REM-#2 Civil Procedure EDITED

8/6/2019 REM-#2 Civil Procedure EDITED

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BASIC CONCEPTS

LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE

RULES

Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, liberalconstruction of the rules is thecontrolling principle to effectsubstantial justice. Thus, litigationsshould, as much as possible, bedecided on their merits and not ontechnicalities. This does not mean,however, that procedural rules areto be ignored or disdained at will tosuit the convenience of a party.

Procedural law has its ownrationale in the orderlyadministration of justice, namely,to ensure the effectiveenforcement of substantive rightsby providing for a system thatobviates arbitrariness, caprice,despotism, or whimsicality in thesettlement of disputes. Hence, it isa mistake to suppose thatsubstantive law and procedural laware contradictory to each other, oras often suggested, that

enforcement of procedural rulesshould never be permitted if itwould result in prejudice to thesubstantive rights of the litigants.(Abrenica vs. Abrenica, G. R. No.169420, September 22, 2006)

Cases should be determined on themerits, after full opportunity to allparties for ventilation of theircauses and defenses, rather thanon technicality or some proceduralimperfections. In that way, the

ends of justice would be servedbetter. Procedural rules arecreated not to hinder or delay butto facilitate and promote theadministration of justice. It is farbetter to dispose of the case on themerits which is primordial andrather than on technicality, if it bethe case, that may result ininjustice. (Serrano vs. GalantMaritime Services Inc., G.R. No.151833, 8-7-2003)

PROCEDURAL RULES

Like all rules, procedural rulesshould be followed except onlywhen, for the most persuasive ofreasons, they may be relaxed torelieve a litigant of an injustice notcommensurate with the degree ofhis thoughtlessness in not

complying with the prescribedprocedure. (Republic of thePhilippines vs. Kenrick

Development Corporation, G.R. No.149576, August 8, 2006)

Procedural rules are not to bebelittled or dismissed simplybecause their non-observance mayhave resulted in prejudice to theparties substantive rights. Like allrules, they are required to befollowed except only for the mostpersuasive of reasons as whentranscendental matters of life,liberty or state security are

involved. Litigation is not a gameof technicalities. It is equally true,however, that every case must bepresented in accordance with theprescribed procedure to ensure anorderly and speedy administrationof justice. (Mindanao Savings Loan

Association vs. Vicenta Vda. DeFlores, G.R. No. 142022, 9/7/2005)

Technical rules must be suspendedwhenever the purposes of justicewarrant it, such as in this case

where substantial and importantissues await resolution. (Ricardo S.Silverio Jr. vs. Filipino BusinessConsultants, R.R. No. 143312,8/12/2005)

In denying or giving due course toa petition, courts should not givepremium to form but shouldconsider the important rights of theparties. A substantial compliancewith formal requirements issufficient. Cases should be

determined on the merits. Theparties should be given fullopportunity to ventilate theircauses and defenses, rather thanon technicalities or proceduralimperfections. In that way, the endof justice would be served better.Rules of procedure are mere toolsdesigned to expedite the decisionor resolution of cases and othermatters pending in court. A strictand rigid application of rules,resulting in technicalities that tend

to frustrate rather than promotesubstantial justice, must beavoided. (Posadas-Moya vs.Greenfield Dev. Corp., G.R. No.14115, 6-10-2003).

The general rule is that rules ofprocedure must be faithfullycomplied with and should not be

SIGNIFICANT DOCTRINES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE


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discarded with the mereexpediency of claiming substantialmerit. The rule, however, is notabsolute. Under exceptionalcircumstances, on the ground of

justice and equity, a delay in the

filing of an appeal may be excused.The inquiry on this score thereforebasically boils down to whetherthere are ample circumstancessurrounding the present case tomerit the disregard of the delay inthe filing of the petition. If thereare none, such delay is fatal topetitioners plea.

Heavy workload, which is relativeand often self-serving, ought to becoupled with more compelling reasonssuch as illness of counsel or otheremergencies that could be substantiatedby affidavits of merits. Standing alone,heavy workload is not sufficient reason todeviate from the 60-day rule for filing apetition for certiorari. (Yupangco vs. CA,G.R. No. 137264, 8-1-2002)RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

Statutes regulating procedure shallbe construed as applicable topending actions and undeterminedat the time of their passage.

Procedural laws are retroactive inthat sense and to that extent.Thus, a petition for certiorari whichwas filed out of time under therules applicable at the time of itsfiling, may be deemed as timelyfiled under the new rulepromulgated during the pendencyof the action which was not yetdetermined at the time of itspassage. (A.M. No. 00-2-03amending sec. 4, Rule 65 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedureeffective Sept. 1, 2000)

The rule allows filing of the petitionfor certiorari, not only within 60days from notice of judgment butalso within 60 days from notice ofthe denial of the motion forreconsideration or new trial,whether required or not. (ArkTravel Express, Inc. vs. RTC ofMakati, Branch 150, G.R. No.137010 8-29-2003)

Even if petitioner did not raise orallege the amendment in theirmotion for reconsideration beforeit, the Court of Appeals should havetaken mandatory judicial notice ofthis Courts resolution in A.M.Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. Theresolution did not have to specifythat it had retroactive effect as it

pertains to a procedural matter.Contrary to private respondentsallegation that the matter was nolonger pending and undetermined,the issue of whether the petitionfor certiorari was timely filed was

still pending reconsideration whenthe amendment took effect onSeptember 1, 2001, hence,covered by its retroactiveapplication. (Siena Realty Corp. vs.Gal-Lang, G.R. No. 145169, 5-13-2004)

APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES

Sec. 8 of R.A. 1125 creating theCTA expressly provides that it shallnot be governed strictly by

technical rules of procedure. (CABLeasing and Finance Corp. vs. Comof Internal Revenue, G.R. No.138342, 7-8-2003).

Administrative and quasi-judicialbodies like the NLRC, are notbound by the technical rules ofprocedure in the adjudication ofcases filed before them. (C-EConstruction Corporation vs. NLRC,G.R. No. 145930, 8-19-2003)

HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Courts of co-equal and coordinatejurisdiction may not interfere withor pass upon each others orders orprocesses, except in extremesituations authorized by law.(Spouses Suntay vs. EugeniaGocolay, G.R. No. 144892,September 23, 2005)

A lower court cannot reverse or setaside decisions or orders of a

superior court, especially of thisCourt, for to do will negate theprinciple of hierarchy of courts andnullify the essence of review. Afinal judgment, albeit erroneous, isbinding on the whole world. Thus, itis the duty of the lower courts toobey the decisions of this court andrender obeisance to its status asthe apex of the hierarchy of courts.(Manila Electric Company vs.Philippine Consumers Foundation,Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 101783,

01/23/2002)

The Courts original jurisdiction toissue writs of certiorari, as in thecase at bar, prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeascorpus and injunction is shared bythis Court with the Regional Trial


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Courts and the Court of Appeals. Adirect invocation of the SupremeCourts original jurisdiction to issuethese writs should be allowed onlywhen there are special andimportant reasons therefor, clearly

and specifically set out in thepetition. This is an establishedpolicy necessary to avoidinordinate demands upon theCourts time and attention whichare better devoted to thosematters within its exclusive

jurisdiction, and to preclude thefurther clogging of the Courtsdocket. (Lim vs. Vianzon, G.R. No.137187, August 3, 2006)

The Supreme Court has the

discretionary power to takecognizance of a petition which doesnot observe the principle ofhierarchy of courts for compellingreasons or if warranted by thenature of the issues raised, or inthe interest of speedy justice aswhen the case had been pendingsince 1996. (Ark Travel ExpressInc. vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010,8-29-2003)

RULE-MAKING POWER

In modifying the pertinentprovisions of the Rules of Courtinsofar as they provide the directappeals from the RTC to the SC incase where the penalty imposed isdeath, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment and other pertinentresolution on the matter, theSupreme Court merely exercisedits power to promulgate rulesconcerning pleadings, practice andprocedure. Procedural matters fall

squarely within the rule-makingprerogative of the Supreme Court. The rule allowing an immediatereview by the Court of Appealsbefore the case is elevated to theSupreme Court on automaticreview is a procedural matter.(People vs. Mateo, G.R. No.147678-87, 7-7-2004)

FINDINGS OF FACT OF LOWERCOURTS

Basic is the rule that factual issuesare beyond the province of thisCourt in a petition for review, for itis not its function to reviewevidence all over again. Althoughthere are exceptions, petitioner didnot show that this case is one ofthem. Factual findings of the Courtof Appeals are binding and

conclusive upon this Court andgenerally, will not be reviewed onappeal. (Vibram ManufacturingCorp. vs. Manila Electric Company,G.R. No. 149052, August 9, 2005.)

The Court will not disturb thefindings of facts of trial courtsunless there is a showing that itfailed to consider facts andcircumstances, which if taken intoaccount, would materially affectthe resolution of a case. (People ofthe Philippines vs. AntonioMendoza, G.R. No. 152589 & No.152758, January 31, 2005)

It must be stressed that onlyquestions of law may be raised in

petitions to review decisions of theCourt of Appeals filed before thisCourt. The factual findings of theCA affirming those of the trial courtare final and conclusive. Theycannot be reviewed by the SC saveonly in the followingcircumstances: (1) when thefactual conclusion is a findinggrounded entirely on speculations,surmises and conjectures; (2) whenthe inference is manifestlymistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)

when there is a grave abuse ofdiscretion; (4) when the judgmentis based on a misapprehension offacts; (5) when the findings of actare conflicting; (6) when the CAwent beyond the issues of the casein making its findings, which arefurther contrary to the admissionsof both the appellant and theappellee; (7) when the CAsfindings are contrary to those ofthe trial court; (8) when theconclusions do not cite the specific

evidence on which they are based;(9) when the facts set forth in thepetition as well as in thepetitioners main and reply briefsare not disputed by therespondents; and (10) when theCAs findings of fact, supposedlypremised on the absence ofevidence, is contradicted by theevidence on record. (Republic ofthe Philippines and Cavite Collegeof Fisheries vs. Maxima Lensico,G.R. No. 158919, August 9, 2005)

Findings of fact of the trial court,when affirmed by the Court ofAppeals, are binding upon theSupreme Court. It is not thefunction of the Supreme Court toweigh anew the evidence alreadypassed upon by the Court ofAppeals for these are deemed final


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and conclusive and may not bereviewed on appeal. A departurefrom the general rule may bewarranted where the findings offact of the Court of Appeals arecontrary to the findings and

conclusions of the trial court, orwhen the same is unsupported bythe evidence on record. (Changcovs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R.No. 128033, 03/20/2002)

The general rule is that the findingsof facts of quasi-administrativebodies are conclusive and notsubject to review by the Court.However, this rule does not apply ifsuch findings are tainted withmistake or are not supported by

substantial evidence. (Office of theOmbudsman vs. Angeles, G.R. No.152244, 9- 27-04)

Factual findings by quasi-judicialagencies, such as the NLRC, whichhave acquired expertise becausetheir jurisdiction is confined tospecific matters, are generallyaccorded not only respect but evenfinality. (Kar Asia, Inc. vs. Corona,G.R. No. 154985, 8- 24-04)

ESTOPPEL

While an order or decisionrendered without jurisdiction is atotal nullity and may be assailed atany stage, active participation inthe proceedings in the court, whichrendered the order or decision, willbar such party from attaching its

jurisdiction. (Sps. Gonzaga, et. al.s. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.144025, 12/27/2002).

An election of a specific theory forrelief operates as bar to thesubsequent adoption of a differentand wholly inconsistent theory.

Under the principle of judicialestoppel, a party is bound by his judicialdeclarations and may not contradict themin a subsequent action or proceedinginvolving the same properties. The reasonfor the principle is to prohibit fraud andthe deliberate shifting of position to suitthe exigencies of each particular case that

may arise concerning the subject matterof the controversy. That the petitioner is agovernment agency tasked to administerthe property does not bar the applicationof the principle. This is so because when asovereignty submits itself to the

jurisdiction of the court and participatestherein, its claims and rights of the privateparties under similar circumstances. The

government, when it comes to the court tolitigate with one of its citizens, mustsubmit to the rules of procedure and itsrights and privileges at every stage of theproceedings are substantially in everyrespect the same as those of its citizens; it

cannot have a superior advantage.(National Housing Authority vs. Garcia,G.R. No. 143230,8- 20-04)

WHEN TO APPLY ESTOPPEL

Estoppel must be applied only inexceptional cases, as itsmisapplication could result in amiscarriage of justice. (Ouero vs.Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.131282, 01/04/2002)

Assuming that the Court of Appealsshould have dismissed Guevarrasappeal on technical grounds,Pajuyo did not ask the appellatecourt to deny the motion forextension and petition for review atthe earliest opportunity. Instead,Pajuyo vigorously discussed themerits of the case. It was onlywhen the Court of Appeals ruled inGuevarras favor that Pajuyo raisedthe procedural issue againstGuevarras petition for review.A party who, after voluntarily

submitting a dispute for resolution,receives an adverse decision on themerits, is estopped from attacking the

jurisdiction of the court. Estoppel sets innot because the judgment of the court isvalid and conclusive adjudication, butbecause the practice of attacking thecourts jurisdiction after voluntarilysubmitting to it is against public policy.(Pajuyo vs. CA G.R. No. 146364, 6-3-2004)

WHEN NOT TO APPLY ESTOPPEL

The fundamental rule is that, thelack of jurisdiction of the court overan action cannot be waived by theparties, or even cured by theirsilence, acquiescence or even bytheir express consent. Further, aparty may assail the jurisdiction ofthe court over the action at anystage of the proceedings and evenon appeal.

In Javier vs. Court of Appeals, theCourt ruled that if the party commits

error in filing his suit or proceeding in acourt that lacks jurisdiction to takecognizance of the same, such act may notat once be deemed sufficient basis ofestoppel. It could have been the result ofan honest mistake or of divergentinterpretations of doubtful legalprovisions. If any fault is to be imputed to


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a party taking such course of action, partof the blame should be placed on thecourt which shall entertain the suitthereby lulling the parties into believingthat they pursued their remedies in thecorrect forum under the rules. It is the

duty of the court to dismiss an actionwhenever it appears that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter,should the Court render a judgmentwithout jurisdiction, such judgment maybe impeached or annulled for lack of

jurisdiction, within ten (10) years from thefinality of the same. (Duero vs. Court of

Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 131282,01/04/2002)

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is the authority to hearand determine a cause. Jurisdictionover the subject matter is thepower to hear and determine thegeneral classes to which theproceedings in question belong.

Jurisdiction over the subject matteris conferred by law and not by theconsent or acquiescence of any orall of the parties or by erroneousbelief of the court that it exists.Basic is the rule that jurisdictionover the subject matter is

determine by the cause or causesof action as alleged in thecomplaint. But where the actualissues are evident from the recordsof the case, then jurisdiction overthe subject matter need notdepend upon the literal avermentsin the complaint, but on the law asapplied to established facts. (AlliedDomecq Phil., Inc., vs. Villon, G.R.No. 156264, 9-30-04)

Jurisdiction is conferred by the

Constitution or by law. It cannot beconferred by the will of the parties,nor diminished or waived by them.

The jurisdiction of the court isdetermined by the averments ofthe complaint or Information, inrelation to the law prevailing at thetime of the filing of the criminalcomplaint or Information, and thepenalty provided by law for thecrime charged at the time of itscommission. (Jaime Guinhawa vs.People of the Philippines, G.R. No.

162822, August 25, 2005)

In criminal actions, it is afundamental rule that venue is

jurisdictional. Thus, the placewhere the crime was committeddetermines not only the venue ofthe action but is an essentialelement of jurisdiction. (Allen

Macasaet vs. People of thePhilippines, G.R. No. 156747,February 23, 2005)

Well settled is the rule that whatdetermines the nature of an action

as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are theallegations of the complaint andthe character of the relief sought.(Ross Rica Sales Center Inc. vs.Spouses Ong, G.R. No. 132197,

August 16, 2005)

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, thecomplaint must allege the assessedvalue of the real property subjectof the complaint or interest

thereon. In this case, thecomplaint of the respondentagainst the petitioner is forrecovery of possession of realproperty but the complaint doesnot contain any allegation of theassessed value of the lot. There isno showing on the face of thecomplaint that the RTC had

jurisdiction over the action of therespondent. Moreover, as gleanedfrom the receipt of realty taxpayments issued to the

respondent, the assessed value ofthe property in 1993 wasP8,300.00. patently then, the MTCand not the RTC had exclusive

jurisdiction over the action of therespondent. Hence, all theproceedings in the RTC, includingits decision, are null and void.(Laresma, vs. Abellana, G.R. No.140973, 11-11-04)

Generally, jurisdiction isdetermined by the law in force at

the time of the institution of theaction. When the petitioner filedthe ejectment case on May 17,1979, the applicable law was P.D.1367, Section 1 which providedthat labor arbiters shall notentertain claims for moral or otherforms of damages. However, onMay 1, 1980, during the pendenceyof this case, P.D. 1691 waspromulgated, amending of P.D.1367 granting the Labor Arbiter

jurisdiction over money claims.

The later law, P.D. 1367 by P.D.1691, is a curative statute which correctedthe lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbitersat the start of the proceedings andtherefore should be given retroactiveapplication vis--vis pending proceedings.It was intended to correct a situationwhere two different tribunals had

jurisdiction over separate issues arising


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from the same labor conflict. (UST vs. CA,G.R. No. 124250, 10-18-04)

ORIGINAL vs. EXCLUSIVE

Original jurisdiction means

jurisdiction to take cognizance of acause at its inception, try it andpass judgment upon the law andfacts, while exclusive jurisdictionprecludes the idea of co-existenceand refers to jurisdiction possessedto the exclusion of others. (Cuberovs. Laguna West Multi-PurposeCooperatives, Inc., G.R. No.166833, December 5, 2006)

OVER THE PERSON OF THE PARTIES

Courts acquire jurisdiction over theplaintiffs upon the filing of thecomplaint. On the other hand,

jurisdiction over the defendants ina civil case is acquired eitherthrough the valid service ofsummons upon them or throughtheir voluntary appearance in courtand their submission to itsauthority. As a rule, if defendantshave not been summoned, thecourt acquires no jurisdiction overtheir person and a judgment

rendered against them is null andvoid. To be bound by a decision, aparty should first be subject to thecourts jurisdiction. (Bank of thePhilippine Islands vs. SpousesEvangelista, et. al., G.R. No.146553, 11/27/2002)

A court acquires jurisdiction over aperson through either a validservice of summons or the personsvoluntary appearance in court. Acourt must necessarily have

jurisdiction over a party for the

latter to be bound by a courtdecision.

Generally accepted is the principlethat no man shall be affected by anyproceeding to which he is a stranger, andstrangers to a case are not bound by

judgment rendered by a court. (Padilla, et.al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.123893, 11/22/2001)

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECTMATTER

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction overthe subject matter of a case isconferred by law and is determinedby the allegations in the complaintand the character of the reliefsought irrespective of whether theplaintiff is entitled to all or some ofthe claims. (RCPI vs. CA, G.R. No.

136109, 8-1-2002)

Jurisdiction over the subject matteris determined by the allegations ofthe complaint. It is not affected bythe pleas set up by the defendant

in his answer or in a motion todismiss, otherwise, jurisdictionwould be dependent on his whims.

The allegations in petitionerscomplaint show that the action is one forrecovery of possession, not one whichinvolves an agrarian dispute. Therespondents only basis in assailing the

jurisdiction of the trial court is that thesubject matter of the case is anagricultural land and that they do notdeny at all the allegation of the complaintof petitioners that there is no tenancy or

leasehold agreement between themunmistakably show that there is noagrarian dispute to speak of over whichthe DARAB has exclusive original

jurisdiction. (Snduco vs. Diaz, G.R. No.147444, 10-01-04)

The well entrenched principle isthat the jurisdiction of the courtover the subject matter on theexistence of the action isdetermined by the materialallegations of the complaint and

the law, irrespective of whether ornot the plaintiff is entitled torecover all or some of the claims orreliefs sought therein. We hadruled that the jurisdiction of thecourt over the nature of the actionand the subject matter thereofcannot be made to depend uponthe defenses set up in the court orupon a motion to dismiss for,otherwise, the question of

jurisdiction would depend almostentirely on the defendant. The

MTC does not lose its jurisdictionover an ejectment case by thesimple expedient of a party raisingas a defense therein the allegedexistence of a tenancy relationshipbetween the parties. (Sumawangvs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 150106)

The MTC does not lose itsjurisdiction over an ejectment caseby the simple expedient of a partyraising as a defense therein thealleged existence of a tenancy

relationship between the parties.But it is the duty of the court toreceive evidence to determine theallegation of tenancy. If afterhearing, tenancy had in fact beenshown to be the real issue, thecourt should dismiss the case forlack of jurisdiction. (Hilado vs.Chavez, G.R. No. 134742, 9- 22-04)


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Jurisdiction is not affected by thependency of another action orbecause the plaintiff is guilty offorum shopping. These matterscannot strip the court of jurisdiction

because jurisdiction is fixed by law.(Agilent Technologies vs.Integrated Silicon Technology Phils.Corp., G.R. No. 154618, 4-14-04)

OVER THE ISSUES

Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide aquestion not in issue. Thus, a

judgment that goes beyond theissues and purports to adjudicatesomething on which the court did

not hear the parties, is not onlyirregular but also extrajudicial andinvalid. The rule rests on thefundamental tenets of fair play.(Commissioner of Internal Revenuevs. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation,G.R. No. 159593, October 12,2006)

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

The doctrine of primary jurisdictionprecludes the courts from resolving

a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially beenlodged with an administrative bodyof special competence. Foragrarian reform cases, jurisdictionis vested in the Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR); morespecifically, in the Department ofAgrarian Reform AdjudicationBoard (DARAB). (Bautista vs. Vda.De Villena, G.R. No. 152564,9- 13-04)

The doctrine of Primary Jurisdictionapplies only where theadministrative agency exercise itsquasi-judicial or adjudicatoryfunction. Thus, in cases involvingspecialized disputes, the practicehas been to refer the same to anadministrative agency of specialcompetence pursuant to thedoctrine of primary jurisdiction.

The courts will not determine acontroversy involving a questionwhich is within the jurisdiction of

the administrative tribunal prior tothe resolution of that question bythe administrative tribunal prior tothe resolution of that question bythe administrative tribunal, wherethe question demands the exerciseof sound administrative discretionrequiring the special knowledge,

experience and services of theadministrative tribunal todetermine technical and intricatematters of fact, and a uniformity ofruling is essential to comply withthe premises of the regulatory

statute administered. Theobjective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court indetermining whether it shouldrefrain from exercising its

jurisdiction until after anadministrative agency hasdetermined some question or someaspect of some question arising inthe proceeding before the court. Itapplies where the claim is originallycognizable in the courts and comesinto play, whenever enforcement ofthe claim requires the resolution ofissues which, under a regulatoryscheme, has been placed withinthe special competence of anadministrative body; in such casethe judicial process is suspendedpending referral of such issues tothe administrative body for itsview. (Smart vs. Piltel vs. NLRC,G.R. No. 151908; Globe vs. CA G.R.No. 152 063, 8-12-2003)

NON-INTERFERENCE

In the absence of bad faith, theCourt would not disturb theOmbudsmans findings of absenceof bad faith because of its policy ofnon-interference with the exerciseby the Ombudsman of itsinvestigatory and prosecutorypowers. The policy consistentlyadopted in the Courts decisions isnot only a recognition of theauthority of the Ombudsmanmandated by the Constitution butfor practicality as well. The courtswill be graciously hampered byinnumerable petitions assailing thedismissal of investigatoryproceedings by the Office of theOmbudsman. (Flores vs. Office ofthe Ombudsman, G.R. No. 136769,9-17-2002)

A matter already on review by anappellate court may not beinterfered with by the lower court.(New Sampaguita Builders

Constructions, IN., et. al. vs. Estateof Canoso, et. al., G.R. No. 151447,02/14/2003)

LACK OF JURISDICTION

Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity andmay be struck down at any time,


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even on appeal before this Court;the only exception is when theparty raising the issue is barred byestoppel. (Spouses Suntay vs.Eugenia Gocolay, G.R. No. 144892,September 23, 2005)

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION vs.ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION

Excess of jurisdiction asdistinguished from absence of

jurisdiction means that an act,though within the general power ofa tribunal, board, or officer, is notauthorized and invalid with respectto the particular proceedingbecause the conditions which aloneauthorize the exercise of the

general power in respect of it arewanting. Without jurisdictionmeans lack or want of legal power,right, or authority to hear anddetermine a cause or causes,considered either in general or withreference to a particular matter. Itmeans lack of power to exerciseauthority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capriciousand whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words,

where the power is exercised in anarbitrary manner by reason ofpassion, prejudice, or personalhostility, and it must be so patentor so gross as to amount to anevasion of a positive duty or tovirtual refusal to perform the dutyenjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law. (Sia vs.Villanueva, G.R. No. 152921,October 9, 2006)

ERROR OF JURISDICTION vs. ERROROF JUDGMENT

An error of judgment is one thatthe court may commit in theexercise of its jurisdiction. Such anerror does not make the courtsdecision void and it may serve onlyas a ground for reversal if it isshown that prejudice has beencaused by it. An error of judgmentcan be reviewed only by an appeal.

On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the actcomplained of was issued by the court,officer or quasi-judicial body without or inexcess of jurisdiction or with grave abuseof discretion which is tantamount to lackor excess of jurisdiction. An error of

jurisdiction renders a judgment void or atleast voidable and which error iscorrectible only by the extraordinary writ

of certiorari. (Jaro vs. Court of Appeals, et.al., G.R. No. 127536, 02/19/2002)

RESIDUAL JURISDICTION vs. RESIDUALPREROGATIVES

Residual jurisdiction is embodied inSection 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules ofCourt. The residual jurisdiction oftrial courts is available at a stage inwhich the court is normallydeemed to have lost jurisdictionover the case or the subject matterinvolved in the appeal. This stageis reached upon the perfection ofthe appeals by the parties or uponthe approval of the records onappeal, but prior to the transmittalof the original records or the record

on appeal. In either instance, thetrial court still retains its so-calledresidual jurisdiction to issueprotective orders, approvecompromises, permit appeals ofindigent litigants, order executionpending appeal, and allow thewithdrawal of the appeal.

The CA s motu proprio dismissal ofpetitioners Complaint could not havebeen based therefore, on residual

jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably,such order of dismissal was not one forthe protection and preservation of therights of the parties, pending thedisposition of the case on appeal. Whatthe CA referred to as residual prerogativeswere the general residual powers of thecourts to dismiss an action motu proprioupon the grounds mentioned in Section 1of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and underauthority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of thesame Rules. (Katon vs. Palanca, Jr. G.R.No. 151149, 9- 7-04)


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JURISDICTION; Payment of docketfees

Although the payment of the properdocket fees is a jurisdictionalrequirement, the trial court may

allow the plaintiff in an action to paythe same within a reasonable timebefore the expiration of theapplicable prescriptive orreglementary period. If the plaintifffails to comply within thisrequirement, the defendant shouldtimely raise the issue of jurisdictionor else he would be considered inestoppel. In the latter case, thebalance between the appropriatedocket fees and the amount actuallypaid by the plaintiff will beconsidered a lien or any award hemay obtain in his favor. (Emnacevs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.126334, 11/23/2001)

It is well - established that thepayment of docket fees within theprescribed period is mandatory forthe perfection of an appeal. This isso because a court acquires

jurisdiction over the subject matterof the action only upon thepayment of the correct amount of

docket fees regardless of theactual date of filing of the case incourt. The payment of the full-amount of the docket fee is a sinequa non requirement for theperfection of an appeal. The courtacquires jurisdiction over the caseonly upon the payment of theprescribed docket fees.(Meatmasters International Corp.vs. Lelis Integrated DevelopmentCorp., G.R. No. 163022, February28, 2005)

Appeal to the CA shall be takenwithin 15 days from the notice of

judgment or final order appealedfrom. Within the same periodappellant shall pay to the clerk ofcourt which rendered the finalorder appealed from, the fullamount of the appellate courtdocket and other lawful fees.

The payment of the appellatedocket fee is not a mere technicality oflaw or procedure. It is an essentialrequirement, without which the decision orfinal order appealed from would becomefinal and executory as if no appeal wasfiled at all. (Papa, et. al. vs. De Leon, G.R.No. 140858, 11/27/2001)

The matter of payment of docket fees isnot a mere triviality. These fees arenecessary to defray court expensesin the handling of cases.Consequently in order to avoid

tremendous losses to the judiciary,and to the government as well, thepayment of docket fees cannot bemade dependent on the outcome ofthe case, except when the claimantis a pauper litigant. (Emnace vs. CA,G.R. No. 126334, 11/23/2003)

Indeed, a court acquires jurisdictionover the claim of damages uponpayment of the correct docket fees.(Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. FYSons, Inc., G.R. No. 150789, May 5,

2006)

JURISDICTION OF RTC OVER CASESINVOLVING TITTLE TO REALPROPERTY

The Regional Trial Court, formerlythe Court of First Instance, is acourt of general jurisdiction. Allcases, the jurisdiction over which isnot specifically provided for by lawto be within the jurisdiction of anyother court, fall under the

jurisdiction of the Regional TrialCourt. But the Regional Trial Courtis also a court of limited jurisdictionover, among others, cadastral andland registration cases. Allproceedings involving title to realproperty or specifically landregistration cases, including itsincidents such as the issuance ofowners duplicate certificate oftitle, are matters cognizable by theRegional Trial Courts have

jurisdiction over all actions

involving possession of land,except forcible entry and illegaldetainer. (Durisol Philippines, Inc.vs. Court of Appeals, er. Al., G.R.No. 121106, 02/20/2002) Note:

Jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 issubject to assessed value of theland.

ASSESSED VALUE OF PROPERTY ASSHOWN BY THE TAX DECLARATION ASBASIS OF JURISDICTION OF COURT

Under paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94,the exclusion of the termdamages of whatever kind indetermining the jurisdictionamount under Section 19(8) andSection 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, asamended by R.A. 7691, applies tocases where the damages are


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merely incidental to or aconsequence of the main cause ofaction, the amount of such claimshall be considered in determiningthe jurisdiction of the court.(Ouano vs. PGTT International

Investment Corporation, et. al.,G.R. 134230, o7/17/2002)

When the action involvesownership and possession of realproperty, the jurisdiction over thesubject matter of the claims isdetermined by the assessed value,not the market value, thereof,pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg.129, as amended by R.A. 7691.

Moreover, the finding of the judge

that the value of the lot is higher than thatindicated in the tax declaration is highlyspeculative. It is elementary that the taxdeclaration indicating the assessed valueof the property enjoys the presumption ofirregularity as it has been issued by theproper government agency. (Ouano vs.PGTT International InvestmentCorporation, et. al., G.R. No. 134230,07/17/2002)

INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

Significantly, the respondentscomplaint has not sought torecover the possession orownership of the subject land.Rather, it is principally an action toenjoin petitioner Bokingo and hisrepresentatives from committingacts that would tend to prevent thesurvey of the subject land. Itcannot be said therefore that it isone of a possessory action. Therespondents, as plaintiffs in the

court a quo, to be entitled to theinjunctive relief sought, need toestablish the followingrequirements: (1) the existence ofa right to be protected; and (2) thatthe acts against which theinjunction is to be directed areviolative of the said right. As such,the subject matter of litigation isincapable of pecuniary estimationand properly cognizable exclusivelyby the court a quo, a Regional TrialCourt under Section 19 (1) of BPBlg. 129, as amended by RA 7691.(Bokingco vs. CA, G.R. No. 161739,May 4, 2006)

In the factual setting at bar,the Court rules that theParaaque RTC has

jurisdiction over thecomplaint of respondent Uy

it being a case in which thesubject of litigation forpermanent injunctionagainst the termination ofhis contract, is incapable ofpecuniary estimation. The

prayer of respondent Uy inCivil Case No. 99-0425 topermanently enjoinpetitioners from rescindingthe LCA, is not forbiddenunder RA 7227, PD 1818,and RA 8975. Saidprohibitive laws cover onlytemporary or preliminaryrestraining orders orinjunctions to preventunjustified stoppage of theimplementation of government projects; butnot permanent injunctions.

Thus, the Paraaque RTC hasjurisdiction to hear respondent Uys actionand even grant his supplication for apermanent injunction. (BCDA vs. UY, G.R.No. 144062, November 2, 2006)

RTCs JURISDICTION ENFORCEMENTOF GUARD SERVICE CONTRACT

It is well settled in law and

jurisprudence that where noemployer-employee relationshipexists between the parties and noissue is involved which may beresolved by reference of the LaborCode, other labor statutes, or anycollective bargaining agreement, itis the Regional Trial Court that has

jurisdiction. (Urbanes, Jr. vs.Secretary of Labor and Employment, et. al., G.R. No.122791, 02/19/2003)


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JURISDICTION of DARAB

The jurisdiction of DARAB is limited tocases involving a tenancyrelationship between the parties.

The following elements areindisputable to establish a tenancyrelationship: (1) the parties are thelandowner and the tenant or lessee;(2) the subject matter of therelationship is an agricultural land;(3) there is consent between theparties to the relationship; (4) thepurpose of the relationship is tobring about agricultural production;(5) there is personal cultivation onthe part of the lessee; and (6) theharvest is shared between thelandowner and the tenant oragricultural lessee. (Almuete vs.

Andres, G.R. No. 122276,11/20/2002)

In an action for unlawful detainer,the defendants contended in theiranswer that they entered the landsubject of the action in their ownright and have acquired the sameby ordinary prescription and thatthe Regional Director of the DENRhas already upheld theirpossession in question and thatthey were entitled to the landbecause they have successfullyproven their actual, notorious,physical, open and uninterruptedpossession thereof since 1960.Defendants also contend that it isthe DENR, not the courts which candecide the issue of possession.Plaintiff contends, on the otherhand, that the decision of the DENRis not yet final.

Ruling: Under the Public Land Act,the management and disposition of publicland is under the primary control of thedirectors of Lands (now the Director of theLands Management Bureau or LMB,subject to review by the DENR Secretary.As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdictionto intrude upon matters properly fallingwithin the powers of the LMB. The powersgiven to the LMB and DENR to alienateand dispose of public land does nothowever, divest regular courts of

jurisdiction over possessory actionsinstituted by occupants or applicants to

protect their possessions. The power todetermine who has actual physicalpossession of public land and who has thebetter right of possession remains with thecourts. Therefore, while the issue as towho among the parties are entitled to apiece of land remains pending with theDENR, the question of recovery of

possession is a matter that may beaddressed to the courts. But once theDENR has decided, particularly throughthe grant of a homestead patent, and theissuance of the certificate of title, itsdecision on this point will normally prevail.

(Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs.Cormoposa, G.R. No. 152807, 8-12-2003).

A boundary dispute arose betweenthe Municipality of Kananga andthe City of Ormoc. What court has

jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: Since there is no legalprovision specially governing jurisdictionover boundary disputes between amunicipality and an independentcomponent city, it follows that regional

trial courts have the power and theauthority to hear and determine suchcontroversy. (Municipality of Kanaga vs.Madrona, G.R. No. 141375, 4-30-2003)

Mere invocation of agriculturaltenancy does not ipso facto divestthe MTC of jurisdiction over acomplaint for ejectment. (Riveravs. Santiago, G.R. No. 146501, 8-28-2003).

However, when tenancy is averred

as a defense and is shown primafacie to be the real issue, the MTCmust dismiss the case for lack of

jurisdiction. Before doing so, theMTC must determine if suchrelationship was indeed the realissue. Because jurisdiction isdetermined by the allegations ofthe complaint, the MTC did notautomatically lose its jurisdictionsimply because respondents raisedtenancy as a defense. It continuedto have the authority to hear the

case precisely to determinewhether it had jurisdiction todispose of the ejectment suit on itsmerits. (Rivera vs. Santiago, G.R.No. 146501, 8-28-2003)

JURISDICTION OF DIRECTOR OFLANDS

The jurisdiction of the Director ofLands is limited to public land anddoes not extend to land privatelyowned. A free patent which

purports to convey land to whichthe government no longer has titleat the time of its issuance does notvest any title in the patentee asagainst the registered owner.(Castillo vs. Balinghasay et. al.,G.R. No. 150976, October 18,2004)


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JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL HOUSINGAUTHORITY

Under Section 1 of P.D. 1344, theNational Housing Authority has theexclusive jurisdiction to hear and

decide the following cses: a)unsound real estate businesspractice; b) calims involving refundand any other claims filed bysubdivision lot or condominium unitbuyer against the project owner,developer, dealer, dealer, broker,or salesman; and c) cases involvingspecific performance or contractualand statutory obligations filed bybuyers of subdivision lot orcondominium unit against theowner, dealer, dealer, broker, or

salesman. (Spouses Kakilala vs.Iluminada, G.R. No. 143233, 10-18-04)

JURISDICTION; Ombudsman

The power to investigate and toprosecute granted by the law tothe ombudsman is plenary andunqualified. It pertains to any actor omission of any public officer oremployee when such act oromission appears to be illegal,

unjust improper or inefficient. Thelaw does not make a distinctionbetween cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan and thosecognizable by regular courts. It hasbeen held that the clause anyillegal act or omission of any publicofficial is broad enough toembrace any crime committed by apublic officer or employee.Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the

ombudsman primary jurisdiction overcases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

The grant of this authority does notnecessary imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving publicofficers and employees cognizable byother courts. The exercise of theOmbudsman of his primary jurisdictionover the cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan is not incompatible withthe discharge of his duty to investigateand prosecute other offenses committedby public officers and employees. It mustbe stressed that the powers of theOmbudsman are very broad andencompass all kinds of malfeasance,misfeasance and nonfeasance committedby public officers and employees duringtheir tenure of office.

The jurisdiction of the Office of theOmbudsman should not be equated withthe limited authority of a SpecialProsecutor. The Office of the Special

Prosecutor is merely a component of theOffice of the Ombudsman and may onlyact under the supervision and control ofthe Ombudsman. Its power to investigateand prosecute is limited to criminal caseswithin the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman on theother hand is mandated by law to act onall complaints against officers andemployees of the government and toenforce their administrative, civil, andcriminal liability in every case where theevidence warrants. (Office of theOmbudsman vs. Enoc, G.R. No. 145957-68, 01/25/2002)

VENUE

Actions affecting title to or

possession or real property or aninterest therein (real actions), shallbe commenced and tried in theproper court that has territorial

jurisdiction over the area where thereal property is situated. On theother hand, all other actions,(personal actions) shall becommenced and tried in the propercourts where the plaintiff resides orwhere the defendant or any of theprincipal defendants resides.(Cabutihan vs. LandcenterConstruction and DevelopmentCorporation, G.R. No. 146594,06/10/2002).


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Referring to the place where a civil actionis tried, venue, unlike jurisdictionwhich is conferred by law, isessentially a rule of procedure whichlooks primarily at the convenience ofthe litigants. A plaintiff impliedly

elects venue by choosing the courtwhere he files his complaint. Venuecan even be subject to agreement bythe parties. Under the old rules, suchagreement to venue may be impliedlymade by the defendant if heseasonably fails to object to it. Whilethe present 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure does not contain similarprovisions to Section 3 and 4 of theold rules, the deletion however cannotbe taken to mean that objection tovenue may not be raised at any timebut that, rather, an objection to venuemay still be made in an answer, if nomotion to dismiss is filed. (Gumabonvs. Larin, G.R. No. 142523,11/27/2001)

IMPROPER VENUE

The wrong venue, being merely aprocedural infirmity and not

jurisdictional impediment, does not,without timely exception, disallow thecourt to take cognizance of andproceed with the case. In failing toraise his objection to it either in amotion to dismiss or in his answercoupled by his having sought relieffrom the court and favorable

judgment on his demurer to evidence,the party himself has evidence anacceptance on the venue of theaction. (Gumabon vs. Larin, G.R. No.142523, 11/27/2001).

ACTIONS

It is axiomatic that the nature of anaction is determined by thematerial allegations thereof andthe reliefs prayed for therein,whether or not the plaintiff isentitled to such reliefs or only tosome of them. The caption of thecomplaint is not determinative ofthe nature of the action. (NationalHousing Authority vs. Baello, et al.,G.R. No. 143230, 8-20-04)

CAUSE OF ACTION

A cause of action is an act oromission by which a party violatesa right of another. The essentialelements of a cause of action are:(1) a legal right or rights of theplaintiff by whatever means andunder whatever law it arises or iscreated; (2) an obligation on the

part of the named defendant torespect or not to violate such right;and (3) an act or omission on thepart of such defendant in violationof the right of the plaintiff orconstituting a breach of the

obligation of the defendant to theplaintiff or which the latter maymaintain an action for recovery ofdamages.

A cause of action is sufficient if avalid judgment may be rendered thereonif the alleged facts were admitted orproved.

In order to sustain a motion todismiss for lack of cause of action, thecomplaint must show that the claim forrelief does not exist, rather than that aclaim has been merely defectively statedor is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.(Westmont Bank vs. Ong, G.R. No.132560, 01/30/2002)

The test of the sufficiency of theallegations constituting the causeof action is whether, admitting thefacts alleged, the court couldrender a valid judgment on theprayers. This test implies that theissue must be passed upon on the

basis of the bare allegations in thecomplaint. The court does notinquire into the truth of suchallegations and declare them tofalse. To do so would constitute aprocedural error and a denial of theplaintiffs right to due process. (Sta.

Ana Homeowners Assos. Vs.Gaston, G.R. No. 141961,01/23/2002)

Basic is the rule that only theallegations of the complaint may

be used to determine whether acause of action is being pleaded.Whether these are true or false isunimportant at this point. The testis, assuming the allegations to betrue, can a valid judgment, asprayed for by the plaintiff, berendered by the court? If so, thenthe complaint states a cause ofaction.

In the present case, the complaintcontains sufficient allegations to implicateLicaros in an alleged conspiracy toaccumulate ill-gotten wealth. Thecontentions that his acts were done ingood faith, or by the monetary Board arematters of defense that cannot abate theComplaint upon a motion to dismiss. Theherein petitioners are seeking thedismissal of the present case, because 1)the action imputed to Licaros as CB


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governor were allegedly official acts of themembers of the Monetary Board acting asa collegial body; 2) the acquisition wasdone through a public bidding and in goodfaith. These contentions are evidentlymatters of defense, the veracity of which

must be determined in a full-blown trial (orin a pre-trial stipulation), and not in amere motion to dismiss. (Heirs of Licarosvs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 157438, 11-18-04)

HSBANK is being sued forunwarranted failure to pay thechecks notwithstanding therepeated assurance of the drawer

Thompson as to the authenticity ofthe checks and frequent directivesto pay the value thereof to Catalan.

Her allegations in the complaintthat the gross inaction of HSBANKon Thompsons inactions, as well asits evident failure to inform Catalanof the reason for its continuedinactions and non-payment of thechecks are sufficient statements ofclear abuse of right for which itmay be held liable to Catalan forany damages she incurredresulting therefrom.

HSBANK claims that Catalan has noaction because under Section 189 of theNegotiable Instruments Law, a checkdoes not operate as an assignment of anypart of the funds to the credit of thedrawer with the bank, and the bank is notliable to the holder and until it accepts orcertifies it.

However, HSBANK is not beingsued on the value of the checks itself butfor how it acted in relation to Catalansclaim for payment despite the repeateddirectives of the drawer Thompson torecognize the check the latter issued.Catalan may have prayed that she paidthe value of the checks but it is axiomaticthat what determines the nature of theaction, as well as which court has

jurisdiction over it, are the allegations ofthe complaint, irrespective of whether ornot the plaintiff is entitles to recover uponall or some of the claims asserted therein.(Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp.Ltd. vs. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590,11-18-04)

CONSOLIDATION OF CASES

In PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, theCourt declared that the mainobject of consolidation is to avoidmultiplicity of suits, guard againstoppression or abuse prevent delay,clear congested dockets, simplify

the work of the trial court to saveunnecessary costs and expense.

While nothing in the rules expresslyprohibits consolidation of appealed casewith a case being heard originally,

consolidation of the two cases would notserve the purposes cited above if: (1) itwould only delay the resolution of the twocases; (2) the two cases raise evidentlyintertwined; and (3) it does not appearcertain that consolidation is a wise stepwhere one or both cases had already beenpartially heard.

The propriety of consolidation restsupon the sound discretion of the trial court

judge. (Republic vs. Mangrobang, G.R. No.130907, 11/27/2001)

REAL ACTIONS

Real actions, as opposed to personalactions, are those which affect thetitle to or possession of realproperty. Where a contrary claim toownership is made by an adverseparty, where the relief prayed forcannot be granted without the courtdeciding on the merits the issue ofownership and title, morespecifically so as to who betweenthe contending parties, would have abetter right to the property, the casecan only be but a real action.(Gumabon vs. Larin, G.R. No.142523, 11/27/2001)

The cancellation of real estatemortgage filed by herein petitioner wasprimarily an action to compel privaterespondent bank to return to him theproperties over which the bank hadalready initiated foreclosure proceedingbecause of the cancellation of the saidrespondent bank of the omnibus creditline. The prime objective is to recoversaid real properties. Respondent bankhad already initiated the extrajudicialproceedings, and were it not for the timelyissuance of restraining order secured bypetitioner in the lower court, the samewould have already been sold at a publicauction.

In sum, the cancellation of the realmortgage is a real action considering thata real mortgage is a real right and a realproperty by itself. An action for

cancellation of real estate mortgage isnecessarily an action affecting title to theproperty. It is, therefore, a real actionwhich should be commenced and tried inthe place where the subject property lies.(Go vs. United Coconut Planters Bank,G.R. No. 156187, Nov. 11, 2004)


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IN PERSONAM

A proceeding in personam is aproceeding to enforce personalrights and obligations broughtagainst the person and is based on

the jurisdiction of the person,although it may involve his right to,or the exercise of ownership of,specific property, or seek tocompel him to control or dispose ofit in accordance with the mandateof the court. The purpose of aproceeding in personam is toimpose through the judgment of acourt, some responsibility orliability directly upon the person ofthe defendant. (FilemonaDomagas vs. Vivian Layno Jensen,

G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005)

IN REM ACTIONS

A judicial reconstitution proceedingis one in rem. It denotes arestoration of the instrument whichis supposed to have been lost ordestroyed in its original form orcondition. It denotes a restorationof the instrument which issupposed to have been lost ordestroyed in its original form or

condition. The purpose of thereconstitution of title or anydocument is to have the samereproduced, after observing theprocedure prescribed by law, in thesame form they were when the lossor destruction occurred.

The petition for reconstitution ismandated to prove not only the loss ordestruction of the title sought to bereconstituted but also that at the time thesaid title was lost or destroyed, he was the

registered owner thereof. The fact that noopposition is filed by a party or theRepublic of the Philippines will not relievethe petitioner of his burden. The Republicof the Philippines is not estopped fromassailing the petition if, on the basis of thelaw and evidence on record, such petitionhas no merit. (Republic of the Philippinesvs. G.R. No. 146846, Aug. 31, 2004).

QUASI IN REM ACTIONS

A proceeding quasi in rem is one

brought against persons seeking tosubject the property of suchpersons to the discharge of theclaims assailed. In an action quasiin rem, an individual is named asdefendant and the purpose of theproceeding is to subject hisinterests therein to the obligationor loan burdening the property.

Actions quasi in rem deal with thestatus, ownership or liability of aparticular property but which areintended to operate on thesequestions only as between theparticular parties to the

proceedings and not to ascertain orcut off the rights or interests of allpossible claimants. (FilemonaDomagas vs. Vivian Layno Jensen,G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005)

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

The presence of all indispensable partiesis a condition sine qua non for theexercise of judicial power. It isprecisely when an indispensable partyis not before the court that the actionshould be dismissed. Thus, theplaintiff is mandated to implead allthe indispensable parties, consideringthat the absence of one such partyrenders all subsequent actions of thecourt null and void for want ofauthority to act, not only as to theabsent parties but even as to thosepresent. One who is a party to a caseis not bound by any decision of thecourt; otherwise, he will be deprivedof his right to due process. (PedroSupulveda, Sr. vs. Atty. PacificoPelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31,2005)

The Rules of Court compels theinclusion of a necessary party whenthere is an opportunity to includehim because failure to include himwould mean waiver of the claimagainst such party. (Rexion RealtyGroup, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et.al., G.R. No. 128412, 03/15/2002)

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

Basic it is in the law of procedurethat every action must beprosecuted or defended in thename of the real party-in-interest,meaning, the party who stands tobe benefited or injured by the

judgment in the suit, or the partyentitled to the avails of the suit, aprocedural rule reechoed in a long

line of cases decided by this Court.(Republic of the Philippines vs.Gregorio Aguinoy Sr., G.R. No.155394, February 17, 2005)

Interest within the meaning ofthe rule means material interest,an interest in issue and to beaffected by the decree, as


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distinguished from mere interest inthe question involved, or a mereincidental interest. The interest ofthe party must also be personaland not one based on a desire tovindicate the constitutional right of

some third and unrelated party.Real interest, on the other hand,means a present substantialinterest, as distinguished from amere expectancy or a future,contingent, subordinate, orconsequential interest. (VSCCommercial Enterprises, Inc., vs.Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.121159, 12/16/2002)

In case the action is broughtagainst the agent, the action must

be brought against an agent actingin his own name and for the benefitof an undisclosed principal without

joining the principal, except whenthe contract involves thingsbelonging to the principal. The realparty in interest is the party whowould be benefited or injured bythe judgment or is the partyentitled to the avails of the suit.We have held that in such asituation, an attorney-in-fact is nota real party in interest and that

there is no law permitting an actionto be brought by and against anattorney-in-fact new title, null andvoid. (Carillo vs. Court of Apeals,G.r. No. 121165, September 26,2006)

DEATH OF PARTY - Substitution of aparty

The second paragraph of the rule isplain and explicit: the heirs may beallowed to be substituted for the

deceased without requiring theappointment of an administrator orexecutor. However, if within thespecified period a legalrepresentative fails to appear, thecourt may order the opposingcounsel, within a specified period,to process the appointment of anadministrator or executor who shallimmediately appear for the estateof the deceased. Thepronouncement of this Court inLawas v. Court of Appeals (relied

upon by petitioner), that priority isgiven to the legal representative ofthe deceased (the executor oradministrator) and that it is only incase of unreasonable delay in theappointment of an executor oradministrator, or in cases wherethe heirs resort to an extrajudicialsettlement of the estate that the

court may adopt the alternative ofallowing the heirs of the deceasedto be substituted for the deceased,is no longer true. (San Juan vs.Cruz, G.R. No. 167321, July 31,2006)

The failure of a counsel to complywith his duty under Section 16 ofRule 3 of the Revised Rules ofCourt, to inform the court of thedeath of his client and nosubstitution of such is effected, willnot invalidate the proceedings andthe judgment thereon if the actionsurvives the death of such party.(Riviera Filipina, Inc. vs. Court of

Appeals et. al., G.R. No. 117355,04/05/2002)

Formal substitution of heirs is notnecessary when the heirsthemselves voluntarily appeared,shared in the case and presentedevidence in defense of thedeceased party. This is preciselybecause the heirs right to dueprocess was not impaired. In otherwords, the purpose of the rule onsubstitution of a deceased partywas already achieved. (Brioso vs.Rili-Mariano, G.R. No. 132765,

01/31/2003)

PARTIES IN INTEREST; Taxpayerssuit


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When the petition, brought by a citizen,involves the enforcement ofconstitutional rights, which arematters of transcendental publicimportance, the petitioner has therequisite locus standi. (Chavez vs.

Public Estates Authority, et. al., G.R.No. 133250, 07/09/2002).

MISJOINDER AND NON-JOINDER OFPARTIES

The non-joinder of indispensable parties isnot a ground for the dismissal of anaction. At any stage of a judicialproceeding and/or at such times asare just, parties may be added on themotion of a party or on the initiativeof the tribunal concerned. If theplaintiff refuses to implead anindispensable party despite the orderof the court, that court may dismissthe complaint for the plaintiffs failureto comply with the order. The remedyis to implead the non-party claimed tobe indispensable. (PamplonaPlantation Co., vs. Rodel Tinghil, G.R.No. 159121, February 3, 2005)

Dismissal is not the remedy for non- joinder of parties. Under the rules,the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be necessary orindispensable in the action.(Vesagas vs. CA, G.R. No. 142924,12/5/2001)

Neither a misjoinder or non-joinder ofparties is a ground for the dismissal ofan action. Parties may be dropped oradded by order of the court, onmotion of any party or on the courtsown initiative at any stage of theaction. The non-inclusion of anecessary party does not prevent thecourt from proceeding with the action,

and the judgment rendered thereinshall be without prejudice to the rightsof such parties. (Cabutihan vs.Landcenter Construction andDevelopment Corporation, G.R. No.146594, 06/10/2002)

PARTIES IN A CLASS SUIT

In determining the question of fairand adequate representations ofmembers of a class, the court mustconsider: (1) whether the interestof the named party is coextensivewith the interest of other membersof the class; (2) the proportion ofthose who made the parties as it sobears to the total membership ofthe class; and (3) any other factorbearing on the ability of the named

party to speak for the rest of theclass.

The rules require that courts mustmake sure that the persons interveningshould be sufficiently numerous to fully

protect the interest of all concerned.(MVRS Publication vs. Islamic DawahCouncil of the Philippines, G.R. No.135306, 01/28/2003).

PLEADINGS

KINDS

ANSWER

(Allegation of fraud is not equivalent todenial under oath)

A reading of respondents Answershows that the respondent did notspecifically deny that he signed theloan documents. What he merelystated in his Answer was that thesignature appearing at the face ofthe promissory note seems to behis. Respondent also denied anyliability on the promissory note ashe allegedly did not receive theamount stated therein, and theloan documents do not express thetrue intention of the parties.Respondent reiterated theseallegations in his denial underoath, stating that the promissorynote sued upon, assuming that itexists and bears the genuinesignature of herein defendant, thesame does not bind him and that itdid not truly express the realintention of the parties as stated inthe defenses.

Respondents denial do notconstitute effective denial ascontemplated in by law. To deny thegenuineness and due execution of anactionable document the defendant mustdeclare under oath that he did not signthe document or that it is otherwise falseor fabricated. Neither does the statementof the answer to the effect that theinstrument was procured by fraudulentrepresentation raised any issue as to itsgenuineness or due execution. On thecontrary such plea is an admission of thegenuineness and due execution thereof,since it seeks to avoid the instrument

upon the ground not affecting either.(Permanent Savings and Loan Bank vs.Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, 9-23-04)

COUNTERCLAIM

A compulsory counterclaim is onewhich, being cognizable by the


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regular courts of justice, arises outof or is connected with thetransaction or occurrenceconstituting the subject matter ofthe opposing partys claim anddoes not require for its adjudication

the presence of third parties ofwhom the court cannot acquirejurisdiction.

In Valencia vs. Court of Appeals,the Court capsulized the criteria or teststhat may be used in determining whethera counterclaim is compulsory orpermissive, summarized as follows: (1) Arethe issues of fact and law raised by theclaim and counterclaim largely the same?(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequentsuit on defendants claim absent thecompulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Willsubstantially the same evidence supportor refute plaintiffs claim as well asdefendants counterclaim? (4) Is there anylogical relation between the claim and thecounterclaim?

Another test, applied on the morerecent case of Quintanilla vs. Court ofAppeals, is the compelling test ofcompulsoriness which requires a logicalrelationship between the claim andcounterclaim, that is, where conductingseparate trials of the respective claims theparties would entail a substantialduplication of effort and time by theparties and the court.

There is no need for the party topay docket fees for the compulsorycounterclaim. On the other hand, in orderfor the trial court to acquire jurisdictionover the permissive counterclaim, theparty is bound to pay the prescribeddocket fees. (Alday vs. FGU InsuranceCorporation, G.R. No. 138822,01/23/2001)

CROSS-CLAIM

Under Section 7 of Rule 6 of the1988 Rules of Court, a cross-claimis proper only when: (1) it arisesout of the subject matter of thecomplaint; (2) it is filed against aco-party; and (3) the cross-claimant stands to be prejudicedby the filing of the action againsthim.

The purpose of a cross-claim is toavoid multiplicity of suits. Multiplicity ofsuits should be avoided if the filing of aseparate and independent action torecover a claim would entail provingexactly the same claim in an existingaction. However, when the causes ofaction are distinct and separate from each

other, the independent interest should bepursued in another proceeding. (Londres,et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.136427, 12/17/2002)

FORMAL REQUIREMENTS

CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUMSHOPPING

Forum shopping consists of filingmultiple suits involving the sameparties for the same cause ofaction, either simultaneously orsuccessively, to obtain a favorable

judgment. (Ricardo S. Silverio Jr.vs. Filipino Business Consultants,R.R. No. 143312, August 12, 2005)

There is forum shopping when, as aresult of an adverse opinion in oneforum, a party seeks a favorableopinion, other than by appeal orcertiorari in another. There canalso be forum shopping when aparty institutes two or more suits indifferent courts, eithersimultaneously or successively, inorder to ask the courts to rule onthe same or related causes and/orto grant the same or substantially

the same reliefs on the suppositionthat one or the other court wouldmake a favorable disposition orincrease a partys chance ofobtaining a favorable decision oraction. It is an act of malpracticebecause it trifles with the courts,abuses their processes, degradesthe administration of justice andadds to the already congestedcourt dockets. (Teresita Villaluz vs.Rolando Ligon, G.R. No. 143721,

August 31, 2005)

To determine whether a partyviolated the rule against forumshopping, the most importantquestion to ask is whether theelements of litis pendentia arepresent or whether a final

judgment in once case will result tores judicata in another. Otherwisestated, to determine forumshopping the test is whether in thetwo or more cases pending, thereis identity of parties, rights or

causes of action, and reliefssought. (Huibonhoa vs.Concepcion, G.R. No. 153785,

August 3, 2006)

The rules on forum shoppingshould not be literally interpreted.Even assuming that separate


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actions have been filed by twodifferent parties involvingessentially the same subjectmatter, no forum shopping iscommitted if the parties have notresorted to multiple judicial

remedies. (R.P. vs. ExpressTelecommunications Co., Inc., et.al., G.R. No. 147096, 01/15/2002)

When there is no identity of partiesand causes of action between thecases as to give rise to res judicataor litis pendentia, the allegation offorum shopping cannot prosper.(MR Holdings, Ltd. Vs. Bajar, et. al.,G.R. No. 138104, 04/11/2002)

Forum shopping applies only to judicial

cases or proceedings, not todisbarment proceedings. (Lucente,et. al. vs. Evangelista, Jr., A.C. No.5957, 02/04/2003).

A disbarment case may proceedindependently of the civil action forcollection, without running afoul ofthe prohibition against forumshopping. Moreover, the elementsof forum shopping areconspicuously absent. Betweenthese two cases, there is no

identity of parties, as thecomplainant is in no case a party tothe administrative proceeding.Obviously, there is neither identityof rights asserted nor reliefs prayedfor. Lastly, the judgment in thedisbarment proceeding would notbar the collection case. (Fajardo vs.Bugaring, A.C. No. 5113, 10- 7-04)

The essence of forum shopping isthe filing of multiple suits involvingthe same parties for the same

cause of action, eithersimultaneously or successively, forthe purpose of obtaining afavorable judgment. In severalcases, the Court has held thatforum shopping exist when, as aresult of an adverse opinion in oneforum, a party seeks a favorableopinion in another, or when heinstitutes two or more actions orproceedings grounded on the samecause to increase the chances ofobtaining a favorable decision. An

important factor in determining theexistence of forum shopping is thevexation caused to the courts andparties-litigants by the filing ofsimilar cases to claim substantiallythe reliefs.

Forum shopping exists where theelements of litis pendentia are present or

where a final judgment in one case willamount to res judicata in another. Hence,the following requisites concur: (1) identityof parties, or at least such parties asrepresent the same interests in bothactions; (2) identity of rights asserted and

relief prayed for, the relief being foundedon the same facts; and (3) the identity ofthe two preceding particulars is such thatany judgment rendered in the other actionwill, regardless of which party issuccessful, amount to res judicata in theaction under consideration. (Tboli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) vs.Solilapsi, A.C. No. 4766, 12/27/2002).

The certification of non-forum shopping isa mandatory part of an initiatorypleading and its omission may beexcused only upon manifestequitable grounds provingsubstantial compliance therewith.(Spouses Ong vs. Court of Appeals,et. al., G.R. NO. 144581,07/05/2002)

A compulsory counterclaim is not acomplaint or initiatory pleadingthat requires a certification againstforum shopping. It bears stressingthat the Rule distinctly providesthat the required certification

against forum shopping is intendedto cover an initiatory pleading,meaning an incipient applicationof a party asserting a claim forrelief. A compulsory counterclaimis not a complaint or initiatorypleading that requires acertification against forumshopping. Also, an Answer withCounterclaim filed merely tocounter petitioners complaint thatinitiates the civil action is aresponsive, not an initiatorypleading. In other words, the rulerequiring such certification doesnot contemplate a defendantsclaim for relief that is derived onlyfrom, or is necessarily connectedwith, the main action or complaint.(Spouses Carpio vs. Rural Bank ofSto. Tomas Batangas, G.R. 153171,May 4, 2006)


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The certification against forum shoppingmust be by the plaintiff or any of theprincipal parties and not by theattorney. It is mandatory that thecertification be executed by the

petitioner himself, and not by theattorney. A certification againstforum shopping executed by thecounsel is cause for dismissal of thecase. (Republic vs. CarmelDevelopment, Inc., G.R. No. 142572,02/20/2002)

In Sy Chin vs. CA, the Court heldthat the procedural lapse of apartys counsel in signing thecertificate of non-forum shoppingmay be overlooked if the interests

of substantial justice would therebybe served. Further, in Damaso vs.NLRC, we noted that the certificateof non-forum shopping wasexecuted by the petitionerscounsel, but nevertheless resolvedthe case on its merits for thereason that technicality should notbe allowed to stand in the way ofequitably and completely resolvingthe equity and obligations of theparties to a labor case.

The rules on forum shopping, whichwere precisely designed to promote andfacilitate the orderly administration of

justice, should not be interpreted withsuch absolute literalness as to subvert itsown ultimate and legitimate objectivewhich is the goal of all rules of procedure that is, to achieve substantial justice asexpeditiously as possible. (GreatSouthern Maritime Services Corp. vs.

Jennifer Anne B. Acua, G.R. no. 140189,February 28, 2005)

SUMMONS

The preferential rule regardingservice of summons found in theRules of Court applies suppletorilyto the Revised Rules of the Houseof Representatives Electoral

Tribunal. Hence, as regards thehierarchy in the service ofsummons, there ought to be norational basis for distinguishingbetween regular court cases andelection protest cases pending

before the HRET. (Sandoval II vs.House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal, et. al., G.R. No. 149380,07/03/2002)

The service of the summons is not onlyrequired to give the court jurisdictionover the person of the defendant,but also to afford the latter anopportunity to be heard on the claim

made against him. Thus, compliancewith the rules regarding the serviceof summons is as much as an issueof due process is to be found in thereasonable opportunity to be heardand submit any evidence one mayhave in support of his defense. It iselementary that before a person canbe deprived of his property, heshould first be informed of the claimagainst him and the theory on whichsuch claim is premised. (Samartinovs. Raon, et. al., G.R. No. 131482,07/03/2002)

Summons belatedly served doesnot confer a retroactive acquisitionof jurisdiction over the person ofthe defendant. The law does notallow for retroactivity of a belatedservice. Thus, where the writ ofpreliminary attachment was servedupon the defendant on October 28,1988 while the summons wasserved only on January 26, 1989,the subsequent service does not

validate the enforcement of thewrit. (Mangila vs. CA, G.R. No.125027, 8-12-2002,)

SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL

If Service is made by registeredmail, proof shall be made by theaffidavit of the person mailingshowing that it was mailed bydepositing the copy in the postoffice in a sealed envelop, plainlyaddressed to the party or his

counsel at his office, with postagefully pre-paid, and with theinstruction to the post-master toreturn the mail to the sender afterten (10) days if undelivered. (Sec.13, 7, Rule 13) The proof alsorequires the registry receipt issuedby the mailing office.

In other words, if service is byregistered mail, proof of service consistsof the affidavit of the person mailing andthe registry receipt, both of which must beappended to the motion. Absent one orthe other or worse both, there is no proofof service. (Cruz vs. CA, G.R. No. 123340,8-29-2002)

SERVICE IN PERSON

In actions in personam, summonson the defendant must be served


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by handling a copy thereof to thedefendant in person, or, if herefuses to receive it, by tendering itto him. If an effort to serve thesummons personally to defendantis impossible, service may be

effected by leaving copies of thesummons at the defendantsdwelling house or residence withsome person of suitable age anddiscretion residing therein, or byleaving the copies at thedefendants office or regular placeof business with some competentperson in charge thereof.Otherwise stated, service ofsummons upon the defendant shallbe by personal service first andonly when the defendant cannot bepromptly served in person willsubstituted service be availed of.

The impossibility of personalservice justifying availment of substitutedservice should be explained in the proof ofservice and why efforts exerted towardspersonal service failed. The pertinent factsand circumstances attendant to theservice of summons must be stated in theproof of service or Offices Return,otherwise, the substituted service cannotbe upheld. It is only under exceptionalterms that the circumstances warrantingsubstituted service of summons may beproved by evidence aliunde. It bearsstressing that since service of summonsespecially for action in personam, isessential for the acquisition of jurisdictionover the person of the defendant, theresort to a substituted service must beduly justified. Failure to do so wouldinvalidate all subsequent proceeding on

jurisdictional grounds. (Samartino vs.Roan, et. al., G.R. No. 131482,07/03/2002)

Where personal service ofsummons could not be effected ona party, substituted service couldbe availed of. Where thedefendant resident is abroad orwhose whereabouts are unknown,summons by publication may beeffected under Sec. 16 and Sec. 14of Rule 14. (Mangila vs. CA, G.R.No. 125027, 8-12-2002)

It is well-established that summonsupon a respondent or a defendantmust be served by handling a copythereof to him in person or, if herefuses to receive it, by tendering itto him. Personal service ofsummons most effectively ensuresthat the notice desired under theconstitutional requirements of dueprocess is accomplished. If,however, efforts to find him

personally would make promptservice impossible, service maybecompleted by substituted service,i.e., by leaving copies of thesummons at his dwelling house orresidence with some person of

suitable age and discretion thenresiding therein or by leaving thecopies at his office or regular placeof business with some competentperson in charge thereof.

Substituted service derogates theregular method of personal service. It is anextraordinary method since it seeks tobind the respondents or the defendant tothe consequences of a suit even thoughnotice of such action is served not uponhim but upon another whom the law couldonly presume would notify of the pendingproceedings. As safeguard measures forthis drastic manner of bringing in a personto answer for a claim. It is a required thatstatutory restrictions for substitutedservice must be strictly, faithfully and fullyobserved. In our jurisdiction, forsubstituted service of summons to bevalid, it is necessary first to establish thefollowing circumstances: (1) impossibilityof service of summons within a reasonabletime; (2) efforts exerted to locate thepetitioners; and (3) service upon a personof sufficient age and discretion residingtherein or some competent person incharge of his office or regular place ofbusiness. It is also essential that thepertinent facts providing thesecircumstances be stated in the proof ofservice of officers return itself and onlyunder exceptional terms may they beproved by evidence aliunde. Failure tocomply with this rule renders absolutelyvoid the substituted service along with theproceedings taken thereafter for lack of

jurisdiction over the person of thedefendant or the respondent. (Sandoval II

vs. House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal, et. al., G.R. No. 149380,07/03/2002)

The trial courts, clerks of court andprocess servers must ensure thatsummonses and other courtprocesses are properly served inorder to spare them, the litigantsand the government from waste ofefforts, time and resourcesresulting from the improper serviceof summonses. It is their duty tosee to it that these are validlyserved in order to avoid needlessdelays in the outcomes of cases.(Bank of the Philippine Island vs.Spouses Evangelista, et. al., G.R.No. 146553, 11/27/2002)


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The absence in the sheriffs returnof a statement about theimpossibility of personal servicedoes not conclusively prove thatthe substituted service is invalid.Besides, the sheriffs neglect in

making such a disclosure shouldnot unduly prejudice the plaintiff ifwhat was undisclosed was in factdone.

Even if the defect is apparent onthe face of the returns, evidencethat would prove propercompliance with the Rules onsubstituted service may bepresented. (Bank of the PhilippineIslands vs. Spouses Evangelista, et.al., G.R. No. 146553, 11/27/2002)

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE

The impossibility of personalservice, justifying substitutedservice should be explained in theproof of service and why effortstoward personal service failed. Thepertinent facts and circumstancesattendant to the service of serviceor Officers Return; Otherwise thesubstituted service cannot beupheld. (Samartino vs. Raon, 383

SCRA 664, 670, 2002).

In the absence of even the barestcompliance with the procedure forsubstituted service of summonsoutlined in the Rules of Court, thepresumption of regularity in theperformance of public functiondoes not apply.

Resort to substituted servicewithout first attempting to personallyserve the process violates the rule

granting absolute preference to personalservice of summons and, only secondarily,when the defendant cannot be promptlyserved in person and after compliancewith stringent formal and substantiverequirements, permitting resorts tosubstituted service. (Sandoval II vs. Houseof Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et.al., G.R. No. 149380, 07/03/2002)

EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE

Facts: The husband filed for the

declaration of the nullity of hismarriage based on thepsychological incapacity of his wife.As the wife was at the time alreadya resident of the United States,summons by publication waseffected by leave of court. Afterhearing, the marriage was declareda nullity. The wife insists that the

trial court cannot render a valid judgment because it neveracquired jurisdiction over herperson since she was never servedwith summons. Is the service ofsummons valid?

Ruling: The service of summonsby publication is valid. Under Sec. 15 ofRule 14, extraterritorial service ofsummons by publication may be effectedwhen the action affects the personalstatus of the plaintiff as in action fordeclaration of the nullity of marriage. Thecontention that the court had neveracquired jurisdiction over the person ofthe non-resident spouse is erroneous.Such kind of jurisdiction applies only in anaction in personam. When the case is anaction in rem or quasi in rem, the courtdoes not need jurisdiction over the personof the defendant in order to validly try thecase. It only needs jurisdiction over theres like in an action for declaration ofnullity of marriage. In this kind of action,

jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.(Romualdez-Licaros vs. Licaros, G.R. No.150656, 4- 29-03)

PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OFSUMMONS

MOTIONS

MOTION ATTACKING A JUDGMENT ORPROCEEDING OMNIBUS MOTION

The Rule of Court requires that allavailable objections to a judgmentor proceeding must be set up in anOmnibus Motion assailing it,otherwise, they are deemedwaived. The Omnibus Motion Rulerequires the movant to raise all theavailable exceptions in the singleopportunity to avoid multipleplacements objections. However, toapply that statutory norm, theobjections must have beenavailable to the party at the timethe Motion was filed. (PH CreditCorporation vs. Court of Appeals,et. al., G.R. No. 109648,11/22/2001)

Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules usesthe mandatory term must in

fixing the period within which themotion shall be scheduled forhearing, so that a motion that failsto comply with this mandatoryprovision is pro forma and does notmerit the attention andconsideration of the court. In thecase at bar, Garcia does not evenrefute the fact that the Motion to


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Dismiss was scheduled for hearingon 3 December 2004, or three (3)days beyond the ten (10)-dayperiod in Sec. 5, Rule 15. Thus, themotion is a mere scrap of paperwhich does not toll the running of

the prescriptive period to file ananswer and is not entitled to judicial cognizance.The Motion to Dismiss remains

defective and of no legal effect despite thedisposition by the Sandiganbayan of theissue raised in the motion. Thesubsequent action of the court on adefective motion does not cure the flaw,for a motion with a fatally defective noticeis a useless scrap of paper, and the courthas no authority to act thereon. (Garciavs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 167103,

August 31, 2006)

MOTION TO DISMISS

Under Section 1 of Rule 16 of the RevisedRules of Civil Procedure, a motion todismiss shall be filed within the timefor but before filing the answer tothe complaint or pleading assertinga claim. (Kho vs. Court of Appeals,et. al., G.R. No. 115758, 03/19/2002)

As a general rule, a complaint cannot bedismissed based on a ground notrelied upon in a motion to dismissand, therefore, not offering theplaintiff any chance to argue thepoint. Section 2 of Rule 16 of theRules of Court requires that duringthe hearing of a motion to dismiss,the parties shall submit to the courttheir arguments on questions of lawand their evidence on questions offact, except those not available atthat time. (Spouses Benito vs.Saquitan-Ruiz, G.R. No. 149906,12/26/2002)

Section 2 and 3 of Rule 16 (Motion toDismiss) of the 1997 rules allow thepresentation of evidence during thehearing on the motion to dismiss.

These sections provide that at thehearing of the motion, the partiesshall submit all arguments andevidence then available. If the casegoes to trial, the evidence presentedshall automatically constitute part ofthe evidence of the party whopresented the same. Thus, it is not

necessary to attach to the motion todismiss the evidence required toestablish the movants cause andfailure to do so is not fatal to thiscas

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