition legislation, and with reference to

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Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, with the intention of encouraging competition, is it assumed in the Regulation that these instructions will be issued to the managing body of an airport/competent authority or should these instructions be issued to the coordinator?

28. In its letter, the District Court requested the Court to apply an accelerated procedure pursuant to Article 97a of the Rules of Procedure (“RoP”). This request was granted by order of the Court’s President of 30 September 2014.

IV WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS

29. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 97 and 97a RoP, written observations have been received from:

– The Competition Authority, represented by Gizur Bergsteinsson, Attorney at Law;

– Isavia, represented by Hlynur Halldórsson, Supreme Court Attorney;

– Icelandair, represented by Helga Melkorka Óttarsdóttir, Supreme Court Attorney;

– ESA, represented by Xavier Lewis, Director, Markus Schneider, Deputy Director and Auður Ýr Steinarsdóttir, Officer, Department of Legal & Exceutive Affairs , acting as Agents; and

– The European Commission (“the Commission”), represented by Teresa Vecchi, Folkert Wilman and Nicola Yerrell, members of its Legal Service, acting as Agents.

V SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED

The Competition Authority

30. As regards the first question, the Competition Authority submits that an EEA State responsible for a coordinated airport shall, pursuant to Article 4 of the Regulation, ensure the appointment of a qualified natural or legal person as an airport coordinator. The coordinator shall act in an independent, neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent manner. Moreover, the EEA State is responsible for providing a legal framework that separates the functions of the coordinator from those of any interested party. In addition, the system of financing the coordinators’ activities shall guarantee the coordinator’s independent status.

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31. The Competition Authority contends that the Regulation does not require an EEA State to provide the coordinator with a specific legal status under national law. Such a requirement can hardly be reconciled with Article 4(1) of the Regulation which, according to the Competition Authority, allows for the same coordinator to be appointed for airports in more than one EEA State.

32. In the view of the Competition Authority, the fact that EEA States have different arrangements for the appointment of coordinators illustrates that the determination of the legal status of the coordinator is within the discretion of the EEA States as long as the requirements in Article 4 of the Regulation are fulfilled.

33. As for the second question the Competition Authority submits that the procedure described in Article 11 of the Regulation does not prevent national competition authorities from exercising their powers under national competition law to require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated. Both the coordinator’s role and the complaint procedure described in Article 11 are substituted by national competition authorities when they decide to exercise their powers under national law. This interpretation is supported by the explicit reservation in Article 8b and the amendments introduced in Regulation 793/2004.

34. As regards the third question, the Competition Authority submits that, since Article 8b of the Regulation substitutes the coordinator’s role when national competition authorities decide to adopt remedies under national competition law, decisions on complaints in respect of the coordinator must be addressed to the airport managing body, not the coordinator.

35. The Competition Authority recalls that, pursuant to Article 2(j) of the Regulation, the airport managing body has the task of administering and managing the airport facilities and coordinating and controlling the activities of the various operators present at the airport or within the airport system concerned. In this regard it is not only logical, but necessary, for national competition authorities to address their decisions to the managing body.

36. According to Article 4(5) of the Regulation, the coordinator shall allocate the slots in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation.

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The Competition Authority argues that slot allocation according to the Regulation does not occur when a national competition authority, on the basis of national competition law and in accordance with Article 8b of the Regulation, issues instructions regarding slots. Consequently, the Competition Authority argues that the coordinator is not authorised under the Regulation to comply with such instructions.

37. The Competition Authority proposes that the Court should answer the questions as follows:

1. Regulation 95/93 does not require Member States to grant a coordinator independent administrative power under national law. The Member States have discretion as to a coordinator’s legal status provided that the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Regulation are fulfilled.

2. Article 11 of Regulation 95/93, as amended with Regulation 793/2004, does not affect the powers of national competition authorities to require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to national competition law.

3. Regulation 95/93 presumes that national competition authorities’ decisions in respect of slot allocations should be addressed to the managing body of an airport.

Isavia

38. As to the first question, Isavia argues that the purpose of the Regulation indicate that the coordinator is fully independent in his work and cannot receive instructions or orders from interested parties. The coordination committee can only make proposals to or advice the coordinator on various issues and has no authority to instruct him.

39. Furthermore, Isavia submits that that the Regulation shall ensure that the coordinator is autonomous and neutral in his work. The coordinator allocates slots within a specific legal framework and should be considered to possess independent administrative powers enabling him to allocate slots in full conformity with the rules set out in the Regulation. EEA States have no discretion to change the status of or interfere with the independence of the coordinator as prescribed in the Regulation and cannot deviate from the allocation rules of the Regulation.

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40. Isavia argues that an EEA State must make sure that slot allocation rules are correctly and strictly transposed into domestic legislation in accordance with the Regulation. Each EEA State is further obliged to grant the coordinator sufficient administrative power to allocate the slots in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation. Isavia submits that an EEA State has some discretion as to the legal form of the undertaking appointed under Article 4(1) of the Regulation (for example natural person, public company or private company), provided that the independence, autonomy and neutrality of the coordinator is not compromised.

41. As for the second question, Isavia submits that there is no indication that domestic competition rules are to be taken into account in the process of allocating slots under the Regulation. Thus, an EEA State cannot allow competition authorities to interfere with the allocation process or change the allocation of slots to air carriers, for example by means of an administrative decision such as the decision of the Competition Authority in the present case. According to Isavia, this would contradict the aim of the Regulation, which is to apply the same slot allocation rules at all EEA airports. There are provisions in the Regulation that directly address competition matters with a balanced approach, for example the provisions concerning new entrants.

42. Furthermore, Isavia submits that no local guidelines have been approved by the Icelandic Government. In any case, local guidelines need prior approval by ESA or the Commission to ensure that they do not compromise or distort unified and harmonised slot allocations at EEA airports. Authorities within an EEA State can therefore not interfere with the slot allocation executed by the coordinator by giving instructions or request allocation of slots on other grounds than those expressly spelled out in the Regulation.

43. Isavia argues that the above indicates that complaints based on considerations of competition (cf. Article 8b of the Regulation) and complaints regarding allocation of slots executed by the coordinator (cf. Article 11 and Article 5(1)(b) of the Regulation) are entirely separate issues. To maintain a common and harmonised market, allocation rules contain exhaustive sets of instructions, among them instructions based on competition concerns. These rules need to be homogenous across EEA and implemented strictly in accordance with the Regulation by each EEA State.

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44. However, Isavia observes that, according to Article 8b of the Regulation, the Regulation does not affect the powers of public authorities to require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to domestic competition law or to Articles 53 or 54 EEA. In Isavia’s view, this could indicate that a national competition authority could intervene in the utilisation of slots by air carriers already allocated to them, on the basis that the air carrier in question is in breach of competition rules.

45. Isavia thus claims that competition authorities can require air carriers to transfer slots allocated to them by the coordinator in accordance with the Regulation, presumably on the basis of anti-competitive behaviour on the relevant market. This would in effect mean that the competition authorities could require the air carrier in question to return slots allocated to it by the coordinator to the slot pool pursuant to Article 10 of the Regulation, and, possibly, to transfer allocated slots to another air carrier negatively affected by the anti-competitive behaviour. Therefore, Isavia concludes that Article 8b can only refer to slots already allocated to air carriers and instructions to air carriers, but can neither refer to slots held by the coordinator in the slot pool nor justify instructions to the coordinator to allocate slots.

46. Isavia contends that the complaint procedure described in Article 11 of the Regulation clearly indicates that the coordination committee does not address competition issues. The coordination committee can only make proposals to the coordinator and/or try to mediate between parties involved. It is however clear that the coordination committee does not have any power to instruct the coordinator or change his allocations.

47. Consequently, Isavia submits, on the one hand, that the handling of complaints concerning allocation of slots under Article 11 and Article 5(1)(b) of the Regulation and, on the other hand, complaints based on competition considerations are separate issues. Complaints regarding competition should be handled by domestic competition authorities, or by ESA or the Commission if there is an appreciable effect on competition between EEA States. The handling of complaints under Article 11 of the Regulation cannot lead to changes in the allocation of slots, as the coordination committee has no powers of instruction over the coordinator.

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48. As regards the third question, Isavia claims that if a competition authority issues instructions based on domestic legislation, such instructions must be addressed to the relevant air carrier. It is clear from the provisions of the Regulation that the competition authorities of an EEA State cannot issue instructions that interfere with the coordinator’s allocation of slots. Neither can such instructions be directed to the airport managing body, as the latter neither allocates slots under the Regulation nor has any authority to instruct the coordinator in this respect.

49. Isavia proposes that the Court should answer the questions as follows:

1. EU and EFTA Member States are obligated to make sure that slot allocation rules are correctly and strictly transposed into the domestic legislation in accordance with Regulation 95/93. Each EU and EFTA Member State is further obligated to grant the coordinator sufficient domestic legal authority in a form of administrative power to allocate the slots in accordance with the subjective rules of Regulation 95/93. In this respect the Member State has no discretion to deviate from rules of the Regulation intended to protect the autonomy and independence of the coordinator. Member States have further no discretion to deviate from or change the slot allocation rules under Regulation 95/93. Member States can have some discretion as to the legal form of the undertaking which is appointed under Article 4(1), e.g. natural person, public or private company, provided that it does not compromise the above.

2. Handling of complaints concerning allocation of slots under Article 8(7) and Article 8(8) [Article 11 and Article 5(1)(b)] and complaints based on competition considerations are separate issues falling under different articles of Regulation 95/93. Complaints regarding competition considerations should be handled by domestic competition authorities, or if the consideration has an appreciable effect on competition between EEA Member States, by EFTA Surveillance Authority or the Commission. Rules on allocation of slots are exhaustive and finite set out instructions which cannot be changed with interference by competition authorities of a Member State. Handling of complaints concerning slots under Article (7) and Article 8(8) [Article 11] do not lead to changes in allocation of slots as the coordination committee has no instructive powers over the coordinator.

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3. Competition authority of a Member State cannot issue instructions on the basis of domestic competition legislation towards the managing body of an airport/competent authority or to the coordinator. A competition authority of Member State can only issue instructions on the basis of domestic competition legislation towards air carrier(s) which have been allocated slots under Regulation 95/93, and require them to either transfer allocated slot(s) between air carriers or return slot(s) to the slot pool after being found in breach of domestic competition legislation. Reference to “domestic competition legislation” entails that the subjective rules of domestic competition legislation will have to correspond to the subject matter of Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement (Art. 101 or 102 TFEU) and applicable rules on mergers.

Icelandair

50. As regards the first question, Icelandair submits that the coordinator is entrusted with an administrative role within the governmental system and to perform certain public service activities clearly defined in the Regulation and distinct from any other activities of the coordinator1. The coordinator’s independence is an essential requirement for him to properly carry out his tasks under the relevant legislation. The functional separation provided for in the Regulation means that the coordinator shall act autonomously from, and not be instructed by or have any reporting duties towards the airport managing body, a service provider or any air carrier. Furthermore, to safeguard that independence the coordinator shall be financially autonomous from any single party directly affected by - or having interest in - its activities.

51. Icelandair submits that it follows from Icelandic Regulation 858/2014 that the Icelandic authorities have acknowledged that Icelandic Regulation 1050/2008 did not ensure the independence of the coordinator from the airport managing body, Isavia.

52. According to Icelandair, the Regulation must be interpreted in a way that obliges the EEA State to ensure that a coordinator appointed is, as regards the execution of his tasks, granted independent administrative

1 Reference is made to Case T-177/04 easyJet v Commission [2006] ECR II-01931, paragraphs 91 and 93

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power under domestic legislation as part of the executive of the EEA State. However, as long as the coordinator’s independence is protected in law and in fact under the domestic legislation of the relevant EEA State, its specific status under the same legislation is irrelevant.

53. As to the second question, in Icelandair’s view, it is clear that the procedure provided for in the Regulation is set out, inter alia, to protect competition.2 Although the Regulation does not prevent the public authorities from intervening with the slot allocation with reference to competition rules, Icelandair is of the opinion that those rules must, however, not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to the coordinator. Intervention of national competition authorities on slot allocation cannot be without boundaries.

54. Icelandair claims that the special procedure for slot allocation laid down in the Regulation prevails over national competition law in such a way that national competition authorities should not intervene unless there is clear and factual evidence that the coordinator has not respected its obligations. The fact that the Regulation provides for parameters on the allocation of slots, whose purpose is, inter alia, to protect competition, must be taken into consideration.

55. Icelandair further maintains that the intervention of the competition authorities should always be subject to the condition that the relevant air carrier has exhausted all reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary slots through the general slot allocation process provided for in the Regulation, unless there exists a clear and factual evidence for a breach of competition rules.

56. Icelandair also notes that the Regulation entails a total harmonisation, aiming to provide common rules on the allocation of slots in the EEA. Total harmonisation leaves an EEA State with no scope for further independent action in the field covered by the harmonising measure. 3 In Icelandair’s view, different methods of allocation of slots in each EEA State would jeopardise the entire system of slot allocations in Europe.

2 Reference is made to easyJet v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.3 Reference is made to Case C-16/83 Criminal proceedings against Karl Prantl [1984] ECR 01299,

paragraph 13; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel [2003] ECR I-10155, paragraphs 62 and 65 to 72; and Case C·52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-03827, paragraphs 16, 19 and 24.

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57. Accordingly, Icelandair concludes that an air carrier disputing the coordinator’s slot allocation on the basis of national competition law must make all reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary slots through the general slot allocation process provided for in the Regulation. Further, any intervention by the national competition authorities must be in line with EEA law and the parameters for allocation of slots set out in the Regulation, and respect the principal of proportionality.

58. As for the third question, Icelandair points out that Article 8(5) of the Regulation requires the coordinator to take account of local guidelines proposed by the coordination committee and approved by the EEA State or any other competent body responsible for the airport in question, provided that such rules and guidelines do not affect the independent status of the coordinator. That provision cannot be interpreted in such a way that the managing body of an airport should be able or obliged to provide the coordinator with guidelines on the allocation of slots, as it would clearly affect the independent status of the coordinator.

59. In the view of Icelandair, any intervention by Isavia on the coordinator’s tasks appears to conflict both with the principle of functional separation and the principles of neutrality and non-discrimination, as enshrined in Article 4(2)(b) and (c) of the Regulation.4 It is thus Icelandair’s view that any guidelines or decisions by the national competition authorities should not be directed against the managing body of an airport.

ESA

60. ESA considers it appropriate to reply to the first and the third questions together.

61. As a starting point, ESA submits that it is necessary to make a distinction between the allocation of slots and the transfer of slots. Slot allocation refers to the first time a slot is established and allocated by a slot coordinator, whereas the transfer of slots refers to the transfer or exchange of slots between those air carriers holding slots and those seeking new or additional slots.

4 Reference is made to the Commission decision to bring Portugal to ECJ for failing to guarantee the independence of the airport slot coordinator (European Commission Notice of 20 November 2013 - IP/13/1100 - 20/11/2013).

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62. ESA contends that the Regulation itself does not contain any provisions relating to the status of the coordinator as a natural person or entity exercising public authority. Neither does it explicitly address the legal form of the coordinator. Article 4 of the Regulation merely requires EEA States to ensure that the coordinator is a qualified natural or legal person that acts in a neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent manner. In addition, the coordinator must be functionally separated from any interested party and the system of financing the coordinator’s activities must guarantee the coordinator’s independent status.

63. ESA refers to the Commission’s Communication on the application of the Regulation,5 according to which functional separation means, inter alia, that the coordinator should act autonomously from, not be instructed by, and not have a duty to report back to the airport managing body, a service provider or any air carrier operating from the airport concerned. Furthermore, the system of financing the coordinator’s activities should be set up in such a way that the coordinator is financially autonomous from any single party directly affected by, or having an interest in, its activities. The coordinator should therefore keep separate accounts and budgets and not rely for the financing of his activities only on the airport managing body, a service provider or a single air carrier.

64. ESA submits that the Regulation provides for full-harmonisation on the matter. As long as the Regulation is correctly applied so as the coordinator’s full independence is guaranteed, it is a matter for national law whether the entity designated as coordinator exercises public or private law.

65. ESA observes that coordinators take various legal forms in different EEA States. This lack of uniform status and legal form of coordinators further suggests that the Regulation cannot be regarded as requiring the coordinator to have a specific status or legal form under domestic legislation. ESA therefore considers that it is for each EEA State to decide the status and legal form of the coordinator under domestic legislation as long as his full independence is guaranteed.

5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On the application of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports, as amended. COM (2008) 227, p. 3.

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66. As to whether or not competition authorities can issue guidelines or instructions to the coordinator, ESA recalls that Article 4(2)(b) of the Regulation requires the coordinator to be independent, and that Article 4(5) of the Regulation confers the sole responsibility for allocating slots to the coordinator. Nonetheless, under Article 8(5) of the Regulation the coordinator may be required to take into account certain priority rules and guidelines. However, such rules and guidelines must comply with the conditions set out in Article 8(5) and the EEA State must notify them to ESA or the Commission.

67. Furthermore, Article 8b of the Regulation provides for the possibility for a public authority to require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to national competition law. A national competition authority may thus require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated if a competition law issue has been established. However, ESA argues that this provision should be interpreted to the effect that any such action taken by a public authority should not interfere with the independence of the coordinator.

68. ESA further claims that it would be incompatible with the coordinator’s role and independence if instructions or decisions regarding slot allocation could be addressed to the airport managing body or the coordinator, save for circumstances where the coordinator, acting as an undertaking, has infringed competition rules and the instructions are therefore specifically meant to address that particular infringement by the coordinator.

69. With reference to the second question, ESA contends that the complaint procedure set out in Article 11(1) of the Regulation should neither be considered mandatory nor exhaustive. First, Article 11 of the Regulation explicitly addresses the issue in stating that the complaint procedure is without prejudice to rights of appeal under national law. Second, the provision does not provide for any binding dispute resolution mechanism. It merely provides that the coordination committee shall consider the matter and if possible make proposals to attempt to resolve the problem brought before it. Also, the coordination committee’s other tasks laid down in Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulation are only advisory. Third, Article 11 provides that an EEA State may provide for non-binding mediation.

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70. Furthermore, as regards competition rules, the preamble to the Regulation provides that the application of the provisions of that regulation is without prejudice to the competition rules of the EU Treaty. ESA claims that recital 15 in the preamble to the Regulation should be read in conjunction with its Article 8b.

71. ESA therefore concludes that Article 11(1) of the Regulation should not be construed to mean that all complaints, including complaints based on competition considerations, are subject exclusively to the procedure set out in that article. Rather, as regards competition law enforcement, it is for domestic law to determine which bodies have jurisdiction to apply national or EEA competition rules. Under the EEA legal order, these rules can be applied by both national competition authorities and national courts (and indeed must be applied by them in some circumstances).

72. ESA advises the Court to reply to the questions referred in the following manner:

1. Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports requires that EEA States must ensure the full independence of persons or entities designated as slot coordinators. As long as this is the case, it is a matter for national law whether slot coordinators are established under public or private law.

2. On a proper construction of Regulation No 95/93, the complaint procedure described in its Article 11 is without prejudice to remedies available under national law, including competition law. It is for domestic legislation to determine which authorities or courts have jurisdiction to apply such rules.

3. Article 8b of Regulation No 95/93 should be interpreted to the effect that any action taken by a public authority should not interfere with the independence of the slot coordinator.

The Commission

73. As for the first question, it is the Commission’s view that the requirement of functional separation in Article 4(2)(b) of the Regulation means that the coordinator must act autonomously, and, in particular, not be instructed by, or have a duty to report back to, the airport managing body, a

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service provider or any air carrier operating from the relevant airport. The Commission contends that the notion of independence normally means a status which ensures that the body/entity concerned can act completely freely, without taking instructions or being put under any pressure.6

74. The Commission submits that, provided that these essential requirements are met, the Regulation is otherwise silent as to the precise status or legal form the position of coordinator is to take. This accordingly remains a matter for the EEA States.

75. The Commission emphasises that one consequence of the functional separation is that the coordinator cannot be subject to instructions of for example the airport managing body. Further, the Commission argues that since it is the coordinator who bears sole responsibility for slot allocation under Article 8 of the Regulation, any instructions from the airport managing body as to how to carry out an allocation would clearly be incompatible with the Regulation.

76. As for the second question, in the Commission’s view it is clear that the procedure prescribed in Article 11(1) of the Regulation is in no way intended to be exhaustive. As is expressly stated in the introductory phrase of Article 11(1), the complaints procedure is without prejudice to the rights of appeal under national law.

77. The Commission contends that this conclusion is further reinforced by the terms of recital 15 in the preamble to the Regulation and recital 17 in the preamble to the amending Regulation 793/2004. Both emphasise that the application of the provisions of the Regulation is to be without prejudice to the competition rules of the Treaty. Article 8b of the Regulation also states that the regulation shall not affect the powers of the public authorities to require the transfer of slots between air carriers and to direct how these are allocated pursuant to national or EEA competition law - reflecting the fact that this is one of the specific remedies which might be adopted in case of a breach of competition law rules.

78. To that end, the Commission argues, first, that it is true that Article 11(1) of the Regulation does not further define the precise nature of any complaints to be considered under the complaints procedure, other than

6 Reference is made to Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-1885, paragraph 18.

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to state that they should relate, inter alia, to the slots allocation process or creation of the slot pool. In the Commission’s view, the primary task of the coordination committee in this context is to analyse a complaint in light of the requirements of the Regulation. Although these may themselves incorporate certain competition law considerations, it is clear that the coordination committee would not be competent to make a definite ruling on purely competition law issues, either as a matter of EEA or national competition law.

79. Second, the Commission continues, it is clear that compliance with the rules of the Regulation cannot necessarily preclude a breach of competition rules by an undertaking (indeed as is further illustrated by the wording of Article 8b of the Regulation itself). However, in the Commission’s view, a decision raising specific competition concerns involving a breach of the EEA provisions on restrictive practices or abuse of a dominant position, or a decision based on the Merger Regulation,7 would need to be adopted before a particular remedy could be imposed. In other words, a general finding by a national competition authority of a lack of competition without the identification of a specific conduct contrary to EEA competition law provisions could not properly be used as a basis for overriding the rules laid down in the Regulation. In this regard, the Commission would in particular note that Article 8(2) of the Regulation expressly allows for the continuation of certain historical rights to slots (the so-called “grandfather rights”).

80. Finally in this respect, the Commission would emphasise that there is no obligation under EEA competition law for potential complainants to have first exhausted all other remedies available (including an Article 11(1) complaint under the Regulation).

81. As the Commission understands it, the third question arises because of a particular feature of Icelandic competition law, namely that Article 16(1)(b) of the Competition Act also permits the Competition Authority to take measures against acts of public entities where they may have detrimental effects on competition - and not merely against undertakings in cases where an infringement of competition law has been established.

7 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1.

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82. The Commission emphasises that the independence of the coordinator, as required by Article 4 of the Regulation, is one of the key elements in ensuring the proper functioning of the slot allocation process. Consequently, in the Commission’s view the possibility of instructions being addressed directly or indirectly to the coordinator in relation to this process is clearly incompatible with the requirement of independence.

83. At the same time, the Commission argues that it is true that the Regulation is without prejudice to EEA competition law rules, and that Article 8b of the Regulation expressly envisages that a competition law authority may be able to require the transfer of slots between carriers as a matter of national or EEA competition law. The Commission understands this to mean that there is nothing in the Regulation to preclude a subsequent transfer of slots being required as a matter of competition law, but this situation must be distinguished from the primary allocation under Article 8 of the Regulation. Further, if such a remedy were found necessary by the competition authorities, this should properly take the form of instructions addressed to the undertakings concerned, that is the air carriers, and not to the coordinator.

84. Finally, the Commission adds, with reference to recital 15 in the preamble to the Regulation, there is of course nothing in the Regulation to preclude a relevant competition authority from addressing a decision based on a breach of Articles 101/102 TFEU or Articles 53/54 EEA to a coordinator, provided that the coordinator can itself be classified as an undertaking and has as such committed a specific breach of competition rules by its own conduct, and not simply on the basis of a correct application of the provisions on slot allocation.

85. The Commission proposes that the Court should answer the questions referred as follows:

1. Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 does not contain specific requirements as to the status or legal form of the coordinator to be appointed under that article. Provided that the independence of the coordinator is guaranteed in accordance with the requirements of that article, this accordingly remains a matter for the EEA States.

2. The complaints procedure laid down in Article 11(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 is not exhaustive, and cannot preclude

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access to other available legal procedures and remedies, including those based on competition law.

3. In the context of the slot allocation process under Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93, the issuing of instructions to the coordinator is incompatible with the requirement of independence laid down in its Article 4 as well as the sole responsibility of the coordinator for that allocation process by virtue of its Article 4(5). This is however without prejudice to the provisions of Article 8b of the Regulation, as well as the possibility for the relevant competition authorities to take measures in relation to a specific breach of competition rules committed by the coordinator by its own conduct.

Per Christiansen

Judge-Rapporteur

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Case E-10/14Enes Deveci and Others

vScandinavian Airlines System

Denmark-Norway-Sweden

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Case E-10/14 Enes Deveci and Others v Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden

CASE E-10/14Enes Deveci and Others

v

Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden

(Directive 2001/23/EC – Transfer of undertakings – Collective agreements – Freedom to conduct a business)

Judgment of the Court, 18 December 2014 ................................................. 1366



1. Directive 2001/23/EC (“the Directive”) is intended to achieve partial harmonisation and not to establish a uniform level of protection within its scope throughout the EEA. The Directive does however strive to ensure a fair balance between the interests of transferred employees and of the transferee undertaking. Thus, the Directive can only be relied on to ensure that employees are protected in their relation to the transferee to the same extent they were in their relation to the transferor under the legal rules of the EEA State concerned.

2. If conditions of pay enjoyed by the transferred employees under the collective agreement with the transferor are replaced with conditions of pay laid down by the collective agreement in force with the transferee only after the expiry of the former agreement, the loss of the entitlement to a particular salary is not linked to the transfer, but to the

expiry of the collective agreement. The Directive safeguards employees’ rights and obligations in force on the day of the transfer. It is not intended to protect mere expectations to rights and, therefore, hypothetical advantages flowing from future changes to collective agreements.

3. In principle, the rates of pay put in place by a collective agreement fall within the scope of Article 3(3) of the Directive. This applies whether or not those conditions are applicable to the persons concerned by virtue of the collective agreement as such or a national rule maintaining effects of a collective agreement after its expiration. It is sufficient that such terms and conditions have been put in place by a collective agreement and effectively bind the transferor and the employees transferred. However, given the limited level of harmonisation, the scope of protection is defined by national law and cannot be extended by Article 3(3) of the Directive.

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SAK E-10/14Enes Deveci m.fl.

mot


(Direktiv 2001/23/EF – Virksomhetsoverdragelse – Tariffavtaler – Frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet)

Domstolens dom, 18. desember 2014 ........................................................ 1366

Rettsmøterapport ....................................................................................... 1390

Sammendrag

1. Direktiv 2001/23/EF (“direktivet”) tar bare sikte på en delvis harmonisering, og har ikke til formål å etablere et ensartet beskyttelsesnivå på sitt virkeområde i EØS. Direktivet søker imidlertid å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom de overførte ansattes og erververens interesser. Direktivet skal dermed bare sikre at ansatte gis samme grad av beskyttelse i sitt forhold til erververen som de hadde i sitt forhold til overdrageren etter rettsreglene i den aktuelle EØS-stat.

2. Dersom lønnsvilkårene som gjelder for de overførte ansatte etter overdragerens tariffavtale, erstattes med lønnsvilkårene i tariffavtalen hos erververen bare etter at førstnevnte avtale er utløpt, følger tapet av retten til en bestemt lønn ikke direkte av overdragelsen, men av tariffavtalens utløp. Direktivet ivaretar de rettigheter og forpliktelser for ansatte som

gjelder på datoen for overdragelsen. Det har ikke til formål å beskytte rene forventninger om rettigheter, og følgelig heller ikke hypotetiske fordeler som knytter seg til fremtidige endringer i tariffavtaler.

3. Lønnen som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale er i prinsippet omfattet av direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3. Dette gjelder uavhengig av om disse vilkår får anvendelse for de berørte personer i kraft av tariffavtalen som sådan eller i kraft av en nasjonal regel som opprettholder virkningen av en tariffavtale etter avtalens utløp. Det er tilstrekkelig at slike vilkår er fastsatt i en tariffavtale og faktisk er bindende for overdrageren og de overførte ansatte. Men siden harmoniseringen er begrenset, må beskyttelsens omfang fastlegges av nasjonal rett og kan ikke utvides av direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3.

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4. In the interest of the employees, a national rule may give continued effects to a collective agreement in order to avoid a rupture of the framework governing the employment relationship. In that case, it must be assessed whether such a rule complies with the main objective of the Directive. That objective is to ensure a fair balance between the interests of the employees and those of the transferee. The transferee must be in a position to make adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations. Since continued effects applicable after the expiration of a collective agreement limit the freedom of action of the transferee, such a national rule must be limited in its duration. Otherwise, it would bind the transferee indefinitely.

5. It is consistent with Article 3(3) of the Directive if conditions of pay enjoyed by the transferred employees under the collective agreement with the transferor are replaced, in conformity with national law, by conditions of pay laid down in the collective agreement in force with the transferee after the expiry of the former collective agreement. A pay reduction – whether significant or otherwise – cannot influence this assessment.

6. However, the national court must examine whether the applicable national law provides for continuing effects in a situation such as the present. Article 3(3) of the Directive has to be interpreted as meaning that terms and conditions laid

down in a collective agreement to which such continuing effects apply constitute “terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement” so long as those employment relationships are not subject to a new collective agreement or new individual agreements are not concluded with the employees concerned.

7. Article 3(3) of the Directive does not prevent the transferee from applying to the transferred employees the transferee’s collective agreement two months after the transfer, if that collective agreement is made applicable in accordance with national law. However, Article 3 of the Directive precludes the possibility that transferred employees suffer a substantial loss of income, in comparison with their situation immediately prior to the transfer, because the duration of their service with the transferor is not sufficiently taken into account when their starting salary position at the transferee is determined and where the conditions for remuneration under the newly applicable collective agreement have regard inter alia to the length of service. In that determination the equivalent duration of service of those employees already in the service of the transferee must be taken into consideration. It is for the national court to examine whether the conditions of pay under the transferee’s collective agreement take due account of the length of service.

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4. For å ivareta de ansattes interesser kan en nasjonal regel gi en tariffavtale forlenget virkning for å opprettholde rammeverket som regulerer ansettelsesforholdet. I så tilfelle må det vurderes om en slik regel er i samsvar med direktivets hovedmål. Dette mål er å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom de ansattes og erververens interesser. Erververen må kunne foreta de justeringer og endringer som er nødvendige for å drive virksomheten videre. Siden forlengede virkninger som anvendes etter utløpet av en tariffavtale begrenser erververens handlefrihet, må en slik nasjonal regel ha begrenset varighet. Ellers ville erververen bli bundet på ubestemt tid.

5. Det er forenlig med direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 dersom lønnsvilkårene som gjelder for de overførte ansatte i henhold til overdragerens tariffavtale, i samsvar med nasjonal rett erstattes med lønnsvilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjelder hos erververen, etter at den førstnevnte tariffavtale er utløpt. En lønnsreduksjon – enten den er vesentlig eller ikke – kan ikke ha betydning for denne vurdering.

6. Den nasjonale domstol må imidlertid vurdere om gjeldende

nasjonal rett gir tariffavtalen ettervirkninger i en situasjon som den foreliggende. Direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 må tolkes slik at vilkår i en tariffavtale som får slike ettervirkninger, utgjør «arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale» så lenge de aktuelle ansettelsesforhold ikke er gjenstand for en ny tariffavtale, og det ikke er inngått nye individuelle avtaler med de berørte ansatte.

7. Direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 er ikke til hinder for at erververen kan anvende sin tariffavtale på de overførte ansatte to måneder etter overdragelsen, dersom tariffavtalen er gitt anvendelse i samsvar med nasjonal rett. Direktivet artikkel 3 er imidlertid til hinder for at de overførte ansatte kan påføres et vesentlig inntektstap sammenlignet med situasjonen umiddelbart forut for overdragelsen, som følge av at deres ansiennitet hos overdrageren ikke er blitt tilstrekkelig vektlagt ved deres lønnsmessige innplassering hos erververen, når lønnsvilkårene i den nye tariffavtale blant annet baserer seg på ansiennitet. Ved denne vurdering skal det tas hensyn til tilsvarende ansiennitet hos erververens eksisterende ansatte. Det er opp til den nasjonale domstol å vurdere om lønnsvilkårene i erververens tariffavtale tar tilbørlig hensyn til ansienniteten.

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18 December 2014*

(Directive 2001/23/EC – Transfer of undertakings – Collective agreements – Freedom to conduct a business)

In Case E-10/14,

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Eidsivating Court of Appeal (Eidsivating lagmannsrett), in the case of

Enes Deveci and Others

and

Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden,

concerning the interpretation of Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses,

THE COURT,




– Enes Deveci and Others (“the appellants” or “the transferred employees”), represented by Sigurd-Øyvind Kambestad, advokat, and Christen Horn Johannessen, advokat;

– Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden (“the defendant” or “the transferee”), represented by Frode Martin Toftevåg, advokat, and Bjørnar Alterskjær, advokat;

* Language of the request: Norwegian.

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Judgment

DOMSTOLENS DOM

18. desember 2014*

(Direktiv 2001/23/EF – Virksomhetsoverdragelse – Tariffavtaler – Frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet)

I sak E-10/14

ANMODNING til EFTA-domstolen i henhold til artikkel 34 i Avtalen mellom EFTA-statene om opprettelse av et Overvåkningsorgan og en Domstol fra Eidsivating lagmannsrett i en sak mellom

Enes Deveci m.fl.

og


om forståelsen av rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om ivaretakelse av arbeidstakernes rettigheter ved overdragelse av foretak, virksomheter eller deler av foretak eller virksomheter, avsier

DOMSTOLEN,

sammensatt av: Carl Baudenbacher, president og saksforberedende dommer, Per Christiansen og Páll Hreinsson, dommere,

justissekretær: Gunnar Selvik,

etter å ha tatt i betraktning de skriftlige innlegg inngitt på vegne av:

– Enes Deveci m.fl. («de ankende parter» eller «de overførte ansatte»), representert ved advokat Sigurd-Øyvind Kambestad og advokat Christen Horn Johannessen,

– Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden («ankemotparten» eller «erververen»), representert ved advokat Frode Martin Toftevåg og advokat Bjørnar Alterskjær,

* Språket i anmodningen om rådgivende uttalelse: norsk.

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– the Swedish Government, represented by Anna Falk, Director, Charlotta Meyer-Seitz, Deputy Director, Ulrika Persson, Emil Karlsson, Lars Swedenborg, Natacha Otte-Widgren, Legal Advisers, as well as Fredrik Sjövall, Special Adviser, and Karin Sparrman, Desk Officer, within the Legal Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agents;

– the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”), represented by Maria Moustakali, Officer, and Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Temporary Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents; and

– the European Commission (“the Commission”), represented by Johan Enegren, Member of its Legal Service, acting as Agent,

having heard oral argument of the appellants, represented by Christen Horn Johannessen and Nina Kroken, advokat; the defendant, represented by Bjørnar Alterskjær and Frode Martin Toftevåg; the Norwegian Government, represented by Ketil Bøe Moen, advokat, Office of the Attorney General (Civil Affairs); ESA, represented by Janne Tysnes Kaasin and Maria Moustakali; and the Commission, represented by Johan Enegren, at the hearing on 28 October 2014,


gives the following

JUDGMENT

I INTRODUCTION

1 Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS is a former subsidiary of Spirit Air Cargo Handling AB, itself wholly owned by a company belonging to the SAS Group. It was active in terminal operations and cargo handling. After a failed attempt to sell the Spirit Group of which Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS was a member, it was decided to transfer the business of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS to the defendant. The transfer of undertaking became effective on 1 March 2012.

2 The Norwegian collective bargaining system is a three-tier system. At the highest level there are basic agreements (tier one). These are supplemented by nationwide agreements applicable to certain industries or occupational groups (tier two). Finally, there are special agreements in

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Judgment

– Sveriges regjering, representert ved Anna Falk, Director, Charlotta Meyer-Seitz, Deputy Director, Ulrika Peersson, Emil Karlsson, Lars Swedenborg, Natacha Otte-Widgren, Legal Advisers, samt Fredrik Sjövall, Special Adviser, og Karin Sparman, Desk Officer, Legal Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, som partsrepresentanter,

– EFTAs overvåkningsorgan («ESA»), representert ved Maria Moustakali, Officer, og Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Temporary Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, som partsrepresentanter, og

– Europakommisjonen («Kommisjonen»), representert ved Johan Enegren, medlem av Kommisjonens juridiske tjeneste, som partsrepresentant,

etter å ha hørt muntlige innlegg fra de ankende parter, representert ved Christen Horn Johannessen og advokat Nina Kroken, ankemotparten, representert ved Bjørnar Alterskjær og Frode Martin Toftevåg, Norges regjering, representert ved advokat Ketil Bøe Moen, Regjeringsadvokaten, ESA, representert ved Janne Tysnes Kaasin og Maria Moustakali, og Kommisjonen, representert ved Johan Enegren, i rettsmøte 28. oktober 2014,

og med henvisning til rettsmøterapporten,

slik

DOM

I INNLEDNING

1 Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS er et tidligere datterselskap av Spirit Air Cargo Handling AB, som igjen er eid i sin helhet av et selskap tilhørende SAS-konsernet. Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS Det drev virksomhet innen terminaldrift og frakthåndtering. Etter et mislykket forsøk på å selge Spirit-konsernet, som Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS var en del av, ble det besluttet at virksomheten i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS skulle overdras til ankemotparten. Overdragelsen trådte i kraft 1. mars 2012.

2 Det norske tariffavtalesystem har tre nivåer. På det høyeste nivå er hovedavtalene (nivå én). Disse suppleres av landsdekkende overenskomster som gjelder for bestemte bransjer eller yrkesgrupper

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a particular legal entity (tier three). The system represents a hierarchy of agreements. Following the transfer of the undertaking, it is disputed in the case before the national court whether the transferred employees could be paid in accordance with the special agreements that applied from 1 May 2012 in the transferee’s undertaking.

II LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law

3 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16) (“the Directive”) was incorporated into Annex XVIII to the EEA Agreement at point 32d by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 159/2001 of 11 December 2001 (OJ 2002 L 65, p. 38, and EEA Supplement No 13, p. 22).

4 Article 3 of the Directive reads:

1. The transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee.

Member States may provide that, after the date of transfer, the transferor and the transferee shall be jointly and severally liable in respect of obligations which arose before the date of transfer from a contract of employment or an employment relationship existing on the date of the transfer.

2. Member States may adopt appropriate measures to ensure that the transferor notifies the transferee of all the rights and obligations which will be transferred to the transferee under this Article, so far as those rights and obligations are or ought to have been known to the transferor at the time of the transfer. A failure by the transferor to notify the transferee of any such right or obligation shall not affect the transfer of that right or obligation and the rights of any employees against the transferee and/or transferor in respect of that right or obligation.

3. Following the transfer, the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until the date of

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(nivå to). Endelig kompletteres systemet med særavtaler som inngås på foretaksnivå (nivå tre). Systemet bygger på et hierarki av avtaler. Saken for den nasjonale domstol gjelder om de overførte ansatte kunne avlønnes etter den særavtale som gjaldt fra 1. mai 2012 i erververens virksomhet.

II RETTSLIG BAKGRUNN

EØS-rett

3 Rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF av 12. mars 2001 om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om ivaretakelse av arbeidstakernes rettigheter ved overdragelse av foretak, virksomheter eller deler av foretak eller virksomheter (EFT 2001 L 82, s. 16) («direktivet») ble innlemmet i EØS-avtalens vedlegg XVIII i punkt 32d ved EØS-komiteens beslutning nr. 159/2001 av 11. desember 2001 (EFT 2002 L 65, s. 38, og EØS-tillegg nr.13, s. 22).

4 Direktivet artikkel 3 lyder:

1. Overdragerens rettigheter og forpliktelser i henhold til en arbeidsavtale eller et arbeidsforhold som gjelder på datoen for overdragelsen, skal som følge av overdragelsen overføres til erververen.

Medlemsstatene kan fastsette at overdrageren og erververen etter datoen for overdragelsen skal være solidarisk ansvarlige for forpliktelser som har oppstått før datoen for overdragelsen som følge av en arbeidsavtale eller et arbeidsforhold som forelå på datoen for overdragelsen.

2. Medlemsstatene kan vedta egnede tiltak for å sikre at overdrageren underretter erververen om alle rettigheter og forpliktelser som vil bli overdratt til erververen i henhold til denne artikkel, såfremt disse rettighetene og forpliktelsene er eller burde ha vært kjent for overdrageren på tidspunktet for overdragelsen. Dersom overdrageren unnlater å underrette erververen om en slik rettighet eller forpliktelse, skal dette ikke berøre overdragelsen av denne rettigheten eller forpliktelsen eller arbeidstakernes rettigheter overfor erververen og/eller overdrageren med hensyn til denne rettigheten eller forpliktelsen.

3. Etter overdragelsen skal erververen opprettholde de arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale på samme vilkår som gjaldt for overdrageren i

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termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement.

Member States may limit the period for observing such terms and conditions with the proviso that it shall not be less than one year.

National law

5 The Directive has been implemented in Norwegian law through Chapter 16 of the Act of 17 June 2005 No 62 relating to working environment, working hours and employment protection etc. (lov om arbeidsmiljø, arbeidstid og stillingsvern mv.) (“the Working Environment Act”).

6 Article 3(1) and (3) of the Directive has been implemented by subsections (1) and (2) of Section 16-2 (Pay and working conditions), which reads as follows:

(1) The rights and obligations of the former employer ensuing from the contract of employment or employment relationship in force on the date of transfer shall be transferred to the new employer. Claims pursuant to the first sentence may still be raised against the former employer.

(2) The new employer shall be bound by any collective pay agreement that was binding upon the former employer. This shall not apply if the new employer at the latest within three weeks after the date of transfer declares in writing to the trade union that the new employer does not wish to be bound. The transferred employees have nevertheless the right to retain the individual working conditions that follow from a collective pay agreement that was binding upon the former employer. This shall apply until this collective pay agreement expires or until a new collective pay agreement is concluded that is binding upon the new employer and the transferred employees.

7 The first sentence of subsection (1) reflects the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Directive and subsection (2) reflects the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive, albeit with certain addenda concerning the applicability of the collective agreement in force in the transferor’s undertaking.

8 Norway has not availed itself of the possibility of limiting the period for observing the terms and conditions applicable to the transferor as provided for in Article 3(3) of the Directive.

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Judgment

henhold til samme avtale, inntil den dato tariffavtalen sies opp eller utløper, eller en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller får anvendelse.

Medlemsstatene kan begrense tidsrommet for opprettholdelse av slike arbeidsvilkår, forutsatt at tidsrommet ikke er kortere enn ett år.

Nasjonal rett

5 Direktivet er innarbeidet i norsk lov ved lov 17. juni 2005 nr. 62 om arbeidsmiljø, arbeidstid og stillingsvern mv. («arbeidsmiljøloven») kapittel 16.

6 Direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 1 og 3 er innarbeidet ved arbeidsmiljøloven § 16-2 (Lønns- og arbeidsvilkår) første og andre ledd, som lyder slik:

(1) Tidligere arbeidsgivers rettigheter og plikter som følger av arbeidsavtale eller arbeidsforhold som foreligger på det tidspunkt overdragelsen finner sted, overføres til den nye arbeidsgiver. Krav etter første punktum kan fortsatt gjøres gjeldende overfor den tidligere arbeidsgiver.

(2) Ny arbeidsgiver blir bundet av tariffavtale som tidligere arbeidsgiver var bundet av. Dette gjelder ikke hvis ny arbeidsgiver senest innen tre uker etter overdragelsestidspunktet skriftlig erklærer overfor fagforeningen at ny arbeidsgiver ikke ønsker å bli bundet. De overførte arbeidstakerne har likevel rett til å beholde de individuelle arbeidsvilkår som følger av tariffavtale som den tidligere arbeidsgiver var bundet av. Dette gjelder inntil denne tariffavtalen utløper eller til det inngås ny tariffavtale som er bindende for den nye arbeidsgiver og de overførte arbeidstakere.

7 Første ledd første punktum gjenspeiler direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 1 første punktum, og andre ledd gjenspeiler direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 første ledd, men med visse tilføyelser vedrørende anvendelsen av tariffavtalen som gjelder i overdragerens foretak.

8 Norge har ikke benyttet seg av muligheten til å begrense perioden for overholdelse av vilkårene som får anvendelse for overdrager, som fastsatt i direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3.

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9 According to the first and second sentences of Section 16-2(2) of the Working Environment Act, the new employer is bound by the obligations stemming from the former employer’s collective agreements, unless the transferee notifies the other party to the collective agreement in accordance with requirements set out in that provision. If a new employer thus exercises its right to declare itself not bound, the general principles of Norwegian collective labour law apply. According to those principles, collective agreements do not pass from the transferor to the transferee in the case of a transfer of undertaking.

10 However, according to case law in Norway, the transferee may exceptionally be bound by the collective agreements entered into by the transferor if the transfer is deemed to be non-genuine. Whether a transfer is non-genuine is decided on the basis of a case by case assessment. Elements of the assessment are whether the transferee is an independent legal person, operations have been interrupted and the intention was to evade obligations stemming from a collective agreement.

11 The Norwegian system of collective agreements is based on a hierarchy of such agreements. Basic agreements are entered into by the general branches of employers’ confederations (i.e. the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (“NHO”)) and trade unions (such as the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (“LO”) and the Confederation of Vocational Unions (“YS”)). They regulate permanent and general matters between the parties. Those basic agreements are supplemented by nationwide agreements often applicable to a certain industry or occupational group. Finally, the system of collective agreements is completed by special agreements entered into at the level of an individual undertaking, laying down more specific rules (i.e. pay rates). The special agreements must always comply with the more general agreements, similar to the rule of lex superior.

12 The Norwegian Act of 27 January 2012 No 9 (lov om arbeidstvister) (“the Labour Disputes Act”) contains rules relating to collective agreements and their legal effects. Sections 4 and 5 of the Labour Disputes Act provide that a collective agreement is valid for a limited period of time and shall, as a rule, contain provisions concerning its date of expiry and period of notice.

13 According to the Labour Disputes Act, the period of notice is three months, although other periods of notice may be agreed. If notice of termination

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9 I henhold til arbeidsmiljøloven § 16-2 andre ledd første og andre punktum er den nye arbeidsgiver bundet av forpliktelsene i den tidligere arbeidsgivers tariffavtaler med mindre han underretter den annen part i tariffavtalen i samsvar med kravene fastsatt i denne bestemmelse. Dersom en ny arbeidsgiver således benytter sin adgang til å erklære seg ubundet, skal de generelle prinsipper i norsk kollektiv arbeidsrett få anvendelse. Av disse prinsipper følger at tariffavtaler ikke går over fra overdrager til erverver ved virksomhetsoverdragelser.

10 Dersom overdragelsen ikke anses reell, kan imidlertid erververen i henhold til rettspraksis i Norge unntaksvis bli bundet av de tariffavtaler som overdrager var bundet av. Hvorvidt en overdragelse ikke er reell, beror på en konkret vurdering i den enkelte sak. Elementer i vurderingen er om erververen er et selvstendig rettssubjekt, om det har vært avbrudd i driften og om hensikten har vært å unndra seg forpliktelser fastsatt i en tariffavtale.

11 Det norske tariffavtalesystem bygger på et hierarki av slike avtaler. Hovedorganisasjonene for arbeidsgiverne (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon («NHO»)) og fagforeningene (som Landsorganisasjonen i Norge («LO»), og Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund («YS»)), inngår hovedavtaler som regulerer varige og overordnede forhold mellom partene. Hovedavtalene suppleres av landsdekkende overenskomster som ofte gjelder for en bestemt bransje eller yrkesgruppe. Endelig kompletteres tariffavtalesystemet med særavtaler som inngås på foretaksnivå, og som fastsetter mer spesifikke regler (lønnssatser). Særavtalene må i alle tilfeller være i samsvar med de mer generelle avtaler, i tråd med «lex superior»-prinsippet.

12 Lov 27. januar 2012 nr. l («arbeidstvistloven») inneholder blant annet regler om tariffavtaler og deres rettsvirkninger. Etter arbeidstvistloven §§ 4 og 5 er en tariffavtale gyldig i et begrenset tidsrom, og skal som hovedregel ha en fastsatt utløpstid og oppsigelsesfrist.

13 Ifølge arbeidstvistloven er oppsigelsesfristen tre måneder, men andre oppsigelsesfrister kan avtales. Dersom varsel om oppsigelse av en

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of a collective agreement has not been given on time and in the correct manner before the expiry of the collective agreement period (the agreed period of validity of the collective agreement), the agreement is deemed, by law, to have been automatically renewed for a further period of one year. A collective agreement for which notice of termination has been given can either be renewed or amended through negotiations at the time of expiry (“revision of a collective agreement”). In formal terms, a new collective agreement is then entered into for a new period.

14 According to the national court, notice of termination of a collective agreement normally reflects a wish to make changes to the agreement and not a wish for the collective agreement to lapse. The negotiations and, if applicable, arbitration will often take time, so that a new agreement will not be in place on the date on which the old agreement should have expired pursuant to the notice of termination. In order to prevent difficulties arising in such an intervening period with no collective agreement, Section 8(3) of the Labour Disputes Act gives collective agreements a statutory continuing effect, or “after-effect”. Such continuing effects shall apply as long as a strike, lock-out or other industrial action cannot be lawfully instigated. From the submissions of the parties, the nature of these continuing effects and their scope appear to be disputed in the main proceedings before the national court.


15 The appellants are former employees of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS and either members of the Norwegian United Federation of Trade Unions (“Fellesforbundet”) or the Norwegian Union of Employees in Commerce and Offices (“Handel og Kontor i Norge”), both members of LO, or members of the trade union Parat, which is a member of YS. It appears that the defendants’ employees and the appellants, in other words the newly transferred employees, are represented by the same trade unions.

16 The defendant is a consortium wholly owned by three Nordic limited liability companies, themselves owned by a parent company, SAS AB, and part of the SAS Group. The defendant is a member of NHO and an industry employers’ confederation: Confederation of Norwegian Aviation Industries (“NHO Luftfart”).

17 The SAS Group’s main activities consist in the operation of passenger plane services and the provision of air cargo and other aviation-related

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tariffavtale ikke er gitt til rett tid og på rett måte innen tariffavtaleperiodens utløp (tariffavtalens avtalte varighet), anses avtalen etter loven å ha blitt fornyet automatisk for et tidsrom på ytterligere ett år. En oppsagt tariffavtale kan enten fornyes eller endres gjennom forhandlinger ved utløpstiden («revisjon av en tariffavtale»). Formelt sett inngås da en ny tariffavtale for en ny periode.

14 Ifølge den nasjonale domstol gjenspeiler en oppsigelse av en tariffavtale som regel et ønske om å foreta endringer i avtalen, og ikke et ønske om at tariffavtalen skal falle bort. Ofte vil forhandlingene og en eventuell mekling ta tid, slik at en ny avtale ikke vil være på plass på det tidspunkt den forrige avtale skulle ha utløpt i henhold til oppsigelsen. For å hindre at det oppstår vanskeligheter i en slik mellomliggende periode uten tariffavtale, gir arbeidstvistloven § 8 tredje ledd tariffavtaler en lovfestet ettervirkning. Denne forlengede virkning skal gjelde så lenge en streik, lockout eller annen arbeidskamp ikke lovlig kan iverksettes. Ut fra partenes innlegg synes arten og omfanget av denne forlengede virkning å være omtvistet i saken for den nasjonale domstol.

III FAKTUM OG SAKSGANG

15 De ankende parter er tidligere ansatte hos Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS og er dels medlemmer av Fellesforbundet eller Handel og Kontor i Norge, som begge er tilsluttet LO, og dels medlemmer i Parat, som er tilsluttet YS. Det synes som om ankemotpartens ansatte og de ankende parter representeres av de samme fagforeninger.

16 Ankemotparten er et konsortium som i sin helhet er eid av tre nordiske aksjeselskaper, som igjen er eid av et morselskap, SAS AB, og er en del av SAS-konsernet. Ankemotparten er medlem av NHO og av NHO Luftfart.

17 SAS-konsernets hovedaktivitet er passasjerflytrafikk, flyfrakttjenester og andre flyrelaterte tjenester. Disse tjenester utføres av forskjellige

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services. Those services are carried out by different companies within the group. The defendant is one of those companies. Until 2001, the defendant operated the SAS Group’s cargo services as a separate business under the name SAS Cargo.

18 The activities gradually evolved into a separate business, which was later contained in the wholly-owned subsidiary Spirit Air Cargo Handling AB, and finally became a separate sub-group of the SAS Group (“the Spirit Group”). The Spirit Group’s operational activities were run by different national subsidiaries, e.g. Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

19 An attempt to sell the Spirit Group was unsuccessful. It was therefore decided that the business of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS should be transferred back to the defendant’s business. The transfer of undertaking was implemented through the sale of the contents of the business of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS with effect from 1 March 2012. The employees’ employment relationships were transferred with effect from the same day.

20 Both the defendant and Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS are bound by a number of collective agreements. They were members of the same employer confederations (NHO/NHO Luftfart) on a national level, and bound by the same basic and nationwide collective agreements. However, those collective agreements were supplemented by third-tier special agreements on pay rates, which differed between the defendant and Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

21 In January 2012, the trade unions to which the appellants belong gave timely notice of termination in relation to the nationwide collective agreements. The expiry date was 31 March 2012.

22 After the transfer took place on 1 March 2012, the defendant continued to pay the employees who had been taken over from Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS in accordance with the rates stipulated in the special agreement for that company.

23 On 16 March 2012, the appellants’ trade unions received notification pursuant to the second sentence of Section 16-2(2) of the Working Environment Act. The SAS consortium informed the unions that it did not wish to be bound by the collective agreements that had applied in Spirit

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selskaper i konsernet. Ankemotparten er ett av disse selskap. Inntil 2001 drev ankemotparten SAS-konsernets flyfrakttjenester som et eget forretningsområde under navnet SAS Cargo.

18 Virksomheten utviklet seg etter hvert til et eget forretningsområde som senere ble innlemmet i et eget heleid datterselskap, Spirit Air Cargo Handling AB, og som til slutt ble et eget underkonsern i SAS-konsernet («Spirit-konsernet»). Spirit-konsernets operative virksomhet ble drevet av forskjellige nasjonale datterselskaper, for eksempel Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

19 Et forsøk på å selge Spirit-konsernet mislyktes. Det ble derfor besluttet at virksomheten i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS skulle overdras tilbake til ankemotpartens virksomhet. Virksomhetsoverdragelsen ble gjennomført ved at innholdet i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS ble solgt med virkning fra 1. mars 2012. Arbeidstakernes ansettelsesforhold ble overført med virkning fra samme dag.

20 Både ankemotparten og Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS er bundet av en rekke tariffavtaler. De var tilsluttet de samme arbeidsgiverorganisasjoner (NHO/NHO Luftfart) på nasjonalt plan, og var bundet av de samme hovedavtaler og landsdekkende overenskomster. Tariffavtalene var imidlertid supplert med lokale særavtaler om lønnssatser, som var forskjellige for ankemotparten og Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

21 I januar 2012 ble de landsdekkende overenskomster rettidig sagt opp av de ankende parters fagforeninger. Utløpsdatoen var 31. mars 2012.

22 Etter virksomhetsoverdragelsen 1. mars 2012 fortsatte ankemotparten å avlønne de ansatte som var overtatt fra Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS, i henhold til lønnssatsene i sistnevnte selskaps særavtale.

23 Den 16. mars 2012 mottok de ankende parters fagforeninger underretning i henhold til arbeidsmiljøloven § 16-2 andre ledd andre punktum. SAS-konsortiet informerte fagforeningene om at man ikke ønsket å være bundet av Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS’ særavtaler. Spørsmålet om

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Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. However, it appears to be disputed in the proceedings before the national court whether the special agreement that applied in Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS had been correctly terminated, e.g. by notification in the transferee’s letter of 16 March 2012. Moreover, it appears to be contested in the national proceedings how, in general, third-tier agreements are to be terminated under Norwegian law.

24 On 30 March 2012, the SAS consortium informed the transferred employees that they would be covered by the third-tier special agreement applying to the defendant. Accordingly, individual terms would be adjusted by 1 May 2012. As of that date, the employees in question were thus paid in accordance with the special agreement that applied in the defendant’s undertaking. It appears also to be disputed in the national proceedings whether the defendant was entitled to apply its special agreement to the transferred employees.

25 Pursuant to the current special agreement, the pay level in the defendant’s undertaking is on average between 4% and 8% lower than for corresponding employee categories in Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. Changes were made at the individual level in the magnitude of plus 3% to minus 11.5%. When the employees were assigned a grade in the applicable pay tables in the defendant’s undertaking, they were fully credited for their seniority and qualifications under their former employment relationship with Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

26 The appellants, 129 former employees of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS, did not accept the pay reduction, which resulted from the transfer to the new collective agreement. They sought an order before Øvre Romerike District Court (Øvre Romerike tingrett), requiring the defendant, inter alia, to continue to apply the higher pay rates, in accordance with the special agreement entered into by Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. By judgment of 18 November 2013, the District Court found in favour of the defendant.

27 That judgment was appealed to Eidsivating Court of Appeal. On 31 March 2014, the Court of Appeal decided to seek an Advisory Opinion from the Court and referred the following questions:

1. Is it consistent with Article 3(1), cf. Article 3(3), of Council Directive 2001/23/EC that the transferee undertaking assigns the individual employees covered by the transfer a place in a pay table set out in a collective agreement that applies in the transferee undertaking,

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særavtalen som gjaldt i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS var blitt gyldig oppsagt, for eksempel ved underretning i erververens brev av 16. mars 2012, synes imidlertid å være omtvistet i saken for den nasjonale domstol. Det synes videre å være omtvistet i saken for den nasjonale domstol hvordan særavtaler generelt kan bringes til opphør etter norsk rett.

24 Den 30. mars 2012 informerte SAS-konsortiet de overførte arbeidstakere om at de ville bli omfattet av ankemotpartens særavtale, og at individuelle vilkår således ville bli justert den 1. mai 2012. Fra og med denne dato ble de berørte ansatte følgelig avlønnet i henhold til den særavtale som gjaldt i ankemotpartens foretak. Det synes også å være omtvistet i saken for den nasjonale domstol om ankemotparten hadde rett til å anvende sin særavtale på de overførte ansatte.

25 I henhold til gjeldende særavtale ligger lønnsnivået i ankemotpartens foretak i snitt mellom 4 og 8 prosent lavere enn for tilsvarende kategorier av ansatte i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. Endringene på individnivå varierte mellom pluss 3 prosent og minus 11,5 prosent. Ved innplassering i gjeldende lønnstabeller i ankemotpartens foretak fikk de ansatte fullt ut godskrevet sin ansiennitet og kompetanse fra sitt tidligere ansettelsesforhold i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

26 De ankende parter, 129 tidligere ansatte i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS, aksepterte ikke lønnsreduksjonen som fulgte av overføringen til den nye tariffavtale. De tok ut stevning for Øvre Romerike tingrett og fremsatte blant annet krav om at ankemotparten måtte opprettholde det høyere lønnsnivå som var fastsatt i særavtalen inngått av Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. Ved tingrettens dom 18. november 2013 ble imidlertid ankemotparten frifunnet.

27 Dommen ble anket til Eidsivating lagmannsrett. Den 31. mars 2014 besluttet lagmannsretten å anmode EFTA-domstolen om en rådgivende uttalelse. Følgende spørsmål ble forelagt:

1. Er det forenlig med rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF artikkel 3 nr. 1, jf. nr. 3, at den ervervende virksomhet innordner den enkelte ansatte som omfattes av virksomhetsoverdragelsen, til en lønnstabell fastsatt i en

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with effect from a date after the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking has expired, even if this results in pay reduction for the individual employees?

2. Does the answer to Question 1 depend on whether the collective agreement that applied to the employees of the transferor was still in force when the transferee’s collective agreement was made applicable to the employees covered by the transfer of the undertaking?

3. Does the answer to Question 1 depend on whether the reduction in pay is significant or not?


IV THE QUESTIONS

Admissibility

29 The defendant, the Government of Sweden and the Commission contend that the second question appears to be hypothetical, as the collective agreement had expired before the date of transfer, and is therefore inadmissible.

30 It follows from well-established case law that where a national court or tribunal submits a question concerning the interpretation of EEA law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling. Questions concerning EEA law enjoy a presumption of relevance. However, the Court may not rule on a question referred by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EEA law sought is unrelated to the facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted (see Case E-9/14 Otto Kaufmann AG, judgment of 10 November 2014, not yet reported, paragraph 34, and case law cited).

31 In the present case, it seems clear from the national court’s request that the two nationwide collective agreements expired on 31 March 2012. However, with respect to the special local agreements, it follows from the

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gjeldende tariffavtale hos den ervervende virksomhet, fra et tidspunkt etter at tariffavtalen som gjaldt hos overdrageren er utløpt, selv om dette fører til en lønnsreduksjon for den enkelte ansatte?

2. Beror svaret i spørsmål 1 på om tariffavtalen som gjaldt for de ansatte hos overdrageren, fortsatt løper på tidspunktet erververens tariffavtale gis anvendelse for de ansatte som omfattes av virksomhetsoverdragelsen?

3. Beror svaret i spørsmål 1 på om lønnsreduksjonen er vesentlig eller ikke?

28 Det henvises til rettsmøterapporten for en mer utførlig redegjørelse for den rettslige ramme, de faktiske forhold, saksgangen og de skriftlige innlegg fremmet for EFTA-domstolen, som i det følgende bare vil bli nevnt eller drøftet så langt dette er nødvendig for domstolens begrunnelse.

IV SPØRSMÅLENE

Spørsmål om avvisning

29 Ankemotparten, Sveriges regjering og Kommisjonen anfører at det andre spørsmål synes å være hypotetisk, siden tariffavtalen var utløpt før overdragelsen, og at spørsmålet derfor må avvises.

30 Det følger av fast rettspraksis at EFTA-domstolen i prinsippet er forpliktet til å besvare spørsmål fra en nasjonal domstol som gjelder tolkningen av EØS-retten. Slike spørsmål nyter godt av en presumsjon om relevans. EFTA-domstolen kan imidlertid ikke besvare et spørsmål fra en nasjonal domstol når det er helt åpenbart at den etterspurte tolkning av EØS-retten ikke har noen relevans for sakens faktiske forhold eller formål, når spørsmålet er hypotetisk, eller når EFTA-domstolen ikke har de nødvendige faktiske eller rettslige opplysninger for å kunne gi et nyttig svar på spørsmålene den er forelagt (se sak E-9/14 Otto Kaufmann AG, dom 10. november 2014, ennå ikke i Sml. (avsnitt 34), og den rettspraksis det vises til der).

31 I den foreliggende sak synes det å fremgå klart av den nasjonale domstols anmodning at de to landsdekkende overenskomster utløp 31. mars 2012. Når det gjelder de to særavtaler, fremgår det derimot bare av

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request simply that the defendant declared itself not to be bound on 16 March 2012. From the submissions of the parties, it appears still to be disputed in the national proceedings whether this was sufficient to result in the expiry of that agreement.

32 Accordingly, the second question is not hypothetical and therefore admissible.

Substance

The first and third questions

33 By its first question, the national court asks, in essence, whether it is compatible with Article 3(3) of the Directive that the conditions of the collective agreement in the transferee’s undertaking are applied to the employees covered by the transfer after the expiry of the collective agreement in the transferor’s undertaking, even if this results in a pay reduction. By its third question, the referring court asks whether the answer to Question 1 depends on whether the reduction in pay is significant. The Court finds it appropriate to assess these questions together.


34 The appellants argue that the Directive aims, in essence, at preventing employees subject to a transfer from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer. They take the view that Article 3(1) and (3) of the Directive precludes the defendant from applying another local agreement, applicable within the transferee undertaking, after the expiry of the collective agreement entered into by the transferor. Under Norwegian law, formally expired collective agreements produce continuing effects until the agreement has been lawfully replaced by another collective agreement. In the view of the appellants, this continued effect is included within the Directive’s protection.

35 Even if this is not the case, the appellants argue that it follows from the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) in Case C-108/10 Scattolon [2011] ECR I-7491 that the Directive precludes the transferred employees from suffering a substantial loss solely as a result of the transfer. Consequently, the pay grades of these employees could not have been changed with effect from 1 May 2012. All the same, the

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anmodningen at ankemotparten erklærte seg ubundet den 16. mars 2012. Ut fra partenes innlegg synes det fremdeles å være omtvistet i saken for den nasjonale domstol om dette var tilstrekkelig til å bringe nevnte avtale til opphør.

32 Det andre spørsmål er følgelig ikke hypotetisk og kan derfor ikke avvises.

Realitetsbehandling

Det første og tredje spørsmål

33 Med sitt første spørsmål ønsker den nasjonale domstol i hovedsak å vite om det er forenlig med direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 at vilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjelder i erververens virksomhet anvendes på de ansatte som omfattes av overdragelsen, etter at tariffavtalen som gjaldt i overdragerens foretak er utløpt, selv om dette fører til en lønnsreduksjon. Med sitt tredje spørsmål ønsker den nasjonale domstol å vite om svaret på spørsmål 1 beror på om lønnsreduksjonen er vesentlig eller ikke. EFTA-domstolen finner det hensiktsmessig å besvare disse to spørsmål samlet.

Innlegg inngitt til EFTA-domstolen

34 De ankende parter anfører at direktivet i det vesentlige har til formål å hindre at overførte arbeidstakere settes i en mindre gunstig posisjon utelukkende som følge av overdragelsen. De er av den oppfatning at direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 1 og 3 er til hinder for at ankemotparten kan anvende en annen særavtale, som gjelder i erververens virksomhet, etter utløpet av den tariffavtale som var inngått av overdrager. Etter norsk rett skal formelt utløpte tariffavtaler ha ettervirkninger frem til avtalen er blitt gyldig erstattet av en annen tariffavtale. Etter de ankende parters oppfatning er denne ettervirkning en del av den beskyttelse direktivet gir.

35 Selv om dette ikke skulle være tilfellet, anfører de ankende parter at det følger av dommen avsagt av Den europeiske unions domstol («EU-domstolen») i sak C-108/10 Scattolon, Sml. 2011 s. I-7491, at direktivet er til hinder for at de overførte ansatte kan påføres et vesentlig tap utelukkende som følge av overdragelsen. Følgelig kunne ikke disse ansattes lønnstabeller ha blitt endret med virkning fra 1. mai 2012. De ankende parter erkjenner likevel at den forlengede beskyttelse etter

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appellants concede that the extended protection under the Scattolon test is not indefinite. The one-year period mentioned in Article 3(3) of the Directive and the considerations underlying the possibility of limiting the protection pursuant to that Article could serve as a guideline in this regard. The Scattolon test requires, in the view of the appellants, a global comparison between the conditions which the transferred employees enjoy under the collective agreement with the transferor and those laid down by the collective agreement in force with the transferee to determine whether the latter are, overall, less favourable than those applicable before the transfer.

36 The defendant argues with particular reference to the ECJ’s judgment in Case C-396/07 Juuri [2008] ECR I8883 that Article 3 of the Directive imposes no obligation on the transferee to continue to observe the terms and conditions deriving from a collective agreement beyond the date of expiry of that agreement. The Directive only provides for partial harmonisation and is intended to ensure that the employee is equally protected in his relations with the transferee as he was in his relationship with the transferor under the law of the EEA State in question. Hence, the question whether a transferee may apply its own collective agreements to the transferred employees is a question of national law, even if this results in a significant wage reduction for the individual employee.

37 Furthermore, the defendant argues that the ECJ’s judgment in Case C-328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, judgment of 11 September 2014, published electronically, is limited to providing for an extension of the protective effects of the Directive if and insofar as national law extends the protection of working conditions following from a collective agreement beyond its date of expiry.

38 At the hearing, the defendant claimed that, under Norwegian law, there are two types of “after-effects”. First, during the negotiation of new collective agreements between the same parties, old agreements are binding even if they have expired. That first possibility is, in view of the defendant, not at issue in the present case. A second type of after-effect is that the individual employment contracts will be interpreted as containing terms and conditions on matters such as wages resulting from collective agreements that previously applied, even though the collective agreement as such is no longer applicable. As a result, such continued effect of an

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Scattolon-testen ikke gjelder på ubestemt tid. Perioden på ett år som nevnes i direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3, og de hensyn som muligheten til å begrense beskyttelsen i henhold til nevnte artikkel er basert på, kan være retningsgivende i dette henseende. Etter de ankende parters oppfatning krever Scattolon-testen at det foretas en helhetlig sammenligning mellom vilkårene de overførte ansatte nyter i henhold til tariffavtalen som gjaldt hos overdrageren, og vilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjelder hos erververen, for å fastslå om de sistnevnte generelt er mindre gunstige enn dem som ble anvendt før overdragelsen.

36 Med henvisning til EU-domstolens dom i sak C-396/07 Juuri, Sml. 2008 s. I-8883, anfører ankemotparten at direktivet artikkel 3 ikke pålegger erververen å opprettholde arbeidsvilkår fastsatt i en tariffavtale etter avtalens utløpsdato. Direktivet tar bare sikte på en delvis harmonisering, og har til formål å sikre at den ansatte blir like godt beskyttet i forhold til erververen som vedkommende var i forhold til overdrageren etter den aktuelle EØS-stats rett. Spørsmålet om en erverver kan anvende sin egen tariffavtale på de overførte ansatte, må følgelig avgjøres i henhold til nasjonal rett, selv om dette medfører en vesentlig lønnsreduksjon for den enkelte ansatte.

37 Videre anfører ankemotparten at EU-domstolens dom i sak C-328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, dom 11. september 2014, publisert elektronisk, tillater utvidelse av direktivets beskyttende virkning bare dersom og i den utstrekning nasjonal rett utvider beskyttelsen av arbeidsvilkår som følger av en tariffavtale, ut over tariffavtalens utløpsdato.

38 I rettsmøtet hevdet ankemotparten at det i henhold til norsk rett finnes to forskjellige typer ettervirkninger. Den første går ut på at gamle avtaler er bindende selv etter at de er utløpt, så lenge forhandlingene om en ny avtale pågår mellom de samme parter. Denne første type er etter ankemotpartens syn ikke relevant i den foreliggende sak. En annen type ettervirkninger går ut på at de individuelle ansettelsesavtaler skal tolkes slik at de inneholder vilkår, blant annet vedrørende lønn, som følger av tidligere gjeldende tariffavtaler, også om tariffavtalen som sådan ikke lenger gjelder. Følgelig må en slik forlenget virkning av individuell art vike for alle andre motstridende

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individual nature has to yield to any other conflicting conditions, such as one that results from a collective agreement binding on the employees.

39 With respect to the appellants’ arguments, the defendant contends that the facts underlying Scattolon differ from those in the case at hand. In Scattolon, a new collective agreement was applied to the transferred employee, even though the original collective agreement was seemingly still in force. Moreover, in the view of the defendant, it follows from Scattolon (paragraphs 73 and 74) and Juuri that the Directive itself does not require the transferee to ensure the terms and conditions laid down in the transferor’s expired collective agreement. Finally, even in the Scattolon (paragraphs 82 and 83) situation, the ECJ did not question the application of the transferee’s collective agreement. Simply, the ECJ required that the length of service of the individual employee is fully taken into account, which is the case in the current proceedings.

40 Finally, the defendant claims that the Directive must be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) and in particular with the freedom to conduct a business enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter, which finds expression also in Article 3 of the Directive. Even though the Charter has not been incorporated into the EEA Agreement, it is, in the defendant’s view, relevant, in accordance with the principle of homogeneity, to the interpretation of the provision at hand, since in relation to that provision there are no differences in scope and purpose between EEA and EU law. In principle, the defendant continues, the interpretation sought by the appellants would result in the collective agreements of the transferor becoming the threshold from which subsequent collective agreements may only derogate in favour of the employees. This, however, would ignore the interests of the transferee with regard to saving costs and good industrial relations and therefore restrict a transferee’s freedom to conduct a business.

41 The Norwegian Government submits that the system provided for in Article 3(1) and (3) of the Directive is to balance the rights of the employees in the event of a transfer of undertaking with those of the new employer for a limited period. If the collective agreement has expired, the employees cannot rely directly on the terms and conditions specified in that agreement. However, given that the Directive only provides for partial harmonisation, the conditions for expiry and the conclusion of a

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vilkår, for eksempel et vilkår fastsatt i en tariffavtale som er bindende for de ansatte.

39 Med hensyn til de ankende parters anførsler gjør ankemotparten gjeldende at de underliggende faktiske forhold i Scattolon og den foreliggende sak er forskjellige. I Scattolon var en ny tariffavtale blitt anvendt på den overførte ansatte til tross for at den opprinnelige tariffavtale tilsynelatende fremdeles gjaldt. Etter ankemotpartens oppfatning følger det videre av Scattolon (avsnitt 73 og 74) og Juuri at direktivet i seg selv ikke krever at erververen opprettholder vilkårene som er fastsatt i overdragerens utløpte tariffavtale. Endelig anfører ankemotparten at EU-domstolen selv ikke i Scattolon-situasjonen (avsnitt 82 og 83) stilte spørsmål ved anvendeligheten av erververens tariffavtale. EU-domstolen krevde bare at det måtte tas fullt ut hensyn til den enkelte ansattes ansiennitet, hvilket ble gjort i den foreliggende sak.

40 Endelig hevder ankemotparten at direktivet må tolkes i samsvar med Den europeiske unions pakt om grunnleggende rettigheter («pakten»), nærmere bestemt friheten til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet, som er nedfelt i pakten artikkel 16, og som også kommer til uttrykk i direktivet artikkel 3. Selv om pakten ikke er innarbeidet i EØS-avtalen, mener ankemotparten at den i tråd med homogenitetsprinsippet er relevant for tolkningen av den foreliggende bestemmelse ettersom det ikke er noen forskjell mellom EØS-retten og EU-retten hva angår bestemmelsens virkeområde og formål. Ifølge ankemotparten ville tolkningen de ankende parter søker i prinsippet innebære at overdragerens tariffavtaler oppstiller en terskel som senere tariffavtaler bare kan avvike fra dersom det er til de ansattes fordel. Dette ville imidlertid medføre at erververens interesser knyttet til kostnadsbesparelser og til å sikre et godt forhold mellom partene i arbeidslivet ikke blir tatt hensyn til, og at det dermed legges en begrensning på erververens frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet.

41 Norges regjering anfører at systemet fastsatt i direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 1 og 3 har til formål å sikre en balanse mellom rettighetene til de ansatte og interessene til den nye arbeidsgiver i en begrenset periode i tilfelle av en virksomhetsoverdragelse. Dersom tariffavtalen er utløpt, kan ikke de ansatte direkte påberope seg vilkårene som er fastsatt i avtalen. Men ettersom direktivet bare tar sikte på en delvis harmonisering, må vilkårene for utløp og for inngåelse av en ny tariffavtale, samt de mulige

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new collective agreement, as well as the possible effects despite the expiry of a collective agreement are matters for national law. In the view of the Norwegian Government, that national autonomy was confirmed in Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund with respect to the effects that a collective agreement, after expiry, produces under national law until a new agreement applies to the employees transferred.

42 The Norwegian Government notes that in Scattolon the ECJ emphasised that the objective of the Directive is to prevent employees that are subject to a transfer from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer. In its view, this appears relevant to substantial reductions in wages for any number of reasons and not simply where this results from a failure to take proper account of an employee’s length of service.

43 The Norwegian Government fully acknowledges the Court’s settled case law that any provision of EEA law is to be interpreted in light of fundamental rights common to the EEA States and that the European Convention of Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are to be considered essential sources for determining the scope of these rights.

44 However, according to the Norwegian Government, an automatic application of the Charter, which is not incorporated in the EEA Agreement, would challenge State sovereignty and the principle of consent as the source of international legal obligations. In its view, the Charter provides, in some respects, for fundamental rights beyond those common to the EEA States. That is the case with regard to Article 16 of the Charter. The right to conduct business is not, at least not in such a general manner, reflected in other international legal instruments by which the EEA States are bound. That warrants caution in equalling the scope of Article 16 of the Charter with fundamental rights common to the EEA States.

45 The Swedish Government observes that the wording of Article 3(3) of the Directive suggests, in principle, that there is an obligation on the transferee to observe the collective agreements concluded by the transferor. However, it follows from the wording of that provision that the obligation lasts only until the expiry of the collective agreement concerned. Were Article 3(3) of the Directive to be interpreted differently, the transferee

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virkninger etter utløpet av en tariffavtale, reguleres av nasjonal rett. Norges regjerings syn er at denne nasjonale autonomi ble bekreftet i Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund hva angår virkningene etter nasjonal rett av en utløpt tariffavtale frem til en ny avtale blir gjeldende for de overførte ansatte.

42 Norges regjering peker på at EU-domstolen i Scattolon understreket at direktivets formål er å hindre at overførte arbeidstakere settes i en mindre gunstig posisjon utelukkende som følge av overdragelsen. Etter Norges regjerings oppfatning synes dette å være relevant for vesentlige lønnsreduksjoner av en rekke årsaker, og ikke bare der dette skyldes at en ansatts ansiennitet ikke er blitt tilstrekkelig vektlagt.

43 Norges regjering anerkjenner fullt ut EFTA-domstolens faste rettspraksis om at enhver bestemmelse i EØS-retten må tolkes i lys av de grunnleggende rettigheter som er felles for EØS-statene, og at Den europeiske menneskerettighetskonvensjon og Den europeiske menneskerettighetsdomstols rettspraksis skal anses som primære kilder når det gjelder å fastslå anvendelsesområdet for disse grunnleggende rettigheter.

44 Ifølge Norges regjering ville imidlertid en automatisk anvendelse av pakten, som ikke er innarbeidet i EØS-avtalen, rokke ved statenes suverenitet og prinsippet om samtykke som grunnlag for internasjonale rettslige forpliktelser. Etter Norges regjerings oppfatning gir pakten i visse henseender grunnleggende rettigheter som går lenger enn dem som er felles for EØS-statene. Dette er tilfelle for pakten artikkel 16. Retten til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet gjenspeiles ikke, eller i det minste ikke i så generell forstand, i andre internasjonale rettsakter som EØS-statene er bundet av. Følgelig kan virkeområdet til pakten artikkel 16 ikke uten videre likestilles med grunnleggende rettigheter som er felles for EØS-statene.

45 Sveriges regjering anfører at ordlyden i direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 tilsier at det i prinsippet foreligger en forpliktelse for erververen til å overholde tariffavtaler inngått av overdrageren. Det følger imidlertid av bestemmelsens ordlyd at forpliktelsen bare varer frem til utløpet av den aktuelle tariffavtale. Dersom direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 skulle tolkes på en annen måte, ville erververen bli bundet på ubestemt tid av tariffavtaler

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would be bound indefinitely by collective agreements whose terms it could not affect. That would reduce contractual freedom to the point where it would adversely affect the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business. Moreover, the perpetuation of expired collective agreements would make it impossible for the transferee to apply, in a non-discriminatory manner, the terms of a collective agreement to transferred and non-transferred employees alike.

46 The Swedish Government submits further that the ECJ’s judgment in Scattolon does not establish a general rule concerning the interpretation of the Directive but stems from the very specific circumstances of the case. The judgment applies to situations where the collective agreement applicable was immediately replaced upon transfer and the qualifications of the employees, such as length of service, were not properly taken into account after the transfer, leading to a substantial reduction in the remuneration of the employees concerned. Thus, Scattolon supports the view that the Directive aims at avoiding employees being placed, solely by reason of a transfer to another employer, in an unfavourable position compared to that which they previously enjoyed.

47 By contrast, the Swedish Government argues that in a situation, such as in the case at hand, where the transferred employees no longer enjoy rights under a previously applicable agreement, due to the fact that this agreement has expired, the loss of their right to a particular salary is not directly linked to the transfer, but to the expiry of the collective agreement. In such a situation, the Swedish Government adds, the findings in Juuri are relevant.

48 In ESA’s view, it follows from established case law that the Directive, while not seeking full harmonisation, strives to ensure a fair balance between the interests of transferred employees and the interests of the transferee undertaking.

49 Pursuant to the wording of Article 3(3) of the Directive, the obligation on the transferee to obey the terms and conditions of the collective agreements in force with the transferor ends when those collective agreements expire. However, the Directive does not harmonise the conditions under which an existing collective agreement expires nor does it harmonise how another collective agreement enters into force or is made applicable.

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han ikke selv har kunnet påvirke. Dette ville redusere avtalefriheten i en slik grad at selve kjernen i erververens frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet ville bli rammet. Dersom utløpte tariffavtaler skulle gis bestående gyldighet, ville dette dessuten gjøre det umulig for erververen å anvende vilkårene i en tariffavtale på overførte og ikke-overførte ansatte på en måte som ikke innebærer forskjellsbehandling.

46 Sveriges regjering anfører videre at EU-domstolens dom i Scattolon ikke etablerer noen generell regel for tolkningen av direktivet, men har sitt utspring i sakens meget spesielle omstendigheter. Dommen gjelder situasjoner der den gjeldende tariffavtale erstattes umiddelbart etter overdragelsen, og der de ansattes kvalifikasjoner, herunder ansiennitet, ikke blir tilstrekkelig vektlagt etter overdragelsen, med en vesentlig lønnsreduksjon som følge for de berørte ansatte. Følgelig understøtter Scattolon-dommen oppfatningen om at direktivet søker å forhindre at ansatte settes i en mindre gunstig posisjon enn tidligere, utelukkende som følge av overføring til en annen arbeidsgiver.

47 I en situasjon som i den foreliggende sak, der de overførte ansatte ikke lenger nyter rettigheter i henhold til en tidligere gjeldende tariffavtale fordi den er utløpt, anfører Sveriges regjering derimot at de ansattes tap av retten til en bestemt lønn ikke er direkte forbundet med overdragelsen, men med tariffavtalens utløp. I en slik situasjon er Juuri-dommen relevant, ifølge Sveriges regjering.

48 Etter ESAs oppfatning følger det av fast rettspraksis at direktivet ikke tar sikte på en full harmonisering, men like fullt har til formål å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom de overførte ansattes og erververens interesser.

49 Av ordlyden i direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 følger det at erververens forpliktelse til å overholde vilkårene i gjeldende tariffavtaler som er inngått av overdrageren, faller bort når tariffavtalene utløper. Direktivet harmoniserer imidlertid ikke vilkårene for utløp av en eksisterende tariffavtale, og det harmoniserer heller ikke hvordan en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller gis anvendelse.

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50 With reference to Scattolon (paragraph 75), ESA observes that national rules must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the Directive. Due account has to be taken of factors such as the length of service, education and type of experience affecting the calculation of remuneration that the employee receives in the transferee’s undertaking. Provided that national rules are interpreted in light of the purpose of the Directive, ESA takes the view that the conditions of a collective agreement in a transferee undertaking may be applied to the transferred employees, even if this results in a reduction in pay.

51 With regard to the third question, ESA emphasises that a significant reduction in remuneration may entail a substantial change in working conditions within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Directive. Thus, if the employment relationship is terminated because of this change in working conditions, Article 4(2) imposes responsibility for this termination on the employer, the consequences of which have to be determined by national law. Therefore, Article 4(2) limits the employer’s discretion to adjust working conditions to the detriment of the transferred employees. In response to a question posed by the Court, ESA clarified at the hearing that this Article is to be understood as a source of inspiration.

52 At the hearing, ESA also submitted that, in accordance with case law, the EEA Agreement has to be interpreted in light of fundamental rights. The right to conduct a business is safeguarded in the EEA irrespective of the Charter’s provisions. One of the main objectives of the EEA Agreement is to contribute to trade liberalisation and to the fullest possible realisation of the four freedoms, for which the right to conduct a business is an indispensable prerequisite. However, the Charter and Article 16 thereof do not seem to provide any additional guidance in the interpretation of the Directive and in answering the questions of the national court.

53 The Commission submits that after the transfer the SAS consortium was obliged to observe the terms and conditions resulting from the agreement at issue in the national proceedings only until the date of its expiry of 31 March 2012. This interpretation results from the fact that the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive cannot override the intentions of the parties to a collective agreement as expressed therein. Thus, if the parties have limited the enjoyment of certain rights guaranteed by an agreement to a particular date, Article 3(3) cannot impose an obligation on

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50 Med henvisning til Scattolon (avsnitt 75) bemerker ESA at nasjonale regler må tolkes i lys av direktivets formål. Det må tas behørig hensyn til faktorer som ansiennitet, utdanning og erfaring, som påvirker beregningen av lønnen den ansatte mottar i erververens virksomhet. Under forutsetning av at nasjonale regler tolkes i lys av direktivets formål, er ESA av den oppfatning at vilkårene i en tariffavtale i en ervervende virksomhet kan anvendes på de overførte ansatte selv om dette medfører en lønnsreduksjon.

51 Når det gjelder det tredje spørsmål, understreker ESA at en betydelig lønnsreduksjon kan innebære en vesentlig endring i arbeidsvilkårene etter direktivet artikkel 4 nr. 2. Dersom ansettelsesforholdet opphører som følge av denne endring i arbeidsvilkårene, fastsetter artikkel 4 nr. 2 at arbeidsgiveren skal anses som ansvarlig for opphøret, og konsekvensene av dette beror på nasjonal rett. Dermed begrenser artikkel 4 nr. 2 arbeidsgiverens skjønnsmyndighet til å justere arbeidsvilkårene til ugunst for de overførte ansatte. Som svar på et spørsmål fra EFTA-domstolen presiserte ESA i rettsmøtet at denne bestemmelse er å forstå som en inspirasjonskilde.

52 I rettsmøtet anførte ESA også at EØS-avtalen i henhold til rettspraksis skal tolkes i lys av de grunnleggende rettigheter. Retten til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet er sikret i EØS uavhengig av bestemmelsene i pakten. Et av EØS-avtalens hovedmål er å bidra til handelsliberalisering og at de fire friheter blir gjennomført i størst mulig grad; retten til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet er en ufravikelig forutsetning for å oppnå dette mål. Pakten og dens artikkel 16 synes imidlertid ikke å gi noen ytterligere veiledning med hensyn til hvordan direktivet skal tolkes eller spørsmålene fra den nasjonale domstol besvares.

53 Kommisjonen anfører at SAS-konsortiet etter overdragelsen var forpliktet til å overholde vilkårene i avtalen den nasjonale tvist gjelder, men bare frem til avtalens utløpsdato, 31. mars 2012. Denne tolkning bygger på at direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 første ledd ikke kan tilsidesette tariffavtalepartenes intensjoner slik disse er uttrykt i avtalen. Dersom partene har fastsatt at visse rettigheter i en avtale bare skal gjelde frem til en bestemt dato, kan ikke artikkel 3 nr. 3 pålegge erververen

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the transferee to observe those working conditions after that specific date. Should the relevant collective agreements that applied in the transferor’s undertaking produce continuing effects as a matter of national law, the judgment in Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund would be of relevance.

54 The Commission argues that Scattolon does not support an alternative interpretation of the Directive. Moreover, it is not disputed in the present case that the transferred employees were fully credited for their seniority and qualifications, unlike the situation in Scattolon.

55 The Commission submits further that it is for the national court to decide whether the special agreements applicable to the employees transferred had expired for the purposes of Article 3(3) of the Directive. Finally, on the question of the impact of the Charter in the case at hand, the Commission notes that the ECJ found in Case C426/11 Alemo-Herron and Others, judgment of 18 July 2013, published electronically, that Article 3 of the Directive must be interpreted in accordance with Article 16 of the Charter.


56 By its first and third questions, the referring court seeks guidance on whether it is consistent with Article 3(3) of the Directive that terms and conditions of pay specified in the collective agreement applicable in the transferee’s undertaking are applied to the transferred employees after the collective agreement applicable in the transferor’s undertaking has expired, even if this results in a significant reduction in pay.

57 The Directive is intended to achieve partial harmonisation and not to establish a uniform level of protection within its scope throughout the EEA. The Directive does however strive to ensure a fair balance between the interests of transferred employees and of the transferee undertaking (see Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, cited above, paragraph 29, and case law cited). Thus, the Directive can only be relied on to ensure that employees are protected in their relation to the transferee to the same extent they were in their relation to the transferor under the legal rules of the EEA State concerned (see, to that effect, Case E-2/04 Rasmussen [2004] EFTA Ct. Rep. 57, paragraph 23).

58 Under Article 3(3) of the Directive, the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in a collective agreement on the same

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å opprettholde arbeidsvilkårene etter denne dato. Dersom de relevante tariffavtaler som gjaldt hos overdrageren får forlenget virkning i henhold til nasjonal rett, vil dommen i Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund være relevant.

54 Kommisjonen anfører at Scattolon ikke støtter en annen tolkning av direktivet. Videre er det i den foreliggende sak ubestridt at de overførte ansatte fikk godskrevet sin ansiennitet og kompetanse fullt ut, til forskjell fra situasjonen i Scattolon.

55 Kommisjonen anfører videre at det er opp til den nasjonale domstol å avgjøre om særavtalene som gjaldt for de overførte ansatte var utløpt i henhold til direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3. Når det gjelder spørsmålet om betydningen av pakten for den foreliggende sak, anfører Kommisjonen endelig at EU-domstolen i sak C426/11 Alemo-Herron m.fl., dom 18. juli 2013, publisert elektronisk, fant at direktivet artikkel 3 må tolkes i samsvar med pakten artikkel 16.

Rettens bemerkninger

56 Med sitt første og tredje spørsmål søker den anmodende domstol veiledning med hensyn til om det er forenlig med direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 at lønnsvilkårene i tariffavtalen i erververens virksomhet anvendes på de overførte ansatte etter at tariffavtalen som gjaldt i overdragerens foretak er utløpt, selv om dette fører til en vesentlig lønnsreduksjon.

57 Direktivet tar bare sikte på en delvis harmonisering, og har ikke til formål å etablere et ensartet beskyttelsesnivå på sitt virkeområde i EØS. Direktivet søker imidlertid å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom de overførte ansattes og erververens interesser (se Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, som omtalt over (avsnitt 29), og den rettspraksis det vises til der). Direktivet skal dermed bare sikre at ansatte gis samme grad av beskyttelse i sitt forhold til erververen som de hadde i sitt forhold til overdrageren etter rettsreglene i den aktuelle EØS-stat (se i denne retning sak E-2/04 Rasmussen, Sml. 2004 s. 57 (avsnitt 23)).

58 Etter direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 skal erververen opprettholde arbeidsvilkår i en tariffavtale på de samme vilkår som gjaldt for overdrageren i henhold til

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terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement.

59 If conditions of pay enjoyed by the transferred employees under the collective agreement with the transferor are replaced with conditions of pay laid down by the collective agreement in force with the transferee only after the expiry of the former agreement, the loss of the entitlement to a particular salary is not linked to the transfer, but to the expiry of the collective agreement. The Directive safeguards employees’ rights and obligations in force on the day of the transfer. It is not intended to protect mere expectations to rights and, therefore, hypothetical advantages flowing from future changes to collective agreements (compare Case C-499/04 Werhof [2006] ECR I-2397, paragraph 29). The issue of whether the application of new conditions results in a pay reduction – whether significant or not – can therefore have no influence on the assessment under the Directive.

60 However, should the referring court find that national law provides for continuing effects after the expiry of the collective agreement, the issue must be examined further.

61 Article 3(3) of the Directive does not prescribe the application of a collective agreement as such but is related to its terms and conditions, governing matters such as pay.

62 It follows that, in principle, the rates of pay put in place by a collective agreement fall within the scope of Article 3(3) of the Directive. This applies whether or not those conditions are applicable to the persons concerned by virtue of the collective agreement as such or a national rule maintaining effects of a collective agreement after its expiration. It is sufficient that such terms and conditions have been put in place by a collective agreement and effectively bind the transferor and the employees transferred (compare Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, cited above, paragraph 25). However, given the limited level of harmonisation, the scope of protection is defined by national law and cannot be extended by Article 3(3) of the Directive.

63 In the interest of the employees, a national rule may give continued effects to a collective agreement in order to avoid a rupture of the framework

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samme avtale, frem til den dato tariffavtalen sies opp eller utløper, eller en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller får anvendelse.

59 Dersom lønnsvilkårene som gjelder for de overførte ansatte i henhold til overdragerens tariffavtale, erstattes med lønnsvilkårene i tariffavtalen hos erververen først etter at førstnevnte avtale er utløpt, er tapet av retten til en bestemt lønn ikke direkte forbundet med overdragelsen, men med tariffavtalens utløp. Direktivet ivaretar de rettigheter og forpliktelser for ansatte som gjelder på datoen for overdragelsen. Det har ikke til formål å beskytte rene forventninger om rettigheter, og følgelig heller ikke hypotetiske fordeler som knytter seg til fremtidige endringer i tariffavtaler (jf. sak C-499/04 Werhof, Sml. 2006 s. I-2397 (avsnitt 29)). Spørsmålet om anvendelsen av nye vilkår fører til en lønnsreduksjon – enten denne er vesentlig eller ikke – kan derfor ikke ha noen betydning for vurderingen etter direktivet.

60 Skulle den anmodende domstol derimot finne at tariffavtalen har ettervirkninger i henhold til nasjonal rett etter avtalens utløp, må spørsmålet vurderes nærmere.

61 Direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 krever ikke at en tariffavtale som sådan skal anvendes, men knytter seg til tariffavtalens vilkår, blant annet om lønn.

62 Følgelig er lønnen som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale, i prinsippet omfattet av direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3. Dette gjelder uavhengig av om disse vilkår får anvendelse for de berørte personer i kraft av tariffavtalen som sådan eller i kraft av en nasjonal regel som opprettholder virkningen av en tariffavtale etter avtalens utløp. Det er tilstrekkelig at slike vilkår er fastsatt i en tariffavtale og faktisk er bindende for overdrageren og de overførte ansatte (jf. Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, som omtalt over (avsnitt 25)). Men siden harmoniseringen er begrenset, må beskyttelsens omfang fastlegges av nasjonal rett og kan ikke utvides av direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3.

63 For å ivareta de ansattes interesser kan en nasjonal regel gi en tariffavtale forlenget virkning for å opprettholde rammeverket som regulerer

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governing the employment relationship. In that case, it must be assessed whether such a rule complies with the main objective of the Directive. That objective is to ensure a fair balance between the interests of the employees and those of the transferee. The transferee must be in a position to make adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations (compare, to that effect, Alemo-Herron and Others, cited above, paragraph 25). Since continued effects applicable after the expiration of a collective agreement limit the freedom of action of the transferee, such a national rule must be limited in its duration. Otherwise, it would bind the transferee indefinitely.

64 The Court finds no reason to address the question of Article 16 of the Charter. The EEA Agreement has linked the markets of the EEA/EFTA States to the single market of the European Union. The actors of a market are, inter alia, undertakings. The freedom to conduct a business lies therefore at the heart of the EEA Agreement and must be recognised in accordance with EEA law and national law and practices.

65 In these circumstances, the answer to the first and third questions must be that it is consistent with Article 3(3) of the Directive if conditions of pay enjoyed by the transferred employees under the collective agreement with the transferor are replaced, in conformity with national law, by conditions of pay laid down in the collective agreement in force with the transferee after the expiry of the former collective agreement. A pay reduction – whether significant or otherwise – cannot influence this assessment.

66 However, the national court must examine whether the applicable national law provides for continuing effects in a situation such as the present. Article 3(3) of the Directive has to be interpreted as meaning that terms and conditions laid down in a collective agreement to which such continuing effects apply constitute “terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement” so long as those employment relationships are not subject to a new collective agreement or new individual agreements are not concluded with the employees concerned.

The second question

67 By its second question, the national court asks, in essence, whether it is compatible with Article 3(1) and (3) of the Directive that the conditions of the collective agreements in the transferee’s undertaking are applied to the

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ansettelsesforholdet. I så tilfelle må det vurderes om en slik regel er i samsvar med direktivets hovedformål. Dette formål er å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom de ansattes og erververens interesser. Erververen må kunne foreta de justeringer og endringer som er nødvendige for å drive virksomheten videre (jf. Alemo-Herron m.fl., som omtalt over (avsnitt 25)). Siden forlengede virkninger som anvendes etter utløpet av en tariffavtale begrenser erververens handlefrihet, må en slik nasjonal regel ha begrenset varighet. Ellers ville erververen bli bundet på ubestemt tid.

64 EFTA-domstolen ser ingen grunn til å gå inn på spørsmålet om anvendelse av pakten artikkel 16. EØS-avtalen har knyttet EØS/EFTA-statenes markeder til det felles marked i Den europeiske union. Aktørene i et marked er blant annet foretak. Friheten til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet står derfor i kjernen av EØS-avtalen, og må anerkjennes i samsvar med EØS-retten og nasjonal rett og praksis.

65 Under disse omstendigheter må svaret på det første og tredje spørsmål bli at det er forenlig med direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 dersom lønnsvilkårene som gjelder for de overførte ansatte i henhold til overdragerens tariffavtale, i samsvar med nasjonal rett erstattes med lønnsvilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjelder hos erververen, etter at den førstnevnte tariffavtale er utløpt. En lønnsreduksjon – enten den er vesentlig eller ikke – kan ikke ha betydning for denne vurdering.

66 Den nasjonale domstol må imidlertid vurdere om gjeldende nasjonal rett gir tariffavtalen ettervirkninger i en situasjon som den foreliggende. Direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 må tolkes slik at vilkår i en tariffavtale som får slike ettervirkninger, utgjør «arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale» så lenge de aktuelle ansettelsesforhold ikke er gjenstand for en ny tariffavtale, og det ikke er inngått nye individuelle avtaler med de berørte ansatte.

Det andre spørsmål

67 Med sitt andre spørsmål ønsker den nasjonale domstol i hovedsak å vite om det er forenlig med direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 1 og 3 at vilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjelder i erververens virksomhet anvendes på de ansatte som omfattes av overdragelsen, selv om dette fører til en

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employees covered by the transfer, even if this results in pay reduction, at a time when the collective agreement that applied to the employees of the transferor is still in force.


68 The appellants submit that the collective agreement that is applicable in the transferor’s undertaking can only be replaced by applying the procedures provided for under the Directive and Norwegian law, as Norway has not limited the period of protection under Article 3(3) of the Directive. However, in the view of the appellants, the procedure applied by the defendant to replace the collective agreement’s terms and conditions was in line neither with Norwegian law nor with the Directive.

69 The appellants submit further that even if the replacement was lawful and continuing effects were not protected under the Directive, the protection of employees provided for in Scattolon did not permit the replacement of the collective agreement’s terms and conditions in the manner and at the time the defendant did so in the present case.

70 The Norwegian Government submits that if the collective agreement was still in force, at least two issues remain. The first is whether the employees are bound by this new collective agreement applied by the transferee. That must be decided under national law. The second issue is whether the employees are protected against substantially lower wages in the collective agreement applicable in the transferee’s undertaking. That depends on the interpretation of Scattolon and whether there has been a substantial reduction of wages solely as a result of the transfer. Were Scattolon to be seen as relevant, the national court would have to make the assessment based on all the circumstances of the case.

71 According to ESA, there are two aspects to the second question, as it concerns both the conditions for the application of another agreement and the content of such an agreement.

72 ESA contends that, if the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking is still in force, it follows from the wording of Article 3(3) of the Directive that one of the alternative conditions mentioned therein will, when fulfilled, end the obligation of the transferee to observe the terms and conditions of the collective agreement that applied in the

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lønnsreduksjon, på et tidspunkt der tariffavtalen som gjaldt for de ansatte hos overdrageren, fremdeles er gjeldende.

Innlegg inngitt til EFTA-domstolen

68 De ankende parter anfører at siden Norge ikke har valgt å begrense beskyttelsesperioden i henhold til direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3, kan tariffavtalen som gjelder i overdragerens foretak, bare erstattes ved å bruke fremgangsmåtene fastsatt i direktivet og i norsk lovgivning. Etter de ankende parters oppfatning var imidlertid fremgangsmåten ankemotparten brukte for å erstatte vilkårene i tariffavtalen, verken i samsvar med norsk lovgivning eller med direktivet.

69 De ankende parter anfører videre at selv om erstatningen skulle være lovlig og ettervirkningene ikke var beskyttet i henhold til direktivet, var de ansattes beskyttelse slik denne er angitt i Scattolon til hinder for at vilkårene i tariffavtalen kunne erstattes på den måte og på det tidspunkt ankemotparten gjorde dette i den foreliggende sak.

70 Norges regjering anfører at dersom tariffavtalen fremdeles gjaldt, er det minst to spørsmål som gjenstår å besvare. Det første er om de ansatte er bundet av den nye tariffavtale som gjelder hos erververen. Dette må avgjøres etter nasjonal rett. Det andre spørsmål er om de ansatte er beskyttet mot vesentlig lavere lønn etter tariffavtalen som gjelder i erververens foretak. Dette beror på tolkningen av Scattolon og om det har funnet sted en vesentlig lønnsreduksjon utelukkende som følge av overdragelsen. Dersom Scattolon-dommen anses relevant, vil den nasjonale domstol måtte foreta vurderingen på grunnlag av alle sakens omstendigheter.

71 Ifølge ESA berører det andre spørsmål to aspekter, siden det gjelder både vilkårene for anvendelse av en annen avtale og innholdet i en slik avtale.

72 ESA hevder at dersom tariffavtalen som gjaldt i overdragerens virksomhet fortsatt løper, følger det av ordlyden i direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 at når ett av de alternative vilkår som der er angitt er oppfylt, vil erververens forpliktelse til å overholde vilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjaldt i overdragerens foretak,

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transferor undertaking. The Directive does not rank the alternatives but presents them as equal in value and effect.

73 As the Directive harmonises neither the conditions under which an existing collective agreement expires nor the manner in which another collective agreement enters into force or is made applicable, it is for national law to regulate such situations.

74 Hence, ESA continues, if the national rules for replacing the collective agreement applicable in the transferor’s undertaking by the agreement applicable in the transferee’s undertaking are fulfilled, the conditions of the collective agreement applicable in the transferee undertaking will apply and a reduction in pay will be possible. The same conclusion must be reached if the national rules governing the replacement of an existing collective agreement by a new collective agreement are fulfilled. However, if the national rules governing the replacement of collective agreements are not fulfilled, the terms and conditions of the existing collective agreement will continue to apply after the transfer.

75 In light of the submissions made at the hearing by the parties to the national proceedings, the Commission acknowledges that there seems to be disagreement whether the collective agreements at issue had expired for the purposes of Article 3(3) of the Directive. This is a matter for the national court to decide. If the collective agreement had not expired, it appears that the answer to the second question lies more in the direction of Scattolon.


76 The first aspect of this question concerns the conditions for the application of another collective agreement pursuant to Article 3(3) of the Directive. The second aspect concerns the conditions for the application of the collective agreement applicable in the transferee’s undertaking two months after the transfer, if said application leads to a pay reduction for the transferred employees.

77 Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive, the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in a collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement. Those alternatives under the Directive are equal in value and effect.

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falle bort. Direktivet rangerer ikke alternativene, men presenterer dem som likeverdige med hensyn til vekt og virkning.

73 Siden direktivet ikke harmoniserer vilkårene for en eksisterende tariffavtales utløp, og det heller ikke harmoniserer hvordan en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller gis anvendelse, må slike situasjoner reguleres av nasjonal rett.

74 Følgelig mener ESA at dersom de nasjonale vilkår for å erstatte den gjeldende tariffavtale i overdragerens foretak med avtalen i erververens foretak er overholdt, skal vilkårene i tariffavtalen i erververens foretak få anvendelse, og en lønnsreduksjon er da mulig. Konklusjonen må bli den samme dersom de nasjonale vilkår for å erstatte en eksisterende tariffavtale med en ny tariffavtale er overholdt. Dersom de nasjonale vilkår for å erstatte tariffavtaler ikke er overholdt, skal imidlertid vilkårene i den eksisterende tariffavtale fortsette å gjelde etter virksomhetsoverdragelsen.

75 I lys av innleggene inngitt i rettsmøtet av partene i saken for den nasjonale domstol, konstaterer Kommisjonen at det synes å være uenighet om de aktuelle tariffavtaler var utløpt i henhold til direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3. Dette er opp til den nasjonale domstol å avgjøre. Dersom tariffavtalen ikke var utløpt, synes svaret på det andre spørsmål å helle i retning av Scattolon-dommen.

Rettens bemerkninger

76 Det første aspekt ved dette spørsmål gjelder vilkårene for å anvende en annen tariffavtale etter direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3. Det andre aspekt gjelder vilkårene for at tariffavtalen som gjelder i erververens foretak skal få anvendelse to måneder etter overdragelsen, dersom slik anvendelse medfører en lønnsreduksjon for de overførte ansatte.

77 I henhold til direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 første ledd skal erververen opprettholde de arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale på samme vilkår som gjaldt for overdrageren etter samme avtale, frem til den dato tariffavtalen sies opp eller utløper eller en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller får anvendelse. Direktivet presenterer disse alternativene som likeverdige i vekt og virkning.

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78 The second subparagraph of Article 3(3) provides that an EEA State may limit the period for observing such terms and conditions with the proviso that it shall not be less than one year. Whether or not the EEA State in question has availed itself of that possibility, the rule contained in the second subparagraph cannot deprive the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of its substance.

79 The Directive does not, therefore, prevent the terms and conditions in the collective agreement, to which the employees concerned were subject before the transfer, from ceasing to apply within one year after the transfer, including immediately on the date on which the transfer takes place, provided that the agreement has been terminated or has expired or another collective agreement has entered into force or become applicable (compare Scattolon, cited above, paragraph 73; and Juuri, cited above, paragraph 34).

80 Consequently, it is not contrary to Article 3(3) of the Directive for the transferee to apply, from the date of the transfer or, as in the present case, two months after the transfer, the terms and conditions laid down by the collective agreement in force, including those concerning pay.

81 Before the expiry of a collective agreement, it depends on the conditions set out in national law at what time another collective agreement enters into force or becomes applicable to the transferred employees. By contrast, if the national rules governing the replacement of collective agreements are not fulfilled, the terms and conditions of the non-expired collective agreement will continue to apply after the transfer.

82 The Directive leaves a margin of manoeuvre allowing the transferee and the other parties involved to arrange the salary integration of the transferred employees, taking the circumstances of the transfer into account. However, the arrangement chosen has to respect the aim of the Directive.

83 In this light, Article 3 of the Directive precludes the possibility that transferred employees suffer a substantial loss of income, in comparison with their situation immediately prior to the transfer, because the duration of their service with the transferor is not sufficiently taken into account when their starting salary position at the transferee is determined, considering the equivalent duration of service of those employees already in the service of the transferee, and when the conditions for remuneration under the newly applicable collective agreement have regard inter alia to length of service.

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78 Artikkel 3 nr. 3 andre ledd fastsetter at en EØS-stat kan begrense tidsrommet for opprettholdelse av slike arbeidsvilkår, forutsatt at tidsrommet ikke er kortere enn ett år. Uavhengig av om EØS-staten har valgt å benytte seg av denne mulighet eller ikke, kan ikke regelen i andre ledd frata artikkel 3 nr. 3 første ledd sitt innhold.

79 Direktivet er derfor ikke til hinder for at vilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjaldt for de berørte ansatte før overdragelsen, kan opphøre å gjelde innen ett år etter overdragelsen, herunder umiddelbart på den dato overdragelsen finner sted, forutsatt at avtalen er sagt opp eller utløpt eller en annen tariffavtale har trådt i kraft eller er gitt anvendelse (jf. Scattolon, som omtalt over (avsnitt 73), og Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 34)).

80 Følgelig kan erververen anvende vilkårene som er fastsatt i den gjeldende tariffavtale, herunder vilkårene som gjelder lønn, fra og med datoen for overdragelsen, eller to måneder etter overdragelsen som i den foreliggende sak, uten at dette er i strid med direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3.

81 Før en tariffavtales utløp vil spørsmålet om når en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller får anvendelse for de overførte ansatte, bero på hvilke regler som er fastsatt i nasjonal rett. Dersom nasjonale regler for å erstatte tariffavtaler ikke er overholdt, skal vilkårene i den ikke-utløpte tariffavtale fortsette å gjelde etter virksomhetsoverdragelsen.

82 Direktivet gir erververen og de andre involverte parter et visst spillerom for å tilrettelegge lønnsintegrasjonen av de overførte ansatte, under hensyn til omstendighetene ved overdragelsen. Løsningen som velges, må imidlertid være forenlig med direktivets formål.

83 I dette lys er direktivet artikkel 3 til hinder for at de overførte ansatte kan påføres et vesentlig inntektstap, sammenlignet med situasjonen umiddelbart forut for overdragelsen, som følge av at deres ansiennitet hos overdrageren ikke blir tilstrekkelig vektlagt ved deres lønnsmessige innplassering hos erververen, sammenlignet med erververens eksisterende ansatte med tilsvarende ansiennitet, når lønnsvilkårene i den nye tariffavtale blant annet baserer seg på ansiennitet.

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84 It appears from the request and the parties’ submissions that the transferred employees were fully credited for their competence and length of service, equivalent to that completed by employees in the service of the transferee. However, this is for the national court to examine.

85 The answer to the second question must therefore be that Article 3(3) of the Directive does not prevent the transferee from applying to the transferred employees the transferee’s collective agreement two months after the transfer, if that collective agreement is made applicable in accordance with national law. However, Article 3 of the Directive precludes the possibility that transferred employees suffer a substantial loss of income, in comparison with their situation immediately prior to the transfer, because the duration of their service with the transferor is not sufficiently taken into account when their starting salary position at the transferee is determined and where the conditions for remuneration under the newly applicable collective agreement have regard inter alia to the length of service. In that determination the equivalent duration of service of those employees already in the service of the transferee must be taken into consideration. It is for the national court to examine whether the conditions of pay under the transferee’s collective agreement take due account of the length of service.

V COSTS

86 The costs incurred by the Norwegian Government, the Swedish Government, ESA and the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are a step in the proceedings pending before Eidsivating Court of Appeal, any decision on costs for the parties to those proceedings is a matter for that court.

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84 Ut fra anmodningen og partenes innlegg synes det som om de overførte ansatte fikk godskrevet sin kompetanse og ansiennitet fullt ut, på lik linje med erververens ansatte. Dette er det imidlertid opp til den nasjonale domstol å vurdere.

85 Svaret på det andre spørsmål må derfor bli at direktivet artikkel 3 nr. 3 ikke er til hinder for at erververen kan anvende sin tariffavtale på de overførte ansatte to måneder etter overdragelsen, dersom tariffavtalen er gitt anvendelse i samsvar med nasjonal rett. Direktivet artikkel 3 er imidlertid til hinder for at de overførte ansatte kan påføres et vesentlig inntektstap sammenlignet med situasjonen umiddelbart forut for overdragelsen, som følge av at deres ansiennitet hos overdrageren ikke er blitt tilstrekkelig vektlagt ved deres lønnsmessige innplassering hos erververen, når lønnsvilkårene i den nye tariffavtale blant annet baserer seg på ansiennitet. Ved denne vurdering skal det tas hensyn til tilsvarende ansiennitet hos erververens eksisterende ansatte. Det er opp til den nasjonale domstol å vurdere om lønnsvilkårene i erververens tariffavtale tar tilbørlig hensyn til ansienniteten.

V SAKSOMKOSTNINGER

86 Omkostninger som er påløpt for Norges og Sveriges regjeringer, ESA og Kommisjonen, som alle har inngitt innlegg for EFTA-domstolen, kan ikke kreves dekket. Siden foreleggelsen for EFTA-domstolen utgjør ledd i behandlingen av saken som står for Eidsivating lagmannsrett, ligger det til lagmannsretten å ta en eventuell avgjørelse om saksomkostninger for partene.

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On those grounds,

THE COURT

in answer to the questions referred to it by Eidsivating Court of Appeal hereby gives the following Advisory Opinion:

1. It is consistent with Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23/EC when terms and conditions of pay enjoyed by the transferred employees under the collective agreement with the transferor are replaced, in conformity with national law, by conditions of pay laid down in the collective agreement in force with the transferee after the expiry of the former collective agreement.

A pay reduction – whether significant or otherwise – cannot influence this assessment.

However, the national court must assess whether the applicable national law provides for continuing effects in a situation such as the present. Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23/EC has to be interpreted as meaning that terms and conditions laid down in a collective agreement to which such continuing effects apply constitute “terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement” so long as those employment relationships are not subject to a new collective agreement or new individual agreements are not concluded with the employees concerned.

2. Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23/EC does not prevent the transferee from applying to the transferred employees the transferee’s collective agreement two months after the transfer, if that collective agreement is made applicable in accordance with national law.

However, Article 3 of Directive 2001/23/EC precludes the possibility that transferred employees suffer a substantial loss of income, in comparison with their situation immediately prior to the transfer, because the duration of their service with the transferor is not sufficiently taken into account when their starting salary position at the transferee is determined and where the conditions for remuneration under the newly applicable collective agreement have regard inter alia to the length of service. In

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På dette grunnlag avgir

EFTA-DOMSTOLEN

som svar på spørsmålene forelagt den av Eidsivating lagmannsrett, følgende rådgivende uttalelse:

1. Det er forenlig med artikkel 3 nr. 3 i direktiv 2001/23/EF når lønnsvilkårene som gjelder for de overførte ansatte i henhold til overdragerens tariffavtale, i samsvar med nasjonal rett erstattes med lønnsvilkår i tariffavtalen som gjelder hos erververen, etter at den førstnevnte tariffavtale er utløpt.

En lønnsreduksjon – enten den er vesentlig eller ikke – kan ikke ha betydning for denne vurdering.

Den nasjonale domstol må imidlertid vurdere om gjeldende nasjonal rett gir tariffavtalen ettervirkninger i en situasjon som den foreliggende. Artikkel 3 nr. 3 i direktiv 2001/23/EF må tolkes slik at vilkår i en tariffavtale som får slike ettervirkninger, utgjør «arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale» så lenge de aktuelle ansettelsesforhold ikke er gjenstand for en ny tariffavtale og det ikke er inngått nye individuelle avtaler med de berørte ansatte.

2. Artikkel 3 nr. 3 i direktiv 2001/23/EF er ikke til hinder for at erververen kan anvende sin tariffavtale på de overførte ansatte to måneder etter overdragelsen, dersom tariffavtalen er gitt anvendelse i samsvar med nasjonal rett.

Artikkel 3 i direktiv 2001/23/EF er imidlertid til hinder for at overførte ansatte kan påføres et vesentlig inntektstap, sammenlignet med situasjonen umiddelbart forut for overdragelsen, som følge av at deres ansiennitet hos overdrageren ikke er blitt tilstrekkelig vektlagt ved deres lønnsmessige innplassering hos erververen, når lønnsvilkårene i den nye tariffavtale blant annet

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that determination the equivalent duration of service of those employees already in the service of the transferee must be taken into consideration.

It is for the national court to examine whether the conditions of pay under the transferee’s collective agreement take due account of the length of service.


Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 18 December 2014.


Registrar President

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baserer seg på ansiennitet. Ved denne vurdering skal det tas hensyn til tilsvarende ansiennitet hos erververens eksisterende ansatte.

Det er opp til den nasjonale domstol å vurdere om lønnsvilkårene i erververens tariffavtale tar tilbørlig hensyn til ansienniteten.


Avsagt i åpen rett i Luxembourg, 18. desember 2014.


Justissekretær President

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in Case E-10/14

REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“SCA”) by

Eidsivating Court of Appeal (Eidsivating lagmannsrett) in the case between

Enes Deveci and Others

and


concerning the interpretation of Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfer of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses.

I INTRODUCTION

1. By letter of 31 March 2014, Eidsivating Court of Appeal requested an Advisory Opinion in a case pending before it between Enes Deveci and others (“the appellants”) and Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden (“the defendant”). The case before the national court concerns an appeal against the decision of Nedre Romerike District Court (Nedre Romerike tingrett), which ruled in favour of the replacement of terms and obligations stemming from a collective agreement concluded by the transferor with a collective agreement entered into by the transferee, after the transfer of an undertaking and the expiry of the original collective agreement.

II LEGAL BACKGROUND

EEA law

2. Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfer of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (“the Directive”) (OJ 2001 L 117, p. 32) was incorporated into Annex XVIII to the EEA Agreement at point 32d by Decision of the EEA Joint

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RETTSMØTERAPPORT

I sak E-10/14

ANMODNING til EFTA-domstolen i henhold til artikkel 34 i Avtalen mellom EFTA-statene om opprettelse av et Overvåkningsorgan og en Domstol («ODA») fra Eidsivating

lagmannsrett i en sak mellom

Enes Deveci m.fl.

og


vedrørende forståelsen av rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om ivaretakelse av arbeidstakernes rettigheter ved overdragelse av foretak, virksomheter eller deler av foretak eller virksomheter.

I INNLEDNING

1. Ved brev 31. mars 2014 fremsatte Eidsivating lagmannsrett en anmodning om rådgivende uttalelse i en verserende sak mellom Enes Deveci m.fl. («de ankende parter») og Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden («ankemotparten»). Saken for den nasjonale domstol gjelder en anke over Nedre Romerike tingretts dom, som slo fast at vilkår som stammer fra en tariffavtale inngått av overdrageren, kan erstattes med en tariffavtale inngått av erververen, etter at virksomhetsoverdragelsen har funnet sted og den opprinnelige tariffavtale er utløpt.

II RETTSLIG BAKGRUNN

EØS-rett

2. Rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om ivaretakelse av arbeidstakernes rettigheter ved overdragelse av foretak, virksomheter eller deler av foretak eller virksomheter («direktivet») (EFT 2001 L 117, s. 32) ble innlemmet i EØS-avtalens vedlegg XVIII i punkt

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Committee No 159/2001 of 11 December 2001 (OJ 2002 L 65, p. 38, and EEA Supplement No 13, p. 22).


1. The transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee.

Member States may provide that, after the date of transfer, the transferor and the transferee shall be jointly and severally liable in respect of obligations which arose before the date of transfer from a contract of employment or an employment relationship existing on the date of the transfer.

2. Member States may adopt appropriate measures to ensure that the transferor notifies the transferee of all the rights and obligations which will be transferred to the transferee under this Article, so far as those rights and obligations are or ought to have been known to the transferor at the time of the transfer. A failure by the transferor to notify the transferee of any such right or obligation shall not affect the transfer of that right or obligation and the rights of any employees against the transferee and/or transferor in respect of that right or obligation.

3. Following the transfer, the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement.

Member States may limit the period for observing such terms and conditions with the proviso that it shall not be less than one year.

National law

4. The Directive has been implemented in Norwegian law, inter alia with reference to Article 8 of the Directive, through Chapter 16 of the Act of 17 June 2005 No 62 relating to working environment, working hours and employment protection etc. (“the Working Environment Act”). Article 3(1) and (3) of the Directive have been implemented by subsections (1) and (2) of Section 16-2 (Pay and working conditions), which read as follows:

(1) The rights and obligations of the former employer ensuing from the contract of employment or employment relationship in force on the date

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32d, ved EØS-komiteens beslutning nr. 159/2001 av 11. desember 2001 (EFT 2002 L 65, s. 38, og EØS-tillegg nr.13, s. 22).

3. Direktivets artikkel 3 lyder:

1. Overdragerens rettigheter og forpliktelser i henhold til en arbeidsavtale eller et arbeidsforhold som gjelder på datoen for overdragelsen, skal som følge av overdragelsen overføres til erververen.

Medlemsstatene kan fastsette at overdrageren og erververen etter datoen for overdragelsen skal være solidarisk ansvarlige for forpliktelser som har oppstått før datoen for overdragelsen som følge av en arbeidsavtale eller et arbeidsforhold som forelå på datoen for overdragelsen.

2. Medlemsstatene kan vedta egnede tiltak for å sikre at overdrageren underretter erververen om alle rettigheter og forpliktelser som vil bli overdratt til erververen i henhold til denne artikkel, såfremt disse rettighetene og forpliktelsene er eller burde ha vært kjent for overdrageren på tidspunktet for overdragelsen. Dersom overdrageren unnlater å underrette erververen om en slik rettighet eller forpliktelse, skal dette ikke berøre overdragelsen av denne rettigheten eller forpliktelsen eller arbeidstakernes rettigheter overfor erververen og/eller overdrageren med hensyn til denne rettigheten eller forpliktelsen.

3. Etter overdragelsen skal erververen opprettholde de arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale på samme vilkår som gjaldt for overdrageren i henhold til samme avtale, inntil den dato tariffavtalen sies opp eller utløper, eller en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller får anvendelse.

Medlemsstatene kan begrense tidsrommet for opprettholdelse av slike arbeidsvilkår, forutsatt at tidsrommet ikke er kortere enn ett år.

Nasjonal rett

4. Direktivet er, blant annet under henvisning til direktivets artikkel 8, innarbeidet i norsk lov ved lov 17. juni 2005 nr. 62 om arbeidsmiljø, arbeidstid og stillingsvern (arbeidsmiljøloven) kapittel 16. Artikkel 3 nr. 1 og 3 i direktivet er innarbeidet ved arbeidsmiljøloven § 16-2 (Lønns- og arbeidsvilkår) første og annet ledd, som lyder slik:

(1) Tidligere arbeidsgivers rettigheter og plikter som følger av arbeidsavtale eller arbeidsforhold som foreligger på det tidspunkt

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of transfer shall be transferred to the new employer. Claims pursuant to the first sentence may still be raised against the former employer.

(2) The new employer shall be bound by any collective pay agreement that was binding upon the former employer. This shall not apply if the new employer at the latest within three weeks after the date of transfer declares in writing to the trade union that the new employer does not wish to be bound. The transferred employees have nevertheless the right to retain the individual working conditions that follow from a collective pay agreement that was binding upon the former employer. This shall apply until this collective pay agreement expires or until a new collective pay agreement is concluded that is binding upon the new employer and the transferred employees.

5. The first sentence of subsection (1) reflects the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Directive and subsection (2) of Section 16-2 reflects the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive, albeit with certain addenda concerning the applicability of the collective agreement in force in the transferor’s undertaking.

6. Norway has not availed itself of the possibility of limiting the period for observing the terms and conditions applicable to the transferor as provided for in Article 3(3) of the Directive.

7. According to the first and second sentences of Section 16-2(2), the employer is bound by the obligations stemming from the former employer’s collective agreements unless the transferee notifies the other party to the collective agreement in accordance with requirements set out in that provision. If a new employer exercises its right to declare itself not bound in accordance with the first and second sentences of Section 16-2(2) of the Working Environment Act, the general principles of Norwegian collective labour law apply. According to those principles, collective agreements do not pass from the transferor to the transferee in the case of a transfer of undertaking.

8. Based upon these principles, the Norwegian courts have established through case law a doctrine of “exceptionally being bound”. In the case of a non-genuine transfer, the transferee may exceptionally be bound by the collective agreements entered into by the transferor. The analysis whether a transfer is non-genuine depends on a case by case assessment. Elements of the assessment are whether the transferee is an independent

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overdragelsen finner sted, overføres til den nye arbeidsgiver. Krav etter første punktum kan fortsatt gjøres gjeldende overfor den tidligere arbeidsgiver.

(2) Ny arbeidsgiver blir bundet av tariffavtale som tidligere arbeidsgiver var bundet av. Dette gjelder ikke hvis ny arbeidsgiver senest innen tre uker etter overdragelsestidspunktet skriftlig erklærer overfor fagforeningen at ny arbeidsgiver ikke ønsker å bli bundet. De overførte arbeidstakerne har likevel rett til å beholde de individuelle arbeidsvilkår som følger av tariffavtale som den tidligere arbeidsgiver var bundet av. Dette gjelder inntil denne tariffavtalen utløper eller til det inngås ny tariffavtale som er bindende for den nye arbeidsgiver og de overførte arbeidstakere.

5. Paragraf 16-2 første ledd første punktum gjenspeiler direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 1 første punktum, og § 16-2 annet ledd gjenspeiler direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 første ledd, men med visse tilføyelser vedrørende anvendelsen av tariffavtalen som gjelder i overdragerens foretak.

6. Norge har ikke benyttet seg av muligheten til å begrense perioden for overholdelse av vilkårene som får anvendelse for overdrager, som fastsatt i direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3.

7. I henhold til § 16-2 annet ledd første og annet punktum er arbeidsgiveren bundet av forpliktelsene i den tidligere arbeidsgivers tariffavtaler med mindre erververen underretter den annen part i tariffavtalen i samsvar med kravene fastsatt i denne bestemmelse. Dersom en ny arbeidsgiver benytter sin adgang etter arbeidsmiljøloven § 16-2 annet ledd første og annet punktum til å erklære seg ubundet, skal de generelle prinsipper i norsk kollektiv arbeidsrett få anvendelse. Av disse prinsipper følger at tariffavtaler ikke går over fra overdrager til erverver ved virksomhetsoverdragelser.

8. På grunnlag av disse prinsipper har norske domstoler gjennom rettspraksis etablert en lære om «unntaksvis bundethet». For det tilfelle at en overdragelse ikke er reell, kan erverver unntaksvis bli bundet av de tariffavtaler som overdrager var bundet av. Hvorvidt det foreligger en overdragelse som ikke er reell, beror på en konkret vurdering i den enkelte sak. Elementer i vurderingen er om erververen er et selvstendig

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legal person, whether operations have been interrupted and whether the intention was to evade obligations stemming from a collective agreement.

9. The Norwegian Act of 27 January 2012 No 1 (“the Labour Dispute Act”) contains, inter alia, rules relating to collective agreements and their legal effects. Sections 4 and 5 of the Labour Dispute Act provide that a collective agreement is valid for a limited period of time and shall, as a rule, contain provisions concerning its date of expiry. Section 8 of the Labour Dispute Act gives collective agreements a statutory continuing effect, applicable for the time a strike, lock-out or other industrial action cannot be lawfully instigated.

10. The Norwegian system of collective agreements is based on a hierarchy of such agreements. Basic collective agreements are entered into by the general branches of employers’ confederations (i.e. the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (“NHO”)) and trade unions (such as the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (“LO”) and the Confederation of Vocational Unions (“YS”)) and regulate more permanent and general matters between the parties. Those basic collective agreements are supplemented by nationwide collective agreements, which are often applicable to a certain industry or occupational group. Finally, the system of collective agreements is completed by local agreements entered into at the level of an individual undertaking, laying down more specific rules (i.e. pay rates). In all cases, the specific agreements must always comply with the more general agreements, similar to the rule of “lex superior”.


11. The appellants are former employees of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS and members of the Norwegian United Federation of Trade Unions (“Fellesforbundet”), or the Norwegian Union of Employees in Commerce and Offices (“Handel og Kontor i Norge”), both being members of LO, or members of the trade union Parat, which is a member of YS.

12. The defendant is a consortium wholly owned by three Nordic limited liability companies, themselves owned by a parent company, SAS AB, and part of the SAS Group. The defendant is member of the employers’ Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (“NHO”) and the national employers’ Confederation of Norwegian Aviation Industries (“NHO Luftfart”).

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rettssubjekt, om det har vært avbrudd i driften og om hensikten har vært å unndra seg forpliktelser fastsatt i en tariffavtale.

9. Lov 27. januar 2012 nr. l (arbeidstvistloven) inneholder bl.a. regler om tariffavtaler og deres rettsvirkninger. Etter arbeidstvistloven §§ 4 og 5 er en tariffavtale gyldig i et sbegrenset tidsrom, og skal som hovedregel ha en fastsatt utløpstid. Arbeidstvistloven § 8 fastsetter at en tariffavtale skal fortsette å gjelde så lenge en streik, lockout eller annen arbeidskamp ikke lovlig kan iverksettes.

10. Det norske tariffavtalesystem bygger på et hierarki av slike avtaler. Hovedorganisasjonene for arbeidsgiverne (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon («NHO»)) og fagforeningene (særlig Landsorganisasjonen i Norge («LO»), og Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund, («YS»)) inngår hovedavtaler som regulerer mer varige og overordnede forhold mellom partene. Hovedavtalene suppleres av landsdekkende tariffavtaler som ofte gjelder for en bestemt bransje eller yrkesgruppe. Endelig kompletteres tariffavtalesystemet med særavtaler som inngås på foretaksnivå, og som fastsetter mer spesifikke regler (lønnssatser). Særavtalene må i alle tilfeller være i samsvar med de mer generelle avtaler, i tråd med «lex superior»-prinsippet.

III FAKTUM OG SAKSGANG

11. De ankende parter er tidligere ansatte hos Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS og er dels medlemmer av Fellesforbundet eller Handel og Kontor i Norge, som begge er tilsluttet LO, og dels medlemmer i Parat, som er tilsluttet YS.

12. Ankemotparten er et konsortium som i sin helhet er eid av tre nordiske aksjeselskaper, som igjen er eid av et morselskap, SAS AB, og er en del av SAS-konsernet. Ankemotparten er medlem av NHO og av NHO Luftfart.

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13. The SAS Group’s main activities consist in the operation of passenger plane services and the provision of air cargo and other aviation-related services. Those services provided by the group are carried out by different companies within the group. The defendant is one of those companies. Until 2001, the defendant operated the SAS Group’s cargo services as a separate business under the name SAS Cargo.

14. The activities related to terminal operations and cargo handling gradually evolved into a separate business, which was later contained in the wholly-owned subsidiary Spirit Air Cargo Handling AB, and finally became a separate sub-group of the SAS Group (“the Spirit Group”). The Spirit Group’s operational activities were run by different national subsidiaries, e.g. Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

15. After a planned sale of the Spirit Group was unsuccessful it was decided that the business of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS should be transferred back to the defendant’s business. The transfer was implemented through the sale of the contents of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS with effect from 1 March 2012. The employees’ employment relationships were transferred with effect from the same day.

16. Both the defendant and Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS are bound by a number of collective agreements. As both were members of the same employer confederations (NHO/NHO Luftfart), both were bound by the same basic and nationwide collective agreements. However, those collective agreements were supplemented by local agreements on pay rates, which differed between the defendant and Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

17. In January 2012, the trade unions to which the appellants belong gave timely notice of termination in relation to the nationwide collective agreements. The expiry date was 31 March 2012.

18. On 16 March 2012 the appellants’ trade unions received notification, in accordance with Section 16-2(2) of the Working Environment Act, by which the defendant informed the trade unions that it did not wish to be bound by the local collective agreements on pay rates, which had applied to Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

19. During the period after the transfer took place on 1 March 2012, the defendant continued to pay the employees who had been taken over

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13. SAS-konsernets hovedaktivitet er passasjerflytrafikk, flyfrakttjenester og andre flyrelaterte tjenester. De leverte tjenester utføres av forskjellige selskaper i konsernet. Ankemotparten er ett av disse selskap. Inntil 2001 drev ankemotparten SAS-konsernets flyfrakttjenester som et eget forretningsområde under navnet SAS Cargo.

14. Virksomheten knyttet til terminaldrift og frakthåndtering utviklet seg etter hvert til et eget forretningsområde som senere ble innlemmet i et eget heleid datterselskap, Spirit Air Cargo Handling AB og til slutt fusjonert inn i et eget underkonsern i SAS-konsernet («Spirit-konsernet»). Spirit-konsernets operative virksomhet ble drevet av forskjellige nasjonale datterselskaper, for eksempel Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

15. Etter at et planlagt salg av Spirit-konsernet mislyktes, ble det besluttet at virksomheten i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS skulle integreres i ankemotpartens virksomhet igjen. Overdragelsen ble gjennomført ved at innholdet i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS ble solgt med virkning fra 1. mars 2012. Arbeidstakernes arbeidsforhold ble overført med virkning fra samme dato.

16. Både ankemotparten og Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS er bundet av en rekke tariffavtaler. Ettersom begge var medlemmer av de samme arbeidsgiverorganisasjonene (NHO/NHO Luftfart), var de begge bundet av de samme hovedavtaler og landsdekkende tariffavtaler. Tariffavtalene var imidlertid supplert med lokale særavtaler om lønnssatser, som var forskjellige for ankemotparten og Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

17. I januar 2012 ble de landsomfattende tariffavtaler rettidig sagt opp av de ankende parters fagforeninger. Utløpsdatoen var 31. mars 2012.

18. Den 16. mars 2012 mottok de ankende parters fagforeninger underretning i henhold til arbeidsmiljøloven § 16-2 annet ledd, der ankemotparten informerte om at man ikke ønsket å være bundet av Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS’ særavtaler.

19. I perioden etter virksomhetsoverdragelsen 1. mars 2012, fortsatte ankemotparten å avlønne de ansatte som var overtatt fra Spirit Air

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from Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS in accordance with the rates stipulated in the special agreement for that company.

20. With effect from 1 May 2012, employees who had been taken over from Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS were paid in accordance with the special agreement (pay table) entered into between the defendant and the transferred employees’ trade unions.

21. In a letter of 30 March 2012 from the defendant, the employees who had been taken over from Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS were informed, inter alia, of the following matters:

“... At the same time, we inform you that, from 1 April 2012, you will be covered by SAS / SHG’s collective agreements as regards collective pay and terms of employment.

This means that your individual terms will be adjusted in accordance with the above with effect from 1 May 2012.”

22. Pursuant to the current special agreement, the pay level in the defendant’s undertaking is on average between 4 and 8% lower than for corresponding employee categories in Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. Changes were made at the individual level in the magnitude of plus 3% to minus 11.5%.

23. When the employees were assigned a grade in the applicable pay tables in the defendant’s undertaking, the employees were fully credited for their seniority and qualifications etc. under their former employment relationship with Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

24. The appellants, 129 former employees of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS, did not accept the pay reduction, which resulted from the transfer to the new collective agreement and sought an order, before the Nedre Romerike District Court, requiring the defendant, inter alia, to continue to apply the higher pay rates, in accordance with the local agreement entered into by Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. However, Nedre Romerike District Court found in favour of the defendant.

25. The appellants appealed against this decision before the requesting court. According to the information received by Eidsivating Court of Appeal, the appellants argue, in essence, that Article 3 of the Directive precludes the transfer of the employees of Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS to the

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Cargo Handling Norway AS i henhold til lønnssatsene i sistnevnte selskaps særavtale.

20. Med virkning fra 1. mai 2012 ble arbeidstakere som var overtatt fra Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS avlønnet i henhold til den særavtale (lønnstabell) som var inngått mellom ankemotparten og de overførte arbeidstakernes fagforeninger.

21. Ved brev 30. mars 2012 fra ankemotparten ble ansatte som var overtatt fra Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS blant annet informert om følgende:

«(...) Samtidig gjør vi oppmerksom på at du fra 1. april 2012 vil være omfattet av SAS / SHG sine tariffavtaler hva angår kollektive lønns- og arbeidsbetingelser.

Dette innebærer at dine individuelle vilkår blir justert i henhold til ovenstående med virkning fra 1. mai 2012.»

22. I henhold til gjeldende særavtale ligger lønnsnivået i ankemotpartens foretak i snitt mellom 4 og 8 prosent lavere enn for tilsvarende kategorier av ansatte i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. Det inntraff endringer på individnivå i størrelsesorden pluss 3 prosent til minus 11,5 prosent.

23. Ved innplassering i gjeldende lønnstabeller i ankemotpartens foretak fikk de ansatte fullt ut godskrevet sin ansiennitet, kompetanse og lignende fra sitt tidligere ansettelsesforhold i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS.

24. De ankende parter, 129 tidligere ansatte i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS, aksepterte ikke lønnsreduksjonen som fulgte av overføringen til den nye tariffavtale, og tok ut stevning for Nedre Romerike tingrett. Det ble blant annet fremsatt krav om at ankemotparten måtte opprettholde lønnsnivået fastsatt i særavtalen inngått av Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS. Nedre Romerike tingrett frifant imidlertid ankemotparten.

25. De ankende parter anket dommen inn for den anmodende domstol. Ifølge opplysningene mottatt av Eidsivating lagmannsrett anfører de ankende parter i hovedsak at direktivets artikkel 3 er til hinder for at de ansatte i Spirit Air Cargo Handling Norway AS kan overføres til

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collective agreement applicable in the defendant’s undertaking, which contains materially lower pay levels.

26. Based upon the information contained in the request, it would appear that the defendant argues, in principle, that Article 3(3) of the Directive does not require the transferee to be bound by the collective agreements entered into by the transferor after the date of expiry of such agreements.

27. The requesting court underlines the fact that a transfer of an undertaking has undoubtedly taken place. It observes further that it is common ground between the parties that the defendant’s notification, served in accordance with Section 16-2 of the Working Environment Act, was received in due time.

28. On 31 March 2014, Eidsivating Court of Appeal decided to seek an Advisory Opinion from the Court, and referred the following questions:

1. Is it consistent with Article 3(1), cf. Article 3(3), of Council Directive 2001/23/EC that the transferee undertaking assigns the individual employees covered by the transfer a place in a pay table set out in a collective agreement that applies in the transferee undertaking, with effect from a date after the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking has expired, even if this results in pay reduction for the individual employees?

2. Does the answer to Question 1 depend on whether the collective agreement that applied to the employees of the transferor was still in force when the transferee’s collective agreement was made applicable to the employees covered by the transfer of the undertaking?

3. Does the answer to Question 1 depend on whether the reduction in pay is significant or not?

IV WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS


– the appellants, represented by Sigurd-Øyvind Kambestad, advokat, and Christen Horn Johannessen, advokat;

– the defendant, represented by Frode Martin Toftevåg, advokat, and Bjørnar Alterskjær, advokat;

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tariffavtalen som gjelder i ankemotpartens foretak, der lønnsnivået er vesentlig lavere.

26. Ut fra opplysningene i anmodningen synes ankemotparten i hovedsak å anføre at direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 ikke krever at erververen skal være bundet av tariffavtalene som er inngått av overdrageren, etter disse avtalenes utløpsdato..

27. Den anmodende domstol understreker at det utvilsomt foreligger en virksomhetsoverdragelse. Den bemerker videre at det er enighet mellom partene om at ankemotpartens underretning i henhold til arbeidsmiljøloven § 16-2 ble mottatt innen tidsfristen.

28. Den 31. mars 2014 besluttet Eidsivating lagmannsrett å anmode om en rådgivende uttalelse fra EFTA-domstolen. Følgende spørsmål ble forelagt:

1. Er det forenlig med rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF artikkel 3 nr. 1, jf. nr. 3, at den ervervende virksomhet innordner den enkelte ansatte som omfattes av virksomhetsoverdragelsen, til en lønnstabell fastsatt i en gjeldende tariffavtale hos den ervervende virksomhet, fra et tidspunkt etter at tariffavtalen som gjaldt hos overdrageren er utløpt, selv om dette fører til en lønnsreduksjon for den enkelte ansatte?

2. Beror svaret i spørsmål 1 på om tariffavtalen som gjaldt for de ansatte hos overdrageren, fortsatt løper på tidspunktet erververens tariffavtale gis anvendelse for de ansatte som omfattes av virksomhetsoverdragelsen?

3. Beror svaret i spørsmål 1 på om lønnsreduksjonen er vesentlig eller ikke?

IV SKRIFTLIGE INNLEGG

29. I medhold av artikkel 20 i EFTA-domstolens vedtekter og artikkel 97 i rettergangsordningen er skriftlige innlegg inngitt av:

– de ankende parter, representert ved advokat Sigurd-Øyvind Kambestad og advokat Christen Horn Johannessen,

– ankemotparten, representert ved advokat Frode Martin Toftevåg og advokat Bjørnar Alterskjær,

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– the Swedish Government, represented by Anna Falk, Director, Charlotta Meyer-Seitz, Deputy Director, Ulrika Persson, Emil Karlsson, Lars Swedenborg, Natacha Otte-Widgren, Legal Advisers, as well as Fredrik Sjövall, Special Adviser, and Karin Sparrman, Desk Officer, within the Legal Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agents;

– ESA, represented by Maria Moustakali, Officer, and Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Temporary Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents; and

– the European Commission (“the Commission”), represented by Johan Enegren, Member of its Legal Service, acting as Agent.

V SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED

The appellants

30. In the appellants’ view, Eidsivating Court of Appeal has sufficiently presented their arguments in its request to the Court under Article 34 SCA and, thus, they refer to page 8 of that request.

31. According to the arguments presented in the request, the appellants take the view that Article 3(1) and (3) of the Directive precludes the defendant from applying another local agreement, applicable within the transferee undertaking, after the expiry of the collective agreement that initially applied, entered into by the transferor, as the other local agreement contains materially lower pay rates.

32. According to the request from the Eidsivating Court of Appeal, in the proceedings before the national court, the appellants contended that the Directive is intended to protect workers’ rights as regards the transfer of undertakings. The Directive’s objective consists, in essence, of preventing workers subject to a transfer from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer.1

33. The appellants argue that this objective sets an outer limit on what the social partners, in the situation of a transfer of an undertaking, may agree. It may be deduced from the request by the Eidsivating Court of Appeal that the

1 Reference is made to Case C-108/10 Scattolon [2011] ECR I-7491, paragraph 75.

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– Sveriges regjering, representert ved Anna Falk, Director, Charlotta Meyer-Seitz, Deputy Director, Ulrika Persson, Emil Karlsson, Lars Swedenborg, Natacha Otte-Widgren, Legal Advisers, samt Fredrik Sjövall, Special Adviser, og Karin Sparrman, Desk Officer, Legal Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, som partsrepresentanter,

– ESA, representert ved Maria Moustakali, Officer, og Janne Tysnes Kaasin, Temporary Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, som partsrepresentanter, og

– Europakommisjonen («Kommisjonen»), representert ved Johan Enegren, medlem av Kommisjonens juridiske tjeneste, som partsrepresentant.

V SAMMENDRAG AV FREMSATTE ANFØRSLER

De ankende parter

30. De ankende parter mener at Eidsivating lagmannsrett har gjengitt deres argumenter på en tilfredsstillende måte i sin anmodning til EFTA-domstolen etter ODA artikkel 34, og de viser derfor til side 8 i anmodningen.

31. Ifølge anførslene som gjengis i anmodningen, mener de ankende parter at direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 1 og 3 er til hinder for at ankemotparten kan anvende en annen særavtale i erververens foretak etter utløpet av den tariffavtale som opprinnelig gjaldt, og som var inngått av overdrager, ettersom den senere særavtale inneholder vesentlig lavere lønnssatser.

32. Ifølge anmodningen fra Eidsivating lagmannsrett anførte de ankende parter i saken for den nasjonale domstol at direktivets formål er å beskytte arbeidstakernes rettigheter ved virksomhetsoverdragelse. Direktivets formål består i det vesentlige i å hindre at overførte arbeidstakere settes i en mindre gunstig posisjon utelukkende som et resultat av overdragelsen.1

33. De ankende parter anfører at dette formål trekker opp en yttergrense for hva arbeidslivets parter kan avtale i forbindelse med en virksomhetsoverdragelse. Det kan utledes av anmodningen fra Eidsivating lagmannsrett at de ankende parter gjør gjeldende at

1 Det vises til sak C-108/10 Scattolon, Sml. 2011 s. I-7491 (avsnitt 75).

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appellants argue that the protection provided for by the Directive applies notwithstanding the expiry of the collective agreement that initially applied.

34. The appellants submit that, even after the date of expiry, an employer is not completely free to change the pay level, as the employer must in every case obey the outer limit set by the objective of the Directive.2

35. Finally, it follows from the request that, according to the appellants, the outer limit set by the Directive cannot be said to conflict with “the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business”,3 as it is based on a pay level the transferee must have been aware of even before the transfer took place.

The defendant

Second question

36. The defendant submits that the second question must be deemed inadmissible, as the question has no bearing in the factual circumstances. Nedre Romerike District Court found that the local agreement, entered into by the transferor, had already expired at the time the local agreement, entered into by the transferee, was applied in relation to the transferred employees.

37. The defendant argues further that national law already precludes a transferee from applying another collective agreement as long as the collective agreement concluded with the transferor is still in force. Hence, had the collective agreement still been in force, once the defendant applied its own collective agreement, the question raised could have been resolved within the national legal system.

38. Thus, the defendant considers the second question hypothetical and unrelated to the facts of the underlying case, as well as being solvable based on national law alone.

First and third questions

39. As regards the first and third questions, the defendant suggests that, as they are closely related, they can be analysed together.

2 Reference is made to Scattolon, cited above.3 Reference is made to Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron, judgment of 18 July 2013, published

electronically, paragraphs 33-35.

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beskyttelsen direktivet gir, gjelder uavhengig av om tariffavtalen som opprinnelig gjaldt, er utløpt eller ikke.

34. De ankende parter anfører at selv etter tariffavtalens utløp står arbeidsgiver ikke fullstendig fritt til å endre lønnsnivået, ettersom arbeidsgiveren i alle tilfelle må holde seg innenfor den yttergrense som direktivets formål trekker opp.2

35. Endelig fremgår det av anmodningen at de ankende parter anfører at yttergrensen som trekkes av direktivet ikke kan sies å stride mot selve substansen av erververens frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet,3 ettersom den er basert på et lønnsnivå som erververen måtte være klar over før overdragelsen fant sted.

Ankemotparten

Det annet spørsmål

36. Ankemotparten anfører at det annet spørsmål må avvises ettersom det ikke har noen betydning for de faktiske forhold. Nedre Romerike tingrett fant at særavtalen overdrageren hadde inngått, allerede var utløpt på det tidspunkt særavtalen inngått av erververen begynte å gjelde for de ansatte som var overført.

37. Ankemotparten anfører videre at nasjonal lovgivning allerede forbyr en erverver å anvende en annen tariffavtale så lenge tariffavtalen som er inngått av overdrageren, fremdeles gjelder. Dersom tariffavtalen fremdeles hadde løpt på det tidspunkt da ankemotparten begynte å anvende sin egen tariffavtale, kunne spørsmålet følgelig ha blitt løst innenfor rammen av det nasjonale rettssystemet.

38. Ankemotparten anser derfor det annet spørsmål for å være hypotetisk og uten relevans for forholdene i den underliggende sak, og at det dessuten kan løses utelukkende på grunnlag av nasjonal lovgivning.


39. Når det gjelder det første og tredje spørsmål, foreslår ankemotparten at disse kan vurderes samlet siden de er nært forbundet med hverandre.

2 Det vises til Scattolon, som omtalt over.3 Det vises til sak C-426/11 Alemo-Herron, dom av 18. juli 2013, publisert elektronisk (avsnitt 33-35).

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40. The defendant argues that, according to the Directive, the obligation to continue to observe the terms and obligations agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement only lasts until the termination or expiry of that agreement or the entry into force or application of a new agreement.

41. The defendant’s argument is based on the view that the Directive does not aim solely at safeguarding the interests of employees in the event of a transfer of an undertaking, but also seeks to ensure a fair balance between the interests of the employees and the transferee. It relies on case law, according to which the transferee must be in a position to make adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations.4 Accordingly, the Directive allows the transferee to replace the original collective agreement by another collective agreement, even if the new collective agreement is less favourable than the original agreement.5 Further, the obligation of the transferee to continue to observe the terms and obligations agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor does not result in the transfer of the collective agreement as such.

42. Moreover, in the defendant’s view, the second subparagraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive cannot deprive the first subparagraph of that provision of its substance. The former provision does not prevent working conditions specified in the collective agreement to which the employees concerned were subject prior to the transfer from ceasing to apply during the year after the transfer, e.g. immediately on the date of the transfer itself, if one of the events mentioned in the first subparagraph arises.6

43. Furthermore, the defendant points out that, since the Directive seeks to secure a fair balance between the employees and the transferee, any such fair balance between the two groups requires temporal limitations on the transferee’s obligation to continue to observe terms and conditions under collective agreements entered into by the transferor.

4 Reference is made to Alemo-Herron, cited above, paragraph 25, and Case C-499/04 Werhof [2006] ECR I-2397, paragraph 31.

5 Reference is made to K. Riesenhuber, European Employment Law, 2012, p. 590.6 Reference is made to Scattolon, cited above, paragraph 73, and Case C-396/07 Juuri [2008] ECR

I-8883, paragraph 34.

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40. Ankemotparten anfører at etter direktivet gjelder forpliktelsen til å opprettholde de arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale på samme vilkår som gjaldt for overdrageren etter samme avtale, bare frem til den dato tariffavtalen sies opp eller utløper eller en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller får anvendelse.

41. Ankemotpartens anførsel bygger på det syn at direktivet ikke bare har til formål å ivareta arbeidstakernes rettigheter ved overdragelse av et foretak, men også søker å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom de ansattes og erververens interesser. Dette synspunktet har støtte i rettspraksis, som går ut på at erververen må være i stand til å foreta de justeringer og endringer som er nødvendige for å kunne drive virksomheten videre.4 Følgelig tillater direktivet at erververen erstatter den opprinnelige tariffavtale med en annen tariffavtale selv om den nye tariffavtale er mindre gunstig enn den opprinnelige avtale.5 Videre innebærer ikke erververens forpliktelse til å opprettholde de arbeidsvilkår som er fastsatt i en tariffavtale på samme vilkår som gjaldt for overdrageren, at tariffavtalen som sådan overføres.

42. Videre kan ikke direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 annet ledd etter ankemotpartens syn frata bestemmelsens første ledd sitt innhold. Annet ledd er ikke til hinder for at arbeidsvilkår i tariffavtalen som gjaldt for de berørte ansatte før overdragelsen, kan opphøre å gjelde i løpet av året etter overdragelsen, for eksempel umiddelbart fra datoen for selve overdragelsen, dersom en av hendelsene nevnt i første ledd inntreffer.6

43. Ankemotparten påpeker videre at siden direktivet søker å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom de ansatte og erververen, forutsetter enhver slik rimelig balanse mellom de to grupper tidsmessige begrensninger for erververens forpliktelse til å opprettholde vilkår som er fastsatt i tariffavtaler inngått av overdrageren.

4 Det vises til Alemo-Herron, som omtalt over (avsnitt 25), og sak C-499/04 Werhof, Sml. 2006 s. I-2397 (avsnitt 31).

5 Det vises til K. Riesenhuber, European Employment Law, 2012, s. 590.6 Det vises til Scattolon, som omtalt over (avsnitt 73), og sak C-396/07 Juuri, Sml. 2008 s. I-8883

(avsnitt 34).

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44. According to the defendant, this is also supported by the legislative background to the Directive. The previous provision, i.e. Article 3(2) of Council Directive 77/187/EEC, was modelled on German law and intended to create a legal safeguard against repudiation of collective agreements simply by reason of a change of employer.7 The original drafts of Council Directive 77/187/EEC8 were based on the presumption that the transferee’s obligations were time limited. That time limitation was kept in the final text of Council Directive 77/187/EEC, even if it differed to some extent from the original wording of the proposal. The defendant adds that the temporal limitations are also to be found in various Commission documents.9

45. By reference to case law,10 the defendant argues that Article 3 of the Directive imposes no obligation on the transferee to continue to observe the terms and conditions deriving from a collective agreement beyond the date of expiry of that agreement. In the view of the defendant, in particular the case of Juuri11 supports this argument and is, moreover, fully applicable in the case at hand since the collective agreements the transferor had entered into had expired when the transferee’s collective agreement was applied to the transferred employees.

46. The defendant notes that the Directive only provides for partial harmonisation. It is not intended to establish a uniform level of protection, but to ensure that the employee is equally protected in his relations with

7 Reference is made to B. Hepple, “The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations”, Industrial Law Journal, 1982 (29), p. 36, and S. Evju, Arbeidsrett:Utvalgte artikler 2001-2010, Universitetsforlaget, 2010, pp. 463-483.

8 Reference is made to the Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of the legislation of Member States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations (COM(74) 351 final/2), OJ 1974 C 104, p. 1, and Amended proposal for a Directive of the Council on the harmonisation of the legislation of the Member States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations (COM(75) 429 final).

9 Reference is made to the Memorandum from the Commission on acquired rights of workers in case of transfer of undertaking (COM(97) 85 final), at pp. 8-9, and 15, and Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (COM(2007) 334 final), at pp. 6-7.

10 Reference is made to Case C-4/01 Martin [2003] ECR I-2859, paragraph 48, Werhof, cited above, paragraphs 28 and 30, and Juuri, cited above, paragraphs 32-34.

11 Reference is made to Juuri, cited above, paragraphs 32-34.

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44. Ifølge ankemotparten understøttes dette også av direktivets rettslige bakgrunn. Den tidligere bestemmelse, rådsdirektiv 77/187/EØF artikkel 3 nr. 2, var basert på tysk lovgivning og hadde som formål å sikre mot avvisning av tariffavtaler alene som følge av skifte av arbeidsgiver.7 De opprinnelige utkast til rådsdirektiv 77/187/EØF8 bygget på den forutsetning at erververens forpliktelser var tidsbegrenset. Denne tidsbegrensning ble beholdt i den endelige tekst i rådsdirektiv 77/187/EØF, selv om den avvek noe fra forslagets opprinnelige ordlyd. Ankemotparten legger til at de tidsmessige begrensninger også er å finne i forskjellige dokumenter fra Kommisjonen.9

45. Med henvisning til rettspraksis10 anfører ankemotparten at direktivets artikkel 3 ikke inneholder noen forpliktelse for erververen til å opprettholde arbeidsvilkår fastsatt i en tariffavtale etter denne avtales utløpsdato. Etter ankemotpartens oppfatning understøttes dette argument særlig av Juuri11-dommen, som for øvrig har full overføringsverdi på den foreliggende sak siden tariffavtalene inngått av overdrageren var utløpt da erververens tariffavtale begynte å gjelde for de ansatte som var overført.

46. Ankemotparten bemerker at direktivet bare tar sikte på en delvis harmonisering. Det har ikke til formål å etablere et ensartet beskyttelsesnivå, men å sikre at den ansatte blir like godt beskyttet i

7 Det vises til B. Hepple, “The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations”, Industrial Law Journal, 1982 (29), s. 36, og S. Evju, Arbeidsrett: Utvalgte artikler 2001-2010, Universitetsforlaget, 2010, s. 463-483.

8 Det vises til Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of the legislation of Member States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations (COM(74) 351 final/2), EFT 1974 C 104, s. 1, og Amended proposal for a Directive of the Council on the harmonisation of the legislation of the Member States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations (COM(75) 429 final).

9 Det vises til Memorandum from the Commission on acquired rights of workers in case of transfer of undertaking (COM(97) 85 final), s. 8-9 og 15, og Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (COM(2007) 334 final), s. 6-7.

10 Det vises til sak C-4/01 Martin, Sml. 2003 s. I-2859 (avsnitt 48), Werhof, som omtalt over (avsnitt 28 og 30), og Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 32-34).

11 Det vises til Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 32-34).

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the transferee as he was in his relationship with the transferor under the law of the EEA State in question.12

47. Thus, the defendant maintains that it is consistent with the Directive to assign the individual employees a place in a pay table in accordance with the collective agreement entered into by the transferee, with effect from the date the original collective agreement expired, even if this results in a significant wage reduction for the individual employee.

48. Hence, the defendant concludes that the question whether a transferee may apply its own collective agreements to the transferred employees is a question of national law.

49. Furthermore, the defendant argues that the Advocate General’s Opinion in the pending case of Österreichischer Gewerkschaftbund only contemplates an extension of the protective effects of the Directive if and insofar as national law extends the corresponding temporal limitations afforded to the protection of working conditions following from a collective agreement beyond the date of expiry.13 In this regard, the defendant observes that under Norwegian law14 such continued effect of collective agreements is only granted in favour of employees until the time they are lawfully bound by new collective agreements, and hence no additional protection in time is afforded by Article 3 of the Directive whether or not the employee has been subject to a transfer of an undertaking. In the case at hand, a continued effect or prolonged protection is not an issue.

50. In relation to Scattolon15 and the appellants’ arguments based on that judgment, the defendant argues that the judgment is irrelevant as regards the case at hand and therefore supporting arguments cannot be derived from it.

51. In the defendant’s view, the question raised in Scattolon is different to that raised in the request by Eidsivating Court of Appeal; in Scattolon a new collective agreement was applied to the transferred employee,

12 Reference is made to Case C-458/12 Lorenzo Amatori, judgment of 6 March 2014, published electronically, paragraph 41.

13 Reference is made to the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón of 3 June 2014 in Case C-328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftbund, published electronically.

14 Reference is made to the observations in the request by the Eidsivating Court of Appeal, pp. 3-4.15 Reference is made to Scattolon, cited above.

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forhold til erververen som vedkommende var i forhold til overdrageren i henhold til lovgivningen i den aktuelle EØS-stat.12

47. Ankemotparten fastholder dermed at det er forenlig med direktivet å innordne de enkelte ansatte i en lønnstabell fastsatt i tariffavtalen som er inngått av erververen, med virkning fra det tidspunkt den opprinnelige tariffavtale utløp, selv om dette medfører en vesentlig lønnsreduksjon for den enkelte ansatte.

48. Følgelig konkluderer ankemotparten med at spørsmålet om en erverver kan anvende sin egen tariffavtale på de overførte ansatte, må avgjøres i henhold til nasjonal lovgivning.

49. Videre anfører ankemotparten at generaladvokatens uttalelse i den verserende saken Österreichischer Gewerkschaftbund gir anvisning på en utvidelse av direktivets beskyttelse bare dersom og i den utstrekning nasjonal lovgivning utvider utover utløpsdatoen de tilsvarende tidsmessige begrensninger som gjelder for beskyttelsen av arbeidsvilkårene fastsatt i en tariffavtale.13 I denne sammenheng anfører ankemotparten at i henhold til norsk lovgivning14 skal utløpte tariffavtaler bare opprettholdes til fordel for de ansatte frem til de ansatte er lovlig bundet av nye tariffavtaler, og dermed gir direktivets artikkel 3 ingen ytterligere beskyttelse i tid, uavhengig av om den ansatte har vært omfattet av en virksomhetsoverdragelse eller ikke. Opprettholdelse av utløpte tariffavtaler eller forlenget beskyttelse er ikke relevant i den foreliggende sak.

50. Med hensyn til Scattolon15 og de ankende parters argumenter som støtter seg på denne dom, anfører ankemotparten at dommen ikke er relevant for den foreliggende sak, og at det følgelig ikke kan utledes noen støtteargumenter fra den.

51. Etter ankemotpartens oppfatning er spørsmålet som reises i Scattolon forskjellig fra det som reises i Eidsivating lagmannsretts anmodning. I Scattolon var en ny tariffavtale blitt anvendt på den overførte ansatte til

12 Det vises til sak C-458/12 Lorenzo Amatori, dom 6. mars 2014, publisert elektronisk (avsnitt 41).13 Det vises til generaladvokat Cruz Villalóns uttalelse 3. juni 2014 i sak C-328/13 Österreichischer

Gewerkschaftbund, publisert elektronisk.14 Det vises til merknadene i Eidsivating lagmannsretts anmodning, s. 3-4.15 Det vises til Scattolon, som omtalt over.

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even though the original collective agreement was seemingly still in force on that date. On the contrary, in the case at hand, the question to be answered is whether the terms and conditions guaranteed by a collective agreement entered in the transferor’s undertaking need to be obeyed by the transferee after the proper expiry and replacement of that agreement.

52. Moreover, the defendant submits that the extended protection stemming from the Directive is limited to workers who are being placed, solely by reason of a transfer to another employer, in a less favourable position. In its view, in the case at hand, the employees’ position results from the fact that the collective agreements applicable previously expired and thereafter the collective agreements concluded in the defendant’s undertaking before the transfer also apply to the transferred employees. Hence, the defendant continues, the situation of the appellants does not result solely from the transfer, but is a legal consequence of the collective agreements applicable and the general principles of collective labour law in Norway.

53. The defendant also argues that where the more favourable terms previously offered by the transferor arose from a collective agreement which is no longer legally binding on the employees of the entity transferred the protection granted by the Directive (including any temporal limitation thereupon) does not apply.16

54. Moreover, the defendant submits that it has fully taken account of length of service for the purposes of calculating remuneration.

55. Finally, the defendant claims that the Directive must be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) and more precisely with the freedom to conduct a business enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter, which finds expression also in Article 3 of the Directive. Even though the Charter has not been incorporated into the EEA Agreement, in the defendant’s view, the Charter is relevant, in accordance with the principle of homogeneity, to the interpretation of the provision at hand, since there are no differences in scope and purpose of the provision at issue between EEA and EU law.

56. In principle, the defendant takes the view that the interpretation sought by the appellants would result in the collective agreements of the transferor

16 Reference is made to Martin, cited above, paragraph 48.

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tross for at den opprinnelige tariffavtale tilsynelatende fremdeles gjaldt på den aktuelle dato. Tvert imot gjelder spørsmålet som skal besvares i den foreliggende sak om vilkårene som er sikret gjennom en tariffavtale inngått i overdragerens foretak, må overholdes av erververen etter at denne avtale er formelt utløpt og erstattet.

52. Ankemotparten anfører videre at den forlengede beskyttelse som direktivet gir, er begrenset til arbeidstakere som settes i en mindre gunstig posisjon utelukkende som et resultat av en overføring til en annen arbeidsgiver. Etter ankemotpartens oppfatning er de ansattes situasjon i den foreliggende sak en konsekvens av at tariffavtalene som tidligere gjaldt er utløpt, og at tariffavtalene som var inngått i ankemotpartens foretak før overføringen, deretter begynte å gjelde også for de overførte ansatte. Følgelig, fortsetter ankemotparten, er de ankende parters situasjon ikke utelukkende et resultat av overføringen, men også en rettslig konsekvens av de gjeldende tariffavtaler og de generelle prinsipper i norsk kollektiv arbeidsrett.

53. Ankemotparten anfører også at beskyttelsen direktivet gir (herunder enhver tidsbegrensning som følger av denne), ikke får anvendelse når de gunstigere vilkår som tidligere ble tilbudt av overdrageren, var fastsatt i en tariffavtale som ikke lenger er rettslig bindende for de ansatte i den overførte enhet.16

54. Ankemotparten anfører videre at det er tatt fullt hensyn til ansiennitet ved beregning av de ansattes lønn.

55. Endelig hevder ankemotparten at direktivet må tolkes i samsvar med Den europeiske unions pakt om grunnleggende rettigheter («pakten»), nærmere bestemt i samsvar med friheten til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet, som er nedfelt i artikkel 16 i pakten, og som også kommer til uttrykk i direktivets artikkel 3. Selv om pakten ikke er innarbeidet i EØS-avtalen, mener ankemotparten at den, i tråd med homogenitetsprinsippet, er relevant for tolkningen av foreliggende bestemmelse, ettersom det ikke er noen forskjell mellom EØS-retten og EU-retten hva angår bestemmelsens virkeområde og formål.

56. Ankemotparten er av den oppfatning at tolkningen som søkes av de ankende parter i prinsippet ville innebære at overdragerens tariffavtaler gjøres til en

16 Det vises til Martin, som omtalt over (avsnitt 48).

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becoming the threshold from which subsequent collective agreements may only derogate in favour of the employees. The defendant argues that this would ignore the interests of the transferee with regard to saving costs and good industrial relations and therefore restrict a transferee’s freedom to conduct a business.

57. The defendant proposes that the Court should answer the questions as follows:

1. Question 2 is inadmissible

2. Questions 1 and 3: It is compatible with Article 3 of Council Directive 2001/23/EC to place individual employees covered by the transfer in a pay table set out in a collective agreement that applies in the transferee undertaking with effect from a date after the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking has expired, even if this results in a pay reduction for the individual employee, and regardless of whether this reduction in pay is significant or not.

The Swedish Government

First question

58. The Swedish Government observes that the wording of Article 3(3) of the Directive suggests, in principle, an obligation on the transferee to observe the collective agreements concluded by the transferor. However, it follows from its wording that the obligation lasts only until the expiry of the collective agreement concerned.

59. In the view of the Swedish Government, this interpretation is also supported by the fact that Article 3(3) of the Directive cannot impose an obligation on the transferee to guarantee specific working conditions, which have been agreed on by the transferor, after the agreed date of expiry of the collective agreement, if the contracting parties have agreed not to guarantee certain working conditions beyond a particular date.17 After expiry, the agreement is no longer in force.

60. The Swedish Government emphasises that the judgment in Scattolon18 does not establish a general rule concerning the interpretation of the Directive but

17 Reference is made to Juuri, cited above, paragraph 33.18 Reference is made to Scattolon, cited above.

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terskel som påfølgende tariffavtaler bare kan avvike fra dersom det er til de ansattes fordel. Ankemotparten anfører at dette ville medføre at erververens interesser knyttet til kostnadsbesparelser og til å sikre et godt forhold mellom partene i arbeidslivet ikke blir tatt hensyn til, og at det dermed legges en begrensning på erververens frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet.

57. Ankemotparten anmoder EFTA-domstolen om å besvare spørsmålene på følgende måte:

1. Spørsmål 2 avvises.

2. Spørsmål 1 og 3: Det er forenlig med rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF artikkel 3 å innordne enkeltansatte som omfattes av virksomhetsoverdragelsen, til en lønnstabell fastsatt i en gjeldende tariffavtale hos den ervervende virksomhet, fra et tidspunkt etter at tariffavtalen som gjaldt hos overdrageren er utløpt, selv om dette fører til en lønnsreduksjon for den enkelte ansatte, og uavhengig av om lønnsreduksjonen er betydelig eller ikke.

Sveriges regjering

Det første spørsmål

58. Sveriges regjering anfører at ordlyden i direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 i prinsippet fastsetter en forpliktelse for erververen til å overholde tariffavtaler inngått av overdrageren. Det følger imidlertid av ordlyden at denne forpliktelse bare varer frem til utløpet av den berørte tariffavtale.

59. Etter Sveriges regjerings oppfatning støttes denne tolkning også av at direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 ikke kan medføre en forpliktelse for erververen til å opprettholde bestemte arbeidsvilkår inngått av overdrageren etter avtalt utløpsdato for tariffavtalen, dersom avtalepartene har avtalt å ikke garantere opprettholdelse av bestemte arbeidsvilkår ut over en bestemt dato.17 Når avtalen er utløpt, gjelder den ikke lenger.

60. Sveriges regjering understreker at Scattolon18-dommen ikke etablerer noen generell regel for tolkningen av direktivet, men har sitt utspring i sakens

17 Det vises til Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 33).18 Det vises til Scattolon, som omtalt over.

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stems from the very specific circumstances of the case. On its reading of the case, the judgment in Scattolon applies to situations where the collective agreement applicable was immediately replaced upon transfer and the qualifications of the employees, such as length of service, were not properly taken into account after the transfer, leading to a substantial reduction in the remuneration of the employees concerned.19 Thus, Scattolon supports the view that the Directive is aimed at avoiding workers being placed, solely by reason of a transfer to another employer, in an unfavourable position compared with that which they previously enjoyed.20

61. Conversely, the Swedish Government submits that in a situation, such as in the case at hand, where the transferred employees no longer enjoy rights under a previously applicable agreement, due to the fact that this agreement has expired, the loss of their right to a particular salary is not directly linked to the transfer, but to the expiry of the collective agreement. In such a situation, the Swedish Government adds, the Juuri case law applies.21

62. Moreover, the Swedish Government takes the view that, if Article 3(3) of the Directive were to be interpreted as continuing obligations for the transferee resulting from a previous collective agreement now expired, this would risk perpetuating expired collective agreements. The transferee would be bound indefinitely by collective agreements whose terms it could not affect. That would reduce contractual freedom to the point where it would adversely affect the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business.22

63. As a final point, the Swedish Government argues that the perpetuation of expired collective agreements would make it impossible for the transferee to apply, in a non-discriminatory manner, the terms of a collective agreement to transferred and non-transferred employees alike, as possibly several collective agreements – or rights deriving from expired collective agreements – would have to be applied in the undertaking.

64. Consequently, the Swedish Government proposes that the first question should be answered in the affirmative.

19 Ibid.20 Ibid., paragraph 77.21 Reference is made to Juuri, cited above, paragraph 33.22 Reference is made to Alemo-Herron, cited above, paragraphs 33-36.

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meget spesielle omstendigheter. Slik Sveriges regjering forstår det, gjelder Scattolon-dommen situasjoner der den gjeldende tariffavtale erstattes umiddelbart etter overdragelsen, og der de ansattes kvalifikasjoner, herunder ansiennitet, ikke blir tilstrekkelig vektlagt etter overdragelsen, med en vesentlig lønnsreduksjon som resultat for de berørte ansatte.19 Følgelig understøtter Scattolon-dommen oppfatningen om at direktivet søker å forhindre at arbeidstakere settes i en mindre gunstig posisjon enn tidligere, utelukkende som et resultat av overføring til en annen arbeidsgiver.20

61. I en situasjon som i den foreliggende sak, der de ansatte som er overført ikke lenger nyter rettigheter i henhold til en tidligere gjeldende tariffavtale som følge av at denne avtale er utløpt, anfører Sveriges regjering derimot at de ansattes tap av retten til en bestemt lønn ikke er direkte forbundet med overdragelsen, men med tariffavtalens utløp. I en slik situasjon, legger Sveriges regjering til, er Juuri-dommen relevant.21

62. Sveriges regjering er videre av den oppfatning at dersom direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 skulle tolkes slik at den fastsetter vedvarende forpliktelser for erververen basert på en tidligere, nå utløpt tariffavtale, ville dette kunne gi utløpte tariffavtaler bestående gyldighet. Erververen ville bli bundet på ubestemt tid av tariffavtaler som han ikke selv har kunnet påvirke. Dette ville redusere avtalefriheten i en slik grad at selve substansen i erververens frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet ville bli rammet.22

63. Endelig anfører Sveriges regjering at dersom utløpte tariffavtaler skulle gis bestående gyldighet, ville dette gjøre det umulig for erververen å anvende vilkårene i en tariffavtale på overførte og ikke-overførte ansatte på en måte som ikke innebærer forskjellsbehandling, ettersom muligens flere tariffavtaler – eller rettigheter som følger av utløpte tariffavtaler – ville måtte anvendes i virksomheten.

64. Sveriges regjering foreslår følgelig at det første spørsmål besvares bekreftende.

19 Samme sted.20 Samme sted (avsnitt 77).21 Det vises til Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 33).22 Det vises til Alemo-Herron, som omtalt over (avsnitt 33-36).

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Second question

65. According to the Swedish Government, it follows from the national court’s request that the collective agreement which applied to the transferor has expired. In light of the answer proposed to the first question, it is consequently unnecessary to answer the second question.

Third question

66. Finally, in the view of the Swedish Government, the third question must be answered in the negative, since a transferee is no longer bound by obligations established in a previous collective agreement if that collective agreement has expired.

67. The Swedish Government proposes that the Court should answer the questions as follows:

1. Question 1: It is consistent with Article 3(1) and 3(3) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC that the transferee undertaking assigns the individual employees covered by the transfer a place in a pay table set out in a collective agreement that applies in the transferee undertaking with effect from a date after the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking expired, even if this results in a pay reduction for the individual employees.

2. Question 3: The third question must be answered in the negative.

ESA

Introductory remarks

68. In its introductory remarks, ESA observes that the Directive seeks to ensure a fair balance between the interests of transferred employees and those of the transferee.23 Moreover, it follows from case law that Article 3 of the Directive, read in conjunction with Article 8, cannot be interpreted as entitling the EEA States to introduce measures which are liable to adversely affect the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business.24

23 Ibid., paragraph 25.24 Ibid, paragraphs 25-36.

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65. Ifølge Sveriges regjering følger det av den nasjonale domstols anmodning at tariffavtalen som gjaldt for overdrageren, er utløpt. I lys av forslaget til svar på det første spørsmål er det følgelig ikke nødvendig å besvare det annet spørsmål.

Det tredje spørsmål

66. Etter Sveriges regjerings oppfatning må det tredje spørsmål besvares benektende, ettersom en erverver ikke lenger er bundet av forpliktelser fastsatt i en tidligere tariffavtale dersom denne tariffavtale er utløpt.

67. Sveriges regjering anmoder EFTA-domstolen om å besvare spørsmålene på følgende måte:

1. Spørsmål 1: Det er forenlig med rådsdirektiv 2001/23/EF artikkel 3 nr. 1 og 3 at den ervervende virksomhet innordner den enkelte ansatte som omfattes av virksomhetsoverdragelsen, til en lønnstabell fastsatt i en gjeldende tariffavtale hos den ervervende virksomhet, fra et tidspunkt etter at tariffavtalen som gjaldt hos overdrageren er utløpt, selv om dette fører til en lønnsreduksjon for den enkelte ansatte.

2. Spørsmål 3: Det tredje spørsmål må besvares benektende.

ESA

Innledende bemerkninger

68. Innledningsvis bemerker ESA at direktivet søker å sikre en rimelig balanse mellom interessene til de ansatte som overføres og erververen.23 Videre følger det av rettspraksis at direktivets artikkel 3, lest i sammenheng med artikkel 8, ikke kan tolkes slik at den gir EØS-statene rett til å iverksette tiltak som er egnet til å ramme selve kjernen i erververens frihet til å opprette og drive egen virksomhet.24

23 Samme sted (avsnitt 25).24 Samme sted (avsnitt 25-36).

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69. ESA submits further that the Directive is intended to achieve only partial harmonisation and not intended to establish a uniform level of protection throughout the EEA.25 The Directive can only be relied upon to ensure that the transferred employee is protected in his relations with the transferee to the same extent as he was in his relations with the transferor undertaking under the legal rules of the EEA State concerned.26

First question

70. ESA observes that the Directive does not harmonise the conditions under which an existing collective agreement expires nor does it harmonise how another collective agreement enters into force or is made applicable. Thus, it is for national law to determine the conditions under which another collective agreement may enter into force or take effect after the expiry of a previous collective agreement.

71. ESA submits that, pursuant to the wording of Article 3(3) of the Directive, the obligation on the transferee to obey the terms and conditions of the collective agreements in force with the transferor ends when those collective agreements expire.27

72. In ESA’s view, there is no indication that the transferee should be bound by collective agreements other than those in force at the time of the transfer,28 as the Directive aims merely to safeguard the rights and obligation of employees in force on the day of the transfer and is not intended to protect mere expectations.29

73. ESA observes, in addition, that the Directive does not preclude the transferee from reducing the amount of remuneration paid, e.g. for the purpose of complying with national rules in force for public employees, as long as those national rules are interpreted in light of the purpose of the Directive and the length of service is taken into account.30

25 Reference is made to Juuri, cited above, paragraph 23, and Case C-425/02 Delahaye [2004] ECR I-10823.

26 Reference is made to Juuri, cited above, paragraph 23, Martin, cited above, paragraph 41, and Case 324/86 Tellerup v Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] ECR 739, paragraph 16.

27 Reference is made to Juuri, cited above, paragraphs 33-34.28 Reference is made to Werhof, cited above, paragraph 29.29 Reference is made to Werhof, cited above, paragraph 29, and the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz

Villalón in Österreichischer Gewerkschaftbund, cited above, point 51.30 Reference is made to Delahaye, cited above, paragraph 35.

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69. ESA anfører videre at direktivet bare tar sikte på en delvis harmonisering og ikke har til formål å etablere et ens nivå for beskyttelse i hele EØS.25 Direktivet skal bare sikre at den overførte ansatte gis samme grad av beskyttelse i sitt forhold til erververen som vedkommende hadde i sitt forhold til den overdragende virksomhet etter lovgivningen i den berørte EØS-stat.26

Det første spørsmål

70. ESA anfører at direktivet ikke harmoniserer vilkårene som regulerer en eksisterende tariffavtales utløp, og at det heller ikke harmoniserer hvordan en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller gis anvendelse. Følgelig er det nasjonal rett som bestemmer vilkårene for at en annen tariffavtale kan tre i kraft eller få anvendelse etter utløpet av en tidligere tariffavtale.

71. ESA gjør gjeldende at det av ordlyden i direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 følger at erververens forpliktelse til å overholde vilkårene i gjeldende tariffavtaler inngått av overdrageren faller bort når tariffavtalene utløper.27

72. Etter ESAs oppfatning er det ingenting som tilsier at erververen skulle være bundet av andre tariffavtaler enn de som gjelder på overdragelsestidspunktet,28 ettersom direktivet bare tar sikte på å ivareta de rettigheter og forpliktelser for ansatte som gjelder på datoen for overdragelsen, og ikke har til formål å beskytte rene forventninger.29

73. ESA bemerker dessuten at direktivet ikke er til hinder for at erververen kan redusere lønnen som betales, for eksempel for å overholde gjeldende nasjonale regler for offentlig ansatte, såfremt disse nasjonale regler tolkes i lys av direktivets formål og det tas hensyn til ansiennitet.30

25 Det vises til Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 23), og sak C-425/02 Delahaye, Sml. 2004 s. I-10823.26 Det vises til Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 23), Martin, som omtalt over (avsnitt 41), og sak 324/86

Tellerup mot Daddy’s Dance Hall, Sml. 1988 s. 739 (avsnitt 16).27 Det vises til Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 33-34).28 Det vises til Werhof, som omtalt over (avsnitt 29).29 Det vises til Werhof, som omtalt over (avsnitt 29), og generaladvokat Cruz Villalóns uttalelse i

Österreichischer Gewerkschaftbund, som omtalt over (avsnitt 51).30 Det vises til Delahaye, som omtalt over (avsnitt 35).

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74. ESA submits that the obligation to take account of factors such as the length of service, education and type of experience that affect the calculation of remuneration appears to reflect aspects of fairness that must be taken into account such as to determine remuneration in accordance with the Directive’s aims.

75. Hence, ESA takes the view that the first question must be answered in the affirmative in as much as the conditions of a collective agreement in a transferee undertaking may be applied to the transferred employees, even if this results in a reduction of pay, provided that the relevant rules of national law are interpreted in the light of the Directive and due account is taken of the qualifications of the employees.

Second question

76. According to ESA, there are two aspects to the second question, as it concerns both the conditions for the application of another agreement and the content of such an agreement.

77. If the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking is still in force, it follows from the wording of Article 3(3) of the Directive that one of the alternative conditions mentioned therein will, when fulfilled, end the obligation of the transferee to observe the terms and conditions of the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking. The Directive does not rank the alternatives but presents them as equal in value and effect.

78. ESA submits that, as the Directive does not harmonise the conditions under which an existing collective agreement expires, nor how another collective agreement enters into force or is made applicable, it is for national law to regulate such situations.

79. Hence, ESA continues, if the national rules for replacing the collective agreement applicable in the transferor’s undertaking by the agreement applicable in the transferee’s undertaking are fulfilled, the conditions of the collective agreement applicable in the transferee undertaking will apply and a reduction in pay will be possible. Similarly, the same conclusion must be reached if the national rules governing the replacement of an existing collective agreement by a new collective agreement are fulfilled.

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74. ESA anfører at forpliktelsen til å ta hensyn til faktorer som ansiennitet, utdanning og erfaring, som påvirker beregningen av lønnen, synes å gjenspeile rimelighetshensyn som må tas i betraktning for å fastsette lønnen i samsvar med direktivets formål.

75. Følgelig er ESA av den oppfatning at det første spørsmål må besvares bekreftende i den utstrekning vilkårene i en tariffavtale i en ervervende virksomhet kan anvendes på de overførte ansatte, selv om dette medfører en lønnsreduksjon, forutsatt at de relevante regler i nasjonal lovgivning tolkes i lys av direktivet og det tas hensyn til de ansattes kvalifikasjoner.


76. Ifølge ESA berører det annet spørsmål to aspekter, ettersom det gjelder både vilkårene for anvendelse av en annen avtale og innholdet i en slik avtale.

77. Dersom tariffavtalen som gjaldt i overdragerens virksomhet fortsatt løper, følger det av ordlyden i direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 at når et av de alternative vilkår som der er angitt er oppfylt, vil erververens forpliktelse til å overholde vilkårene i tariffavtalen som gjaldt i overdragerens virksomhet, falle bort. Direktivet rangerer ikke alternativene, men presenterer dem som likeverdige med hensyn til vekt og virkning.

78. ESA anfører at siden direktivet ikke harmoniserer vilkårene for en eksisterende tariffavtales utløp, og det heller ikke harmoniserer hvordan en annen tariffavtale trer i kraft eller gis anvendelse, må slike situasjoner reguleres av nasjonal lovgivning.

79. Følgelig mener ESA at dersom de nasjonale vilkår for å erstatte den gjeldende kollektivavtale i overdragerens virksomhet med avtalen i erververens virksomhet er overholdt, skal vilkårene i tariffavtalen i erververes virksomhet få anvendelse, og en lønnsreduksjon er da mulig. Tilsvarende må konklusjonen bli den samme dersom de nasjonale vilkår som gjelder for å erstatte en eksisterende tariffavtale med en ny tariffavtale er overholdt.

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80. At the same time, ESA also emphasises that if the national rules governing the replacement of collective agreements are not fulfilled, the terms and conditions of the existing collective agreement will continue to apply after the transfer.

81. Hence, ESA proposes that the second question should be answered in the affirmative, namely, the answer to the first question may depend on whether the collective agreement in the transferor undertaking was still in force when the transferee’s collective agreement was made applicable. However, whether and, if so, to what extent this may affect the entry into force or application of another agreement will depend on the rules of collective labour law in the EEA State concerned.

Third question

82. With regard to the third question, ESA observes that, in addition to the obligation on the transferee to interpret the relevant rules in line with the aim of the Directive, as already stated with regard to the other questions, Article 4(2) of the Directive provides for further restrictions on the discretion of the transferee to determine the conditions of work in relation to the transferred workers after the date of expiry of the previous collective agreements.

83. In the view of ESA, a significant reduction in remuneration may entail a substantial change in working conditions within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Directive. Thus, if the employment relationship is terminated because of this change in working conditions, Article 4(2) will impose the responsibility for the termination on the employer, the consequences of which have to be determined by national law. Therefore, Article 4(2) limits the employer’s discretion to adjust working conditions to the detriment of the transferred workers.

84. Consequently, ESA proposes that, due to the close relationship between the answers to questions 1 and 3, those two questions should be answered together.

85. ESA proposes that the Court should answer those questions as follows:

1. Questions 1 and 3: The conditions of the collective agreement in the transferee undertaking may be applied to the transferred workers after

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80. Samtidig understreker ESA også at dersom de nasjonale vilkår som gjelder for å erstatte tariffavtaler ikke er overholdt, skal vilkårene i den eksisterende tariffavtalen fortsette å gjelde etter virksomhetsoverdragelsen.

81. Følgelig foreslår ESA at det annet spørsmål besvares bekreftende; svaret på det første spørsmål kan avhenge av om tariffavtalen i overdragerens virksomhet fremdeles gjaldt da erververens tariffavtale ble gitt anvendelse. Vurderingen av om og i hvilken grad dette kan påvirke ikrafttredelsen eller anvendelsen av en annen avtale, vil imidlertid avhenge av reglene i den berørte EØS-stats kollektive arbeidsrett.

Det tredje spørsmål

82. Når det gjelder det tredje spørsmål, bemerker ESA at i tillegg til erververens forpliktelse til å tolke de relevante regler i tråd med direktivets formål, som allerede nevnt i tilknytning til de øvrige spørsmålene, fastsetter direktivets artikkel 4 nr. 2 ytterligere begrensninger i erververens skjønnsmyndighet til å fastsette arbeidsvilkårene til de arbeidstakere som er overført etter utløpet av de foregående tariffavtaler.

83. Etter ESAs oppfatning kan en betydelig lønnsreduksjon innebære en vesentlig endring i arbeidsvilkårene i henhold til direktivets artikkel 4 nr. 2. Dersom ansettelsesforholdet opphører som følge av denne endring i arbeidsvilkårene, fastsetter artikkel 4 nr. 2 at arbeidsgiveren skal anses som ansvarlig for opphøret, og konsekvensene av dette beror på nasjonal lovgivning. Dermed begrenser artikkel 4 nr. 2 arbeidsgiverens skjønnsmyndighet til å justere arbeidsvilkårene til ugunst for de overførte arbeidstakere.

84. Ettersom svarene på spørsmål 1 og 3 er så nært knyttet til hverandre, foreslår ESA følgelig at disse to spørsmål besvares samlet.

85. ESA anmoder EFTA-domstolen om å besvare de nevnte spørsmål på følgende måte:

1. Spørsmål 1 og 3: Vilkårene i tariffavtalen i erververens virksomhet kan anvendes på de overførte ansatte etter utløpet av tariffavtalen i

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the expiry of the collective agreement in the transferor undertaking even if this results in a reduction of pay, provided that the relevant rules are interpreted in light of the purpose of the Directive and account is taken of the length of service with the transferor undertaking and other equivalent factors when calculating the remuneration in the transferee undertaking. The amount of the reduction in pay will be of significance in so far as it may entail a substantial change in working conditions within the meaning of Article 4(2).

2. Question 2: If the collective agreement in the transferor undertaking is in force on the date of the transfer, this may affect the application of the collective agreement of the transferee, depending on the regulation of collective labour law in the respective State.

The Commission

First and third questions

86. The Commission submits that, since the collective agreement at issue in the national proceedings expired before the date of transfer, the defendant is not obliged to observe the terms and conditions set out therein.

87. According to the Commission, this interpretation results from the fact that the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive cannot override the intentions of the parties to a collective agreement as expressed therein. Thus, if the parties have limited the enjoyment of certain rights guaranteed by an agreement to a particular date, Article 3(3) cannot impose an obligation on the transferee to observe those working conditions after that specific date.31

88. The Commission argues that Scattolon32 does not support an alternative interpretation of the Directive, as, unlike in Scattolon, in the case at hand, the previous collective agreement had expired, and hence, no collective agreement entered into by the transferor was in force on the date of the transfer. Moreover, it is not disputed in the present case that the transferred employees were fully credited for their seniority and qualifications, unlike the situation in Scattolon.

31 Reference is made to Juuri, cited above, paragraph 33.32 Reference is made to Scattolon, cited above.

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overdragerens virksomhet, selv om dette medfører en lønnsreduksjon, forutsatt at de relevante regler tolkes i lys av direktivets formål og det tas hensyn til ansiennitet i overdragerens virksomhet og andre tilsvarende faktorer ved beregning av lønnen i erververens virksomhet. Lønnsreduksjonens omfang vil være av betydning i den utstrekning det kan innebære en vesentlig endring i arbeidsvilkårene i henhold til direktivets artikkel 4 nr. 2.

2. Spørsmål 2: Dersom tariffavtalen i overdragerens virksomhet fremdeles løper på datoen for overdragelsen, kan dette påvirke anvendelsen av erververens tariffavtale, avhengig av reglene som er fastsatt i den respektive stats kollektive arbeidsrett.

Kommisjonen


86. Kommisjonen anfører at siden tariffavtalen som den nasjonale tvist gjelder utløp før datoen for overdragelsen, er ankemotparten ikke forpliktet til å overholde vilkårene i avtalen.

87. Ifølge Kommisjonen bygger denne tolkningen på at direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 1 første ledd ikke kan tilsidesette intensjonene tariffavtalens parter har, slik intensjonene er uttrykt i avtalen. Dersom partene har fastsatt at visse rettigheter i en avtale bare skal gjelde frem til en bestemt dato, kan ikke artikkel 3 nr. 3 pålegge erververen å opprettholde arbeidsvilkårene etter denne dato.31

88. Kommisjonen anfører at Scattolon32 ikke støtter en annen tolkning av direktivet; i den foreliggende sak – til forskjell fra Scattolon – var den tidligere tariffavtale utløpt, og på datoen for overdragelsen var dermed ingen tariffavtale inngått av overdrageren i kraft. Videre er det i den foreliggende sak ubestridt at de overførte ansatte fikk godskrevet sin ansiennitet og kompetanse fullt ut, til forskjell fra situasjonen i Scattolon.

31 Det vises til Juuri, som omtalt over (avsnitt 33).32 Det vises til Scattolon, som omtalt over.

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89. The Commission proposes that the Court should answer the first and third questions as follows:

Questions 1 and 3: Art. 3(3) of the Directive does not preclude a transferee undertaking from assigning the individual employees covered by a transfer a place in a pay table set out in a collective agreement that applies in the transferee undertaking with effect from a date after the expiry of the collective agreement that applied in the transferor undertaking, irrespective of the size of any resulting reduction in pay.

Second question

90. In the Commission’s view, application of Article 3(3) of the Directive does not limit a transferee undertaking’s non-observance of a collective agreement that bound the transferor undertaking, but which expired prior to the transfer, to instances where any pay reduction as a result of the transfer is not significant.

91. Thus, the Commission considers the second question hypothetical.

Carl Baudenbacher

Judge-Rapporteur

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89. Kommisjonen anmoder EFTA-domstolen om å besvare det første og tredje spørsmål på følgende måte:

Spørsmål 1 og 3: Direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 er ikke til hinder for at den ervervende virksomhet innordner de enkelte ansatte som omfattes av en virksomhetsoverdragelse, til en lønnstabell fastsatt i en gjeldende tariffavtale hos den ervervende virksomhet, fra et tidspunkt etter at tariffavtalen som gjaldt hos den overdragende virksomhet er utløpt, uavhengig av størrelsen på lønnsreduksjonen dette eventuelt måtte medføre.


90. Etter Kommisjonens oppfatning innebærer ikke anvendelsen av direktivets artikkel 3 nr. 3 at en ervervende virksomhets tilsidesettelse av en tariffavtale som bandt den overdragende virksomhet men som utløp før overdragelsen, bare er begrenset til tilfelle der lønnsreduksjonen overdragelsen måtte medføre ikke er betydelig.

91. Kommisjonens anser derfor det annet spørsmål for å være hypotetisk.

Carl Baudenbacher

Saksforberedende dommer

1410


Book 3

1023

II. Administration

and Activities of the Court

1412

ADMINISTRATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE COURT

The Court took up its functions on 4 January 1994 in Geneva with five Judges nominated by Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Due to the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union and the ratification of the EEA Agreement by Liechtenstein, the Court has since mid-1995 consisted of three regular Judges and six Ad hoc Judges. The Governments of the EEA/EFTA States decided on 14 December 1994 that the seat of the Court should be moved to Luxembourg. Since 1 September 1996, the Court has had its premises at 1, Rue du Fort Thüngen, Kirchberg, Luxembourg.

As provided for in Article 14 of Protocol 5 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (ESA/Court Agreement), the Court remains permanently in session. Its offices are open from Monday to Friday each week, except for official holidays

Provisions regarding the legal status of the Court are to be found in Protocol 7 to the ESA/Court Agreement which bears the title: Legal Capacity, Privileges and Immunities of the EFTA Court. The Court has concluded a Headquarters Agreement with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which was signed on 17 April 1996 and approved by the Luxembourg Parliament on 11 July 1996. This Agreement contains detailed provisions on the rights and obligations of the Court and its judges and staff as well as privileges and immunities of persons appearing before the Court. Provisions for the internal administration of the Court are laid down in the Staff Regulations and Rules and in the Financial Regulations and Rules, as adopted on the 4th of January 1994, and as later amended.

The ESA/Court Agreement also contains provisions on the role of the Governments of the EFTA/EEA States in the administration of the Court. Thus, Article 43 of the Agreement stipulates that the Rules of Procedure shall be approved by the Governments. Article 48 of the Agreement states that the Governments shall establish the annual budget of the Court, based on a proposal from the Court. A committee of representatives of the participating States was established and is charged with the task of determining the annual budget. This body, the ESA/Court Committee, is composed of the heads of the Icelandic, Liechtenstein and Norwegian Missions to the European Union in Brussels.

Administration and Activities of the Court

Book 3

1413

The Court held regular meetings with the Court of Justice of the European Union and attended that Court’s official functions. It also participated in the official functions of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Moreover, representatives of EFTA and its Member States, of the EU judiciary and other of EU institutions, of the Luxembourg judiciary, the diplomatic corps and the Luxembourg civil society took part in the official functions of the Court. In addition, Ambassadors from the EFTA States, EU States and other countries have visited the Court. The Court was visited, during the period covered by this Report, inter alia by Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, Prime Minister of Iceland, Thomas Zwiefelhofer, Deputy Prime Minister of the Principality of Liechtenstein, Bjarni Benediktsson, Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs in Iceland, Anniken Ramberg Krutnes, Norwegian Ambassador to Luxembourg, a delegation of Norwegian parlamentarians, delegations from the Princely Court of Liechtenstein and from Gjøvik District Court, Norway. Law professors, assistants, researchers and students from several European universities, as well as trainees from the EFTA institutions in Brussels, Luxembourg and Geneva, attended oral hearings and seminars on the Court’s jurisdiction and case law.

The Judges, the Court’s Registrar and Legal Secretaries have given speeches on the EEA and the Court and on European integration in general in all the EFTA States, as well as in a number of EU countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Slovakia and the United Kingdom and in non-EU countries such as Japan, South Korea and Russia. The President and the Judges of the Court paid visits to national Courts, including the Supreme Court of Norway, and Government Ministers in Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

On the occasion of the Court’s 20th anniversary a conference with over 200 participants from all branches of the legal profession was held in June at Cercle Cité in Luxembourg. H.E. Xavier Bettel, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, opened the proceedings with a keynote speech on ‘European integration’. President Carl Baudenbacher called the EFTA Court an example of the judicialisation of international law and said that the EEA Agreement due to its institutions has worked better than expected. Brussels lawyer QC Ian Forrester and Paris lawyer Eric Morgan de Rivery complimented the Court on the clarity of its judgments and welcomed the scope of judicial review. A panel chaired by University of Oslo Professor Giuditta Cordero-Moss, which brought together the Chief Justice of Norway, Tore Schei, the President of the Supreme Court of Iceland Markús Sigurbjörnsson, the President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court, Andreas Batliner, and the President


1414

of the Administrative Court of Luxembourg Georges Ravarani, discussed the Shakespearian question in a slightly different form: ‘To refer or not to refer’.

Another event marking the 20th Anniversary of the EFTA Court, was the publication of a commemorative book “The EEA and the EFTA Court – Decentred Integration”. The volume includes over forty topics that reflect the wide scope of the EEA Agreement, the only association treaty ever concluded by the European Union to permit associated States to have their own surveillance authority and their own court. The authors are distinguished members from all branches of the legal profession. The book was presented to the public on 4 December 2014 in the presence of some of the authors and other distinguished guests. The keynote speech “The EFTA Court 20 years on: an important contribution to wider European integration” was delivered by Viviane Reding, former Vice-President of the European Commission and EU Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship and Member of the European Parliament, who has contributed to the commemorative book.

Under the auspices of the EFTA Court Lunchtime Talks, Mats Persson, Director of Open Europe, an independent think-tank with offices in Brussels and London, gave a talk on the subject of “Different Levels of Integration”.

The website of the Court is: www.eftacourt.int. It contains general information on the Court, its case law, reports for the hearing and press releases, publications, news, and the main legal texts governing the activities of the Court.

The Court’s e-mail address is: [email protected]


III. Judges and Staff

http://www.eftacourt.int

Book 3

1415

III. Judges and Staff

14161416Judges and Staff

JUDGES AND STAFF

The members of the Court in 2014 were as follows:

Mr Carl BAUDENBACHER (nominated by Liechtenstein)

Mr Per CHRISTIANSEN (nominated by Norway)

Mr Páll HREINSSON (nominated by Iceland)

The judges are appointed by common accord of the Governments of the EFTA States.

The Registrar of the Court is Mr Gunnar Selvik.

Ad hoc Judges of the Court are:

Nominated by Iceland:

Mr Benedikt Bogason, hæstaréttardómari (Supreme Court Judge)

Ms Ása Ólafsdóttir, University of Iceland (Associate Professor)

Nominated by Liechtenstein:

Ms Nicole Kaiser, Rechtsanwältin (lawyer)

Mr Martin Ospelt, Rechtsanwalt (lawyer)

Nominated by Norway:

Mr Ola Mestad, University of Oslo (Professor)

Ms Siri Teigum, Advokat, (lawyer)

Book 3


In addition to the Judges, the following persons were employed by

the Court in 2014:

Mr Kjartan BJÖRGVINSSON, Legal Secretary

Ms Harriet BRUHN, Senior Administrative and Financial Officer

Mr Michael-James CLIFTON, Legal Secretary (temporary officer)

Ms Mary COX, Information and Communication Coordinator

Ms Hrafnhildur EYJÓLFSDÓTTIR, Personal Assistant

Mr Salim GUETTAF, Manager of premises

Mr Tomasz MAZUR, Administrative and Financial Officer (temporary officer)

Ms Silje NÆSHEIM, Personal Assistant

Ms Bryndís PÁLMARSDÓTTIR, Senior Officer

Mr Thomas POULSEN, Legal Secretary (until 1 September)

Ms Giulia PREDONZANI, Research lawyer (temporary officer)

Mr Jørgen REINHOLDTSEN, Legal Secretary (from 4 August)

Ms Kerstin SCHWIESOW, Personal Assistant

Mr Gunnar SELVIK, Registrar

Mr Philipp SPEITLER, Legal Secretary

Ms Sharon WORTELBOER, Administrative Assistant


CURRICULA VITAE OF THE JUDGES AND THE REGISTRAR

Carl BAUDENBACHER

Born: 1 September 1947, in Basel, Switzerland, citizen of Murten.

Education: University of Berne school of law and economics 1967–1971; Dr. jur. University of Berne 1978, Alexander-von-Humboldt-scholar, Max Planck Institute of International Intellectual Property Law Munich 1979–1981, Habilitation/Privatdozent University of Zurich 1983.

Professional career: Universities of Berne and Zurich, Assistant, 1972–1978; Legal Secretary, Bülach District Court, 1982–1984; Visiting Professor, Universities of Bochum, Berlin, Tübingen, Marburg, Saarbrücken, 1984–1986; Professor of Private Law, University of

Kaiserslautern, 1987; Chair of Private, Commercial and Economic Law, University of St. Gallen 1987-2013; Director of the University of St. Gallen Institute of European Law 1991-2014; since 2014 Director of the University if St. Gallen Competence Center of European and International Law; Visiting Professor, University of Geneva, 1989-1990; Visiting Professor University of Texas School of Law 1993-2004; Chairman of the St. Gallen International Competition Law Forum since 1994; Co-Chairman of the Grigory Tunkin Readings at Moscow State (Lomonosov) University; Member of the Board of the Center for Global Energy, International Arbitration, and Environmental Law of the University of Texas School of Law; Member of the Supreme Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein, 1994–1995; Expert advisor to the Governments of the Principality of Liechtenstein, Israel, the Russian Federation and the Swiss Confederation as well as to both chambers of the Parliament of the Swiss Confederation; Judge of the EFTA Court since 6 September 1995; President of the EFTA Court since 15 January 2003; Dr. rer. pol. h.c. of Leuphana University 2012.

Publications: Over 40 books and over 200 articles on European and International law, law of obligations, labour law, law of unfair competition, antitrust law, company law, intellectual property law, comparative law and the law of international courts.

© YAPH

Book 3


Per CHRISTIANSEN

Born: 1949 in Larvik, Norway.

Education: Cand jur (University of Oslo), 1976; studies at the University of Glasgow, 1978-1979; Dr Juris (University of Oslo),1988; Fulbright Scholar (George Washington University, Washington DC), 2005-2006.

Professional career: Legal Counsellor, Norges Bank, 1976-1982; Head of Division and Deputy Director in the Economic Policy Department, Ministry of Finance, 1982-1985; Head of Office and Secretary to the Board of Governors, Norges Bank, 1985-1986; Assistant Director General of the Economic Policy Department, Ministry of Finance, 1986-1988;

Counsellor, Norwegian Mission to the European Communities (Brussels), 1988-1994; Director General in the Economic Policy Department, Ministry of Finance, 1994; Director General of the Financial Markets Department, Ministry of Finance, 1994-1995; Registrar at the EFTA Court, 1995-1998; Advocate at Advokatfirmaet Pricewaterhouse Coopers DA, 1998-2002; Professor of Law at the University of Tromsø, Norway since 2001; Judge at the EFTA Court since 2011.

Publications: various publications in the field of international law, EU and EEA law and financial law.

©Jessica Theis


Páll HREINSSON

Born: 20 February 1963, in Reykjavík, Iceland

Education: Cand. Juris 1988 from the University of Iceland. Visitor student in Administrative Law and Public Administration at the University of Copenhagen 1990-1991. Doctor Juris 2005 from the University of Iceland.

Professional career: Assistant Judge, City Court of Reykjavik, 1988-1991; Special Assistant, The Althing Ombudsman (The Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Office), 1991-1998; Member of the committees of specialists which wrote the legislative bills on the Administrative Act from 1993 and the Freedom of Information Act from 1996; Associate Professor, Faculty

of Law, University of Iceland, 1998-1999; Professor of Law, University of Iceland, 1999-2007; Vice-Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Iceland, 2002-2005; Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Iceland, 2005 – 2007; Chairman of the Commission for access to administrative documentation from the 1st of January 2005 to the 1st of September 2007. Justice at Supreme Court of Iceland, 2007-2011. Chairman of the Special Investigation Commission which was established with Act no. 142/2008 on an Investigation of the Events Leading To, and the Causes Of, the Downfall of the Icelandic Banks in 2008, and Related Events, from the 1st of January 2009 to the 1st of September 2010. Chairman of the Board of The Data Protection Authority 1999-2011. Chairman of the Committee on the Evaluation of the Judicial Candidates in Iceland 2010-2011. Judge at the EFTA Court since 2011.

Publications: books and articles on Administrative law, constitutional law, Data Protection and Information Privacy, financial law and EU and EEA law.

©Jessica Theis

Book 3


GUNNAR SELVIK

Born: 13 November 1963, in Bergen, Norway

Education: Master’s degree in Economics, Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, 1986; Norwegian Law Degree, University of Oslo, 1992; Special subject EEA law, University of Oslo, 1994.

Professional career: Miscellaneous posts as officer in the Norwegian Navy, 1986-92; Financial Officer/Treasury Officer, NACMA (NATO), Brussels, Belgium, 1992-98; Registrar, EFTA-Court, Luxemburg 1998-2001; Senior Project leader/lawyer, Interpro AS, Bergen, Norway, 2001-03; Director, West Norway Office, Brussels, Belgium/Bergen, Norway, 2003-06;

Director, Goods Division, EFTA Secretariat, Brussels, Belgium, 2006-12; Appointed Registrar of the EFTA Court in September 2012.

Publications: The development and planning of the Haukeland University Hospital, Bergen, Norway; The academic status of officers graduated from the Norwegian Naval Academy.

©Jessica Theis

1422

IV. List of Court Decisions published

in the EFTA Court Reports


Book 3

1423

IV. List of Court Decisions published

in the EFTA Court Reports

1424Cases 1994 – 2014

CASES 1994 – 2014

Case Parties Type of CaseEFTA Court

Report

1 E-1/94 Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Tullilautakunta, Finland

Admissibility – Free movement of goods – State monopolies of a commercial character – Import monopoly – Articles 11, 13 and 16 of the EEA Agreement – Unconditional and sufficiently precise

[1994-1995] p. 15

2 E-2/94 Scottish Salmon Growers Association Ltd v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Constituent Elements – Judicial Review – Statement of Reasons – Admissibility – Locus standi – Direct and Individual Concern

[1994-1995] p. 59

3 E-3/94 Alexander Flandorfer Friedmann and Others v Republic of Austria

Jurisdiction – Procedure – Admissibility – Legal aid [1994-1995] p. 83

4 E-4/94 Konsument- ombudsmannen v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Marknadsdomstolen, Sweden

Withdrawn

[1994-1995] p. 89

5 E-5/94 Konsumentombuds-mannen v TV-shop i Sverige AB

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Marknadsdomstolen, Sweden

Withdrawn

[1994-1995] p. 93

6 E-6/94 Reinhard Helmers v EFTA Surveillance Authority and Kingdom of Sweden

Direct Action

Procedure – Admissibility – Application for revision

[1994-1995] p. 97 and

103

7 E-7/94 Data Delecta Aktiebolag and Ronnie Forsberg v MSL Dynamics Ltd

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Högsta domstolen, Sweden

Withdrawn

[1994-1995] p. 109

8 Joined Cases

E-8/94 andE-9/94

Forbrukerombudet v Mattel Scandinavia A/S and Lego Norge A/S

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Markedsrådet, Norway

Admissibility – Free movement of services – Council Directive 89/552/EEC – Transmitting State principle – Televised advertising targeting children – Broadcasters/ Advertisers – Circumvention – Directed advertising – Council Directive 84/450/EEC

[1994-1995] p. 113

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1425

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

9 E-1/95 Ulf Samuelsson v Svenska staten

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Varbergs tingsrätt, Sweden

Admissibility – Council Directive 80/987/EEC – National measures to counter abuse – Proportionality

[1994-1995] p. 145

10 E-2/95 Eilert Eidesund v Stavanger Catering A/S

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Gulating lagmannsrett, Norway

Council Directive 77/187/EEC – Transfer of part of a business – Transfer of rights to pension benefits

[1995-1996] p. 1

11 E-3/95 Torgeir Langeland v Norske Fabricom A/S

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Stavanger byrett, Norway

Council Directive 77/187/EEC – Transfer of rights to pension benefits

[1995-1996] p. 36

12 E-1/96 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Republic of Iceland

Discontinuance of proceedings [1995-1996] p. 63

13 E-2/96 Jørn Ulstein and Per Otto Røiseng v Asbjørn Møller

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Inderøy herredsrett, Norway

Council Directive 77/187/EEC – Transfer of rights to pension benefits

[1995-1996] p. 65

14 E-3/96 Tor Angeir Ask and Others v ABB Offshore Technology AS and Aker Offshore Partner AS


Council Directive 77/187/EEC – Transfer of part of a business

[1997] p. 1

15 E-4/96 Fridtjof Frank Gundersen v Oslo kommune

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Oslo byrett, Norway

Withdrawn

[1997] p. 28

16 E-5/96 Ullensaker kommune and Others v Nille AS

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Borgarting lagmannsrett, Norway

Admissibility – Free movement of goods – Licensing scheme

[1997] p. 30

17 E-6/96 Tore Wilhelmsen AS v Oslo kommune


Alcohol sales – State monopolies of a commercial character – Free movement of goods

[1997] p. 53

18 E-7/96 Paul Inge Hansen v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for failure to act – Admissibility

[1997] p. 100

1426Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

19 E-1/97 Fridtjof Frank Gundersen v Oslo kommune, supported by Norway


Alcohol sales – State monopolies of a commercial character – Free movement of goods

[1997] p. 108

20 E-2/97 Mag Instrument Inc v California Trading Company Norway, Ulsteen

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Fredrikstad byrett, Norway

Exhaustion of trade mark rights

[1997] p. 127

21 E-3/97 Jan and Kristian Jæger AS, supported by Norwegian Association of Motor Car Dealers and Service Organisations v Opel Norge AS

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Nedre Romerike herredsrett, Norway

Competition – Motor vehicle distribution system – Compatibility with Article 53(1) EEA – Admission to the system – Nullity

[1998] p. 1

22 E-4/97 The Norwegian Bankers’ Association v EFTA Surveillance Authority, supported by Kingdom of Norway

Direct Action

State Aid – Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Admissibility – Exceptions under Article 59(2) EEA – Procedures

[1998] p. 38 and

[1999] p. 1

23 E-5/97 European Navigation Inc v Star Forsikring AS, under offentlig administrasjon (under public administration)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Høysteretts kjæremålsutvalg, Norway

Withdrawn

[1998] p. 59

24 E-7/97 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Kingdom of Norway

Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Safety and health protection of workers in surface and underground mineral – extracting industries – Council Directive 92/104/EEC

[1998] p. 62

25 E-8/97 TV 1000 Sverige AB v Norwegian Government


Council Directive 89/552/EEC – Transfrontier television broadcasting – Pornography

[1998] p. 68

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1427

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

26 E-9/97 Erla María Sveinbjörnsdóttir v Government of Iceland

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur, Iceland

Council Directive 80/987/EEC – Incorrect implementation of a directive – Liability of an EFTA State

[1998] p. 95


Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfill its obligations – Health protection for workers exposed to vinyl chloride monomer – Council Directive 78/610/EEC

[1998] p. 134

28 E-1/98 Norwegian Government v Astra Norge AS


Free movement of goods – Copyright – Disguised restriction on trade

[1998] p. 140

29 E-2/98 Federation of Icelandic Trade (Samtök verslunarinnar – Félag íslenskra stórkaupmanna, FIS) v Government of Iceland and the Pharmaceutical Pricing Committee (Lyfjaverðsnefnd)


Pricing of pharmaceutical products – General price decrease – Price control system

[1998] p. 172

30 E-3/98 Herbert Rainford-Towning

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz des Fürstentums Liechtenstein

Right of establishment – Residence requirement for managing director of a company

[1998] p. 205

31 E-4/98 Blyth Software Ltd v AlphaBit AS


Withdrawn

[1998] p. 239

32 E-5/98 Fagtún ehf v Byggingarnefnd Borgarholtsskóla, Government of Iceland, City of Reykjavík and Municipality of Mosfellsbær

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Hæstiréttur Íslands, Iceland

General prohibition on discrimination – Free movement of goods – Post-tender negotiations in public procurement proceedings

[1999] p. 51

1428Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

33 E-6/98 R & E-6/98

Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

State aid – Suspension of operation of a measure – Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – General measures – Effect on trade – Aid schemes

[1998] p. 242 and

[1999] p. 74

34 E-1/99 Storebrand Skadeforsikring AS v Veronika Finanger

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Norges Høyesterett, Norway

Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives – Driving under the influence of alcohol – Compensation for passengers

[1999] p. 119


Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations - Council Directive 92/51/EEC on a second general system for the recognition of professional education and training to supplement Directive 89/48/EEC

[2000-2001] p. 1

36 E-1/00 State Debt Management Agency v Íslandsbanki-FBA hf.


Free movement of capital – State guarantees issued on financial loans – Different guarantee fees for foreign and domestic loans

[2000-2001] p. 8

37 E-2/00 Allied Colloids and Others v Norwegian State


Free movement of goods – Directives on dangerous substances and preparations – Joint Statements of the EEA Joint Committee

[2000-2001] p. 35


Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Fortification of foodstuffs with iron and vitamins – Protection of public health – Precautionary principle

[2000-2001] p. 73

39 E-4/00 Dr Johann Brändle Request for an Advisory Opinion from Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz des Fürstentums Liechtenstein

Right of establishment – Single practice rule – Justification by overriding reasons of general interest

[2000-2001] p. 123

40 E-5/00 Dr Josef Mangold Request for an Advisory Opinion from Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz des Fürstentums Liechtenstein


[2000-2001] p. 163

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1429

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

41 E-6/00 Dr Jürgen Tschannet Request for an Advisory Opinion from Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz des Fürstentums Liechtenstein


[2000-2001] p. 203

42 E-7/00 Halla Helgadóttir v Daníel Hjaltason and Iceland Insurance Company Ltd


Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives – Standardised compensation system – Compensation for victims

[2000-2001] p. 246

43 E-8/00 Landsorganisa- sjonen i Norge v Kommunenes Sentralforbund and Others

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Arbeidsretten, Norway

Competition rules – Collective agreements – Transfer of occupational pension scheme

[2002]p. 114

44 E-9/00 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway

Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – State retail alcohol monopoly – licensed serving of alcohol beverages – discrimination

[2002]p. 72

45 E-1/01 Hörður Einarsson v The Icelandic State


Differentiated value-added tax on books – Article 14 EEA – Competing products – Indirect protection of domestic products

[2002]p. 1

46 E-2/01 Dr Franz Martin Pucher

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz des Fürstentums Liechtenstein

Right of establishment – Residence requirement for at least one board member of a domiciliary company

[2002]p. 44

47 E-3/01 Alda Viggósdóttir v Íslandspóstur hf.


Council Directive 77/187/EEC – Transfer of a State administrative entity to a State owned limited liability company

[2002]p. 202

48 E-4/01 Karl K. Karlsson hf. v The Icelandic State


State alcohol monopoly – incompatibility with Article 16 EEA – State liability in the event of a breach of EEA law – Conditions of liability

[2002]p. 240

1430Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

49 E-5/01 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Principality of Liechtenstein

Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations - Council Directive 87/344/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance

[2000-2001] p. 287

50 E-6/01 CIBA and Others v The Norwegian State


Rules of procedure – Admissibility – Jurisdiction of the Court – Competence of the EEA Joint Committee

[2002]p. 281

51 E-7/01 Hegelstad and Others v Hydro Texaco AS


Competition – Exclusive purchasing agreement – Service-station agreement – Article 53 EEA – Regulation 1984/83 – Nullity

[2002]p. 310

52 E-8/01 Gunnar Amundsen AS and Others v Vectura AS


Withdrawn

[2002]p. 236


Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Equal Rights Directive - Reservation of academic positions for women

[2003]p. 1

54 E-2/02 Technologien Bau- und Wirtschaftsberatung GmbH and Bellona Foundation v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance

Authority-State aid-Admissibility-Locus standi

[2003]p. 52

55 E-3/02 Paranova AS v Merck & Co., Inc. and Others

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Norges Høyesterett, Norway

Parallel imports – Article 7(2) of Directive 89/104/EEC – Use of coloured stripes on the parallel importer’s repackaging design – Legitimate reasons

[2003]p. 101

56 E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland

Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – free movement of services -higher tax on intra-EEA flights than on domestic flights

[2003]p. 143

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1431

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

57 E-2/03 Ákæruvaldið (The Public Prosecutor) v Ásgeir Logi Ásgeirsson, Axel Pétur Ásgeirsson and Helgi Már Reynisson

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjaness, Iceland

Jurisdiction – Admissibility – Fish products – Protocol 9 to the EEA Agreement – rules of origin – Protocol 4 to the EEA Agreement – Free Trade Agreement EEC-Iceland

[2003]p. 185

58 E-3/03 Transportbedriftenes Landsforening and Nor-Way Bussekspress AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Withdrawal of an application

[2004]p. 1


Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Article 8 of Directive 98/34/EC

[2004]p. 3

60 E-1/04 Fokus Bank ASA v

The Norwegian State, represented by Skattedirektoratet (the Directorate of Taxes)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Frostating lagmannsrett, Norway

Free movement of capital – taxation of dividends – tax credit granted exclusively to shareholders resident in a Contracting Party – denial of procedural rights to shareholders resident in other Contracting Parties

[2004]p. 11

61 E-2/04 Reidar Rasmussen, Jan Rossavik, and Johan Käldman, v Total E&P Norge AS, v/styrets formann


Transfer of undertakings - Council Directive 77/187/EEC – time of transfer – objection to transfer of employment relationship

[2004]p. 57

62 E-3/04 Tsomakas Athanasios and Others with Odfjell ASA as an accessory intervener v The Norwegian State, represented by Rikstrygdeverket


Freedom of movement for workers - social security for migrant workers - Title II of Regulation 1408/71 – form E 101 - Article 3 EEA

[2004]p. 95

1432Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

63 E-4/04 Pedicel AS v Sosial- og helsedirektoratet (Directorate for Health and Social Affairs

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Markedsrådet, Norway

Free movement of goods and services - prohibition against alcohol advertisement - trade in wine – Articles 8(3) and 18 EEA - “other technical barriers to trade”- advertisement of wine – restriction – protection of public health – principle of proportionality – applicability of the precautionary principle

[2005]p. 1

64 Joined Cases

E-5/04E-6/04 and

E-7/04

Fesil and Finnfjord, PIL and others and The Kingdom of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

State aid – Exemptions from energy tax for the manufacturing and mining industries – Admissibility – Selectivity – Effect on trade and distortion of competition – Existing aid and new aid – Recovery – Legal certainty – Legitimate expectations – Proportionality

[2005]p. 117

65 E-8/04 EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Principality of Liechtenstein

Direct Action

Right of establishment – Residence requirement for one member of management board and one member of executive management in banks

[2005]p. 46

66 E-9/04 The Bankers’ and Securities’ Dealers Association of Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – State guarantee for a publicly owned institution – State aid – Services of General Economic Interest – Decision not to raise objections – Initiation of the formal investigation procedure – Admissibility

[2006]p. 42

67 E-9/04 COSTS

The Bankers’ and Securities’ Dealers Association of Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Taxation of costs

[2007]p. 74

68 E-9/04 COSTS II

Bankers´and Securities´Dealers Association of Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Taxation of costs

[2007]p. 220

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1433

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

69 E-10/04 Paolo Piazza v Paul Schurte AG

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Fürstliches Landgericht (Princely Court of Justice), Liechtenstein

Admissibility –security for costs before national courts – free movement of capital – freedom to provide services

[2005]p. 76

70 E-1/05 EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway

Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – life assurance services – freedom to provide services and right of establishment – Article 33 of Directive 2002/83/EC – justification of restriction based on general good – proportionality

[2005]p. 234

71 E-2/05 EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Republic of Iceland

Direct Action

State aid - Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Second subparagraph of Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA – Validity of a decision by the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Termination of tax measures and recovery of aid - Absolute impossibility to implement a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority

[2005]p. 202


Direct Action

Failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – free movement of workers – social security for migrant workers with family members residing in an EEA State other than the State of employment – regional residence requirement for family benefits – Article 73 of Regulation EEC 1408/71 – Article 7(2) of Regulation EEC 1612/68 – discrimination – justification on grounds of promoting sustainable settlement

[2006]p. 102

73 E-4/05 HOB-vín v The Icelandic State and Áfengis- og tóbaksverslun ríkisins (the State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Reykjavík District Court), Iceland

Free movement of goods – State monopolies of a commercial character – requirements to supply goods on pallets and to include the pallet price in the price of the goods – discrimination against importers of alcoholic beverages – abuse of a dominant position

[2006]p. 4

1434Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

74 Joined Cases

E-5/05 E-6/05 E-7/05

E-8/05 andE-9/05

EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Principality of Liechtenstein

Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services – Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) – Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) – Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) – Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive)

[2006]p. 142


Direct Action

National legislation transferring the operation of gaming machines to a State-owned monopoly – restriction of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services – justification – legitimate aims – consistency of national legislation – necessity of national legislation

[2007]p. 8


Direct Action

Conditions for concession for acquisition of hydropower resources – scope of the EEA Agreement – free movement of capital – right of establishment – indirect discrimination – public ownership – security of energy supply – environmental protection – proportionality

[2007]p. 164

77 E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v Staten v/Kultur- og kirkedepartementet and Staten v/Landbruks- og matdepartementet

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Oslo tingrett (Oslo District Court), Norway

Right of establishment – freedom to provide services – national restrictions on gambling and betting – legitimate aims – suitability/ consistency – necessity – provision and marketing of gaming services from abroad

[2007]p. 86

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1435

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

78 E-4/06 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Staten v/ Finansdepartementet (The Norwegian State, represented by the Ministry of Finance)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Borgarting lagmanssrett (Borgarting Court of Appeal), Norway

Withdrawn

[2007]p. 4


Direct Action

(Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Article 4(1) and (2a) of Regulation EEC 1408/71 – social security benefits and special non-contributory benefits – legal effect of Annex IIa to Regulation EEC 1408/71 listing special non-contributory benefits – Decision 1/95 of the EEA Council on the entry into force of the EEA Agreement for Liechtenstein)

[2007]p. 296


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise

[2007]p. 238

81 E-1/07 Criminal proceedings against A


Lawyers’ freedom to provide services – Council Directive 77/249/EEC – Article 7 EEA – Protocol 35 EEA – principles of primacy and direct effect – conforming interpretation

[2007]p. 246


Direct Action

Widow’s and widower’s pension rights – Equal treatment of women and men – Article 69 EEA – Directive 79/7/EEC – Directive 86/378/EEC

[2007]p. 280


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2002/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 amending Directive 97/68/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures against the emission of gaseous and particulate pollutants from internal combustion engines to be installed in non-road mobile machinery

[2007]p. 356

1436Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

84 E-4/07 Jón Gunnar Þorkelsson

v Gildi-lífeyrissjóður

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Reykjavík District Court), Iceland

Invalidity pension rights – free movement of workers – Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 – Regulation (EEC) No 574/72

[2008]p. 3

85 E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Municipal kindergartens – State aid – Notion of undertaking – Decision not to raise objections – Initiation of the formal investigation procedure – Admissibility

[2008]p. 62

86 E-6/07 HOB vín ehf. v Faxaflóahafnir sf.

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Hæstiréttur Íslands (the Supreme Court of Iceland), Iceland

Port charges – charges having equivalent effect to customs duties – internal taxation – free movement of goods

[2008]p. 128

87 E-7/07 Seabrokers AS v The Norwegian State, represented by Skattedirektoratet (the Directorate of Taxes)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Stavanger tingrett (Stavanger District Court), Norway

Freedom of establishment – double taxation agreement – calculation of maximum credit allowance for tax paid in another EEA State – debt interest and group contributions

[2008]p. 172

88 E-8/07 Celina Nguyen v The Norwegian State, represented by Justis- og politidepartementet (the Ministry of Justice and the Police)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Oslo tingrett (Oslo District Court), Norway

Compulsory insurance for civil liability in respect of motor vehicles – Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC and 90/232/EEC – compensation for non-economic injury – conditions for State liability – sufficiently serious breach

[2008]p. 224

89 Joined Cases

E-9/07 and E-10/07

L’Oréal Norge AS (Case E-9/07 and Case E-10/07); L’Oréal SA (Case E-10/07) v Per Aarskog AS (Case E-9/07); Nille AS (Case E-9/07); Smart Club AS (Case E-10/07)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Follo tingrett (Follo District Court) and Oslo tingrett (Oslo District Court), Norway

Exhaustion of trade mark rights

[2008]p. 259

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1437

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

90 Joined Cases

E-11/07 and E-1/08

Olga Rindal (Case E-11/07); Therese Slinning, represented by legal guardian Olav Slinning (Case E-1/08) v The Norwegian State, represented by the Board of Exemptions and Appeals for Treatment Abroad

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Borgarting lagmannsrett (Borgarting Court of Appeal) and Oslo tingrett (Oslo District Court), Norway

Social security – Freedom to provide services – National health insurance systems – Hospital treatment costs incurred in another EEA State – Experimental and test treatment

[2008]p. 320


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2004/26/EC relating to measures against the emission of gaseous and particulate pollutants from internal combustion engines to be installed in non-road mobile machinery

[2008]p. 301


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Regulation (EC) No 648/2004 on detergents

[2008]p. 308

93 E-4/08 Claudia Sebjanic v Christian Peters


Withdrawn

[2008]p. 299

94 E-5/08 Yannike Bergling v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Inadmissable

[2008]p. 316


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2002/91/EC on the energy performance of buildings

[2009-2010]p. 4


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Freedom of establishment – Residence requirements

[2009-2010]p. 46

1438Cases 1994 – 2014


Report


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Commission Regulation (EC) No 593/2007 on the fees and charges levied by the European Aviation Safety Agency – judgment by default

[2009-2010]p. 12


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as

Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC

[2009-2010]p. 20

99 E-4/09 Inconsult v the Financial Market Authority (Finanz-marktaufsicht)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Appeals Commission of the Financial Market Authority (Beschwerdekommission der Finanzmarktaufsicht), Liechtenstein,

Admissibility – Directive 2002/92/EC on

insurance mediation – Concept of a “durable

medium

[2009-2010]p. 86


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC

[2009-2010]p. 30

101 E-6/09 Magasin- og Uke-presseforeningen v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for failure to act – State aid – Existing aid – Admissibility

[2009-2010]p. 144


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies

[2009-2010]p. 38

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1439

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

103 E-8/09 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Republic of Iceland

Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to lifts – Judgment by default

[2009-2010]p. 180

104 E-1/10 Periscopus AS v Oslo Børs ASA and Erik Must AS

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Oslo District Court (Oslo tingrett)

Directive 2004/25/EC – Acquisition of control – Mandatory bid – Adjustment of the bid price – Clearly determined circumstances and criteria – Reference to market price

[2009-2010]p. 198

105 E-2/10 Thor Kolbeinsson v The Icelandic State

Direct Action

Safety and health of workers – Directives 89/391/EEC and 92/57/EEC – Article 3 EEA – Employers’ and employees’ liability for work accidents – State liability

[2009-2010]p. 234


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2002/87/EC on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate

[2009-2010]p. 188

107 E-5/10 Dr. Joachim Kottke v Präsidial Anstalt and Sweetyle Stiftung

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Fürstliches Obergericht (Princely Court of Appeal)

Security for costs before national courts –

Discrimination – Article 4 EEA – Justification

[2009-2010]p. 320

108 E-4,6,7/10 The Prinicipality of Liechtenstein, REASSUR Aktiengesellschaft and Swisscom RE Aktiengesellschaft v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of ESA decision 97/10/COL regarding the taxation of captive insurance companies under the Liechtenstein Tax Act

[2011]p. 16

1440Cases 1994 – 2014


Report


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications

[2009-2010]p. 296


Direct Action


[2009-2010]p. 304


Direct Action


[2009-2010]p. 312


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2006/54/EC on implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation

[2009-2010]p. 368


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of provision of services

[2011]p.117

114 E-13/10 Aleris Ungplan AS v Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Refusal by ESA to commence proceedings for alleged failure of an EEA State to fulfil its obligations in the field of procurement

[2011]p. 3

115 E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Application for the annulment of ESA decision 254/10/COL of 21 June 2010, to close case without opening formal investigation procedure

[2011]p. 266

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1441

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

116 E-16/10 Philip Morris Norway AS v Staten v/Helse- og omsorgsdeparte-mentet

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Oslo District Court (Oslo tingrett)

Free movement of goods – Prohibition on the visual display of tobacco products – Articles 11 and 13 EEA – Measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions –Selling arrangements – Protection of public health – Proportionality

[2011]p. 330


Direct Action

Non-compliance with a judgment of the Court establishing a failure to fulfil obligations - Article 33 SCA - Measures necessary to comply with the judgment of the Court

[2011]p. 202

118 E-1/11 Norwegian Appeal Board for Health Personnel - appeal from A

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Appeal Board for Health Personnel (Statens helsepersonellnemnd)

Free movement of persons – Directive 2005/36/EC – Recognition of professional qualifications – Protection of public health – Non-discrimination - Proportionality

[2011]p. 484

119 E-3/11 Pálmi Sigmarsson v the Central Bank of Iceland

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Reykjavík District Court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur)

Free movement of capital – Article 43 EEA – National restrictions on capital movements – Jurisdiction – Proportionality – Legal certainty

[2011]p. 430

120 E-4/11 Arnulf Clauder Request for an Advisory Opinion from Verwaltungsgerichtshof des Fürstentums Liechtenstein (Administrative Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein)

Directive 2004/38/EC – Family reunification – Right of residence for family members of EEA nationals holding a right of permanent residence – Condition to have sufficient resources

[2011]p. 216

1442Cases 1994 – 2014


Report


Direct Action

Non-compliance with a judgment of the Court establishing a failure to fulfil obligations - Article 33 SCA - Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a

European Maritime Safety Agency – Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 on multiannual funding for the action of the European Maritime Safety Agency in the field of response to pollution caused by ships and amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002

[2011]p. 418


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2002/49/EC on the assessment and management of environmental noise

[2011]p. 467

123 E-14/10 COSTS

Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

(Taxation of costs)

[2012]p. 900

124 E-15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Competition – Abuse of a dominant position – Market for business-to-consumer over-the-counter parcel delivery – Distribution network – Exclusivity agreements – Conduct liable to eliminate competition on the market – Justification – Duration of infringement – Fine

[2012]p. 246

125 Joined Cases

E-17/10E-6/11

The Principality of Liechtenstein and VTM Fund- management v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – State aid – Special tax rules applicable to investment companies – Selectivity – Existing aid and new aid – Recovery – Legitimate expectations – Legal certainty – Obligation to state reasons

[2012]p. 114

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1443

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

126 E-2/11 STX Norway Offshore AS m.fl. v Staten v/Tariffnemnda

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Borgarting lagmannsrett (Borgarting Court of Appeal)

Freedom to provide services – Directive 96/71/EC – Posting of workers – Minimum rates of pay – Maximum working hours – Remuneration for work assignments requiring overnight stay – Compensation for expenses

[2012]p. 4

127 E-7/11 Grund, elli- og hjúkrunarheimili v Lyfjastofnun

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Reykjavík District Court)

Directive 2001/83/EC – Free movement of goods – Pharmaceuticals – Parallel import – Control reports – Protection of public health – Justification – Language requirements for labelling and package leaflets

[2012]p.188

128 E-9/11 Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway

Direct ActionFailure of an EEA State to fulfil obligations –Right of establishment – Free movement of capital – Ownership limitations and voting right restrictions in financial services infrastructure institutions – Proportionality – Legal certainty

[2012]p. 442

129 Joined Cases

E-10/11and

E-11/11

Hurtigruten ASA and The Kingdom of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – State aid – Maritime transport – Article 61(1) EEA – Article 59(2) EEA – Services of general economic interest – Public service compensation – Overcompensation – Principle of good administration – Legal certainty – Obligation to state reasons

[2012]p. 758

130 E-12/11 Asker Brygge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct ActionAction for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – State aid – Sale of land by public authorities – Market investor principle – Option agreement – Relevant time of assessment for considering the market value

[2012]p. 536

1444Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

131 E-13/11 Granville Establishment v Volker Anhalt, Melanie Anhalt and Jasmin Barbaro, née Anhalt

Request for an Advisory Opinion fromthe Fürstliches Landgericht (Princely Court of Justice)

Jurisdiction agreements – Freedom to provide and receive services – Discrimination on grounds of nationality – Justification – Remedies for non-conformity with EEA law

[2012]p. 400

132 E-14/11 DB Schenker v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Admissibility – Measures of Organization of Procedure – Reopening of oral procedure

[2012]p. 1178

133 E-15/11 Arcade Drilling AS v Staten v/Skatt Vest

Request for an Advisory Opinion fromOslo tingrett (Oslo District Court)

Freedom of establishment – Articles 31 and 34 EEA – Taxation – Anti-avoidance principles – Proportionality

[2012]p. 676

134 E-17/11 Aresbank SA v Landsbankinn hf., Fjármálaráðuneytið and the Icelandic State

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Hæstiréttur Íslands (Supreme Court of Iceland)

Directive 94/19/EC – Directive 2000/12/EC – Directive 2006/48/EC – Admissibility – National legislation adopting provisions of EEA law to regulate purely internal situations – Notion of deposit – Interbank loans – Mutual recognition of an authorisation for the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions – Applicability of decisions of the EEA Joint Committee

[2012]p. 916

135 E-18/11 Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd v Kaupþing hf.


Article 34 SCA – Appeal against a decision making a request for an Advisory Opinion – Reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions – Directive 2001/24/EC – Conform interpretation

[2012]p. 592

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1445

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

136 E-19/11 Vín Tríó ehf. v the Icelandic State


Free movement of goods – Admissibility – Product coverage – Articles 11 and 16 EEA - State monopolies of a commercial character – Rules concerning the existence and operation of a monopoly – Product selection rules – Refusal to sell alcoholic beverages containing stimulants such as caffeine – Discrimination between domestic and imported products – Absence of domestic production

[2012]p. 974

137 E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – State aid – Alleged aid granted to Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA) – Decision not to open the formal investigation procedure – Notion of economic activity – Notion of doubts – Obligation to state reasons

[2012]p. 1040

138 E-2/12 HOB-vín ehf. v Áfengis- og tóbaksverslun ríkisins


Free movement of goods – Directive 2000/

13/EC – Product coverage – Labelling of

foodstuffs – Misleading labelling – Lack of

notification to ESA of a national measure – J

ustification – State liability

[2012]p. 1092


Direct Action

Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes – Obligation of result – Emanation of the State – Discrimination

[2013]p. 4

140 E-3/12 Staten v/Arbeidsdeparte-mentet v Stig Arne Jonsson

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Borgarting lagmannsrett (Borgarting Court of Appeal)

Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 – Social security for migrant workers – Unemployment benefits – Residence in the territory of another EEA State – Condition of actual presence in the State of last employment for entitlement to unemployment benefits

[2013]p. 136

1446Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

141 E-10/12 Yngvi Harðarson v Askar Capital hf.

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Reykjvik District Court)

Directive 91/533/EEC – Obligation to inform employees – Amendments to a written contract of employment – Effect of non-notification of amendments

[2013]p. 204


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC

[2013]p. 240


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Council Directive 90/167/EEC of 26 March 1990 laying down the conditions governing the preparation, placing on the market and use of medicated feedingstuffs in the Community

[2013]p. 248

144 E-14/12 EFTA Surveillance Authority v the Principality of Liechtenstein

Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Freedom of establishment – Freedom to provide services – Articles 31 and 36 EEA – Obligation on temporary work agencies to deposit a guarantee – Indirect and direct discrimination – Residence requirement – Justification

[2013]p. 256

145 E-11/12 Beatrix Koch, Lothar Hummel and Stefan Müller v Swiss Life (Liechtenstein) AG

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Fürstliche Landgericht des Fürstentums Liechtenstein (Princely Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein)

Directive 90/619/EEC – Directive 92/96/EEC – Directive 2002/83/EC – Directive 2002/92/EC – Life assurance – Unit-linked benefits – Obligation to provide fair advice – Information to be communicated to the policy holder before the contract is concluded – Principle of equivalence – Principle of effectiveness

[2013]p. 272

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1447

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report


Direct Action

Action for failure to act – Non-contractual liability of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Legitimate expectations – Principle of good administration – Failure of the EFTA Surveillance Authority to take a decision within a self-imposed time limit

[2013]p. 356

147 E-9/12 Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – State aid – Sale of land by public authorities – Market investor principle – State Aid Guidelines – Well-publicised bidding procedure comparable to an auction – Manifest error of assessment – Principle of sound administration – Obligation to state reasons

[2013]p. 454

148 E-15/12 Jan Anfinn Wahl v the Icelandic State

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Hæstiréttur Íslands (the Supreme Court of Iceland)

Article 3 EEA – Article 7 EEA – Form and method of implementation of directives – Directive 2004/38/EC – Free movement of EEA nationals – Restrictions on right of entry – Procedural safeguards

[2013]p. 534

149 E-6/12 EFTA Surveillance Authority v the Kingdom of Norway

Direct Action

Failure by an EEA/EFTA State to fulfil its obligations – Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 – Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 – Social security for migrant worker

[2013]p. 618

150 Joined Cases

E-4/12 and E-5/12

Risdal Touring AS and Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Admissibility – No need to adjudicate

[2013]p. 668

151 E-2/13 Bentzen Transport AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Refusal to commence proceedings for alleged failure of an EEA State to fulfil its obligations in the field of procurement – Actionable measures – Admissibility

[2013]p. 802

1448Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

152 E-2/12 INT HOB-vín ehf. Direct Action

Interpretation of a judgment – Advisory Opinion – Application manifestly inadmissible

[2013]p. 816

153 E-22/13 Íslandsbanki hf. v Gunnar V. Engilbertsson

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Hæstiréttur Íslands (the Supreme Court of Iceland)

Withdrawal of a request for an Advisory Opinion

[2013]p. 826


Direct Action

Failure by an EEA State to fulfil its obligations – Commission Directive 2010/48/EU of 5 July 2010 adapting to technical progress Directive 2009/40/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles and their trailers

[2013]p. 830


Direct Action

Failure by an EEA/EFTA State to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle for equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast)

[2013]p. 840


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2002/92/EC of 9 December 2002 on insurance mediation

[2013]p. 848

157 E-6/13 Metacom AG v Rechtsanwälte Zipper & Collegen

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Fürstliche Landgericht des Fürstentums Liechtenstein (Princely Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein)

Lawyers’ freedom to provide cross-border services – Directive 77/249/EEC – Self-representation – Notification requirement in national law – Consequences of failure to notify

[2013]p. 856

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1449

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report


Direct Action

Failure by an EEA State to fulfil its obligations –Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing

[2013]p. 914


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Articles 31 and 40 EEA – Different taxation on domestic and cross border mergers within the EEA

[2013]p. 924


Direct Action

Failure by an EEA State to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests

[2013]p. 936


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Failure to implement - Directive 2008/122/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts

[2013]p. 946


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2009/44/EC – Failure to implement

[2013]p. 954


Direct Action


[2013]p. 962

164 E-7/13 Creditinfo Lánstraust hf. v Register Iceland and the Icelandic State

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Reykjvik District Court)

Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information – Principles governing charging – Transparency – Notion of cost – Self-financing requirements

[2013]p. 970

1450Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

165 E-1/13 Míla v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment – State aid – Lease contract – Failure to initiate the formal investigation procedure – Admissibility – Legal interest – Status as interested party – Doubts or serious difficulties – Market investor principle – Tender procedure

[2014]p. 4


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2009/111/EC – Failure to implement – Failure to notify

[2014]p. 58

167 E-23/13 Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Verwaltungsgerichtshof des Fürstentums Liechtenstein (the Administrative Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein)

Directive 2003/6/EC – Admissibility – Judicial or administrative function – Information request – Requirement in national law to set out the facts that give rise to the suspicion

[2014]p. 88


Direct Action

Action for annulment of decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Admissibility

[2014]p. 148

169 E-26/13 The Icelandic State v Atli Gunnarsson

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Hæstiréttur Íslands (Supreme Court of Iceland)

Free movement of persons – Article 28 EEA – Direc-tive 2004/38/EC – Directive 90/365/EEC – Right of residence – Right to move from the home State – Less favourable tax treatment

[2014]p. 254


Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Ad-missibility – Measures of organization of procedure – EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Rules on access to documents 2012

[2014]p. 304

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1451

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report

171 Joined Cases

E-3/13 and E-20/13

Fred. Olsen and Others and Petter Olsen and Others v the Norwegian State

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Skatteklagenemnda ved Sentralskattekontoret for storbedrifter (the Tax Appeals Board for the Central Tax Office for Large Enterprises) and Oslo tingrett (Oslo District Court)

Taxation of controlled foreign companies – Right of establishment – Free movement of capital – Circumvention of national law – Justifica-tion – Proportionality

[2014]p.400

172 E-25/13 Gunnar V. Engilbertsson v Íslandsbanki hf.

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Reykjvík District Court)

Article 34 SCA – Appeal against a request for an Advisory Opinion – Indexation of mortgage loans – Directive 87/102/EEC – Directive 93/13/EEC – Principles of effectiveness and equivalence

[2014]p. 524

173 E-15/10 COSTS

DB Schenker v Posten Norge AS

Direct Action

Taxation of costs – Recoverable costs – VAT

[2014]p. 616

174 E-8/13 Abelia v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Proper representation before the Court – State aid – Alleged aid granted to lessors of premises to public schools – Decision not to open the formal investigation procedure – Legal interest – Status as interested party – Competitive link

[2014]p. 638

175 E-24/13 Casino Admiral AG v Wolfgang Egger

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Staatsgerichtshof des Fürstentums Liechtenstein (State Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein)

Freedom of establishment – Freedom to provide services – Obligation of transparency – Principles of equivalence and effectiveness

[2014]p. 732


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Failure to implement – Directive 2006/38/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures

[2014]p. 802

1452Cases 1994 – 2014


Report


Direct Action

Failure by an EEA State to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2009/12/EC on airport charges

[2014]p. 812


Direct Action

Failure by a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations – Failure to implement – Directive 2007/23/EC on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles

[2014]p. 822


Direct Action

Failure by an EEA State to fulfil its obligations – Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives

[2014]p. 830


Direct Action

Failure by an EEA State to fulfil its obligations – Freedom to provide services – Article 36 EEA – Full registration tax on leased motor vehicles temporar-ily imported by Norwegian residents to Norway

[2014]p. 840

181 E-21/13 FIFA v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Direct Action

Action for annulment – Television broadcasting – Article 14 of Directive 2010/13/EU – Measures concerning events of major importance for an EEA State – FIFA World Cup – Freedom to provide ser-vices – Right to property – Statement of reasons

[2014]p. 854

182 Joined Cases

E-4/12 and E-5/12 COSTS

EFTA Surveillance Authority v Risdal Touring AS and Konkurrenten.no AS

Direct Action

Taxation of costs – Recoverable costs – VAT

[2014]p. 934

183 E-28/13 LBI hf. v Merrill Lynch Int. Ltd.


Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/24/EC – Winding up of credit institutions – Applicable law – Voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts – Acts governed by the law of another EEA State

[2014]p. 970

CASE E-XX/X

Summary

1453

Book 3

Cases 1994 – 2014

Cases

1994-2014


Report


Direct Action


[2014]p. 1018


Direct Action


[2014]p. 1028


Direct Action


[2014]p. 1038

187 E-9/14 Proceedings concerning Otto Kaufmann AG

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Fürstliches Landgericht des Fürstentums Liechtenstein (Princely Court of Liechtenstein)

Admissibility – Exchange of information on convic-tions of legal persons – Freedom to provide services – Freedom of establishment – Directive 2004/18/EC – Directive 2006/123/EC

[2014]p. 1048

188 E-27/13 Sævar Jón Gunnarsson v Landsbankinn hf.


Indexation of loans – Directive 87/102/EEC – Consumer credit agreements – Directive 93/13/EEC – Unfair terms – Mandatory terms

[2014]p. 1090


Direct Action

Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Access to documents – Ad-missibility – Article 38 SCA – ESA’s Rules on public access to documents 2012

[2014]p. 1180

190 E-18/14 Wow Air ehf. v The Competition Authority, Isavia and Icelandair ehf.


Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 – Allocation of time slots at EEA airports – Intervention by competition authorities – Accelerated procedure

[2014]p. 1304

1454Cases 1994 – 2014


Report

191 E-10/14 Enes Deveci and Others v SAS Denmark, Norway, Sweden

Request for an Advisory Opinion from Eidsivating lagmanssrett (Eidsivating Court of Appeal)

Directive 2001/23/EC – Transfer of undertakings – Collective agreements – Freedom to conduct a business

[2014]p. 1364

The EFTA Court was set up under the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the EEA Agreement) of 2 May 1992. The EEA Agreement

entered into force on 1 January 1994. The EFTA Court is composed of three judges. The EFTA States which are parties to the EEA Agreement are

Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

This report contains information on the EFTA Court and the administration of the Court for the period from 1 January to

31 December 2014. In addition, it has a short section on the Judges and the staff and the Court’s activities in 2014.

The report includes the full texts of the decisions of the EFTA Court as well as the reports for the hearing prepared by the Judge-Rapporteurs

during this period. This Report also contains an index of decisions printed in prior editions of the EFTA Court Report.

REPORT of the EFTA Court

Documents

Transcript of REPORT of the EFTA Court