Remrev Yu Valencia

7/28/2019 Remrev Yu Valencia

1/18

Yu vs. Magpayo

[G.R. No. L-29742. March 29, 1972]

PARTIES:

Plaintiff-appellant : Vicente YuDefendant-appellee : Emilio Mapayao

FACTS:

Preliminary

Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to

recover from defendant Mapayo the sum of P2, 800,

which represented an unpaid balance of the purchase

price of an engine (Gray Marine), sold to defendant.

The defendant admitted the said transaction in his

answer but he alleged that the engine had hidden

defects causing him to spend the same amount for the

repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waivethe balance due on the price of the engine and

counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees.

Procedural history

City Court-disallowed the defenses and ordered the

defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs.

In CFI

Defendant appealed and filed an answer that was a

virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City

Court.

The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear

and the court scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on

the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present his

evidence but it failed to do so. The plaintiff's counsel

refused to comply and instead of calling his witnesses,

he moved the Court to present them after the defendant

had presented their evidence. The court asked said

counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for

the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and stick

to his demand that he would introduce his witnessesonly in rebuttal

.

This prompted the court to dismiss the case on ground

of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, hence this appeal.

MRs-Denied

Hence the petition.

ISSUE:

W/N CFI validly dismissed the case for failure toprosecute.

HELD: NO

RULE:

Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports

appellant:

Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.Admissions made by the parties in thepleadings, or in the course of the trialor other proceedings do not requireproof and cannot be contradictedunless previously shown to have beenmade through palpable mistake.

APPLICATION:

The court held that the dismissal in untenable

and contrary to law. The defendant was not able tosupport his special defences. The answer admitteddefendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, andpleaded special defences hence the plaintiff had everyright to insist that it was for the defendant to comeforward with evidence in support of his special defencesJudicial admissions do not require proof.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissais hereby revoked and set aside, and the court below is

directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff andagainst the defendant for the sum of P2,800.00, plusattorney's fees which this Court considers just andreasonable (Civil Code, Article 2208, paragraph 11)Costs against defendant-appellee.

Topic: ConsolidationACTIVE WOOD PRODUCTS CO., INC. vs.CAG.R. No. 86603. February 5, 1990

FACTS:Respondent Judge Legaspi is the presiding judge ofBranch XX where Civil Case No. 6518-M is pending.LRC Case No. P-39-84 is pending in Branch XIV

presided over by Judge Felipe N. Villajuan, Jr. Active Wood constituted a mortgage in favor of State

Investment to secure indebtedness. It wasforeclosed and the lands auctioned off to StateInvestment as the highest bidder. The certificate ofsale issued to State Investment was registered in1983.

State Investment initiated LRC Case No. P-39-84

which was assigned to Branch XIV. It filed a petitionfor the issuance of a writ of possession pendingredemption of the lands by Active Wood. JudgeVillajuan of Branch XIV granted the writ upon filing ofa bond.


2/18

On the other hand, in view of the foreclosure, Active

Wood filed Civil Case No. 6518-M, Branch XX.Respondent Judge Legaspi declared as null andvoid the foreclosure and State Investment'scertificate of sale.

SC set aside the order of Branch XX a quo that had

earlier declared null and void the foreclosure andState Investment's certificate of sale.

Subsequently, Active Wood filed a motion in LRC

Case No. P-39-84 pending in Judge Villajuan'sBranch XIV for the consolidation of said case withCivil Case No. 6518-M pending in respondentJudge's Branch XX. Moreover, Active Wood filed amotion in said LRC Case No. P-39-84 to dismiss andor suspend the proceedings of that case until BranchXX resolved the issue of validity of the mortgageraised in Civil Case No. 6518-M.

Acting on Active Wood's motions, Judge Villajuan of

Branch XIV, held in abeyance resolution of StateInvestment's petition for the Writ of Possession anddirected that said LRC Case No. P-39-84 pending inhis branch be consolidated with Civil Case No. 6518-

M pending in respondent Judge's branch providedthe latter would not object.

State Investment argues that the aforequoted

provision of the rules mention only actions, whichmeans an ordinary suit in a court of justice by whichone party prosecutes another for the enforcement orprotection of a right, or the prevention or redress of awrong. Civil Case No. 6518-M is such an action.On the other hand, LRC Case No. P-39-84 involvingthe Petition for a Writ of Possession is an ex-parteproceedings and does not require notice to be givento the other parties. The two, action andproceedings, being different, cannot beconsolidated.

The respondent Judge issued the assailed order

returning the LRC Case No. P-39-84 to Branch XIVobviously signifying his objection to the proposedconsolidation of that case with the case pending inhis branch.

ISSUE: W/N the two cases can be validly consolidated?

HELD: YESSection 1. Consolidation. When actionsinvolving a common question of law or fact are pendingbefore the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial ofany or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may orderall the actions consolidated; and it may make suchorders concerning proceedings therein as may tend toavoid unneccessary costs or delay.

The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases,

which are intimately related, acted upon by onebranch of the court to avoid the possibility ofconflicting decisions being rendered that will notserve the orderly administration of justice.

It is true that a petition for a writ of possession is

made ex-parte to facilitate proceedings, beingfounded on a presumed right of ownership. Be thatas it may, when this presumed right of ownership iscontested and made the basis of another action,

then the proceedings for writ of possession wouldalso become seemingly groundless. The entire casemust be litigated and if need be as in the case at barmust be consolidated with a related case so as tothresh out thoroughly all related issues. Thus in thecase at bar, this technical difference between anaction and a proceeding becomes insignificantand consolidation becomes a logical conclusion.

The consolidation of cases becomes mandatory

because it involves the same parties and thesame subject matterwhich is the same parcel ofland. Such consolidation is desirable to avoidconfusion and unnecessary costs and expenses withthe multiplicity of suits.

Thus the rules do not distinguish between cases

filed before the same branch or judge and those thatare pending in different branches, or before different

judges of the same court, in order that consolidationmay be proper, as long as the cases involve theresolution of questions of law or facts in commonwith each other.

The respondent court has, indeed, committed a

reversible error.

Consolidation of these two cases in Branch XX, in

which the earlier case filed now pends, is morepromotive of their expeditious and less expensivedetermination as well as the orderly administration of

justice than if they were to remain in the twobranches of the same court.

G.R. No. L-60601 December 29, 1983

CESAR NEPOMUCENO, LEON ARCILLAS

and RUBEN AVENIDO, petitioners, vs. THE

HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

OSCAR LASERNA, respondents.

TOPIC: CONSOLIDATION; Effect of Denial or

Grant of Demurrer to Evidence

DOCTRINE:

Rule on Demurrer of Evidence authorizes

a judgment on the merits of the case

without the defendant having to submit

evidence on his part as the relief sought.

The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or

instruments for the expeditious

termination of an action, similar to a

motion to dismiss, which the court or

tribunal may either grant or deny.

However, a denial of the demurrer is not a

final judgment, but merely interlocutory

in character as it does not finally dispose

of the case, the defendant having yet the


3/18

right to present his evidence, as provided

for under Section 1 of Rule 35.

FACTS:

Petitioners Cesar Nepomuceno, Leon

Arcillas and Ruben Avenido were the

official candidates of the

Nacionalista Party in the 1980 localelections for the positions of mayor,

vicemayor and member of the

Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, of

Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

On January 14, 1980, private

respondent Oscar Laserna filed a

petition before the COMELEC,

docketed as PDC Case No. 65, to

disqualify petitioners on the ground

of turncoatism.

On January 25, 1980, the COMELEC

issued Resolution No. 8484, granting

said petition, thereby denying due

course to petitioners' certificates of

candidacy.

Alleging denial of due process,

petitioners assailed said resolution

in a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with prayer for a

temporary restraining order filed

with this Court. [G.R. Nos. 52427 and

52506].

SC issued a restraining order enjoining

the COMELEC from enforcing Resolution

No. 8484, by reason wherefore petitioners

were allowed to be voted for in the

elections of January 30, 1980. It appears

that in said elections,petitioners wonand were Proclaimed winners in their

respective positions.

The COMELEC accordingly set PDC Case

No. 65 for hearing on the merits.

However, on July 17, 1980, petitioners

filed a motion to dismiss the said case,

alleging that it being a pre-election case,

the same should be dismissed, without

prejudice to the filing of appropriate quo

warrants proceedings pursuant to Section

189 of the 1978 Election Code.

Having obtained an unfavorable

ruling from the COMELEC, petitioners

filed another petition with this Court,

docketed as G.R. No. 54633,

assailing the COMELEC's resolution

which denied their motion to

dismiss.

SC dismissed the said petition. Likewise,

denying the motion for reconsideration of

the other Resolution.

Thereafter, the Comelec proceeded to

hear PDC Case No. 65, with petitioners'

manifestation 'That "They do not waive

their right to question the jurisdiction of

the Comelec" having been placed on

record.

Rejoinders and memoranda were filed by

the parties, and on March 31, 1982, the

Comelec issued the following order

denying the demurrer to evidence.

RESPONDENTS BY COUNSEL individually

filed demurrers to the evidence, to whichthe petitioner did not lose time to oppose.

The demurrers should be DENIED.

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of

the above order were likewise derived.

On April 15, 1982, petitioners filed with

the Comelec another Motion to Dismiss,

which was denied in an order dated April

16, 1982.

ISSUES:

1. THAT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO AN

ACT IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT

JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE

PETITIONERS' DEMURER TO EVIDENCE BY

WAY OF A JUDGMENT WHEREIN IT SHOULD

STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH

THE IS RESOLUTION IS BASED.


4/18

2. THAT THE RESPONDENT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF' DISCRETION, AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. IN DENYING

PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DISMISS.

3. THAT THE RESPONDENT COMELEC

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN

PROMULGATING THE RESOLUTION OF APRIL16, 1982 THROUGH THE ACT OF ONLY ONE

MEMBER OF A DIVISION.

RULING:

Petitioners are obviously misled by the

title of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court,

"Judgment on Demurer to Evidence."

It is thus apparent that the requirement

of Section 1 of Rule 36 would onlyapply if the demurrer is granted, for

in this event, there would in fact be

an adjudication on the merits of the

case, leaving nothing more to be

done, except perhaps to interpose an

appeal.

The challenged order being merely an

interlocutory order and not a final

judgment or decision, no abuse of

discretion was committed by

respondent Comelec in its failure to

state the facts and the law on which

its order denying petitioners'

demurrer to evidence is based.

Their insistence on raising said issue over

and over again is an obvious dilatory

tactic intended to frustrate this Court's

directive to respondent COMELEC to have

the case heard and terminated asexpeditiously as possible.

Clearly, the said resolution is merely

interlocutory, and being such, the

Presiding Commissioner of the Division is

competent to sign said resolution alone.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner is hereby denied.

Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. L-33695 May 15, 1989

MANUFACTURER'S BANK & TRUST CO., petitioner,

vs. DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIES, INC., and ALFONSO

TAN, respondents

TOPIC: Denial in Answer May Not Amount to Tender of

Issue

DOCTRINE:

Where amendment is not a matter of right, a bare

assertion of a desire to amend the pleading because

certain matters had not been therein alleged, or the

submission of an amended one, without more, is

obviously not sufficient. It is needful to state to the

Court some reasonable ground justifying its exercise

of discretion to allow amendment.

The denials in the amended answer are cut from the

same bolt as those in the original answer. They are

sham denials, consisting of an avowed lack ofknowledge of facts which could not but be clearly

known to the defendants or ought to be or could

quite easily have been known by them.

Amendment in the circumstances was clearly

subject to said Court's discretion the exercise of

which cannot be faulted; and the defendants' origina

answer in truth tendered no issue, or otherwise

admitted the allegations of the complaint material

and necessary to a valid decision.

FACTS:

Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. filed a complaint

with the Court of First Instance of Manila for the

recovery of a sum of money against Diversified

Industries, Inc. and Alfonso Tan. The complaint

alleged:

o Defendants were granted a loan in the

form of an agreement for credit in current

account in the sum of ONE HUNDRED

TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS

(P125,000.00) with interest at the rate of10% per annum computed upon average

daily balances.

o That the loan became due and pay able

on February 26, 1965, but the defendants

failed and refused to liquidate their

obligations, leaving an outstanding

balance of P100,119.21 as of June 25,

1965;


5/18

Manufacturers Bank moved for judgment on the

pleadings. It adverted to the defendants' admissions

of the parties' personal circumstances and "the fact

that the defendants were granted a loan in the form

of an Agreement for Credit in Current Account in the

sum of P125,000.00 with interest at the rate of 10%

per annum computed upon average daily balances,

a copy of which agreement has been attached as

Annex A of the complaint."

The defendants, Diversified Industries and Tan,

filed an opposition to the bank's motion for

judgment on the pleadings. They alleged that

neither the amounts drawn against the overdraft

account nor the current balance due from them,

were within the knowledge either of Alfonso Tan

because he was a mere "guarantor" or even of

Diversified Industries because its account

officer had long since resigned, and moreover,

they could not be expected to know the

attorney's fees that Manufacturers Bank hadundertaken to pay to its attorney. They also

theorized that since there was no allegation that they

had in fact made drawings against the overdraft

account, no obligation to pay a sum of money had

been pleaded and therefore, the complaint failed to

state a cause of action.

On the same date the defendants filed a motion for

leave to amend their answer, and the amended

answer itself. Their motion alleged that their original

pleading had failed to embody their true plea

respecting every material allegation of the complaint

and had failed to set forth their affirmative defenses.

The Court denied the defendants' motion for

leave to amend their answer and rendered

judgment on the pleadings. It opined that the

original answer failed to tender any issue, the

defendants' asserted lack of knowledge or

information regarding matters principally and

necessarily within their knowledge could not be

considered a specific denial.

ISSUE:

Manufacturers Bank faults the Trial Court for (1) not

specifying the defendants' liability to it to be joint and

several; and (2) requiring payment by defendants of

interest only at the legal rate instead of that stipulated in

their agreement.

On the other hand, Diversified Industries and Alfonso

Tan ascribe the following errors to the Court a quo: (1)

refusing to admit their amended answer; (2) not

dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of

action; and (3) rendering judgment on the pleadings.

RULING:

Of no little significance is the fact that the motion to

amend the answer was presented only after two

(2) years had lapsed from the date of its filing,

and only after the plaintiff had drawn attention to

its patent and grave imperfections and moved

for judgment on the pleadings.

o Equally noteworthy is that defendants never

challenged the authenticity of their letter to

the bank dated October 18, 1966, advising

that they had made, thru an Atty. Colayco,

payment on their account and requesting

that they be allowed to pay their obligation

by installments at the rate of P20,000.00

every six (6) months. These facts,

considered conjointly with the

admissions expressly made in the

pleadings and those reasonably inferable

therefrom, dictate a verdict in favor of the

plaintiff bank.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,

the amendment of the answer in substantial

aspects was not a matter of right, but lay in the

discretion of the Court.

Their motion merely declared that they had failed to

include certain allegations and defenses in theiroriginal answer, but gave no explanation for their

failure to do so at the time they drew up that

pleading or within a reasonable time thereafter, and

why they had not essayed such amendment until

after two (2) years and only after their receipt of

plaintiff bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings

which cited certain serious defects of their answer.

The absence of such an explanation, and the implicit

admission of liability.

Their disclaimer of knowledge of the amount of their

outstanding balance is implausible, but even if true,cannot be deemed a proper denial because

concerning something they could very easily have

learned or verified had they wished to. Their

disclaimer of knowledge of the amount of the fee

undertaken to be paid by the Manufacturers Bank to

its attorneys is immaterial because not prayed for in

the complaint, the claim being in fact for attorney's

fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, as

expressly stipulated in the contract. And the

averment that their obligation was not yet due


6/18

because plaintiff bank had extended the term of

payment is also specious, being contrary to the

defendants' written request to the bank that they be

allowed to repay their loan in stated installments.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Trial Court is

AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that the liability

to Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. of Diversified

Industries, Inc. and Alfonso Tan is pronounced to be joint

and several, and the interest payable on their obligation

is fixed at 10% per annum of the total amount due, in

accordance with the Agreement of Credit on Current

Account, with costs against the latter.

G.R. No. 74766 December 21, 1987DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., petitioner,vs. HON. JOSE T. SUELTO Presiding Judge of theMunicipal Trial Court in Davao City, Branch IV,MANOLITO GUINOO ROMEO MONTEBON andPORFERIO CABASE respondents.NARVASA, J.:

DOCTRINE: Even if the Answer does tender issues and therefore a judgment on the pleadings is not proper a summary judgment may still be rendered on theplaintiff's motion if he can show that the issues tenderedare not genuine, sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in badfaith, or patently unsubstantial.FACTS:

Vergara commenced in the MTC an action for illegal

detainer against the private respondents. He is theowner of a commercial building consisting of 3sections separately occupied by the privaterespondents as lessees.

The respondents defaulted in the payment of their

rentals for many months and so Vergara sentdemand letters, notice of termination of lease andnotice to vacate.

In a letter, private respondents committed to leave

the premises but asked for an extension of 3 monthsto enable them to find a new space.

However, in another letter to Vergara, they

acknowledged the latter's ownership and their statusas lessees, but refused to vacate the premisesbecause the lot on which the building stands, thoughtitled in Vergara's name, was part of a tract of landwhich had been ordered reverted to the publicdomain by the RTC in a decision rendered in Civil

Case No. 16192. Furthermore, private respondents Answer:

o Denied Vergara's ownership of the building

and claimed that their lease contract withVergara were null and void.

o Denied that they initially paid rentals and

claimed that they had been "occupying thepremises in the concept of an owner."

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: They were not

parties to Civil Case No. 16192 and could not bebound by the judgment and in any event, the actionis an ejectment suit and the said case has no

relevant. Vergara filed a Motion for SummaryJudgment.

Private respondents opposed the motion and filed a

MTD. Arguing that a genuine issue exists which"cannot be resolved by mere resort to summary

judgment," that issue having arisen from defendantscontroversion of Vergara's claim "of possession andownership over the commercial building and the landon which the same is constructed."

The respondent Judge resolved the matter in twoseparate orders:o FIRST: Denied the private respondents'

MTD on the ground that ownership has notbeen seriously denied by defendants andthe case is an Unlawful Detainer action.

o SECOND: Denied Vergara's motion for

summary judgment because it appears fromthe answer that the material allegations offacts in the complaint constituting plaintiff'scause of action are specifically deniedandthat the private respondents putup affirmative defenses. There should be atrial of the case upon its merits.

RESPONDENT JUDGES BASIS: In the Unlawful

Detainer action, the material averments of factsconstituting plaintiff's cause of action have beenspecifically denied in accordance with 10, Rule 8 ofthe ROC.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Their

denials of Vergaras assertions are not meregeneral denials but "definitely tendered a genuineissue," "which cannot be resolved by resort to meresummary judgment."

ISSUE: Even if the Answer does tender issues (andtherefore a judgment on the pleadings is not proper),may a summary judgment still be rendered on theplaintiff's motion? YESRULING:

The essential question is not whether the answer

does controvert the material allegations of thecomplaint but whether that controversion is in goodfaith. The fundamental issue is not whether theanswer does tender valid issues as by setting forthspecific denials and/or affirmative defenses, butwhetherthe issues thus tendered are genuine, orfictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS: Rule 19, 1

provides that where an answer "fails to tender anissue or otherwise admits the material allegation ofthe adverse party's pleading, the court may, onmotion of that party, directjudgment on such

pleading." The answer would fail to tender an issueif it doesnt comply with the requirements for aspecific denial (Rule 8, 10). If an Answer does infact specifically deny the material averments of thecomplaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses, a

judgment on the pleadings would naturally not beproper.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT : However, even if the

Answer does tender issues and a judgment on thepleadings is not proper, a summary judgmentmay


7/18

still be rendered on the plaintiff's motion if hecan show that "except as to the amount ofdamages, there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact," the issues thus tendered are notgenuine, sham, fictitious, contrived, set up inbad faith, patently unsubstantial. Thedetermination may be made by the Court on thebasis of the pleadings, depositions, admissions andaffidavits that the movant may submit, as well asthose which the defendant may present.

On its face, the private respondents' Answer

appears to tender issues. It dealt with each of thematerial allegations of the complaint and has set upaffirmative defenses. However, the issues thustendered are sham and not genuine.

Their disavowal of the plaintiff's ownership of the

building cannot be genuine because they have beenoccupying the premises for years, as evidenced bywritten contracts and have been paying rentals, forwhich respondents were issued official receipts.Moreover, their Answer contains their admission thatVergara has title over the land on which the buildingstands.

The affirmative defense, in which they assert title

over the land is also sham and an absurdity. TheCourt sustained Vergaras contention that the partieswere not bound by said judgment and that the claimis irrelevant to the ejectment suit. Moreover, they areestopped to dispute the plaintiff's title. "The tenant isnot permitted to deny the title of his landlord at thetime of the commencement of the relation of landlordand tenant between them."

No genuine issue having been tendered by the

defendants, judgment should be directed as a matterof right in the plaintiff's favor. To require a trialnotwithstanding the pertinent allegations of thepleadings and the other facts indubitably appearingon record would be a waste of time and an injusticeto plaintiff.

Diman vs. Alumbres[G.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998]

PARTIES:

Petitioners : Cristina Diman, ClarissaDiman, George Diman, Felipe Diman

and Florina DimanRespondents : Hon, Florentino M.

Alumbres of RTC Las Pias, Heirs of Veronica V.Moreno Lacalle,

represented by Jose Moreno LacalleFACTS:

Preliminary

A complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages"

was filed by the Heirs of Veronica V.Moreno Lacalle

(represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle) against

petitioners.

Lacalle heirs claimed that:

a) their mother, the late, was the owner of a"parcel of land situated at Brgy. Pulang LupaUno, Las Pias.b) Veronica Lacalle had acquired the land in1959 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, andretained as caretakers the persons she foundin occupancy of the lot at the time of the sale,namely: Julian Nario and his wife, AdelaidaLegaspi, with arrangement to share theagricultural fruits" until the former would haveneed of the property;c) the caretakers of the lot were served witha notice for them to vacate the land andan alias writ of demolition (dated June 7, 1994)issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 2619 -- acase for "ejectment with damages" filed by theDimans against the Narios, judgment in which,commanding the Narios' ouster, hadsupposedly been affirmed by the MakatiRegional Trial Court;d) neither the deceased Veronica nor any ofher heirs had been made parties to saidejectment action;

e) the complaint for ejectment contains falseassertions, and had caused them injury forwhich the Dimans should be made to paydamages.

In theiranswerwith counterclaim dated February2, 1995, the Dimans alleged that:

a) they are the registered and absoluteowners of the land registered in their namesunder TCT), and have no knowledge of theland claimed by the Lacalle Heirs;b) they are entitled to eject from their landthe Nario Spouses, who were falsely claiming

to be their lessees;c) if the Heirs' theory is that the land in theirtitle, No. 273301, is the same as that coveredby the Dimans' titles, then said title No.2733101 is spurious because:

(1) no less than three officialagencies -- (i) the Office of theRegistrar of Deeds for Rizal andRegional Registrar for Region IV, (ii)the Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City,and (iii) the Pangasiwaan Pangtalaanng Lupain (Land Registration

Authority) -- have certified to theabsence of any entry in their recordsconcerning TCT No. 273301 coveringland with an area of 22,379 squaremeters in the name of Veronica Vda.De Moreno Lacalle;(2) Decree No. N-11601 explicitlycited as basis by TCT No. 273301refers to land in Mauban, QuezonProvince, according to the records ofthe Land Registration Authority; andGLRO Record No. 14978 alsoexpressly mentioned as basis for TCTNo. 273301, refers to a registration


8/18

case heard in Pangasinan;andd) they are entitled to damages on theircounterclaim.

The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR

SUMMARRY JUDGMENT" dated drewing attention to

the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial Brief, and the

several instances when the Heirs failed to appear at

scheduled hearings resulting in the dismissal of their

complaint, which was however later reinstated.

The Heirs' counsel filed a two-page oppositionasserting inter alia that: In order for defendants (Dimans)to successfully pray for judgment on the pleadings, theyhave to clearly alleged in their permissive counterclaimtheir cause of action and if the answer of the plaintiffs(Heirs) to such kind of counterclaim admit (sic) it or theanswer to the counterclaim is a sham, that is the time forthe defendants to move for a judgment summarily. ** **(D)efendants have no cause of action for praying forsummary judgment. It is the plaintiffs who will pray for

that and not the defendants."

Procedural history

TC - denied motion for summary judgment

CA - Affirmed TCs decision. MR-denied

CA ruled that a "perusal of the Complaint andthe Answer will clearly show that material issue israisedin that both plaintiffs and defendants claimedownership over the land in dispute, presenting theirrespective titles thereto and accused each other of

possessing false title to the land." It also added that asummary judgment "is not proper where the defendantpresented defenses tendering factual issues which callfor the presentation of evidence."

Hence the petition.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in not granting the motion for summaryjudgment

HELD: YES

RULE:

Rule 19 expresses the principle as follows:"Where an answer fails to tender anissue, or otherwise admits the materialallegations of the adverse party'spleading, the court may, on motion ofthat party, direct judgment on suchpleading."

APPLICATION:

Clearly, the grounds relied on by the Judge areproper for the denial of a motion forjudgment on the

pleadings -- as to which the essential question, asalready remarked, is: are there issues arising from orgenerated by the pleadings? -- but not as regards amotion forsummary judgment-- as to which the cruciaquestion is: issues having been raised by the pleadings,are those issues genuine, or sham or fictitious, as

shown by affidavits, depositions or admissionsaccompanying the application therefor?

It is the law which determines when a summaryjudgment is proper. It declares that although thepleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact --e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factuaallegations -- if it is shown by admissions, depositions oraffidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or notgenuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that "except asto the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue asto any material fact and that the moving party is entiledto a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall rende

a summary judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant asthe case may be.

Parenthetically, the existence or appearance oostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, andtheir sham or fictitious character, on the other, are whatdistinguish a proper case for a summary judgment fromone for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19 ofthe 1964 Rules. In the latter case, there is no ostensibleissue at all, but the absence of anybecause of thefailure of the defending party's answer to raise an issue.

On the other hand, in the case of a summary

judgment, issues apparently exist -- i.e., facts areasserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yetno admission, disavowal or qualification; or specificdenials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in theanswer -- but the issues thus arising from the pleadingsare sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown byadmissions, depositions or admissions. In other wordsas a noted authority remarks, a judgment on thepleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded while asummary judgment is a judgment on the facts assummarily proven by affidavits, depositions oadmissions. Another distinction is that while the remedyof a judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a

claimant (one seeking to recover upon a claimcounterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratoryrelief, supra), a summary judgment may be applied forby either a claimant or a defending party.

The Heirs had proven nothing whatever to justifya judgment in their favor. They had not presented anycopy whatever of the title they wished to bequieted. They had not adduced any proof worthy of thename to establish their precedessors' ownership of theland. On the contrary, their own evidence, fromwhatever aspect viewed, more than persuasively


9/18

indicated their lack of title over the land, or thespuriousness of their claim of ownership thereof. Theevidence on record could not be interpreted in any otherway, and no other conclusion could be drawn therefromexcept the unmeritoriousness of the complaint. Thecase at bar is a classic example of the eminent proprietyof a summary judgment, or a judgment on demurrer toevidence.

Considering these circumstances, including theoutlandish grounds of opposition advanced by the Heirsagainst the Dimans' motions for summary judgment andfor demurrer to evidence, no less than the obviouslymistaken grounds cited by the Trial Court for denyingsaid motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaringthat it was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the partof the Trial Court to have refused to render a summary

judgment or one on demurrer to evidence. In no sensemay the Trial Court's errors be considered, as the Courtof Appeals did in its judgment of September 9, 1997, asmere errors of judgment correctible by appeal,untarnished by any capriciousness or whimsicality.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of theCourt of Appeals promulgated on September 9, 1997 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.

TOPIC: Propriety of SJNATALIA REALTY CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,vs. PROTACIO RANCHU VALLEZ, CEFERINOMARTINEZ, PABLO ESPEMEDA, AUGUSTO ARIZOLAand CERIACO BANDOC, defendants-appellants.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUMMARY JUDGMENT;PROPER IF THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO

THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL FACT; PURPOSE. It is settled that a summary judgment under Rule 34 ofthe Rules of Court is proper only if there is no genuineissue as to the existence of any material fact. It isintended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases wherethe facts appear undisputed and certain from thepleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits onrecord.2. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS MUSTBE ANALYZED; CASE AT BAR. The focal point ofinquiry is whether or not there is a factual controversy inthese consolidated cases. To resolve this query, thepleadings and documents on file and an analysis thereof

are both indispensable and decisive. The sine qua nonof such an adjudicative recourse is spelled out thus:After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be renderedforthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissionson file together with the affidavits, show that, except asto the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue asto any material fact and that the moving party is entitledto a judgment as a matter of law. We are convinced thatthe rendition of the questioned summary judgment bythe trial court is proper and valid. Tested against thestatutory and jurisprudential rules above stated, the veryallegations of the defendants prove that no valid issuehas been tendered by them. They relied mainly on two

points, the alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff andtheir supposed acquisition of the properties by adversepossession. Defendants' theses are obviously puerilebut they are entitled to the benefit of clarification.FACTS:

Five (5) civil cases commenced by herein appellee

Natalia Realty Corporation against the five (5)appellants, namely, Protacio Ranchu Vallez,Ceferino Martinez, Pablo Espemeda, Augusto

Arizola, and Ceriaco Bandoc, which wereconsolidated and assigned to the RTC Rizal.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendants unlawfully

occupied portions of the parcels of land belonging toit and registered in its name under TCT Nos. 31527and 31528 of the RD of Rizal. It was prayed thatdefendants be adjudged without valid rightwhatsoever in plaintiff's land, that they be ordered tovacate the same and to pay the reasonablecompensation and financial reliefs stated in therespective complaints against them.

Defendants sought the dismissal of all the aforesaid

complaints for ejectment on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction. Their motion was denied on a holdingthat the grounds therefor are not indubitable.

Plaintiff Corporation moved for a summary judgment

on the consolidated cases under Rule 34 of theRules of Court. Plaintiff claimed that the only issuefor resolution, if any, is strictly legal; and that "thepleadings manifestly show that there is no genuineissue or issues as to any material fact averred in thecomplaint and that defendants in their commonanswer to complaint have put up sham defenses andcounterclaims all of which are mere pretendeddenials and flimsy defenses." Annexed to saidmotion is the affidavit of the company's executivevice-president, Eugenia Oliveros, attesting to thetruth of the averments therein.

An opposition was filed by defendants.

The trial court rendered a summary judgment upon

finding that no valid issue was raised by defendantsbut only "conclusions that because they have beenin actual possession for over 30 years of theirrespective farm lots they are entitled to be respectedof (sic) such occupancy and as such the complaintsshould be dismissed, that the titles of plaintiff are nuland void ab initio and should be cancelled and in lieuthereof issued new certificates of titles (sic) to thedefendants in accordance with the land reformprogram under P.D. No. 2.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff

ordering the defendants to vacate the portions ofland involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo acted correctly inrendering a summary judgment in the aforesaid cases.HELD: We affirm the summary judgment rendered bythe court a quo. (See Syllabus)


10/18

ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK, INC., petitioner,

vs. HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. and/or COURT

OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Quezon City,

REGINO CLEOFAS, and LUCIA DE LA CRUZ,

respondents.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE

BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE

CAMPOS, REGINO CLEOFAS, and LUCIADE LA CRUZ, respondents.

TOPIC: Remedies from judgments; Newly

discovered evidence

DOCTRINE:The rule for the granting of a

motion for new trial, as all other rules of

procedure, should be liberally construed to

assist the parties in obtaining a just and

speedy determination of their rights.

FACTS:

Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la Cruz filed

suit against St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc,

Araceli Wijangco del Rosario, National

Investment and Development

Corporation, Banco Filipino Savings and

Mortgage Bank, the Register of Deeds of

Rizal, the Register of Deeds of Quezon

City and the Sheriff of Quezon City.

In their amended complaint, the spouses

prayed that they be declared the rightful

owners of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad

Estate, The amended complaint likewise

sought issuance of preliminary injunction

and the appointment of a receiver. The

lower court ordered appointment of a

receiver, but upon filing of a bond by the

Memorial Park, the receivership was

lifted.

o that the Torrens Title to said lot be

reconstituted, the title thereto of

their deceased predecessor,

Antonio Cleofas, having been

burned in a fire in 1933;

o that the certificates of title over

said lot in the name of the

Memorial Park, and that in the

name of Wijangco del Rosario, and

all the certificates of title from

which these certificates were

derived be declared null and void;

o that the mortgages over said, lot

constituted in favor of Banco

Filipino and the NIDC be declared

null and void; and that theMemorial Park be ordered to pay

plaintiffs damages.

The lower court, on May 2, 1973,

rendered a decision in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the

defendants.

The Memorial Park and Banco Filipino, on

June 23, 1973, filed their joint motion for

reconsideration of the decision. On June

30, 1973, they filed a joint motion for new

trial. On July 9, 1973, the Memorial Park

filed a supplement to the motion for

reconsideration with prayer for new trial.

On February 28, 1974, the Memorial

Park filed before this Court a petition

for certiorari and prohibition with

preliminary injunction (L-38280)

against the trial judge and theplaintiff spouses, seeking annulment

of the court's order denying new

trial, on the ground that the same

was issued in grave abuse of

discretion.

However, on July 8, 1974, the court, again

upon motion of said spouses, dismissed

the appeal filed by both the Memorial

Park and Banco Filipino, on the ground

that the same was abandoned whenMemorial Park filed the present petition

for certiorari on February 28, 1974, the

dismissal order having been brought to

the attention of this Court in the

manifestation of the Memorial Park of July

31, 1974.

On January 3, 1975, Banco Filipino, for

its part, filed in this Court a petition


11/18

for certiorari and mandamus with

preliminary injunction (L-38843),

against the trial judge and the spouses

Cleofas and Dela Cruz, to annul the trial

court's order of July 8, 1974 dismissing its

own appeal.

ISSUE:

The main issue in these two cases is whether

or not the respondent Judge acted in grave

abuse of discretion in dismissing the joint

appeal of the Memorial Park and Banco

Filipino in its order of July 8, 1974.

And with respect to Case No. L-38280, the

main issue is whether or not the respondent

Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion

when it denied in its order of February 5,

1974 the motion for new trial of the MemorialPark.

RULING:

It must be noted that the petitioner in L-

38280 is only St. Peter Memorial Park.

Banco Filipino is not a party in that

first proceeding before this Court.

Thus, whatever may be the effect of

the filing of a petition for certiorari,

on the pending appeal, cannot affectthe appeal of Banco Filipino. And the

respondent Judge clearly committed a

clear error and a grave abuse of

discretion when it dismissed the appeal of

Banco Filipino due to the filing by the

Memorial Park of its petition in L-38280.

Moreover, as will now be explained,

the dismissal of the appeal violated

the restraining order issued by this

Court.

Even with respect to the Memorial Park,

we cannot say there was abandonment of

the appeal. There would have been

abandonment if there is

incompatibility between the two

remedies sought by the Memorial

Park, that is, between said appeal

and the petition for certiorari.The

appeal is from the decision of May 2,

1973; the certiorari petition is directed

against the order dated February 5, 1974.

A motion for new trial does not work

as a waiver of the appeal, unless

there is a rule to the contrary.Thus,

both the motion for new trial and the

appeal may be pursued at the same

time. This ruling is of persuasive

effect on us considering the source

of our rules on appeal and new trial.

Here, the certiorari petition in L-38280 is

in pursuance of the motion for new trial.

Memorial Park can pursue this remedy as

well as that of the appeal from the main

decision.

Any court action or order that wouldchange any circumstance of the decision

is necessarily included in the scope of the

restraining order. At the time that

restraining order was issued, the

trial court's decision was a decision

on appeal. The order dismissing the

appeal tended to change the status

quo since by reason of the dismissal,

the enjoined decision became final.

For the reasons we have expounded we

find said dismissal order to have been

issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Fully convinced of the validity of its title,

having discovered no flaw in spite of

extraordinary diligence and extensive

search into record connected with Lot No.

719 of the Piedad Estate, defendant St.

Peter assessed and analyzed the situation

after receipt of a copy of the Decision

sought to be reconsidered.

o The hunch of defendant St. Peter

became a reality. The entry on

sheet or page 15 of OCT no. 614

refers to another lot (not 719) and

another title (TCT No. 15694

covering Lot No. 640 of the Piedad

Estate).

ON THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL


12/18

Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, the

requisites for the grant of new trial based

on: Newly discovered evidence, which

he could not, with reasonable

diligence, have discovered, and

produced at the trial, and which if

presented would probably alter the

result, are: (1) that such evidencehas been discovered after the trial;

(2) that even with the exercise of

reasonable diligence, it could not

have been discovered and produced

at that trial; and (3) that such

evidence is of such a nature as to

alter the result of the case if

admitted (People vs. Ventura, 5

SCRA 741).

Gauged by these standards, we find theevidence proposed to be presented by

petitioner in a new trial are newly

discovered evidence within the

contemplation of the Rules of Court. The

said evidence could not have been

produced during the trial because

the subject-matter of the trial was

Lot No. 719. Petitioner correctly

searched, discovered and presented

during that trial, all documents pertainingto Lot No. 719 only. If admitted in a

new trial, these newly discovered

evidence will probably alter the

judgment of the trial court.

We hold that respondent Judge committed

grave abuse of discretion in denying the

motion for new trial, having disregarded

in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the

newly discovered.

We rule, therefore, in favor of new trial. The

grant of new trial necessarily vacates the

judgment.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the

petitions in L-38280 and L-39905 are

granted, the orders of February 5, 1974 and

July 8, 1974 are hereby declared null and

void and set aside, and both cases are

remanded to the trial court for new trial

pursuant to the motion to that effect of both

Banco Filipino and Memorial Park, dated June

30, 1973, which is hereby granted. Costs

against private respondents.

EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L.

TUASON, respondents.

TOPIC: Relief From Judgment

DOCTRINE:

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; ALLOWED ONLY

IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE THERE IS

NO OTHER AVAILABLE OR ADEQUATE

REMEDY. -A petition for relief from

judgment is an equitable remedy; itis allowed only in exceptional cases

where there is no other available or

adequate remedy. When a party has

another remedy available to him, which

may be either a motion for new trial or

appeal from an adverse decision of the

trial court, and he was not prevented by

fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

negligence from filing such motion or

taking such appeal, he cannot availhimself of this petition. Indeed, relief

will not be granted to a party who

seeks avoidance from the effects of

the judgment when the loss of the

remedy at law was due to his own

negligence; otherwise the petition

for relief can be used to revive the

right to appeal which have been lost

thru inexcusable negligence.

WHEN AVAILED MUST BE BASED ON THEGROUND OF FRAUD, ACCIDENT, MISTAKE

OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE AND THAT IT

IS SHOWN THAT PETITIONER HAS A

GOOD, SUBSTANTIAL AND MERITORIOUS

DEFENSE OR CAUSE OF ACTION. - A

petition for relief from judgment is

governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the

Revised Rules of Court. A final and

executory judgment or order of the


13/18

Regional Trial Court may be set aside

on the ground of fraud, accident,

mistake or excusable negligence. In

addition, the petitioner must assert facts

showing that he has a good, substantial

and meritorious defense or cause of

action. If the petition is granted, the

court shall proceed to hear and determine

the case as if a timely motion for new trial

had been granted therein.

FACTS:

Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a

petition for annulment or declaration

of nullity of her marriage to

petitioner Emilio R. Tuason.

Imputations were raised against him

(physical injuries, etc)

Petitioner answered denying the

imputations against him. As affirmative

defense, he claimed that he and private

respondent were a normal married couple

during the first ten years of their

marriage and actually begot two children

during this period; that it was only in

1982 that they began to have serious

personal differences when his wife did notaccord the respect and dignity due him as

a husband but treated him like a persona

non grata; that due to the extreme

animosities between them, he

temporarily left the conjugal home for a

cooling-off period in 1984. Petitioner

petitioned the court to allow him to return

to the conjugal home and continue his

administration of the conjugal

partnership.

After the issues were joined, trial

commenced on March 30, 1990. Private

respondent presented four witnesses,

namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a

Canon Law expert and marriage

counselor of both private respondent and

petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close

friend of the spouses, and Any. Jose F.

Racela IV, private respondents counsel.

Private respondent likewise submitted

documentary evidence consisting of

newspaper articles of her husbands

relationship with other women, his

apprehension by the authorities for illegal

possession of drugs; and copies of a prior

church annulment decree. The parties

marriage was clerically annulled by the

Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale

which was affirmed by the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.

During presentation of private

respondents evidence, petitioner, on

April 18, 1990, filed his Opposition to

private respondents petition for

appointment as administratrix of the

conjugal partnership of gains.

After private respondent rested her case,

the trial court scheduled the reception of

petitioners evidence on May 11, 1990.

On May 8, 1990, two days before the

scheduled hearing, a counsel for

petitioner moved for a postponement

on the ground that the principal counsel

was out of the country and due to return

on the first week of June. The court

granted the motion and reset the hearingto June 8, 1990.

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to

appear. On oral motion of private

respondent, the court declared

petitioner to have waived his right to

present evidence and deemed the

case submitted for decision on the

basis of the evidence presented.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered

judgment declaring the nullity of

private respondents marriage to

petitioner and awarding custody of

the children to private respondent.

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of

this decision on August 24, 1990. No

appeal was taken from the decision.


14/18

Private respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of

Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the

Conjugal Properties Petitioner opposed

the motion on October 17, 1990.

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990,

petitioner, through new counsel,

filed with the trial court a petition

for relief from judgment of the June

29, 1990 decision.

The trial court denied the petition on

August 8, 1991.

Petitioner appealed before the Court of

Appeals the order of the trial court

denying his petition for relief from

judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of

Appeals dismissed the appeal and

affirmed the order of the trial court.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:The threshold issue is whether a

petition for relief from judgment is warranted

under the circumstances of the case.

RULING: We rule in the negative.

Under the rules, a final and executory

judgment or order of the Regional

Trial Court may be set aside on the

ground of fraud, accident, mistake or

excusable negligence. In addition,

the petitioner must assert facts

showing that he has a good,

substantial and meritorious defense

or cause of action. If the petition is

granted, the court shall proceed to hear

and determine the case as if a timely

motion for new trial had been grantedtherein.

In the case at bar, the decision

annulling petitioners marriage to

private respondent had already

become final and executory when

petitioner failed to appeal during the

reglementary period. The failure of

petitioners counsel to notify him on time

of the adverse judgment to enable him to

appeal therefrom is negligence which is

not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of

record is binding upon the client and the

neglect or failure of counsel to inform him

of an adverse judgment resulting in the

loss of his right to appeal is not a ground

for setting aside a judgment valid and

regular on its face.

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim

that he was deprived of due process.

He may have lost his right to present

evidence but he was not denied his

day in court. ]

Indeed, relief will not be granted to

a party who seeks avoidance from

the effects of the judgment when theloss of the remedy at law was due to

his own negligence; otherwise the

petition for relief can be used to

revive the right to appeal which had

been lost thru inexcusable

negligence.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and

the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is

affirmed.

G. R. No. L-60036 January 27, 1987INVESTMENTS, INC., petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, TOBACCO INDUSTRIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., and THE SHERIFF OF THECITY OF MANILA, respondents.NARVASA, J.:DOCTRINE:

A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposesof a case. Once rendered, the task of the Court isended, as far as deciding the controversy or

determining the rights and liabilities of the litigantsis concerned.

A judgment is FINAL upon the expiration of the period toappeal or if no appeal has been perfected. The recordsof the case are returned to the Court of origin and the

judgment can be EXECUTED. FINAL ANDEXECUTORYFACTS:

Civil Case No. 116617 was instituted by petitioners

against TIP for the annulment of a chattel mortgageexecuted by Investments in TIP's favor covering 5cigarette-making machines, which were about to be


15/18

sold on foreclosure.

Initially, a TRO was issued by the Court ex-parte

enjoining the Sheriff from proceeding with theauction sale. However, the TC denied Investments'application for a writ of injunction and dissolved theTRO. With the MR being denied, Investmentsbrought the matter to the CA on certiorariandprohibition.

Upon posting of bond by Investments, CA directed

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunctionagainst the auction sale on 12/21/1978. Theinjunction was subsequently lifted.

At the hearing, Investments argued for the

reinstatement of the preliminary injunction since "thehearing on the merits of the main case below isabout to be terminated." The injunction bond wasincreased to cover the principal obligation.

The parties both agreed and the Court approved the

bond and issued a restraining order which in effectreinstated the injunction earlier granted(12/21/1978).

The CA deemed the proceedings before it

terminated because it had already stopped thesale of the machines, until final judgment shallhave been rendered in Civil Case No. 116617. The Clerk of Court caused entry of judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-08253-R.

[COMMENTO: Upon the posting of the increased

bond, the CA terminated the proceedings forcertiorariand prohibition (CA-G.R. No. SP-08253-R), but the Injunction subsists until the finaldetermination of the Civil Case.]

Trial in Civil Case No. 116617 continued and

judgment was rendered in 12/19/1980,dismissing Investment's complaint for lack of

merit, and awarding moral and exemplarydamages to TIP. Investments appealed thatdecision to the CA.

TIP filed with the Trial Court a motion for execution

pending appeal and with the CA (CA-G.R. No. SP-08253-R), a motion to lift the writ of preliminaryinjunction.

PETITIONER opposed both motions on the

ground that the injunction issued by the AppellateCourt against the holding of the auction sale wasmeant to subsist until "final in Civil Case No.116617" and since the decision rendered in saidcase was not yet final and executory, said

injunction was still in force. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The judgment

rendered by the TC in Civil Case No. 116617 on12/19/1980 was not a "final judgment" because itwas an appealable judgment and in fact, it had beenappealed seasonably.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The judgment

was a "final judgment" as the term is used inprocedural law, even if appealable. Hence, upon itsrendition, the preliminary injunction of the AppellateCourt expired.

TIP then caused the mortgaged chattels to be sold

by the Sheriff at a public auction (8/24/1981), atwhich sale it was the successful bidder.

Investments filed with respondent CA a motion for

contempt and for annulment of the sale, but theCourt declared the auction sale valid and dissolvedthe restraining order.

Investments then presented a motion for extension

of time to file a MR which was denied for lack ofmerit. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: What is the meaning that is to be accorded tothe term "final judgment" in the context of Civil Case No.116617?RULING:

A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposesof a case. The Court has nothing more to do in respectthereto because there have been an adjudication on themerits based on the evidence presented during the trial.A Final judgment declares categorically what therights and obligations of the parties are and whichparty is in the right; for instance, a judgment or orderthat dismisses an action on the ground ofresadjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task ofthe Court is ended, as far as deciding thecontroversy or determining the rights and liabilitiesof the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains tobe done by the Court except to await the parties' nextmove (which may consist of the filing of a motion for newtrial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) andultimately, to cause the execution of the judgmentonce it becomes "final" or to use the establisheddistinctive term, "final and executory."

An order that does not finally dispose of the case anddoes not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties'contentions and determining their rights and liabilities is"interlocutory." Unlike a "final" judgment or order, whichis appealable, an "interlocutory" order may not be

questioned on appeal except only as part of an appealthat may eventually be taken from the final judgmentrendered in the case.

A "final judgment" becomes final upon expiration ofthe period to appeal, if no appeal has beenperfected or an appeal therefrom having been taken, the

judgment of the appellate tribunal becomes final andthe records of the case are returned to the Court oforigin. The "final" judgment is then correctlycategorized as a "final and executory judgment" inrespect to which, as the law explicitly provides,"execution shall issue as a matter of right." Only afinal judgment or order, i.e., "a judgment or order that

finally disposes of the action of proceeding"

can becomefinal and executory.There is no showing that the parties and their counselintended to give the term "final judgment" a specialsignification, a meaning other than that accorded to it bylaw and established usage. Their agreement must beconstrued to mean that upon rendition by the Trial Courtof itsjudgment on the merits (its "final judgment,")the life and effectivity of the preliminary injunctioncame to an end, regardless of the appealability of, orthe actual taking of an appeal from said judgment. The petitioner's theory of the case, founded on itsconcept of a "final judgment" is erroneous and cannot be


16/18

sustained.

BF CORPORATION,petitioner, vs. EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL and RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO,RUFINO T. SAMANIEGO, CYNTHIADEL CASTILLO,KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOONTSEN,respondents.[G.R. No. 132655. August 11, 1998]MENDOZA, J.:FACTS:

1. On July 26, 1993, petitioner BF Corporationbrought suit to collect from respondents EDSAShangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI), et alfor the which amount represents the allegedliability of respondents to petitioner for theconstruction of the EDSA Shangri-La Hotel onSt. Francis Street, Mandaluyong City.

2. RTC of Pasig City rendered judgment orderingrespondents to pay.

3. MR denied, whereupon they appealed.4. Pending disposition of the appeal, petitioner filed

a motion for the execution of the decision in itsfavor which the trial court granted in its orderdated January 21, 1997.

5. Private respondents assailed the order ofexecution pending appeal in a petition forcertiorari which they filed in the Court of

Appeals. In due time, petitioner filed aComment with Opposition to PreliminaryInjunction.

6. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunctionenjoining the trial court from carrying out itsorder of execution, upon the filing byrespondents of a bond in the amount of P1million. In a supplemental resolution issued onthe same day, the appellate court issued a writof preliminary mandatory injunction ordering

that:a. all garnishments and levy made under the

enjoined order of execution pending appealbe lift.

b. Said Sheriff desist from delivering to privaterespondent all his garnishments onpetitioners bank deposits and, instead,immediately return the same to PNB,Shangri-la Plaza Branch.

c. If the garnished deposits have beendelivered to private respondent [hereinpetitioner], the latter should forthwith returnthem to petitioners [herein respondents]

deposit accounts.[2]

7. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the tworesolutions.

8. MR denied.CA held that the trial courts reasonfor ordering execution pending appeal, that(petitioners) viability as a building contractor isbeing threatened by (respondents) continuedrefusal to pay theirobligations, did not justify such an order.

9. Hence, this petition.ISSUE:WoN CA gravely erred when it held that petitionersserious financial distress and urgent need of funds were

not good reason to justify execution pending appeal inutter disregard of well-founded and established

jurisprudential precepts.HELD: NOFirst. Execution pending appeal is not to be grantedexcept for good reason to be stated in a specialorder. For the general rule is that only judgments whichhave become final and executory may be executed. Inthis case, the issuance of an order granting executionpending appeal is sought to be justified on the plea thatthe [r]espondents dilatory appeal and refusal to paypetitioner the amount justly due it had placed petitionerin actual and imminent danger of insolvency.The contention is without merit. As we recently heldin Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of

Appeals:It is significant to stress that private respondent Falcon isa juridical entity and not a natural person. Evenassuming that it was indeed in financial distress and onthe verge of facing civil or even criminal suits, theimmediate execution of ajudgment in its favorpending appeal cannot be justified as Falconssituation may not be likened to a case of a natural

person who may be ill or may be of advanced age.Even the danger of extinction of the corporation willnotper se justify a discretionary execution unless thereare showings of other good reasons, such as forinstance, impending insolvency of the adverse party orthe appeal being patently dilatory. But even as to thelatter reason, it was noted inAquino vs. Santiago (161SCRA 570 [1988]), that it is not for the trial judge todetermine the merit of a decision he rendered as this isthe role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not withincompetence of the trial court, in resolving a motion forexecution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal ispatently dilatory and rely on the same as its basis for

finding good reasons to grant the motion. Only anappellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of anappeal as an additional good reason in upholding anorder for execution pending appeal which may havebeen issued by the trial court for other good reasons, orin cases where the motion for execution pending appealis filed with the appellate court in accordance withSection 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules ofCourt.Nor does the fact that petitioner filed a bond in theamount of P35 million justify the grant of executionpending appeal. As the Court have held in a number ofcases, the posting of a bond to answer for damages isnot alone a sufficient reason for ordering executionpending appeal. Otherwise, execution pending appealcould be obtained through the mere filing of such abond.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appealsdated June 30, 1997 and its resolutions dated March 7,1997 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION thatrecovery of the garnished deposits delivered to petitioneshall be against the bond of petitioner BF Corporation.SO ORDERED
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/aug1998/132655.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/aug1998/132655.htm#_edn2


17/18

Other relevant matter:The issuance by the Court of Appeals of writs ofpreliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction againstthe trial court, the sheriff, and petitioner is justifiable.Petitioner assails the issuance of the writs, claiming thatthe same had been issued on the basis of motions whichhad no verification and without affording it due process.The motions referred to by petitioner merely sought theexpeditious resolution of respondents application for awrit of preliminary injunction as contained intheir verified petition for certiorari. This petitioncontained the necessary factual averments justifying thegrant of injunction. Nor was petitioner denied the right tobe heard before the writs were issued. Petitioner filed acomment which controverted the allegations of thepetition, including its prayer for a writ of preliminaryinjunction. There is, therefore, no basis for its claim thatit was denied due process.Be that as it may, this question became moot in view ofthe appellate courts decision rendered on June 30,1997, permanently enjoining the trial court fromenforcing its order of execution pending appeal andordering petitioner to return the amounts paid to it by

virtue of the garnishment of respondents bank deposits.Petitioner argues that, instead of being required to makerestitution, the bond for P35 million, which it had posted,should have been proceeded against. It cites the caseofEngineering Construction Inc. v. National PowerCorp., where this Court, instead of ordering the

judgment creditor to return funds that had beenimproperly garnished pursuant to an order of executionpending appeal, directed the judgment debtor to proceedagainst the bond filed by the judgment creditor. We findthis contention correct. Rule 39, 5 of the Rules of CivilProcedure provides that Where the executed judgmentis reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or

otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue suchorders of restitution or reparation of damages as equityand justice may warrant under the circumstances.

As garnishment is a specie of attachment, the procedureprovided in Rule 57, 20 of the Rules of Court for therecovery of damages against a bond in case of irregularattachment should be applied. This means that noticeshould be given to petitioners surety and that thereshould be a hearing before it is held liable on its bond.In its supplemental petition, petitioner contends that thepropriety of the issuance of the writ of execution pendingappeal is an ancillary issue which should have beenraised by respondents in their appeal from the trialcourts decision on the merits instead of in a separatepetition forcertiorari.The contention is also without merit. Certiorariliesagainst an order granting execution pending appealwhere the same is not founded upon goodreasons. Appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedythat can relieve the losing party from the immediateeffects of an improvident execution pending appeal.DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appealsdated June 30, 1997 and its resolutions dated March 7,1997 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION thatrecovery of the garnished deposits delivered to petitioner

shall be against the bond of petitioner BF Corporation.SO ORDERED

ERIBERTO G. VALENCIA, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CARLOS C.OFILADA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,Bulacan, Branch XL, Third Judicial Region, DeputySheriff PABLO R. GLORIOSO, MIGUEL BUNYE and

RICARDO BAGTAS, respondents.TOPIC: DISCRETIONARY EXECUTIONS, when stayedFacts:Valencia filed an action for rescission of a contract oflease over a 24-hectare fishpond against Bunye andBagtas (private respondents).Private respondents filed an answer with counterclaimfor damages.During the pendency of the case, the lease contractexpired so private respondents surrendered the fishpondto Valencia.The RTC ruled that the case is now moot and academicin view of the surrender of the said fishpond but itawarded moral and exemplary damages to privaterespondents.January 3, 1989 private respondents received the RTCorder. (So they have until January 18, 1989 within whichto appeal.)January 10, 1989 Valencia received the copy of theRTC order. (So he has until January 25, 1989 withinwhich to appeal.)On January 16, 1989, Valencia filed a NOTICE ofAPPEEAL which was given due course.On January 17, 1989, Private respondents filed aMOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.The RTC Judge GRANTED the motion for executionpending appeal upon payment by private respondents

of a bond.On April 10, 1989, the RTC Judge issued a WRIT OFEXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.Valencia filed a petition for certiorari but the CAdismissed the petition.Hence this petition.Issue: WON the judge erred in issuing the writ oexecution pending appeal?Held: YES.In order that there may be a discretionary issuance of awrit of execution pending appeal the following requisitesmust be satisfied:(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with

notice to the adverse party;(b) There must be a good reason for issuing the writ ofexecution; and(c) The good reason must be stated in a speciaorder. (This is absent in this case!)

The mere filing of a bond by private respondents isnot a good reason for the court to issue/grant thewrit of execution pending appeal.The exercise of the power to grant or denyimmediate or advance execution is addressed to thesound discretion of the court. However, theexistence of good reasons is principally what


18/18

confers such discretionary power. Absent any suchgood reason, the special order of execution must bestruck down for having been issued with graveabuse of discretion.The courts look with disfavor upon any attempt toexecute a judgment which has not acquired a finalcharacter. Section 2 of Rule 39 which authorizes thediscretionary execution of judgments, being anexception to the general rule, must be restrictivelyconstrued. It would not be a sound rule to allowindiscriminately the execution of a money judgment,even if there is a sufficient bond.Awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot bethe subject of execution pending appeal. Theexecution of any award for moral and exemplarydamages is dependent on the outcome of the maincase. Unlike actual damages for which the petitionersmay clearly be held liable if they breach a specificcontract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain,liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damagesas well as the exact amounts remain uncertain andindefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate

Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The

existence of the factual bases of these types ofdamages and their causal relation to the petitioners' actwill have to be determined in the light of the assignmentsof errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners,after all, while liable for actual damages may not beliable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in somecases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards maybe reduced.CA reversed and set aside.WRIT of EXECUTION is hereby ANNULLED.

Remrev Yu Valencia

Documents

Transcript of Remrev Yu Valencia