POINTERS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

A petition for declaration of presumptive death is not a special proceeding. (Republic v. Madrona, G.R. 163604, 6 May 2005).

Article 151 of the Family Code not applicable to special proceedings. (Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 16 January 2001).

S6 R39 not applicable to special proceedings. (Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, 14 March 2007).

Petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is classified as a special proceeding. (Ong v PDIC, 18 August 2010).

The Supreme Court has held that a probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title to properties. Such question should be resolved in a separate action. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, L- 31979, 6 August 1980).

Declaration of heirship must be made in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining the heirs and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. (Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, 13 March 2009).

SC upheld dismissal of an action to annul an affidavit of self-adjudication by plaintiffs who are alleged heirs where their heirship had not been determined in the proper heirship proceedings. (Heirs of Ypon v Ricaforte, 8 July 2013).

Donata Lardizabal is the original owner of a parcel of registered land. Her heirs sold the land to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued defendants for annulment of title. Defendants contend that status of heirs of D.L. must first be established in a special proceeding. Held: No prior requirement that status of heirs of D.L. be first established in a special proceeding if plaintiffs base their right of action not on the fact of heirship to D.L. but on their rights as innocent purchasers for value. (Limos v. Odones, 11 August 2010).

Mandamus not proper to compel a mother to produce the father’s holographic will. This is because there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, that is, the filing of a petition for probate under S1 R76 and then moving for the production of the will under S2-5 R75. Under S1 R76, an interested person may petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. (Uy v. Lee, 15 January 2010).

Where the addresses of the heirs, legatees, and devisees are known, personal and individual notice to them is mandatory. (De Aranz v. Galing, 161 SCRA 628).

Publication is sufficient and notice is not necessary when the addressees are not known or the address given in the petition is wrong. (De Aranz v. Galing, 161 S 628).

The Supreme Court has held that to contest a will means to challenge the authenticity thereof. Since the challenge was based on undue influence and lack of testamentary intent but did

not otherwise attack the will’s authenticity, the testimony of one competent witness was sufficient. (See Azaola v. Singson, 109 Phil. 102).

Since the will was contested (it being alleged that the testatrix’s signature was a forgery), the presentation of 3 competent witnesses is mandatory. The presentation of only two competent witnesses is not enough; the proponent should have resorted to expert testimony. (Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333).

Secondary evidence: A photocopy is admissible to prove a lost or destroyed holographic will. Testimonial evidence is however not admissible as secondary evidence because of the great risk of fraud or mistake. (Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil 509; Rodelas v. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16).

A will executed abroad may be probated in the Philippines even if it had not been probated in it place of execution. In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. (Palaganas v. Palaganas, 26 January 2011).

Failure to file income tax return is not an offense involving moral turpitude which would make a person incompetent to serve as executor or administrator. Moreover the conviction was not yet final as Bongbong Marcos had appealed therefrom. (Republic v. Marcos, 4 August 2009).

Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. Legitimate grandchild Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay and illegitimate grandchild Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay appointed as co-administrators by SC. The SC reconsidered its earlier order and upheld the appointment only of Isabel as taking into account her “unassailable status” as the next of kin.1 The SC also took into account the animosity between Isabel and Emilio and Emilio’s failure to return a true and complete inventory. (Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 10 October 2012).

Unlike that of a special administrator, the appointment of a regular administrator cannot be procured by a mere motion. A petition must be filed pursuant to S2 R79. (Ocampo v. Ocampo, 5 July 2010).

An interested person is one who stands to benefit from the distribution of the estate as in the case of an heir or one who has a claim against the estate, as in the case of a creditor of the deceased. The interest must be material and direct and not merely indirect or contingent. (San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007).

The Supreme Court has held that a person who has cohabited with another is a co-owner of the properties acquired through their joint efforts during the cohabitation pursuant to Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code and that such co-ownership would qualify her as an interested person within the purview of S2 R79. (San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007).

Only an heir or creditor can oppose the issuance of letters of administration as they are the only ones who would be benefited by the estate. (Chua v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33).

Hence an heir who has assigned his hereditary rights before settlement proceedings were commenced, is no longer an interested person qualified to file or oppose a petition for letters of administration.

Pending appeal from the appointment of a regular administrator, the court may not appoint a special administrator because the administrator-appointee should be the administrator pending appeal from his appointment. (Relucio v. San Jose, 81 Phil. 365).

The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory and discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable. (S1[e] R109). However, it can be subject to certiorari if it can be shown that the appointment was made with grave abuse of discretion. (Jamero vs. Melicor, 26 May 2005)

The 3-month period for the executor/administrator to file the inventory is not mandatory tor jurisdictional. However The executor’s/administrator’s unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal. (Cuizon v. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495).

While the probate court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included in the inventory or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, such a determination is not final and without prejudice to the right of the interested party to raise in a proper action the question of ownership. (Reyes v. Mosqueda, 187 SCRA 661).

The making of the inventory is therefore of a preliminary and provisional nature and is not absolutely decisive of the rights of all persons in interest. The duty of an administrator to render an accounting is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded when the same is terminated. It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally closed and terminated. (Joson v. Joson, 2 SCRA 82).

It would be improper for the administrator to appoint himself as agent to sell estate property even if he proves benefit to be derived by the estate. A contrary rule would open the door to fraud and mismanagement. (Jaroda v. Cusi, 28 SCRA 108).

An administrator has no authority without prior court approval to borrow money in behalf of the estate. He is not authorized to contract debts and establish obligations to the injury and prejudice of the heirs, and in case the administrator has so acted, he alone will be responsible with his own property for the debts contracted by him. (Fabie v. Yulo, 24 Phil. 240).

Liability under the bond may be enforced either in an ordinary civil action or in the same administration proceedings. The surety may not raise the defense that the bond was not renewed or that the premiums thereon have not been paid. The surety’s liability under the bond is continuing for as long as the executor or administrator has duties to perform as such. (Luzon Surety Co. v. Quebral, 127 SCRA 295). Furthermore under Section 177 of the Insurance Code, the suretyship shall be binding notwithstanding nonpayment of the premium where the obligee has accepted the bond.

Contingent creditor has the personality to seek the removal of an executor or administrator. The interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the executor or administrator is necessary to fulfill such promise. (Hilado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164108, 8 May 2009).

That an administratrix was later held to be without the right to intervene in the settlement of the estate as an heir is not a ground for her removal, since even a stranger can be appointed as an administrator. (Parreno v. Aranzado, L-27657, 30 August 1982).

The temporary residence outside the country, maintained for the benefit of the health of the administrator’s family, is not a ground for his removal. An executor who claimed as his own certain shares in the deceased’s name in a gas company on the ground that the deceased was merely his dummy was properly removed on the ground of unsuitability. (Borromeo v. Borromeo, 97 Phil. 549).

Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas’ counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle’s estate. And Atty. Bermudo succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney’s fees. (Bermudo v. Tayag-Roxas, 2 February 2011).

The Supreme Court has held that the lawyer should first seek payment from the executor or administrator who is primarily liable. However if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the lawyer, the latter has two alternatives in collecting fees for legal services rendered in settling an estate. First the lawyer may file a separate suit against the executor or administrator in the latter’s personal capacity. Second the lawyer may file a direct claim against the estate itself for recovery of the fees as administration expenses. When a lawyer files a direct claim against the estate, there should be notice to all interested persons so that they may have the opportunity to challenge the propriety or the reasonableness of the fees. (Salonga Hernandez & Allado v. Pascual, G.R. 127165, 2 May 2006.).

The Supreme Court has held that contractual money claims under S5 R86 refers to all money claims arising out of contract, quasi-contract, or law but do not refer to those arising from crime or quasidelict. (Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959).

Claims for money which are founded on tort or crime are not money claims and should thus be filed against the executor/administrator or against the heirs.

Claims for unpaid taxes by the government are not money claims. In fact they must be paid first before the estate is distributed and where the estate is distributed without the taxes being paid, the taxes may be enforced against the distributees in proportion to their shares in the inheritance. (Gov’t v. Pamintuan, 55 Phil. 13).

The fact that the claimant was unaware of the estate proceedings or that he was negotiating with one of the heirs for payment is not a good cause to allow filing of a tardy claim. Nor will the fact that the decedent mentioned a creditor’s claim in his will exempt the creditor from the requirement of filing his claim within the statute of non-claims. Examples of a good cause for allowing the filing of a tardy claim. 1. Where a claim of P31,000 was not presented because the administrator made it appear that the value of the estate did not exceed P1,300. (In re Estate of Reyes, 17 Phil. 188).

2. Fraudulent omission of certain assets in the inventory. (Barredo v. CA, 6 SCRA 620). 3. Where the judgment in favor of claimant was rendered by the CA on appeal after the expiration of the statute of non-claim, claimant arguing that she could not have filed a money claim before since the trial court did not award damages in her favor. (De Rama v. Palileo, 26 February 1965).

Where the deceased was substituted by the administrator in the civil action involving a money claim, the estate is deemed to have notice of such claim. The substitution of the deceased in the civil action by the administrator or the decedent’s representative is generally considered as equivalent to the presentation of the claim with the probate court. Under the circumstances, the filing of the contingent claim ad abundantiorem cautelam was a mere formality. (Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co., G.R. No. L- 18936, 23 May 1967).

Non-payment of the docket fee for a money claim is not a ground for its dismissal. The probate court should just order the payment of the docket fees within a reasonable time. (Sheker v. Estate of Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, 13 December 2007).

A certificate against forum shopping is not required of a money claim since it is not an initiatory pleading. (Id.). The possibility of recovering on a deficiency judgment is a contingent claim which should be filed within the statute of non-claims. What the bank should have done was to file a contingent claim for the probable deficiency with the probate court within the 6-month period. (PNB v. CA, 360 SCRA 370).

In the action for reconveyance brought by the Republic against the Marcoses, Imelda and Bongbong, the executors, are indispensable parties under S1 R87 and hence may not be dropped from the complaint. (Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 8 February 2012).

Instances when the heirs may sue for the recovery of estate property during the pendency of probate proceedings: 1. If the executor/administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit. 2. When the executor/administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party-defendant. 3. When letters testamentary or of administration have not yet been issued. (Into v. Valle, 9 December 2005).

Order of distribution: The order shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts to which each is entitled. (S1 R90). The order of distribution must also be at the same time a declaration of heirs since a separate action for the declaration of heirship is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436).

The issue of heirship is not to be determined until the distribution stage of the proceedings. The exception would be to determine entitlement or preference in the appointment of the administrator in accordance with the statutory order of preference. (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, 9 SCRA 113).

An order approving the project of partition which had already become final may no longer be amended by the probate court even if erroneous. (Imperial v. Munoz, 58 SCRA 678 [1974]).

ORDER OF CLOSURE: Issued by the probate court after the payment of all debts and the delivery of the estate to the heirs. This is because the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after such payment and delivery. The finality of the order of distribution or of

the approval of the project of partition does not yet terminate the proceedings. (Siguion v. Tecson, 89 Phil. 28).

CONTRIBUTIVE SHARES. Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid, and have become liable to contribute for the payments of such debts and expenses, the probate court may issue writs of execution to satisfy the contributive shares of such devisees, legatees, or heirs. (S6 R88). Where the heirs had already received their shares in the estate, the probate court may issue a writ of execution to compel them to pay their respective shares to satisfy unpaid debts of the estate. (Ignacio v. Elchico, G.R. No. L-18937, 16 May 1967).

Remedy of an heir entitled to the residue of the estate but not given his share: 1. Where an heir who has been duly notified of the proceedings is not included or not given any share in the order of distribution, he must move for reconsideration or appeal therefrom within 30 days from notice, otherwise the order becomes final. 2. Where the heir and his address is known to the petitioner, but no notice was given to him, the heir can file an action to annul the judgment. The failure to notify him deprives the probate court of jurisdiction to render a valid judgment. 3. Where the heir or his address is unknown and no notice was given to him, he can file a motion with the probate court for the delivery of his share or to re-open the proceedings if the order of closure is not yet final. If the order of closure has become final, the remedy of the heir is to file an action for reconveyance against the distributees, subject to acquisitive prescription. 4. Where the heir is given a share in the order of distribution, he may move for the delivery of the same to him, even after the closure of the proceedings. The provisions of S6 R39 do not apply to special proceedings. (Rodil v. Benedicto, 95 SCRA 137 [1980]).

In an intestate estate proceeding, the probate court found that the decedent left no heirs or persons entitled to his estate. The probate court could not then and there decree that the estate be awarded to the State. The requirements for bringing an escheat proceeding (like publication once a week for 6 consecutive weeks) under R91 should be complied with. (De Guzman v. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 891 [1974]).

The action at bottom seeks to nullify the judgment of the CFI, acting as a land registration court, on the ground that a land registration court cannot issue a title over property of the public domain. Hence it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129 and R47 of the Rules of Court. (Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168861, 26 October 2007).

Adjoining land owners are not the real parties in interest to file a reversion suit over land alleged to be foreshore. In all actions for the reversion to the State of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, it is the Republic which is the real party in interest. The action must be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead in behalf of the Republic. The action for the annulment of the homestead patent was thus dismissed. (Manese v. Sps. Velasco, 29 Jan 09).

It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualifications to acquire land. Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity

of a person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or any other individual. (Balais-Mabanag v. Register of Deeds, 29 March 2010).

The CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested. (RCBC v. Hi-Tri Development Corp., 13 June 2012).

Where the purchaser of a manager’s check (Hi-Tri Dev’t Corp) payable to Rosmil Corp., retained the manager’s check and did not deliver it to the payee, the money allocated to the manager’s check remained as the bank deposit of the purchaser rather than the payee. Hence it was wrong for the bank to treat the money as the deposit of the payee. Before the bank should have reported the money as an unclaimed balance, it should have first notified Hi-Tri Dev’t Corp. (Id.).

In the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent, the choice of a suitable guardian is left to the sound discretion of the guardianship court. (Goyena v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 147148, 13 January 2003).

A non-resident should not be appointed as a guardian because it would be difficult for him to fulfill his duties. (Vansil v. Balmes, 358 SCRA 707 [2001]).

There is no rule of preference regarding the appointment of a guardian over an incompetent. (Compare with the rule on the appointment of a guardian over a minor under S6 RGM).

It is not necessary for the grant of authority to sell that the ward’s income be insufficient to maintain and educate him, it being enough that the sale is for the ward’s benefit. (Tavera v. El Hogar, 98 Phil. 481).

In general, a guardian has full authority to take possession of the property of the ward and to perform all acts necessary for its management, and to bring and defend such actions as may be needed for this purpose. (Caniza v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640).

Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, the Supreme Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. A petition which is deficient in form, such as a petition-letter, may be entertained so long as its allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus. (Fletcher v. Director of BuCor, UDK- 14071, 17 July 2009).

The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by a court which has jurisdiction to do so. Since Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article 67 (attempting to begin or create a mutiny) and Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), the legality of his arrest is settled and the writ is unavailing. Furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement, the writ will only lie if what is questioned is the fact or duration of confinement. (Aquino v. Esperon, 174994, 31 August 2007).

The restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. This is sanctioned by Sec. 52.4 of R.A. No. 8551 (New DILG Act of 1990). Even assuming that there initially was no administrative investigation when placed in custody, the subsequent investigation would legalize his restrictive custody. (Ampatuan v. Macaraig, 29 June 2010).

The writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of in cases of detention by virtue of a judicial process or valid judgment. Exceptions where the writ may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy: (JEC) (a) There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) An excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. (Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741; Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, 21 June 2005).

Dimagiba’s contention that the principle of retroactivity of penal laws would benefit him is not correct since Adm. Cir. 12-2000 is not a law which deleted the penalty of imprisonment but a circular which merely established a rule of preference, subject to the judge’s discretion, in imposing penalties under B.P. Blg. 22. The SC cannot delete the penalty of imprisonment for that would in effect be a law which only Congress may enact. Nor would the plea of equal protection of laws be appropriate. This is because SC A.C. No. 12-2000 as aforestated is not a law. Hence we apply the general rule that habeas corpus is unavailing if a person is under custody by virtue of legal process or a valid judgment. (Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876. June 21, 2005).

Adm. Cir. 08-2008 (Rule of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel) not a ground for the release on habeas corpus of reporter. The circular cannot be given retroactive effect where judgment in criminal case already final and executory. (Adonis v Tesoro, 5 June 2013).

If what is alleged is forcible taking and disappearance, not arrest and detention, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus but criminal investigation and proceeding. Here the respondents denied having custody of the missing person and there was no adequate proof that respondents had such custody. (Martinez v. Mendoza, G.R. 153795, 17 August 2006).

Take note however that effective 27 October 2007 the writ of amparo is available in cases of enforced disappearance. The convict may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. If the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict. A similar petition may be filed either in the CA or in the SC, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue appropriate orders. (S10 Rule on DNA Evidence). Take note

that such petition for habeas corpus may even be filed by the prosecution. (Id.). Where the person is detained under governmental authority and the illegality of his detention is not patent from the petition for the writ, the court may issue a preliminary citation to the government officer having custody to show cause why the writ should not issue. When the cause of the detention appears to be patently illegal, the court may issue a peremptory writ requiring the unconditional production before the court of the body of the person detained at the date and time specified. (Lee Yick Hon v. Insular Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548, 30 March 21).

A judicial guardian who was unduly deprived of custody of her ward is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus in order to regain custody. (Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, 7 August 2009).

Motion to quash writ and to dismiss case denied. The petition for habeas corpus was properly filed in the RTC of Caloocan. Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that “the petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resided or where the minor may be found,” is not applicable because it refers to a petition for custody of minors. What is applicable is Section 20 which covers petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under R102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought. As regards Petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under R102 or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. (Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera, 28 July 2014).

The Family Courts Act of 1997 did not revoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. (S20 SC Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation thereto; Thornton v. Thornton, 16 August 2004).

Where both parents have joint custody of a child, the writ may be availed of if a father is deprived of his right to see his child. (Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. 162734, 29 August 2006).

Writ of habeas corpus not available to compel a husband to live with his wife. (Ilusorio v. Bildner, 332 SCRA 169).

A habeas corpus case involving a minor is not limited to the production of the minor before the court. The main purpose of the proceeding is to determine who has rightful custody over the child. The court should still proceed to determine who should have the rightful custody of the child. (Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27 November 2009).

S6 R99 expressly acknowledges and authorizes that the matter of care and custody of the children may be raised and adjudicated as an incident to any proceeding, such as a case for habeas corpus. (Sy v. CA, 27 December 2007).

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final and executory judgment is not included among the enumeration of rights in S1 RWA. (Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, 5 June 2008, en banc).

Writ of amparo not available against Brgy. Captain’s alleged trespass of Petitioner’s property since merely a violation of Petitioner’s property rights. (Sps. Pador v. Arcayan, 12 March 2013).

A petition for a writ of amparo is not available in order for a biological mother to recover custody of child from the DWSD. There is no enforced disappearance within the context of the Rules on the Writ of Amparo. Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. (Caram v. Segui, 5 August 2014).

Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person. (Navia v Pardico, 19 June 2012, e.b.).

The inclusion of petitioners' names in the Order of Battle List does not, by itself, constitute an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and security as to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo. (Ladaga v. Mapagu, 13 November 2012)

President may not be impleaded as respondent because of presidential immunity from suit. (Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, 18 February 2010; Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 22 June 2010).

May the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP director be included as respondents in a writ of amparo case solely on the basis of command responsibility? Yes but not for the purpose of attaching accountability and responsibility to them for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes but only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for and has the duty to address the disappearance and harassments complaint of in order to enable the court to devise remedial measures. (Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, 18 February 2010).

The RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Respondents De Lima et al., to file an answer rather than a return. A return is different from and serves a different function from an answer. (De Lima v. Gatdula, 19 February 2013).

While the RWA provides for the interim reliefs of TPO IO, and PO, these provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. (Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, 11 February 2010 [e.b.]).

Interim reliefs can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since petitioner was granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 15 November 2011).

Fr. Reyes’ petition for writ of amparo to set aside his inclusion in the HDO list was denied since he should have filed the appropriate motion in the RTC where the rebellion case filed against him was pending. (Reyes v. Gonzalez, 3 December 2009).

Where there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security – the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. (Tapuz v Del Rosario, 17 June 2008, e.b., Brion, J.)

Technical rules of evidence not strictly observed in writ of amparo case. The fair and proper rule is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. The courts should exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. (Razon v. Tagitis, 3 December 2009, Brion, J.)

The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. (Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, 11 February 2010 [e.b.]).

Before a concerned citizen may file a petition for writ of amparo in behalf of a non-relative, the petitioner must allege that there were no known members of the immediate family or

relatives of the aggrieved party in line with Sec. 2(c) of the RWA. Compare with a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party. (Boac v Cadapan, 31 May 2011).

Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. The appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. That would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom. (Boac v Cadapan, 31 May 2011).

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. (Gamboa v. Chan, 24 July 2012).

The writ of habeas data not available to employee who wanted to get details on the reason for her transfer from Pampanga to Alabang. The issue essentially is one of labor law not properly the subject of the writ. (Manila Electric Co. v. Gopez-Lim, 5 October 2010, e.b.)

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Mayor Gamboa filed a petition dated for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte for including her in the list of persons maintaining private armed groups (PAGs) and for forwarding such list and related reports to the Zenarosa Commission. The SC upheld the dismissal of the petition. The right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. (Gamboa v. Chan, 24 July 2012, e.b.).

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, 29 September 2014, Velasco, J.).

An alien may file a petition for change of name provided he is domiciled in the Philippines. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-20997, 27 April 1967).

A mother cannot file a petition for change of name in behalf of her minor daughter. The petition should be filed by the daughter herself when she reaches the age of majority. The decision to change one’s name is a personal one. (Republic v. Marcos, G.R. No. 31065, 15 February 1990).

CHANGE OF NAME CF. CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF NAME: In order to differentiate change of name from correction of entry of name, it must be understood that the real or official name of a person is that which is given in the civil register, not the name by which he was baptized in his church or by which he has been known in the community. (San Roque v. Republic, G.R. L-22035, 30 April 1968).

Hence any petition which seeks to change the name recorded in the civil registry is a petition for change of name governed by R103. However mere correction of typographical or clerical errors in the entry of the name which are obvious to the understanding are governed by R108. If what a petitioner seeks to do is simply to correct a typographical or clerical error in the entry of her name, then the procedure to be followed is Rule 108 and not Rule 103. On the other hand, Rule 103 is based on change of name which is not simply a correction of a typographical or clerical error, as where the name is dishonorable or is indicative of former alienage. Here the correction of a patently misspelled name (Marilyn to Merlyn) is proper under Rule 108. The RTC did not allow Mercadera to change her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she has been using ever since she could remember. (Republic v. Mercadera, G.R. No. 186027, 8 December 2010).

The above grounds are not exclusive. The matter of whether to grant a petition for change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court. The petition should be granted where there is proper and reasonable cause and where there is no showing that the petition was motivated by fraudulent intent or that the change of surname will prejudice public interest. (Oshita v. Republic, G.R. No. L-21180, 31 March 1967).

Q Is the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name enough to justify a child born of a Singaporean father and a Filipino mother, but whose birth was registered in the Philippines, to change his name by dropping the middle name (surname of the mother)? A No. To justify a change of middle name, the petitioner must not only show proper and compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true name. Convenience for the child shall not suffice. (In Re Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, 30 March 2005)

TWO SETS OF NOTICES: A reading of S3 & 4 R108 readily shows that R108 mandates two sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first notice is that given to the persons “named in the petition” and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. (Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476, 2 February 2011)

The failure to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of the petition would render the proceedings and the judgment void. Non-impleading, however, as respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition would not nullify the proceedings and judgment as they are deemed notified through publication. (Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476, 2 February 2011)

The change being sought in Respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It has the effect of changing his status from legitimate to illegitimate.

Hence R108 applies. Under R108 the petition must be filed in the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located which in this case is Makati. The petition was however filed in Quezon City where Respondent resides. Also neither the LCR or the Respondent’s father and mother were impleaded in violation of S3 R108 which requires that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. The service of a copy of the petition and its annexes upon the LCR did not cure the defect. (Republic v Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476, 2 February 2011)

In a petition under R108 to change Petitioner’s status from legitimate to illegitimate and from Chinese to Filipino, the Petitioner’s parents and siblings must be impleaded as they are indispensable parties under S3 R108. (Republic v Uy, 12 Aug 13)

Yes. Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under R108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. A petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction. This is required by S3, R108. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them. (Onde v. Local Civil Registrar, 10 September 2014).

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Petitioners’ insistence that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto in untenable. The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively. Hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. (Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, 4 December 2009).

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (628 SCRA 266 [2010]) this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a R108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.” Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, However, this rule does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is no circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,

which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. (Fujiki v. Marinay, 20 June 2013).

Gerbert is a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship. He went to the Philippines and married Daisylyn in Pasig City. Due to work commitments, he had to return to Canada. Shocked by Daisylyn’s affair with another man, he divorced her in Canada. Later, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying her, he went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree. a) Was the recording of the Canadian divorce decree lawful? No. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. b) Gerbert filed with the RTC of Laoag City a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree. The RTC rendered decision dismissing the petition on the ground that only the Filipino spouse can invoke the provisions of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Was the judge’s decision correct? No. While the judge was correct in saying that the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 bestows no rights upon an alien, that would not lead to the conclusion that a foreigner cannot file a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce decree. Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law c) Assuming that the RTC renders a decision recognizing the Canadian divorce decree, would that by itself already authorize the cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry? No. The recognition that an RTC may extend to the foreign divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. The proper proceeding is that provided for in R108. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.2 d) It is required that two separate proceedings for the registration of the Canadian divorce decree - - one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of entry under R108 be brought? No. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a R108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, R108 can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 11 August 2010, Brion, J.).

Rule 108 may be availed of to cancel a fake marriage certificate. No need to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the Family Court. (Republic v Olaybar, 10 February 2014).

It is submitted that a petition for change of name and correction of entry may be joined in one proceeding if the change of name and correction of entry are based on the same underlying

facts or logically connected to each other and provided that all the requirements of R108 and R108 are complied with. (Republic v. Belmonte, G.R. No. L-32600, 26 February 1988).

The primordial purpose of R107 is to provide for an administrator of the property of the absentee. The general interest of society may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an owner. (Reyes v. Alejandro, G.R. No.L-32026, 16 January 1986).

The primordial purpose of R107 is to provide for an administrator of the property of the absentee. The general interest of society may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an owner. Since Roberto has no property, there is no point in declaring him an absentee. (Reyes v. Alejandro, G.R. No.L-32026, 16 January 1986).

The order of the intestate court for Nelly to vacate a portion of the estate property is only an interlocutory order that may not be the subject of an appeal. It is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. (Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 178933, 16 September 2009).

From the probate court’s order allowing the will of Ferdinand Marcos and issuing letters testamentary to Imelda and Bongbong Marcos, the Republic should have appealed to the CA under S1(a) R109 instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. (Republic v. Marcos, 4 August 2009).

Order of probate court that certain properties should be included in the inventory is interlocutory and cannot be appealed under S1 R109. Remedy is certiorari under R65. (Aranas v Mercado, 15 Jan 2014).

PERIOD OF APPEAL AND HOW APPEAL TAKEN: In special proceedings and other cases of separate or multiple appeals where a record on appeal is required, the appeal shall be taken within 30 days from notice by filing a notice of appeal and a record on appeal with the court from which the appeal is being taken. (S2[a] & 3 R41). The test for determining if a record on appeal is required is to ask if the court a quo notwithstanding the appeal still needs to hold on to the original record since it has not fully disposed of or decided the case. Appeal from the RTC’s order granting a petition for change of name is perfected by filing a notice of appeal only. A record on appeal is not required since the case does not involve multiple or separate appeals where the trial court needs to retain the original record. (Republic v. Nishina, 15 November 2010).

POINTERS IN EVIDENCE

While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least be substantial. In an investigation before the OMB for grave misconduct, the SC upheld the inadmissibility of affidavits and NBI report based thereon on the ground of hearsay. (Miro v. Vda de Erederos, 20 November 2013).

Yes. Article 7 of P.D. No. 603 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said article would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply. Since both Article 7 of P.D. No. 603 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent. (Tolentino v. Mendoza, 440 SCRA 519 [2004], cited in De Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, 8 July 2014).

Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108 (2001). The SC adopted Wigmore’s comment that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, if the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. (DBU).

Gaw v. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, 16 April 2008, Nachura, J. Production of the original may be dispensed with in the trial court’s discretion whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the documents and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. Here there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence the RTC correctly admitted the photocopies in evidence. Concepcion Chua admitted signing the deed of partition and in effect admitted the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale when she failed to specifically deny it under oath pursuant to S8 R8. The Spouses Gaw did not contest the contents of the deeds but simply alleged that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary. A certification by an officer of the local assessor’s office that a copy of the deed of sale is a certified true copy is not an acceptable secondary evidence. First the local assessor’s office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in S24 R132. Second the certification did not state that it is a certified true copy of the original. (Gabatan v. CA, 13 March 2009).

The fact that the articles of incorporation, memorandum of agreement, purchase agreement, confidential memorandum, and letters were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigation of the alleged illgotten wealth of the Marcoses did not make them public records within the purview of S3(c) and S7 R130. Hence they could not be admitted for being in violation of the best evidence rule. As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGG’s exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court. (Republic v Marcos-Manotoc, 8 February 2012).

Presentation of photocopy of Gulf Air finance manual permissible in labor proceedings which are nonlitigious. (Gulf Air v. NLRC, 24 April 2009).

Best evidence rule does not apply where the contents of a document are not the subject of inquiry, as in the case where neither party disputed the contents of a service contract. (Nissan North EDSA v. United Phil. Scout Agency, 20 April 2010).

Citibank v. Teodoro, G.R. 150905, 23 Sep 03. Suit by the Petitioner against the Respondent for credit card debts, at issue was the admissibility of photocopies of sales invoices/charge slips signed by the Respondent. SC said the proponent must account for the non-production of all the originals. Where the loss of the marriage certificate has been proven, secondary evidence in the form of testimonies may be adduced to prove the fact of marriage. (Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, 22 January 2014).

Photocopies of fax transmissions are not admissible unless the non-production of the original fax transmission is accounted for. Fax transmissions are not electronic documents or electronic evidence. (MCC Industrial Corporation v. Ssangyong Corp., 17 October 2007, Nachura, J.)

If not all the contents of a document are generated or recorded electronically, such as if the document contains a manual signature and handwritten notations, then a photocopy of such document will not be considered as an equivalent of the original. (National Power Corporation v. Codilla, 3 April 2007).

The SC held that the parol evidence rule applies only to the parties to the contract and their successorsin-interest and not to the defendants who are not parties to the deed of sale. (Lechugas v. CA, 143 SCRA 355).

Even if the deed of sale stated that the buyers had paid the consideration, the seller may prove otherwise. This is an exception to the parol evidence rule, that is, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. (Sps. Lequin v. Sps. Vizconde, 12 October 2009).

A beneficiary under a stipulation pour autrui is considered a party to a written contract and is bound by the parol evidence rule. (Pacres v. Heirs of Ygona, 5 May 2010).

Rudlin Corp contends that although the price stated in the contract is P6.9 million, there was an understanding that the price would be reduced to P6 million. They invoke the exception to the PER under S9(a) R130 wherein the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties. SC held that S9(a) R130 available only where written contract is so ambiguous or obscure that the parties’ contractual intention cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. (Financial Building Corp. v. Rudlin International Corp., 4 October 2010, Villarama, J.)

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.1 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them. (Pp v Enojas, 10 March 2014).

DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID/DNA. The chain of molecules found in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individual’s DNA is unique for the individual, except identical twins.

DNA testing is conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence; if 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. (Rule on DNA Evidence). First application of New Rules on DNA Evidence. Biological samples taken from AAA (rape victim), BBB (17 y.o.), and the accused. Results showed that there is a 99.999% probability that the accused is the father of BBB. (People v. Umanito, 16 April 2009).

While the accused’s DNA profile was not in the vaginal smear, the DNA result was not conclusive since the specimen was contaminated or stained, having undergone a serological analysis. (People v. Pascual, 19 January 2009).

Compliance with the conditions under S4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not mean that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. (Lucas v. Lucas, 6 June 2011).

There is no law requiring a witness to present authorization to testify from the party presenting him. All that the Rules require is that a witness possess all of the qualification and none of the disqualification provided therein. (AFP-RSBS v Republic, 20 March 2013).

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. (Pp v Aleman, 24 July 2013).

“What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute.” (Garcia v. Vda. De Caparas, 17 April 2013).

What the SC in turn overlooked was that Amanda was not the party-claimant or assignor of a party to a case or one in whose behalf a case is prosecuted but only a witness; hence the Dead Man’s Statute does not bar her from testifying.

Alvarez v. Ramirez, 14 October 2005: Where the husband had tried to set fire to his sister-in-law’s house knowing fully well that his wife was also inside, the wife could testify against him as he committed a crime against her. The SC also stated that where there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility to be disturbed, the reason for the MDR ceases and a spouse may testify against the other.

Krohn v. CA, 233 S 146, 14 June 1994: In a marriage annulment case, a husband could testify as to the contents of a confidential psychiatric evaluation of his wife as a schizophrenic. The SC said that the privilege bars only the physician not other persons. The SC said that the testimony may not be considered a circumvention of the privilege since the husband’s testimony cannot have the same force and effect as the testimony of the physician. The respondent’s counsel waived the hearsay objection when he failed to raise this as a ground in his objection.

Chan v Chan, 24 July 2013: In an action for nullification of marriage, Josielene filed a motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to the hospital where Johnny had undergone rehabilitation for the production of his medical records. The SC treated the motion as one for production of documents under R27 (since trial had not yet started) which does not cover privileged matter. Josielene claimed that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial. The SC held that to allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. A physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

A stepmother may be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter. The filial privilege does not apply since the same covers only direct ascendants and direct descendants, and a stepdaughter is not a direct descendant of the stepmother. (Lee v. Court of Appeals, 13 July 2010).

Accused’s silence when his wife’s nephew asked him why he killed his wife is an admission by silence under S32 R130. In addition, accused’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which can be received as an implied admission of guilt under S27 R130. (Pp v. Español, 13 Feb 09).

The offer of compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt. (San Miguel Corp. v. Kalalo, 13 June 2012).

Failure to respond to a demand letter is not an implied admission of liability. A person does not make a letter evidence by sending it to a party against whom he wishes to prove the facts stated therein. He can no more impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. (Phil. First Ins. Co. v. Wallem Phils., 26 March 2009).

Non-flight is not evidence of innocence. (Eduarte v. People, 16 April 2009).

The statements of Ayala Land Inc., (the developer) would be binding upon the Ayala Alabang Village Association (the homeowner’s association) in an action by the latter to enforce the deed of restrictions over a lot in Ayala Alabang. This is because ALI under the deed of restrictions may enforce the same together with AAVA and thus ALI is a person jointly interested under S28 R130. (The Learning Child Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association, 7 July 2010).

The CA correctly applied S29 R130 on joint interest. By entering into a joint venture, MBMI has a joint interest with Corporations A, B, and C. Hence its statements in relation to such joint venture are an exception to the res inter alios acta rule. (Narra Nickel Mining Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., 21 April 2014).

An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant, even if it implicates others in an alleged conspiracy if there is no proof of the conspiracy aside from the extrajudicial confession. (Tamargo v. Awingan, 19 January 2010).

Accused’s confession to a radio broadcaster was admissible in evidence. He was not entitled to the Miranda rights as he was not under custodial investigation. (People v. Hipona, 18 February 2010).

Accused’s confession to a Bantay Bayan made without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Inquiry made by a bantay bayan has the color of a state-related function and entitles the suspect to his Miranda rights. (People v. Lauga, 15 March 2010).

On the other hand, the accused’s admissions before barangay tanod and barangay officials made in public with other persons present were held admissible notwithstanding that the accused was not afforded his Miranda rights. (People v. Sace, 5 April 2010).

ADOPTIVE ADMISSION: Adoptive admission is where a party, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopts or ratifies another’s statement. Evidence of the statement would then be admissible against the party. Here the Respondent adopted its counsel’s statement that he had transmitted the draft of the answer to the Respondent, but did not sign the answer which was filed. (Republic of the Philippines v. Kenrick Dev’t Corp., G.R. 149576, 8 August 2006).

The 3 contracts to sell were not sufficient to prove a habit or custom on the part of XEI to grant the 120- month term to all its lot buyers. There was no adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. (Boston Bank v. Manalo, 9 Feb 06).

Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest. They do not include a party’s testimony in court as a witness. The proper ground for objecting to self-serving statements is not that they are self-serving but that they are hearsay. Statements made by a party in court favoring his interest may not be objected to as self-serving since the party may be cross-examined. (People v. Omictin, 26 July 2010).

In a marriage nullity case, the lack of personal interview of the respondent does not render hearsay the psychologist’s report. (Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, 18 August 2010).

Even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies the basic minimum test of relevance and consistency with other evidence. The courts should exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. (Razon v. Tagitis, 3 December 2009, Brion, J.)

NBI agent’s testimony that Zaldy had identified in a police line-up the accused as the perpetrators of the robbery and killing was held unreliable where Zaldy did not testify in court and the NBI agent did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the accused (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as the accused. (Pp v Cachuela, 10 June 2013).

It should also be noted that the NBI agent’s testimony on Zaldy’s out-of-court identification is hearsay. The affiant’s failure to identify their affidavits in the preliminary investigation before the OMB and the grave nature of the charges (grave misconduct) led the SC to treat their affidavits as inadmissible under the hearsay rule. (Miro v. Vda de Erederos, 20 Nov 2013).

Medical certificate that plaintiff suffered whiplash is hearsay where the physician who executed it not presented in court. (Dela Llana v Biong, 4 Dec 2013).

Yes, since Dr. Mijares did not testify in court regarding the same. In fact his testimony was dispensed with. (People v. Rondina, 30 June 2014). (Note that the stipulation was not on the authenticity of the medical report but on the fact simply that AAA submitted herself to medical examination one week after the alleged rape).

Under the Rules on Evidence, a dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule and admissible in evidence. Emong gave the statement under a consciousness of an impending death. Even if he did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of his wounds and his death shortly after sustaining the wounds is sufficient to show that Emong was conscious of his dying condition. (Marturillas v. People, G.R. 163217, 18 Apr 06).

The fact that the victim had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48 hours indicates that the victim was conscious of his impending death. (People v. Tabarnero, 24 February 2010).

Bloodied condition of a stab victim indicates that victim must have been fully aware that he was on the brink of death. (People v. Serenas, 29 June 2010).

It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a consequence of appellant’s stabbing him in the chest. At the time the victim made his declaration, his breathing labored, he realized that he could die after having been stabbed twice in the chest. (People v. Rarugal, 16 January 2013).

With respect to the identification of the sales invoices, Haw’s testimony was hearsay because he was not present during its preparation and the secretaries who prepared them were not presented to identify them in court. Further, these sales invoices do not fall within the exceptions to the hearsay rule even under the “entries in the course of business” because the petitioners failed to show that the entrant was deceased or was unable to testify. (Advance Paper Corp. v. Arma Traders Corp., 11 Dec 2013).

Not only the testimony or deposition, but the documents which are part of the testimony or deposition, are admissible under this exception. (Manliclic v. Calaunan, 25 January 2007).

Francisco v. People, GR 146584, 12 July 2004, Callejo, J.: Jovita’s testimony in Case 1 (qualified theft) that Pacita confessed to her that she had sold the jewelry to Francisco is inadmissible against Francisco in Case 2 (fencing) to prove the truth of said admission. It bears stressing that Francisco was not a party (accused) in Case 1. Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in Case 2 nor was Pacita presented as a witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly made to Jovita. Thus there was no opportunity to cross-examine Pacita. Pacita’s testimony in the preliminary

investigation of Case 2 as well as her affidavit are inadmissible against Francisco since the latter did not have the opportunity to crossexamine Pacita. The testimony of witnesses in a prior criminal case for reckless imprudence against the employee (bus driver) cannot be introduced in a subsequent civil case for tort filed by the offended party against the employer (bus company) to enforce the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. This is because the employer is not a party in the criminal case and thus had no opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses. However where the employer failed to object to the TSNs when they were offered in evidence, the same are admissible. The driver’s acquittal is of no moment since the tort case is an independent civil action. (Manliclic v. Calaunan, 25 January 2007).

A judgment of conviction of the employee is however conclusive upon the employer in a motion or action to enforce the employer’s subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and said judgment is admissible in evidence in the proceedings brought to enforce the employer’s subsidiary liability.

However if the declarant’s statement is about his relationship to R, then preliminary proof of relationship is no longer required. Thus if the declarant’s statement was that he is the illegitimate son of R, then preliminary proof is no longer required. (See Tison v. CA, 31 July 1997).

Statement made as part of the res gestae admissible even if made eleven hours after the incident, provided the declarant was still under the influence of the startling event. (Zarate v. People, 3 July 2009).

POEA certification that accused was not a licensed recruiter is an official record. Hence it is an exception to the hearsay rule and admissible even if the one who made the certification was not presented in court. (People v. Ochoa, 31 August 2011).

The SC noted that a witness had identified the signature of the certifying officer. It is opined that even if the certifying officer’s signature was not identified, the certification would still be admissible as it is a public document which does not need to be authenticated. - The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in the performance of their duties not on the basis of their own personal observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis of the complainants' affidavits, is hearsay, in fact double hearsay. Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman cannot rely on it. (Miro v Vda de Erederos, 20 Nov 2013).

The accused in a murder case raised the defense that victim was a drug addict and thief to try to show that he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen. The SC said that proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to establish the probability or improbability of his killing since the accused did not allege that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. (Pp v. Lee, G.R. No. 139070, 29 May 2002).

Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The parties may however stipulate on what the foreign law is in which case the same are judicial admissions binding upon them and they cannot take a contrary stance. (PCIB v. Escolin, G.R. 27936, 29 March 1974). –

Court of Appeals erred in taking judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor. Requirement of notoriety not met. (Sps. Latip v. Chua, 16 October 2009). –

Courts cannot take “judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in Philippine society.” (New Sun Valley Homeowners’ Assoc. v. Sangguniang Bgy. of Sun Valley, 27 July 2011). –

The Management Contract entered into by Asian Terminals Inc. and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with ATI. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied. (Asian Terminals Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., 4 April 2011). –

Courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. (Dela Llana v. Biong, 4 Dec 2013).

Failure to answer the complaint is not an implied admission of the allegations thereof. (Heirs of de Guzman v. Perona, 2 July 2010).

The benefit of a judicial admission may be lost by failure to object to the presentation of evidence contradicting it. (ATCI Overseas Corp. v. Echin, 11 October 2010).

Testimony of witness who died before he could be cross-examined must be expunged if there is no showing of delay by party waiting to cross. (Sps. Dela Cruz v. Papa, 8 December 2010, Abad, J.)

If the predicate is not laid, the impeachment is not complete and the witness has not been impeached effectively. (Pp v. Cortezano, 375 SCRA 95).

Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually believed that Kenneth’s testimony would greatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's counsel was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner. (Design Sources International v. Eristingcol, 19 February 2014).

An improperly notarized deed of sale is not a public document which carries the presumption of due execution and authenticity. Hence the evidentiary standard to prove forgery is merely preponderance of evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. The alleged seller’s testimony that his signature was forged taken with the testimony of the buyer that he did not see the seller sign and that he did not acknowledge the document before the notary public was sufficient to prove forgery even without presenting a handwriting expert. (Dela Rama v. Papa, 30 January 2009).

- Acknowledgment defective where person who appeared before notary public not indicated in the acknowledgment. Hence the document is not considered a public document. (Dycoco v. Orina, 30 July 2010). –

The fact that Pantranco’s articles of incorporations, memorandum of agreement, and purchase agreement were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigation of the Marcoses’

alleged ill-gotten wealth do not make the same public records within the purview of S19(c) R132. (Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 8 February 2012). –

The certification as to the income of the deceased, executed by his employer the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are public documents under S19(a) R132. Hence its authenticity and due execution are already presumed and moreover it is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein under S23 R132. (Heirs of Ochoa v. G&S Transport, 16 July 2012). –

The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document under S19(a) R132. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the forensic chemist who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted. (Kummer v Pp, 11 Sep 2013). –

NSO certification of marriage, death, and that private respondent has record of 2 marriages are public documents pursuant to Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered as public documents and shall be prima facie proof of the facts therein. Hence there was no need to present the records custodian of the NSO to testify on their authenticity and due execution. (Iwasawa v. Gangan, 11 Sep 2013).

CENRO and PENRO certifications that land alienable and disposable do not fall within the purview of the first sentence of S23 R132. (Republic v Medida, 13 August 2012).

They fall within the purview of the second sentence and are thus proof only of the fact of execution and the date thereof. (Republic v. De Tensuan, 23 October 2013).

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, that marriage license no. 9969967 was issued to another couple and that “it appear that no marriage license was issued to Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo” was sufficient to prove the lack of marriage license. The certification need not stated that a diligent search was made because of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Besides the fact that the MCR stated that license no. 9969967 was issued to another couple shows that she undertook a diligent search. (Abbas v. Abbas, 30 January 2013).

Malayan Insurance Co. v. Phil. Nails Corp., G.R. 138084, 10 April 2002: Respondent sued Petitioner on a marine cargo policy for loss arising from short delivery of steel billets. Petitioner was declared in default and a default judgment rendered in favor of the Respondent. Respondent’s lone witness presented Ms. King who prepared the summary of steel billets received based on the bill of lading and the SGS report. The SC however found that the B/L and the SGS report were not authenticated as Ms King did not see the same executed or written nor was evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting or signature thereon adduced pursuant to S20 R132. Hence the SC said that the summary of steel billets received had no proven real basis.

Accused argued that an obscene picture sent through a text message was an electronic document that should have been authenticated by a digital signature. SC said that the objection was not raised during the trial and was thus waived. (Ang v. Court of Appeals, 20 April 2010, Abad, J.)

Mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits does not confer any evidentiary weight on the documents unless these are formally offered. (Heirs of Cruz-Zamora v. Multiwood Inter. Inc., 19 Jan 09).

a) No the R65 petition of Viveca was not rendered moot and academic when she made a tender of excluded evidence before the trial court. Under S40 R132 before tender of excluded evidence may be made the evidence must be formally offered to the court and denied admission by it. Here the insurance policy and application were not formally offered to the trial court. Hence the tender of proof was not an adequate remedy which precludes the filing of a petition for certiorari. b) No the contents of an insurance policy and application are not privileged and confidential. The Insurance Commission itself has issued an opinion that Circular Letter No. 11-2000 was not designed to obstruct lawful court orders. (Yu v. CA, G.R. 154115, 29 Nov 05).