Religious Ethics, Gift Exchange and Capitalism

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Religious Ethics, Gift Exchange and Capitalism

W study, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capita-

lism() is probably his most oftenand sometimes mostbitterlydiscussed work. There is no doubt that this essay has become acanonical reference in the field of the sociology of religions and moregenerally of the social sciences. The reason for this is simple: linking areligious movement and an economic process is particularly fascinatingin as far as it succeeds in joining two worlds that a priori seem farremoved from each other. Weber is credited with a stroke of geniuswhich supposedly opened new perspectives and for a long time left itsmark on the debate between cultural and religious history on the onehand and economic history on the other. However, this perception is

inaccurate. While Webers renown and influence are due to the method-ological rigor of his analyses as well as the wealth of his documentation,the fact remains that his approach was already widespread in Germansociology at the end of theth century. Besides, Weber explicitly refersto his predecessors and audience: Lujo Brentano, Werner Sombart,Ernst Troeltsch, Georg Simmel, not to mention lesser critics. Betweenthe first (-) and second () edition of the text, Webersdebate with these various authors became more specific as he respondedto their new publications. Surprisingly, however, in spite of commentsby Weber himself on the resistance of Catholic populations to the pro-

cess of capitalist development, no serious attempt was made to interpretthis inertia.

It is noted but not explained. And yet, Weber states the problemaccurately when he reminds an opponent of the importance of the roleof cultural conditions in his hypotheses about Protestant ethic: Whydid the Catholic Church not develop these combinations and a type oftraining similarly oriented toward capitalism ()? We would have liked

() Weber M. The Protestant Ethic and theSpirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott

Parsons (New York, Charles Scribners Sons,).

() Afinal Rebuttal of Rachfahls Critiqueof the Spirit of Capitalism, in M. Weber,

The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capita-lism and other Writings, ed. and trad. by

Marcel H, Universityof California, SanDiego [[email protected]]Arch. europ. sociol., XLIV, (), --//-$. perart+$. perpage A.E.S.


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a detailed answer. Weber seems to think it sufficient to understand the

Catholic case schematically as the negation of ascetic Protestantism.

This point of view makes sense, but it would have been more interesting

to see the investigation started from the other end.

However, another well known sociologist, Werner Sombart, soon

thereafter came up with a tentative explanation. In his famous essay, Der

Bourgeois(), Sombart tries to argue the completely opposite standpoint

of Webers theses, at least in the chapter on the role ofmoral forcesin the emergence of capitalism. Here Sombart compares the respective

contributions of Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism. He wants to

show that scholastic thought, especially that of Thomas Aquinus,

constituted the theoretical framework for rationalizing economic life.Like Weber, he considers that for capitalism to emerge, such rationali-

zation was essential. More overs, he shows that the condemnation of

usury was in fact the prohibition of profit for profits sake and on theother hand favored loans destined for productive investmentwhich isprecisely the aim of capitalism. Finally he shows how in the th cen-

tury someone like the great Florentine humanist Alberti, in his treatise

on the family, had already defined the entire range of bourgeois virtues

which Weber had found referenced among the Calvinist Puritans. In

contrast, Sombart shows that reformers had denounced usury and

excessive riches from the beginning and that every Puritan sect had beenconstantly animated by this anti-capitalist spirit. In short, the Weberian

theses were turned upside down, point by point. Weber responded in his

notes to the new edition of The Protestant Ethic. Once more he was

forced to repeat that it is not sufficient to demonstrate the presence here

and there of rationality in the management of property, a penchant for

acquiring riches or a rigorous life style in order to detect the existence of

the capitalist spirit. Far more was needed, as we will see later. In short,

Sombarts counter attack fell short, and generally speaking, his lack ofmethodological rigor deprived him of a following in sociological

research.

Such an initiative could have come from scholars from the Roman

tradition. However, Catholic theologians or intellectuals generally limi-

ted themselves to contesting Webers analyses [or those ofTroeltsch ()], not in order to claim the modernity that was denied

themthey would not have dared since at the same time modernism

P. Behr and G.C. Wells (Penguin Books, Lon-

don, , p. ).

() W. Sombart,Der Bourgeois; zur geistge-

sichte des mondernen Wirtschaftmenschen (Mn-cher, Dunker & Humblot,).

() A Protestant theologian and sociologist,

Ernst Troeltsch was close to Weber. His work

is of great importance for the sociology of

religions.


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toconsiderfollowingtheWeberianmethodhowthoseformsandprac-

tices fared better with some religious representations rather than others.

Such an investigation remains incomplete. Nevertheless, a kind of

match to Webers thesis is available in the form of an essay that could

have been called Catholic ethics and the spirit of non-capitalism. It is

Antidora. Antropologia catolica de la economia moderne(), written by

Bartolome Clavero. We will comment later at greater length on the

merits and limits of this stimulating historical study.

First of all, we must signal in the title of the French version (La

Grce du don)the appearance of two relevant key concepts in this work:

grace and gift. Clavero uses them as he comments on the texts but does

not analyze them. That will be our task. The important point here is thatthose are precisely the two concepts missing in Weber. To be sure, the

word grace does appear, but only as a notion put forward by Reformation

theologians. As we know, the break between Catholics and Protestants fo-

cused on the question of predestination, which is a radical version of the

doctrine of grace. It is essential to understand that the doctrine of grace

itself is the theological version of the theory of the gift-giving relation.

I propose then to return to Webers study and to show how it moves

close to these questions without being able to ask them. Perhaps this

domain highlighted by contemporary anthropology since Mauss canyield another approach to the disagreement between Protestants and

Catholics and help formulate a different hypothesis about the so-called

anti-economic attitude of the latter. What persists is a more difficult

problem; roughly outlined here, the question remains: why did

Southern Europe, i.e., Latin Europe generally (but not only that area),

remain in the Roman Catholic sphere of influence when Northern

Europe went over en masse to Protestantism? Differences in economicdevelopment? As we will see, Weber immediately sees the objections to

this hypothesis. We have to look further. The anthropological roots are

perhaps more deeply buried than we imagined. Neither Weber norClavero asks what they are. We might we imitate their caution. Sombart

had offered reflections on the ethnic predispositionsof cert-ain peoples with respect to capitalism. He could only come up with a

pitiful mass of clichs without any anthropological arguments. Can wetoday venture serious hypotheses? I will try to indicate briefly that this is

indeed the case.

() B. Clavero,Antidora. Antropologia cato-

lica de la economia moderna (Dott. A. Editore,

Milano, ); French Translat. by Jean-Frdric Schaub: La grce du don. Anthropo-

logie catholique de lconomie moderne (Paris,

Albin Michel, ). There is not yet any

English translation available. References inthis essay will be made to the French edition.


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The Protestant Ethic and the Question of Grace

The Hypotheses of Weber and Troeltsch

Very early on a kind of vulgate emerged from The Protestant Ethic

and the Spirit of Capitalism, to wit that the Reformation would have

encouraged, or even provoked the capitalist dynamic. Weber, however,

stated over and over again that this was absolutely not what he intended

to demonstrate. From the outset he advanced the opposite hypothesis: it

is economic development in certain regions that promoted the Refor-mation. And this would presuppose the existence of very ancient cir-

cumstancesin which religious affiliation is not a cause of the economicconditions, but to a certain extent appears to be a result of them(). Headds further on, There arises this historical question: why were thedistricts of highest economic development [in Germany] at the same

time particularly favourable to a revolution in the Church?(). Withthis reminder, which refers to other research, Weber fully intends to

bring out the original link between those two phenomena. Right away,

this link seems paradoxical to him: the Reformation did not appear to

reduce the religious domination over the individual, but on the contraryto increase it. This appears paradoxical in as far as economic

developmentespecially in its capitalist formtends to destroy oldbeliefs, to liberate the individual from submission to religious authori-

ties. If then a privileged link developed between the Protestant Refor-

mation and emerging capitalism, it happened, according to Weber, at the

very level of religious behavior, precisely as an ethic. Subsequently, it

became a de facto conjunction, and not the result of somebodys cons-cious project. In the first case, Weber speaks of elective affinities, orthe congruence between two specific aspects:

forms of religious belief

() The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of

Capitalism, (underlined by the author), ,

p. . For those who are still tempted by an

immediate causal explanation, Weber adds:

The fact that this or that important form ofcapitalist organization is considerably older

than the Reformation is a sufficient refuta-

tion. Tawneys criticisms () and espe-cially those of Robertson () are thus

mostly the result of a misunderstanding.

C. Lefort remains ambiguous about this

debate in Capitalisme et religion au

e

sicle:le problme de Weber in Les formes de lhis-

toire (Paris, Gallimard, , pp.-).

. The Protestant Ethic, transl. Parsons, op.

cit., p. . Weber also cautions against the

opposite excess:On the other hand, however,we have no intention whatever of maintaining

such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as that the

spirit of capitalism (in the provisional sense of

the term explained above) could only have

arisen as the result of certain effects of the

Reformation, or even that capitalism as an

economic system is a creation of the Reforma-

tion, p..


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and professional ethics(). Secondly, this conjunction eluded the very

people who were its agents. The Reformers passionately proclaimed the

urgency for each believer to insure his salvation: We cannot well

maintain that the pursuit of worldly goods, conceived as an end in itself,

was to any of them of positive ethical value().

They were never even tempted by a program of moral reform. That

was to be derived from religious choices: We shall thus have to admit

that the cultural consequences of the Reformation were to a great extent,

perhaps in the particular aspects with which we are dealing predomi-

nantly, unforeseen and even unwishedfor results of the labours of

reformers. They were often far removed from or even in contradiction to

all that they themselves thought to attain(). Weber insists on theindirect character of this link: it is not a causal relation between a faith

and economic phenomena but between an ethic and a spirit. Ernst

Troeltsch confirms this approach when he writes: What it [Protestan-tism] has here effected, it has effected indirectly and involuntarily by

doing away with old restrictions, and favouring the developments which

we have already characterised in detail [...]. On the whole, the important

political and economic results of Calvinism were produced again its

will().We need this reminder in order to avoid from the outset presupposi-

tions that imply simplistic causal relations in the notion of the link

between Protestantism and capitalism. In his essay Weber does not

claim to define what he means by capitalism (which he does elsewhere)

but solely itsspirit.Weber puts the termGeistin parentheses, at least in

the version, probably in order to underscore its problematic and

especially non-Hegelian character. He may also have wanted to indicate

his debt to Sombart who had been the first to use this expression. What

is this spirit about? It cannot be defined, as some have done, by the desire

to acquire, by the auri sacra fames. That desire is as old as the oldest

civilizations and has marked the most diverse professions.What distinguishes the spirit of capitalism, according to Weber, is the

rational domination of this impulse. This means that the important

thing is not acquisition as such but the search for profitability, the pur-

suit of investments by developing exchanges, the definition of transac-

tions and accounting in terms of money, the use of free labor, the

mobilization of knowledge and techniques to maximize productivity, the

strengthening of property rights. In short, the capitalist phenomenon

() Ibid., p. .

() Ibid., p. () Ibid., p. .

() Troeltsch, E., Protestantism and Pro-

gress, Boston, Beacon Press, , pp. -,.


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asserts itself is at every level of social and economic activityindustrial,

financial, commercial, administrative, technical, scientific and legal.

However, these forms of rationalization alone were insufficient to

account for the surprising dynamics of capitalism. Also needed was an

invisible element, an attitude, an ethos, the will to go beyond the tradi-

tional framework of even very profitable business.The question of the

motive forces in the expansion of modern capitalism is not in thefirst

instance a question of the origin of the capital sums which were available

for capitalistic uses, but, above all, the spirit of capitalism. Where it

appears and is able to work itself out, it produces its own capital and

monetary supplies as the means to its ends, but the reverse is not

true(). It was not necessary to have adventurers, bold speculators oreven outstanding financiers, explains Weber, who adds: On thecontrary, they were men who had grown up in the hard school of life,

both calculating and daring at the same time, above all temperate and

reliable, shrewd and completely devoted to their business, with strictly

bourgeois opinions and principles().It is precisely at this point, devotion to duty, that the spirit of capi-

talism meets the Protestant ethic (). Weber refuses to assume that the

one produced the other. He confines himself to signaling their remark-

able conjunction. It shows up differently in Luther and Calvin. It also

presents nuances in other Protestant currents (Pietist, Baptist, Metho-dist, Quakers). But in every case, the model is quite legible. It is to

Webers immense credit to have made it so obvious. Thus he highlightsthe remarkable equivalency between the notion of calling and profession

when Luther uses the term Beruf. To be sure, Weber is aware that a large

part of Medieval theology had already begun to revalorize work ().

However, in Beruf, there is more: the profession becomes the task par

excellencethe vocationassigned by God to the believer during his lifeon earth. This new meaning of the word corresponds to a new idea; it isthe product of the Reformation

(). Weber notes the paradox: far

() M. Weber, op. cit. (underlined by the

author), pp. -.

() Ibid., p..

() Nevertheless, we provisionally usethe expression spirit of (modern) capitalism

to describe that attitude that seeks pro-

fit rationally and systematically... (Ibid.,p. ).

() See J. Le Goff,Time,Work and Culture

in the Middle Age, Tr. A Goldhammer (Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, ) [Ed. orig. :

Pour un autre Moyen Age; Temps, travail, cul-ture (Paris, Gallimard, )].

() M. Weber (ibid., p. ). To be sure,

Weber does not confuse the novelty of the

notion with the novelty of its importance.

Indeed, the acknowledged significance of the

profession as the earthly task of the Christian,

already has an important presence in Medieval

theologyespecially in preachingfrom theth century on. Good examples are the ser-

mons of the Franciscan Berthold de Ratisbone,

who preached in southern German towns in

the th century. See A. Gourevitch, Le

marchand in J. Le Goff LHomme mdival(Paris, Seuil, ). Weber knew this prea-


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from having caused the secularization of religious values, this trans-

formation led to the penetration of religion into daily life. This religious

legitimization is what provided a most favourable foundation for the

conception of labour as an end in itself, as a calling which is necessary to

capitalism...().

Weber insists on this point. There is another one which he only

mentions in passing and which may be more decisive. It can be sum-

marized as follows: accomplishing professional tasks is more important

than charitable works. What is more, it replaces them. Luther goes as far

as to assume that the division of labor itself fulfills ones obligations to

others (). In this way, according to Weber, Luther rather naively

anticipates Adam Smith. Or perhaps not so naively. For what is at stakehere, which Weber did not make sufficiently clear, is the whole question

of the social relations within the tradition of the primacy of charitable

relations. And yet, these relations are essential, not only in the Gospel or

Pauline sermons, but also in the Stoic tradition of good deeds, e.g.,

Seneca, Marcus Aurelius. To be sure, Luther wants to eliminate the

practice of charity asgood deedsguaranteeing salvation. It is easy to

understand how challenging that practice would conform to a theologi-

cal notion of faith as an act of unconditional trust in the divine word. We

will get back to this. However, the break created by the Reformation isclearly not only about the religious revalorization of the profession as a

vocation.

More fundamentally, perhaps, it concerns the devalorization of the

generous act supposedly essential to salvation and finally its presentation

as an economically irrational act. What is involved here is the form of social

relations itself. If the latter are supposed to be generated by the com-

plementarity of tasks instead of the reciprocity of gifts, then the trans-

formation mentioned by Weber is even more radical. Hyperbolically,

this is indeed what Calvins thought shows.

His thought rests entirely on a fundamental dogma, the doctrine of

predestination. To be sure, this is not a new doctrine. It was already form-

ulated quite precisely in the fourth and fifth century by St. Augustine,

whose among followers the Reformers and later the Jansenists, count

themselves, and consists in the unconditional affirmation of divine

chers texts, which he mentions in FinalRebuttal of Rachfahls critique in op. cit.,p. . Troeltsch says the same thing: Thedoctrine of the calling as a doctrine of the

systematic contribution of every worker to thedelege naturae appointed purpose of Society,

had already long been a doctrine of catholi-

cism, Protestantism and Progress, op. cit.,p. .

() M. Weber, ibid., p..

() Ibid., p. .


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freedom in the face of sinful humanity (). This freedom includesfirst

of all Gods sovereign decision made for all eternity to save somethe

chosenand to condemn others. The interpretation of this decision,

which remains relatively nuanced in Augustine, becomes radical in

Calvin. For him, the abyss between God and creature is insurmountable.

Divine grace is granted or refused regardless of what man does. God

determines His choice on the basis of His glory and majesty alone; this is

a constant formula in Calvin, the absolutist connotation of which is

striking. What is more, no one can be assured of being elected. No

intermediary can be of any help in the recognition of eternal salvation,

neither preacher, nor the Church nor the sacraments, nor God himself

who cannot change His eternal decree according to which Christ diedonly for the elect. Of course then the question arises: what is the use of

doing good if ones fate is already a foregone conclusion? Calvin answersthat whether we are saved or not, it behooves us to act righteously to

honor the divine majesty. Weber recalls this formulation but does not

inquire any further into its genealogy or ask why the very ancient doc-

trine of divine gracethehenof the biblical texts, the charisof Paulspreaching, the gratia of St. Augustinebecomes this strange form ofdivine arbitrariness which determines salvation and damnation. In

short, why that which has always been understood as an act of giving

becomes an act based on the judgment of a distant God who decideswithout appeal. It is as if that which had always been understood as

bringing God closer would render Him forever inaccessible. Weber does

not seem to perceive that this is crucial. We will have to come back to this

later. Whatever the genealogy of the doctrine of predestination, one may

investigate its link to the spirit of capitalism. According to Weber,however, the link is real and profound. Indeed, both the individual and

collective attitudes generated by this belief, as well as the related set of

religious and moral practices, have produced one of the most substantial

cultural and social changes in the history of the West, which happened

because the ethic turned out to be in perfect harmony with this spirit ofcapitalism. That harmony can be understood when one considers theeffects of the doctrinal position of Protestantism, of Calvinism in par-

ticular.

The first effect, and also the most global, is what Weber calls in a

phrase that remained famous,the disenchantment of the world().

() The essential texts of St. Augustine are

(in Migne Patrologie latine, Paris, -),

De gratia et libero arbitrio (vol. );De corrup-

tione et gratia and De predestinatione (Ibid.,vol. ).

() Weber, op. cit., p. . (Tanslatorsnote:Parsons translates: the elimination of magicfrom the world; however, the phrase disen-

chantment of the worldhas become commonplace in English and is therefore used here.)


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the world of traditional monasticism. Just as the monks were seeking

mastery of the body and desires by observing precise rules applied at

every moment of the day, so the Puritan aims at self mastery in the

rigorous and methodical exercise of his profession. In this respect

without having aimed for it nor even understood itthe Protestant ethic

found itself in remarkable harmony with the spirit of capitalism; at least

with one of its aspects, for this spirit is not limited to the requirement of

methodical and honest work.

However, as in Luthers case, it seems that Weber passes too fast over

an essential point mentioned above, i.e., the way in which the Calvinist

ethic tends to dismiss traditional social relations without being able to

institute others of comparable strength. Indeed Weber notes a numberof characteristics such as the suspicion of others (), the solitude of the

subject cut off from any intermediary, pessimism without illusions, all

this resulting in this tremendous tension to which the Calvinist wasdoomed by an inexorable fate, admitting of no mitigation(). Thequestion then arises: how is a community possible under those cir-

cumstances? What shapes the form of Calvinist social relations?

Nevertheless, a community of believers exists, and it is even essen-

tiel (). But what makes it possible is each and every ones desire totestify by disciplined behavior to a life based on the hope (but not the

certainty) of election. And yet, as Weber admits, this in no way consti-

tutes a behavior of personal attention and affection towards others. On

the contrary,any personal relation of person to person which is purelybased on sentimentand thus devoid of rationalitycan easily be sus-pected of idolatry of the flesh(). In summarizing all the attitudes ofdenominations of the Calvinist faith, Weber does not hesitate to state:

the English, Dutch and American Puritans were characterized by theexact opposite of the joy of living, a fact which is indeed, as we shall see,

most important for our present study().

At this point, Webers analysis stops. While he does give an admirabledescription of the effects of this excessively harsh or even inhumanethic, he does not say, or says too little about, what he thinks should

constitute real community relations or what would be a more humane or

more amiable ethic. In many passages of his study he seems to grant

Catholicism this advantage. Thus, in opposition to the inner solitude of

() Ibid., p..

() Ibid., p..

() Troeltsch recalls Calvins ambition toconstitute a kind of sacred community (see

Calvinismus und Luthertum, ).() Weber, ibid., adds in note , p. :

The traditional American objection to per-forming personal service is probably connec-

ted, besides the other important causes resul-

ting from democratic feelings, at least

indirectly to that tradition.() Ibid., p..


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the Calvinist, he speaks of the Catholic, authentically human, to-and-fro

between sin, repentance, and absolution, followed once again by

sin(). This remains rather allusive and needed to be elaborated.

Troeltsch extends the question to the field of aesthetics: Catholicism is

in fact, more at home with sensuousness, in the widest sense of the word,

than Protestantism. And, accordingly, Catholicism entered into a much

deaper and more vigorous union with Renaissance art than Protestan-

tism did().

The major social effects of the break between the Protestants and the

Church of Rome are probably most noticeable at this level of the

expression of sensibility and community relations. It is also at that level

that the difference between Catholic traditionalism and Protestantmodernity can be found. If indeed for Protestants divine grace is

manifested in the acceptance of the profession-vocation (Beruf), this

means in fact that henceforth social relations will have to be established

through this activity; to be sure, those are solid relations, but more

objective and neutral. They are relations without affect, i.e., functional.

Even though he does not pose the question in these terms, Weber is right

in considering this an extraordinary revolution. The question remains:

what older relations were abandoned and why did the Catholic tradition

continue to be faithful to them? And with what consequences for theeconomy?

Grace, Protestantism and the Crisis of the Gift Relation

The dimension of thedisenchantment of the world, which is onlyalluded to in The Protestant Ethic, appears more insistently in other

texts. This is the disappearance of what Weber callsthe religious ethicof fraternity. We could also speak of the disenchantment of the

community. By going back to this theme, I believe we can define acrucial issue of which Weber had an inkling but which lies beyond thehorizon of his problematic.

Weber proposes the concept of fraternity in the framework of his

research on religions concerned with salvation and deliverance (Erlo-

sung) (). What does he mean by this? We are dealing here more with

() Ibid., p. (my underlining).

() Op. cit., pp. -. Troeltsch adds

later: [Protestantism] never elevated artisticfeeling into the principle of a philosophy of

life, of metaphysics or ethics [...]. That waswhy it repelled the Renaissance. That is why,

also, modern art everywhere proves the end of

Protestant ascetism; it is absolutely opposed to

it in principle, Ibid., pp. -.() The most important text in this

domain is that of , rewritten in ,entitled Religious Rejections of the world


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prophetic or ascetic movements inside established religions such as

Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These movements gene-

rally present the following characteristics: ) an attempt to interiorize

beliefs and thus the devaluation of rituals and magical practices to

attain salvation;) the search for a spiritual method that makes it possi-

ble to obtain regularly inner goods (such as peace of mind); asceticism is

one of the possible but not necessary variants;)finally, an attempt at

sublimating ones relations with others to the point of universal or

unworldly love which makes any human a being worthy of the attention

and the love of the believer.

We are interested in that last point. This unworldly love requires on

the one hand the repression of kinship relations (to cut oneself offfromones family, from ones clan, as Jesus demands for instance), but on the

other hand it establishes a community where relations between members

are modeled on the forms of natural kinship(Sippe). Weber calls this

thereligious ethic of brotherliness(). Such an ethic impliesfirst of

all the exchange of gifts and services, material mutual aid for subsis-

tence, mutual support in suffering. The effects on social life are impor-

tant. They can appear as the softening of hierarchical relations: the

powerful must help and protect the weak. At the economic level, the

ethic of fraternity prohibits interest bearing loans, encourages volunta-rism and the sharing of wealth. Finally, on a more general level this ethic

turns every relation with others into a personal relation and eludes the

rational scrutiny of situations in favor of an affective attitude.

Now, explains Weber, it is precisely on the basis of the communal

experience of fraternity, at first limited to aneighborhood grouping,i.e., on the basis of personal exchanges, that the leap towards universal

love can occur, towards altruistic and generous relations with whomever,

a stranger, a foreigner or even an enemy. According to Weber, we are

dealing here with the offer of love for just anybody, which Baudelaire

defined as the holy prostitution of the soul() so characteristic ofChristian love.

Now, at a given point the religious ethic of fraternity ran into deep

conflict with the very movement of economic development. This

movement establishes a rationality that must put aside personal involv-

ement in the exchange of goods; define the cost of every productive

activity; obtain interest for the investment of capital to be productive;

and their Directions, in WM., Essays inSociology (G H. H. and W Mills C.,

trad. and ed., New York, Oxford UniversityPress, ).

() Ibid.,passim.

() W, Les Foules, in uvres com-

pltes (Paris, La Plade,t. I, p. ).


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and for transactions to be efficient avoid bargaining and have set prices.

It so happens that the Protestant ethic met those requirements without

having aimed to do so, while the Catholic tradition remained attached tothe religious ethic of fraternity. Weber suggests this on several occa-sions.

This gives us a clearer picture. Nevertheless, there remains some-

thing enigmatic, i.e., the role of the concept of grace and the doctrine of

predestination in the disagreement between Protestants and Catholics.

Weber does indeed take this doctrine very seriously, but only in as far as

in Protestantism it is the source of the radical break between the pers-

pective of faith and that of asceticism in the world. He is not interes-ted in its genealogy. As we have seen above, the doctrine of predestina-

tion is the radicalization of the doctrine of grace, which is the theological

version of the concept of the gift exchange, at least in the Christian

formulation. It is important for us to review the main elements of this

significant dossier because this question is at the heart of the ethic of

fraternity; it concerns the opposition between generous relationsactsof gift exchange and profitable relations, i.e., market activity.

Why does Weber not dwell on the description and analysis of the

world of gift exchanges, several aspects of which he glimpsed? There are

several reasons. Thefirst is that the issue was not really considered then

as a sociological or anthropological problem. To be sure, there werepublications, such as those of Boas or Thurnwald, that amply described

ceremonies of reciprocal gift exchanges. However, MalinowskysArgo-nauts of the Western Pacificdoes not appear until , two years after

Webers death and Mauss The Gift, not until .Even if Weber had lived longer, there is no reason to believe that this

problematic would have interested him more from a theoretical point of

view (). In his research, Weber had very little curiosity about the

so-called primitive societies; there are scarcely any allusions to them in

his texts. Given his usual methodological flair, he felt perhaps that the

available documentation in this area was still weak and poorly organized.In any case, he limited himself to the great civilizations and their reli-

gions, where scholarship, and especially German scholarship, had pro-

duced first-rate knowledge.

() Sometimes Weber mentions gift

exchanges in his General Economic history

(London, Transaction Books, ), but only

as incipient forms of trade. This confusion is

widely shared by other theoreticians of

exchange such as Simmel in his Philosophy of

Money []. Neither Weber nor Simmelpaid attention to the work of their colleague R.

Thurnwald who, besides his research on

ancient Egypt, known to Weber, had done

fieldwork in the Bismarck and Salomon Islands

in Melanesia; those results, published in ,

and admired by Mauss, were a prelude to

Malinowskys investigation of the gift exchan-

ges on the Trobiand Islands.


15/32

Today however, essentially in the wake of Mauss, the anthropological

documentation of ritual gift exchanges is one of the most solid and most

fascinating in modern anthropology (). If we were able to determine

in what way the ethic of fraternity discussed by Weber is indeed an

essential version of the problematic of the gift exchange, then we could

shed another light on the issues raised by the process of the disen-

chantment of the world.

Before Mauss essay it was commonplace to classify the phenomenon

of the gift exchange among archaic forms of commerce; or it was

considered as one of the numerous expressions of courtesy which were

lavished among groups or villages during certain celebrations. They

were seen as analogous forms of our own traditions of the gift exchange.Finally it was perceived as an act of moral generosity of a friend toward

his close relatives; that of the rich man toward the poor; or of a host

toward his guests. However, in its social form the gift exchange cannot be

reduced to any of these practices; it is neither trade, nor simple polite-

ness, nor a charitable act. What Mauss taught us and which numerous

studies in contemporary anthropology have fully confirmed is that the

system of gift exchange represents the fundamental form of expression

of relations between groups in traditional societies. There is no question

here of reopening the scholarship on the gift exchanges or presenting the

theory again. We will assume that the reader is familiar with the main

outlines of the issue. It is important nevertheless to recall here a few

basic elements in order for our argument to be coherent.

First of all, our approach needs be critical of the very concept of the

gift exchange. From the outset we tend to understand this notion in

moral terms. To give is an altruistic act which arouses the respect of

others. The more the act is perceived as discreet and sincere, the greater

the respect. On the basis of this notion one then proceeds to forms of gift

exchange that are more socially coded or institutionalized. It needs to be

() M. Mauss, The Gift, [] translated

by W. D. Hals (Norton, N.Y., London, );

B. Malinowski,Argonauts of the Western Paci-

fic (New York, Dutton, ); C. Lvi-Strauss,The Elementary Structures of Kinship, transla-

ted by J. H. Bell, J. R. von Sturmer and R.

Needham (Boston, Beacon Press, ); A.

Strathern, The Rope of Moka. Big-Men and

Ceremonial Exchange in Mount Hagen-

NewGuinea (Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, ). M. S,Stone Age Eco-

nomics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,

). Annette Weiner,Inalienable Possessions;the Paradox of Keeping while Giving (Berkeley,

University of California Press, );C. Gre-

gory, Gifts and Commodities (San Diego, Aca-

demic Press, ); M. Godelier, The Enigm of

the Gift (University of Chicago Press, )

[Ed. orig. LEnigme du don (Paris, Fayard,

)]; A. Iteanu, La Ronde des changes (Paris,

Maison des Sciences de lhomme, ); A.Testart, Des dons et des dieux (Paris, A. Colin,

); Jacques Godbout and Alain Caill,TheWorld of the Gift(Montreal, Mc Gill QueensUniversity Press, ); M. H, Le Prixde la vrit : le don, l argent, la philosophie

(Paris, Seuil, ).


16/32

said that the approach which moves backwards from the ethical gift to

the ceremonial gift and evaluates the latter by the yardstick of the for-

mer, is irrelevant. At the least it may profoundly distort the understand-

ing of the traditional system of gift exchange. On the contrary, only by

correctly establishing the specificity of the latter can the nature of the

moral gift be understood. Hopefully we might then be able to consider

the question of theethic of fraternityfrom a different perspective. How

then should the ceremonial gift exchange be defined?

The definition of ceremonial gift exchange may be applied to the

set of procedures by which a group, or an individual in the name of

a group, recognizes another group by offering it goods considered

precious, by words or acts of respect, by generally showing deference.These acts of recognition and the goods that are their pledges, institute

intense relations, the most important of which is the matrimonial

alliance.

The concepts of recognitionand relationare essential here. Giving is

an act of recognition because it is neither a question of exchanging goods

nor of meeting the needs of the other. In short, the act of giving has

neither a utilitarian objective, not even in terms of domestic economy,

nor a charitable objective. The precious goods that are offered (jewels,

shells, fabrics, wrought objects, livestock, festive food or drink) do notaim at enriching the partner but at honoring him, at showing the

importance attached to the relation established with him. Most often

those goods do not leave the circuit of gift exchanges, even among shep-

herd peoples where the livestock is destined for ceremonial exchanges

and very little meat is consumed, and then only in ritual circumstances.

To say that the relation of gift exchange allows for reciprocal recognition

means that for human societies it is their own particular mode of esta-

blishing relations and maintaining them.

To be sure, it is a benevolent act but also a challenge; a risky move

of the self towards the other, a wager. It is always simultaneouslya self affirmation and the recognition of the other, the provocation

as well as the gratification of the other. To give is both to give up what

one gives and to impose oneself upon another with what one gives.

It is both an offering and a challenge, game and pact, an agreement on

the verge of disagreement, peace concluded at the edge of a possible

conflict.

This is why such relations are imbued with formalism and what

explains their ceremonial character. Malinowski underlines its impor-

tance:I shall call an action ceremonial, if it is () public; () carried on

under observance of definite formalities; () if it has sociological, reli-


17/32

gious, or magical import, and carries with it obligations().

Obviously, we are dealing with institutional acts even when in certain

cases the relations only exist between individuals. But what are those

ceremonial obligations Malinowsky is talking about? Mauss was proba-

bly the first to identify them clearly. They are giving, receiving and

returning, i.e., giving in return. Giving is compulsory precisely because

it is the primordial way of recognizing the other and of constituting

relations between groups, and first of all to make matrimonial alliance

possible. Hence the obligation of receiving and giving in return. To

refuse a gift, or to fail to respond in time with a counter gift is to deny the

recognition that is offered and to enter into conflict. The problem is not a

moral one, i.e., whether one is more or less benevolent or generous. It is asocial one, i.e., to be part of the community or not. At this level it is

pointless to ask whether a gift can be a gift when it is compulsory. It

would mean unduly projecting on the ceremonial gift the question of the

moral gift. For Mauss, it can be summarized in a principle: To gooutside oneself involves free and obligatory giving(). Besides, thisobligation is never general; it is always determined precisely according to

the status of the partners (e.g., according to the position in the kinship or

the hierarchy) or the circumstances (weddings, deaths, seasonal holidays,

reconciliation rites, etc.).

However, no matter how institutional and public the practice of the

gift exchange, the relations established between partners are above all

personal, in two ways. First, because to give is to give something of

oneself or more precisely, it is to give oneself in the thing that is offered

and which constitutes the token of that act; hence the numerous forms

of magical protection surrounding these relations where one is exposed

to each other. Mauss insists:by giving one is giving oneself, and if onegives oneself, it is because one owes oneselfones person and onesgoodsto others().

Secondly, these relations are personal because exchanges most oftentake place between statutory partners such as brothers-in-law, chiefs

among themselves, members of the clan and their chief, or chosen part-

ners, as for instance in the Trobiandan kula. To be sure, there are public

festivals between groups, as in the Kwakiutlpotlatch, but even then they

happen through the mediation of the chiefs.

In short, the system of the ceremonial gift exchange constitutes a

tight network of bilateral relations through persons. Of course, this

() B. Malinowski, The Argonauts of the

Western Pacific (New York, E. P. Dutton, ,p. ).

() M. Mauss, op. cit., p..

() Ibid., p. (underlined by Mauss).


18/32

gives us a hint on how to expand on the Weberian opposition between

the personal and the impersonal. According to Mauss, we are not dealing

here with simple politeness, but with a total social phenomenon,which implicates the entire society in all its facets; it is the very expres-

sion of its being.

Rapidly summarized, these are the essential characteristics of

the procedure of recognition and community foundation. It must be

noted that this ceremonial and bilateral form is characteristic of seg-

mentary societies where the kinship system is identified with social

organization. At this point we face a question which will lead us back to

Weber and the problem of grace: what happens when segmentary

societies are included in a larger institutional whole, such as an empire,or change into a type of political society themselves? In the first case, we

most often find that practices of gift exchange are maintained and

remain relatively unaffected by the appearance of a central administra-

tion. However, the image of an powerful outside authority can be deci-

sive in the idea of an asymmetrical gift, either as unequal (the subordi-

nate cannot really give in return) or unilateral (only the superior can

give).

The second case could be considered particularly interesting in that it

has left its mark on the Western tradition, that is the advent of political

society in ancient Greece. This complex phenomenon took placethrough a progressive lessening of the role of the clansgen,through the emergence of a shared public space, and in the recognition

of the written law as imposing the same obligations on all. One might

then ask what links members of the city to one another? Plato first

answers that this link is formed by reciprocal need (). But he under-

stands quite well that this explanation is insufficient. Referring to the

myth of Prometheus in the Protagoras, he gives us another answer: it is

thephiliathat Zeus, the supreme God, gives to humankind and which

allows them to form a civic community. This story says it all: needsalone, and the related professions, cannot unite men. For that a divine

gift is necessary, an affective link that circulates among them but pro-

ceeds from a unique source. The passage from segmentary to political

society calls for capping the bilateral reciprocal link with a multilateral

collective link. One could say that the idea of grace is already emerging

in this mutation. Even if we only wanted to read the story in the Prota-

goras metaphorically, we would still have to deal with the Greek expe-

rience of the charis, as the public form of charm, as that which unites the

() Plato,The Republic, translated by F.M. Cornford (London, Oxford University Press, thed., , p.).


19/32

citizens in the worship of beauty that transcends them all and is given to

all ().

At the same time the idea of a collective gift emerges, which makes it

possible to think the unity of the city as such, that is a civic link which

compensates for the disappearance of the ceremonial gift exchange; it is

also the time when the requirement of the individual gift is formulated,

left to individual initiative; in other words, the moral gift proper. This is

the type of generous gift analyzed and encouraged by the Nichomachian

Ethics. To call it a moral gift means that it becomes a virtue and no

longer in the first instance an act of reciprocal recognition, except

perhaps in encounters and festivals, but an act of mutual aid, which is

profoundly alien to the ceremonial gift. It is the type of gift celebratedby Seneca in De Beneficiis. Give, he says, give without counting. Imitate

in this way the gods who give us life, the growth of plants, light, in short

all the blessings of nature. Finally Seneca ends up by saying: Godbestows without any expectation of return; he has no more need of our

gifts than we are in a position to give him any(). Besides the passagefrom the plural to the singular, from gods to God, which gives the text a

monotheistic flavor, there is a surprising correspondence between this

affirmation and the Christian idea of grace. This occurs at a time when it

becomes prominent in St. Pauls preaching, which itself is profoundly

indebted to the entire biblical heritage and which we should now reviewbriefly.

It is generally agreed that the termhnin Hebrew corresponds to the

Greek charis and the Latin gratia. Hn means the gift, or rather generousact, of the only God; this does not seem to really correspond to the charis

of the city.Hndesignates two aspects of one and the same reality: first

of all, the act of generous benevolence from a highly placed figure

towards an inferior. It also expresses the content of this favor, which in

turn gives rise to the idea of charm or even beauty that can be applied

more generally to people or things. While Greek grace concerns fore-

most the visible world and flows back towards the act, biblical grace

belongs to the act and can subsequently extend towards the visible

world. This conception of the favor granted by a superior to an inferior

(the connotation of hnis the attitude of leaning forward, to look down

indulgently) is common to all cultures and religions of the ancient

Middle-East ().

() C. Maier, Politik und Anmut (Berlin,

Siedler, ).

() De Beneficiis, IV-IX, (Paris, Editions

Belles Lettres, , p. ).() A. Lemaire, Le monde de la Bible (Paris,

Gallimard, ); J. Bottro, La plus vieillereligion (Paris, Gallimard, ); J. Bottero,

Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning and the Gods

(University of Chicago Press, ).


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In the biblical texts the image of God as a generous giver is a perm-

anent feature structuring three essential aspects of the Hebraic religion:

the election, the alliance, the law. The notion of alliance is particularly

interesting for us. Alliance,berith, is a term that normally designates all

sorts of pacts between individuals or groups such as mutual aid or peace

agreements. But a special meaning of berithconcerns the vassalage pact

established between a powerful protector and an individual (or group)

placing himself under the formers protection and in his dependency.

Such a pact is concluded ritually around a sacrifice involving dividing

the victim, most often a calf, in two. The partners go between the two

halves and then commit themselves with an oath; some memorial will

then mark the occasion: a tree will be planted or a stone erected.Starting with the very first documents (), the biblical texts put the

alliance at the heart of the belief in the only God. While it is clearly

modeled on the vassalage pact, it has nevertheless a special feature: the

commitment is presented as having been initiated by the overlord him-

self. This is certainly a bold presentation. There does not seem to be

another example of an alliance between a god and a people, this motifseems to be a peculiarity of the religion of Israel(). For this smallpeople of shepherds rebelling against the practices and life styles of the

urbanized peoples surrounding it, this was a way of giving themselves a

purely religious royalty, a king who was at the same time the unique and

invisible God. This means that no human authority could intervene

between God and his people. For the children of Israel any otheroverlord is by definition excluded: By submitting through an alliance tothe authority of a god, they elude that of earthly kings, of the pharaoh or

the little rulers of the Canaan city-states. They affirm their complete

independence and at the same time cement their union, for the rules and

the laws [...] are sanctioned by the divine sovereign when they replace

the prescriptions of the overlord in vassalage treaties().

This is an extreme case of the spiritual radicalism typical of peoplesof the desert or the steppe. For this poor nomadic people, more often

than not dominated by its neighbors, the alliance represents the privilege

of being elected. The berith proclaims the following: by choosing his

people, the one and only God himself proposes the pact that unites

them. The offer was not solicited, but it comes from above: You haveseen what I have done to Egypt and how I carried you on the wings of

eagles and had you come to me. And now, if you listen carefully to my

() See A. Caquot, La religion dIsrael

in Histoire des Religions (Paris, Gallimard,, vol. I, p. sq.).

() Ibid., p. .

() Ibid., p. .


21/32

voice and if you keep the alliance with me, you will be for me

my personal property among all the peoples, for the whole earth is mine.

And you will be for me a kingdom of priests, a holy nation (Exodus, IX,

).

The structure of this alliance, which is totally original in the context

of vassalage pacts, makes it possible to understand the equally unique

character of grace, of the divine favor, hn, as an act that is uncondition-

al, sovereign, absolutely free and which cannot be reciprocated. The

absolute transcendency of the divine gift will be at the heart of the most

powerful currents of Christianity.

At this point we can finally reconsider the question of the gift as such.

As we have seen, we dealt with three types of gift relations:

first of all the ceremonial gift exchange which above all aims atrecognizing the partner and constitutes the very social life of traditional

societies;

then we encountered the unilateral gift from the sovereign or thecity, and its variety of versions in the Greek charis or the biblical hn; we

call this grace;

finally there is the individual gift of the moral kind which dependson the free decision by the donor. This gift can be reciprocal or not; it is

above all the expression of generosity and compassion. This is the actwhich Aristotle made into a virtue and which Seneca recommended all

should practice. We could probably situate what Weber calls the reli-gious ethic of fraternity at this level.

Generally speaking, we are dealing with the form of social relations in

each case. And thus, where the transition from a clan society to a political

society occurs, as in Greece for instance, in short from a segmentary

system founded on a tight network of reciprocal services to a system

organized around a centerthe meson of public spacewe will also find

a crisis in the system of the ceremonial gift exchange and ritual reci-procity, inseparable from punitive justice. Greek tragedy testifies to this

crisis. Then it becomes necessary to invent a link for the new commu-

nity, i.e., the polis, that will be as strong as the link provided by the

ceremonial gift exchange. The answer lies in the double movement of

the divine charis and the individual philia. The collectivity has to be

wholly enclosed in relations that will ensure its unity, just as the network

of gift exchanges between private individuals manifests this grace. The

practice of the generous act, i.e., the ethic of the gift exchange, remains

reciprocal. Providing a network of commitments is precisely what needs

to be done. Yet reciprocity itself is in crisis, as De Beneficiis shows.


22/32

Reciprocity can no longer be understood and is reduced to the search for

ones advantage, do ut des.

Now the pure gift needs to be affirmed, without the expectation of a

payback. For Seneca, the reciprocal gift no longer has any meaning.

Only a totally gratuitous gift is truly a gift, the gift that imitates the

divine gift. Without unconditional offerings social relations will fall

apart. In short, after the crisis of the ceremonial gift linked to the

emergence of the city, there comes the crisis of the moral gift linked to

the dismantling of the city.

Then at the same time and in a very different context, Jesuss preach-

ing encounters just such a crisis, as is shown in a remarkable study by

Camille Tarot ().To the question of who must give, to whom andwhat, Jesus answers: who? everyone; to whom; to all and what? every-

thing [...] In this sense of overabundant generosity, in the refusal to limit

or even stop the gift, there is potlatch in the attitude of Jesus and his

disciples(). The requirement of a limitless generosity is the mostaudacious response to a situation of virulent conflict between several

political and religious tendencies: Pro-Roman followers of Herod,

legalistic Pharisees, purist Qumranians, Samaritans, Sadduceans, Esse-

nes. In this hopelessly blocked and shattered society, the requirement of

unconditional charity offers a universal solution. Henceforth, only thus

can another community become possible.

Each crisis reflects a different stage in the process as gift exchange

relations become more and more interiorized; it testifies to the

increasingly radical movement towards purity of intention, when offer-

ings become unconditional. One could say it is the type of crisis that

reoccurs with Luthers dissidence and then Calvins. However, a newand unknown threshold is crossed here: God alone can give, no human

gift can add to the divine gift which has to be received by faith. As for the

rest, it is important to stick to what is our vocation: everyday life in a

profession. And so thereligious ethic of fraternityis set aside; and sothe Protestant ethic finds itself in accord with the spirit of capitalism

which prospers at the moment when the system of gift exchange is

fading away. By restricting the power of giving to God, the doctrine of

predestination leaves it up to the world of work and business to manage

social relations.

If the gift exchange relations and the personal bonds they imply have

become burdensome, it is also because a more profound movement is

()Repres pour une histoire de la nais-

sance de la grce in Revue du MAUSS (),.

() Ibid., p. .


23/32

emerging. Indeed, everything is happening as if the thought of the

Reformers, driven by theological necessity, obeyed the logic of a fund-

amental change taking place primarily in the urban settings of com-

mercial Europe. It is indeed in those settings that a form of rationality

prevails at the level of daily life itself, which hitherto had only concerned

clerics. This is also the environment where commercial exchanges based

on contracts, even modest ones, overtake relations of service, mutual aid

or gift exchanges. One could say that the legitimate condemnation of the

misuse of good deeds, made it possible to devalue charitable relations

when it became important to give free reign to contractual relations.

Neutral and rational, only the latter allow for the type of exchange nee-

ded by capitalism. A good Hegelian would see here an extraordinaryruse of history. A good Weberian would find himself forced to elaborate

on or even go beyond Webers analyses, or at least to complement them.For instance, the following question needs to be asked: what is happen-

ing in Catholic Europe at that same time? If indeed, as Weber sometimes

mentions, Catholics were able to preserve more human social rela-

tions with deeper roots in friendships, this supposedly was also because

they retained closer links to peasant and artisan communities, in spite of

the expansion of large commercial cities. In short, to validate Webersthesis, attention needs to be focused on the Catholic ethic and the spirit

of non-capitalism. It so happens that the elements for such a study exist

even if its goal is different. This is Claveros work, mentioned above.

The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit

of Non Capitalism According to B. Clavero

In spite of its limits, Claveros book, Antidora. Antropologia catolicade la economia moderna(), is of major interest in that it presents the

missing piece of the case opened by M. Weber and E. Troeltsch. Hismethod, documentation and hypotheses make his argument quite

convincing. The two German sociologists enabled us to understand the

profound link between Protestantism and emerging capitalism. Calvero

makes crystal clear the relation between Catholic doctrine and an idea of

the economy which resists the very emergence of capitalism. However,

this wording still implies a retrospective approach, as if the rise of

capitalism had been either resisted or applauded by one or the other, at a

time when no one had named or recognized it as a global process.

() Op. cit. see note .


24/32

Catholics no more knew they were resisting capitalism than the Calvi-

nists knew they were favoring it. By situating himself as much as possi-

ble at the level of the actors in the past, Clavero shows that things were

lived and understood in significantly different ways from what a retros-

pective perspective imagines.

With respect to the Catholic world, it is customary to mention only

the central role that the condemnation of profit, identified with usury,

supposedly played in burdening banking and trade. That point is well

established (). How then can we account for the equally severe

condemnation on that score in Luthers preaching? Clearly, this gene-

ralization is insufficient. Actually, the prohibition of usury is but the

negative side of the essentially positive injunction of generous recipro-city. Clavero finds a name for it which recurs in theological treatises or

manuals on morality during the Renaissance: antidora, a term from the

Greek which literally means counter-gift. In short, usury (this definition

covers all profits) stands condemned because it contradicts the require-

ment of charity, of the obligation to give in return. However, things are

not that simple, as we will see. For this command implies a whole way of

thinking related to ideas of friendship and justice, of what is natural and

what is artificial, of intention and formalism, of symmetrical equality

and proportional equality, of family and state.

Before returning to these issues, I would like to make a preliminary

commentonClaverosanalyses.Inadvancingsuchahypothesis,theauthorcould have been expected to make an attempt to find out more about

generous reciprocity, either in earlier Western thought, or more gene-

rally in what anthropology has brought to light since Mauss wrote about

relations based on the system of gift exchanges in traditional societies.

Calvero does not ask these questions. He even appears to exclude them

in his methodological concern to rely solely on documents of the period

in question, theth andth centuries in Spain. For him this seems to

guarantee avoiding the risk of imposing alien concepts on the past.Such a choice unquestionably increases the credibility of his argu-

ment since it produces convincing results without outside recourse.

However, it also weakens its scope since it remains silent on the entire

philosophical (Aristotle and Seneca for instance) and theological (the

Church Fathers and Medieval theologians) tradition concerning the

condemnation of profit and the valorization of gratuitous generosity.

Most significantly however, it fails to situate this Catholic anthropo-

() B. N. Nelson, The Idea of Usury

(Princeton University Press,); J. Le Goff,Marchands et Banquiers du Moyen Age (Paris,

PUF, ); Le Goff, Your Money or Your Life

(New York, Zone Books, ) [Ed. orig.: LaBourse ou la vie (Paris, Hachette, )].


25/32

logyin the general framework of a problematic of gift-giving found in

every culture. Finally, even if his argument shows how the rejection of

profit was formulated, it does not say why the Catholic world tended to

resist the emergence of economic practices which suited the Protestant

ethic so well. To clarify this difference is going to be a most difficult

theoretical task.

The main lines of Claveros argument focus on a number of issues

that may be summarized as follows: the priority of generous and chari-

table relations over contractual and legal relations; the priority of pro-

portional and distributive equality over strict commutative equality; the

priority of the order of family and friends over public and administra-

tive authorities. Those three types of priorities can be found in theolo-gical treatises as well as in exchange practices. This implies a whole

range of important consequences when it comes to legal formulations,

debates about the legitimacy of business dealings, andfinally the pree-

minence of the order of grace with respect to everything that could be

thought of as the economy.Let us consider first of all generous relations. In the discourse of

Catholic theologians, social relations are understood to be defined by

charity. Charity means benevolence, friendship, to wish the other well, to

help him and support him. Such relations are presented as the only

naturel and spontaneous ones. Natural, because they arise from theorder of things desired by God. Besides, they are also Gods relationstowards man: pure generosity without calculation. There is community

among men only because there exists between them the same type of

relations God has established towards them. It is with the same charitythat we honor God and our neighbors, writes Victoria, a Spanishtheologian at the beginning of theth century (). From this alone

ensues the illicit character of usury. By usury is to be understood every

form of profit in loans. According to one author of that time:There isno doubt that to accept a high rate of interest for money given is in itself

unjust(). Usury is identified with profit no matter what it is. Thisrefusal is nothing less than a divine command: the Lord says: give eachother loans without expecting anything in return(). However, andthis is the point, it does not prevent the beneficiary from giving back more,

not for the lenders profit, but as a token of gratitude. The surplus in the

restitution is in turn a mark of generosity. Clearly, Victoria and so many

other theologians of his time pose the problem in these surprising terms:

he who provides a loan in reality makes some kind of a gift and he who

() Cited in B. C, La grce du don,op. cit., p.. () Cited in ibid., p..() Ibid., p..


26/32

returns it with a surplus only gives back and honors the received

gift. Obtaining something through friendship does not constitute

usury(), affirms a theologian. This is indeed the remarkable processof Catholic thought: translating the loan into a gift and the interest

received as a counter-gift: antidora. The economic transaction has cer-

tainly taken place, but is understood or at least presented as an act of

generous reciprocity. This means that it remains in the range of personal

relations, in the logic of the warm social link. Hence the emergence ofthe concept of antidora. For anyone familiar with classical Greek voca-

bulary, this terms seems strange. One could have expected antidosis (gift

in return, exchange) used by Aristotle. Clavero pretends not to know this

as he only refers to Spanish treatises of the sixteenth century that use theLatin term antidorum or the feminine form antidora. What prevails is the

idea of an obligation that is not legal but moral or statutory. The require-

ment to be generous also has its antecedents in the ethic of gift-giving as

formulated by Seneca. What appears surprising is the precedence given

to the notion of counter-gift rather than gift. Clavero does not seem to be

quite familiar with the contemporary anthropological data on this issue.

He only tells us that the term has been sanctioned by numerous texts.

This may be so. Those he cites seem to imply that giving is always also to

give back, the reply to a gift which already preceded us. This is unders-

tandable in a universe haloed with divine grace; and one could considerthat the prefix antiinsists on the point of view of the beneficiary and his

response.

As we see, theological thought that privileges the logic of charity and

of gift-giving relations, ends up recoding profitable actions in terms of

this logic. It is easy to surmise what the modernproblem will be: touncouple economic activity from the relations based on the exchange of

gifts that remain personal, fraught with warm sociality, dependency,affects. This is precisely the uncoupling that will be achieved by the

Lutheran doctrine of profession-vocation(Beruf)and by the Calvinist

thought of inner-worldly asceticism.Thus the major problem posed by Catholic doctrine is not only the

devaluation of business for the sake of charitable relations, but even

more the formulation of business as a variation of those generous rela-

tions. All in all, this moral theology of exchange requires the translation

of any form of commercial exchange in terms of reciprocal gifts. The

risk then is that agents of financial exchanges will play on words, and

hypocritically call loaned money received gifts and returned gifts the

money paid back with interest. Of course, it is precisely to deal with such

() Cited in ibid., p..


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a risk of abuse that the question of intention is introduced: the generous

relation must first be an inner disposition, otherwise the gift-giving

relation could hide mental usury().Intention makes all the difference between the profitable and the

selfless act. The power of intention then allows for the constant transfer

of the commercial exchange into the order of charity: to loan as if one

were giving, to pay back as if one were giving back liberally. Intention

operates the translation of the commercial relation into a gift-giving

relation.

This is why the charitable order is radically different from the legal

relation, from the order of the Law ruled by the category of the contract:

The law of friendship (jus amicitiae) precedes and prevails over theLaw itself(). What is the goal of friendship? It is to make friends, asAristotle told us already, which is another way of saying that the

exchange of goods has no other purpose than to maintain or reinforce

social relations. Such is not the purpose of the order ofthe Law. What is

the latters domain? It is to attend to the formal equilibrium of relations.It defines what is due according to convention, not nature. It insures that

nobody is wronged, no more. It does not expect feelings of gratitude

from partners. Thus it can guarantee that the merchant will be comp-

ensated for his efforts and his work. But these earnings have no charita-

ble value. The legal relation does not engage partnerspersonally. It doesnot create social relations. It strictly insures that due is given and

punishes when commitments are not respected. Thus it operates in a

restrictive rather than positive mode. It distributes, limits, protects,

constrains, prevents, punishes, confirms, concludes. It does not per se

create links between two individuals.

The contract is undoubtedly its most constant expression. In busi-

ness the latter fixes prices, financial interests and temporal limits to

commitments. It is restrictive, i.e., it imposes an absolute obligationsuch as guaranteed profitsunder the threat of sanctions. It does not

require good intentions directly, nor the expression of benevolence, evenif such sentiments may accompany or favor it. That is why the contract

is the clearest expression of the legal order. However it would be exces-

sive to reduce the idea of justice to this form alone. There are indeed two

types of justice, one which is strictly contractual and egalitarian and is

called commutative. The other type, a superior and more flexible type,

remains compatible with the order of charity. The latter is distributive or

proportional justice. These are of course Aristotelian categories, revived

by Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages.

() Domingo de Soto, cited in ibid., p.. () Ibid., p..


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Commutative justice presupposes or institutes formal equality

between partners; it ignores differences in status or resources; it only

takes into account that which is exchanged. In that respect it is abstract

and impersonal. This is why it is appropriate for contracts which also

deal with objects and tend to ignore the uniqueness of the contracting

parties. On the other hand distributive justice is superior because it is

more subtle and remains compatible with the order of charity. It is

proportional in as far as it takes into account the status of agents, such as

the difference between husband and wife, parents and children, master

and servant, lord and peasants, etc. In this particular theological

conception this means that it fits well with the natural order of things.

This natural order of things, which constantly dominates thisoutlook, means first of all that society is nothing but the association of

families. Even though Aristotle had established the primary and natural

character of the family, he nevertheless considered that the order of the

city which presupposes it, is different and superior (). This idea still

persists in Scholastic thought. However, in large sections of Catholic

theology, the family takes over as the social authority.The family pre-vailed and with it charity, a dimension that has priority over justice.

There existed a certain autonomy of the family that was superior to the

civil, political or social order, just as there existed a religion that deter-

mined this autonomy by capturing it(). Besides, the vocabulary ofthe family presupposes its natural character when it names the relations

within the Christian community: father, brother, sister, mother. This is

not new but the erosion of the civil order reinforces its impact. This is

why the economy also wants to benatural.It is supposed to be just afamily affair, household business, very literally that of the oikos. Hence

the oconomia, according to Clavero. There is no general economy,but there are particular economies for each household (). Here an

anthropological perspective needs to complement Claveros: the familyin question is the kinship system, or rather what at the time was called

theparentele,the Roman or Medieval familia, bound together by reci-

procal obligations of service and mutual aid.

We can now begin to see some of the consequences of these concepts

and practices. First, it is impossible to imagine an economy in the

modern sense of the term in this universe of the antidora. Or rather, this

is in fact an economy (production and exchange) but without economic

objectives. Clavero needs to be reminded that this is true of all ancient

economies and those of all traditional civilizations. Economic objectives

() Polit. I, a-.() B. C, op. cit., pp. -. () Ibid., p. .


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presuppose the rationality of investments aiming at profits in order to

further increase the investments. But to make a profit in order to increase

ones well being and prestige, that is a traditional attitude. From that

point of view then Catholic culture is not specific but essentially faithful

to the immemorial values of social relations based on the exchange of

gifts, and to aristocratic values of lavish liberality.

Thesecond consequence isthat if thecharitablerelationismore impor-

tant than the order of the Law, there will be insufficient legal form-

ulation to regulate contractual exchanges. One could say that it is pre-

cisely in this matter that the Protestant world will take the turn towards

modernity by allowing the world of business to decree precise rules for

commercial and financial transactions. Economic rationality cannotfunction without conventions that fix prices, obligations and deadlines.

But what happened in the universe of the antidora? Actually at workhere were relations of grace. Banking activities could leave no room for

economic forecast nor for legal responsibility [...] The legal system did

not offer enough coverage; judges were incapable of providing it()[...] The banks could not count on a proper legal system(). What wasthere instead? Clavero answers: a society of patronage and clienteles, in

short a society where relations centered on the exchange of gifts and

services imply the personal commitment of partners. These are relations

between protectors and protegees. This is not a marginal dimension butan entire world: on the one hand celestial protectors, that is saints with

various competencies, and on the other hand terrestrial protectors,

relatives or well placed friends. It would be interesting here to continue

the analysis and try to understand in which way a form of classical cor-

ruption is nothing but the perverse crossing of the traditional logic of the

gift exchange with that of modern business; the concept of corruption

indicates then the point at which they clash, are confused and become

incompatible. One thing appears remarkable: while the term grace in the

Protestant context invariably evokes the doctrine of predestination, in

the Catholic context it implies first of all the idea of charity, but also the

idea of relations based on personal favors and almost clan-like solida-

rity ().

() Ibid., p..

() Ibid., p..

() This study needs to be supplemented

by further research into the cultural roots of

the two traditions in Western Christianity. The

case of the Orthodox tradition would also need

to be reevaluated. Comparing the results

obtained by Weber and Troeltsch with Cla-veros findings makes the distance between

them very clear. There is general agreement

that Catholic theology and sermons remained

faithful to the concepts of charity and generous

gift-giving, implying a more personal and

active sociality than in the Protestant world,

while the latter was acknowledged to be more

modern and efficient

However, the fact that the Protestant ethiccorresponded to the world of business and


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** *

Perhaps we should now measure the distance we have covered so far.

We started out with Webers thesis on the convergence of the Protestant

ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Weber clearly outlines the increase in

rationality generated by this ethic, the rigidity of which he recognizes at

the same time. He clearly shows in what way the Protestant doctrine of

predestination, by reinforcing the notion of divine transcendence, leads

to the paradox of another reinforcement, that of the investment of

human capacities in professional life. Weber notes then that such a

transformation does not occur in the Catholic world where an ethic of

fraternitycontinues to prevail, which is certainly more livable but lessfavorable to the economic rationality and its dynamics embodied by

capitalism. Why the resistance? Weber does not say. Interestingly,

something becomes doubly clear by considering the issue of grace, so

central to the dispute between Protestants and Catholics, as the trans-

formation of the anthropological question of the gift exchange, i.e., as

the interiorized version of the unilateral gift. First of all the Protestant

doctrine of the absolute nature of grace is the affirmation of the

intransitive nature of the divine gift to which no answer is possible.

Hence predestination. It is not even desirable any longer to interiorizethe gift. Freed from an impossible response, the believer is called on to

honor God by his work: Beruf, profession-vocation. This is the only way

social relations will be established. They are relations of reciprocal

dependency rather than of mutual attachment.

What also becomes clearer is the condition of societies where thereligious ethic of fraternityprevails, which is the interiorized form of

emerging capitalism, and that the Catholic

ethic seemed to have resisted, does not explain

why the Reformation spread primarily in

Northern Europe and why the Latin countriesremained more faithful to Rome than the

others. The traditional answer is to oppose the

urban and progressive North to the agricultu-

ral and conservative South. This would mean

an opposition between the individualism of the

cities and the ancient solidarity of the

countryside. Then what about Northern Italy

where capitalism first emerged? What about

the great commercial centers of France and

Southern Germany that remained Catholic?

Conversely, how then to explain Luthers suc-cess among the poorest peasants? Other para-

meters need to be taken into account, such asfor instance the fact that the Protestant Refor-

mation spread almost exclusively in the areas

that were not subject to the tradition of Roman

Law. This would certainly be a major factor in

creating the differences. Other less obviouselements need to be brought out; those would

make it clear that the opposition between Pro-

testantism and Catholicism originates less in

doctrinal differences than in a sharp diver-

gence between two models of structuring the

social bond, the anthropological origins of

which remain to be unearthed. The first model

is based on the interdependence of needs and

the logic of profit; the second model ack-

nowledges the importance of status, solidarity

and personal relations, which remains close to

the traditional forms of community and then

appears as a lack of modernity.


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the traditional gift exchange. Catholic culture maintains the principle

that a return gift to God is possible, by giving to others, in short by

charity. Social life and exchanges then remain under the influence of thatrequirement. Claveros inquiry shows this clearly. The primacy of per-sonal and generous relations over neutral and contractual exchanges led

to an ethic which turned out to be ineffective given the needs of capita-

lism in its emergent phase. We must note here that this maladjustment is

and remains characteristic of all traditional cultures where there is warm

sociality dominated by links of kinship and reciprocal obligations.

Whatever the anthroplogical and historical antecedents of the opposi-

tion between Protestantism and Catholicism may have been; whatever

the doctrinal reasons for the break, there remains the exemplary diver-

gence between the two resulting types of ethic. Those two attitudes are

no longer theirs alone; they can be found everywhere in contemporary

societies. In a way they have been globalized: the one tends to managesocial relations in a rigorous and operational way, while the other will

first appeal to privileged personal trust. Perhaps it is the talent of the

new spirit of capitalism to call on them simultaneously or to mix them

with innocent cynicism. *

* Translated by Anne-Marie Feenberg.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

A, De gratia et libero arbitrio [vol. ];

De corruptione et gratia; De predestinatione

[vol. ] in Migne Patrologie latine (Paris,

-).

BJ.,.La plus vieille religion(Paris,

Gallimard)., . Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning and

the Gods (Chicago, University of Chicago

Press).

C A., . Anthropologie du don (Paris,Mescle de Brouwer).

C, A. . La religion dIsrael inHistoire des Religions (Paris, Gallimard,

vol. I).

C B., . Antidora. Antropologia

catolica de la economia moderna (Milano,

Dott. A. Editore) [French Translat. by

Jean-Frdric Schaub, . La grce du

don. Anthropologie catholique de lconomiemoderne (Paris, Albin Michel)].

D L., . Essays on Individualism

(Chicago, University of Chicago Press) [Ed.

orig.: Essais sur lindividualisme (Paris, Seuil,

)].

G J. and A. C, . The World of

Religious Ethics, Gift Exchange and Capitalism

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