Religious Repression in Tibet 2012

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Religious Repression in Tibet:Special Report 2012

zh--I-z--fz-fP-hP-P-G-w-M-e-Gm-DP-Tibetan Centre for Human Rights & Democracy


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Buddhism too recognises that human beings are entitled to dignity, thatall members of the human family have an equal and inalienable right

to liberty, not just in terms of political freedom, but also at the funda-

mental level of freedom from fear and want. Irrespective of whether

we are rich or poor, educated or uneducated, belonging to one nation

or another, to one religion or another, adhering to this ideology or

that, each of us is just a human being like everyone else.

~ His Holiness the IVth Dalai Lama


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Contents

I Introduction ....................................................................... 1

II A Brief History of Buddhism in Tibet ................................. 5

III Overview of Legal Framework Relating to the Freedom

of Religion ....................................................................... 9

A. A General Look at the International Standards Protecting

the Right to Freedom of Religion ........................................ 9

B. Chinese Law Relevant to Freedom of Religion.................. 11

1. International Obligations ............................................. 12

2. Constitution ................................................................. 13

3. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law ................ 15

4. The State Secrets Law: the Regulation on State Secrets andtheSpecicScopeofEachLevelofSecretsin

Religious Work ............................................................. 18

5. The National Regulation on Religious Affairs ............. 20

C. Conclusion ......................................................................... 23

IV The Current Situation Chinese Policies towards

Tibetan Buddhism .............................................................. 25 A. Anti-DalaiLamaCampaignandPatrioticEducation ..... 25

1. Principles of the Anti-Dalai Lama Campaign ............... 26

2. PatrioticEducationSessions...................................... 31

B. Control Over Monastic Institutions .................................. 35

1. State Administration For Religious Affairs, Management

Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries,

OrderNo.8(theManagementMeasures) ................. 36


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2. Recent Adjustments: the Complete Long-Term

Management Mechanism for Tibetan Buddhist

Monasteries .................................................................. 41 3. ModicationstotheGesheSystem .......................... 43

4. Harmonious Model Monasteries and Patriotic

Monks and Nuns .......................................................... 44

5. TheNineMust-HavesandtheSixOnes................ 45

6. MeasuresSpecifctotheTibetanAutonomousRegion ..48

7. AdditionalExamplesofRepressiveMeasuresatthe

Prefectural or Municipal Level ..................................... 51

i. MeasuresforDealingStrictlywithRebellious

Monasteries and Individual Monks and Nuns in

Kardze TAP, Sichuan Province .............................. 52

ii. BriengBookletonLawandOrderLhasa

MunicipalityLawandOrderInformation

Department, Tibet Autonomous Region ............... 54

8. Conclusion .................................................................... 57

C. Order No. 5: Management Measures for the Reincarnationof Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism ............................ 58

D. ReactionaryMeasures......................................................... 61

1. BansonHolidays.......................................................... 61

2. Restrictions on Movement ........................................... 62

3. Lockdowns,HeightenedSecurity,andViolence.......... 64

4. LegalMeasures........................................................... 68

V In-Depth Legal Framework and Analysis ........................... 71

A. FreedomofReligionorBeliefTheRightItself............... 72

1. Freedom to Adopt, Change, or Renounce a

Religion or Belief .......................................................... 72

2. Freedom from Coercion ............................................... 73

3. The Right to Manifest Ones Religion or Belief ........... 77

a) FreedomtoWorship............................................... 78

b) PlacesofWorship ................................................... 81


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c) ReligiousSymbols................................................... 84

d) ObservanceofHolidaysandDaysofRest ............. 86

e) AppointingClergy.................................................. 88 f) TeachingandDisseminatingMaterials ................... 93

g) TheRightofParentstoEnsuretheReligiousand

MoralEducationoftheirChildren ......................... 96

h) Registration............................................................. 99

i) TheRighttoCommunicatewithIndividuals

and Communities on ReligiousMatters at the

National and International level ........................... 103

j) TheRighttoEstablishandMaintainCharitableand

Humanitarian Institutions and to Solicit and

Receive Funding.................................................... 108

B. Discrimination .................................................................. 110

1. Discrimination on the Basis of Religion or Belief ...... 111

a) DeJureDiscrimination......................................... 113

b) DeFactoDiscrimination ...................................... 115

2. State Religion .............................................................. 118 C. VulnerableGroups ........................................................... 122

1. Persons Deprived of Their Liberties ........................... 122

2. Protecting Minorities .................................................. 123

D. Intersection of Freedom of Religion or Belief with

Other Human Rights ....................................................... 127

1. FreedomofExpression ............................................... 127

2. RighttoLife,Liberty,andtheSecurityofPersons .... 131 E. Cross-cuttingIssues .......................................................... 136

1. Derogation .................................................................. 136

2. Limitations.................................................................. 139

3. Legislative Issues ......................................................... 140

4. Defenders of Freedom of Religion or Belief ............... 143

VI Conclusion ................................................................... 147

Contents


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Introduction

The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is afundamentalanduniversalright,rstenshrinedinArticle18oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)in1948.Despite

itsvaluetotheinternationalcommunity,Statescontinuetoviolatetheright to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion across the globe.ThisisparticularlytrueinTibet,wheretheChinesegovernmentthroughlaw,policy,andpracticeconsistentlyrepressesthereligiousand other rights of the Tibetan Buddhists in the Tibetan AutonomousRegion(TAR)andotherTibetanareasincorporatedintoChineseprovinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Gansu. Since 1999,the United States Commission on International Religious FreedomrecommendedthatthePeoplesRepublicofChinabedesignatedby

theUSDepartmentofStateasacountryofparticularconcern,that is, a countrywhose government has engaged in or toleratedsystematicandegregiousviolationsoftheuniversalrighttofreedomof religion or belief.1 In fact, the Commission considers China to beone of the mostegregious violators of religious freedom.2

ThegoverningandsolepartyofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC),theCommunistPartyofChina(CPC)followsaMarxist,atheistideologyinwhichreligionisconsideredasuperstitiousand

unscienticproductofnaturalandsocialoppression,exploitedandused in backward societies to suppress the lower class and preservesocial inequalities.3 As such, Marxismstipulatesthatinasocialist

1 U.S. Dept. of State, CoUntry reportSon HUman rigHtS praCtiCeSfor 2011: CHina (in-ClUDeS tibet, Hong Kong, anD maCaU) (2012) [hereinafter US CoUntry report 2012], avail-able athttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=187481#wrapper.

2 U.S. CommiSSionon international religioUS freeDom, annUal report 2012 136 [hereinafterUSCIRF], available athttp://www.uscirf.gov/images/Annual%20Report%20of%20USCIRF%202012(2).pdf.

3 tHe international Campaignfor tibet, WHentHe SKy fellto eartH: tHe neWCraCKDoWnon bUDDHiSmin tibet6(2004),available athttp://72.32.136.41/les/documents/2004ReligionReport.pdf.


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societyinwhichthereisnoclasssystem,religionwillnaturallyandinevitablydisappear.4Consequently,thePRCappearscondentthat

the Tibetan peoples religious faith and fervour will die once strongereconomic and social progress is achieved.

In addition to ideological differences, the Chinese governmentlinks Tibetan Buddhism with the perceived fear of the Tibetan desireforseparationfromChina.Astrategywhich,accordingtoChina,ispromulgatedbytheDalaiLama,theCentralTibetanAdministration,andotherforeignhostileandanti-Chineseforces.5 As a result, theChinese government intends to either eliminate the religious faith

of the Tibetans or transform Tibet into an atheist region where thecommunal spiritual civilization will be propagated to the Tibetanpeople.6ThisistheunderlyingpolicyonwhichChinasreligiouslyrepressive measures in Tibet are founded.

In 2008 the Tibetan Plateau experienced a wave of protests,during which thousands of Tibetans called for religious freedom, afree Tibet, and the return of their spiritual leader His Holiness theDalai Lama to Tibet. Since then, government control over religious

practice and the management of monastic institutions has beenextraordinarilytight.7Manyofthemonks,nuns,andotherpoliticalprisoners arrested during the 2008 uprising still remain in detentiontoday.Heavyrestrictionsonfreedomofmovementandtheforcedrelocation of nomadic communities from their grasslands to smalltowns,effectivelycuttingthemofffromtheirtraditionalBuddhistculture, contribute to the virtual lockdown and undeclared martiallawinplaceinTibettoday.AstheUSCommissiononInternational

Freedom noted in its 2012 report, [t]he religious freedom conditionsin Tibetan Buddhist areas of China remained acute, worse now thanatanytimeoverthepastdecade.8

The increased restrictions have resulted in 95 protest self-immolations in Tibet.9 A large number of the self-immolators have

4 Id.5 Id. at 8.6 tibetan Centrefor HUman rigHtSanD DemoCraCy, HUman rigHtS SitUationin tibet:annUal

report 2002 136 [hereinafter tCHrD annUal report 2002].

7 U.S. Departmentof State, international religioUS freeDom report 2010, available athttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148863.htm.8 USCIRF,supra note 2, at 139.9 As of 10 December 2012.


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Introduction

been monks and nuns who could no longer bear the oppression.Tibetan Buddhist monks have been known for their patience and

resilienceinthefaceofadversity.ThecaseoftheseburningprotestsisclearevidencethatTibetanmonkshavebeenpushedtotheextremelimits of human endurance and helplessness in the face of oppressiveChineserule.AlthoughtheChinesegovernmenttriesdesperatelyto conceal them, numerous videos, pictures, and news of the self-immolationshave been leaked into the international community.These depictions capture the self-immolators calling for religiousfreedominTibet,andthereturnoftheirbelovedspiritualleader,His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Thisreportisanin-depthanalysisoftheinternationallyprotectedrighttofreedomofreligionandbelief,andthewaysinwhichthegovernmentofthePRCiscontinuouslyandsystematicallyviolatingitinthecontextofTibetanBuddhism.TherstsectionprovidesabriefhistoryofTibetanBuddhisminTibet,beginningwiththeintroduction of Buddhism in Tibet in the 5th century C.E., andendingwithanaccountofTibetanBuddhisminTibettoday.Thesecond section contains a general overview of both the internationaland Chinese laws that pertain to the right to freedom of religion.The third section of the report describes in detail some of the mostreligiouslyoppressivemeasuresimposedbytheChinesegovernmenton Tibetan Buddhists.

Theheartofthisreportisthefourthsection,whichisananalysisoftheeffectofChinasoppressivelawsastheypertaintotherightto freedom of religion. The structure of this section is borrowed

fromtheframeworkforcommunicationspresentedbytheUnitedNations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief.10 Thisframeworkmostaccuratelyincorporatesthedistinctyetinterrelatedissues that comprise the right to freedom of religion or belief. Assuch, the section is divided into ve categories: the elements ofthe right to freedom of religion or belief and the right to manifestones religion or belief; discrimination based on religion or belief;

10U.N.OfceoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights[UNOHCHR],Report of the SpecialRapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief,Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Reli-gion or Belief, para. 35, U.N. Doc: E/CN.4/2006/5(9Jan.2006)(deliveredatthe62ndSessionoftheEconomicandSocialCouncil)[hereinafter2006Report].


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vulnerable groups whose right to freedom of religion requiresspecial attention; the intersection of freedom of religion and other

human rights; cross-cutting issues relating to the right to freedom ofreligion or belief, including limitations and derogations.11 The lastsection draws the issues discussed in the report together in the formof recommendations to the Peoples Republic of China, the UnitedNations,andtheinternationalcommunityasawhole.

11Becausetheyarenotpertinenttotheargumentsmadeinthisreport,veofthesub-categoriesareexcluded:therighttoconscientiousobjection,oneoftheelementsoftherighttomanifestonesre-ligion or belief, as this is not relevant to Chinas oppressive policies; the vulnerable groups as thesecould constitute entire reports in themselves; and the intersection between the freedom of religion

and the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,as it relates to issues of religions permitting or encouraging torture and other cruel, inhuman, ordegrading treatment or punishment, which is not the case in Tibetan Buddhism.


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A Brief History of Buddhism in Tibet

You know, religion is very harmful to the development of a nation.First of all, it acts as a hindrance to material progress and secondly, itweakens the race. Your mind is somewhat like a scientists, so you can

understand what I mean. Religion is poison.ChairmanMaoZedongto His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1959

Buddhism is believed to have come from India to Tibet in the 5thCenturyC.E. InTibet,Buddhismgrewintoitsownvibrantsect,referredtoasTibetanBuddhism.TibetanBuddhismhasplayedacrucialroleinboththecultureandidentityoftheTibetanpeople.For instance, the religious canons were all written in Tibetan, makingTibetan Buddhism closely linked to the Tibetan language. The

majorityofTibetanstodayareBuddhist.

ThePRCsleaderMaoZedongwasfamouslyhostiletoreligion,and spentmany of the early years of his dictatorship convertingmonasteries and temples as well as monks and priests into secular stateorganizations and agents. In 1953, Buddhism in China was organizedinto the BuddhistAssociation ofChina (BAC),whose purposewas to place Buddhism under the leadership of the CommunistParty.However,the1954Constitutionofciallyendorsedreligion,

whiletheBACstrictlylimitedBuddhistactivityandcontrolledthemonastic institutions.12

Facing increased pressure and oppression, His Holiness theDalai Lama followed by thousands of Tibetans ed to India in1959. Between 1959 and 1966, the Chinese government increased itscontrol over Tibet, targeting monasteries as the backbone of Tibetansociety.13Itisestimatedthatby1966,80%ofcentralTibets2,700

12free tibet, CHronologyof CHineSe poliCieSon religionin tibet, available athttp://www.freetibet.org/about/chronology.

13Id.


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monasteriesweredestroyed,andonly6,900of115,600monksandnuns remained.14

Theyear1966markedthebeginningofwhatisreferredtoastheCulturalRevolution.LedbyMaosRedGuards,thisperiodismarkedbythegovernmentofChinasviolentattempttoobliteratereligion.Duringthistime,ofcialsbannedallreligiousactivitywhiletheyvandalizedandlootedreligiousinstitutions,shrines,artefacts,and scriptures. Monks and nuns were subject to severe persecutioncarried out through indiscriminate arrests, torture, and killings.Ofcialguresestimatethatby1978,onlyeightmonasteriesand970

monks and nuns remained in the TAR.15

The monastic populationhadbeenreducedby93%.16

When Mao Zedong died in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping rose topower,Chinesepoliciesrelaxed,resultinginamoreopenapproachto religion, similar to that of the 1950s. With a focus on nationalreconstruction and modernization, the government took stepsto right some of the wrongs of the Cultural Revolution, allowingthe restoration of religious institutions and releasing some of the

persecuted religious leaders. In 1980, Hu Yaobang, the then GeneralSecretaryoftheCPCapologizedforthepreviousfailuresofpartypolicy.17HelaunchedanewpolicyinTibet,basedonthepremisethatreligioncannotbeeliminatedbyforce,religiousfreedomshouldbe permitted, and the Chinese government should cooperate withpatriotic religious leaders tobuilda uniedandmodern socialiststate.18 In 1982, the Constitution of the PRC was revised, andincluded a provision for freedom of religion. The 1980s thus brought

a period of moderate tolerance, allowing Tibetans to rebuild theirmonasteriesandnunneries,restoreclergy,andcelebratefestivals.19

From 1987 to 1989, Tibetans staged a series of demonstrationscalling for human rights and freedom, resulting in a security

14Id.15Id.16HUman rigHtS laW netWorK & tibetan Centrefor HUman rigHtSanD DemoCraCy, impoSing

moDernityWitH CHineSe CHaraCteriStiCS: tHe fateof tibetan CiviliSation270(2011),[herein-after impoSing moDernity].

17WHentHe SKy fellto eartH,supra note 3, at 7.18Id.19free tibet, CHronologyof CHineSe poliCieSon religionin tibet,supra note 12.


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A Brief History of Buddhism in Tibet

crackdown on major monasteries.20 In 1994, the Chinese governmentshifteditsreligiouspolicyfromoneofmoderatecontrol,toactive

suppression of religious growth, restricting religious practice to limitsacceptabletotheCPC.Stillmotivatedbythebeliefthatreligionwillvoluntarilydisappear,therestofthe1990sandthebeginningofthenewmillenniumsawincreasinglystrictconstraintsonTibetanBuddhism.

Zhu Weiqun, Executive Head of the United Front WorkDepartment (the CPC agency that maintains relations with non-Communistpartyelite)summedupthePartyscurrentpolicytoward

TibetanBuddhismduringavisittotheTARinApril2011.AParty-run newspaper described his remarks:

He[ZhuWeiqun]expressedhishopesthatreligiouspersonagesandbelieverswillalwaysimplementtheline,principle,andpoliciesof the Party, unswervingly carry out struggle against the Dalaiclique, expose the reactionary essence of Dalai, establish a soundand permanent mechanism for the management of monasteries, andensure that all activities of monasteries will have rules to follow. In

addition, their interpretations of religious doctrines and rules mustbe [in] line with social development and progress and ensure thatTibetanBuddhismwillactivelyadaptitselftosocialistsociety.21

This notion that Tibetan Buddhist followers require tight controltoavoidundueinuencebytheDalaiLamaandthereforeadapttosocialistsocietyismorecompletelyexploredbelow.

20Id.21CongreSSional-exeCUtive CommiSSionon CHina, annUal report 2011, available athttp://www.

cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt11/AR2011nal.pdf.


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Overview of Legal Framework Relating to theFreedom of Religion

Freedom of religion is an important fundamental right protectedbyamyriadofinternationallegalinstruments.Inlightofthecurrent

global climate of religious persecution and discrimination, freedomofreligionisahottopicthatisheavilydiscussedandpromotedat the international level. Therst part of this section is abriefintroduction to the freedom of religion and the specic rights itentails, which will be discussed in more detail in part four of thisreport.Thesecondpartofthissectionisanexplorationofthelawof the Peoples Republic of China as it pertains to the freedom ofreligion, identifyingboth domestically enacted legislation and thePRCs international obligations.

A. A General Look at the International StandardsProtecting the Right to Freedom of Religion

Therighttofreedomofreligion,morecompletelyknownasthefreedomofthought,conscience,andreligion,wasrstenshrinedinArticle18oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)in1948.Article18states,[E]veryonehastherighttofreedomof

thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to changehisreligionorbelief,andfreedom,eitheraloneorincommunitywith others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or beliefin teaching, practice, worship and observance.22 In addition totheexplicitrighttofreedomofreligion,Article2guaranteesthateveryoneisentitledtoalloftherightsintheUDHRregardlessoftheir particular religious belief. This makes the right to freedom ofreligion universal across all religious practices.

22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,G.A.Res.217A(III),U.N.Doc.A/810para.18(1948)[hereinafter, UDHR].


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Following the UDHR, the two leading international authoritieson the freedom of religion are the International Convention on Civil

andPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andtheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheEliminationofAllFormsofIntoleranceandofDiscriminationBasedonReligionorBelief(theDeclaration).Article18oftheICCPRreiteratestheUDHR,providingeveryonewiththerighttofreedom of thought, conscience, and religion, which includes thefreedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of ones choice, as wellasthefreedomeitherindividuallyorincommunitywithothersandin public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,observance,practice,andteaching.Thisfreedomtomanifestreligion

orbeliefmayonlybelimitedbylawandonlywhennecessarytoprotectpublicsafety,order,health,orthefundamentalrightsandfreedoms of others.23TheICCPRprohibitsanyformofcoercionthatwould impair an individuals freedom to have or to adopt religion orbelief,andrespectstheautonomyofparentsorlegalguardianstoensure the religious and moral education of their children.24 TheHumanRightsCommittee,theUnitedNationsbodychargedwithprotectingandclarifyingtheICCPR,observedinparagraph5ofits

general comment 22 that the freedom to have or to adopt a religionorbeliefnecessarilyentailsthefreedomtochooseareligionorbelief,including the right to replace ones current religion or belief withanother or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain onesreligionorbelief.25

In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly adopted theDeclaration. Article 1 echoes the language of Articles 18 of theUDHR and ICCPR. Article 6 elaborates on what is entailed in the

freedomofreligion,namely,thefreedomsto:worshiporassemblein connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintainplaces for those purposes; establish and maintain appropriatecharitable or humanitarian institutions; make, acquire and use thematerials and articles related to the rites and customs associated witha religion or belief; write, issue, and disseminate relevant publications;

23InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(NewYork,16Dec.1966)999U.N.T.S.171,entered into force23Mar.1976,art.18(3)[hereinafterICCPR].

24Id.art.18(4).

25HumanRightsCommittee,GeneralComment22,Article18(Forty-eighthsession,1993),CompilationofGeneralCommentsandGeneralRecommendationsAdoptedbyHumanRightsTreatyBodies,U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1,para.5(1994)[hereinafterHRCGCNo.22].


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Overview of Legal Framework Relating to the Freedom of Religion

teachreligionorbeliefinsuitablevenues;solicitandreceivenancialand other contributions; train, appoint, elect, or designate succession

ofreligiousleaders;observedaysofrestandcelebrateholidaysandceremonies; establish and maintain communications with individualsand communities in religious matters at the national and internationallevels. As in the ICCPR, the religious and moral education of childrenis left to parents and legal guardians.26

ThemajorityoftheDeclarationfocusesontheneedtopreventdiscrimination based on religion or belief. Article 2 articulates thisright to freedom from discrimination by any State, institution,

group, or individual on the grounds of religion or other belief. TheDeclarationdenesintoleranceanddiscriminationbasedonreligionorbeliefasanydistinction,exclusion,restrictionorpreferencebasedonreligionorbeliefandhavingasitspurposeorasitseffectnullicationorimpairmentoftherecognition,enjoymentorexerciseofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsonanequalbasis.27Everyformof discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief is consideredanaffronttohumandignityandadisavowaloftheprinciplesoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations.28 As such, all member states of theUN, including China, are called upon to enact legislation that willnotonlypreventandeliminatediscriminationbasedonreligionorbelief,29buttoproactivelypromotefreedomofreligionandbeliefina practical and realizable manner.30

B. Chinese Law Relevant to Freedom of Religion

Asanactivememberoftheinternationalcommunity,especially

theUnitedNations(ChinaisapermanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil and a member of the Human Rights Council31,amongothers),thePRCistightlyboundbyinternationallaw. Assuch,China is

26UnitedNationsDeclarationontheEliminationofAllFormsofIntoleranceandofDiscriminationBasedonReligionorBeliefG.A.res.36/55,36U.N.GAORSupp.(No.51)at171,U.N.Doc.A/36/684(1981)[hereinafterDeclaration].

27Id.art.2(2).28Id. art. 3.29Id. art. 4.30Id. art. 7.31Afterservingthemaximumoftwoconsecutiveterms,ChinawillstepdownfromtheCouncilat

theendof2012,seeChathamHouse,ChinaandtheInternationalHumanRightsSystem,October2012,availableathttp://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/les/public/Research/Internation-al%20Law/r1012_sceatsbreslin.pdf


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obliged to enact domestic legislation reecting its internationalresponsibilities. In this regard, China is liable at an international levelto protect the freedom of religion within its borders. On the onehand,thePRCdoesfullitspromisetotheinternationalcommunitybyproclaimingitprotectshumanrightsinitsnationallaws.Butontheotherhand,Chineselawisfullofjusticationsandoutstoviolatehumanrights,especiallythefreedomofreligion.DespitetheclearcircumventionsofdomesticlawbytheChinesegovernment,the PRC often applauds itself for upholding human rights standardsandfulllinghumanrightsobligations.32

1. International Obligations

TheUDHRiswidelyacceptedascustomaryinternationallaw,adopted and respected as international legal standard to whichallnationsaresubject.Beyonditscustomarystatus,ChinaisboundtotheprinciplesenshrinedinUDHRbyvirtueofbeinga member of the United Nations Human Rights Council. InitscandidacystatementtojointheHumanRightsCouncilin2006, China stated that, the Chinese government respects theuniversalityofhumanrightsandsupportstheUNinplaying

an important role in the protection and promotion of humanrights.33 In a similar manner, China, as a member of theUnitedNationsisobligatedtocomplywiththedeclarationssetforthbytheGeneralAssembly,suchastheDeclarationon the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and ofDiscrimination Based on Religion or Belief.

Furthermore,theViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesrequires signatories of treaties to refrain from acts whichwoulddefeattheobjectandpurposeofatreatyithassigned. 34Inthisregard,thePRC,asasignatorytotheICCPR,35 shouldattheveryleastnotovertlyviolatetermsoftheCovenant,specicallyArticle18pertainingtothe freedom of religion

32 Wang Guanqun,Report says China fullls all targets of its Human Rights Action Plan, xinHUa, 14July2011,availableathttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-07/14/c_13984269.htm.

33amneSty international, HUman rigHtSin peopleS repUbliCof CHina(2007),availableathttp://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china/report-2007.

34ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,art.18,1155U.N.T.S.331(23May1969).35ChinasignedtheICCPRon5October1998.Despitenumerousstatementsofintenttoratify(see

forexampleChinasresponsetorecommendationssetforthinreportontHe WorKing groUpoftHe UniverSal perioDiC revieW CHina, para. 1, (2009)UN Doc. A/HRC/11/25.


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2. Constitution

The dichotomy between the governments outwarddeclaration of allegiance to human rights standards on onehandandinternaljusticationstoviolatethemontheotherisclearlypreserved inChinasConstitution. According tothe Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China, adoptedon 4 December 1982, all citizens of the PRC are equal beforethelaw,enjoyingthesamerights(setoutinchapterII),andresponsibleforthesamedutiesprescribedbytheConstitutionand other laws.36 The same article declares that, the State

respects and preserves human rights.37

More specicallyin Article 36, citizens are granted the freedom of religiousbelief:

Nostateorgan,publicorganizationorindividualmaycompelcitizenstobelievein,ornottobelievein,anyreligion;normay they discriminate against citizens who believe in, ordo not believe in, any religion. The state protects normalreligiousactivities.Noonemaymakeuseofreligiontoengage

in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health ofcitizensorinterferewiththeeducationalsystemofthestate.Religiousbodies andreligious affairsarenot subject toanyforeign domination.38

The opening sentence of the provision appears to provideunrestricted protection of the freedom of religious belief,including from discrimination. It is important to notehowever, the variousways inwhich the provision curtailstheright.Therstpredicamentisthatthetermnormalis never dened, therefore authorizing the governmentto arbitrarily impose a subjective view of normal when

36 Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China of 1982, art. 33, ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoXianfa,1982[hereinafterXianfa(1982)].

37Id.38 Note: the same language is echoed in Article 11 ofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaRegionalEthnic

AutonomyLawof1984,whichstates,Autonomousagenciesinethnicautonomousareasguaranteethefreedomofreligiousbelieftocitizensofthevariousnationalities,andcontinuestorecitethisprovision of the constitution. This is of particular importance to the Tibetan Autonomous Region

and the various Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures. The language of the Law was retrieved from theCongressional-ExecutiveCommissiononChinasVirtualAcademy,available athttp://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=9507.


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determining which religious activities to protect and which toneglect.Similarly,itimpliesthatwhattheStatedisapproves

ofisconsideredabnormal,andthussusceptiblenotonlytobeing unprotected, but criminalized as well.

Thenextsentence,whichprohibitstheuseofreligiontoengagein activities that disrupt public order or impair the health ofcitizens, has become progressively problematic in practice.As will be discussed in more detail, the Chinese government,especiallysince2008,hasincreasinglyusedharmingsocialstability, and disrupting public order as justication to

detain and prosecute Tibetans engaging in peaceful protestsagainst ofcial policies infringing upon their fundamentalrights, including their right to religious freedom.

Moreover,thenextphraseoftheaboveprovision,whichbarstheuseofreligiontointerferewiththe educationalsystemof the State, results in grave consequences in the TibetanBuddhistcontext.Throughthiscondition,theStateisabletojustifythenumerousencumbrancesitplacesontraditional

monasticeducation,suchasthecoercivepatrioticeducationsessionsthatdisruptcustomaryTibetanBuddhistlearning,alaw barring monks below age 18 from joining monasteries,and regulations enacted to control the monasteries andeducationsystemingeneral.Byprohibitinganyinterferencewith education in the name of religion, the PRC is in fact ableto interfere with religious education without lawful objection.Asinthecaseofdisruptingpublicorder,anyinterferencewith

StateeducationandthereforeanyobjectionstoState-imposededucation or education laws are treated as criminal, met witharrest and prosecution.

Lastly, the nal sentence of the provision stipulating thatreligious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to anyforeign domination is a direct reference to the Dalai Lamaand the Dalai Clique. This section allows the Chinesegovernmenttoenactlawsspecicallyprohibitinganycontact

withexiledTibetanreligiousgures.It issignicantinthatall four heads of the four main schools of Tibetan Buddhism


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and the indigenousBonreligionare living in exile, andarebannedfromdominating,thatis,communicatingwithand

leading, their religious followers. The Constitution formally respects other interrelated

fundamental rights as well. Citizens of the Peoples RepublicofChinaenjoyfreedomofspeech,ofthepress,ofassembly,of association, of procession, and of demonstration accordingto Article 35. Article 37 further guarantees that the freedomof person of citizens is inviolable, in that no onemay bearrested without the approval of a peoples procuratorate,

or peoples court, prohibiting unlawful deprivation orrestriction of citizens freedom of person, and unlawful searchofthepersonofcitizens.Theseseeminglyinalienablerightsarelimitedhowever,bytheresponsibilityofcitizensofthePRC to abide by the constitution and the law, keep statesecrets, protect public order and respect social ethics.39 Theprotection against discrimination enshrined in Article 4 isrestrictedbytheprohibitionofanyactsthatunderminetheunityoftheethnicitiesorinstigatetheirsecession.Article54 dictates the duty of citizens to safeguard the security,honour, and interests of the motherland; they must notcommitactsdetrimentaltothesecurity,honour,andinterestsofthemotherland.Furthermore,judgescannotupholdthehumanrightsprotectedintheConstitution,astheycannotapplytheConstitutionincourtcases,sinceitsinterpretationis reserved exclusively to the Standing Committee of theNational Peoples Congress.40 Thus the guarantee of freedom

of religion, among other human rights, is more rhetoric thanreality.

3. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law

TheextenttowhichtheConstitutionservesasafaadeforthe protection of religious freedom is illustrated in both theCriminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC.While Article 251 of the Criminal Law purports to punish

39Xianfa(1982),art.53.40U.S. Dept. of State CoUntry report 2012, supra note 1.


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During the March 2012 annual session, Chinas parliament,theNationalPeoplesCongress(NPC),approvedproposed

changes to its CPL. While the latest amendments include forthersttimetheencouragingwordsrespectandsafeguardhuman rights,45 they fail to outlaw the persistent use ofenforced disappearance as a tool to crack down on criticsofofcialpolicies. Perhapsthemostdisturbingrevision isembodiedinArticle73,whichessentiallylegalizesthesecretdetention of persons charged with perceived political crimes.The revised law referred to as the residential surveillanceclause, allows authorities to detain suspects charged with

endangering state security, crimes of terrorism, or large-scalebriberyinanundisclosedlocationforuptosixmonthswithout contact with the outside world or communicationswithfamily.46Thelawissupposedtoapplywhenresidentialsurveillanceatthedomicilemayimpedeinvestigation.47Manyfearthatthetermsnationalsecuritythreats,andterrorism,as well as the situations in which in home surveillance mightimpede investigation, will be loosely dened to further

exploitthelawtocarryoutrepressivepractices.48

Humanrightsactivistsandanalystsexpressedtheveryrealconcernthatarticle73mayleadtoincreasedinstancesofmiscarriagesofjusticeagainstTibetansandChinesecitizensingeneral.49

Directly contradicting international standards, Article 83provides a further impediment in the revised CPL, requiringthatauthoritiesmustnotifytherelativesofadetainedsuspectwithin 24 hours, unlessthesuspectisallegedlyinvolvedin

45CriminalProcedureLawofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,art.2(2012),takenfrom:li CHang-SHUan, WorKingtranSlationof amenDmentStotHe Criminal proCeDUre laWoftHe peopleSrepUbliCof CHina, marCH 14, 2012 1(TheDanishInstituteforHumanRights,2012)[hereinafter2012 CPL], available athttp://lawprofessors.typepad.com/les/120320-cpl-amendments_en_nal.pdf. The Chinese version of the new law is available athttp://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=378480.

46Id. art. 73.47YaxueCao,Criminal Procedure Law: What are they Amending?,Seeing reDin CHina, 13 March

2012, available athttp://seeingredinchina.com/2012/03/13/criminal-procedure-law-what-are-they-amending.

48 Benjamin Cost, China Passes Secret Detention law despite criticism from Netizens, SHangHaiiSt, 15March 2012, available athttp://shanghaiist.com/2012/03/15/china_passes_secret_detention_law_d.

php.49irene CHan, legal reformin CHina: QUelling tibetan UnreSt?, 45 S. rajaratnam SCHoolof

international StUDieS CommentarieS,2,(2012).


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endangering state security or terrorism and notifying thefamilymayimpedetheinvestigation.50

4. The State Secrets Law: the Regulation on State Secretsand the Specic Scope of Each Level of Secrets inReligious Work

To fully understand the scope of the crimes consideredendangering state secrets, one must look at the vague andoverbroad State Secrets law itself. The Law on the Protectionof State Secrets of the Peoples Republic of China (State

Secrets Law) obliges state organs, armed forces, politicalparties, organizations, enterprises, institutions, and individualcitizens, thedutytoprotectChinasstatesecrets. The lawis to be applied in conjunction with the 1990 Measures forImplementing the Law on the Protection of State Secrets ofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,theStateSecurityLawofthePeoples Republic of China,51 as well as the Criminal Law andthe Criminal Procedure Law. Article 9 of the State SecretsLaw categorizes state secrets as:most condential or top

secret, if disclosure would cause extremely serious harm;classiedorhighlysecret,ifdisclosurewouldcauseseriousharm;andcondentialorsecret,ifdisclosurewouldcauseharm.

A reection of the priority to suppress political dissent,Article 2 denes important information on internationalhostileorganizations,splittistsorganizations,andhostilereligious organizations currently under investigation by apublicsecurityorganasTopSecret.Informationregardinghandling illegal gatherings, demonstrations, disturbances,riots, or other critical political incidents that have majorinuenceonlocalsocialorderisconsideredHighlySecret.52As shall be seen later, these categories are of particularrelevance to Tibetan Buddhism.

50 2012 CPL, art. 83.

51LawofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaonProtectionofStateSecrets(2010),ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoFaluHuibian.

52CHinaS legal labyrintH,supra note 42, at 125, 128,


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InArticle3,theregulationdenesTopSecretreligiousworkas: strategies and measures for handling major public order

emergencies involving religious matters; strategies underconsideration for handling criminal activities involving theuseofreligiontocarryoutpoliticalinltrationortoengagein serious violations of the law; and guiding principles andstrategies under consideration for handling major religiousissues that involve foreign relations.53Analysesofreligiousdevelopments and situations, as well as important guidingprinciples and strategies under consideration for dealingwiththemisconsideredHighlySecret,54 while reactions to

important issues concerning the implementation of religiouspolicies and internal-help guidelines for handling foreignaffairs propagandawork are considered Secret.55 Internalissues are listed in Article 4 and range from information on,and suggestions drawn upon regarding and arrangements for,importantrepresentativesofreligiousgroups,toanalysesofinformation on the trends of overseas religious organizationsand their personnel, to information and statistical data

that should not be disclosed to the public regarding religiousorganizations, religious institutes and religious activities,among others.56

The law further protects prison administration and conditions,labelling as Secret and thus precluding the disclosure of statisticsonprisonerexecutions,unusualdeathsindetentionfacilities,re-education plans for political and religious prisoners, dataoninstancesofpoliceofcerscausinginjuriesordisabilities

toprisoners,andevengeneralstatisticsonthenumberofprisonersheldindetentionatanygiventime.57

Various state organs are authorized with the power to

53RegulationonStateSecretsandtheSpecicScopeofEachLevelofSecretsinReligiousWork, art.3.1(1995),LiZhidong,ed.Compendium of Laws of the Peoples Republic of China on the Protectionof State Secrets, (Circulation limited to departments, organizations and personnel doing state secretsprotectionwork)(Changchun:JilinPeoplesPress,1999).

54Id. art. 3.2.

55Id. art. 3.3.56Id. arts. 4.1, 4.5, 4.6.57CHinaS legal labyrintH,supra note 42, at 152.


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deneandclassifyinformationasstatesecrets. 58 Based onthe Implementation Measures of 1990, information can be

classiedasastatesecretbothpre-emptivelyandretroactively:the former being based upon the potential harm of disclosure,and the later being based on the harm perceived to haveoccurred because of disclosure. In this respect, the scope of theStateSecretsLawisboundless.Anindividualfoundguiltyofdisclosing,illegallyobtaining,orillegallyholdingstatesecretsis subject to administrative and/or criminal punishment.59Article 35 of the 1990 Implementation Measures includesinthedenitionofdisclosing:allowingastatesecrettobe

knownbyanyindividualthatisnotallowedtoknowsuchinformation;andallowinginformation,togobeyondthespeciedgroupofindividualsallowedaccessandnotbeingable to prove that such a disclosure of information did nottakeplace.

ThefactthatvirtuallyeveryaspectofreligiousandpoliticalaffairsislegallycategorizedassecrettoonedegreeoranothergivestheChinesegovernmentunfetteredauthoritytocreateandcarryoutreligiouslyoppressiveregulationsandpoliciesin the name of protecting state secrets. Due to the lackof clear and specic denitions [and] the role of objectiveperceptions,60 the state secrets framework is vulnerable toseriousabusebyauthorities.Itisthisbroadandoverreachinglaw that remains the main source of legitimization for thereligiousrepressioninTibettoday.

5. The National Regulation on Religious AffairsThe CPC United Front Work Department and the governmentStateAdministration forReligiousAffairs (SARA) createand maintain religious laws and policies at the national level.In 2005, SARA enacted the National Regulation on ReligiousAffairs(theRegulation).Underthepretenceofensuringcitizens freedom of religious belief, maintaining harmony

58RegulationonStateSecretsandtheSpecicScopeofEachLevelofSecretsinReligiousWork,supra

note 53, art. 10-16.59CHinaS legal labyrintH,supra note 42, at 17.60Id. at 14.


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among and between religions, preserving social concord andregulating theadministration of religious affairs,61 the law

regulates religious institutions, sites for religious activities,religiouspersonnel,religiousproperty,andlegalliabilityofState actors who violate the right to religious freedom as wellas the legal liability of religious institutions and personnelwho violate the regulations.

Article 2 of the Regulations protects citizens freedom ofreligious belief, prohibiting organizations and individualsalike from compelling citizens to believe in or not to believe

inanyreligion,preventingdiscriminationbasedonreligion,and promoting harmonyand co-existence between citizensregardless of religion. A violation of Article 2 is subject tocivil and criminal sanctions.62 In Article 3, the State restrictsits role in protecting religion, which is limited to normalreligiousactivitiesinaccordancewiththelaw.ThemeaningofnormalreligiousactivitiesisnotdenedintheRegulationor other Chinese law. Like all Chinese citizens, religiousbodies, sites for religious activities, and religious personnelmustnotonlyabidebytheConstitution,laws,regulations,and rules of China, butmust also safeguard unication ofthe country, unity of all nationalities, and the stability ofsociety.63Assuch,noorganizationorindividualmaymakeuse of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order,impair health of citizens or interfere with the educationalsystemoftheState,orinotheractivitiesthatharmStateorpublicinterests,orcitizenslawfulrightsandinterests.64

The Regulation grants autonomy and the right to self-governance, free from foreign domination, to all religions,though the Religious Affairs Bureau of the Peoplesgovernment at or above the county level is authorized toadminister religious affairs that involve State or public

61RegulationonReligiousAffairs,art.1(1994),ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoDifang XingFaguiHuibian.

62Id. art. 39.63Id. art. 3.64Id.


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interest.65 Moreover, sites for religious activities must set upand record democratic management organizations,66 which

are subject to the guidance, supervision,and inspectionbythe relevant departments of government.67

Religious bodies may compile and publish referencepublications to be circulated within religious circles, but mustcomplywiththeprovisionsoftheRegulationsonPublicationAdministration, and may not contain contents which:jeopardize the harmonious co-existence between religiousandnon-religiouscitizens; jeopardizetheharmonybetween

different religions or within a religion; discriminate against orinsult religious or non-religious citizens; propagate religiousextremism;orcontravenetheprincipleofindependenceandself-governance in respect of religions.68 The relevant competentgovernment department shall impose administrative penaltiesandinvestigatecriminalliabilityinthecaseofaviolationtothis provision.69

Asiscustomaryinmanycountries,religiousinstitutionsand

religiouseducationalinstitutionsmustregister,andnotifytheappropriategovernmentbodyofanyalterationsorclosings. 70The same is true for sites of religious activities, religiousstructures, and statues, the establishment of which must beappliedforandpre-approvedbythegovernment.71 Religioussites are subject to the inspection and monitoring of ReligiousAffairs Bureaus.72 Large-scale religious activities taking placeoutsideofasiteforreligiousactivitymustrstbeauthorized

by the government and are then subject to governmentalcontroltoexercisethenecessaryadministrationinordertoensurethesafeandorderlyprogressofthelarge-scalereligious

65Id. art. 4.66Id. art. 17.67Id. art. 18.68Id. art. 7.69Id. art. 42.70Id. arts. 6, 8, 24.71Id. arts. 12-16.72Id. art. 19.


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activity.73 Both the appointment and leave of religiouspersonnel must also be recorded with the government.74Any

violations of the Regulation result in administrative, civil,and/orcriminalpenaltiesaccordingtothenatureandseverityof the breach.75

The Regulation applies to all religions across the PRC,but ismerely a framework. At each levelof government,the corresponding branch of SARA, the United FrontWorkDepartment, the specicgovernment-run religiousorganization (such as the Buddhist Association of China),

as well as other government bodies are authorized to create,uphold, and repeal more detailed laws and regulations astheyseet.Therefore,whilethefreedomofreligiondoestechnicallyexistinChina,itisheavilyregulated,monitored,andsupervisedbytheatheistgovernment.

C. Conclusion

The right to freedom of religion is enshrined in a number of

international legal instruments since the UDHR. In the internationalrealm, religious freedom is a fundamental right that must be respectedwithout exception. China is accountableunder international lawas a member of the United Nations, the Human Rights Council,a signatory and a party to multilateral human rights treaties.Subsequently, Chinese legislation includes safeguards to formallyprotect the right to freedom of religion. At the same time, legislationinthePRCclearlydisregardsthenotionthattherightisfundamentalandnon-derogable(withafewexceptions).Thelawcontinuouslyproscribes limits and restrictions on the right to freedom of religion,often exploited to justify the oppressive policies imposed on theTibetanBuddhists,discussedinthenextsection,below.

73Id. art. 22; this is also true when a unit or an individual intends to alter or construct buildings, setupcommercialservicecenters,holdsdisplaysorexhibitions,ormakeslmsortelevisionprograms

in a site for religious activities. See id. art. 23.74Id. art. 27 & 28.75Id. arts. 40-46.


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Motherland in its place. These practices are carried out throughwhat is known as the Anti-Dalai Lama Campaign and Patriotic

Education.1. Principles of the Anti-Dalai Lama Campaign

The PRCs view of theDalaiLamacanbesummedupbyformerTARpartysecretaryZhangQinglisstatementsataMarch 2011 meeting of TAR delegates to the National PeoplesCongress: The Secretary of the TAR Committee, Qingliaccused the Dalai Lama of being the boss of splittism anda double dealer who, under the signboard of religion,

seeks to deceive religious believers simple feelings.77 HehasconsistentlywarnedofalifeanddeathstrugglewiththeDalaiclique.78Instead,heproposestheCommunistPartyastherealBuddhaforTibetans.79InFebruaryof2009,theTibetBranchoftheBuddhistAssociationofChinaamendeditscharter,classifyingtheDalaiLamaasathreattoTibetanBuddhism, and as the ringleader of the separatist politicalassociations, which seeks Tibetan independence.80 Mostrecently,theofcialChina Tibet Online website launched a

bitter attack on the Dalai Lama, accusing him of Nazi racialpoliciesandincitingTibetanstosetthemselvesonre.81

Filled with loathing and suspicion, the Chinese governmentthroughout the PRChasmade it a priority to attack anddiscredittheDalaiLamaofhismoralauthorityandasthelegitimate spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. Believingthat tarnishing the image of the Dalai Lama would win overthe hearts and minds of the Tibetan people, the Chinese

government began to spread propaganda both in China andthroughouttheworld.Effortsareparticularlyfocusedonthe

77ZhangQingli,Overall Situation in Tibet Stable, xinHUa, 7 March 11 (translated in Open SourceCenter,12March11).

78free tibet, free tibetS SUbmiSSiontotHe ConServative party HUman rigHtS CommiSSion free-Domto believe: proteCtinganD promoting artiCle 18 freeDomof religionin tibet13(2010)[hereinafter free tibetS SUbmiSSion], available athttp://www.freetibet.org/les/Freedom%20of%20religion%20evidence(2).pdf.

79Communists Hailed as Living Buddha for Tibet, reUterS, 2 March 2007, available athttp://in.news.yahoo.com/070302/137/6crl3.html.

80free tibetS SUbmiSSion, supra note78,at13;AwardCeremonySpeechbytheChairmanofthe

NorwegianNobelCommittee,EgilAarvik,1989.81 China Accuses Dalai Lama of Nazi Policies,tHe gUarDian, 25 Mar. 2012, available athttp://www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/25/china-accuses-dalai-lama-nazi.


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The Current Situation Chinese Policies towards Tibetan Buddhism

Western World,82whogenerallysympathizewithandsupportthe Dalai Lama and his peaceful methods. Ignoring his roleas religious leader, the Chinese government instead focusedon his role as political leader, and are therefore able to labelhimathreat tonational security. JampaPhuntsog (Pinyin:XiangbaPingcuo), Chairmanof the StandingCommittee ofthe TAR Peoples Congress, said that if the Dalai Lama isindeed a religious person he should not dabble in politicalissues83

In1994,BeijingbannedanypicturesoftheDalaiLamainTibetan monasteries, and later in private houses, a violation

of which results in a ne or imprisonment. TheDeputySecretaryoftheCommunistPartyinTibetandvice-chairmanoftheregionalgovernmentHaoPengisquotedasjustifyingthis drastic measure to the foreign press by saying, [t]heDalaiLama isnotmerely areligiousgure,he is also amastermindofseparatistactivities.Nosovereigncountryinthe world would allow the hanging of a portrait of a personlike that.84 In addition to pictures of the Dalai Lama, furtherregulationswereenactedtobanallofhisteachingsinany

form,Tibetanags,andanyothersymbolseenasevidenceofwhattheChineseconsidersplittistactivity.Althoughbeginning in the monastic institutions, such policies spread tothelay-communityaswell,reachingeventhenomads.Twotothreetimesayear,Chinesesecurityforceswouldgoandsearchthetentsofeverynomadicgrouporclan,lookingforags,CDsofreligious teachings fromIndia andpicturesofthe Dalai Lama.85

In September 2012, the Chinese authorities in Rebkong (Ch:Tongren)CountyissuedanoticebanningphotographsoftheDalai Lama.86

82WHentHe SKy fellto eartH,supra note 3, at 16.83QiangbaPuncog [XiangbaPingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and

Stand Aloof From Worldly Affairs, CHina neWS agenCy, 16 March 11 (translated in Open SourceCenter,16March2011).

84free tibetS SUbmiSSion, supra note 78, at 11.85HUman rigHtS violationSanD Self-immolation: teStimonieSby tibetanSin exile,

international feDerationfor HUman rigHtS (fiDH) anD tHe international Campaignfortibet (iCt) 6 (2012).

86APublicNoticeFromAmdoBanningPhotosoftheDalaiLama,HighPeaksPureEarth,availableat http://highpeakspureearth.com/2012/a-public-notice-from-amdo-banning-photos-of-the-dalai-lama/


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In contrast, the Dalai Lama is famous for the Middle-Way Approach,which, according to the Central Tibetan

Government (CTA) aims to achieve peace through non-violence, mutual benet, unity of nationalities, and socialstability.ThisapproachrejectsthepresentstatusofTibetunder the PRC, but also does not call for the completeindependenceofTibet.ThroughtheMiddle-WayApproach,the Dalai Lama and the CTA appeal instead to the governmentofChinaforgenuineautonomyforallTibetanslivinginthethree traditional provinces of Tibet, within the framework ofthePRC.Underthisnotionofautonomy,Tibetanswould

be entitled to a popularly elected legislature and executivethroughademocraticprocess,anindependentjudicialsystem,and control over Tibetan affairs such as religion, culture,education,economy,health,andenvironmentalandecologicalprotection.TheChineseinreturnwouldcontrolallexternalaffairs:keep(alimitednumberof)armedforcesinTibetforitsprotection;maintainresponsibilityforthepoliticalaspectsof Tibet; and manage international relations and defence.87

TheDalai Lama promotes the Middle-WayApproach as acompromise meant to safeguard the interests of all concernedparties: protecting and preserving the Tibetan culture,religion, and national identity; ensuring the security andterritorialintegrityoftheChineseMotherland;andprovidingpeaceful borders and international relations.88ThepolicywasadoptedbytheCTAunanimouslyin1988,andreafrmedin 1996 and 1997.89 Despite the efforts of the U.S. and other

governments,theChinesegovernmentandCommunistPartyofcials continually refuse to meet with the Dalai LamasrepresentativestonegotiatetheMiddle-WayApproach.90

In March 2011, in spite of overwhelming opposition fromboththeTibetanparliament-in-exileandTibetancommunity

87tHe offiCeof HiS HolineSS, tHe Dalai lama, HiS HolineSSS miDDle Way approaCH forreSolvingtHe iSSUeof tibet[hereinafter miDDle Way approaCH], available athttp://www.dalailama.com/messages/middle-way-approach.

88Id.89Id.90 USCIRF,supra note 2, at 140.


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ingeneral,theDalaiLamaformallyrenouncedhispoliticalauthority.91HerequestedthattheTibetanbodyrelievehim

ofhispoliticalduties,inanattempttodeepentheauthorityof the movements democratic government.92 Analystsbelieve that his retirement did not mean that the DalaiLama would cease to be recognized as the overall leader ofthe Tibetan cause.93Withaheavyheart,parliamentacceptedhis request, and a month later, elected Harvard-trainedacademicLobsangSangay, as the new KalonTripa.94 Onescholar of modern Tibet was quoted as writing in an emailthe signicance of the Dalai Lamas attempt to promote

democratization of the government not in Dharamsala, butin Tibet. Arguing that if Tibetans there see him as havingkept his word about letting the people vote for their leaders,whereastheChinesegovernmentandthepartyhavetalkedaboutthisbutnotdoneit.95

As both Tibets spiritual leader and former political leader,the Dalai Lama is world renowned for his stance on non-violence. He has won multiple awards for his teachings,including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, the Mahatma GandhiInternational Award for Reconciliation and Peace, and theprestigious Templeton Prize. After the attacks on New Yorkon September 11, 2001, the Dalai Lama was quoted as arguingthat, terrorism cannot be overcome by the use of forcebecauseitdoesnotaddressthecomplexunderlyingproblems.Infacttheuseofforcemaynotonlyfailtosolvetheproblems,itmayexacerbatethemandfrequentlyleavesdestructionand

sufferinginitswake.Humanconictsshouldberesolvedwith

91Tibetan Parliament-in-exile Opposes Dalais Decision to Retire, tHe timeSof inDia, 5 Mar. 2011,available athttp://www.timesnow.tv/Tibetan-parliament-in-exile-opposes-Dalais-decision-to-retire/articleshow/4367854.cms.

92JimYardleyandEdwardWong,Dalai Lama Gives Up Political Role, tHe neW yorK timeS, 10 Mar.2011, available athttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/y/jim_yardley/index.html?inline=nyt-per.

93Id.; Dalai lama, tHe neW yorK timeS, 28 Apr. 2011, available athttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/_dalai_lama/index.html.

94KalonTripais the title of Prime Minister. Dalai lama, tHe neW yorK timeS,supra note 93.

95JimYardleyandEdwardWong,supra note 92.


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compassion.Thekeyisnon-violence.96 With a fundamentalbelief that unhappy events are brought about by negative

emotions, and that negative motivations produce in thedeepestsense,violent[actions],eventhoughitmayappeartobedeceptivelygentle,97 it is unsurprising that the Dalai LamaandtheCTAobstinatelyopposedtheviolenceofthe2008protests. Appealing to his people, the Dalai Lama threatenedto resign if Tibetans continued with the violence, even thoughitwasperpetratedwhileunanimouslycallingforhisreturn.98Moreover,whenaTibetanexile,ThubtenNgodupsethimselfonreinprotestwhentheIndianpolicebrokeupahunger

strikestagedinNewDelhibytheTibetanYouthCongress,theDalaiLamawhisperedinthedyingmansearnottopassoverwithhatredfortheChineseinyourheart.Youarebraveandyoumadeyour statement, but letnotyourmotive behatred.99

Although the Chinese government accuse the Dalai Lama ofinciting the dramatic self-immolations of Tibetans, he and theCTAmaintainthattheyhavealwaysdiscouragedsuchdrasticactions.100 His Holiness the Dalai Lama has been quotedon the subject, in which he mourned, [t]hese incidents ofself-immolationareveryverysad.TheleadershipinBeijingshould look into the ultimate cause of these tragic incidents.TheseTibetanshavefacedatremendouslydesperatesituation,otherwisenobodywillcommitsuchdrasticacts. 101 WhentheChinesePremierWenJiabaoalludedtotheTibetanexilesparticipation in the self-immolations, the Dalai Lama reiterated

96tHe offiCeof HiS HolineSS, tHe Dalai lama, relevant CommentSby HiS HolineSStHe Dalailama SUbSeQUenttotHe Sept. 11, 2001 terroriSt attaCKontHe US, available athttp://www.dalailama.com/messages/world-peace/9-11, [hereinafter relevant CommentS].

97Id.98Dalai Lama Threatens to Resign, neW yorK timeS, 19 March 2008, available athttp://www.nytimes.

com/2008/03/19/world/asia/19dalai.html.99 Peter Goodspeed,Dying as a Political Act: Centuries-old Buddhist Tradition of Self-immolation

Continues in China, reUterS, 17 Mar. 2012, available at http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/17/dying-as-a-political-act-centuries-old-buddhist-tradition-of-self-immolation-continues-in-china.

100 Central Tibetan Administration, Three Generations Suffered Under Chinese Rule in Tibet, 13 Mar.2012, available athttp://tibet.net/2012/03/14/three-generations-suffered-under-chinese-rule-in-

tibet.101 Claude Arpi, Stomping All Over Tibet,tHe pioneer, 21 March 2012, available athttp://www.

dailypioneer.com/columnists/item/51276-stomping-all-over-tibet.html.


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aninvitationtoinvestigate,rstofferedafterthe2008Tibetanuprising.Heisquotedassaying,PrimeMinisterWenJiabao

and foreign media, he mentioned all these crises started fromIndia, from Dharamsala. Then I immediately responded,please send some Chinese ofcials.Check all our les andrecordsofmytalk[in]Tibetan.Mostwelcome.Butnobodycome.Sothistimealso,iftheycome,startaninvestigationhere.Mostwelcome.102 Nonetheless, the government of thePRC continues to accuse the Dalai Lama and the CTA ofanti-China activities, making the shaming and disgracing oftheCTAandtheTibetanexilesatoppriority.

2. Patriotic Education Sessions

For many decades, the Chinese government has tried todiscredit the Dalai Lama. The last two decades have beenmet with increasingly aggressive rhetoric and policies, themostpopularofwhichispatrioticeducation.CommonlyreferredtoasLoveyourCountry,LoveyourReligion,thecampaignwasoriginallylaunchedasave-yearprogramin

1996,andhasbeenexpandingeversince.103 The two mainobjectivesofpatrioticeducation(sometimescalledpatrioticre-education, andnow almost always aslegal education)are: to inculcate love for communism and the ChineseMotherland and place it before religion; and to compelrecipients of the education to denounce the Dalai Lama andtheDalaiClique.104

Originally meant for monastic institutions, patrioticeducationeventuallyspreadtothelaycommunityaswell,especially schools and universities. Chinese authoritiesrequire professors to attend political education sessionsand subsequently rid their syllabi of separatist ideas. Inaddition,manyancientorreligiousTibetantextsarebannedfromthecurriculum.Evenoutsideofeducationalinstitutions,

102 Barbara Chai,Dalai Lama Says Hed Welcome Investigation of Tibetan Self-Immolations, WallStreet joUrnal, 20 Mar. 2012, available athttp://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2012/03/20/the-dalai-

lama-on-the-tibetan-self-immolations.103 free tibetS SUbmiSSion, supra note 78, at 7.104 Id. at 8.


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the lay community has been heavily exposed to patrioticeducation. For example, patriotic education spread to

theruralTibetancommunitiesofNgabaCountyfollowinga period of protests and unrest. Facing imprisonment, theresidentsofNgabaCountyweretoldtopledgeeightpointsinfront of a camcorder for public record. These pledges were:1)IopposetheDalaiLama;2)IwillnotkeepphotosoftheDalaiLamainmyhouse;3)MythinkingisnotinuencedbytheDalaiClique;Iwillnotfollowsplittism;theconspiracyto split nationalities cannot succeed; I love the CommunistParty;IwillfollowthePartynomatterwhat;Irecognizethe

Partysgreatkindness.105

While the campaign spreads across the Tibetan plateau, itprimarilyfocusesonthemonasticcommunity.ChenQuanguo,TARPartySecretaryhasstatedtimeandagaintheneedtohaveclergywhoarewelleducatedabouttheDalai-cliqueand other national splittist plans.106Patriotic educationiscarriedoutbyworkteams(Tib:ledonrukhag)madeupofChineseandtrustedTibetanofcials.Themonasteryornunneryssize,politicalpast,andrecordoftroubledeterminehowmanyindividualsvisit,forhowlong,andhowfrequently.There may be between 3 and 20 individuals in the workteam who visit for between ve days and four months.107During these visits, regular religious classes are cancelled toaccommodatethelegaleducationsessions.Movementofmonksandnunsisseverelyrestricted,prohibitingmonksandnuns from leaving their respective monasteries and nunneries

to visit other monasteries, nunneries, and spiritual teachers,andsometimesinhibitingmonksandnunsfromcarryingoutdailyactivities,suchasshoppingforfood.108 Missing sessions

105 international Campaignfor tibet, tibetata tUrning point: tHe Spring UpriSinganDCHinaS neW CraCKDoWn75(2008),available athttp://savetibet.de/leadmin/user_upload/con-tent/berichte/Tibet_at_a_Turning_Point_for_online.pdf.

106 tibetan Centrefor HUman rigHtSanD DemoCraCy, HUman rigHtS SitUationintibet:annUal report 2011 56 [hereinafter tCHrD annUal report 2011].

107 free tibetS SUbmiSSion, supra note 78, at 8.108TibetanCentreforHumanRightsandDemocracy,TibetanCentreforHumanRightsandDemocracy,China Re-launches Legal Education

Campaign in TAR,17May2012,available athttp://www.tchrd.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=224:china-re-launches-legal-education-campaign-in-tar&catid=70:2012-news&Itemid=162.


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ornot paying attention is strictly forbidden and results inpunishmentsrangingbetweennes,preventativecounselling,

increasedsurveillance,andevenexpulsion.

109

Duringpatrioticeducationsessions,workteamofcialsstresstheimportanceofdenouncingtheDalaiLamawhotheyclaimisnotareligiousleader,butrathermisleadsafewpeopleandcreatestroubleandhavocin[the]country.110 While theexactcurriculumvaries frommonastery tomonastery, theunifyingcharacteristicsincludesessionsonChineselawandideology, thehistoryofTibetaccording totheChinese(in

whichTibethasbeenapartofChinasincetheTangdynastyin the 7thCenturyA.D.),contemporarypolicies,andtheevilsof separatism. After reading and discussing these materials,monksandnunsmustprovetheyarepatriotic,throughanexamination,orsignedpledgeinwhichheorshedenouncesthe Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration,opposesseparatism,recognizesGyaltsenNorbu,theChineseappointed 11thPanchenLama,asthetruePanchenLama,andexpresseshisorherloveof,andunconditionalallegianceto,China.Somemonksandnunsreportedthattheyweremadetowrite a self-analyticalessayonrejectinganddenouncingtheblindfaithTibetanshavehadtowardstheDalaiLama,111lloutpoliticallysensitivequestionnaires, 112 and even writepublicizedarticlesextollingthevirtuesandgreatnessofthesocialistsystem.113

Patrioticeducationgivesenormouspowersandimmunity

tothegovernmentlawenforcingagenciestocarryoutpoliticaland legal strikes against the monasteries, stupas, templesand other cultural learning centres,which are periodicallyvisited, inspected, and ransacked to uncover anti-China andsplittist materials such as history books, pamphlets and

109 free tibetS SUbmiSSion, supra note 78, at 9; a briefing booKleton laWanD orDer (LhasaMunicipalityLawandOrderInformationDepartment,2009).

110 tibetan Centrefor HUman rigHtSanD DemoCraCy, HUman rigHtS SitUationintibet:annUal report 2008 104 [hereinafter tCHrD annUal report 2008].

111 tibetan Centrefor HUman rigHtSanD DemoCraCy, HUman rigHtS SitUationin

tibet:annUal report 2009 113 [hereinafter tCHrD annUal report 2009].112 tCHrD annUal report 2008,supra note 110, at 103-104.113 tCHrD annUal report 2009,supra note 111, at 131.


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literaturefromtheexileTibetans. 114Ofcialsoftenconductraidsonmonkshousesinwhichmonkshavebeenreportedly

beatenandtortured,eveniftheywerenotatallconnectedtopolitical activities.115

Theimplementationandexecutionofpatrioticeducationhashadtraumatizingeffectsonthemonasticcommunity.Monksandnunseefromtheirmonasteriesandnunneriesbecausethey face expulsion for refusing to comply with the strictcampaign.Asaresult,manymonasterieshavebeenabandonedor closed.116Themonasticcommunityhasexpressedfeelings

ofpsychological trauma, regrettably expressed in the formofsuicideorattemptedsuicide,especiallysince2008. 117 ThemajorityofmonksandnunswhondrefugeinIndiaidentifypatrioticeducationasaprominent,ifnotthemainreasonfor leaving Tibet.

Despite the disturbing effects the campaign has on the monasticcommunity,theChinesegovernmentcontinuestostrengthenandspreadit.AsofMay2012,legaleducationcampaigns

have been launched in allthe monasteries and nunneries in theTAR.TARgovernorPemaThinleystatedthat,thesuccessfulimplementation of legal education campaigns, which teachthe monks and nuns to love the Chinese motherland, takepride in national identity, learn legal and civic awareness,havecontributedtotheprotectionoflong-termstabilityintheregion.118Healsoreafrmedthebeliefthatitscontinuedimplementation is crucial for strengthening the management

of monastic institutions and an important starting point formaintainingharmonyandstability...providingguidancetoTibetanBuddhisminadapting itself toasocialist society isaneffectivewaytoresisttheinltrationandsabotagefrom

114 tCHrD annUal report 2008,supra note 110, at 83.115 tibetan Centrefor HUman rigHtSanD DemoCraCy, HUman rigHtS SitUationin

tibet:annUal report 2007 69 [hereinafter tCHrD annUal report 2007].116 TCHRD, China Re-launches Legal Education Campaign in TAR, supra note 108.117U.N.OfceoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights[UNOHCHR],SpecialRapporteuronU.N.OfceoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights[UNOHCHR],SpecialRapporteuron

Freedom of Religion or Belief, Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received,

paras.65-66,UNDoc.A/HRC/13/40/Add.1(16Feb.2010)(deliveredatthe14thSessionoftheHumanRightsCouncil).

118 TCHRD, China Re-launches Legal Education Campaign in TAR, supra note 108.


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theDalaiclique.119 This belief that the political educationcampaign is successful and effective demonstrates that the

government has no intentions of ending the practice.B. Control Over Monastic Institutions

A Chinese Communist Party document that emerged out ofthe Third Work Forum, entitled A Golden Bridge Leading IntoaNewEra,highlightsthePartysconcernsoverthelinkbetweenmonasteries and political activism. The document names religiousinstitutions as counter-revolutionary bases, inwhich the Dalai

Clique and others who inltrate plots to take hold of districtsbelongingtotheCommunistParty.120 This paranoid view of themonastic institutions combined with the CPCs belief that the Tibetanreligion is backward and a hindrance to economic development121is the basis for the Chinese governments desperate need to controlreligious institutions.

ChinaspolicyforTibetanmonasteries,rstintroducedin1962,providedthatallmonasteriesweretoberunbymonkswithonly

indirectsupervisoryinvolvementofgovernmentofcials.122

WhilethiswascompletelyabandonedduringtheCulturalRevolutionfrom1966 to 1979, the 1980s brought back a policy allowing nominalself-rule, an autonomy upon which the authorities have slowlybutsteadilyinfringedsinceitsintroduction.123 Before his death in1989, one of Tibetan Buddhisms most important spiritual leaders,the 10thPanchenLamaChoekyiGyaltsen,widelywroteabouthowthemonasterieshadlosttheirfunctionandsignicanceasreligiousorganizations.124

Monasticinstitutionsarecontrolledbyavarietyofgovernmentalbodies at the national, provincial, prefectural, municipal, county,

119 Id.120 WHentHe SKy fellto eartH,supra note 3, at 10; AGoldenBridgeLeadingIntoANewEra

(Tibetan:Dusrabsgsar par skyod-paigserzam),apropagandamanualpublishedbythePropagandaCommitteeoftheTARCommunistPartyasreferencematerialstopublicizethespiritoftheThirdForumonWorkinTibet(TibetanPeoplesPublishingHouse,1October1994).

121 tCHrD annUal report 2011,supra note 106, at 47.122 Human Rights Watch,Human Rights Watch, China: Tibetan Monasteries Placed Under Direct Rule, 16 Mar. 2012, available

athttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/16/china-tibetan-monasteries-placed-under-direct-rule.123 Id.124 tCHrD annUal report 2011,supra note 106, at 51.


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and village level. The State Administration for Religious Affairs(SARA) is a national body that was created in 1998 to ensure

normal religious behaviour byreligiouscitizensin all ofChina.TogetherwiththeChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommitteesUnited Front Work Department (UFWD), SARA makes mostreligious management policies at the national level.

Many organizations and regulations are specic to TibetanBuddhism. The most prominent is the Buddhist Association of China(BAC), a patriotic religious organization under the leadershipof the CPC, which serves as a link between the government and

believers.Theseregulationsandorganizationsapplydistinctivelytothe Tibet, including the TAR and other Tibetan areas in Qinghai,Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan province. SARA (which at lowerlevelsiscalledtheReligiousAffairsBureau,orRAB),UFWD,andBACcanbefurtherbrokendowntoprefectural,municipal,county,andvillagelevels.Itisinthismannerthattwenty-fourgovernmentorgans, including the ofces of public security, foreign affairs,and justice, were listed in regulations issued in Ngaba prefecturein Sichuan Province as involved in managing local monasteries in2009.125Thefollowingisanon-exclusivelistofthemostrepressiveChinese regulations enacted in Tibet.

1. State Administration For Religious Affairs,Management Measures for Tibetan BuddhistMonasteries, Order No. 8 (the ManagementMeasures)

In 2009, the Chinese government issued a national-levelregulation effective 1 November 2010, that along with theprefectural-level regulations, tighten and expand existingmeans of government control and monitoring of TibetanBuddhist institutions. The stated purpose of the regulationis to ensure the normal functioning of temple managementin order to safeguard the freedom of belief of the Tibetanpeople.126 The preamble species that the provisions are

125 China: Tibetan Monasteries Placed Under Direct Rule,supra note 122.126ManagementMeasuresforTibetanBuddhistMonasteries,preamble&art.1(2010),

ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoDifang Xing FaguiHuibian, [hereinafter Management Measures].


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specictoTibetanBuddhismintheTAR,127and the Tibetanareas in the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai,

and InnerMongolia,whohaveextensivemass foundationandsocialinuence:TibetanBuddhisttemplesarenotonlyplacesofreligiousactivity,butatthegrass-rootslevel,playanimportantroleinthelivesoftheTibetanpeople.128 Furtherstated in the preamble is the need to manage the TibetanBuddhist temples from separatist forces, inside and outside,whichunderminenationalunityandpromoteactivitiesaimedat splitting the motherland.129 These forces, the decree argues,seriouslyaffectthenormalorderofTibetanBuddhismand

the religious life of believers, and disrupt the normal academicactivities of the Tibetan Buddhist temples, to the point thatthemajorityofTibetanBuddhistgroupsstronglyaskedtheGovernment to strengthen and standardize the management oftemples, on a long-term effective management mechanism.130

Purportedly in response, the order sets up DemocraticManagement Committees (DMC), consisting of electedreligious representatives and citizens of the local villageor neighbourhood committees.131 The members of theorganizations are required to: uphold the Constitution,complywith national laws, regulations, and rules, supportthereunicationof themotherland,opposeethnicdivision,and maintain religious and social harmony; be of goodcharacter with a certain prestige among secular citizens;have strong organization, coordination, and managementcapabilities, and be dedicated to religious civil service.132 The

Democratic Management Committees are charged with anarray of duties, ranging from administering and educatingtemple staff, to organizing teachings regarding relevantlaws,rules,regulationsoftheStateandthecountrysethnic

127TheTARistheonlyareaofTibetconsideredbytheChinesegovernmenttobeTibet,whiletheSichuan,Yunnan,Gansu,andQinghaiprovincesareconsideredtobeTibetanareas.Incontrast, the Tibetans believe Tibet consists of the TAR as well as the Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, andQinghai provinces.

128 Management Measures, preamble.129 Id.

130 Id.131 Id. art. 8.132 Id. art. 10.


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and religious policies, and national unity (or patrioticeducation),tomaintainingnances,donations,heritage,re

safety,environmentalprotection,andsanitation.

133

Membersmust be registered in local governments, and incompetentmembersmustbereplacedinatimelymember.134 Reviewcommittees evaluate and report on the work of the DMCsand the temples.135 Both the DMCs and the temples are subjecttogovernmentsupervisionandinspection,especiallythatofReligiousAffairsBureaus(RAB)andvillagelevelpeoplesormassescommittees.136

The governments stated fear of splittism and foreigninltrationisblatantintheregulations.InArticle7,TibetanBuddhist organizations and individuals are prohibited frombeing used to: undermine social order; impair the nationaleducationsystem,thehealthofcitizens;ortoharmnational,social,andpublicinterestsortheactivityofcitizenslegitimaterights and interests. Furthermore, directly reecting thelimitation in the constitution providing that religiousbodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreigndomination,137temple services are explicitly prohibitedfrombeingaffectedbyanoutsideindividualororganizationinterference and domination. Foreigners must have permissionto take part in temple activities, rituals, lectures, and legalteachings.138

The Management Measures require large-scale religiousactivitiestoberequested,granted,andsubsequentlymanaged

by government agencies of the relevant provinces andautonomousregions.Similarly protecting against gatheringand possibly protesting, temple management should guardagainstanyreligioustaboosthatharmthereligiousfeelingsofcitizens,underminenationalunityandreunicationofthemotherland,oraffectssocialstability.Anysuchaccidentsare

133 Id. arts. 11, 14, & 31.134 Id. arts. 9, 13.135 Id. art. 36.

136 Id. art. 35.137 Xianfa(1982),art.36.138 Management Measures. arts. 7, 34.


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tobeimmediatelyreportedtothereligiousaffairsdepartmentatorabovethecountylevel.139

UndertheManagementMeasures,everyaspectofteachingandstudyingissubjecttoacomplexbureaucraticprocess.Templeshaveaxednumberofbothteachersandstudents,tobebasedoncapacityandself-managementcapacities.EachDMCmustapplyfor,justifyabasisfor,andreceiveapprovalforaxednumberofmonksornunswhomayresideatmonasteriesornunneries.TheBACdeterminesthexednumberandrecordsits decisionwith the county and provincial levelReligious

Affairs departments. All temple staff and students are to beregistered at the provincial level.140

Themajority of theregulation addresses teaching staffandteaching procedures. Article 17 dictates that the number ofteachingstaffshouldnotexceedthexedamountallowedineachtemple.TheteachingstaffisfurthertobeinventoriedeachJanuaryandFebruary,andrecordedattheRABatthecountylevelorhigher.Thesameistruefortheteachingstaff

livingattheTemple,thexednumberofwhichisdeterminedby theDMC, and recorded at the county,or higher, levelRAB.141

The order protects the legitimate rights and interests ofthe Tibetan Buddhist teaching staff, who must observe theConstitution, laws, regulations, and rules of China, as wellas maintain national unity, national solidarity, and socialstability,whilepromotingTibetanBuddhism,andadaptingtosocialistsociety.Allteachingstaffmustholdacerticate,and are subject to certain qualications determined bythe Buddhist Association of China in conformity withthe State Administration for Religious Affairs.142LivingBuddhas,143 the ofcial Chinese term for reincarnatedreligious personalities, are to live at the temple and are subject

139 Id. art. 23.140 Id. arts.23,15,16,29,respectively.

141 Id. arts. 17, 18.142 Id. arts. 3, 4, 19, 26.143Thistermisusedinterchangeablywithtulkus, the Tibetan term for such religious personalities.


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totheDMCsauthority.Lamasandothertraditionalmonkstaffmustbenominated,seated,andeducatedbytheDMC,

approvedbythevillageortownBAC,andrecordedwiththecounty,orhigher,levelReligiousAffairsBureau.AllcoursesaretocomplywiththeconditionssetoutinArticle24,thatis,themusthaveaclearmission,axedplaceoflearningandotherinfrastructure,aretaughtbyqualiedteachers,andhavealegitimatesourceoffunding.CoursesaretobemonitoredbytheDMC,supervisedbythelocalBAC,andapprovedbythecounty- andprovincial-levelReligiousAffairs departments.Local and national religious affairs provisions regulate all

internal publications.Studentsmustbeat least18yearsofage.144

According to the Management Measures, teachers who wishto engage in educational activities in different institutionsmust receive permission from the DMC of both the home andhost institutions, as well as the BAC of the local governmentsin which the home and host institutions are located. If theinstitutions are located in separate counties, prefectures, orprovinces, the teachers must receive permission from theRAB of the home and host institutions at each of those levels,respectively.145 Article 28 outlines the bureaucratic proceduresthroughwhichteachingstaffmayapplytoteachatanothertemple:rsthemustmakeawrittenapplicationtohishomeDMCfollowedbythevillageortownBAC;secondhemustprovide documentary proof of the ling to the ReligiousAffairsBureauatthecountylevel,atwhichpointthecounty

RABwill(orwillnot)issueawrittenconrmation;thirdheissubjecttoanexaminationatthehosttempletodetermineadmission; if he passes, his teaching status is further subject totheapprovaloftheBACofthehosttownandcounty;nallyboth DMCs sign an agreement, the teacher is allowed to teach,butmustreturntohishometempleinatimelymanner.

Articles37through42outlinesthesanctionsforviolatinganyof the preceding provisions, including removal, expulsion,

144 Management Measures.arts.20,21,25,30,27,respectively.145 Id. art. 22.


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criminal investigation, and penalties. The village or townBACisauthorizedtomakethenaldeterminations.

While the Management Measures for Tibetan BuddhistMonasteries is a national policy affecting Tibet, the lawsare further detailed at the provincial and prefectural levels.Regulatory Measures on Tibetan Buddhist Affairs atmonasteries and nunneries in 9 of the 10 Tibetan autonomousprefectureslocatedoutsidetheTARhavealreadytakeneffector are moving through the legislative process.146 The recurringthemes mirror the State regulation, stricter in some cases.

Asageneralrule,theregulationsexpandtheroleofvillage-level committees as the monitors and supervisors of monasticinstitutions, strengthen the power of DMCs to ensure thatreligiouspersonneladheretogovernmentandPartypolicies,and provide for administrative and criminal punishments.

2. Recent Adjustments : the Complete Long-TermManagement Mechanism for Tibetan BuddhistMonasteries

Recently,theChinesegovernmenthastightenedthealreadystrictpolicyoftemplemanagement.ThispolicyisknownastheComplete Long-Term Management Mechanism for TibetanBuddhist Monasteries, and has been described as, critical fortakingtheinitiativeinthestruggleagainstseparatism,aimingto ensure that monks and nuns do not take part in activitiesofsplittingupthemotherlandanddisturbingsocialorder. 147ThenewsystemistheresultofaresearchprojectinitiatedbytheUnitedFrontWorkDepartment,asanemergencyresponseprojectfollowingthewidespreadunrestinTibetanareas in 2008. The stated objectives of the new managementschemearetopromotelastingpoliticalstabilityintheTARand other Tibetan areas, establish harmonious monasteries,and ensure that monks and nuns have the freedom to performtheir religious rituals.148

146CongressionalExecutiveCommissiononChina,ExecutiveCommissiononChina,Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking

Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures, 10 Mar. 2011.147 Chi

Religious Repression in Tibet 2012

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