Religious Extremism and Pak

Relations with Central Asia

Implications for Islamism

Under The Supervision of

Dr. Iram Khalid

Submitted by

Tauqeer Ahmed

M. Phil – International Relations (Sem. I)

Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore

Abstract

This study set to find impacts of Islamism in the region on relations between

Central Asia and Pakistan. Objectives of this study are to find vision and

policies of Pakistan and Central Asian republics towards Islamism and its

repercussions on relations. Descriptive and analytical method is applied by

using secondary data. Pakistan and Central Asian countries have different

policies and approaches towards Islam as a political force as it is manifested in

differences of both sides in Afghanistan which are fueled by ethnic violence.

Pakistan support of Islamism caused tension in the relations due to Islamist

threat to autocratic regimes of Central Asia. Good relations can be maintained if

mutual distrust is eliminated by cooperation and respects for interests of each

other. Islamist Insurgency in Pakistan and imminent US withdrawal from

Afghanistan has changed the scenario from confrontation to cooperation. Recent

developments in security cooperation and counterterrorism are promising which

needed to be strengthened.

Key Words: Ethnic Violence, Extremism, Stability, Afghanistan, Autocracy

In every epoch of time, some factors dictate the relations between different

nations. Although international relations theorists especially realists always

assert that National Interest is motivating factor for relations among nations. But

certainly these interests are also linked with other dimensions of International

System. Security always has been main concern of states but after 9/11 states

not only have to secure themselves from aggressive states but also from non-

state threats which often have their roots in extreme political, ethnic or religious

ideology. Our world is plagued by increasing intolerance fueled by extremist

ideologies. Religious intolerance is by far most wide spread and dangerous

among them. Islamism is one of these extreme religious ideologies. Islamism is

an extremely conservative view of Islam, which may entail violence. Our

country Pakistan has been confronted by this conundrum for a very long time.

Among other things this problem proved an anathema to our foreign relations.

Relations of Pakistan with Central Asia are very important particularly in light

of energy needs of Pakistan and Central Asian need to access the sea. Central

Asia is a complex term. Central Asia is defined differently by various authors.

Some geologists called this region „Inner Asia‟ comprising Central Asian

Republics, Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, Afghanistan, northern Iran and northern

Pakistan (Miroshnikov, 1992: 477-80). Some geologists described as „Middle

Asia‟ the Muslim areas from above mentioned are included in this region

(Soucek, 2000: xi-xii) which together with Muslim nations of Middle East

constitute (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 423). Some scholar use same term

„Central Asia‟ for entire Central Asia for heartland of Asia from Volga to

Siberia and the Himalayas (Akiner, 1998: 4). But now Central Asia is widely

used term among these in contemporary literature, including only five Muslim

Republics of Central Asia of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan (Bergel, 1996: 3). Central Asian republics (the five former

Muslim Soviet republics, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

and Kyrgyzstan) are also facing this problem. There should be cooperation

between Pakistan and these states because both are prone to same threat but

there are some misunderstandings due to some international actors‟ portrayal of

Pakistan as promoter of terrorism, not its victim. This study raises the question

about Central Asian and Pakistani view of Islamism in general and Islamic

extremism in particular. How Islamism can affect the relations between Pakistan

and Central Asian republics.

The objective of this study is to explain implication of Islamism on relations

between Central Asia and Pakistan. This study also focuses on sources of

extreme Islamic ideologies in Central Asia as well as in Pakistan. This study

also elaborates the manner with which Central Asian republics and Pakistan

tackle the threat of Islamic extremism.

Literature Review:

The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (1994) by Ahmed

Rashid describes Islam in Central Asia in pre-independence era. But main focus

of the book is Islamic revival at the time of disintegration of Soviet Union.

Pakistani religious organizations especially Jamat-e-Islami funded many

madrasas in Central Asia which were main source of this Islamic surge in the

region. Pakistani government was also keen to use Islamic sentiments to

increase its influence in the region. But these Islamic movements were loathed

and ultimately suppressed by Central Asian regimes. Pakistani support for these

movements has negative effects on bilateral relation even though both sides

were anxious to strengthen economic relations. Pakistani religious organizations

channeled funds of Saudi Arabia during Tajik Civil War to Islamist factions.

Each of Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan has its chapters, in which differences and

similarities of different Islamist groups throughout Central Asia are discussed.

Baran, Starr and Cornell (2006: 5-49) described the Islamist and secular patterns

of societies of Central Asian Republics. They described pre-independence

Islamic movements in Central Asia. They also enlist different Islamic Radical

groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya (The Islamic Party of Liberation),

Akramiya, Hizb un-Nusrat, The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),

Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRP) and The Islamic Movement of Central

Asia (IMCA). Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and

Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) are important among them. These

three groups are also related to Pakistan because members of these groups were

engaged in training in Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Even Tajik and Uzbek officials

blame Pakistan to support these fundamentalist groups alongside with Turkey

and Saudi Arabia. They also elaborate extremist dimensions of Tulip

Revolution in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and Andijan Tragedy in Uzbekistan also in

2005.

Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (2000) by

Ahmed Rashid give a comprehensive picture about how religious

fundamentalism is turned into violent struggle in the region. The large resources

of oil made Central Asia very important strategically. This region has become a

center of intrigue between different regional powers. He gives the example of

Tajik Civil War in which Iran supported government forces whereas Saudi

Arabia supported Islamist with the help of Pakistan. Iran also supported

Northern Alliance in Afghanistan alongside with Central Asian states whereas

Pakistan was supporting Taliban alongside with Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

These moves pitched Pakistan against Central Asian states. Taliban carried out

massacre of ethnic Tajik and Uzbeks alongside with Hazaras in Northern

Afghanistan, most important of which is the massacre of Mizar Sharif in 1997.

When Pakistan continued the support of Taliban even after these atrocities,

relations with Central Asian countries were severely damaged. But writer did

not mention that Uzbek forces led by Abdul Rashid Dostam also carried put

massacre against ethnic Pashtuns.

The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia (2004) written

by Arne Haugen focuses on how political identity of people of Central Asia

changed from Islam to nationalism. In Soviet times Islam was banished from

political circle of life and was replaced by nationalism. Even Soviet Union

abhorred nationalism too but she used it to counter Islam as a political force

which she perceived as greater threat than nationalism as Basmachi rebellion

and Jadid movement were essentially Islamist rather than nationalist and these

movements made Soviets realized the potential force of Islam. After

independence, leaders of Central Asian countries continued the legacy of their

Soviet predecessors and obstructed any role of religion in politics.

Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (2002) by Ahmed Rashid

listed out major Islamist groups in Central Asia after discussing Islam in the

past. Before Soviet takeover of Central Asia, Sufi Islam was strong in Central

Asia. Soviet authorities suppressed Islam without any distinction between

tolerant Sufi Islam and violent militant Islamism. In this book, one chapter is

reserved for each important Islamist group in Central Asia. These includes Hizb

ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya (The Islamic Party of Liberation), The Islamic Movement

of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Rebirth Party (IRP). The relations of Central

Asian countries with their neighbors are also discussed in a separate chapter

which includes relations of Pakistan with Central Asian republics.

In „Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations‟ (2012)

author Sally M. Cummings describes minute change in political system of

Central Asia since independence. Instead she renders broad understanding of

stability and peace in Central Asia even with problems of ethnicity, language

and religion. She also sheds light on Islamic extremism, its rise and the

participation of Islamist parties in the politics. Autocratic leaders see them as a

opposition to their rule. Central Asian identity was strongly link with religion

but in Soviet era Practice of Islam was severely restricted. Now, Kazakh,

Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz and Turkmen people are returning to religion after

independence but they do not necessarily want Islamist governments. In

security, Central Asian nations are dependent on Russia and China which also

see Islamism as a threat. Tajik Civil War and other security issues have shown

the vulnerability of Central Asian Republics especially to Islamic extremism,

ethnic violence and localism. But she also observed that suppression of religion

by Central Asian leaders also contributed in extremist tendencies in citizens.

Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (2008) by Ahmed Rashid criticize war

on terror did not end the Islamism in the region of Central Asia. The actors in

the region failed to reach on consensus on how to deal with Islamism. One of

the Frontline states against terrorism, Pakistan is still supporting certain Islamist

elements in the region especially in Afghanistan to exert its influence, Central

Asian states are also more focused on their ethnic interests in Afghanistan than

to concentrate on elimination of Islamic extremism in the country. Both sides do

not trust each other. Pakistan believe that Central Asian republics along with

their ethnic allies in Afghanistan trying to undermine her security by tilting

towards India, the arch rival of Pakistan which will result in encirclement of

Pakistan. Central Asian republics think that Pakistan is bent to spread Islamism

in the region to counter Indian influence as Pakistani authorities think that if

Islamist would come into power in Central Asia, they will be more close to

Pakistan rather than India and Russia.

Historical Background

Islamism seeks application of Islamic ideals in all areas of life. Mostly Islamist

groups did not acknowledge other school of thoughts in Islam. They consider

their own interpretation of Islam right whereas they regard difference of opinion

in Islamic values and faith deviation. Some Islamist ideologies consider other

Muslims who do not believe in their version of Islam as heretics, even infidels.

These ideologies advocate violence to spread their beliefs. These ideologies

come under the umbrella of „Islamic Extremism‟. Central Asia and Pakistan

both have been centers of Islamic Mysticism. Islamic Mysticism is and ideology

which is tolerant towards other Islamic schools of thought. This ideology is

even tolerant to non-Muslims. Religious dimension of relations between Central

Asia and Pakistan is spectacular. Many Muslim conquerors from Central Asia

facilitated the cause of Islam in sub-continent. But they were the Sufis who left

magnificent impression on Muslim civilization in India. Muslims in both

Pakistan and Central Asia revered Sufism as path to God. Sufi traditions of

Pakistan especially Suhrawardiyya School of thought have its roots in Central

Asian cities of Bukhara, Samarkand and Khiva. The beacon lit by Bukhari,

Ghazali and Razi (all belonged to Central Asia) was inspiration for Muslim

scholars in India. If we ponder on great Sufi past of Pakistan and Central Asia,

present religious extremism in this area seems very absurd because Sufism in

inherently abominated to religious extremism.

Pakistan has strong and archaic cultural and religious affinities with Central

Asian States. Aryan came to Indus Valley from Central Asia. As Khan (1996,

92) put it, “Central Asia holds signal significance for the land and people of

Pakistan, its culture and the society are Central Asian”. India particularly North-

western India (present day Pakistan) attracted the invaders from Central Asia.

From Kushans, Hephthalites and Parthians to Muslim conquerors such as

Mahmud Ghaznavi, Muhammad of Ghor and Babur and his Mughal

descendants belong to Central Asia. It is interesting that all ruling Muslim

dynasties (Ghulaman, Khilji, Tughlaq, Sadat, Lodi, Suri and Mughal) traced

their lineage from Central Asia. After Mongol invasion of Central Asia many

artists, Sufis, intellectuals and scientist took refuge in India and contributed in

native architecture, literature, arts and sciences. Muslim architecture is heavily

influenced by Central Asia even Taj Mahal took inspiration from Timur‟s

Mausoleum in Samarkand. Pakistan is conscious of this cultural link to Central

Asia. Reetz (1997, 212) said that Pakistan, the most significant countries of

South Asia are highly mindful of their common cultural heritage with Central

Asia.

Transformation of Religious and Cultural Ties:

Central Asia had been under complete Russian domination since 1865. Tsarist

rule was only concerned with political and economic gains from region. It did

not interfere in religious and cultural of native people. But Russians were

apprehensive about relations of Central Asian Muslims with Indian Muslims

which were also now living under domination of a foreign power, Great Britain.

Great Britain and Russia were rivals. This rivalry started the transformation of

cultural ties between Central Asian and Indian Muslims. Now both Muslim

nations were living in hostile empires. Both British and Russians detest Islam as

a political ideology. Due to Salafist movement in present-day Saudi Arabia,

Islamist movements also grew in Central Asia and present-day Pakistan. These

movements were opposite to Sufi ideologies prevailing in these societies. These

movements consider Sufism and mysticism as superstition, heresy even

polytheism. This was the watershed of modern Islamism in both sub-continent

and Central Asia. These movements also sought political domination of Islam

and to establish a society where they could implement their version of Islam.

Revolt of Shah Ismail in Balakot against Sikhs and Faraizi Movement of Haji

Shariat Ullah against British were examples of early Islamist movements in sub-

continent. In Central Asia, Jadidi movement was pioneer Islamist movement

which aimed to achieve a united Muslim Turkistan and revival of true Islam

(according to their own ideology). Both Russian and British crushed these

movements. Even after political domination of Russia and Britain, role of

religion in life of a common man remained the same in Central Asia and sub-

continent respectively. But Communist Revolution in 1917 changed this

scenario. Bolsheviks abhor religion and tradition which was the core of Central

Asian culture. Soviet Union started to discard religion form social and political

spheres in Central Asia. Religion played important role in society before Soviet

overtake of Central Asia but during Soviet period, State and Religion were

separated and atheist ideology of Communism was promoted. Delimitation

process (1921-36) divided single Muslim Turkistan into national republics to

transform identity of people from Islam to nationalism. In wake of this „Divide

and Rule‟ policy, Sharia law and courts were declared null and void. Qadis and

their Sharia courts were replaced by Peoples courts supervised by Supreme

courts which operated on Inquisitorial System of Roman Law. Atheist

communist ideology became prime source of newly developed constrictions of

Central Asian Socialist republics. Religious education was banned. Scientific

education swapped conventional and tradition education as well as schools

replaced Madrasas. Mosques were closed down and scholars were arrested,

executed or deported. Script of all national languages (Tajik, Kyrgyz, Kazakh,

Uzbek and Turkmen) was changed from Persian to Cyrillic. Soviet-sponsored

culture stressed more on different national identities rather than a unified

Muslim heritage. These policies have impact on foreign relations too. In era of

Stalin Central Asia was virtually cut off from Muslim world as Stalin fear the

popularity of movements of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism which are directly

connected to Islamic world. Soviet regime introduced „Look West‟ policy in

which more contacts were established between Central Asian republics and

other communist regimes in Europe. According to Soviet Union, the relations

with other nations were based on political ideology, not on culture or religion.

But in sub-continent, Islam emerged as political mobilizing force during

Khilafat movement which was not only a sign of solidarity for Turk Muslims

but also indicated tendency of people towards a unified government (Caliphate)

based on principles of Islam (even nominally). In contrast to that, Russian Tsars

and their Soviet successors ruthlessly crushed Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism

movements which were also connected to Ottoman Caliphate and Islamic Unity.

These policies resulted in two contrast situations. Soviet authorities were

successful in separation of State and religion in Central Asia. Elite was created

which have no regard for religion. Character of Central Asian people changed

from religious to nationalist. Even after independence, Soviet legacy persisted

and Central Asian societies remained atheist nationalist. But suppression of

Islam did not bring the results Soviet Union wanted. Instead these policies

bought fruits in quite opposite way. Instead it resulted in quite opposite. Soviet

authorities want to end Islam as political ideology and a way of life. They

wanted that people should look towards communism for political guidance

rather than Islam and their way of life should be dictated by Leninist-Marxist

ideology not by some supernatural being. When people were forced to renounce

their beliefs, they abide by decision in the face of mighty power. Oppression

always begets Oppression. Oppression of religion led to Oppression on the

name of religion. So, oppressed religious sentiments turned into religious

extremism Wahabists and Salafists especially during and after Afghan war

exploited the repressed religious sentiments and spread the puritan version of

Islam. Soviet authorities want to end Islam as political ideology and a way of

life. These extremist movements took a toll on stability of Central Asia. So,

Soviet policies polarized Central Asian societies in this way.

As for Pakistan, Islamism was always present because many people believe that

Pakistan achieved independence in the name of Islam. From the Objective

Resolution to Constitution of 1973, Islam was declared „State Religion‟ of

Pakistan. But Pakistan was never an extremist society even though there were

certain Islamist elements which favored extreme version of Islam. Pakistani

society faced extremism as real threat as result of Afghan War.

Afghan Conundrum and Tajik Civil War

Interestingly religious extremism in both Pakistan and Central Asia is, in some

way, linked to invasion of Afghanistan by atheist regime of Soviet Union. By

invading Afghanistan, Soviet imperialism reached at its military zenith. To keep

Russian bear off the warm waters USA started to arm Afghan mujahedeen with

help of Pakistan. Extremist Salafist found their Ideological paradise in

Afghanistan and started tinting an independence movement in the shade of

religious crusade. Now, Central Asia and Pakistan were standing in opposite

sides. Pakistan government deliberately used religious sentiment to counter

Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Islamist from all over the world After Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, religious extremism trickled down to

newly independent Central Asian republics meanwhile Pakistan was exposed to

„Kalashnikov Culture‟ with increasing Sectarian violence thanks to increasing

religious militarism. Authoritarian governments see the rise of Islam as threat

and brutally repressed religion. This victimization card was in return played by

religious extremist who used the public discontent against autocratic regimes to

grind their own axe.

The domestic dissenter elements perceived as threat by authoritarian

governments, Political Islam is greatest among them. Political Islam is greatest

threat to autocrats of Central Asian Republics. Authoritarian rulers of Central

Asian Republics legitimize their rule as bulwark against Islamic extremism (a

claim which is partially valid). In past, some people in Central Asia thought that

survival of Islam would be eventual cause of fall of Soviet Union (Bennigsen

and Wimbush, 1985: 4), they are worried that same Political Islam also can be

dangerous for Independent states of Central Asia. Even common adherence to

Islam is seen in political meaning due to (even after independence) continued

Soviet Context (Khalid, 2003: 574). Pakistani government helped Mujahedeen

who fought on the name of Islam, not on the name of Afghanistan. Pakistani

government also used Islam to portray the imperialism of Soviet Union and

righteousness of Afghan Mujahedeen. These initiatives by Pakistan ultimately

create a perception of Pakistani inclination towards Islamism in the mind of

Central Asian people in general and in mind of Central Asian leaders in

particular.

Tajik Civil War (1992-1997) is most prominent conflict in Central Asia. It was

not purely Inter-State conflict but it involved many states as it grew in its

ferociousness. If the sequences of events leading to this war are seen, it is clear

that why after so many years people of Central Asia are content with autocratic

rulers. As truly described by Rubin (1998, 132) that how Tajikistan went into

chaos explain why Tajikistan went into chaos. Central Asia will face the

baptism of blood and fire as Tajikistan faced from 1992 to 1997 during the civil

war because of friction between extremist elements and regime. But this conflict

was not limited to Tajikistan only, many countries in the region was drawn into

this conflict. Lynch (2001, 49) puts it that Tajik Civil War was fought on basis

of power not on ideologies. Islamist parties do not seek revival of religion, they

seek political power. Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan paddled its Salafist

ideology, to gain influence in Tajikistan, not to save the souls of Tajiks. Islamic

Rebirth Party of Tajikistan could never challenge the authority of Tajik

government unless it did not have the support of Afghan Mujahedeen.

Gulbuddin Hikmetyar was most staunch supporter of Tajik Islamist among

Afghan Mujahedeen. He was supported by Pakistani government against

Ahmad Shah Masood, a Tajik Mujahedeen leader and Abdul Rashid Dostam, an

Uzbek warlord. After independence Central Asian republics look towards

Pakistan alongside with Iran and Turkey for economic assistance. All Central

Asian republics became members of Economic Cooperation Organization

(ECO) and Central Asian leaders paid visits to Pakistan as well as visited by

Pakistani leaders also. But Pakistani support to anti-Tajik and anti-Uzbek

elements in Afghanistan proved a crack in the cup. Pakistan ignored that after

facing economic Both Uzbeks and Tajiks in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and

Afghanistan were part of Tajik Civil war. Due to existing Inter-ethnic tensions

for example between Tajiks and Uzbeks as described by Roy (1997, 143-4),

Uzbekistan was also drawn into this conflict. Uzbekistan especially, is

threatened by Islamism due to very religious area of Farghana Valley. Boas

(2015, 9) stressed that Islamic civil society is most prominent hazard to the

supremacy of the regime in Uzbekistan because compete with the regime for

legitimacy among the populace. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

has strong links with extremist groups in Tribal Areas of Pakistan. But Islamist

threat was not limited to only Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Brown and Sheiko

(2006, 11) of the view that like other leaders of Central Asian Republics,

Turkmen autocrat leaders maintain Islam as the belief of the Turkmen but

discard any political role for spiritual leaders, much like his Communist

forerunners. This fear can be regarded true as nearly all post-Independence

conflicts are related to fundamentalist Islamist ideologies. Plagued with

Islamist insurgency in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, China was also alarmed

by situation. Tajik Islamists started to receive support from Afghan Taliban

which further alienated most of Tajiks from Islamists as they saw them as

agents of Pashtun Taliban which are targeting ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan. This

move also caused rift in ranks of opposition because Pamiris were repulsed by

receiving help from Taliban who are massacring their fellow Shia Muslim

brothers as Pamiris are Ismaili Shias. Roy (1998, 141) also claims that localism

prevailing far and wide in Tajikistan leading to Tajik Civil War. This caused

people to think when there would be democracy in Tajikistan and everyone

have the right to vote, these religious, ethnic, linguistic and regional conflict

will make this country a living hell. Even resenting autocratic rule, Tajik

people, like their fellows living in other Central Asian republics know that these

autocratic are operating as lid on these ethnic and religious tensions. Without

strong leaders, Central Asia will be thrown in conflict and war. Rubin (1998,

153) suggested that breakdown of autocratic institution led to Tajik Civil War

Islamist parties are unable to give stable substitute political as well as economic

structure as Rashid (2002, 113) suggested. This political system has created a

delicate balance between different ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional

groups in terms of power and hierarchy.

Ethnicity also plays a major role as setback for the relations between CARs and

Pakistan. Northern Alliance hostile to Taliban was heavily comprised of Tajik

and Uzbek ethnic groups of Afghanistan which are second and third largest

ethnic groups in Afghanistan respectively. Pakistan government‟s support for

mostly Pashtun Taliban was a source of discomfort for these ethnic groups

which also create apprehensions in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as these states

always try to protect the interest of their brethren in Afghanistan. Tajiks and

Uzbeks are most educated and liberal people of Afghanistan who always see

religious extremism with alarm. They were also suspicious of the intentions of

Pashtuns and they brethren living in Pakistan. Pashtuns of Pakistan likewise

have sympathies for their ethnic fellows in Afghanistan. Pashtuns living on both

sides of Durand Line were deeply religious and traditional. Rise of Taliban

made the waters murkier. Now Central Asian leaders were looking at a group

which endorsed a very conservative Islamic ideology and was also ethnically

Pashtun. Tajik civil war was still raging. Pakistan was again on the other side of

the fence. Pakistani government was wholeheartedly supporting Taliban, many

of whom were educated in Pakistani Madrasas. According to Burke (1998) who

was writing in British daily Independent, Uzbek President Islam Karimov and

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon publicly accused Pakistan of nurturing

Islamism in Central Asia to gain influence in the region. Central Asian states

still fears that any Islamist government will spill Afghan instability over the

whole region as it was done in Tajik Civil War when Tajik Islamist started to

cooperate with Afghan Mujahedeen to defeat regime of Emomali Rahmon and

extended Afghan drug smuggling network up to Russia itself. That time conflict

was averted forces from all Central Asian members of Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS) installed in Tajikistan and Agreement on the

Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed with the

help of mediation by Russia. As Ambrosio (2008, 1336) called stability, even

after end of Tajik Civil war, most important value for Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO). In the perspective of Islamist movements in Russia

Republics of Chechnya and Dagestan and Chinese Autonomous Region of

Xinjiang, China and Russia would never tolerate any Islamist government in

Central Asia. Central Asian Republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and

Turkmenistan share border with Afghanistan which is already in the state of war

due to extreme Islamist ideology of Taliban. Even though, China has extremely

friendly relations with Pakistan, members of SCO are very cautious about

Islamist movements in their countries which have breeding grounds in Pakistan.

Pakistani government changed its attitude towards Islamism in general and

Taliban in particular after 9/11. But many considered it a charade as policies of

military of Pakistan remained same which still considered Islamist elements as

„Strategic Assets‟ against India. Ironically when Pakistan was declared greatest

non-NATO ally against terrorism, Jamat-e-Islami, one of the leading Islamist

parties of the world was governing the very province in which most of extremist

movements including Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya (The Islamic Party of

Liberation) and The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have their training

camps. Triumph of Northern Alliance over Taliban turned the table in the

region. Dominated by Tajiks and Uzbeks, Northern Alliance visibly tilted

towards India which also has implication in Central Asia. Indian lease of

Farkhor and Ayni bases in Tajikistan in addition to military hospital clearly

indicate the failure of foreign policy Pakistan because Pakistani decision makers

failed to understand implications of support of Islamism on the relations with

Central Asian republics.

New Opportunities

In nowadays, Central Asia is dubbed as „New Middle East‟ due to its strategic

location and rich wealth of natural resources especially hydrocarbons. Central

Asia is blessed with being located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and

sharing border with China and Russia but it also face constraints of difficult

terrain and lack of access to sea. The needs of Pakistan and CARs complement

each other perfectly. CARs needed access to sea and transit facilities to reach

out world. Pakistan is facing mammoth energy crisis which can be unraveled

through adding new energy flows in economy. After independence of Central

Asian states Pakistan continued to look towards Central Asia in the light of

cultural and religious ties. Pakistani policy makers ignored the potential of

economic and commercial relations. As Khan (1996, 93) describes, “The

Northern connections were only discernible in the historical perspective and had

little commercial or strategic use for the early policy makers. Pakistan therefore

continued to shut its eyes to the North, until the emergence of new realities.

Both public and government were excitedly awakened to the situation and

attempts at all levels commenced forthwith to revive the links”.

But with energy crisis looming over the economy of Pakistan, government

officials are keener to establish economic relations keeping in view the large oil

and gas resources of Central Asia. “Pakistan‟s economic priority is for

developing bilateral trade in raw material and manufactured goods, opening up

communications and contracting for regular supplies. Pakistan saw industry,

Pakistani entrepreneurs felt they had a great deal to offer in setting up

substantial benefits for its industrial growth in obtaining regular supplies of

surplus power through gas and electricity grid scheme or through future oil

supplies from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Besides

manufacturing and light banking and insurance as well as stock Markets, joint

venture capital and import-export, all sectors poorly developed in Central Asia”

(Anwar, 1997: 190-191). However, Tareen (1995, 35) laments the “directionless

government of Pakistan” for “pursuing equally directionless and haphazard

policy” towards Central Asia which is “against all reasons”. He asks, “How can

we realistically hope for a trade link with Central Asia when the easiest, the

most feasible and economically viable rout that passes through Afghanistan is

blocked?” Pakistan is presently intertwined in severe energy crisis but according

to Tareen she is for the “second time in history losing a golden opportunity next

door”. Tareen says, “Our electricity and power is far more expensive per unit

than imported power from Tajikistan which according to experts would not only

have been feasible but cheaper than locally generated electricity”.

Construction of Gwadar port and the inception of Pak-China Economic Corridor

have given Pakistan relation with Central Asian republics a new dimension.

Pakistan can now have access to mineral resources of Central Asia. But this is

not only opportunity for Pakistan. Central Asian republics can also have access

to new markets with help of above-mentioned projects. According to Effendi

(1995, 2), “Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the two significant South Asian states

are „Eurasia‟s treasure house‟ of natural resources in terms of hydroelectric

power hydrocarbon, agronomical products and minerals. During the Soviet

period these two republics were mainly treated as source for raw materials for

the capital and consumer goods industries of the USSR, located in Western

Russia and Urals. However, despite the ruthless exploitation during the Soviet

era, the resources of the Region seem inexhaustible”. Effendi (1995, 8) further

writes, “The labour market of Uzbekistan has an abundant quantity of good

quality manpower which is both cheaper and more disciplined than what

available in South-West Asia and the Sub-continent. In the same manner the oil

reserves of Kazakhstan accounted for 9% of the former USSR‟s deposits, while

overall the CIS reserves ranging between 6 to 10 % constitute the entire world‟s

hydrocarbon reservoirs. The Manqyshiak oil is unique as it contains limestone

which is an excellent building material”. Deposit of manganese Kazakhstan has

13% of global deposits and is ranked third after US and Ukraine. Furthermore,

Kazakhstan is the world‟s second largest producer of Chromium. In iron

production she ranks as the eighth largest producer and produces 16,662 million

tons of Iron and she is the second largest producer of phosphorous, fourth

largest producer of lead and molybdenum, having large uranium deposits and

“produced 56% of the total output of the former Soviet Union. She has large

uranium deposits and produced 56% of the total output of the former Soviet

Union. Central Asian republics can exploit this mineral potential if these states

have access to lucrative markets of world. Being Landlocked, these states can

reach out the whole world by using Gwadar port. But Islamism posed a threat to

economic projects also. Presence of Islamist movements of TTP in Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa and Jandullah in Baluchistan is alarming because these two

provinces are key regions to transit corridor for Central Asia access to Arabian

Sea.

These opportunities are not only on economic front. US have indicated its

withdrawal from Afghanistan in near future. This scenario projects gloomy

picture for Central Asian republics which are contemplating surge in Islamist

movements in their countries due to Taliban rise in Afghanistan on the horizon

as in past mujahedeen takeover of Afghanistan resulted in extremist violence in

Central Asia which reached its zenith with Tajik Civil war. Pakistan is also

engaged in struggle against extremist elements in the country. Rise of IS in

Afghanistan is also alarming for both Central Asia and Pakistan. Pakistan has

one of the strongest armies of the world whereas Central Asian countries are

dependent on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for their security.

Pakistan has potential to provide security assistance to Central Asian republics

against these extremist movements due to immense experience of dealing with

extreme Islamist movements at home. Fortunately, both sides have realized

these possibilities and making progress towards it. PM Nawaz paid visits to

Tajikistan (17-18 June 2014), Turkmenistan (20-21 May 2015), Kyrgyzstan

(22-23 May 2015), Kazakhstan (25-26 August 2015) and Uzbekistan (17-18

November 2015) while Tajik President visited to Pakistan (12-13 November

2015). In all these visits several agreements were signed which included

security, defense and eradication of terrorism and extremism.

Individual Level Analysis:

Leaders in Pakistan have cognitive map which is definitely embedded in

religion due to their religious upbringing and some leaders like Gen. Zia used

Islam as political ideology because his autocratic regime needed legitimacy. His

use of religion tapped religious extremism into politics which through

Afghanistan (where leaders have same ideology and Islam was also their source

of legitimacy) spread into whole region. In contrast, leaders of Central Asian

Republics were brought up in atheist Soviet Union for whom ethnicity is more

important than religion as Kyrgyz President once said that I am a Kyrgyz, not a

Muslim. These leaders are also repressive but their source of legitimacy is

nationalism, not the religion. They see Islamic extremism as a threat to their

rule as it did threaten Tajik regime in Tajik Civil War (1992-97) and Andijan

insurgency (2005). For Central Asian leaders, Afghan War constructs a

perception of Pakistan as an Islamist state. Lack of any define policy towards

extremism in Pakistan further fueled this perception.

State Level Analysis:

Central Asian Republics came into existence after the breakup of Soviet Union.

These states were based on ethnicities. For example, Tajikistan is an

independent state because it is homeland of Tajik people, not Muslim or Turk

people. If it would be the case than what is difference between Tajikistan and

Uzbekistan? In Central Asia, Islamism posed a threat to autocratic governments

and these governments dealt with it with iron hand. In Pakistan used the policy

of vacillation towards Islamic extremism even after the end of Afghan War.

Furthermore when Islamism rises in Central Asia, these states were at the

threshold of independence. This situation called for stability and consensus

whereas Islamist movements were creating chaos and intolerance. Meanwhile,

Pakistan favored Islamist movements in Central Asia on the grounds that it will

lead to strong relations based on religious ties. In Central Asian political culture

Islamist parties are not tolerated whereas in Pakistan, Islamist parties are strong

and part of both government and opposition. Central Asian bureaucracy is

comprised of elite elements that see Islamism as threat to their interests. In

Pakistan, military bureaucracy is sympathetic to Islamism.

System Level Analysis:

Central Asia is dominated by Russia and China which are facing Islamic

extremism in their countries. Therefore, most significant regional organization

in the region SCO define „Extremism, Terrorism and Separatism‟ as Evil

Triangle. After 9/11, Central Asian republics and Pakistan both decided to join

US in „War on Terror‟. But policies and interests of Pakistan and Central Asian

states are different towards Islamism especially in Afghanistan. But Pakistan is

facing energy crisis and Central Asian republics need transit route for access to

global trade. These elements are bonding these states together despite existence

of above-mentioned factors.

Summary:

Historical relations between Central Asia and present-day Pakistan were based

on religious ties, manifested by Sufi traditions which are opposite to current

Islamist ideologies. Russian Tsardom and British Empire set the trend of

Islamism in Central Asia and Pakistan respectively which still persists. Afghan

war led to surge in Islamism in both Central Asia and Pakistan. Pakistan used

Islamism to exert influence in the region whereas newly-independent Central

Asian states perceived Islamism as a threat due to ideological as well as ethnic

factors. After independence, Central Asian republics established good relations

with Pakistan because they needed economic assistance to build their weak

economies. Inclusion of all Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) in ECO was a sign of increasing

cooperation. But rise of Taliban and subsequent Pakistan support for this ethnic

Pashtun group against Northern Alliance comprised of Uzbek and Tajik

Afghans, led to slouch in relations. After 9/11, Pakistan and Central Asian

republics both find themselves in the ranks of US-led coalition against terrorism

but vacillating policies of Pakistan breed mistrust in relations. Andijan

insurgency and Tulip Revolution in 2005 made Central Asian governments very

cautious about Islamism and prompt them to rally under the flag of Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO) to fight Islamic extremism. In Pakistan, the

rise of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) proved a watershed movement.

Pakistan military conducted operation in Tribal Areas to eradicate extremist

organizations including Hizb ut-Tahrir and The Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan (IMU). These moves by Pakistan are welcomed by Central Asian

republics. Pakistan has become full member of SCO with support of all five

Central Asian republics which is a clear sign of increasing trust in Pakistan.

Findings:

Central Asian leaders view Islam as political force due to persistence

policies of Soviet Union and Islamist opposition to autocratic Central

Asian leaders. Islamist political parties are suppressed at home and in

addition to that Central Asian opposed to Islamist movements in other

countries too especially in the region.

In Pakistan, Islam is a strong political force. This ideology is often

endorsed by successive regimes (such as Gen. Zia). Many Islamist parties

are not only support the enforcement of Islamic laws but also providing

support to Islamic groups in other countries (including Central Asian

states).

Pakistan and Central Asian republics enjoyed good relations but after

start of Tajik Civil War, relations began to sour as Pakistan supported

Islamist elements in Tajikistan which received aid and training from

Saudi Arabia from the channel of Pakistan.

Relations between Pakistan and Central Asian republics were affected

due to their policies towards Afghan Mujahedeen. Central Asian

republics considered them as agents of Islamism in their own countries.

Pakistan viewed them as a channel to increase influence in the region.

Rise of Taliban introduced an ethnic dimension in Islamism in the region.

Pakistan supported Taliban whereas Central Asian states supported

Northern Alliance. Taliban oppression of ethnic minorities of Uzbeks and

Tajiks caused stress in relations of Pakistan and Central Asian states.

Even after Pakistan‟s withdrawal of support for Taliban in the wake of

terrorists attacks of 11 September 2001, relation with Central Asian states

on the issue of Islamism remained tense due to apathy of Pakistan

towards interests of Central Asian states in Afghanistan

Islamist insurgency in Pakistan has significantly changed the policies of

Pakistan towards Islamism. These changes have implications on relations

between Pakistan and Central Asian states as now there is increasing trust

which is shown by many agreements between two sides for annihilation

of Islamism in the region.

Suggestions:

Pakistan should stop Central Asian Islamists groups to use her territory.

Pakistan also should prevent its Islamic parties to support and fund

Islamist groups in Central Asia.

Peace in Afghanistan is necessary for good relations between Central

Asian countries and Pakistan because ethnic groups in these countries

(Pashtun in Pakistan as well as Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan and

Uzbekistan) are also present in Afghanistan in large numbers. Islamism in

Afghanistan is threat to Pakistan and Central Asian states.

Central Asian countries should end the persecution of religion which is

main reason of extremism.

A platform should be created by Pakistan and Central Asian states to

cooperate for eradication of Islamism which is a menace for whole

region. Inclusion of Pakistan in Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO) provides the perfect opportunity for progress in this direction

because other members China and Russia are also facing the peril of

Islamism.

Weaknesses:

Many observers believe that Central Asian concern regarding Islamism is mere

„Cry Wolf‟ and actually government‟s own policies of suppression of religion is

root cause of extremism. In addition to that, Central Asian republics of

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan themselves has been supporting Islamist

movements in Xinjiang region of China due to ethnic affinity with Uighurs

which also points out the main source of conflict is not religion but the

ethnicity.

Even with historical religious ties, Pakistan and Central Asian republics treat

Islamism differently at home and at regional front. Pakistan is often accused

(most of the time correctly) as promoter of Islamism as an agent of influence in

the region. Due to their domestic situation and their interests in Afghanistan,

Central Asian republics are opposed to Islamism which pitches these countries

against Pakistan. Although there is no direct confrontation but there is high

degree of suspicion and mistrust between both sides. Central Asian republics

and Pakistan know that they need good relation among them because of

economic needs. Good relations can be maintained the region to respect the

interests of each other. Islamism is threat to both sides which can be effectively

dealt with cooperation. Peace in Afghanistan is necessary for stability in whole

region and peace in Afghanistan can only be achieved by end if Islamic

extremism in the country. Recent developments regarding cooperation between

Pakistan and Central Asian states regarding security matters especially end of

extremism and terrorism is a sign of progress which needed to be strengthened.

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