Reliably Detecting Uranium in Transit - · PDF fileReliably Detecting Uranium in Transit...

Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, Amalavoyal Narasimha Chari, Thomas Tisch November 12, 2007 Comments to sri at devabhaktuni.us Version 12.103

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Reliably Detecting Uranium in Transit (Slides: http://www.devabhaktuni.us/research/RDP.pdf) Abstract: Nuclear detection at US borders focuses on interception of nuclear materials, has numerous loopholes and employs unreliable detection technology. This is unlikely to dissuade adversaries from mounting nuclear terrorism plots using highly enriched uranium. The government is likely to dissuade adversaries by reliably detecting nuclear weapons on any pathway before it is close to its target and then stopping it. We explore the use of multiple independent detection rings around metropolitan areas and military bases to complement the national borders. We conclude that reliable drive-thru detection portals should be based on a combination of passive gamma, passive neutron, passive muon, and active neutron techniques.

Contents The Problem: Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) ............................................................ 2

What highly enriched uranium looks like ................................................................... 2 Dissuasion versus Interception ................................................................................... 4 Shortcomings of US Government approaches to nuclear detection ........................... 5 Pathways to approach metropolitan areas and military bases ................................ 11

The Solution: Reliably Detecting HEU in Transit ........................................................ 14 HEU cannot always be detected at stand-off distances (10-100 meters) ................. 14 National versus Metropolitan or Base Perimeters ................................................... 15 Requirements for Nuclear Defense Zones (NDZs).................................................... 17 Requirements for Reliable Detection Portals (RDPs) .............................................. 25 How to build an RDP with gammas, neutrons, and muons ...................................... 27 Operational and Response Requirements ................................................................. 35 Spot Checking versus Portal Inspection ................................................................... 38

Brief History of Nuclear Terrorism and Clandestine Nuclear Attack .......................... 39 Worst-case scenarios in which domestic nuclear detection might be useful ................ 42

Terrorists or non-state actors seek and obtain atomic capability ............................ 42 HEU gets loose from stocks by thieves or insiders ................................................... 44 The intelligence community fails .............................................................................. 46 Foreign HEU production is concealed from the international community .............. 49 The nation whose HEU was used in an attack cannot be uniquely identified .......... 50 Foreign nuclear weapons programs evade intelligence ........................................... 53

Policy Recommendations.............................................................................................. 56 What are the US government policies to prevent nuclear terrorism with HEU? ..... 56 What are limitations of US policies? ........................................................................ 57 What does the Nonproliferation Treaty have to do with nuclear terrorism and HEU stockpiles? ................................................................................................................. 58 So what do we do about nuclear detection? ............................................................. 60 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 61

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 63 Appendix: The effect of horizontal spreading in passive muon detection .................... 63


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The Problem: Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

“Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies.”1 – 9/11 Commission Report

Today's national initiatives like the 9/11 Commission Act for scanning 100% of cargo at foreign ports of origin may be useful for interception of certain types of smuggled nuclear materials that are already assumed to be in transit -- by simply creating a roadblock for smuggling on high traffic routes, this does not get us any closer to dissuading adversaries from attacking by other means using highly enriched uranium. Today's programs ignore the options (loopholes) within reach of the adversary that use alternative routes or countermeasures the attacker can employ against the detection technology. Loopholes can come as technical countermeasures usable against today's technology like passive gamma detection (shielding, fractionation) or against future technology like cosmic muon detection (dispersion, spreading). Loopholes may also be present in the form of transportation pathways not secured by any detection technology (private jets, sailboats, luxury cruise ships, and so on). About loopholes, we must ask two questions of any national-scale detection system. Can an adversary discover how to use a loophole? Does an adversary have sufficient resources to confidently execute an attack using this loophole? With two yeses, there is nothing to stop the adversary from attacking -- the entire detection system becomes ineffective and largely wasteful. To dissuade adversaries, we outline a strategy of how to go about designing and deploying a reliable detection portal free of loopholes. There are two interrelated questions we try to answer/debate. First is how and where do we need to deploy detection portals in the real world? Our proposal is to create secure detection rings around metropolitan areas within the US and around military bases worldwide. On the basis of which physical techniques should we design the technology to use in these portals? We identify the countermeasures usable against each physical detection technique, and how portal design can take advantage of multiple detection technologies in conjunction to make up for these weaknesses -- passive gamma/neutron, passive muon, and active neutron interrogation.

What highly enriched uranium looks like The exact shape of the threat using of HEU-based nuclear device cannot be predicted, but one school of thought is that it will most likely come as a pre-fabricated, intact weapon assembled abroad and shipped to its target in the US (> 20kg HEU). Should they have the know-how to assemble it from raw materials the reasoning goes that terrorists would stil likely require assistance of a foreign government2, or they would rather not risk detection domestically in the US. If we could assume the threat could be only from an assembled nuclear device, then we need not worry about a device that is disassembled or the fissile


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material even subdivided into multiple smaller shipments to make them undetectable—indeed it would be a breakthrough even if it were possible to only guarantee detection of an intact device.

HEU Threat Model

• Best case: Assembled Atomic Weapon (Hiroshima‐like) with U‐232– Greater than 20 kg of metallic HEU– Heavy gun barrel– Unshielded, uncluttered, easiest to detect with highly penetrating 2.4

MeV gamma radioactive signature (from U‐232)• Worst case: Disassembled Atomic Weapon, no U‐232

– Reassembled domestically by attacker in a secret location– Shielded to eliminate radioactive signatures, no U‐232– Fractionized into multiple arbitrary small shipments (perhaps as low as

hundreds of grams)– HEU metal crushed and dispersed into small particles or powder– Spread out thin within the same shipment under some minimum

thickness that is undetectable– HEU transported in lower density oxide forms of uranium

The problem arises if the adversary knows that nuclear detection systems employed rely on the detection system’s assumption of an intact device. This knowledge may induce them to pursue disassembly before shipment and post-transport reconstruction within the US albeit at greater expense – their risk of detection depends on the quality of the plan they have in place to ship the parts and reassemble or construct the weapon. According to one estimate, uranium metal casting could be achieved using a vacuum furnace purchased for $50,000 and would still be the most difficult task in assembly of an improvised weapon – the "metallurgy team" of their hypothetical terrorist group would be paid $200,000 and require practice to perfect their technique using some surrogate material or even natural uranium.3 If a terrorist gets hold of enough uranium or an intact weapon, we have to assume they can disassemble it into its components and ship them separately if that leads to higher probability the parts will not be detected. Consider one scenario where a passive or active detector portal is deployed with a 5kg lower bound on detection. So an attacker may ship fractionalized HEU in 50 x 1kg shipments, each of ~50cc shielded inside an automobile differential, motorcycle engine--exact same procedure each time around. That would result in a successful attempt to smuggle 50kg total with zero probability of detection -- but also requires reassembly (vacuum casting). This would motivate the need to have the upper bound much smaller, perhaps as low as 100s of grams or less in order to make fractionalization risky enough for the entire operation. Same goes for crushing HEU and spreading it horizontally -- not necessarily fractionalized between shipments. A muon portal by itself would be unable to detect HEU that is crushed into granules or powder and spread out horizontally.


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Both these countermeasures are where the combination of passive gamma + muon + active neutron detection may help in narrowing the options for the attacker, complicating the calculations, making it too hard, etc. Of course all that engineering effort is for naught if there are other loopholes wide open (like a sailboat from the carribean or private jet from South America). Once the assumption of an intact device is no longer valid, several countermeasures could be employed by an attacker to transport HEU while evading detection systems. These include shielding, fractionation into multiple arbitrary small shipments, crushing and dispersion of the HEU metal smaller particles or powder, spreading this material out within the same shipment below some minimum thickness, and transport in lower density oxide forms of uranium.

Dissuasion versus Interception The obvious goal or purpose of domestic nuclear detection is to minimize the probability of a terrorist nuclear strike or a clandestine nuclear attack by a nation-state. Consider two similar mission statements that could be used to guide domestic nuclear detection efforts:

1. Dissuasion: Use nuclear detection to convince (dissuade) the adversary not to carry out a nuclear terrorism attack by developing a capability to detect an attack early enough to stop it (defeat).

2. Interception: Use nuclear detection to catch nuclear material or weapons being smuggled on transportation pathways.

One might reasonably expect that we want to achieve Dissuasion, and actions by the US Government to-date have been consistent with Interception, not Dissuasion. Putting ourselves in the shoes of an adversary, their decision to circumvent the detection system using any particular countermeasure depends on two questions alone:

1. Know-How: With the detection system in place, can they figure out how to execute the countermeasure to transport the device or material while evading detection in a "reliable enough" way -- say better than 95%? (yes/no)

2. Resources: Do they have access to the resources required to execute this countermeasure with sufficient confidence -- say better than 95%? (yes/no)

Domestic nuclear detection systems can be used for Interception, but if there remains even one countermeasure for which the answer to both these questions is yes, the entire detection system is useless as far as Dissuasion is concerned. Two yeses means the attacker can decide to execute this countermeasure and attack at will – a loophole. Intercepting nuclear materials on what is perceived to be the biggest, most common vulnerability in terms of number of transport vehicles achieves nothing as far as Dissuasion is concerned. Vulnerabilities have to be identified in terms of the knowledge the attacker has about options/alternatives to transport a nuclear device/material already in their possession – complexity or difficulty of the plot is only indirectly related to the reliability/cost of the countermeasure.


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Shortcomings of US Government approaches to nuclear detection In August 2007, Congress passed a law4 to require 100% of all cargo containers to be screened for nuclear devices at ports of origin before they reach the US at seaports, rail stations, or airports – in fulfillment of the Sept 11 Commission recommendations.5 Just one example, scanning at ports of origin neglects the possibility of mid-ocean transfers in which a nuclear device may be loaded from another ship or helicopter after it has left its port of origin. The answer to the “Know-How” question can be "no" if an attacker simply can't figure out the countermeasure (lack of know-how). Mid-ocean transfers and helicopters are the stuff of Hollywood scripts. They easily pass both tests. Similarly, attackers have access to the open literature and can learn the limits of any of the openly discussed detection techniques, like using shielding of radioactive signatures. Same goes for any of the techniques like muons, active neutron interrogation, etc. Attackers may not have access to detailed detector specs or performance numbers, but any detection system has to at least be robust to countermeasures the attacker could obtain based on technical knowledge/estimation of how it works. The answer to the “Resources” question can be "no" if the cost of making the countermeasure reliable enough for the attacker's comfort (>95% say) exceeds available resources. If so they decide it's not worth the risk of getting caught. For example if somehow they were forced to perform dozens of mid-ocean transfers just to avoid getting caught by the detection system (by multiple rings or checks), that might hypothetically cause the attacker to think twice before attempting the attack. If it were possible for the Coast Guard to interrogate or search a ship with a sufficiently high likelihood of detection, that might also cause the attacker to think twice about using a ship for fear of being inspected. Randomized defenses or lack of public information about detector location, timing, specifics could be used to render the countermeasure unreliable for the attacker. Examples of this are random scanning of containers or spot inspections of people, where the attacker lacks inside knowledge of which containers or people would be inspected. In general, the biggest vulnerabilities of the detection system may have nothing to do with the most common or highest volume transport (like cargo containers). On a typical day in 2006 there were approximately four times as many private vehicles (327,000) than cargo containers (71,000) processed by US Customs and Border Protection6 -- the 9/11 law does not account for securing several well-known pathways that could be used to deliver a nuclear device, 7

1. oil tankers 2. cruise ships 3. private jets 4. sailboats 5. yachts 6. passenger airplanes and personal luggage 7. helicopters 8. underground tunnels or sewage pipes 9. automobiles


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In the San Francisco harbor, every day it’s possible to see cruise ships and oil tankers freely passing in from the Pacific ocean well within a mile of downtown San Francisco to dock at SF’s piers and harbor. See the long ships to the east of downtown in the satellite image below, and the piers sticking out on either side of the SF-Oakland Bay bridge.

Figure 1 Satellite View of Downtown San Francisco with Large Ships In Close Proximity If the search was completed at the port of embarkation, that doesn’t prevent an attacker from doing transfers of HEU or an IND anywhere mid-sea or at an intermediate stop en route to the destination and arrive right at the dock. We wouldn’t have to worry about most of these loopholes in the first place if detection of HEU with portable detection at standoff distances (5 feet or more) was not vulnerable to shielding as a countermeasure.

Figure 2 Tourist Attraction or Trojan Horse?

A foreign Luxury Liner docks near Downtown San Francisco


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With so many "windows of vulnerability" both pre/post inspection at ports, is deployment of nuclear detection hopelessly flawed unless we can completely prohibit all private non-containerized boats (including oil tankers) from coming within several miles of a harbor near a major metro? This assumes in the first place that containerized cargo ships can be scanned and sealed to be free of HEU at ports of origin using nuclear detection portals. Secretary Chertoff's discussed the threat of domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs) delivered by private boats/jets and compared them to improvised nuclear devices (INDs).8 The DHS and Coast Guard are operating pilot programs for IND detection in San Diego and Seattle. The Coast Guard and DHS pilot programs he mentions for private boats/jets are likely have "windows of vulnerability" either pre or post inspection. This permits loopholes with near-100% success rates in smuggling INDs or nuclear material by the attacker:

1. Non-cargo ships. There is no detection tool that the Coast Guard can use to fully scan/inspect the contents of every large legal privately loaded boat such as luxury liners, yachts, or sailboats before they reach our shores (no containers to scan). Expanding these pilot programs would be analogous to spot inspections of people for IEDs entering airports, without using scanners or dog-sniffers but relying on manual inspection based on intelligence or profiling.

2. Pre-inspection detonation. By permitting the boat to arrive at close enough

proximity to the target to detonate pre-inspection -- how far out do you need to stop them?

3. Mid-sea or intermediate transfers. Transfers of INDs can be undertaken at

intermediate landing locations en route to the destination (target) even if the entire contents of legal private jets were screened at takeoff at airports of origin.

4. Underwater tows. Concealing INDs in containers towed underwater by the boat

which you have to actually look underneath to find -- from a Hollywood movie plot

5. Scuba divers. The threat object need not be big and heavy, it may just be the

~50kg HEU—disassembled from the entire bomb assembly only to be reassembled domestically. Even if it were possible to inspect incoming private boats for INDs at some perimeter in the ocean outside of a metro, a scuba diver (attacker) could bring the 20-50 kg of HEU needed for an IND underwater -- either whole or in parts. The diver could get off of a ship just before the boat was inspected to evade inspection/detection. Inspection should therefore take place well outside the distance of any simple underwater transport -- not within several miles of the harbor, but then we would also have to ensure that some other boat doesn't get by and "transfer" HEU to the inspected boat (which was already cleared by the inspection).


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How close to a target should any of these private vehicles be allowed if they can't be scanned/inspected to be free of INDs?

Countermeasure: SF BayPre‐inspection Vulnerability

Pacific Ocean

DHS pilots inspections for private boat near cities


TheoreticalInspection Perimeter

For Private Boats



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Scuba diver smuggles HEUoff of boat pre-inspection


If we were to draw an analogy to airport security, today’s plans for nuclear detection would be like securing the international terminals only, while permitting wide open holes in the perimeter around the airport and leaving the domestic terminals unsecured – which in and of itself would make little sense. That’s why airports are not secured until each terminal in the airport is secured, and a secure perimeter is built around the airport to keep attackers out. Border security has been obsolete in terms of dissuading smugglers.9 The United States has 12,034 km of land borders and 19,924 km of coastline for a total of 31,958 km of borders10. Annually, an estimated half-million11 to several million12 illegal immigrants and 30013-200014 metric tons of cocaine cross into the US along these borders – illustrating how easy it would be to smuggle kilogram quantities of HEU into the United States.15 The Government Accountability Office has demonstrated that they could smuggle materials for a dirty (radioactive) bomb across both the Mexican-US and Canadian-US borders.16 ABC News has demonstrated they can smuggle 6.8 kg of depleted uranium – which consists of 0.2% U-235, mostly consisting of U-238, the isotope most useful for passive detection through shielding and therefore in principle easier to detect than HEU – through the ports of New York (in 2002) and Long Beach (in 2003).17 US Port security18 is also questionable even if it were 100% perfect in detecting HEU—interdiction of HEU after it has arrived within US seaports19 or airports may be too late if the weapon is detonated in the port itself located within several miles of a major city like Washington DC or San Francisco. For an HEU-based gun-type weapon comparable to the Hiroshima bomb (10 kiloton yield), the prompt effects would instantly kill people within a circle around the detonation of radius 1 mile and fallout radiation could cause radiation poisoning for people up to 20 miles away within 24 hours (if they were not


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evacuated or otherwise shielded from the fallout).20 Weapons of larger yield would cause greater damage. How can security be achieved via a detection system until and unless the answer to either the “Know-How” or “Resources” questions is "no" across all countermeasures for every plausible attacker who has access to realistic resource levels (perhaps several million dollars)? If there is at least one attacker and one countermeasure with two yeses, the detection system doesn't work to achieve Dissuasion. The ineffectiveness of the US approach to domestic nuclear detection has been compounded by both insufficient detection coverage along the numerous transportation pathways accessible to terrorists and reliance on flawed technical approaches. The US budget for domestic nuclear detection in FY 2007 was $480 million with a request of $562 million for FY 2008.21 Current efforts22 and focus are narrowly fragmented in three independent government initiatives.23 This fragmentation comes from the focus of each agency:

• DHS (DNDO24) customers are Customs & Border Patrol (border security, ports, portals, and cargo), and they focus on long dwell detection in transit, cargo inspection during border crossings, and vehicular monitoring at ports and borders.

• DoD (DTRA25) customers are the combat troops who deal with mobile and transportable detection systems, some mounted on military vehicles, operated by soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, and employed in fluid, potentially hostile situations.

• DoE26 (NNSA27) conducts long term research to provide advance capabilities for nuclear detection and monitoring for the national and homeland security communities.

In terms of detection technology, in 2006 the DHS/DNDO announced their $1.2 billion next-generation “Advanced Spectroscopic Portal” (ASP) program aimed at reducing the number of false-positives currently experienced with detection equipment deployed today while also trying to detect lightly shielded HEU and other nuclear threats. The proposal included 1400 new detection portals based on passively detecting gamma and neutron radiation.28 False-positives arise due to the misclassification of naturally radioactive, non-threatening materials as nuclear threats (for example, granite or people recently diagnosed using radioactive isotopes may be misclassified). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently criticized the DNDO for not considering the effect of false-negatives in the cost-benefit analysis in this $1.2 billion proposal for deploying new systems.29 False-negatives are defined as instances when HEU being transported is not detected and allowed to pass through the portal, which can happen with these portals if the HEU is shielded sufficiently. This can happen not only due to failure of the detector to detect HEU inside the vehicle as pointed out by the GAO, but also due to the absence of a detector in a particular transportation pathway altogether which permits HEU smuggling along that pathway. In response to GAO questions, the DHS has ordered an independent set of tests of the machines used in the ASP program likely to be administered by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).30


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Pathways to approach metropolitan areas and military bases The fundamental tension in nuclear detection is in finding ways to enable and maintain flows of people/commerce while also not permitting more than or some minimum quantity (perhaps as low as 10g or as high as 50kg depending on your threat model) of nuclear usable material like HEU from being transported. Each pathway accessible to terrorists needs to be covered with sufficiently reliable detection techniques, or otherwise prohibited altogether – drawing that line depends on availability of detection technology and enforceability. Major metropolitan areas in the US and military bases including those in the US, Germany, Japan, or Italy make obvious targets for nuclear terrorism or clandestine nuclear attack. High likelihood metro targets may include all cities or megalopolises with population and population densities greater than some number. To make domestic nuclear detection work as Dissuasion, the DoD will need to verify that every vehicle within range of these targets is free of significant quantities of fissile nuclear materials including all forms of HEU – not just simply a limited number of well-known pathways. The DoD should therefore be prepared to detect and intercept any shipment of HEU, whether the vehicle is already inside or approaching the national borders and metropolitan (target) areas or military bases worldwide. The test for a successful nuclear dissuasion policy will be whether it is possible to prevent a non-state actor or rogue state from easily positioning a nuclear weapon inside Washington DC—can we fix the Ring Around Washington? A reliable architecture to detect HEU in transit has the potential not only catch nuclear smugglers and disrupt plots, but it will also deter (prevent) attacks from being attempted as well. As an illustration, we analyze security for a high-value target: the Washington DC metropolitan area.31 To create a reliable deterrent to delivering an HEU-based weapon inside the capital (as a whole or in parts), there needs to be a uniform risk of interception from a sufficiently safe distance of tens of miles across all possible transportation modes that could be used to deliver the weapon. If not, terrorists can simply bypass pathways they perceive to be secured (such as ports) and exploit the paths that remain wide open (such as private jets). 32


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Figure 3 Washington DC and surroundings To ensure that Washington DC is well outside the range33 of the prompt effects of a Hiroshima-sized nuclear detonation and is also immune to a good fraction of the radioactive fallout, a region of at least 5+ mile radius encircling the capital would have to remain free of any HEU. This can be achieved by ensuring no HEU enters the area enclosed by the Capital Beltway loop (Interstate 495), which in turn is approximately 15 miles long by 20 miles wide. The pathways that HEU may be transported into this area include,

1. Ground a. By motorcycle, automobile, truck, or trailer on roads and highways or any

drivable terrain. b. By train on train tracks c. By non-motorized transport (pedestrian, bicycle, or animal) on roads,

through forests, or private property 2. Underground

a. Through sewage pipes, water mains, or telecommunications corridors b. By subway train c. In a tunnel dug by the attackers.

3. Water a. By boat, yacht, ship, or barge on the Potomac River or any of the smaller

rivers and tributaries. b. A swimmer, wind-surfer, or kite-surfer on these rivers

4. Underwater a. A container tugged behind or below the water surface by a boat (like an

underwater trailer) b. An improvised submarine


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c. A diver d. Dolphins or other fish

5. Air a. By airplane or helicopter landing at Reagan National Airport (commercial

or private). b. An airplane, helicopter, blimp, hang-glider, or even a balloon could also

be commandeered to fly straight to and either crash-land at or fly-over any location in the capital.

c. By pilotless drones d. By multiple birds (such as trained pigeon-carriers34), with a carrying

capacity of small quantities (perhaps tens of grams35) of HEU e. By one or more projectiles (using cannons) or bullets (using guns)

following a predictable trajectory

Figure 4 Washington DC, Baltimore, Chesapeake Bay To provide additional hurdles for attackers, ensure that the capital is completely immune from the 24-hour fallout of a Hiroshima-sized weapon, and even immune to the prompt effects of a weapon moderately more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, a region of radius 40+ miles encircling the capital would need to be designed to remain free of any HEU. This can supplement the 5+ mile radius barrier envisioned earlier. The 40+ mile region also incorporates Chesapeake Bay, the City of Baltimore (Maryland), the Port of Baltimore, Baltimore/Washington International Airport, and Dulles International Airport. The additional pathways that HEU may be transported into this region which were not mentioned for the Capital Beltway include,

1. Water a. By boat, yacht, ship, or barge in the Chesapeake Bay


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b. By cruise ship, cargo ship, or oil tanker in the Port of Baltimore 2. Air

a. By airplane or helicopter landing at Dulles International Airport or Baltimore-Washington International Airport

b. By small aircraft or helicopters at any of the regional airports or heliports (private or commercial) such as Carroll County Regional Airport in Westminster, MD.

The Solution: Reliably Detecting HEU in Transit

HEU cannot always be detected at stand-off distances (10-100 meters) “The future force will be organized, trained, equipped, and resourced to deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. It will have capabilities to: detect WMD, including fissile material at stand-off ranges; locate and characterize threats; interdict WMD and related shipments whether on land, at sea, or in the air; sustain operations under WMD attack; and render safe or otherwise eliminate WMD before, during or after a conflict.”36

-- Quadrennial Defense Review (2006),

The implication is that with sufficient research37, long term solutions for detecting nuclear materials in transit will lead to detection capabilities at stand-off ranges (long-distance) much like radar, sonar, or other remote detection techniques. This is unlikely to be possible without the use of a dedicated source of radiation to interrogate the target with. The possibilities are either a directed muon beam or neutron beam,38 which may turn out to be unsafe for people or living beings. This is more likely to be useful on the battlefield in hostile environments, rather than for civilian use on a daily basis. Without a dedicated source of radiation to penetrate the target, any form of passive detection of shielded HEU, including increased-sensitivity gamma-ray imaging39, is fundamentally limited by the radiation emanating from the source—even for an ideal detector with 100% detection efficiency. Due to physical limits based on distance (proximity) and time (duration of exposure) required for detectors to integrate radiation from the source HEU, fixed and handheld detectors at borders are rendered incapable of detecting HEU when a small but sufficient amount of shielding is used to mask its natural radioactivity (a shield composed of lead, steel, or concrete that is 1-10 centimeters thick should suffice).40 The inability to detect HEU from a distance, at “stand-off ranges” without a dedicated source of radiation to interrogate the target, reduces the barrier to HEU trade on the black market since kilogram quantities of HEU can be freely transported to almost any destination worldwide. HEU enriched from naturally occurring uranium ore contains a low level of natural radioactivity making it is easy for nuclear smugglers to evade detection by military and intelligence agencies today.41 The current state of nuclear detection can be described as one where critical mass quantities of HEU can be shielded and freely transported to almost any destination, easily


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bypassing42 the limited radiation detection systems in place at US borders.43 Due to the low radioactivity of HEU which can be further attenuated by shielding (lead or concrete), a proposed network of fixed radiation detectors44 dispersed throughout a city or area will not suffice to detect HEU45, leaving the city wide open to attack by non-state actors or terrorists should they obtain a weapon. When masked by shielding, HEU derived directly from uranium ore (not from spent reactor fuel) requires long periods of exposure time and short distance for passive detection outside a portal. The only reliable, practical passive detection is likely to be embedded detectors inside vehicles that have sufficient exposure time and short enough distance to integrate the HEU signal. We can’t change the laws of physics, and the best we can hope to do is what the laws of physics let us do. Don’t expect fundamentally new techniques to emerge that can remotely detect shielded HEU

1. at a distance of greater than a few meters and time shorter than several minutes, 2. without a radiation source to interrogate/probe the vehicle, and 3. within a form factor and cost that makes widespread deployment practical.

The only known exception to the above statement is when the HEU was produced from nuclear reactor feedstock or in facilities previously contaminated by reactor feedstock. In this case, there may be traces of U-232 present that emit highly penetrating gamma rays useful for detection through the shielding. In this special case, shielded HEU can be detected from a greater distance of possibly several meters or over shorter timescales using fixed or mobile detectors.46 U-232 is likely to be present in HEU from enrichment programs by the US/USSR and other nations which engaged in large scale HEU production during the Cold War, but it is unlikely to be present in HEU produced by clandestine nuclear programs. HEU from clandestine enrichment programs is most likely to have been produced directly from uranium ore, without reprocessing inside a nuclear reactor which means it won’t have shield penetrating gamma emissions from U-232.

National versus Metropolitan or Base Perimeters If we were to operate a single perimeter around the US or even the entire North America of much greater length compared to the national border, it would invite failure by increasing the likelihood that there will be weak spots for attackers to punch through. This can happen due to several reasons. First, lack of maintenance of systems, corruption, and lack of coordination have all been identified as problems with US-funded detection systems operated in Russia. Domestic systems are susceptible to the same risks.47 Even with stronger border security to detect HEU, the attacker is “home free” if they can find a single loophole and the Government Accountability Office has identified several on the 5000 miles of US-Canadian border and 1900 miles of US-Mexican border.48 Multiple security rings can complement each other (the proverbial belt and suspenders). A robust alternative to national border security may be to use multiple independently secure layers of concentric rings around all high-likelihood targets inside the US borders, in order to multiply the probability of failure for attackers as they approach their target. If the probability of evading detection at a particular layer is p (a small number), then the


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probability of evading detection at n successive layers is p^n – a much smaller probability provided the detection failures are independent and uncorrelated.

National vs Metro Detection Rings

• Long US border: 20,000 miles of land/sea borders– 5000 miles US‐Canada

– 1900 miles US‐Mexico

• Extremely porous: Weak spots, millions of illegal immigrants, hundreds of tons of cocaine annually

• Single Points of Failure: Single linear border has no redundancy – once attacker punches through they’re “home free” and there is little time to react

Reliability achievable via multiple redundant borders around Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)

If a ring of circumference 120 miles is required to protect Washington DC, for the same length as the 20,000 miles of national borders, you could create similar rings around 166 (=20,000/120) metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) which today comprise and estimated 220 million people in the US.49 That would cover most if not all of the terrorism targets based on population density. There is no reason local rings can't complement national or super-national rings. This is analogous to targeted screening for explosives in airports to prevent terrorism aboard airplanes, instead of trying to instantiate the same explosive screening throughout the city around the airport.


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In general, there is no need to limit security to N cities and leave city N+1 unprotected. The combination of rings, US national border (porous as it is), and further sub-dividing the nation along much smaller, targeted rings around Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Micropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 50 is one way to construct a reliable deterrent to clandestine attack or nuclear terrorism.

Requirements for Nuclear Defense Zones (NDZs) Perhaps intended for an entirely different purpose than securing Washington DC against a nuclear attack, the Washington DC Air Defense Identification Zone is similar in size and concept to the region that would need to be free of HEU to secure the capital. On February 10, 2003 the United States created51 the Washington DC Air Defense Identification Zone52 to closely track and forcibly deny unauthorized airplanes from approaching a region surrounding the capital—it includes Baltimore to the north and Chesapeake Bay on the east out and stretches well into Virginia and Maryland on the south and west. Unlike flights outside this region, pilots flying the DC ADIZ must have a pre-approved flight plan, maintain two-way communication with Air Traffic Control, and the airplane must have an operating transponder to help identify its location.


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Figure 5 Washington DC Air Defense Identification Zone (DC ADIZ) To ensure the capital remains free of HEU, we must make it difficult or impossible to smuggle HEU on each of the pathways, and therefore we aim to match pathways with detection techniques or otherwise make recommendations that secure these pathways. In the next few sections, based on feasibility of detection solutions we classify transportation pathways into “securable” and “not securable” categories. Pathways are defined as “securable” if a detection technology both exists and can be deployed which certifies every vehicle on that pathway is free of HEU, with sufficiently low false-positives and false-negative rates to make it operationally feasible. Pathways that are “not securable” should therefore be eliminated or prohibited, and this should be enforced until and unless they can be made securable. Pathways may be “not securable” because a

1. good-enough detection technology doesn’t exist or is not expected to become available

2. the detection technology exists, but can’t practically be deployed for use on that pathway


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3. the vehicle arrives from an environment in which it is not possible to ensure that detection techniques to verify its contents are free of HEU (domestic or international), or

4. available technologies would fail operationally in large-scale or in high-volumes. 100% detection reliability and uniform detection across all transportation pathways is an ideal to strive for. Short of that if we create > 0 but uniform risk of failure for a terrorist plot on all pathways, we can dissuade terrorists or hostile nations who work with scarce resources – the higher the risk of failure, the greater the dissuasion effect achieved. The US government will need to plan for subsequent attacks in the aftermath of an nuclear attack as described in “After the Bomb” by Perry, Carter, and May.53 The likely government reaction will be to halt most or all transportation approaching potential targets—just as all aviation was grounded nationwide after the attacks of 9/11 in DC and New York until the security apparatus could be put in place to ensure that the same attack could not be repeated. If caught off guard with the current state of nuclear detection, attackers could exploit any open transportation pathways to deliver another HEU based nuclear weapon. All airplanes would most likely be prevented from taking off or flying into metropolitan areas, water vessels would be kept at safe distances from metros, and ground transportation into these cities would be ordered to stop. Harsh measures like these would grind the US economy to a halt. With advance planning and preparation to ensure HEU does not enter a region in the first place, the number of transportation pathways that can remain open vastly increases. The changes to transportation required will be more gradual, spread over time, rather than being thrust upon the economy after a single attack. What would it take to secure a region comparable to the DC ADIZ—roughly a circle of radius 40 miles surrounding the capital? The circumference is approximately 125 miles—let’s call it the DC “Nuclear Defense Zone” (NDZ) encompassing all transportation pathways, not limited to air transport. Along these lines, the DNDO has begun programs to equip police officers with detectors in suburbs 50 miles outside of New York City to detect nuclear or radiological threats before they reach Manhattan54 – although handheld detectors are unlikely to catch smuggled HEU. To implement the DC NDZ, the three major airports in the area (Reagan, Dulles, and Baltimore) should only accept incoming airplanes that are certified to be free of HEU arriving by well-known, trusted source airports—this would require new FAA regulation on scanning for HEU and commensurate security for source airports. Pilotless drones or other unauthorized airplanes that attackers can fly in on a suicide mission would need to detected and forcibly stopped. All planes that cannot be guaranteed to be free of HEU must not be allowed to enter the NDZ, in a manner similar to the way that the DC ADIZ is enforced today. If it is not possible to certify that airplanes are free of HEU, they will need to be denied entry into the region completely and airports, especially Reagan National, will need to be permanently relocated at a safe distance.


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Securing air transport (especially private planes and helicopters) has difficulties similar to water transport. The exception may be commercial air transportation, provided

1. All cargo and passengers are certified to be free of HEU having been scanned using muon portals or other active interrogation before entering the plane.

2. Airplanes and helicopters are inspected and maintained under tight security at major airports, allowed only to take off from and land at airports that can certify them to be free of HEU. In other words, once a set of high-value cities/areas have been identified, the only allowable incoming flights to those areas would be flights from airports that have a compatible inspection system

Water-based vessels as a class are much hard, if not impossible, to verifiably secure for several reasons. Portals would not work for all but the smallest boats. Seaports cannot be secured in the same way airports can, so unauthorized access is very easy by comparison. Ships and yachts can be extremely large, making them challenging both for portals or in-vehicle detection systems and they would have to be scanned with active techniques. Water vessels can also have improvised containers in tow underwater that may be hard to detect except by extremely close visual inspection. It’s possible that cargo ships can be permitted if nothing else is allowed into the harbor provided that ships’ entire contents are reliably scanned and inspected at origin, the ship has not been boarded midstream so its contents have not changed since scanning, and it can be guaranteed that nothing is in tow above or underwater that evades detection–the feasibility of such inspection remains to be seen. One approach is to keep water vessels outside the NDZ completely, so the port of Baltimore needs to be relocated to an area (perhaps less populous) that is less likely to be a target. Historically ports have been located in or near major cities. The proximity of ports to cities is increasingly a liability from a security perspective, given the technical difficulty of certifying water-borne vessels as free of HEU. Enforcement would take the form of a naval or coast guard presence on the Potomac river and Chesapeake Bay, as well as all other waterways entering the NDZ to keep out ships, sailboats, and all other forms of surface water transport. The same authorities would have to guard against underwater attack from submarines or even human divers entering the NDZ through these water bodies (by using sonar or underwater radar to detect them). If underwater divers are undetectable, the perimeter has to be far enough out to ensure that a human diver can’t swim past the perimeter. All ground transport entering the NDZ by road, rail, and subway needs to be run through portals or otherwise certified to be free of HEU as it enters, even if it happens to be oversized as discussed in the previous section. To ensure security, one or more concentric barriers like those protecting a military base (say 50 feet tall and 50 feet deep into the ground) need to be erected around the NDZ (125 miles long) to ensure that all traffic enters the NDZ through these portals. All underground routes through tunnels need to be either closed off (kept to a minimum) or otherwise monitored for unexpected attackers. Enforcement would be likely to involve constant video surveillance across the 125 mile stretch with a corresponding response capability to ensure that no attacker can penetrate or jump over the barrier. Sensors would be required to constantly verify the structural


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integrity of these barriers to ensure that they have not been compromised by an attacker using conventional explosives or other means. Underground scans (such as underground radar55) will need to be conducted from the surface to detect secret tunnels being dug by attackers to bypass the barrier.56 Table 1 Securing Ground/Underground Transportation in the DC Nuclear Defense Zone (NDZ)

Type Pathway Securable? If so how? Enforcement

Ground

By motorcycle, automobile, truck, or trailer on roads and highways or any drivable terrain.

Yes. Use muon portals at entry points of a 50 foot tall 125-mile barrier surrounding the NDZ.

Army. Intruders detected by video surveillance

By train on train tracks Yes. Same as above Army—same

By non-motorized transport (pedestrian, bicycle, or animal) on roads, through forests, or private property

Yes. Same as above Army—same

Oversized ground vehicles that will not fit into a portal, like cranes and dump trucks.

Minimize as much as possible. If not securable, then do not allow inside the NDZ. For ones that must pass, one possibility is to actively scan these large vehicles using some combination of neutron or muon sources. Another is to disassemble the vehicle and transport it in pieces that fit within the portal.

Army—manual inspection, in-vehicle detection systems, and

Underground

By subway train Yes. Same as above

Army – Intruders detected by video surveillance

Through sewage pipes, water mains, or telecommunications corridors

Close off and minimize if possible. Then secure remaining corridors using video surveillance.

Army—same

In a tunnel dug by the attackers. No.

Army. Regularly use underground scanning techniques to detect these efforts.


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Table 2 Securing Water/Underwater Transportation in the DC Nuclear Defense Zone (NDZ)


Water

By ship containing only containerized cargo coming into the Baltimore or DC harbors.

Yes, provided that containers are scanned at ports of origin, ship has to be inspected free of HEU, no mid-sea transfers took place, and nothing is under tow. Otherwise they are not securable – violation of any of these conditions means the ship is not securable.

Navy, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol

By boat, yacht, ship, or barge on the Potomac river or any of the smaller rivers and tributaries.

No.

Navy, Coast Guard

A swimmer, wind-surfer, or kite-surfer on these rivers No. Coast Guard

By boat, yacht, ship, or barge in the Chesapeake Bay No. Navy Coast

Guard By cruise ship, cargo ship, or oil tanker in the Port of Baltimore No.

Coast Guard

Underwater

A container tugged below the water surface by a boat (like an underwater trailer)

No. Coast Guard. Use radar or sonar

An improvised submarine No. Navy –same

A diver No. Coast Guard –same

Dolphins or fish No.

Coast Guard. Fish-net, or otherwise not possible to secure against—but also a very complex and risky operation for the attacker.


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Table 3 Securing Air Transportation in the DC Nuclear Defense Zone (NDZ)


Air

By airplane or helicopter landing at Reagan National, Dulles International, or Baltimore Washington International Airports (commercial or private).

Yes. Only allow aircraft that have been pre-screened for HEU to arrive.

Air Force. Radar and visual inspection

An airplane, helicopter, blimp, hang-glider, or even a balloon could also be commandeered to fly straight to and either crash-land at or fly-over any location in the capital.

No. Air Force—same

By small aircraft or helicopters at any of the regional airports or heliports (private or commercial) such as Carroll County Regional Airport in Westminster, MD.

No. Air Force—same

By pilotless drones No. Air Force—same

By multiple birds like trained pigeon-carriers. No.

Impossible to secure against. Carrying capacity of birds is biologically limited to small quantities of HEU (tens of grams). Attacker would need to employ dozens or hundreds of birds to smuggle multiple kilograms, increasing the odds of the plot being uncovered.

By one or more projectiles or bullets aimed to transport HEU to destination sites from launching sites (launched in cannons or guns).

No.

Army. Detected through video surveillance and visual inspection.

Nuclear detection measures may seem onerous and likely slow traffic throughput, but there was also a period when airline passengers were not screened for explosives during which explosives-based terrorism was common on airplanes and in airports. After institution of airport security and screening measures, fatalities due to explosives in aviation dropped off almost completely while explosive use by terrorists grew outside airports where no explosive screening measures exist.57 If the total road traffic volume entering the DC NDZ can be estimated by traffic on major highways, it would amount to approximately half a million vehicles one-way per day. The peak usage will be proportional the capacity provided by the number of lanes on the highways (50 total). Assuming a minimum of 1-second spacing between vehicles, this


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comes to approximately 2 million vehicles per day, one-way. We would have to do a queuing theory analysis to accurately determine the number of portals required, but we can use these numbers to derive a ball-park range of the number or portals that would be needed to scan vehicles entering the NDZ. For a single barrier using the average daily volumes, the number of portals required would range from 400 to 4000 assuming the time required to scan each vehicle ranged from one to ten minutes respectively. Likewise during peak travel, the portals required would be 1500 to 15000 assuming the time required to scan each vehicle ranged from one to ten minutes respectively. The number of portals is multiplied if multiple concentric barriers are implemented. The number of air passengers entering through the three airports is an order of magnitude lower, and therefore the number of portals required would be dominated by ground transportation volume—more generally these passengers and cargo would have to be pre-screened at the airports from which they arrive. Table 4 Number of portals required for ground transport in the DC Nuclear Defense Zone (NDZ) Highway Average

Annualized Daily Traffic Volume (AADT) in vehicles

Lanes Maximum Daily

Traffic Volume

(assuming 1-second spacing between

cars)

Number of portals required

1 min scan/delay needed per vehicle inside portal




Avg Peak Avg Peak Avg Peak Avg Peak

I-95 S

190,00058 8 691,200 66 240 132 480 330 1200 660 2400

I-83 S 200,00059 6 518,400 69 180 139 360 347 900 694 1800 I-795 S 115,00060 6 518,400 40 180 80 360 200 900 399 1800 I-70 E

10,00061 6 518,400 3 180 7 360 17 900 35 1800

I-270 S

260,00062 8 691,200 90 240 181 480 451 1200 903 2400

I-66 E

180,00063 10 864,000 63 300 125 600 313 1500 625 3000

I-95 N 141,00064 6 518,400 49 180 98 360 245 900 490 1800 TOTAL 1,096,000 50 4,320,000 381 1500 761 3000 1903 7500 3806 15000 Table 5 Number of portals required for air transport in the DC Nuclear Defense Zone (NDZ) Airport Average Annualized Daily

Passenger Volume Number of portals required at airports from

which the passengers arrive at 1 min scan/delay

2 min scan/delay

5 min scan/delay

10 min scan/delay

Reagan National

51,00065 18 35 89 177

Dulles International

63,00066 22 44 109 219

Baltimore-Washington International

57,00067 20 40 99 198

TOTAL 171,000 59 119 297 594


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Requirements for Reliable Detection Portals (RDPs) Setting cost aside, is it possible to meet quantitative specifications for a reliable detection portal needed for securing a metropolitan area? Once the reliable detection portal (RDP) design is fully understood, unit cost can be managed and is a function of engineering, mass production, and parts supply. As discussed in the next section, for our toolbox we can draw upon a combination of passive gamma/neutron detection of radioactive signatures as well as active interrogation approaches that use artificially generated beams of neutrons, muons, and gammas. If the numerical specification for any of these metrics is physically unrealizable, we should at least be able to restate the best physically realizable specification in these terms. Likewise if there are technological constraints preventing this, we should be able to list all of them and then work towards removing them. Relaxing the quantitative specifications should result in a sequence of lower cost portal options, but this list of requirements should be achievable at some cost.

During large-scale and high-volume operation as a drive-thru portal for pedestrians or inside typical vehicles including motorcycles, cars, trucks, trains, and cargo containers the system should be capable of achieving high probability of detection of the fissile material, a low false positive rate, and immunity to all simple countermeasures.68

1. Minimum Detectable Quantity: Detection of 300 grams or more of highly enriched uranium metal (1 cubic inch), uranium oxides, or plutonium in any shape or form, not limited to solid spheres or cubes. Lower is better.

2. False negatives: A false negative rate less than 5% given a typical vehicle

containing the fissile material. Simple countermeasures to which the portal should be immune may include shielding around the material to eliminate radioactive signatures, transport within vehicles containing human beings or animals to limit application of particular detection techniques, masking with non-threat objects, fractionalized shipments, and dispersion or spreading of the material within the vehicle. Lower is better.

3. False positives: A false positive rate of less than or equal to 10-6 across the

spectrum of vehicles used in daily commerce. In other words, require manual search to resolve questions in less than 10-6 of normal vehicles. Lower is better.

4. Detection Time: Similarly, a maximum detection time of 10 minutes, with

average detection time less than two minutes. Average detection time of one minute or less is desirable. Lower is better.

5. Portal Size: Overall size of the system should be scalable based on the

dimensions of the types of vehicle scanned, with all equipment required not


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exceeding twice the size of the vehicle. For example for a road-going vehicle, the system size should not be wider than two lanes and twice as long as the vehicle itself.

6. Power Consumption: With sufficient AC power, the system should be capable of

operated by a single operator in a variety of weather conditions across the US from winters in North Dakota to summers in the Nevada desert.

7. MTBF: The system has a mean time before failure (MTBF) of more than 10

years. Higher is better. When thinking of the properties of reliable detection portals independent of the underlying technology, it can be helpful to abstractly define them as a function that maps the target space to a binary classification

Portal: TS --> {Clear, Threat}. The target space is simply the set of all vehicles expected to arrive in the portal – normal vehicles (NS) or attacker vehicles (AS) sent by the attacker carrying the minimum quantity of HEU that is to be detected. The false positive rate is simply the expected rate vehicles in NS that are misclassified as ‘Threat,’ whereas false negative rate is the expected rate of vehicles in AS misclassified as ‘Clear.’ False positives and negative rates are computed across different sets of vehicles in TS. A simple countermeasure is defined as a subset of AS for which the attacker can obtain the know-how and resources to implement, and which will also be misclassified by the portal as ‘Clear’ when it should have been classified as ‘Threat.’ Excluding all simple countermeasures, by definition the subset of AS that leads to false negatives would therefore not be easily identified or implemented by the attacker. If the portal is susceptible to any simple countermeasure that an attacker can employ, it means the false negative rate just shot up to 100%. So eliminating countermeasures are all about reducing false negatives as well. Lower is better, but an overall rate of 5% false negatives is not completely useless when you view it in terms of dissuading adversaries—5% is also way better than what we have today. The false negative rate is all about our expectation of the attacker’s experience interacting with the detection system – if they are capable of employing a single countermeasure then that makes the false negative rate 100%. If by employing all possible simple countermeasures an attacker still experiences a 95% failure rate whenever they attempt to smuggle uranium, then that would dissuade most attackers from trying because it requires on average 20x as many retries just to get one shipment through at which point they would be caught the remaining 19 or so times. It is much better if you can achieve zero false negative rates (or anything less than 5%) – that is ideal. But that also means your portal has no simple countermeasures—we cannot


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say that today about any portal technology. Unless you have a perfect technology, we will have to live with false negative rates well above zero for the foreseeable future. For example, Advanced Spectroscopic Portal technology being considered by the DNDO in 2005 did much worse than 5% false negatives and was susceptible to countermeasures according to the Government Accountability Office, “During the 2005 Nevada tests, the incidence of false negatives among the three vendors who received contracts ranged from about 45 percent to slightly more that 80 percent. This raises concerns because, as explained to us by a scientist at a national laboratory, at this level of performance, ASPs could conceivably misidentify HEU as a benign nuclear or radiological material or not detect it at all, particularly if the HEU is placed side by side with a non-threatening material such as kitty litter.”69 Whether at the border or in a domestic context, the purpose of the detection system is to alert the military (or law enforcement) to the presence of a live threat. Unless the military is capable and prepared to act with sufficient force stop each vehicle identified as a "threat," we might as well not even have the detection system because the attacker can pass right through. So a total false positive incidence of 1 per day either on the border or in DC might be on the upper end of being able to maintain a credible deterrent to a would-be attacker – if it were higher the false alarms are liable to be ignored which I turn presents a loophole that an attacker can exploit in the case of a true threat. If we want less than one false positive per day (requiring manual search), there are about 1 million private vehicles/pedestrians/containers per day as shown in the “typical day” 70 stats for the national border we need false positive rates in the range of 1E-6. Same holds true if we are considering rings around metros like Washington DC which would have traffic/vehicle volumes on the order of 1 million per day. Especially if deployed within the US borders, public acceptability will hinge on whether the rate of nuisance searches caused by detection false positives does not exceed the public's willingness to tolerate it. If there are too many manual searches that appear unjustified, the public may reject or oppose any solution from the get-go. In general, ten years MTBF is fairly standard for industrial equipment of various sorts— generally it costs more to engineer for higher MTBF using redundancy and higher quality parts.

How to build an RDP with gammas, neutrons, and muons Detection of special nuclear materials71 (HEU and Pu) concealed inside a target vehicle may be accomplished using a variety of techniques, each with its own capabilities and limitations, and each at various stages of technical maturity or commercial availability.72 Techniques may be classified by whether they are “active,” requiring their own source of electromagnetic or particulate radiation to probe the target, or “passive,” not requiring additional stimulation of the target. These techniques may also be classified based on how they are required to interact with the target: “portals” require the target vehicle or pedestrian to drive or walk through and wait for measurements to be taken, “in-vehicle” or “long-dwell-in-transit” detectors are embedded inside the target vehicles or transport


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containers and constantly take measurements and report these back to the government, “fixed” detectors are located at locations that take measurements as vehicles pass by, and either “mobile” or “handheld” detectors are used by government personnel to detect HEU in a remote target. Using this taxonomy, the known detection techniques may be classified as follows: Table 6 Passive Detection Techniques Passive detection of…

Portal (tomography)

in-vehicle Fixed/mobile/handheld

Photons (gammas and x-rays)

Emitted by HEU at 1. 186 keV 2. 1001 keV (U-

238) 3. 2614 keV (U-

232)73

Would require installation of detector(s) in every vehicle74

Severely limited by shielding75

Neutrons Emitted by HEU at 3/s/kg76 and by Pu at 6x104/s/kg and detectable using large arrays of detectors.77

Would require installation of detector(s) in every vehicle

78

Severely limited by shielding79

Muons Cosmic shower muons scattered by HEU, Pu, and heavy shielding materials80

n/a n/a


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Table 7 Active Detection Techniques Active Interrogation with…

Portal (radiography)

in-vehicle Fixed mobile or battlefield

handheld

> 6MeV Neutrons or Gammas

Stimulates fission of HEU, Pu which can be observed by radiographic techniques81

n/a Possible under controlled conditions

Possible in enemy territory

n/a

MeV range photons

Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence82

n/a n/a n/a n/a

14 MeV Neutrons Scatters off of neutron-shielding materials like water or polyethylene83

n/a Possible under controlled conditions

n/a n/a

X-rays Detects dense materials84 n/a n/a n/a n/a Muons Directed muon beam is

scattered by HEU and heavy shielding materials and detected85

n/a n/a Directed muon beam is scattered by HEU and heavy shielding materials and detected86

n/a

On one hand the Achilles’ heel of passive or active detection using gammas/neutrons is shielding. On the other hand the Achilles’ heel of passive muon deflection-detection is horizontally “spreading” the HEU into arbitrarily thin horizontal sheets (in the x-y plane) to minimize the number of large-angle deflections by cosmic muons arriving from the sky (roughly along the z-axis). No single detection technique by itself may offer a solution free of loopholes that can be exploited by the attacker, but in conjunction it’s possible these techniques can eliminate these loopholes. The question posed in the “Screwdriver Report” by Panofsky/Hofstadter (ca. 1952) was how to detect 1 cubic inch of HEU87 (~300g of metallic HEU) – that may come in any shape or form. If we are not to lose sight of that original goal, it is necessary to integrate multiple techniques to simultaneously test for the different types of shielding, radioactivity, and dense materials (HEU/Pu). The net result would be to verify that a vehicle is free of HEU, or otherwise determine if it is necessary to insist that the vehicle be subjected to more intrusive inspection involving potentially harmful irradiation or opened up for manual search (aka the screwdriver). Passive detection that has historically been in use at border crossings88 using gammas, neutrons, and X-rays are fraught with a number of real-world difficulties that preclude them from being used in large-scale for detecting HEU within civilian transport. Passive detection of gammas is severely limited because – in addition to intrinsically low gamma emission rates (U232 excepted) – an attacker can shield the HEU with lead, steel, or concrete to evade detection89 (false-negatives). Passive detection of neutrons is also limited because, unlike plutonium, the number of neutrons emitted by HEU is small and therefore easy to shield.90 Gamma shielding may be detected using passive/cosmic muons (or radiography). Neutron shielding may detected using 14 MeV neutrons.91


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Another approach to overcoming gamma shielding is to embed one or more detectors continuously travelling with the vehicle to increase integration time and reduce the distance from the detector,92 also known as long-dwell-in-transit93 or in-vehicle detectors. With in-vehicle detectors, the limiting factor becomes the time needed to integrate the gamma signal which depending on the thickness of shielding employed and can range from several hundred seconds (for 0-3 cm lead) to many hours (for 5-10 cm lead).94 If the attacker employs thick shielding (5-10cm of lead) to mask the HEU, this requires several hours (say T minutes) of integration time for the in-vehicle detectors to register enough gamma radiation to identify the HEU. If such long integration times are required, the attacker may simply switch the HEU among multiple vehicles before an hour of time (before T minutes) has elapsed in a single vehicle in order to reliably evade detection while transporting the HEU to its destination.95 With passive detection of gammas, background radiation from common construction materials like granite or material transported like fertilizer can result in false-positives96--but this may be mitigated to some degree by use of multiple and/or energy-selective detectors. Passive gamma detection may provide a useful capability at longer distances (several meters) and with short integration times (seconds) only in the case where the HEU is contaminated with U-232. 97 The number of false-positives that are expected to be responded to and dealt-with grows proportionally to the number of detectors deployed. If they are to be deployed continuously across millions of vehicles or containers, this makes the requirements to filter out false positives for in-vehicle detectors far more stringent than simply measuring these same vehicles as they pass through check-points.98 Active interrogation with neutrons, gammas, or X-rays can pose health risks99 for living beings (humans and animals) that may be inside the target vehicle or container being inspected for HEU. These active techniques may still be useful in a military context when inspecting warheads100, on the battlefield, for containers transporting inanimate cargo, or in highly controlled situations where the target can be ensured to be free of living beings. To make active interrogation a feasible option for private and commercial traffic in a civilian context, the occupants of a vehicle (people and animals) need to disembark prior to initiating a scan of the vehicle – although this might impact vehicle throughput.


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Portal Technology Harmful to humans and living beings

Susceptible to shielding by lead, steel, concrete, etc

Susceptible to neutron shielding

Susceptible to Spreading,Dispersion, Oxides, etc

Passive gamma No Yes No No

Passive neutron No No Yes No

Passive muon tomography

No No—detectsdense shielding

No Yes

Gamma/X‐ray radiography

Yes Yes—detectsdense shielding

No Yes

Active neutron(6 MeV)

Yes No Yes No

Active neutron (14 MeV)

Yes No No—detects neutron shielding

No

Countermeasures of Portal Technologies

Although operationally unproven in large-scale, passive detection using cosmic muons (tomography) is a promising detection technique. Naturally occurring muons penetrate most terrestrial objects and the technique requires no additional radiation source.101 Passive detection portals exploit the differential deflection of cosmic muons based on density of the material they pass through in the target vehicle. The “deflection” of each muon can be observed and correlated in three dimensions with other muon deflections by measuring the difference in angle, displacement, and energy/velocity as the muon enters and exits the target under consideration. Since HEU is denser than most materials, it will deflect muons more than most other types of surrounding matter. The technique has been demonstrated to discriminate102 kilogram quantities of HEU in the presence of other materials under limited test and simulation scenarios. First generation detectors based on this technology are being commercialized by Los Alamos National Laboratory and could be available in 2008.103 Based on our analysis of Washington DC traffic flows below, to make portal detectors operationally useful the false-positive rates would have to be in the range of 1 in a million or less, without introducing an unacceptable number of false-negatives. 104 Muon portals in research labs have been shown to have a false positive rate of ~2% and false negative rate of ~3% for detecting a 20kg HEU sphere, for an integration time of 60 seconds.105 It is not known whether the false positives/negatives can be eliminated by employing sufficiently long detection durations, although that appears promising and needs to be worked out.


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At sea-level, highly energetic muons (typically in the range 3-4 GeV) arrive vertically from the sky towards the earth’s surface at the rate of 10,000 per square meter per minute.106 In one design, detectors are deployed in multiple planes, above and below the object to be scanned. The planes above the object register the incident trajectory of the incoming muon and the planes below detect the outgoing (post-scatter) trajectory of the outgoing muon. From these measurements, the location of the scatterers in the object can be estimated and its characteristics determined, based on the differential scattering of different materials. This approach is sometimes referred to as muon tomography. Such high energy cosmic muons can penetrate most terrestrial objects (10 meters of water107), although they may not be able to reach to all underground locations or locations below several floors of tall buildings for instance without a loss in their usefulness for HEU detection purposes. Researchers anticipate further improvements in scan times and false detection rates108 of muon portals, but the fundamental limits on false-positives/negative rates and detection time versus the minimum detectable quantity of HEU are not yet clear. Even with full weapon-sized quantities of HEU, passive muon detection is potentially susceptible to false negatives in several scenarios (see the Appendix for a mathematical approximation showing this):

1. One possible limitation of this technique is its ability to correctly discriminate small quantities of HEU (tens of grams or less) in the presence of much larger amounts of materials of medium density (Iron) or higher density (Lead)—these may mask the presence of smaller amounts of HEU. Since the muons arrive at the rate of only 1 per minute per square centimeter, smaller HEU quantities will require longer durations of examination for a muon to arrive and be deflected within its volume.

2. Similarly, the attacker could crush solid HEU into a sand-like granules for transport and distribute kilogram quantities sparsely throughout the vehicle making it difficult to discriminate the HEU-sand from the rest of the vehicle. This countermeasure against muon detection may also be called “dispersion” – it does not reduce the total quantity of HEU that can be transported in a single vehicle significantly—but it imposes the additional burden on the attacker to recast the smuggled HEU into a weapons usable form using vacuum casting.

3. Since muons arrive vertically, another countermeasure that an attacker can employ is to transport the HEU in arbitrarily thin horizontal slabs so as to cause minimal muon deflection relative to other cargo such as iron.

4. One way an attacker can try to minimize detection probability is to arrange the HEU vertically in one or more separated tubes to make the number of muons deflected by the HEU insufficient for detection.

5. The final countermeasure is to smuggle uranium as Uranium Oxide. Its density is very close to lead, making it even harder to discern even in the presence of other metals.109 The radiation length of a material is proportional to the square root of the product of material density and atomic number.110 The atomic number of lead is 82 and Uranium is 92--very close. Therefore oxides whose density (11g/cc) is almost half as of the Uranium metal (similar to lead) may not be as easily discernable when viewed under muon tomography.


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Cosmic muons can pass straight through large objects and living beings without causing harm and still be useful for HEU detection. An active form of muon detection (radiography) based on (artificial) directed beam muon sources may be applicable in portal form or to even larger targets such as shipping vessels or oil tankers111, though this is still a subject of research.112 By aiming the muon beam at the target, it is possible to observe muonic X-rays of in the range of 2-6 MeV when HEU is present.113

If the goal is to be able to reliably detect small quantities of uranium in cargo and vehicles (shielded or not), all three approaches can play a unique role in sealing detection portals against countermeasures. A reliable detection portal (RDP) system would avoid the need to screen most vehicles with harmful neutron or gamma/x-ray radiation (i.e. avoid active techniques) and clear most vehicles of the presence of HEU within several minutes or less. To achieve this, a technique is needed to accurately rule out the presence of both unshielded or lightly shielded HEU as well as dense shielding. Only if still in doubt are penetrating active interrogation techniques necessary. To detect small amounts of unshielded or lightly shielded HEU (10s of grams) in vehicles and pedestrians, a combination of both passive detection using gammas/neutrons may be used. The detection of natural radioactivity can be effective for even small amounts of HEU provided that it is unshielded or lightly shielded material (< 1 cm of lead) – the more the shielding the longer the time is required to integrate the radioactive signal. If unshielded or lightly shielded material can be ruled out with passive gamma/neutron detectors, the best use of passive muon detection may be to simply screen for the existence of heavier shielding materials that may be masking the natural radioactivity. These shields would have to be of a certain minimum thickness to avoid detection using passive gamma/neutron techniques which is not susceptible to the false-negative


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scenarios for passive muon detection described above. The longer the detection time, the greater the resolution, the smaller the amount of shielding that may be detected by measuring muon deflections. In order to certify a vehicle is both free of HEU and heavy shielding, determining both the minimum detectable quantity of HEU and the average time required per vehicle to integrate the natural radioactivity and muon deflection signals simultaneously is an open optimization problem – the result will vary based on the assumed distribution of vehicles and their contents. There will be a need for deeper inspection using active neutron/muon interrogation only when significant amounts of shielding are found to be present after using passive muon techniques or if dense materials resembling HEU cannot be ruled out using passive detection. It is possible to use muons to discriminate HEU amidst certain kinds of vehicles/cargo geometries (opportunistic), but that will not be reliable under a fair number of countermeasures. The targeted use of muon detection to isolate lead/steel shielding in conjunction with passive gamma detection and active neutron interrogation remains to be developed, evaluated, and tested. With such a combination approach, most common ground transport may be securable if traffic can be channeled through a portal the width of a traffic lane (pedestrians, cars, buses, trucks, trains, animals). Oversized vehicles are much less common, but are still transported on the ground and may not fit within a portal. These include dump trucks and construction cranes, and all of these will need to be screened for HEU. This leaves a few possibilities,

1. They may be actively scanned using neutron or muon sources. Since these are special purpose vehicles, not intended for human or animal transport, active techniques may be useful. If neutrons are used, both techniques to detect HEU (> 6MeV neutrons) and neutron shields (14 MeV neutrons) will be necessary.

2. They can be disassembled into pieces that can be scanned through a muon portal.

The precise boundaries where one detection technique leaves off and the other one takes over needs further analysis:

1. For passive gammas/neutrons, the observation time and detector solid-angle required versus shielding thickness—for various sizes of HEU sample. Where does passive gamma/neutrons detection give out?

2. For passive muons, the time required to observe significant numbers of high-angle deflections versus shielding (or HEU) thickness (plug in from passive gamma result). High angle deflections are the critical quantity used in POCA, muon-crossing, or other algorithms that distinguish from less dense material.

3. For active neutrons, the two-way link budget to show graph of minimum detection quantity versus hydrogenous shielding (neutrons getting in), metal shielding (gammas getting out) and detection of hydrogenous shielding using 6MeV deflections.


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The Reliable Detection Portal (RDP)

Passive gamma

+ neutron

Gamma Radiography(inanimate cargo)

Active Neutron

Clear Clear

mandatory

If shielding is detected

Clear only when radioactive signature is not presentand shielding is not significant or thick

All vehicles can be screened using passive gammas, neutrons, and muons.Muon tomography does not harm humans or living beings

Passive Muon(passengers or living beings)

Clear

Any detection system is only as good as the integrity of the information and of the human operators. Lack of maintenance of systems, corruption, and lack of coordination have all been identified as problems with US-funded detection systems operated in Russia114, and domestic systems are susceptible to the same risks. Detectors therefore need to be designed with secure, tamper-proof readout and to support remote verification of correct operation, so they can’t be turned off without being detected and responded to.

Operational and Response Requirements Reduction in false-positive rates has been billed as the major challenge to building usable nuclear detection, as summarized by the Department of Energy,

“A detection system whose sensitivity is set very low in order to have high confidence of detecting nuclear material will have a correspondingly higher false positives rate from commonly occurring sources of radiation. Recent developments by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), including installation of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals, are aimed at addressing this challenge. It is important to emphasize that developing appropriate procedures to be followed after an alarm is triggered—the so-called “concept of operations”—is as important to building a successful detection system as the physical characteristics of the detectors themselves.”115

Since responding to a positive detection event is costly, requiring further investigation of the vehicle, the false-positive rate of any detection system needs to be sufficiently low, while also maintaining sufficiently useful detection with low or zero false-negatives.116 For daily traffic volumes of a half million, the false-positive rate would need to be on the order of one in a million (0.0001%) or less to avoid experiencing a false-positive episode every day, given the traffic volumes discussed earlier for the Washington DC area. False-


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negatives need to be low enough to deter attackers and catch all perceived attempts, and there needs to be no way a knowledgeable attacker is capable of increasing false-negative rates to arbitrarily high values (for instance through use of shielding)—false-negative rates perhaps need to be less than 5% in all cases. False-positives/negatives represent only one aspect of the set of metrics that completely define and quantify the success or failure of a security initiative such as the DC NDZ. Additional reliability metrics cover the detection of HEU, transportation pathways covered by detection, operational security, enforcement upon detection, and the minimum safe distance. Poor design, implementation, or operation leading to lack of sufficient performance along any of these metrics will lead to a failed NDZ.

• Safe Distance: The size of the weapon, the prompt effects (fireball), the fallout carried downwind of the detonation, and the sensitivity to casualties dictate how far the ring has to be from the target. A safe distance ensures the capital is immune from all HEU weapons that are likely to be employed by attackers.

o At what distance does the target remain from the nearest point of non-inspected area where a blast could take place?

• Physical Detection Reliability: This characterizes how often the NDZ fails to correctly identify HEU (ideally never).

o How often can HEU pass through a detector undetected (false-negatives), or evade a detector?

o How often does a detection event occur that does not contain HEU (false-positives)?

o What is the minimum detectable quantity of HEU in the presences of arbitrary shielding?

• Pathway Coverage: Ideally, there should be no loopholes. o Which regions or areas does it protect? o What transportation pathways may operate securely? o What transportation pathways are not securable? o What transportation pathways are not covered? o How often can HEU enter the NDZ by avoiding detectors and overcoming

barriers? • Response Capacity: This determines how the attacker could overwhelm the

system. It should be large enough to deter all reasonable attempts by non-state actors.

o How many simultaneous attempts can it detect and block? One? Two? Ten thousand?

o For example, an attacker could use conventional explosives or techniques to break through the NDZ physical barrier and then transport the nuclear device inside the NDZ. How many simultaneous detector failures or attacker-initiated barrier penetrations can be tolerated before no response can be offered and security is lost?

• Operational Detector Reliability: Ideally, the system failures rates should be zero o How often do the detectors fail to operate?


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o How easy is it for detector information to be compromised with false output by intruders or operators themselves?

o How easy would it be for the barriers to be penetrated by the attacker? Synthesizing the requirements described above, the outstanding “applied research challenges” involve developing reliable products to fulfill the vision of a DC NDZ.

• Reliable Detection Portals: Create detection portals through which ground transportation (pedestrians, animals, cars, buses, trains) and air passengers/cargo can be screened safely, efficiently, and reasonably quickly for HEU. False positive rates need to be in the range of less than 1 in a million. Similarly false-negative rates need to be low enough to deter attackers. Combination of passive detection of nautral radioactivity of gamma/neutron (for unshielded HEU) and passive muon detection at portals (to detect shielding) is the primary candidate for this, but it remains to be seen whether these technique are infeasible in large-scale. They would have to be safe, reliable, and easy enough to operate thousands of portals for a metro.

• Passive In-Vehicle Detectors: Develop low-cost energy-selective passive tamper-proof detectors that can be embedded in vehicles and can be wirelessly queried at checkpoints to verify the absence of HEU in the vehicle. These can function as a supplement to passive portals, and are unlikely to substitute. False-negative rates need to be low enough to deter attackers. False-positive rates need to be sufficiently low to support the scale of the deployment, likely in the millions. Form-factor and power requirement need to be targeted to the application (cargo containers, trucks, cars, etc).

• Active Interrogation: This would be a solution for scanning ultra-large vehicles or that cannot fit through portals or vehicles with dense shielding requiring active interrogation (not simply containers). Both neutrons and muons are candidates. These would need to be like power-tools that can be used to thoroughly analyze these vehicles.

• Secure Systems: The detector system design needs to make these systems and the information they generate immune to being compromised by operators or intruders.

• Large-Scale Management: Since thousands of these systems would be operating in a city, they would need to be remotely manageable to detect and respond to operational failures such as loss of power, equipment malfunction, etc.

• Future Proofing and Extensibility: The NDZ should be designed to enable drop-in equipment and software upgrades without requiring severe operational or deployment changes in order to secure against future threats as the threat model evolves, technological improvements become feasible, or complementary technology becomes available.

Other theoretical threats beyond HEU include bombs based on plutonium (inherently easier to detect than HEU, since they emit many times more gamma rays and neutrons), fusion bombs, and neutron bombs. These require much greater testing, verification, and


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access to knowledge/materials and may be more likely to be attributable, so they are less likely to be as significant a threat as HEU. In principle, the passive muon portals and active neutron/muon interrogation techniques can be applied to plutonium just as easily as HEU. Plutonium can also more easily detected using passive neutron detection techniques.

Spot Checking versus Portal Inspection When complete screening is costly or prohibitive, randomized search is often used in terrorism security. To deter subway bombings with conventional explosives, New York City Police are conducting randomized search of passengers in different subways stations at unannounced times just like police checkpoints are used to screen drivers for blood alcohol concentration (BAC) on Friday/Saturday nights, and trace-testing for explosives are conducted at airport check-points on randomly selected travelers:

Officers set up inspection posts at least 35 times a year in each of the city’s 468 subway stations, said Paul J. Browne, the department’s chief spokesman. He said the operations went on 24 hours a day, sometimes in the middle of the night, and for several hours at a time. More than 300 posts are set up each week, for a total of more than 30,000 checkpoints since the program began. Terrorism experts said the program’s effectiveness was not so much that it is a tight barrier to keep terrorists out of the subways, but that its fluid nature could keep any attack planners off balance. Trumpeting the program publicly is also a deterrent, they said. “Understanding that checkpoints only last for three or four hours and are concentrated during the rush hours,” he said, “the department’s own figures reveal that as few as 2 or 3 percent of the 1,000 subway entrances may have checkpoints at any given time.”… Mr. Sheehan said that having officers checking bags at every station all the time would certainly be more effective, but added, “That is difficult to do.” “That would require a tremendous commitment,” he said. “It’s cost-prohibitive in terms of cops and money. But if we have to do it, if the threat requires, we can do it.”117

Unpredictable, randomized searching on subways may create the impression that all stations/trains are searched by police at least some portion of the time—this might serve to raise the attacker’s perceived risk of the being caught. It might cause the attackers to look for softer targets (through a displacement effect118), as which was the case with terrorist use of explosives on airplanes after explosive screening measures were introduced. 119 Based on the risk profile of the attacker, the probability of being searched has to appear to be greater than some number (say >5%), making it not worth the


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attacker’s time/investment to attack the subway, and driving him/her to instead focus on other targets. As an interim measure, short of fully ensuring no HEU enters an NDZ, randomized searching of ground transport may be accomplished provided that technology becomes available for US agents to screen for HEU on the spot throughout the NDZ without requiring the vehicle to be rerouted to a portal. This would require a thorough search of the vehicle—on demand—to uncover shielded HEU. To avoid transporting the vehicle to a portal, this randomized search would need some form of publicly acceptable stand-off detection (no health risks) to conduct randomized searches for HEU, perhaps relying on active interrogation using muons or neutrons—lead, concrete, or steel shielding makes it possible for attackers to conceal HEU from passive radiation detectors. The primary drawback with randomized techniques is that, despite the odds, attackers may not be deterred from attacking national symbols like the capital (DC) or Wall Street (NYC) using HEU-based atomic weapons. If the probability of failure is ‘p’ per attempted attack, the attacker can succeed with a probability ‘1-p.’ Determined attackers can compensate for this by attempting multiple simultaneous HEU attacks and achieve an arbitrarily high probability of at least one attack succeeding. If the rate of random searchers is perceived to be too low, it may not deter an attack. Determining the correct rate of random searches is subject to the risk profile and resources of the attacker, which is variable and unknown a priori. They can also fractionalize the material by dividing it up into a large number of smaller pieces and transporting them separately, so that the interception of any given piece will not adversely impact the overall project. For these reasons, while the probabilistic dissuasion of the random inspections of New York subways might work to some extent to deter the entry of pre-fabricated bombs, it is very questionable whether this approach would work with nuclear materials that can be independently transported and post-assembled. Randomized search would also have to be uniformly applied across all possible pathways (road, air, sea, etc.), leaving no stone unturned. Several pathways simply can’t be searched effectively such as private jets, oil tankers, sailboats, or large cargo ships (before they arrive at the dock). For these, randomized techniques may not work requiring true barriers to entry.

Brief History of Nuclear Terrorism and Clandestine Nuclear Attack The attacks of September 11 launched nuclear terrorism120 into the national political debate121 by raising awareness that the ambitions of terrorists and non-state actors have been increasing. With the steady, worldwide proliferation of fissile material, in particular highly enriched uranium (HEU), the likelihood that HEU can be used in nuclear terrorism or clandestine attack by a nation-state has also been rising. Whereas Plutonium-based nuclear weapons require more sophisticated implosion designs, the technical knowledge to make a simple, low-yield, gun-type atom bomb using HEU has been in the public domain – access to knowledge alone is unlikely to present much of a barrier to a


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determined terrorist group.122 Terrorist groups only need to acquire approximately 50 kilograms (100 pounds or 2.5 liters) of HEU to make an improvised nuclear device.123 Anticipating the possibility of a nuclear event124 after the attacks of September 11, 2001, according to news reports the “Ring Around Washington” was constructed to detect a nuclear weapon smuggled into the capital.125 The early solution proved operationally unworkable to the military over a longer term—so the US backed off from the ring detection approach leaving the capital vulnerable once again.126 The ring may have represented a haphazard attempt to secure the nation’s capital and perhaps served as a warning to would-be attackers. It is questionable how much incremental security it provided at the time given all the alternative routes such as airplanes entering Reagan National Airport, the Potomac river, nearby seaports, and many others. HEU was first manufactured in the United States during World War II, and 60kg of 80% enriched HEU127 used to make the first fission bomb dropped on Hiroshima killing 140,000 people. The design was considered so simple as to not require testing or pre-qualification. Only 1% of the U-235 fissioned and the blast yielded 13 kilotons128 to 18 kilotons129 of TNT equivalent. The theoretical risk of nuclear terrorism or clandestine attack with highly enriched uranium (HEU) has existed since critical mass quantities of HEU were first produced for a nuclear bomb over sixty years ago, in contrast to other types130 of nuclear terrorism. US national intelligence estimates throughout the 1950s and 1960s provided warnings about the possibility of “clandestine” delivery of nuclear weapons by foreign nuclear states via commercial ships or airplanes.131 The easiest way to make a nuclear weapon is to steal or obtain approximately 50 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from existing stocks (1.5 – 2 million kilograms).132 The cheapest and stealthiest way to deliver a nuclear weapon into a metropolitan area is by using commercial or private transportation that today goes unchecked by the military (including ground, air, and sea pathways). An estimate by former US Defense Secretary Perry puts the risk of nuclear detonation on US targets at 50% in ten years, and Defense Secretaries McNamara, Rumsfeld, Gates, and Vice President Cheney have provided similar warnings.133 The CIA, FBI, and Pentagon meet weekly to assess progress on how the US can identify (attribute) the perpetrators of a nuclear terrorist attack134, and the FBI director Mueller has warned that it was only a matter of time and economics before terrorists will be able to purchase nuclear weapons.135 US government and military leaders are participating in contingency planning exercises for a terrorist nuclear attack, and possible steps include the suspension of civil liberties.136 Perry, Carter, and May offer a vivid description137 of the consequences and tough decisions that would have to be made by the US government in the days following a Hiroshima-sized act of nuclear terrorism or clandestine nuclear attack (the “day after”138). People within approximately a few miles of the detonation would either die instantly or shortly thereafter by radiation sickness, and those downwind of the blast would be subject to cancer-causing radiation. We need to "do something" to prevent nuclear terrorism for 50 if not 100 years anticipating new trends in nuclear proliferation, and not simply looking backward at the


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last 50 years as a blueprint for the future – 50-100 years should be the standard by which we judge whether or not our efforts and course of action are sufficient. In this paper, we are concerned with highly enriched uranium that has not been reprocessed – hence contains no penetrating U-232 radiation that can be easily detected from a distance. With radiological threats (and deterring them) it is likely possible to detect them using a thin, sloppy deployment of detectors because their radioactivity is so huge that they can be “seen” from long distances. Detection should not be seen as taking away from the mission of locking down and destroying weapons-usable fissile materials (HEU included), only complementing it. If it happens and no new material is produced by adversarial or rogue nations – that’s a dream come true, but it is too optimistic. With proliferation of enrichment technology, we ma not be able to rely on locking down materials alone in the next 50 years. A lot of things can change that necessitate additional preventative layers. The capability for attribution of HEU used in an attack may be useful to trace the source after the first attack to shut it down and prevent follow on attacks. Attribution is unlikely to be a ‘stick’ or deterrent that is strong enough to compel nations to secure their stocks of nuclear material to the 50 or 100 year standard. For example, being able to trace the source of fertilizer or military high explosive doesn’t do much to prevent it from being misused in improvised explosive devices – it’s not clear that attribution can make the critical difference. Even the US Air Force had had a “bent spear” incident in 2007 where they lost track of nuclear weapons for 36 hours.139 The second problem with attribution is that there are cases where nuclear forensics may not even work in the case of HEU – the case of “fresh fuel” with insufficient number of uranium isotopes to uniquely identify the fuel, the incompleteness forensic sample databases. All said and done, today our best hope to stop a plot involving HEU may still be intelligence, law enforcement, and investigation – whose worldwide coverage is necessarily incomplete.


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Conceptually, domestic nuclear detection of HEU has the potential to serve as the last layer in a multi-layered defense against a terrorist nuclear attack140 – the need rises in proportion to the likelihood that the other layers may fail. The remaining layers consist of nuclear detection in foreign territory, dissuasion through nuclear forensics/attribution followed by threat of retaliation against the source nation, intelligence efforts to disrupt nuclear terrorism plots and smuggling, securing of existing weapons/stockpiles, destroying stocks of nuclear material, and finally nonproliferation treaties to prevent the worldwide spread of weapons-usable nuclear material and production technology. In the event that attackers or smugglers ever acquire HEU, domestic nuclear detection is meant to dissuade their attempts with policies designed to detect and intercept their attempts to smuggle shipments of HEU and transport an HEU-based weapon to its target in the US, whether the transport vehicle is in a foreign country headed to the US, already inside the US, or approaching the borders. Can we can build a nuclear detection architecture (or other alternative approach) that together with the above efforts will suffice for the next 50-100 years to prevent the HEU threat?

Worst-case scenarios in which domestic nuclear detection might be useful Given how hard and costly it would be to create a domestic nuclear detection system that works reliably, in what circumstances would it be worthwhile as a last line of defense?

Terrorists or non-state actors seek and obtain atomic capability In a 2007 survey of 100 American foreign policy experts, respondents were asked to identify nations likely to transfer nuclear technology to terrorists in the next 3-5 years—the responses141 were North Korea142 (73%), Pakistan143 (44%), Iran (40%), Russia144


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(12%), India (2%), Israel (1%), US (1%). Little is known with certainty about the exact composition, motivations, and loyalties of non-state actors, and often cited examples include Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Quds Force145, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Chechnyan Rebels, Lakshar-e-Toiba, Aum Shinrikyo. Since non-state actors neither represent nor are not loyal to any particular nation, the threat of retaliation on a nation-state in response to an attack is unlikely to be effective in deterring a non-state actor such as Al Qaeda.146 The proliferation of HEU to nation-states, next to semi-autonomous or unaccountable insiders, and ultimately to non-state actors remains outside the direct control of the US and is likely to accelerate over time.147 According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (2006),

“The prospect that a nuclear capable state may lose control of some of its weapons to terrorists is one of the greatest dangers the United States and its allies face148… Based on the demonstrated ease with which uncooperative states and non-state actors can conceal WMD programs and related activities, the United States, its allies and partners must expect further intelligence gaps and surprises.149”

Former CIA director George Tenet has estimated that it takes $100 million to be your own nuclear power.150Another estimate of the resources required to carry out a nuclear terrorism plot is roughly $5-6 million: non-state actors could employ a small number (on the order of a dozen) of technically capable people and use $3-5 million to illegally purchase HEU on the black market. 151 They could use it to threaten or kill hundreds of thousands of people in a metropolitan area from the direct radiation (fireball), and potentially harm millions of people who are located downwind of the blast. 152 Losses would be measured in trillions of dollars153. By comparison the US GDP is on the order of $13 trillion.154 Powerful sub-groups within nations may end up cooperating with terrorists directly or indirectly, and their motivations may differ from the national policy or rational interest of the nation’s people.155 These groups include the scientific bureaucracy (such as AQ Khan156 in Pakistan), military, and national leadership.157 In extreme cases the threat of transferring nuclear material to non-state actors itself was used in negotiations between US and North Korea158. Nations such as North Korea or Iran which perceive their delivery systems to be vulnerable to an overwhelming US first strike159 may elect to deliver or store their atomic weapons in a clandestine manner on US soil, despite the incremental risk of losing control of these weapons. According to a British Ministry of Defense analysis (2007-2036),

“The proliferation of nuclear weapons possession beyond the existing powers, particularly to weak and unstable states, will increase the risks of more uninhibited, assertive and intemperate behaviour by these polities while reducing their susceptibility to conventional methods of coercion. Also, the possession of nuclear weapons by states, whose capacity for ensuring their security and safety may be inadequate, will increase the risk of these technologies and associated


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materials being incompetently handled or acquired by third parties, including non-state actors such as criminals and terrorists.”160

HEU gets loose from stocks by thieves or insiders We are in 100% agreement with the aims of a global cleanout of HEU, and efforts should be strengthened to down-blend and eliminate HEU stocks – which would address the most thorny issue. Doubts remain about its feasibility due to the factors outside of domestic control:

1. Will that ever happen since it depends on the cooperation of 40 nations, some potentially hostile?

2. Can we be sure that HEU production in “rogue” nations or by non-state actors (like AQ Khan’s network) will never happen in the future?

The IAEA nominally defines a significant quantity of HEU to be 25kg161. HEU can be split into much smaller quantities (sub-kilograms) and smuggled around the globe, and should therefore be considered significant.162 Fortunately there has not yet been a nuclear detonation by non-state actors, but the threat is real and increasing as long as HEU can be stolen by or transferred to terrorists from even one of these facilities.163 In the last 20 years the IAEA reported 16 smuggling incidents involving HEU and Plutonium. There were at least three incidents involving kilogram quantities of HEU164, and a total of 30.8 kg of HEU involved in known smuggling incidents (stolen, lost or seized). 165 A plot to smuggle an undisclosed amount of HEU to Iran was disrupted by British authorities in early 2006 after the material had been obtained through the black market in Russia.166 In 1992, Russian authorities foiled an attempt to steal 18.5 kg of HEU, which may have been enough for a nuclear weapon.167 Also in 1992, 1.5kg was stolen by insiders of a nuclear facility in increments of 25-30g, falling within the materials accounting precision of the facility in order to evade detection.168 Three gram-quantity cases of HEU smuggling have been reported from 2001-2006 in the former Soviet Union countries.169 One can only speculate on how many more smuggling incidents go undetected by authorities. A US government report argues that “undetected smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear material has likely occurred” at sites in Russia.170 The detection rate of trafficking incidents by Russian security officials was estimated to be only 30-40%, and may be as low as 10%.171 Stockpiles of HEU are prime targets for mercenaries, smugglers, and terrorists, and it is imperative that the HEU in every stockpile worldwide is secured from falling into the wrong hands.172 The most worrisome scenarios are that HEU can be stolen from stockpiles by terrorists or nations seeking nuclear capability, transferred to them by sympathetic insiders173 from any one of the growing number of nations possessing HEU, or fall into the hands of terrorists after the collapse of an unstable national government (such as Pakistan174, North Korea, or formerly as had happened with the Soviet Union)—all it would take is roughly 50 kg out of the 1.9 million kg in worldwide stockpiles to fall into their hands. One probabilistic model puts the likelihood of terrorist attack at 29% in the next decade by making assumptions about a finite number of terrorist groups trying to acquire fissile material from a fixed number of stockpiles.175


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The security and accounting of these large military and civilian HEU stockpiles has been questioned, and has in several instances found to be unsatisfactory according to government and international watchdog agencies. As of 2006, according to the GAO the US has spent $2.2 billion since 1993 to upgrade security for sites Russia and other countries that house nuclear material and weapons, but the long-term sustainability of these US-funded programs is in question176 and many more sites remain to be secured. Recent progress has been reported that two year efforts resulted in agreements between Russia and the US to ensure that Russia takes full responsibility for securing their nuclear materials by 2013.177 By the end of FY2005, the number of secured sites in Russia was estimated to be only 54%178 – implying that about half of those buildings haven’t received security upgrades – and up to 100 more sites do not have state-of-the-art security.179 By one estimate, 500 tons of HEU in Russia is under uncertain security.180 Insiders can exploited the fact that the material within an operating nuclear facility cannot be accounted for to an accuracy perhaps better than 2-4% (“Material Unaccounted For” or MUF) to steal small amounts of material at a time to evade detection.181 Even with security upgrades, the stockpiles may still remain vulnerable to theft through a sufficient number of sophisticated enough attacks—the only real guarantee that material can’t be stolen is if it is completely destroyed or down-blended to LEU. Even if 100% of the existing HEU stockpiles in Russia and other HEU-possessing nations were to be secured, nations may begin to create new HEU stocks without international control.182 In the past, uranium enrichment facilities required tremendous coordination, know how, and resources on the order of billions of dollars. These technical barriers are eroding and the cost of uranium enrichment is dropping over time due to technological trends such as the growing accessibility of high-precision lasers and high-speed gas centrifuges.183 There is a rising demand for Uranium for power generation and weapons programs, and the number of nuclear states is growing over time. An increasing amount of low-enriched uranium184 (LEU) being produced and distributed worldwide for nuclear power generation can in theory also be enriched into HEU—the opposite of down-blending.


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The intelligence community fails What is the likelihood that a terrorist plot to create an HEU-based atomic weapon is well underway and the US intelligence community doesn’t know about it? While overestimation also happens, we found that over 50 years the underestimation of adversary's nuclear capabilities happens more often than we would like until a nuclear test is performed--when the capability is objectively baselined. Unlike with most nations, underestimation of terrorist nuclear capabilities is catastrophic. Nations can simply be deterred by threat of retaliation, terrorists can't. Based on the historical accuracy of US intelligence estimates on foreign nuclear weapons programs, we cannot expect that these estimates by DoD, CIA, DoE, and State-Dept to be much more accurate than to within +5 to -5 years in (1) predicting progress of HEU enrichment programs in foreign countries, (2) determining whether or not foreign groups have attained nuclear weapons capability, and (3) estimating when they are likely to test them. This has proven to be the case in the last 50 years since Nazi Germany, and the forecast accuracy has not been improving over time.185 Iraq186 was no exception to the rule, both before/after the Gulf Wars of 1991187 and 2003.188 Intelligence on terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials or capabilities is even harder to estimate since non-state actors are much more numerous, employ more distributed networks of procurement and operation, and are possibly harder to infiltrate. A terrorist nuclear capability or clandestine attack will likely come as a surprise, and advance warning of less than a few years will be unlikely. We can expect non-state actors to obtain HEU from theft, smuggling, or clandestine HEU enrichment programs and for this to go undetected for perhaps 3-5 years, and for suspicions about true capabilities of non-state actors to remain unresolved for the similar (if not longer) periods of time. Eight countries shown in Table 1 have produced nuclear weapons, five countries in Table 2 have attempted and failed to obtain nuclear weapons capability, although many other nations can opt to do so in a time-frame of a few years or less based on their possession of fissile material. In each case, intelligence analyst views/estimates (assembled through a combination of human intelligence, communications intercepts, satellite imagery, and smuggling intercepts) have routinely been off by 3-5 years when predicting progress towards nuclear weapons capability. Due to the great perceived value that policy makers place on knowing about foreign nuclear programs in advance, combined with the extreme secrecy with which nations carry out their nuclear programs, the US intelligence predictions and conclusions often tolerate the use of insufficient and inconclusive evidence.189 This leads to false-positives meaning that nuclear capability is “assumed” to have been achieved ahead of actual schedule (France, India, South Africa, North Korea, and Iraq in 2003). There are also false-negatives meaning that in several cases, the US was taken by surprise on the date the nation actually achieved its nuclear weapons capability (Israel, Pakistan), performed a nuclear test (Russia), or after definite information was obtained about progress towards nuclear weapons capability from a US-led invasion (Nazi-Germany, Iraq in 1991).


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Obtaining reliable intelligence on terrorist progress toward nuclear weapons is likely to be even harder, given the large number of such groups and their distributed, global networks. Table 8 Accuracy of US intelligence forecasts for nations that achieved nuclear weapons capability

Successful Nuclear Weapons Power

Plans to Build a Nuclear Weapon

Achieved Nuclear Weapons Capability (date and type, Pu or HEU)

Forecast Inaccuracy: The years that the US estimates were off by. MC = “most conservative” ML = “most likely” Estimate must be earlier than or off by one year

Surprise Upon Achieving Nuclear Weapons Capability: Years of underestimation or overestimation on the day that nuclear capability was achieved MC = “most conservative” ML = “most likely”

USSR August 1, 1945190

August 29, 1949191 (Pu)

-2 to +1 years (MC) and 0 to +4 years (ML) spanning 6 years 192

+1 year (MC ) and +4 years (ML), 193

France November 30, 1956 194

February 13, 1960195 (Pu)

-2 to -1 years (MC) -1 to -2 years (ML) spanning 2 years 196

0 years, expected two years before first actual bomb assembly and test

197

China January, 1955198

October 16, 1964199 (HEU)

-1 to +1 years (MC) -0 to +6 years (ML) spanning 13 years200

0 years, based on Chinese preparation of test site shown by satellite imagery201

Israel 1955202 November 1, 1966203 (Pu)

-4 to +1 years (MC) and -4 to +2 years (ML) spanning 8 years204

+1 year (MC) and +2 years (ML)205

India September, 1971206

May 18, 1974207 (Pu)

-6 to -2 years (MC) and -2 to -6 years (ML) spanning 7 years208

0 years, expected to be imminent for at least a decade until first bomb assembly and test, but it was a surprise on the day of the test209

South Africa 1974210 November, 1979211 (HEU)

-2 to 0 years (MC) and -2 to +5 years (ML) spanning 12 years212

0 years, expected a test was imminent based on satellite imagery for at least two years before first bomb assembly213

Pakistan January 20, 1972214

January, 1986215 (HEU)

-6 to -1 years (MC) -5 to -1 years (ML) spanning 10 years216

+1 year, expected a Pu program instead of HEU 217

North Korea late 1970s218 1990s219 (Pu)

insufficient knowledge to calculate the inaccuracy, but estimates span 11 years220

0 years, expected to be imminent for well over a decade until first test; first assembly unknown221


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Table 9 Accuracy of US intelligence forecasts for states that have not yet achieved nuclear weapons capability

Attempted Nuclear Weapons Power

Plans to Build a Nuclear Weapon Cause for Failure

Forecast Inaccuracy: The years that the US estimates were off by. MC = “most conservative” ML = “most likely” Estimate must be earlier than or off by one year

Surprise on the day the weapons program failed: years of underestimation that nuclear capability would have been achieved had it been allowed to continue MC = “most conservative” ML = “most likely”

Nazi Germany

September 25, 1939222

Allied Invasion, April, 1944223

at least 0 to -2 years (MC) and at least 0 to -2 years (ML) spanning 2 years224

would not have been achieved in any predictable time-frame225

Iran 1987226 Still In Progress

at least -2 to -7 years (MC) and at least -2 to -7 years (ML) spanning 15 years227 n/a

Libya 1970228

October, 2003, Exposed by Interception of Centrifuges229

at least -8 to -18 years (MC) and at least -8 to -18 years (ML) spanning 10 years230

5 years (MC) and 10 years (ML)231

Iraq (pre Gulf War of 1991)

September, 1975232

Coalition Invasion, March 1, 1991233

at least -4 to +5 years (MC) and at least -2 to +5 years (ML) spanning 8 years234

-3 years (MC) and 2 years (ML)235

Iraq (post Gulf War of 1991)

September, 1975236

Sanctions, Inspections, and US/British Invasion beginning March 19, 2003237

at least 0 to -3 (MC) spanning 13 years238

would not have been achieved in any predictable time-frame239

Taiwan September, 1969240

Exposed by High-Level Defection, Dec 1987, Col. Chang defected and reported that Taiwan had begun to build a small-scale Pu extraction facility241

estimates span several years242 n/a


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The conventional wisdom is that although nuclear intelligence is not perfect today, detection of the activities of non-state actors with regards to HEU can improve by demanding more from the intelligence community. As suggested by the Presidential Commission on WMD intelligence243 these improvements include intelligence collection, analysis and reporting, and operations and management of intelligence organizations including multiplying human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities.244 Improvements in intelligence will no doubt be useful—even if US intelligence was operating near-perfectly245 per the Presidential Commission recommendations, the odds are that there will still be undetected clandestine nuclear programs or activities involving non-state actors across the world (false-negatives) or that inconclusive evidence may lead to incorrect suspicions (false-positives).246 To use an analogy, let’s suppose a government agency was commissioned to predict something as fundamentally uncertain as whether a fair coin will land up heads or tails. Due to the inherent uncertainty in coin tosses, no matter how hard the government tried or how many resources they spent they would not be able to be better than 50% right. In fact, they could achieve 50% accuracy simply predicting heads every time. If these coin tosses had large consequences (heads = clandestine HEU program exists; tails = clandestine HEU program does not exist), then if the government predicts heads when tails is true they will be branded as acting too conservatively. If they predict tails when in fact the truth is heads (or vice-versa), they will have made a huge mistake.

Foreign HEU production is concealed from the international community Historically, all dual-use technologies have spread all over the globe eventually. If a nation opts to pursue HEU enrichment programs and weapons programs in locations that are undisclosed or inaccessible to international monitors, they are not hard to conceal.247 This is why China and Pakistan exceeded US intelligence estimates of the rate of their progress toward a nuclear weapon, and the South African program was not possible to be tracked closely. While plutonium is highly radioactive and an operating nuclear reactor is required248 to produce it, HEU enrichment and HEU bomb assembly is not usually amenable to external monitoring by satellite or monitoring devices outside the weapons facilities when the location of the facility is not known. 249 In a foreign country, HEU enrichment programs and HEU possession can be concealed250 under any building or underground in a tunnel251, and they are fundamentally unverifiable.252 This continues to be the case today with HEU enrichment programs of Iran253 and North Korea254. This loophole was effectively exploited by Iraq following the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Osirak reactor, when they decided to pursue a clandestine uranium enrichment program that went undetected until after the end of the first Gulf War in 1991.255 Over 50 years of history of intelligence, dozens of case studies have exposed that there is fundamental uncertainty about HEU production capabilities that is related to the ease with which HEU production and smuggling operations can be concealed. The outcome of intelligence gathering on HEU enrichment and weapons production is governed by immutable physical laws that apply to ease of concealment and distribution of HEU


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production and weapons programs, in particular enrichment techniques like gaseous centrifuge cascades and HEU itself.256

Looking to dissuade any U.S. consideration of using military strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran cautioned Friday that it could disperse its facilities to protect them. “We have a large country … and for centrifuge machines a room … is enough,” said Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Centrifuge work “could be performed, could be installed anywhere and could be protected,” he added. 257

In contrast to older techniques, a gas-centrifuge plant to produce 50kg of HEU annually could be concealed in a building 50 meters long by 25 meters wide and consume only 200 kilowatts of electricity.258 Such a plant would not be distinguishable from air or space from other industrial buildings, nor would it leak quantities of gas to the atmosphere that would aid in remote detection to localize the position of the plant.259 Pakistan (AQ Khan) has proved that sensitive nuclear technology can be exported to many nations (Libya, Iran, North Korea260) without the knowledge of US intelligence for many years. Disruption of the AQ Khan network was the result of diligent efforts by US, British, and other intelligence agencies.261 However this tactical success262 ultimately highlights a larger failure to prevent widespread, clandestine proliferation of HEU enrichment technology. Intelligence is essential and may impede the rate of nuclear proliferation, but it is unlikely to be good enough to completely stop states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons.263 Iraq demonstrated that they had maintained a clandestine HEU enrichment and weapons program for many years, and would likely have had a nuclear weapon had the US-led invasion of Kuwait not uncovered and halted the program in 1991.264 Iran continues to show that they can carry out an unverifiable HEU program on their territory in defiance of international pressure and the NPT and international inspection regime.265 The US first learnt of possible North Korean HEU program in 1998 or 1999 that was based on a dozen to two dozen centrifuges and centrifuge designs supplied by the A.Q. Khan network from Pakistan, and later through an interception of aluminum centrifuge tubes in 2003.266After initial US concern about underground North Korean HEU enrichment in 2002267, North Korea maintained ambiguity about the status of their HEU program. This has not been resolved for many years, and is potentially leading to a US reassessment268 about existence or capability of North Korean HEU program without any fundamentally new evidence since 2002 that would prove the non-existence of this program.269

The nation whose HEU was used in an attack cannot be uniquely identified We cannot guarantee that after a terrorist or clandestine attack not delivered by missile or aircraft, the nation(s) who supplied the HEU in an attack may be correctly identified or traced—as a consequence, this makes the threat of retaliation by the US military almost a


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moot point. In order to serve as incentive for nations to ensure the physical security and accounting of their HEU stocks, nuclear forensics would have to help pinpoint the source of the HEU in the event of an attack. 270 This information could then be used to trace how it got loose, who exactly was responsible, and what retaliatory or corrective actions should be taken. 271 Simply being able to trace the source of fertilizer or military high explosive in an IED attack doesn’t do much to prevent it from being misused in improvised explosive devices – it’s not clear that attribution can make the critical difference in compelling nations to secure their stocks of nuclear material to a higher standard. Even with the weekly meetings being devoted to this question by the CIA, FBI, and the Pentagon the President’s decision to retaliate or apply pressure on the source nation will likely be a difficult one due to the ambiguity of attribution.272 In the absence of sufficiently reliable human intelligence about the perpetrators of the attack or the HEU supply chain that was involved, it’s borderline impossible to narrow down the source of the material among any one of several possible nations each with clandestine nuclear programs. 273 This is due to four technical reasons summarized below. The first barrier to forensics is not specific to HEU, and applies to Pu equally. Samples are not exchanged between most nation-states who have HEU stocks – at least today – and there is no reason to believe this is going to get much better except without intelligence gathering.

1. Without a complete database of HEU samples, there is no basis for comparison of a forensic sample.

Second, unlike Pu there are comparatively few isotopes of Uranium (U-234/235/238) to provide an unambiguous fingerprint based on their relative composition – the “signal” may not be as discernable due to measurement error.

2. For HEU produced in a centrifuge directly from natural uranium ore, you have to rely on the ratio of U-234/235 which may lead to inability to distinguish between multiple HEU stockpiles. For “fresh” fuel the daughter products of the Uranium isotopes may have not accumulated in significant quantities to be useful in calibrating the age of the material.

Third, if you are “lucky” and the HEU has been produced through reprocessing, there may be trace contamination of U-232, U-233 , and U-236 as well. This should in theory make it easier to identify the sources.

3. Somehow this was not the case in 2006 between US and Russia. There still remain public differences of opinion between the US and Russia about the origin of HEU in the Georgian smuggling incident of 2006. In press reports Russians claim it’s impossible to attribute if it was produced a long time ago, but the US opinion was that it came from Russia due to the presence of U-234 and U-236 contaminants. Which is true?


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Finally, if we don’t have a sample of a HEU from a stock at least in theory we could attempt to estimate the composition produced by a particular enrichment facility based on knowledge of its cascade/network design facility in order to check if there is a match.

4. Problem is that if the network design is not known accurately, or if the amount of U-234 was intentionally altered by the producer it may be nearly impossible to estimate.

A 2006 incident of a Russian smuggling HEU apprehended by Georgian authorities is a perfect example of the difficulty of reaching international agreement on the source of loose HEU, even when the HEU samples are made available to each nation.274 The judgment of US scientists was that it likely came from Russia based on the presence of U-234 and U-236, whereas Russian scientists could only estimate that the uranium was reprocessed over a decade ago.275 Russian scientists further insisted that there is no evidence the material originated in Russia, and "if this uranium was produced in the 1940s-50s, it will be extremely difficult to identify the country of origin"276 Had this been material recovered by a nation post-blast, the disagreement about its origins would have made it extremely difficult to make decisions to prevent further attacks whether by taking steps to seal up the material leak or threaten retaliation. In an HEU-based nuclear explosion, all physical evidence277 is incinerated except the unexploded HEU that remains after a blast, from which the relative composition of uranium isotopes can be used as a partial signature. In the event of recovery of smuggled HEU prior to an attack,278 other forensic tools (chemical, physical, can provide some insight into the point of origin of the materials). Even with a national attribution program intended to gather “smoking gun” evidence after a blast279, there remain fundamental physical constraints to reliably attributing the HEU to the source nation after an attack or even upon interception of the HEU before an attack. In some cases, isotopic analysis of unexploded HEU after an actual nuclear blast may be used to positively verify whether or not the HEU matches the fingerprint from a well-characterized HEU stockpile.280 It might therefore be used to help exonerate a trusted nation-state that has a transparent nuclear program (example: US and Canada), but not to attribute or confirm the HEU came from a particular nation-state which could then be targeted.281 The presence of U-232, U-233282, and U-236 in the unexploded HEU indicate contamination from reactor feed-stocks. This was the case for HEU produced in gaseous diffusion plants during the Cold War by the US, Britain, and the former Soviet Union.283 In contrast, HEU enriched from natural uranium ore that is not contaminated by feedstock from nuclear reactors will not have any of these uranium isotopes—likely to be case with more recently established enrichment programs based on gas centrifuges284 suspected to be in Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea. The remaining isotopes285 whose relative composition is useful for fingerprinting are only U-234 and U-235, and therefore the isotopic ratio of U-234 to U-235 of samples from the source nation’s stockpile is the critical measurement that can be used for attribution of a future attack. U-234 is present in natural uranium in very small amounts compared to U-235. Enrichment techniques involving laser isotope separation (LIS) or electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), will deplete U-234 relative to U-235, whereas U-234 will be enriched relative to U-235


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with enrichment based on gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuges, thermal diffusion, or aerodynamic enrichment. The exact ratio of U-234 to U-235 depends on specifics of how the cascades stages used for enrichment are networked286 and will be hard to estimate without knowledge (intelligence) of the exact details. The ratio of U-234 to U-235 in unexploded material (post-attack) cannot be used to perform reliable attribution if any of the following hold true,

1. nation-states maintain clandestine nuclear programs and do not voluntarily and verifiably divulge the isotopic composition of their entire HEU stocks, or

2. intelligence fails to uncover the technical details of the process used to enrich the HEU as would be the case with a clandestine enrichment program, or

3. nation-states with clandestine nuclear programs287 intentionally alter the isotopic composition so as to make their HEU impervious to attribution or to provide a false attribution signature.

Clandestine uranium enrichment programs that are not transparent to international inspections are a major risk because concealment and lack of access to the facilities makes it difficult or impossible to fingerprint HEU produced by these programs. 288 Since a national attribution database289 based on the isotopic composition of other nations’ nuclear materials (nuclear fingerprints290) can only be populated either through intelligence or measurement after nuclear tests, such as the 2006 test by North Korea291, these databases are likely to remain incomplete,292 especially in the case of clandestine HEU programs, simply due to gaps in intelligence and measurement. These limitations increase the risk that insiders of a nation-state with a clandestine nuclear program can sell or transfer HEU to non-state actors with impunity293: in one hypothetical scenario the Iranian Revolutionary Guard supplies terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah with HEU or a weapon itself.294 As long as the uranium enrichment processes and the HEU employed by other nations remains unknown, analysis of the isotopic composition of the unexploded uranium remaining after an attack with an HEU-based atomic bomb may not be sufficient to determine the source nation of the HEU. 295 Even if nation-states cooperate to construct an internationally verifiable database of HEU fingerprints (samples) from all known stockpiles worldwide,296 the limited number of uranium isotopes present in these samples makes it physically impossible to unambiguously deduce the stockpile from which the material came. Since the victim nation can potentially narrow down the likely sources of the attack only to the list of nations whose HEU sample compositions are unknown, such a database can maximize the potential repercussions to someone with access to HEU and possibly influence their decision whether to make that material available to terrorists. Creating such a comprehensive database requires all nations to contribute samples of all their HEU stocks, without spoofs, in an internationally verifiable manner—which seems unlikely since it faces the same set of trust, transparency, and cooperation issues between nations.297

Foreign nuclear weapons programs evade intelligence Short of observing a nuclear test298, the only reliable, objective means to determine the status of HEU enrichment and weapons programs by untrustworthy foreign nations is to


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have access to 100% of the territory that could be used in weapons production and to be able to search the territory thoroughly without obstruction, as the US had the opportunity to do during Project Alsos299 in Nazi Germany and with the Iraq Survey Group300 after the Gulf War of 2003. The absence of positive evidence of a terrorist or clandestine nuclear program is not any indication that such a program does not actually exist (false negatives), which was the case early on with the nuclear programs of all the nuclear weapons states. Some types of evidence are reliable, while others that warn of the existence, status, or location of HEU nuclear programs run the risk of being misleading (false positives). Of the sources of intelligence listed in Table 3, the nuclear tests by nuclear weapon nation-states (except Israel and South Africa) have been the most definite source of intelligence and information about their nuclear weapons programs. There is no reason to believe this will be any different with non-state actors. . The major difference is that nuclear tests by nations-states are likely to be conducted at underground or unpopulated sites whereas a “nuclear test” by a terrorist group could be conducted in a populated area with large civilian and economic casualties. Inspections of nuclear facilities help, but they are not always a good indicator and suffer from false-negatives. The host country can attempt to mislead the inspectors (Israel in 1963-1964301), relocate equipment or material during the visits (Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War302), stall or delay inspections (North Korea303), or conduct weapons activities at completely different locations (as feared in Iran304). In rare instances, human intelligence has been invaluable to provide accurate, advance warning such as the defections that led to uncovering Taiwanese305 and Israeli306 programs. Intercepts of materials, documents, communication, have been of questionable value and less often provided conclusive information—as was the case with dual-use aluminum rocket tubes destined for Iraq that were mistaken to be centrifuge parts.307


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Table 10 Reliable and unreliable sources of intelligence on foreign nuclear weapons programs Method Intelligence Provided Requirements/limitations Selected Examples Nuclear Test Reliable confirmation

of nuclear capability may be too late, especially in the case of a non-state actor

Soviet Union, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea

Alsos-style inspections of foreign territory without restrictions for HEU production/presence, once control has been gained through an invasion.

Reliable. Requires knowledge of which territory the facility is in. In case of non-state actors in a friendly country, also requires access to be granted in foreign territory.

Nazi-Germany308 and Iraq309

Sting Operation Reliable. Likely to catch a small fraction of actual activity

Georgian HEU smuggling incident310

Forensic evidence from analyzing materials originating in the source nation near a nuclear facility.

Reliable. Requires receiving and analyzing materials from or with exposure to gaseous, liquid, or solid contaminants in or near a facility that identify weapons (materials) production. Susceptible to spoofing.

Discovery of traces of highly enriched uranium on the clothes of Iraqi hostages released in 1990311

Human Source with High-Level or insider access

Unreliable. Can provide detailed plans, locations, assets and progress to date.

Not always available, often needs to be planted several years in advance. Needs to be authenticated as true.

Taiwan312, Israel313, and China314 (success); Complete lack of visibility into Indian, Soviet, and Iranian programs (failure).

Satellite image of Plutonium Reactor or nuclear complex.

Unreliable. Works for nuclear reactors or for preparation of test sites. Works only when the reactor or power lines are above ground, and its location is known. Does not work for Uranium enrichment or weapons production where a reactor is not required (centrifuges).

Soviet Union315 and China316, (success) and India317 (false-negative); South Africa318 (false-positive)

Parts or material Intercept Unreliable. Likely to catch only a small fraction of actual traffic

Iraqi dual-use aluminum tubes319 (failure); centrifuges in Libya320 (success)

Inspections Unreliable. Inspectors can be misled or material/equipment relocated.

Israel321, North Korea322, Iraq323, Iran324.


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Policy Recommendations

What are the US government policies to prevent nuclear terrorism with HEU? The US government is pursing six preventive325 defense policies:

1. No new HEU: Stop enrichment of Uranium into HEU. This defense includes all diplomatically driven326 efforts for WMD interdiction such as the Proliferation Security Initiative327 (PSI) funded to $50 million in 2005 and preemptive328 military nonproliferation initiatives such as the Operation Iraqi Freedom329. The US State Department spent $197 million on nonproliferation initiatives in 2005330 and requested $209 million for FY2007331. This includes approximately $50 million in voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency332 (IAEA) which verifies compliance of nations with the Nonproliferation Treaty333 (NPT). The Iraq War to preempt clandestine efforts by Saddam Hussein to obtain weapons of mass destruction,334 and in particular a nuclear device335 based on HEU336, began on March 20, 2003. Its cost was estimated to be $53 billion through the end of FY2003 during which President Bush declared end of major combat operations on May 1, 2003.337 A cumulative $378 billion will have been spent on the Iraq War through FY 2007.338 In order to dissuade nations from producing new HEU and building new dual-use (civilian-military) nuclear facilities used in uranium enrichment339, the US will be providing a matching contribution of $50 million (of the total $200 million) to support an international effort to create a “nuclear fuel bank” that will offer an internationally assured supply of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for civilian use (power-generation).340

2. Securing existing HEU: If HEU remains in a stockpile, reactor, or weapons complex then take steps to ensure a terrorist can’t gain access to it.341 This is achieved by destroying the HEU or down-blending it to LEU342 which make the material unusable in a weapon (unless it is re-enriched), or securing the existing HEU in stockpiles. Specifically the FY 2008 budget request for the US fissile material disposition program343 is $610 million of which $66.8 million is to be used for disposition of US-surplus HEU.344 The FY 2008 budget request to secure nuclear sites, convert reactors, and repatriate fuel from reactors worldwide is for $492 million. A total of $2.2 billion has been spent by the US to improve security at foreign sites as of 2006345, and $1.6 billion in Russia alone since 1993346.

3. Intelligence: tracking down individuals, disrupting plots, and destroying facilities involving HEU smuggling, production, and weaponization. The annual intelligence budget for the US was in the range of $26.6 billion in FY 1997, rising to an estimated $44 billion in 2005347 and $48 billion in 2007348.

4. Forensics, Attribution, and Retaliation: Threaten negative diplomatic, military, economic consequences against nation(s) responsible for providing or deploying the material in the event an attack actually taking place. If the HEU was stolen, work constructively with the nation to shore up security of HEU stocks after the leak has been pinpointed. The credibility of these post-attack measures as deterrents and corrective actions hinge on being able to use post-detonation


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forensic evidence to reliably determine where the material came from, and nuclear attribution programs are reportedly funded in the US at a level between $8 and 18 million in FY 2007.349

5. Foreign Detection: From 1994-2005, the DoE, DoD, and State Department have spent $178 million to aid 36 foreign countries in deploying radiation detection equipment, primarily Russia as part of a “Second Line of Defense.”350 Of Russia’s 350 border crossings, international airports, and road/rail crossings), the US has spent $40 million through 2006; approximately 200 of these crossings are expected to have detection equipment installed by the end of 2007, and the remaining are expected to be completed for an additional $100 million over four years.351

6. Domestic Detection: For the case when attackers or smugglers ever acquire HEU, deter their attempts with policies designed to detect and intercept their attempts to smuggle shipments of HEU and transport an HEU-based weapon to its target in the US, whether the transport vehicle is in a foreign country, already inside the US, or approaching the borders. The US budget for domestic nuclear detection in FY 2007 was $480 million with a request of $562 million for FY 2008.352

If the traditional approaches including nonproliferation efforts, intelligence for interdiction/attribution, and military campaigns to eliminate clandestine nuclear programs fail to sufficiently reduce the risk of HEU spreading to terrorists, rogue states, and non-state actors, then additional steps are needed to prevent proliferation of HEU from spiraling out of control. According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (2006),

“The principal objective of the United States is to prevent hostile states or non-state actors from acquiring WMD. This involves diplomatic and economic measures, but it can also involve active measures and the use of military force to deny access to materials, interdict transfers, and disrupt production programs.”353

What are limitations of US policies? As implemented today, none of these defense policies alone may solve the problem. Even in combination they can fail altogether to prevent nuclear terrorism by a small, sufficiently financed, motivated, terrorist group354 or the clandestine delivery of a nuclear weapon by a nation-state. Each layer of defense deserves to be strengthened, enhanced, and further supported with additional funding to the extent that marginal security benefit can be derived. Even so, there remain serious gaps today in the US government policies for these defenses. These gaps are likely to result in failures to prevent nuclear terrorism or clandestine attack. Although the six-layer defense outlined above has succeeded in preventing nuclear terrorism or clandestine attack to-date355, the threat continues to grow with time. We analyze the limitations of these policies in subsequent sections. There is no consensus on what needs to be done to make each of the layers to completely watertight, and there remain several vulnerabilities in each of the layers as implemented. Nonproliferation of HEU and securing existing stockpiles are slowed by negotiations and trust barriers between the growing numbers of nuclear-capable nations. Both the intelligence and attribution of HEU to a nation are error-prone or impossible because they


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are subject to fundamental physical and logistical constraints which are created by foreign entities, outside the control of the US. Today, there are unfortunately many ways for a terrorist to smuggle HEU across the border into a nation like the US whether by land, sea, or air. A few of the loopholes include private jets, sail boats, off road vehicles, and underground tunnels. It is much harder to ensure accountability of US-funded nuclear detection efforts to secure foreign borders and nuclear smuggling corridors when compared to 100% domestic approaches. Corruption or forcible removal of foreign security guards can compromise the detection network, and risk also include the difficulties of remote management, maintenance, and upgrades, and inter-agency coordination.356 Preventing the failures in the first five layers depends heavily on factors beyond the control of the United States, and therefore unlikely to be fixed anytime in the next 50-100 years. Changes will be required to efficiently transport goods and people while ensuring the transportation network is not misused by non-state actors to position highly enriched uranium within the nation’s capital or other major metros. Today’s approaches to domestic nuclear detection being deployed individually or jointly by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office357 (DNDO), Customs and Border Patrol358 (CBP), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency359 (DTRA), and the Department of Energy360 (DoE) are incomplete361 resulting in a large number of false-negatives362 or otherwise hinge on inflated expectations for future developments in nuclear detection technology363 for domestic search364 or reconnaissance in enemy territory365. The DoD366 and DNDO367 requirements for stand-off detection of HEU at greater than 100m or even 1km are unlikely to be fulfilled without active radiation directed at the target, and therefore they do not translate to application outside the battlefield in large-scale civilian environments. Screening cargo containers at sea ports368 and land border crossings369 covers a tiny fraction of the larger problem, and terrorists or smugglers are more likely to try one of the remaining pathways that are unsecured since those present a lower risk of being caught (displacement effect). Surrounding the HEU with lead, steel, or concrete makes it much harder to detect HEU at a distance (shielding).370

What does the Nonproliferation Treaty have to do with nuclear terrorism and HEU stockpiles? The proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations and the proliferation of fissile materials used in nuclear weapons are not governed by the same rules.371 With 184 signatories who have voluntarily agreed to be non-nuclear weapons states and five nuclear weapons states (P-5) 372, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has so far been successful in moderating the chain reaction373 that is weapons proliferation to ten nations down from a peak of 23 nations with active weapons programs during the Cold War374. It does not explicitly stop nations from producing fissile material and maintaining stockpiles for civilian purposes like power generation (sometimes used as a cover for a weapons program).375 In order to dissuade the construction of new dual-use (civilian-military) production facilities for HEU by nations such as Iran, the IAEA is leading an effort to create an assured nuclear fuel supply for LEU376 that can be used for power-generation purposes only.377


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As drafted, the NPT does not constrain the proliferation of HEU itself which President Bush378 refers to as a “loophole,” and the IAEA’s assured nuclear LEU supply is too late by five decades: as of 2003 1900 metric tons of HEU are currently spread across 50 countries.379 Over 55% of the world’s HEU is in Russia, and 35% in the United States.380 As of 2004, the US Government Accountability Office reports that there were at least 128 facilities worldwide with more than 20kg of HEU onsite.381 As of mid-2006, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that the global stockpile of HEU amounts to 1400-2000 metric tons.382 Strengthening, accelerating, and providing full financial support for international efforts to prevent new HEU production383, destroy existing HEU stocks, and deny access to HEU384 is essential. The US-sponsored Global Threat Reduction Initiative, launched in 2004, set out a 10-year goal for converting or shutting down 106 research reactors that run on HEU, but this goal does not include 61 additional reactors that use HEU.385 To date, these efforts begun after the Cold War have remained incomplete for a number of reasons.386 International efforts have been protracted for decades and remain incomplete due to barriers of trust, transparency, and cooperation between nations (such as US-Russia387 or US-Pakistan) or lack of inter-agency collaboration388 within the US government. Had there not been international nonproliferation agreements389 (like the NPT) that have been achieved through voluntary cooperation of nations capable of producing HEU, the number of nations actually producing HEU weapons may have been much greater than it is today. A nation’s compliance with these voluntary agreements is audited by outside inspections of declared nuclear activities390 and also by on-demand “special inspections,”391 “snap-inspections,”392 and location-specific environmental sampling aimed at detecting undeclared nuclear activities (voluntary Additional Protocol393). Nations can refuse these international inspections or access to sites if they are concerned about their national security interests.394 As of early 2007, only 111 states and Taiwan of the 188 states party to the NPT have signed an Additional Protocol and only 78 of these have ratified it.395 NPT inspections of declared facilities or on-demand inspections of suspect sites like the Additional Protocol are not strong enough to completely stop HEU proliferation in uncooperative nation-states or NPT signatories who are intent on deceiving the international community by carrying out nuclear weapons and/or uranium enrichment programs at secret locations.396 Prior to the first Gulf War, Iraq was a signatory to the NPT yet fell into this category.397 The growing list of countries considered to be major nuclear proliferation risks398 includes Iran399, North Korea400, and Pakistan401 and they are either confirmed to have or may have internationally unverifiable HEU enrichment programs. At this time, the efficacy of the NPT is under review in light of clandestine nuclear programs uncovered in Iran, Libya, the AQ Khan network, and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.402 Intelligence gaps about these clandestine programs are likely to grow in the future as more nations may undertake clandestine programs either in response to worldwide nuclear proliferation or for political reasons. For example, Iran’s


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proliferation efforts may inspire its neighbors including Syria and Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear capabilities,403 or South Korea could initiate nuclear weapons development in response to North Korea’s program.404

So what do we do about nuclear detection? Either do it right, or don’t bother. Aim for Dissuasion, not merely Interception:

1. If possible and feasible, then seal up loopholes in the national border. 2. Create multiple concentric Nuclear Defense Zones (NDZs) around major US

cities, megalopolises, and military bases worldwide that are free of loopholes. 3. Create multiple concentric NDZs around the storage sites and cities containing

HEU stockpiles in all countries—that can be independently verified—make technology available internationally to all nations.

4. Make NDZs and reliable detection portals (RDPs) available to all nations in order to enhance security from loose HEU and drive down the cost.

It’s not very useful to close some loopholes while leaving other loopholes wide open – all or 100% of the loopholes have to be buttressed in order for it to change the decision of adversaries to attack. By this logic, the fundamental flaw in requiring screening of 100% of cargo containers at ports of origin as proposed in the recent law405 is that this permits terrorists numerous options to circumvent it and they can therefore attack at will – from the threat clandestine attack or nuclear terrorism using HEU-based weapons, it’s as good as not doing anything. If we were to draw an analogy to airport security, today’s plans for nuclear detection would be like securing the international terminals only, while removing the perimeter around the airport and leaving the domestic terminals unsecured – which in and of itself would make little sense. That’s why airports are not considered secured until each terminal in the airport has been secured, and a secure perimeter is built around the airport to keep attackers out. In 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated US Strategic Command as the focal point for integrating and synchronizing efforts to combat WMD, with Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) as primary support and the Army’s Chem-Bio-Radiological-Nuclear (CBRNE406) 20th support command to “respond-to” and “render-safe” any WMD threat. 407 To achieve these goals, the DTRA408 will need to operate a reliable national detection system to detect HEU across all transportation pathways (vehicles) accessible to terrorists within Nuclear Defense Zones (NDZs) surrounding each metropolitan area and military base. Actionable information on HEU content and integrity of the NDZ operations in each city, with near-zero false-negatives or false-positives, needs to be generated by DTRA and made accessible to the Army, Navy, and Air Force by securely reading out and processing detector readings for each vehicle. As an alternative or supporting function to the DTRA, the National Security Agency (NSA) may be in a stronger position to fulfill the large-scale, distributed, secure computational requirements to reliably operate a national nuclear detection system. The “Global Nuclear Detection Architecture” 409 proposed in the DNDO charter is a mirage, and reliable detection on a global scale is not achievable in the near term—a


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domestic, metropolitan nuclear detection architecture is a more solvable problem that can result in a reliable nuclear detection system around primary targets. Defense Research & Engineering (DR&E) should be charged with the responsibility of engineering a national nuclear detection architecture and reliable detection portal (RDP) capable of detecting HEU in every vehicle. This involves addressing the “applied research challenges” listed in the previous section. This activity can be kicked-off as part of a national security presidential directive (NSPD), similar to how research for tamper-proof nuclear weapons was initiated in NSPD 28 and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established in NSPD 43. 410 Congress should require that DR&E invest in nuclear detection systems at least at a level comparable411 to missile defense spending which is currently $10 billion412 annually (out of a total annual DR&E budget exceeding $70 billion) and projected to remain around that level for over a decade.413 DTRA (and possibly NSA) will need to operate a large-scale secure network to monitor all the detectors across each of these pathways to reliably pinpoint the location of smuggled HEU. DR&E should work out operational aspects and trial a system to gain a handle on costs/phases/timeline of implementation on a large scale, such as in DC or New York. Existing policy for nuclear detection is not aggressive enough, as Senator Kyl points out,

“Finally, I would like to consider the proposition that the US is approaching the issue of nuclear detection at far too leisurely a pace… If a nuclear 9/11 is in fact the greatest existential danger facing this nation, then we must ensure that we are acting in a manner proportionate to the threat. That includes providing adequate funding, adequate authority, and adequate attention to the relevant agencies of our government.”414

Conclusion Security policies that ignore the adversary will not be successful. With the current gaps in our security against “clandestine nuclear attack” or “nuclear terrorism,” the US Department of Defense should come to terms with how this is consistent with its mission415, “To provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States. Everything we do supports that primary mission. Nothing less is acceptable to us, or to the American people.”416 In comparison to the historical focus on regional threats and security,417 all military service branches should conduct a comprehensive review and reassessment of their collective capability in dealing with the global threat of nuclear terrorism perpetrated by transnational, non-state actors or clandestine attack from hostile nation-states. They should identify all the changes, needed for the US to be reliably secured against this threat, and then work to fund/implement those necessary changes.

1. Complete Intelligence Coverage: For example, consider multiplying the budget and operations for intelligence on clandestine nuclear networks and programs to ensure sufficient coverage in all risk areas—this has shown success with the dismantling of parts of the AQ Khan network—remains to be seen if this has been


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fully dismantled.418 Failures and setbacks shave shown intelligence improvements are unlikely to be enough.

2. Global HEU cleanout: Make it a priority to convince all nations to secure and destroy their HEU, and convert to using LEU instead for research & power generation. This is outside of the US control and will never be sufficient until all HEU can be fully eliminated.

3. Reliable Nuclear Detection: We described the concept of a “Nuclear Defense Zone” (NDZs) to protect cities, metropolitan areas, and military bases. The NDZ starts with an impenetrable barrier around a city or base perimeter (ground, water, and air) and permits vehicles to enter only if they can be guaranteed to be free of HEU. Most forms of ground transportation can be screened at entry points of the NDZ using reliable detection portals (RDPs), provided the portal detection technology can be proven to handle millions of vehicles per day. Detection solutions for some transportation pathways are intractable, such as ships at seaports co-located near cities or private aircraft not screened at airports. These need to be relocated far away from populated centers.

International measures alone may be insufficient to halt the physically unverifiable activities of uranium enrichment and black market trade of HEU in foreign countries. Outbound investments in foreign intelligence gathering, international nonproliferation efforts to stop production of new HEU, securing HEU stockpiles, detection of HEU at foreign borders, and finally post-attack attribution/planning should all be redoubled to achieve maximum dissuasion and prevention. The problem of containing and securing one part per million of HEU stocks across fifty countries is unachievable in a reasonable time-frame, especially as the number of nations capable of producing HEU is rising. Advance warning of a nuclear terrorist attack of less than a few years is unlikely—we find that over the last 50 years, US Intelligence estimates on foreign nuclear capability have been accurate to only +/- 5 years, are chronically incomplete, and unreliable. We also find that post-blast evidence after an attack will be unable to reliably identify the source of HEU in order to shut down the supply HEU chain, assign responsibility, or deter aggressors. The scale of foreign nuclear detection required far exceeds that of US domestic nuclear detection, and is likely to take much longer to achieve if ever. To complement the national border, reliable, concentric city-wide and metropolitan HEU detection programs may be necessary to dissuade smugglers and terrorists from transporting and positioning HEU in or near a populated area or megalopolis. A Hiroshima-sized bomb built from HEU could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, casualties in the millions, and trillions of dollars of economic damage. The cheapest and stealthiest way to deliver a nuclear weapon into a metropolitan area is by using one of many commercial or private transportation pathways that today go unchecked by the military (including ground, air, and sea pathways). The easiest way to make a nuclear weapon is to steal or obtain approximately 50 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from existing stocks. The Department of Defense should be determine how to verify that every vehicle within tens of miles of a major city or military base (a “Nuclear Defense Zone”) is free of


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significant quantities of fissile nuclear materials—including all forms of HEU. Proliferation of HEU continues, increasing the risk that it may be exploited for nuclear terrorism by non-state actors or clandestine attack by a nation-state to deploy a fissile nuclear weapon against US or international targets. The DoD has to step up to the threat of clandestine attack and nuclear terrorism with foreign HEU. DoD must apply all its resources to the problem as outlined using DTRA, DRE, Army, Navy and Air Force in an integrated program that incorporates the work of DNDO. Intelligence is unlikely to be able to identify and stop all inbound threats arising from HEU. Attribution of the source of the HEU using nuclear forensics on the unexploded material used in an attack may not be reliable and may be ambiguous especially when the potential sources include countries with clandestine nuclear programs. To dissuade smugglers from trying to acquire and use HEU, the DoD will need to learn how to efficiently verify that every vehicle within a safe radius of a major metro area is free of significant quantities of fissile nuclear materials including all forms of HEU—a Nuclear Defense Zone (NDZ). To dissuade adversaries from planning clandestine nuclear attack or nuclear terrorism, the DoD should be prepared to intercept all shipments of HEU before they enters an NDZ by any pathway that is within the capability of these adversaries. Actionable information on HEU content at the borders of an NDZ needs to be mined by DTRA (or NSA) and be made accessible to Army, Navy, and Air Force which then needs to take control of the HEU. DR&E (Defense Research & Engineering) should own the responsibility of engineering a reliable NDZ capable of detecting HEU in every vehicle using a combination of passive gamma/neutron detectors, passive muon drive-thru portals and active interrogation of large vehicles with muons or neutrons. Detection solutions for some transportation pathways are intractable, like ships at seaports co-located near cities, and they need to be either relocated far away from populated centers or removed entirely.

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the following individuals for their guidance and support as we wrote this paper: Dr. Eric Dickson, Janet Blumenfeld, Ed Kinsey, Dr. Charles Ferguson, Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, Dr. Roy Schwitters, Dr. Jonathan Katz, Jonathan Goldenstein, Debra Decker, Dev Shenoy, Dr. Michael Levi, Dr. Richard Kouzes, Michael Ramage, and Dr. Chris Morris.

Appendix: The effect of horizontal spreading in passive muon detection Back-of-the-envelope estimates below using the Gaussian distribution for scattering confirm that the total number of such events drops off asymptotically to zero the more spread out the material is. This would turn spreading and its variants into an effective countermeasure to muon detection. Imagine splitting a cylinder of highly enriched uranium (of thickness T, any shape) into N slices and arranging them horizontally side by side -- just like slicing a loaf of bread and arranging the slices on a table. If S is the standard deviation of the Gaussian in


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equations describing the scattering angle of the muon, then S ~ SQRT(T/N) because T/N is the vertical distance travelled by the muon through each slice.419 The T/N value underestimates the path length of most muons by at most SQRT(2) since most muons arrive at most 45-degrees from the normal. So you could add a factor of SQRT(2) to be conservative, which would only be a proportionality factor in the equations below. Therefore, the number of scattering events greater than some threshold angle A is given by the complementary error function ERFC(A/S) ~ ERFC(A SQRT(N/T)), where ERF + ERFC = 1. 420 For large x, ERFC(x) = EXP(-x^2)/x – the most significant term in the asymptotic series which is a mathematical result. By spreading out the N slices horizontally, you get at most N times more cosmic muons whose paths cross the material than if there it was all one object (as a single slice) assuming muons arrive vertically. This is an upper bound since you may get some muons also arrive at larger angles from the normal. If the cosmic muons arrived isotropically (which they don’t), one might say that muons intersecting the slices does not increase compared to if the same mass was in one cylinder with N=1 (in that approximation the main result of the analysis is only strengthened). In summary, the expected number of large scattering events is expected to grow with N as ~ N * ERFC(A / S) ~ N * ERFC(A SQRT(N/T)) ~ N * EXP(-A^2 * N / T) / A SQRT(N/T) using the asymptotic approximation above ~ SQRT(N * T) * EXP(-A^2 * N / T) / A So the number of large scattering events tends to zero as the number of slices in increases (N -> infinity) because the exponential (in N) dominates the SQRT term (in N). So at some finite N, slicing or spreading will make the uranium undetectable by muon detection equipment—the exact thickness needed to evade a muon detector would need to be determined by simulation or experiment. The actual distribution may not be Gaussian and have long tails. Without repeating the analysis using the Moliere distribution, it would still have to have a longer tail than 1/SQRT(N) which is no longer a probability distribution. So the same conclusions regarding spreading or dispersion as a countermeasure should hold. 1 p. 344, Thomas Kean, et. al., “The 9/11 Commission Report” <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> 2 Sonia Ben, “Nuclear terrorism's fatal assumptions” (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 23, 2007) <http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/sonia-ben-ouagrham-gormley/20071023.html> 3 See p. 36, Peter D. Zimmerman, Jeffrey G. Lewis “The Bomb in the Backyard” (Foreign Policy, November/December 2006


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4 “To thwart nuclear terror, US directs trade partners to inspect 11 million cargo containers” (International Herald Tribune, August 23, 2007) <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/23/america/NA-GEN-US-Port-Security.php>; “Public Law 110–53: IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007” (Library of Congress, August 3, 2007) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00001:> 5 “U.S. Congress sends bill carrying out Sept. 11 Commission recommendations to president” (International Herald Tribune, July 27, 2007) < http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/27/america/NA-GEN-US-Homeland-Security.php>; 6 US Customs and Border Protection, “On a Typical Day...” <http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/typical_day.ctt/typical_day.pdf > 7 William Branigin, “Chertoff: U.S. 'Unequivocally' Safer Now From Attacks, Secretary Says Security Gaps Remain for Private Airplanes, Small Boats” (Washington Post, September 5, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/05/AR2007090501215.html> 8 Michael Chertoff, “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at a Symposium on Improvised Explosive Devices in the United States” (Department of Homeland Security, October 19, 2007) <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1192831792023.shtm> 9 MICHAEL T. McCAUL, “A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border” (HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY) <http://www.house.gov/mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-Border-Report.pdf> ; Gregory D. Kutz and John W. Cooney, “BORDER SECURITY: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations” (Government Accountabilty Office, September 27, 2007, GAO-07-884T) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07884t.pdf> 10 “The United States” (CIA Factbook, June 19, 2007) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html 11See Table 2, page 42, “ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated”(Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-770, August, 2006) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf> 12 p. 2-3, MICHAEL T. McCAUL, “A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border” (HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY) <http://www.house.gov/mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-Border-Report.pdf> 13 p. 6, “DRUG CONTROL: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations” (Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-200, November, 2005) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06200.pdf> 14 p. 3, MICHAEL T. McCAUL, “A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border” (HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY) <http://www.house.gov/mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-Border-Report.pdf> 15 “Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez summed it up this way: ‘I dare to say that at any given time, daytime or nighttime, one can get on a boat and traverse back and forth between Texas and Mexico and not get caught. If smugglers can bring in tons of marijuana and cocaine at one time and can smuggle 20 to 30 persons at one time, one can just imagine how easy it would be to bring in 2 to 3 terrorists or their weapons of mass destruction across the river and not be detected. Chances of apprehension are very slim.’” on p. 30, MICHAEL T. McCAUL, “A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border” (HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY) <http://www.house.gov/mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-Border-Report.pdf> 16 “With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported Radioactive sources across Both Borders” in Gregory Kutz, Keith Rhodes, and Gene Aloise, “Border Security: Investigation Successfully Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation 's Borders at Selected Locations” (Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-545) <http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/GAOREPORTBorder.pdf> 17 “The ABC News Nuclear Smuggling Experiment: The Sequel The continuing saga of NRDC's uranium slug and the potential consequences.” (Natural Resourced Defense Council, September 11, 2003) <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/furanium.asp> 18Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz, “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost” (Public Policy Institute of California, 2006) <http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_606JHR.pdf>;


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19 Jon Fox, “Congress Agrees on Overseas Cargo Scanning” (Global Security Newswire, July 20, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_7_20.html#85BFE54C> 20 p. 1-15 and 1-17“National Planning Scenarios” (The Homeland Security Council, April, 2005, Version 20.1, DRAFT) <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf> 21 “Budget of the United States Government, FY 2008: Department of Homeland Security” (Office of Management and Budge, 2007) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/homeland.html>; See p. 5, “The Department of Homeland Security’s R&D Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2008” (U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION, March 8, 2007) <http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings/2007/tech/08mar/hearing_charter.pdf> 22 John Kyl, “DETECTING SMUGGLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS” (SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY, AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 27 JULY 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Kyl.pdf> 23 Pete Nanos, “Statement of Dr. George P. Nanos Associate Director Research and Development Enterprise, Defense Threat Reduction Agency” (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Concerning U.S. Nuclear Detection Capabilities, July 27, 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Nanos.pdf> 24 Vayl Oxford, “Opening Statement Of Mr. Vayl S. Oxford Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Department of Homeland Security” (Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, July 27, 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Oxford.pdf> ; Also see “Securing the Cities” initiative of the DNDO, p. 5, Vayl Oxford, “The Nuclear and Radiological Threat: Securing the Global Supply Chain, Opening Statement of Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security” (Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, March 28, 2006) <http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMTDNDOOxford.pdf>; Vayl Oxford, “DNDO Overview” (American Association for the Advancement of Science, April 20, 2006) 25 Pete Nanos, “Statement of Dr. George P. Nanos Associate Director Research and Development Enterprise, Defense Threat Reduction Agency” (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Concerning U.S. Nuclear Detection Capabilities, July 27, 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Nanos.pdf> 26 Aoki; See Secure Freight Initiative in “Radiation Detection Testing Underway at Two Foreign Sea Ports” (DHS, April 11, 2007) <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1176319613900.shtm> and “Secure Freight Initiative: Vision and Operations Overview” (DHS, December 7, 2006) <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1165943729650.shtm> 27 Steven Aoki, “Statement of Dr. Steven Aoki Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Counterterrorism” (Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, July 27, 2006) <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2006/2006-07-27_SJC_Nuclear_Detection_Hearing_(Aoki).pdf > 28 Michael Chertoff and Vayl Oxford, “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and DNDO Director Vayl Oxford at a Press Conference to Announce Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) Program Contracts” (Department of Homeland Security, July 14, 2006) <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0953.shtm> 29 “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits” (Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-133R) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07133r.pdf> ; “COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis” (Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-581T, March 14, 2007) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07581t.pdf> 30 Robert O'Harrow Jr., “Radiation-Monitor Study Sought: Chertoff Wants Cost-Benefit Analysis of New Security Machines” (Washington Post, August 1, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/31/AR2007073101901.html>; Robert O'Harrow Jr., “Review of Radiation Detectors Questioned” (Washington Post, August 16, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-


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dyn/content/article/2007/08/15/AR2007081502222.html?sub=AR> ; Robert O'Harrow Jr., “Radiation Detector Program Delayed” (Washington Post, July 20, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/19/AR2007071902615.html> 31 Hugh Gusterson, “Nuclear terrorism: Correcting the future” (The Bulletin Online, June 5, 2007) <http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/hugh-gusterson/20070605.html> 32 Take for instance the case of terrorist use of explosives in airports versus outside airports. After the introduction of airport security measures, terrorists have avoided using explosives inside airports while their use outside airports (roadside bombs for example) has grown substantially. See p. 596-599, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 33 See page 10, Physicians for Social Responsibility, “The US And Nuclear Terrorism: Still Dangerously Unprepared, Physicians for Social Responsibility (August 2006)” <http://www.psr.org/site/PageServer?pagename=StillDangerouslyUnpreparedCopy>; page 1-1, “National Planning Scenarios”; Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, “The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City” (Harvard and Stanford Universities, May, 2007) <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/DayAfterWorkshopReport_May2007.pdf> 34 See J. A. C. NICOL, “THE HOMING ABILITY OF THE CARRIER PIGEON AND ITS VALUE IN WARFARE” <http://elibrary.unm.edu/sora/Auk/v062n02/p0286-p0298.pdf> Here they say the carrier pigeon can carry 1/16 of its weight. 35 “drug traffickers continue to escape technological advances in surveillance by sending flocks of pigeons, each carrying ten grams of heroin, between Afghanistan and Pakistan.” See Mary Blume, “The hallowed history of the carrier pigeon” (International Herald Tribune, January 30, 2004) <http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/01/30/blume_ed3__1.php> ; A carrier pigeon is described as carrying 75 grains (5 grams) “PIGEONS AS PHOTOGRAPHERS” (The Literary Digest, Funk & Wagnalls Co., Publishers Vol XXXVIII, No. 2; January 9, 1909, pp 52-53) <http://www.deadmedia.org/notes/44/440-comment.html> ; A pigeon weighs approximately 500g so 1/16 of that would be ~30g, H. PHILIP ZEIGLER1, H.L. GREEN AND J.SIEGEL, “Food and Water Intake and Weight Regulation in the Pigeon” (Physiology and Behavior Vol. 8, pp. 127-134. Brain Research Publications, Inc., 1972) <http://www.npi.ucla.edu/sleepresearch/127/127.pdf> 36 p. 51, US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2006” <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> 37 “DHS Awards $33 Million for Stand-Off Radiation Detector System (SORDS) Demonstrations” (Department of Homeland Security, October 1, 2007) <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1191270633797.shtm> 38 p. 18, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; 39 Gabriele Rennie, “Imagers to Provide Eyes to See Gamma Rays” (Science & Technology Review, May 10, 2006) <http://www.llnl.gov/str/May06/Fabris.html>; KLAUS-PETER ZIOCK, “Gamma-Ray Imaging Spectroscopy” (Science & Technology Review, October, 1995) <http://www.llnl.gov/str/pdfs/10_95.2.pdf>; Vetter, K.; Burks, M.; Mihailescu, L., “Gamma-ray imaging with position-sensitive HPGe detectors” (Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A, Volume 525, Issue 1-2, p. 322-327) <http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004NIMPA.525..322V> 40 pp. 578-591, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); p. 1-25, Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew McKinzie, and Art Seavey “An Assessment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Detect HEU in Cargo Containers Using Passive Radiation Portal Monitors” (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005) 41 “…weapons-grade uranium can be effectively shielded from traditional detection techniques” on p. 5 Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, “Report to the President of the United States” (The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005) <http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf> 42 Several examples such as canoes, oil tankers, private jets, horseback, etc. are analyzed in p. 573-574, 595-596, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF


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NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 43Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew McKinzie, and Art Seavey “An Assessment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Detect HEU in Cargo Containers Using Passive Radiation Portal Monitors” (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005) 44 See p. 10, Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, ‘‘Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack,’’ (Washington, DC, June 2004,) <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-06-Clandestine_Nuclear_Attack.pdf> 45 p. 574-577, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 46 See p. 582 and Figure 6 on p. 586, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 47 See p. 3-4, 16-20, 28-29 “GAO-06-311: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries” (Government Accountability Office, March, 2006) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06311.pdf > 48 Gregory D. Kutz and John W. Cooney, “BORDER SECURITY: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations” (Government Accountabilty Office, September 27, 2007, GAO-07-884T) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07884t.pdf> 49 “Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area Estimates” (US Census Bureau, 2006) <http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/metro_general/2006/CBSA-EST2006-01.csv> and <http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/CBSA-est2006-pop-chg.html> 50 The following link has a map of all MSAs in the United States. <http://ftp2.census.gov/geo/maps/metroarea/us_wall/Dec2006/cbsa_us_1206.pdf> 51 “Washington, DC ADIZ Flight Restrictions Map” (Navy Annapolis Flight Center, 2006) <http://www.nafcflying.org/DCADIZ.htm>; James Fallows, “Restricting Airspace -- And Common Sense” (Washington Post, November 2, 2005) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101291.html?nav=rss_opinion/columns> 52 “NOTAM Number : FDC 6/2238” (Federal Aviation Authority, February 22, 2006) <http://tfr.faa.gov/save_pages/detail_6_2238.html> ;“Washington D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” (AeroPlanner, 2007) <http://www.aeroplanner.com/notams/DCADIZ.cfm> 53 WILLIAM J. PERRY, ASHTON B. CARTER and MICHAEL M. MAY, “After the Bomb” (New York Times, June 12, 2007) <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/061207_carter.html> <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/opinion/12carter.html?_r=1&oref=slogin> 54 COREY KILGANNON “Suburban Police Enlisted to Help Protect the City” (New York Times, September 11, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/11/nyregion/11secure.html> 55 “Mack said human intelligence led to the discovery of the underground structure. Agents then used ground-penetrating radar technology from the military to find anomalies in the soil, she said.” in Kevin Bohn, “Feds smoke out largest drug tunnel yet” (CNN Washington Bureau, January 26, 2006) <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/01/26/mexico.tunnel/> 56 “The DEA said since Sept. 11, the U.S. government has uncovered more than 40 tunnels along California and Arizona's border with Mexico.” – See THERESA COOK and JACK DATE, “Feds Find Hidden Border Tunnel” (ABC News, July 3, 2007) <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3331105>; 57 p. 596-599, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 58 See Baltimore, MD “Interstate 95 Annual Average Daily Traffic” (Virginia Department of Transportation 2002 AADT) <http://www.interstate-guide.com/i-095.html> 59 Interchange 13, “Interstate 83 Maryland Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT)” <http://www.interstate-guide.com/i-083_aadt.html> 60 See Baltimore/695, “Interstate 795 Maryland Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT)” <http://www.interstate-guide.com/i-795_md.html>


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61 Interchange 48, “Interstate 70 Utah Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT)” <http://www.interstate-guide.com/i-070_aadt.html> 62 See Exit 5, “Interstate 270 Maryland Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT)” <http://www.interstate-guide.com/i-270_md.html> 63 Interchange 60, “Interstate 66 District of Columbia Annual Average Daily Traffic” (Source: Virginia Department of Transportation 2002 AADT) <http://www.interstate-guide.com/i-066_aadt.html> 64 See Alexandria, VA “Interstate 95 Annual Average Daily Traffic” (Virginia Department of Transportation 2002 AADT) <http://www.interstate-guide.com/i-095.html> 65 “Washington Airports Served 41.5 Million Passengers in 2006” (Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, February 7, 2007) <http://www.mwaa.com/_/file/_/pr20070207.pdf> 66 “Washington Airports Served 41.5 Million Passengers in 2006” (Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, February 7, 2007) <http://www.mwaa.com/_/file/_/pr20070207.pdf> 67 “BWI FACTS AND FIGURES” (Baltimore Washington International Airport, 2007) <http://www.bwiairport.com/about_bwi/general_statistics/> 68 US Customs and Border Protection, “On a Typical Day...” <http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/typical_day.ctt/typical_day.pdf > 69 See page 8, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits” (Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-133R) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07133r.pdf> ; “COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis” (Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-581T, March 14, 2007) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07581t.pdf> 70 US Customs and Border Protection, “On a Typical Day...” <http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/typical_day.ctt/typical_day.pdf > 71 Gary W. Phillips, David J. Nagel, and Timothy Coffey, “A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons” (Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University, July 2005) <http://ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2013%20Primer%20on%20Detection.pdf> 72 See the following references for a discussion of the field. Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114> ; Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; Gerald L. Epstein, “Technologies to Detect Materials for Nuclear/Radiological Weapons” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 10, 2004) <http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/khb3/CPASS/media/Epstein.ppt> ; Alexander Glaser, “Detection of Special Nuclear Materials” (Princeton University April 16, 2007) <http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/lecture2007_detection.pdf> 73 See p. 594, “Compton Imaging of Gamma Rays” on p. 597, and “Coded Aperture Imaging” on p.603 Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114>; p. 579, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); Gabriele Rennie, “Imagers to Provide Eyes to See Gamma Rays” (Science & Technology Review, May 10, 2006) <http://www.llnl.gov/str/May06/Fabris.html>; KLAUS-PETER ZIOCK, “Gamma-Ray Imaging Spectroscopy” (Science & Technology Review, October, 1995) <http://www.llnl.gov/str/pdfs/10_95.2.pdf>; Vetter, K.; Burks, M.; Mihailescu, L., “Gamma-ray imaging with position-sensitive HPGe detectors” (Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A, Volume 525, Issue 1-2, p. 322-327) <http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004NIMPA.525..322V> 74 p. 584, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); p. 20, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic


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Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; 75 p. 584, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 76 p. 594, Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) ; <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114>; p. 580, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 77 Richard Kouzes, et. al., “Passive Neutron Detection for Interdiction of Nuclear Material at Borders” (Pacific Northwest Laboratory, October 8, 2007) to appear in Nuclear Instruments and Methods. 78 p. 584, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); p. 20, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; 79 p. 584, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 80 C. L. Morris, et. al. “Tomographic Imaging with Cosmic Ray Muons” (Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-07-3100) to appear in Science & Global Security; Konstantin N. Borozdin, et. al., “Radiographic imaging with cosmic-ray muons” (NATURE, VOL 422, 20 MARCH 2003); p. 601, Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/p/pdfs/muon1.pdf > <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114>; Konstantin N. Borozdin, et. al., “Scattering Muon Radiography and Its Application to the Detection of High-Z Materials” (Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2003 IEEE, p. 19-25 Oct. 2003, Volume: 2, 1061- 1064 Vol.2) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1351875>; L.J. Schultz, et. al., “Image reconstruction and material Z discrimination via cosmic ray muon radiography” (Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 519, 2004, 687–694) <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6TJM-4B5530X-2&_user=5898323&_coverDate=03%2F01%2F2004&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=5898323&md5=d861adb2254013711f46b7a2f968c588>; William C. Priedhorsky, et. al., “Detection of high-Z objects using multiple scattering of cosmic ray muons” (REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS, VOLUME 74, NUMBER 10 OCTOBER 2003) <http://scitation.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=RSINAK000074000010004294000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=yes> ;Rick Chartrand, et. al., “Detecting Nuclear Materials from Cosmic-Ray Muon Scattering Data” (Los Alamos National Lab, 2005) <http://www.ipam.ucla.edu/publications/gss2005/gss2005_5670.pdf>; “Los Alamos National Laboratory Scientists Harness Cosmic Radiation to Search for Nuclear Materials” (Global Security Newswire, February 22, 2005) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_2_22.html>; Nick Hengartner, “Muon Tomography: Passive detection and imaging of high-Z material using cosmic ray muons” (Workshop on Statistical Inverse Problems University of Göttingen Germany, March 23-25, 2006) <http://www.num.math.uni-goettingen.de/gk/?download=talks_wsip05_Hengartner.pdf>; P. M. Jenneson, “Large vessel imaging using cosmic-ray muons” (Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment, Volume 525, Issues 1-2, 1 June 2004, Pages 346-351) <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6TJM-4C2PXSF-N&_user=10&_coverDate=06%2F01%2F2004&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=61987005a161115e34fb4e5b4403ff0d>; Larry Joe Schultz, et. al., “Cosmic Ray Muon Radiography for Contraband Detection” <http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/p/pdfs/muon2.pdf> ; Holger M. Jaenisch, et. al., “Muon Imaging and Data Modeling” (Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense VI, edited by Edward M. Carapezza, Proc. of SPIE Vol. 6538,


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65380G, 2007) <http:// link.aip.org/link/?PSISDG/6538/65380G/1>; Jonathan Katz, Karol Lang and Roy Schwitters, “Muon Tomography—The Future of Vehicle and Cargo Inspection” (Decision Sciences Corporation, June 4, 2007) 81 p. 604, Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114>; J. T. Mihalczo, “RADIATION DETECTION FOR ACTIVE INTERROGATION OF HEU” (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2004/302) <http://www.ornl.gov/~webworks/cppr/y2004/rpt/122151.pdf#search='heu%20detection>; Dennis Slaughter, et. al., “Detection of special nuclear material in cargo containers using neutron interrogation” (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August 2003) <http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/244044.pdf>; S. Prussin, et. al., “Nuclear car wash status report, August 2005” (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August 16, 2005, UCRL-TR-214636) <http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/purl.cover.jsp?purl=/877756-8AstLV/> ; Dennis R. Slaughter, et. al., “The ‘Nuclear Car Wash’: A Scanner to Detect Illicit Special Nuclear Material in Cargo Containers” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/login.jsp?url=/iel5/7361/21592/101109JSEN2005851013.pdf> ; p. 48, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf>; 82 Warren, Glen A., et. al., “Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence of 235U” (Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2006. IEEE, Oct. 2006) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=4179149> 83 p. 601, Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114> 84 p. 596, Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114> 85 S. Kurennoy, F. Neri, D. Barlow, B. Blind, and A. Jason, “PION-MUON CONCENTRATING SYSTEM FOR DETECTORS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM” (Proceedings of 2005 Particle Accelerator Conference, 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/login.jsp?url=/iel5/10603/33511/01591607.pdf?arnumber=1591607>; p. 18, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; 86 S. Kurennoy, F. Neri, D. Barlow, B. Blind, and A. Jason, “PION-MUON CONCENTRATING SYSTEM FOR DETECTORS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM” (Proceedings of 2005 Particle Accelerator Conference, 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/login.jsp?url=/iel5/10603/33511/01591607.pdf?arnumber=1591607>; p. 18, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; 87 Personal communication from Panofsky, July 26, 2006 88 Joseph C. McDonald, Bert M. Coursey, and Michael Carter, “Detecting Illicit Radioactive Substances” (Physics Today, November, 2004) <http://homeland-security.pnl.gov/pdf/raddetectors-physics_today_nov_04.pdf> ; Richard Hart, “High-Tech Nuke Detectors Tested” (ABC News KGO-TV/DT, March 21, 2007) <http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=drive_to_discover&id=5136547> 89 Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew McKinzie, and Art Seavey “An Assessment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Detect HEU in Cargo Containers Using Passive Radiation Portal Monitors” (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005); 90 p. 594, Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) ; Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew McKinzie, and Art Seavey “An Assessment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Detect HEU in Cargo Containers Using Passive Radiation Portal Monitors” (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005); 91 p. 601, Roger C. Byrd, et. al., “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack” (IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1468114>


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92 p. 582, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 93 See slide 20, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt> 94 See Figures 2-5, 7-8, pp. 574-591, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); p. 1-25, Cochran 95 p. 604, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 96 See table 1, in R. Kouzes, et. al., “NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN CARGO AT U.S. BORDERS” (RAMTRANS 390 Vol. 00, No. 0, pp. 1–9, 2005); Richard Kouzes, et. al., “Naturally occurring radioactive materials in cargo at US borders” (Packaging, Transport, Storage and Security of Radioactive Material, Volume 17, Number 1, 2006 , pp. 11-17, 7) <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/maney/ptssrm/2006/00000017/00000001/art00004> 97 p. 582 and Figure 6 on p. 586, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 98 p. 4, Steven Aoki, “Statement of Dr. Steven Aoki Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Counterterrorism” (Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, July 27, 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Aoki.pdf>; 99 p. 3, Steven Aoki, “Statement of Dr. Steven Aoki Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Counterterrorism” (Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, July 27, 2006) <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2006/2006-07-27_SJC_Nuclear_Detection_Hearing_(Aoki).pdf > 100 p. 48, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf>; 101 John Roach, “Cosmic Particles Could Detect Nuke Materials, Scientists Say” (National Geographic News, March 19, 2003) <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/03/0319_030319_cosmicrays.html> 102 Konstantin N. Borozdin, et. al., “Radiographic imaging with cosmic-ray muons” (NATURE, VOL 422, 20 MARCH 2003); Steve Fetter, Thomas B. Cochran, Lee Grodzins, Harvey L. Lynch, and Martin S. Zucker, ‘‘Gamma-Ray Measurements of a Soviet Cruise-Missile Warhead,’’ (Science 248, May 18, 1990, pp. 828-834); Steve Fetter, Valery A. Frolov, Marvin Miller, Robert Mozley, Oleg F. Prilutsky, Stanislav N. Rodionov, and Roald Z. Sagdeev, ‘‘Detecting Nuclear Warheads,’’ (Science & Global Security 1, 1990, pp. 225-302). 103 “Decision Sciences and Los Alamos Collaborate on Detection System” (Securityinfowatch, May 7th, 2007) <http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/article.jsp?siteSection=482&id=11119>; Erica Sullivan, “3-D Muon Tomography Portfolio” (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2006) <http://www.lanl.gov/source/orgs/tt/license/techs/muon_port.shtml> ;Ted Kochanski, et. al., “MU-Detector, a Novel Method of Detecting Nuclear Weapons, ‘Dirty’ Bombs and Voids in Cargo” (MU-VISION, INC., August 3, 2004) <http://www.mu-vision.com/Composite%20MU-Detector%20Whitepaper_08-03-04.pdf> ; 104 “Los Alamos National Laboratory Scientists Harness Cosmic Radiation to Search for Nuclear Materials” (Global Security Newswire, February 22, 2005) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_2_22.html>; 105 See slide 21, Rick Chartrand, et. al., “Detecting Nuclear Materials from Cosmic-Ray Muon Scattering Data” (Los Alamos National Lab, 2005) <http://www.ipam.ucla.edu/publications/gss2005/gss2005_5670.pdf> 106 Konstantin N. Borozdin, et. al., “Radiographic imaging with cosmic-ray muons” (NATURE, VOL 422, 20 MARCH 2003); 107 Konstantin N. Borozdin, et. al., “Radiographic imaging with cosmic-ray muons” (NATURE, VOL 422, 20 MARCH 2003);


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108 “Los Alamos National Laboratory Scientists Harness Cosmic Radiation to Search for Nuclear Materials” (Global Security Newswire, February 22, 2005) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_2_22.html>; 109 “Composition of URANIUM OXIDE” (National Institute of Standards) <http://physics.nist.gov/cgi-bin/Star/compos.pl?matno=272> 110 p. 1062, Konstantin N. Borozdin, et. al., “Scattering Muon Radiography and Its Application to the Detection of High-Z Materials” (Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2003 IEEE, p. 19-25 Oct. 2003, Volume: 2, 1061- 1064 Vol.2) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1351875>; 111 For a discussion of the threat posed by “oil tankers,” see Jonathan Medalia, “Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil Tankers” (Congressional Research Service, December 7, 2004) <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21997.pdf> ;See also p. 7-8, Jonathan Medalia, ‘‘Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses,’’ CRS Report for Congress , 2005, The Library of Congress, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/43399.pdf>; 112 S. Kurennoy, F. Neri, D. Barlow, B. Blind, and A. Jason, “PION-MUON CONCENTRATING SYSTEM FOR DETECTORS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM” (Proceedings of 2005 Particle Accelerator Conference, 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/login.jsp?url=/iel5/10603/33511/01591607.pdf?arnumber=1591607> 113 p. 18, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; p. 230-232, A. V. Klimenko, et. al., “Exploring Signatures of Different Physical Processes for Fusion With Scattering Muon Tomography” (IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, VOL. 54, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2007) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=4089167> 114 p. 3-4, 16-20, 28-29“GAO-06-311: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries” (Government Accountability Office, March, 2006) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06311.pdf> 115 p. 3, Steven Aoki, “Statement of Dr. Steven Aoki Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Counterterrorism” (Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, July 27, 2006) <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2006/2006-07-27_SJC_Nuclear_Detection_Hearing_(Aoki).pdf > 116 See slides 4-9, Gerald L. Epstein, “Technologies to Detect Materials for Nuclear/Radiological Weapons” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 10, 2004) <http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/khb3/CPASS/media/Epstein.ppt> 117 AL BAKER, “Subway Searches Go on Quietly, Just How Police Like Them” (New York Times, July 6, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/nyregion/06bags.html?ex=1184385600&en=b1d36cbc46a5878f&ei=5070&emc=eta1> 118 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: a vector autoregression-intervention analysis,” (American Political Science Review 87, 1993, pp. 829-44.) 119 p. 596-599, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); 120 See Charles D. Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NucTerrCSR.pdf>; Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005); Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004); William J. Perry, “Worst Weapons In Worst Hands: U.S. Inaction On The Nuclear Terror Threat Since 9/11 And A Path Of Action” (The National Security Advisory Group, 2005), < http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/NSAG.pdf>; Jonathan Medalia, ‘‘Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses,’’ CRS Report for Congress , 2005, The Library of Congress, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/43399.pdf>; David Howe, ‘‘Planning Scenarios, Executive Summaries, Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities,’’ The Homeland Security Council, July 2004 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/hsc-planning-scenarios-jul04_exec-sum.pdf >; p. 87-95, Joseph Cirincione Bomb Scare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); p. 93-99, Micah Zenko, “Intelligence Estimates of Nuclear Terrorism” (The ANNALS of the American Academy of


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Political and Social Science 2006; 607; 87) <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/607/1/87>; Michael Crowley, ‘‘Can Terrorists Build the Bomb?’’ (Popular Science, Feb. 1, 2005), <http://www.popsci.com/popsci/technology/generaltechnology/22379aa138b84010vgnvcm1000004eecbccdrcrd.html> 121 See Charles D. Ferguson, “Can Bush or Kerry Prevent Nuclear Terrorism?” (Arms Control Today, September 2004) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_09/Ferguson.asp>; Wade Boese, “Bush, Kerry Square Off on Arms Control” (Arms Control Today, October 2004) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Bush_Kerry.asp> ; Ellen Tauscher, “CLINTON, TAUSCHER INTRODUCE LEGISLATION TO HELP PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SAFEGUARD NUCLEAR MATERIALS” <http://www.house.gov/tauscher/Press%202006/12-07-06-02.htm>; Barak Obama, “A foreign classroom for junior senator” <http://obama.senate.gov/news/050923-a_foreign_classroom_for_junior_senator/index.html>, “Richardson warns about 'nuclear 9/11'” <http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/richardson_warns_about_nuclear_911/20070329-120832-7062r/ > 122 See Robert Serber, The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How To Build an Atomic Bomb, (University of California Press, 1992); 123 Matthew Bunn “Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?” (The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1, 133-149, 2006) <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/607/1/133> 124 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Page B07, “Preventing a Nuclear 9/11” (Washington Post, September 12, 2004) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13014-2004Sep10.html> ; “Richardson urges prevention of ‘nuclear 9/11’” (Associated Press, March 28, 2007) <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17837066/> 125 See Barton Gellman, ‘‘Fears Prompt U.S. to Beef Up Nuclear Terror Detection Sensors Deployed Near D.C., Borders; Delta Force on Standby,’’ (Washington Post , March 3, 2002, p. A01) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006061200868.html> 126 Barton Gellman, ‘‘In U.S., Terrorism’s Peril Undiminished, Nation Struggles on Offense and Defense, and Officials Still Expect New Attacks,’’ (Washington Post , Dec. 24, 2002, p. A01) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006061200699.html> 127 p. 7, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 128 p. 5, Kenton J. Moody, Ian D. Hutcheon, Patrick M. Grant, “Nuclear Forensic Analysis” (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005) 129 p. 6, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 130 FRIEDRICH STEINHAUSLER, “What It Takes to Become a Nuclear Terrorist” (AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 46 No. 6, February 2003 782-795) <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20356/abs_fritz.pdf> 131 See “1950s and 1960s: The Clandestine Problem” on p. 90, Micah Zenko, “Intelligence Estimates of Nuclear Terrorism” (The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2006; 607; 87) <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/607/1/87> 132 The exact critical mass for HEU is starts at hundreds of kilograms for 20% enriched HEU and goes down with an increase in the enrichment level, see p. 9, 6, 11, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 133 See Robert S. McNamara “Apocalypse Soon” (Foreign Policy, May/June 2005) ; William Perry, “In Search of a North Korea Policy” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001285.html>; GABRIELLE BIRKNER, “Former Defense Secretary To Urge Better Nuclear Security” (The New York Sun, June 7, 2007) <http://www.nysun.com/article/55955> ; “Rumsfeld Concerned Over Nuclear Proliferation, Pessimistic of U.S. Program to Intercept Illicit Cargo” <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_10_19.html#1B152C68> and <http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20061018/pl_afp/usnkoreairannuclear_061018210926>; “Cheney warns terrorism deadlier than Nazis” <http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/view.php?StoryID=20061024-042945-1219r>; Also see Graham Allison’s comment that the likelihood of nuclear attack on US targets is greater


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than 50% in the next decade in “How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?” (Council on Foreign Relations, April 16, 2007) <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/> ; "The nuclear and ballistic missile programs of nations like Iran and North Korea pose one set of problems for their neighbors," he said. "Another, equally worrisome, possibility is that regimes may sell these weapons and materials to others, including terrorist organizations." See ROBERT BURNS, “Gates urges more help for Afghanistan” (Associated Press, June 1, 2007) <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070602/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_asia>; 134 D E. SANGER and THOM SHANKER, “U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism” (New York Times, May 8, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/washington/08nuke.html?hp> 135 Jerry Seper, “FBI director predicts terrorists will acquire nukes” (Washington Times, June 12, 2007) <http://washingtontimes.com/national/20070611-104521-9295r.htm> 136 James Sterngold, “Contingencies for nuclear terrorist attack” (San Francisco Chronicle, May 11, 2007) <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/05/11/MNG2OPP22R1.DTL> 137 WILLIAM J. PERRY, ASHTON B. CARTER and MICHAEL M. MAY, “After the Bomb” (New York Times, June 12, 2007) <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/061207_carter.html> <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/opinion/12carter.html?_r=1&oref=slogin> 138 Hugh Gusterson, “Nuclear terrorism: The new day after” (The Bulletin Online, 24 July 2007) http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/hugh-gusterson/20070725.html 139 Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, “Missteps in the Bunker” (Washington Post, September 23, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/22/AR2007092201447.html> 140 James Goodby, Timothy Coffey, and Cheryl Loeb, “Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism” (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, July 2007) <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2041%20NuclearDetectionStrategy.pdf> 141 p. 7, Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy, “The Terrorism Index” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/pdf/terrorism_index.pdf> 142 North Korea has pledged to “strictly prohibit any… nuclear transfer.” See Paul Kerr, “North Korean Test Provokes Widespread Condemnation” (Arms Control Today, November 2006) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NKTest.asp> 143 The A. Q. Khan network based in Pakistan transferred Uranium enrichment technology and know-how to multiple nations, which include Iran, Libya, and North Korea. See Sharon Squassoni “Closing Pandora's Box: Pakistan's Role in Nuclear Proliferation” (Arms Control Today, April 2004), <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_04/Squassoni.asp>; Gordon Corera, Shopping For Bombs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 144 Tom Z. Collina and Jon B. Wolfsthal, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia”, (Arms Control Today, April 2002) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/colwolfapril02.asp> 145 HELENE COOPER, “U.S. Weighing Terrorist Label for Iran Guards” (New York Times, August 15, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/world/middleeast/15diplo.html> 146 Lewis A. Dunn, “Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?” (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, July, 2005) <http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/docUploaded/206-186_CSWMD_OCP3WEB.pdf> 147 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Can we win the game of catch-up with determined proliferators?” (Joint hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, 27 June 2007) <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/fit062707.htm> 148 p. 31, US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2006” <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> 149 p. 33, US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2006” 150 p. 287, George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, (New York: HarperCollins, 2007); Also see “Tenet confronted Gen on A Q Khan”, (Press Trust of India, Washington, May 5, 2007) <http://www.indianexpress.com/sunday/story/30213.html> 151 See p. 36, Peter D. Zimmerman, Jeffrey G. Lewis “The Bomb in the Backyard” (Foreign Policy, November/December 2006 152 See page 10, Physicians for Social Responsibility, “The US And Nuclear Terrorism: Still Dangerously Unprepared, Physicians for Social Responsibility (August 2006)”


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<http://www.psr.org/site/PageServer?pagename=StillDangerouslyUnpreparedCopy>; Graham Allison., “Blast Maps” < http://www.nuclearterror.org/blastmaps.html>; and page 1-1, “National Planning Scenarios” (The Homeland Security Council, April, 2005, Version 20.1, DRAFT) <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf>; William C Bell and Cham E Dallas, “Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities” International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 <http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5>; ); p. 27-35, Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew McKinzie, and Art Seavey “An Assessment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Detect HEU in Cargo Containers Using Passive Radiation Portal Monitors” (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005); Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, “The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City” (Harvard and Stanford Universities, May, 2007) <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/DayAfterWorkshopReport_May2007.pdf> 153 See p. 103, Matthew Bunn, “A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism” (The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2006; 607; 103) ; Tom Cousins and Barbara Reichmuth, “Preliminary Analysis of the Economic Impact of a Nuclear Weapon Event in Vancouver” (Batelle, May 31. 2007) <http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/vancouver-post-d.pdf> 154 “The World Factbook: The United States” (Central Intelligence Agency, 10 May, 2007) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/us.html> 155 p. 63, Joseph Cirincione Bomb Scare 156 GARY L. ACKERMAN, “A.Q. KHAN’S NUCLEAR WALMART: OUT OF BUSINESS OR UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT?” (SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, JUNE 27, 2007) <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ackerman062707.htm>; David Albright, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks” (House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, June 27, 2007) <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/alb062707.htm> 157 p. 64-68, Joseph Cirincione Bomb Scare 158 Paul Kerr “U.S. Pushes to Restart North Korea Talks” (Arms Control Today, May 2005) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/NK_Talks.asp> 159 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy” (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006) <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204-p0/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html> 160 C J Parry, “The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036” (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, January, 2007) <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/5CB29DC4-9B4A-4DFD-B363-3282BE255CE7/0/strat_trends_23jan07.pdf> 161 “Limits to the Safeguards System” (International Atomic Energy Agency) <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards/pia3810.html> ; Also 162 See Paul Leventhal, “SAFEGUARDS SHORTCOMINGS---A CRITIQUE” (Nuclear Control Institute, September 12, 1994) <http://www.nci.org/p/plsgrds.htm>; Some accounts categorically understate the significance posed by smuggling incidents involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) “In all the cases of nuclear smuggling reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency since the collapse of the Soviet Union, none have involved significant amounts of fissionable materials.” See Steve Coll, “The Unthinkable” (The New Yorker, March 12, 2007) <http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/12/070312fa_fact_coll> 163 See “Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials”, p. 119-138, Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks, A net assessment” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2, 2007) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/>; Lyudmila Zaitseva, “Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking: DSTO Case Study 2001-2005” (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 25-27, 2006) <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/Presentations/Zaitseva_Monterey_2006.pdf>; See “IAEA ILLICIT TRAFFICKING DATABASE (ITDB): Confirmed Incidents, 1993-2005” in International Atomic Energy Agency, “Illicit Trafficking and Other Unauthorized Activities involving Nuclear and Radioactive Materials”; Peter Crail, “Reported Incidents of Trafficking Up in 2006” (Arms Control Today, October, 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_10/Trafficking.asp>


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164 See “Incidents involving HEU and Pu confirmed to the ITDB, 1993-2005” in International Atomic Energy Agency, “Illicit Trafficking and Other Unauthorized Activities involving Nuclear and Radioactive Materials” (IAEA, 2006) <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/fact_figures2005.pdf>; Also see p. 2, Hui Zhang , “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Reducing the Danger of Highly Enriched Uranium” (INMM 44th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona. Conference Paper, INMM, 2003) <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/HEU_INMM03_hui.pdf.pdf> 165 See p. 125, Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks, A net assessment” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2, 2007) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/> 166 “U.K. Stops Iranian Nuclear Smuggling Effort” (Global Security Newswire, June 11, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_6_11.html#7C9358B4> 167 p. 822-823, LYUDMILA ZAITSEVA and KEVIN HAND “Nuclear Smuggling Chains” (AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 46 No. 6, February 2003 822-844) <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20357/abs_zaitseva.pdf> ; 168 p. 823, LYUDMILA ZAITSEVA and KEVIN HAND “Nuclear Smuggling Chains” (AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 46 No. 6, February 2003 822-844) <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20357/abs_zaitseva.pdf> 169 Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, “An Unrealized Nexus? WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union” (Arms Control Today, July/August 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/CoverStory.asp> 170 p. 3, “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces,” (National Intelligence Council, April, 2006) <http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/russia0406.pdf> 171 See p. 127, Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks, A net assessment” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2, 2007) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/> 172 p. 4, 7, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf>; See “Secure All Nuclear Materials” p. 26-27, 39-40, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 173 LISA A. CURTIS, “U.S. POLICY AND PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CONTAINING THREATS AND ENCOURAGING REGIONAL SECURITY” (HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 27, 2007) <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/cur062707.htm> 174 p. 164-165, p. 107, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 175 See p. 103, Matthew Bunn, “A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism” <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/607/1/103#BIBL> 176 Government Accountability Office, “Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain” <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404>; “U.S. Needs Access to Russian Nuclear Sites, GAO Says” (Global Security Newswire, April 3, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_4_3.html#EAA4A28B>; 177 See Jon Fox, “U.S., Russia Hash Out Nuclear Security Agreement” 178 p. v, MATTHEW BUNN, ANTHONY WIER “Securing the Bomb 2006” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006) <http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb> 179Daryl G. Kimball, “Preventing a Nuclear Katrina” (Arms Control Today, October 2005), <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/focus.asp> 180 p. 107, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf>


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181 p. 124, Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks, A net assessment” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2, 2007) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/> 182 “In pursuit of the undoable: Troubling flaws in the world's nuclear safeguards” (The Economist, Aug 23rd 2007) <http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9687869> 183 See “Separation and Enrichment of U Isotopes” in Kenton J. Moody, Ian D. Hutcheon, Patrick M. Grant, “Nuclear Forensic Analysis” 184 Thomas L. Neff, “HEU to LEU = U + SWU” (Arms Control Today, August/September 1998) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_08-09/sidebar.asp>; “Uranium Downblending” (WISE Uranium Project, 20 Aug 2005) <http://www.wise-uranium.org/eudb.html> 185 Jon fox, “Intelligence Analysts Have Misjudged Nuclear Threats Since Day One, Ex-CIA Official Says” (Global Security Newswire, March 14, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_3_14.html#C4B8D20A>; Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 186 p. 472-473, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 187 “Iraq Profile: Nuclear Overview” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, February, 2006) <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iraq/Nuclear/index.html> 188 Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq” (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85202/paul-r-pillar/intelligence-policy-and-the-war-in-iraq.html> 189 “Many observers and participants in the process have noted the cultural gap between policymakers, who must be goal oriented and inclined to action if they are to succeed, and intelligence analysts, who may feel they have the luxury of kibitzing from the sidelines. There needs to be a better understanding among policy consumers (and the public) of what can and cannot be expected of intelligence, and intelligence analysts need to understand the realities of the policy process and the necessity to engage effectively and professionally.” in p. 475 Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 190 p. 64, Richelson 191 p. 67, Jeffery T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb” (Norton, New York, 2006) 192 p. 67, 76-77, Richelson; p. 468-469, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 193 p. 77, Richelson 194 p. 199, Richelson 195 p. 200, Richelson 196 p. 200, 203-204, Richelson 197 p. 204, Richelson 198 p. 137, Richelson 199 p. 167, Richelson 200 p. 143-144, 146, 150-152, 158, 161, 164, 165-166, Richelson; p. 469-470, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 201 p. 165-166, Richelson 202 p. 238, Richelson 203 p. 242, Richelson 204 p. 247, 254, 257, 261-262, 264, Richelson 205 p. 261-262, Richelson 206 p. 224, Richelson 207 p. 232, Richelson


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208 p. 226-228, 231, Richelson; p. 470-471, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 209 p. 231-232, Richelson 210 p. 244-245, Richelson 211 p. 371, Richelson 212 p. 266, 271, 277-281, 375, Richelson 213 p. 277-281, Richelson 214 p. 328, Richelson 215 p. 344, Richelson 216 p. 338-339, 341, 343-344, 346, Richelson 217 p. 343, Richelson 218 p. 232, Richelson 219 p. 522-523, 529, Richelson 220 p. 358, 522-523, 529, Richelson 221 p. 522-523, Richelson 222 p. 21-22, Richelson 223 p. 53, Richelson 224 p. 27, 44-45, 56, 58-59, Richelson; p. 471-472, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 225 p. 56, 58-59, Richelson 226 p. 516, Richelson 227 p. 506, 508-510, 516, Richelson 228 p. 325, Richelson 229 p. 542, Richelson 230p. 336-337, 542, Richelson 231 p. 542, Richelson 232 p. 321, Richelson 233 p. 447, Richelson 234 p. 334, 348, 353, 355-356, 454, 464, Richelson; p. 472, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 235 p. 464, Richelson 236 p. 321, Richelson 237 p. 496, Richelson 238 p. 476, 483-484, 487-488, Richelson; p. 473, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 239 p. 498, Richelson 240 p. 246, Richelson 241 p. 367, Richelson 242 p. 269-270, Richelson 243 Lawrence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005) <http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf> 244 “Much good work has been and is being done on these perennial challenges, but there is no bureaucratic or organizational fix that can ensure they are satisfactorily addressed.” p. 474, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 245 “Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that even if the IC had done its job perfectly, they would have come to the correct conclusion about Saddam’s WMD programs with the information available.” p. 473, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf>


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246 Bruce Blair, “The Logic of Intelligence Failure” (Center for Defense Information, March 9, 2004) <http://www.cdi.org/blair/logic.cfm> 247 See slides 20-22, Alexander Glaser, “Making Highly Enriched Uranium” (Princeton University, February 26, 2007) <http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/lecture2007_makingheu.pdf> 248For an example of US spying on the Chinese, the US intelligence estimators could not “exclude the possibility that there were other, undetected plutonium production facilities under construction.” See p. 152, Jeffery T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb” 249 David Albright, “Looking for Nukes: An ex-inspector explains the art and science of nuclear detective work, and how it applies to Iran.” (Newsweek, March 26, 2007) <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17659938/site/newsweek/> ; p. 152, p. 105-106 and p. 114, Richelson; p. 25, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf>; 250 This was the case with the US trying to find out about Russian HEU programs, see p. 105-106 and p. 114, Jeffery T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb” (Norton, New York, 2006) ; 251 See “Iran Digs New Tunnels” in “Iran Slows Centrifuge Work, Starts New Tunnels”, (Global Security Newswire, July 9, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_7_9.html#DC7D54A8> 252 Jan Lodding & Tariq Rauf , “IAEA & NPT - The Verification Challenge” (IAEA Bulletin, Volume 46, Number 2) <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull462/nonproliferation_regime.html> 253 David Albright, “When could Iran get the Bomb?” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2006) <http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ja06albright>; p. 4, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 254 p. 72-76, Fitzpatrick; James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal With North Korea” (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003) <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030301faessay10336/james-t-laney-jason-t-shaplen/how-to-deal-with-north-korea.html>; See p. 530, Richelson; Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran” (Arms Control Today, March 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/heckerliou.asp> ; Paul Kerr, “News Analysis: Doubts Rise on North Korea 's Uranium-Enrichment Program” (Arms Control Today, April 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/NewsAnalysis.asp>; North Korean nuclear programs may be fundamentally unverifiable due to concealment in underground tunnels, see Audra Ang, “N. Korea agrees to nuclear disarmament” (Associated Press, February 13, 2007) <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20070213/ai_n17221182> 255 See the statements by Khidir Hamza regarding Iraq’s push for uranium enrichment after the bombing of their nuclear reactor by Israel in “Effect on Iran's Nuclear Program”, Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, “A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences” (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, September 9, 2004) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040812.htm> 256 p. 25, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf>; Also see p. 2-3, Alexander Glaser, “Beyond A.Q.Khan: The Gas Centrifuge, Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, and the NPT Regime” (Alexander Glaser) <http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2004aglaser_beyondkhan.pdf> 257 See “Iran Offers to Spread Nuclear Technology” (Global Security Newswire, December 18, 2006) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_12_18.html#0BE48CD4> 258 p. 59, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 259 p. 58-59, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf>; R. Scott Kemp and Alexander Glaser, “THE GAS CENTRIFUGE AND THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS” (Princeton University, 2007) <http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2007aglaser_splg.pdf> 260 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program” (CRS Report for Congress, October 5, 2006) <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74904.pdf> 261 p. ix-x, Gordon Corera, “Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network” (Oxford University Press, 2006) 262 “the successful penetration and disruption of the network by February 2004 was a major U.S. nonproliferation success” in p. 471, Torrey C. Froscher, “ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION:


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Insights from the Past” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf> 263 The director of the FBI has admitted that nuclear terrorism is currently outside the grip of the US intelligence community. See Jerry Seper, “FBI director predicts terrorists will acquire nukes” (Washington Times, June 12, 2007) <http://washingtontimes.com/national/20070611-104521-9295r.htm> 264 “Iraq Profile: Nuclear Overview” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, February, 2006) <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iraq/Nuclear/index.html> 265 DAVID E. SANGER, “Atomic Agency Confirms Advances by Iran’s Nuclear Program” (New York Times, April 19, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/world/middleeast/19nukes.html?ex=1334635200&en=eb8cfdc190e67053&ei=5088&partner=rs> 266 p. 72-76, Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks, A net assessment” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2, 2007) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/> 267 James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal With North Korea” (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003) <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030301faessay10336/james-t-laney-jason-t-shaplen/how-to-deal-with-north-korea.html> ; See p. 530, Richelson , the National Intelligence Estimate of 2002 was “adamant” that NK moved from R&D to production of HEU; Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran” (Arms Control Today, March 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/heckerliou.asp> ; 268 Jon Fox, “U.S. Lowers Confidence in North Korean HEU Program” (Global Security Newswire, February 28, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_2_28.html#7E044A37> ; Glenn Kessler, “New Doubts On Nuclear Efforts by North Korea: U.S. Less Certain of Uranium Program” (Washington Post, March 1, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/28/AR2007022801977.html> ; Paul Kerr, “News Analysis: Doubts Rise on North Korea 's Uranium-Enrichment Program” (Arms Control Today, April 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/NewsAnalysis.asp> 269 Jon Fox, “U.S. Maintains Assessment of North Korean HEU Program, Ex-Official Says” (Global Security Newswire, May 16, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_5_16.html> 270 William Dunlop and Harold Smith, “Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism” (Arms Control Today, October 2006) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/CVRForensics.asp>; Peter D. Zimmerman/ Hans Binnendijk, “New nuclear deterrents” (Washington Times, August 19, 2007) <http://washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070819/COMMENTARY/108190013/1012> 271 Matthew B. Stannard, “New tools for a new world order: Nuclear forensics touted as method to trace bomb materials, deterrent for rogue nations” (San Francisco Chronicle, October 29, 2006) <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/10/29/MNG32M27K61.DTL> 272 D E. SANGER and THOM SHANKER, “U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism” (New York Times, May 8, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/washington/08nuke.html?hp> ; Jon Fox, “Forensics Policy Debate Edges Toward Spotlight” (Global Security Newswire, June 1, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_6_1.html#7E525C13> ; The source of HEU traces found in Iran was also not attributable, see ELAINE SCIOLINO, “Highly Enriched Uranium Found at Iranian Plant” (New York Times, September 1, 2006) <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/01/world/middleeast/01vienna.html> 273 p. 46-49, Michael Miller “Nuclear Attribution As Deterrence,” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol 14, No 1, March 2007) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141toc.htm> 274 LAWRENCE SCOTT SHEETS and WILLIAM J. BROAD, “Smuggler’s Plot Highlights Fear Over Uranium” (New York Times, January 25, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/europe/25nuke.html> ; Elena Sokova, William C. Potter, and Cristina Chuen, “Recent Weapons Grade Uranium Smuggling Case: Nuclear Materials are Still on the Loose” (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 26, 2007) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070126.htm> ; Justin Reed, “HEU Smuggling Sting Raises Security Concerns” (Arms Control Today, March 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/HEU.asp>


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275 LAWRENCE SCOTT SHEETS and WILLIAM J. BROAD, “Smuggler’s Plot Highlights Fear Over Uranium” (New York Times, January 25, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/europe/25nuke.html> 276 See “Origin of uranium seized in Georgia may never be identified” (Novosti, Moscow, January 30, 2007) <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070130/59912799.html> and “Seized Uranium in Georgia Could Be Untraceable” (Global Security Newswire, January 31, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_1_31.html#5F84352F> and 277 Sidney Niemeyer and David K. Smith, “Following the Clues: The Role of Forensics in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism” (Arms Control Today, July/August 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/Clues.asp> 278 Sidney Niemeyer and David K. Smith, “Following the Clues: The Role of Forensics in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism” (Arms Control Today, July/August 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/Clues.asp> 279 p. 4 and p. 25, Charles D. Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NucTerrCSR.pdf>; p. 27-28, Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11” (The Washington Quarterly, volume 30:2, pp. 21–34, Spring 2007), <http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_talmadge.pdf> 280 p. 4 and p. 25, Charles D. Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NucTerrCSR.pdf>; p. 27-28, Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11” (The Washington Quarterly, volume 30:2, pp. 21–34, Spring 2007), <http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_talmadge.pdf> 281 After the first nuclear test by China, the US was only able to conlude though a process of elimination that the HEU used for the bomb did not come from the USSR, and only therefore China has produced its own HEU—which was a surprise to the US at that time. See page 169, Jeffery T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb”. 282 p. 37, Michael Miller “Nuclear Attribution As Deterrence,” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol 14, No 1, March 2007) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141toc.htm> 283 p. 107, Kenton J. Moody, Ian D. Hutcheon, Patrick M. Grant, “Nuclear Forensic Analysis” (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005) 284 p. 113, Kenton J. Moody, Ian D. Hutcheon, Patrick M. Grant, “Nuclear Forensic Analysis” (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005) 285 p. 107, Kenton J. Moody, Ian D. Hutcheon, Patrick M. Grant, “Nuclear Forensic Analysis” (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005) 286 p. 102-107 and 113, Kenton J. Moody, Ian D. Hutcheon, Patrick M. Grant, “Nuclear Forensic Analysis” (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005) 287 p. 50-51, Miller 288 p. 50-51, Michael Miller “Nuclear Attribution As Deterrence,” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol 14, No 1, March 2007) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141toc.htm> 289 Michael May, Jay Davis and Raymond Jeanloz, “Preparing for the Worst” (Nature, Vol 443, 26 October 2006) ; p. 50-51, Miller 290Debra Decker, “Who Pays When the Bomb Goes Off?” (Foreign Policy, December, 2006) <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3653> ; Oxford Analytica, “U.S. Asks Countries For Nuclear Fingerprints” (Forbes, June 6, 2007) <http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/06/05/nuclear-russia-weapons-biz-cx_0606oxford.html> 291 Jon Fox, “D.P.R.K. Test Spurs U.S. to Discuss Nuclear Attribution” (Global Security Newswire, October 20, 2006) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_10_20.html#C3C7D926> 292 “Carter, speaking here yesterday, said the U.S. catalogue of nuclear fingerprints is incomplete. ‘That is, there would be circumstances where a bomb would go off and we couldn’t pin down where it came from,’ he said…” See Jon Fox, “D.P.R.K. Test Spurs U.S. to Discuss Nuclear Attribution” (Global Security Newswire, October 20, 2006) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_10_20.html#C3C7D926>; D E. SANGER and THOM SHANKER, “U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism” (New York Times, May 8, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/washington/08nuke.html?hp> 293 p. 46-49, Michael Miller “Nuclear Attribution As Deterrence,” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol 14, No 1, March 2007) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141toc.htm>


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294 “in the case of Iran, suppose that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officials got control of some nuclear assets and if there was a continuing power struggle in Tehran -- led to them actually, physically getting control of this and then using it for purposes of selling to an overseas group or a foreign group. And the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, you know, has very extensive contacts with Hamas and Hezbollah and others; they have a very strong commercial inclination, they control large areas of commercial activity in Iran; they have a record of corruption and then we know that there are these power struggles. So that all contributes to a scenario in which you could envision them engaged in some kind of a sale effort.” in Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks” (Federal News Service, May 9, 2007) <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13308/nuclear_black_markets.html> 295See “An Iranian bomb that took out a U.S. city might not be traceable to its source if it had first been put in the hands of terrorists smuggling it into the country the same way large quantities of illegal drugs are routinely brought in.” JAY AMBROSE, “Abizaid's risky proposition” (Scripps Howard News Service, September 18, 2007) <http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/26914> 296 Michael May, Jay Davis and Raymond Jeanloz, “Preparing for the Worst” (Nature, Vol 443, 26 October 2006) 297 p. 50-51, Michael Miller “Nuclear Attribution As Deterrence,” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol 14, No 1, March 2007) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141toc.htm> 298 About the origins of the US long-range nuclear test detection efforts, see p. 77-87, Jeffery T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb”, In particular, there appears to be an historical parallel in the efforts and debates to develop nuclear detection and long-range nuclear test detection, see “Long Range Detection Committee” on p. 80-81. Except that a test with non-state actors would likely be on a real target, not in a desert or on an island. As of 1957, a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the US had “excellent capability (90-100%) for detecting airbursts of 10 kilotons or greater, a good capability (60-90%) with respect to 5-10 kiloton airbursts, and a fair one (30-60%) for 3-5 kiloton bursts. There was a poor capability (0-30%) for airbursts less than 3 kilotons.” See p. 131, T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb” (Norton, New York, 2006) 299 p. 51-61, Jeffery T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb” (Norton, New York, 2006) 300 p. 498, Richelson 301 p. 259-261, Richelson 302 p. 447-469, Richelson 303 Dan Pinkston, “The Status of North Korea's Nuclear Inspections” (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 26, 2002) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020226.htm> ; David E. Sanger, “NORTH KOREA ASSEMBLY BACKS ATOM PACT” (New York Times, April 10, 1992) <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1992/18511682-18516144.htm> 304 “Some diplomats accredited or otherwise linked to the IAEA said some intelligence services believed the Natanz site could also be a front. While attention is focused on Natanz, Iranian scientists and military personnel could be working on a secret enrichment program at one or more unknown sites that is much more advanced, the diplomats said.” in Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran said to install uranium centrifuges” (Boston Globe, January 15, 2007) <http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/01/15/iran_said_to_install_uranium_centrifuges/> 305 p. 367, Richelson 306 p. 360-367, Richelson 307 p. 49, Lawrence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005) <http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf> 308 p. 51-61, Jeffery T. Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb” (Norton, New York, 2006) 309 p. 498, Richelson 310 LAWRENCE SCOTT SHEETS and WILLIAM J. BROAD, “Smuggler’s Plot Highlights Fear Over Uranium” (New York Times, January 25, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/europe/25nuke.html> ; Elena Sokova, William C. Potter, and Cristina Chuen, “Recent Weapons Grade Uranium Smuggling Case: Nuclear Materials are Still on the Loose” (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 26, 2007) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070126.htm> ; Justin Reed, “HEU Smuggling Sting Raises Security Concerns” (Arms Control Today, March 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/HEU.asp>


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311 “The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) receives its first clue about the progress of Iraq's nuclear weapons program when Iraq releases Western hostages held near the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. Uranium carbide particles removed from the hostages' clothing show that the uranium specks had been enriched beyond the 20 percent needed for routine experiments.” in “Iraq Profile: Nuclear Chronology 1990-1991” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2003) <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iraq/Nuclear/2121_3292.html> taken from p. 18, Shyam Bhatia and Daniel McGrory, “Brighter than the Baghdad Sun” (Washington, DC: Regenery Publishing Inc., 2000); 312 p. 367, Richelson 313 p. 360-367, Richelson 314 p. 416, Richelson 315 p. 278-278, Richelson 316 p. 165-166, Richelson 317 p. 232, Richelson 318 p. 277-281, Richelson 319 p. 49, Lawrence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005) <http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf> 320 p. 542, Richelson 321 p. 259-261, Richelson 322 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program” (CRS Report for Congress, October 5, 2006) <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74904.pdf> 323 p. 447-469, Richelson 324 “Some diplomats accredited or otherwise linked to the IAEA said some intelligence services believed the Natanz site could also be a front. While attention is focused on Natanz, Iranian scientists and military personnel could be working on a secret enrichment program at one or more unknown sites that is much more advanced, the diplomats said.” in Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran said to install uranium centrifuges” (Boston Globe, January 15, 2007) <http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/01/15/iran_said_to_install_uranium_centrifuges/> 325 See the eight principles to combat nuclear terrorism agreed to by 13 countries, known as the ‘Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Principles’ in Wade Boese, “Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Principles Issued” (Arms Control Today, December, 2006) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_12/AntiNuclear.asp>; BRIAN D. FINLAY AND ELIZABETH TURPEN “25 STEPS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERROR: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS” <http://www.stimson.org/cnp/pdf/25_Steps_complete.pdf> ; Daryl G. Kimball, “Preventing a Nuclear Katrina” (Arms Contol Today, October 2005) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/focus.asp> ; William C. Potter, Charles D. Ferguson, and Leonard S. Spector, “The Four Faces of Nuclear Terror And the Need for a Prioritized Response” (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004) <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501faresponse83313/william-c-potter-charles-d-ferguson-leonard-s-spector/the-four-faces-of-nuclear-terror-and-the-need-for-a-prioritized-response.html> ; Graham Allison, “How to Stop Nuclear Terror” (Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004) <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101faessay83107/graham-allison/how-to-stop-nuclear-terror.html>; “House Panel Boosts Nonproliferation Funding by $150M” (Global Security Newswire, May 11, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_5_11.html#C00085D1> ; “H.R.1585: FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act” <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/ndaafy08/HASCFY08NDAARelease.pdf> ; Graham Allison, “Fast action needed to avert nuclear terror strike on U.S.” (The Baltimore Sun, July 2, 2007) <http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.nukes02jul02,0,41630.story?coll=bal-oped-headlines> ; “INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM” (United Nations, 2005) <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/English_18_15.pdf>; “Pact to Fight Nuclear Terrorism Enters Into Force” (Global Security Newswire, July 9, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_7_9.html#6EA9228E> ; “Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism: Essential steps to reduce the availability of nuclear-explosive materials” (Center for International Security and Cooperation, March 2005)


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<http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/Prvnt_Nuc_Prlf_Nuc_Trror_2005-0407.pdf>; Alexander Glaser and Frank N. von Hippel, “Thwarting Nuclear Terrorism” (Scientific American, February, 2006) <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000CD53D-0CBB-13CC-8B1583414B7F0101&ref=sciam&chanID=sa006> 326 John C. Rood, “Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)” (US Department of State, 2007), <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/>; “NONPROLIFERATION:U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better Data on Proliferation Risks and Program Results” (Government Accountability Office, October 2007) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0821.pdf?source=ra> 327 See the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative involving 80 nations that is reported to have been involved in 30 successful interdictions “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full” (Arms Control Today, June 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Valencia.asp>; Richard Bond, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Three Years On” (British American Security Information Council, August 2, 2006) <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060802.htm>; Also see “The Proliferation Security Initiative” (US State Department, June 2004) <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/> 328 See ‘The Need for Action’ p. 22-23, George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States” (The White House, March 2006) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> ; p. 71, 74, 79-80 Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 329 “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (Multi-National Force – Iraq, 2007) <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/> 330 See p. 130, “Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs ($ in thousands)” (US Department of State, );Miles A. Pomper “Bush Administration Seeks Small Increase for State Department Nonproliferation, Disarmament Budget” (Arms Control Today, March 2004) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_03/StateDepartment.asp> 331 Bureau of Resource Management, “FY 2007 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request” (US Department of State, February 6, 2006) <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2007/html/60200.htm> 332 “International Atomic Energy Agency” <http://www.iaea.org/> 333 “TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS” (Arms Control Association, 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt.asp> 334 See ‘Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction’ p. 23-34, George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States”; p. 2, William J. Perry, “Worst Weapons In Worst Hands: U.S. Inaction On The Nuclear Terror Threat Since 9/11 And A Path Of Action”; 335 p. 8-11, Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, “Report to the President of the United States” (The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005) <http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf> 336 See “Key Judgments [from October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate], Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” in (The White House, July 18, 2003) <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html> 337 See Table 1, page 3, Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” (Congressional Research Service, March 14, 2007) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf> 338 See “Summary” in Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” 339 See Figure 3.1, “Fissile material production in civilian and military nuclear fuel cycles,” p. 21, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 340 “House Puts Weight Behind Nuclear Fuel Bank” (Global Security Newswire, June 19, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_6_19.html#A564ECC8>; Tim Starks, “House Approves Nuclear Fuel ‘Bank’ Funding to Deter Weapons Proliferation” (Congressional Quarterly, June 18, 2007) <http://public.cq.com/docs/cqt/news110-000002534153.html>; p. 95-97, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 341 Hui Zhang , “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Reducing the Danger of Highly Enriched Uranium” (INMM 44th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona. Conference Paper, INMM, 2003) <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/HEU_INMM03_hui.pdf.pdf>


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342 David E. Hoffman, “Victories Come Slowly in Cleanup Of Soviet Bloc Nuclear Materials” (Washington Post, August 30, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/29/AR2007082902382.html> 343 “Detailed Information on the Fissile Materials Disposition Program Assessment” (Department of Energy, 2006) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003238.2006.html> 344 p. 6,“Statement of Will Tobey Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation National Nuclear Security Administration U.S. Department of Energy Before the Committee on House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development & Related Agencies” (Department of Energy, March 22, 2007) <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2007/2007-03-22_Tobey_HEW_%20FY_08_Nonprolif_Budget.pdf> 345 Government Accountability Office, “Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain” <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404> 346 Jon Fox, “U.S., Russia Hash Out Nuclear Security Agreement” (Global Security Newswire, April 13, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_4_13.html#B0B69372> 347 p. 7, “Intelligence Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2003), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/21118.pdf> ;Stephen Daggett, “The U.S. Intelligence Budget: A Basic Overview” (Congressional Research Service, September 24, 2004) <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21945.pdf>; Scott Shane, “Official Reveals Budget for U.S. Intelligence” (New York Times, November 8 2005) <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/politics/08budget.html?ei=5090&en=2e24b46cb3ddeba6&ex=1289106000&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print> 348 Walter Pincus, “House Panel Approves a Record $48 Billion for Spy Agencies” (Washington Post, May 4, 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/03/AR2007050302174.html> 349 John Fox, “Lawmakers may cut nuclear detection office funding” (GovExec.com, August 3, 2006) <http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=34707&ref=rellink>; Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Announces Six Percent Increase In Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request” <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0849.shtm> 350 p. 3, 11 “GAO-06-311: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries” (Government Accountability Office, March, 2006) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06311.pdf>; Matthew B. Stannard, “New tools for a new world order: Nuclear forensics touted as method to trace bomb materials, deterrent for rogue nations” (San Francisco Chronicle, October 29, 2006) <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/10/29/MNG32M27K61.DTL> 351 C. J. CHIVERS, “Radioactivity Sensors for Russia” (New York Times, June 1, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/01/world/europe/01border.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin> 352 “Budget of the United States Government, FY 2008: Department of Homeland Security” (Office of Management and Budge, 2007) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/homeland.html>; See p. 5, “The Department of Homeland Security’s R&D Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2008” (U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION, March 8, 2007) <http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings/2007/tech/08mar/hearing_charter.pdf> 353 p. 33, US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2006” <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> 354 See “Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – 10-kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device” in p. 1-1, 1-2, “National Planning Scenarios” (The Homeland Security Council, April, 2005, Version 20.1, DRAFT) <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf> 355 Vice President Cheney says that “a nuclear weapon in the middle of one of our own cities is the greatest threat we face… We've been successful at defending against further attacks. But it's not easy. It's not dumb luck.” See Mark Silva, “Cheney: Nuclear terrorist attack inside the U.S. ‘a very real threat'’” (Chicago Tribune, April 15, 2007) <http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/2007/04/cheney_nuclear_.html>


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356 p. 3-4, 16-20, 28-29“GAO-06-311: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries” (Government Accountability Office, March, 2006) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06311.pdf> 357 See “Securing the Cities” initiative of the DNDO, p. 5, Vayl Oxford, “The Nuclear and Radiological Threat: Securing the Global Supply Chain, Opening Statement of Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security” (Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, March 28, 2006) <http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMTDNDOOxford.pdf>; Vayl Oxford, “Opening Statement Of Mr. Vayl S. Oxford Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Department of Homeland Security” (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, July 27, 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Oxford.pdf>; Vayl Oxford, “DNDO Overview” (American Association for the Advancement of Science, April 20, 2006) <http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/Forum_2006/oxford.pdf> 358 “DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain GAO-06-389” (Government Accountability Office, March 2006) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06389.pdf>; Gene Aloise, “Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries GAO-05-840T” (Government Accountability Office, June 21, 2005) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05840t.pdf> 359 George P. Nanos, “Statement of Dr. George P. Nanos Associate Director Research and Development Enterprise, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Concerning U.S. Nuclear Detection Capabilities” (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate July 27, 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Nanos.pdf> 360 Steven Aoki, “Statement of Dr. Steven Aoki Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Counterterrorism” (Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, July 27, 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Aoki.pdf>; See Secure Freight Initiative in “Radiation Detection Testing Underway at Two Foreign Sea Ports” (DHS, April 11, 2007) <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1176319613900.shtm> and “Secure Freight Initiative: Vision and Operations Overview” (DHS, December 7, 2006) <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1165943729650.shtm> 361 Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pages 573-614); Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew McKinzie, and Art Seavey “An Assessment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Detect HEU in Cargo Containers Using Passive Radiation Portal Monitors”; 362 p. 10, Gene Aloise, “DHS's Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis GAO-07-581T” (Government Accountability Office, March 14, 2007); p. 8, Gene Aloise, “DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits GAO-07-133R,” (Government Accountability Office, October 17, 2006) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07133r.pdf>; 363 See Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt> 364 Government Accountability Office, “COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened GAO-06-101,” <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061015.pdf>; 365see comment by Richard Wagner in p. 52-53, Steve Coll “The Unthinkable: Can the United States be made safe from nuclear terrorism?” (New Yorker, March 12, 2007); 366 p. 51, US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2006”; p. 15, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, DoD, DoE, CIA, JCS “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism Volume I – Executive Summary (May 2006)” <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nbcterror2006.pdf> 367 p. 8-12, “Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Of Stand-Off Radiation Detection Systems, Broad Agency Announcement 07-01 (BAA07-01)” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, December 18, 2006) <http://www.fbo.gov/EPSData/DHS/Synopses/37711/Reference%2DNumber%2DBAA07%2D01/BAA07%2D01SolicitationFinal%2Edoc>; Jon Fox, “U.S. Aims for New ‘Standoff’ Radiation Detector” (Global


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Security Newswire, April 10, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_4_10.html#B6ED4B5F>; Also see slide 13, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” 368 JayEtta Z. Hecker, “Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges” (Government Accountability Office, November 18, 2002) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03297t.pdf> 369 p. 37, Joseph C. McDonald, Bert M. Coursey, Michael Carter, “Detecting Illicit Radioactive Sources” (Physics Today, November 2004) <http://homeland-security.pnl.gov/pdf/raddetectors-physics_today_nov_04.pdf> 370 p. 578, Devabhaktuni Srikrishna, A. Narasimha Chari and Thomas Tisch, “DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS”; 371 “…making HEU is not outlawed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if it is slated for non-weapons applications such as fueling research or naval reactors.” on p. 18, Charles D. Ferguson, “Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benefits and Risks” (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR NO. 28, APRIL 2007) <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NuclearEnergyCSR28.pdf> 372 George Bunn “The World's Non-Proliferation Regime in Time” (IAEA Bulletin, Volume 46, Number 2) <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull462/nonproliferation_regime.html> 373 For instance if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, this could result in many more nations deciding to withdraw from the NPT and obtain nuclear weapons. See WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER, “Eye on Iran, Rivals Pursuing Nuclear Power” (New York Times, April 15, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/world/middleeast/15sunnis.html?hp>; 374 p. 44 and p. 127, Cirincione, Bomb Scare; p. 17-20, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 375 The capability to produce nuclear weapons and intent to do so are ambiguous in some cases, see Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, “Capability versus Intent: The latent threat of nuclear proliferation” (The Bulletin Online, June 15, 2007) <http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/wolfgang-panofsky/20070615.html> 376 Oliver Meier and Miles A. Pomper , “IAEA, Congress Tackle Nuclear Fuel Supply” (Arms Control Today, July/August 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/FuelSupply.asp> 377 Michael J. Jordan, “UN nuclear watchdog ponders international 'fuel bank'” (Christian Science Monitor, September 18, 2006) <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0918/p04s01-wogi.html> ; “Nuclear Threat Initiative Commits $50 Million to Create IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 19 September 2006) <http://www.nti.org/c_press/release_IAEA_fuelbank_091906.pdf > 378 p. 20, George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States”; p. 107, Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare 379 These figures are by the end of 2003, p. 96, Joseph Cirincione Bomb Scare; 46 countries are known to possess HEU, p. 87, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf>; For a map, see “Civil HEU Stock Map” (Nuclear Threat Institute) <http://www.nti.org/db/heu/map.html> 380 p. 2-4, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts” <http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/tableofcontents.html> 381 See p. 28, U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors GAO-04-807” (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04807.pdf>; “At present, approximately 135 research reactors in nearly 40 countries worldwide use HEU fuel, and many of them store enough material on-site to make a nuclear bomb” – see p. 130, Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks, A net assessment” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2, 2007) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/> 382 p. 2, 15, 19, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf>; p. 86, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf>


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383 p. A15, GEORGE P. SHULTZ , WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER and SAM NUNN, “World Free of Nuclear Weapons” (Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007) <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB116787515251566636.html> 384 p. A15, GEORGE P. SHULTZ , WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER and SAM NUNN, “World Free of Nuclear Weapons” 385 p. 164, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks” (International Institute for Strategic Studies) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm> 386 p. 9, Charles D. Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism; p. 143-165, Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe; See p. 9 William J. Perry, “Worst Weapons In Worst Hands: U.S. Inaction On The Nuclear Terror Threat Since 9/11 And A Path Of Action”; p. 139-143, Joseph Cirincione Bomb Scare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); 387 p. 15, Charles D. Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism; p. 16 and p. 41, BRIAN D. FINLAY AND ELIZABETH TURPEN “25 STEPS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERROR: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS” 388 p. 13, BRIAN D. FINLAY AND ELIZABETH TURPEN “25 STEPS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERROR: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS” 389 See “Appendix I: Nuclear Nonproliferation Regimes” p. 25-33, Charles Pena, “Nuclear Nonproliferation in the Post-9/11 World” (The Independent Institute, 2007) <http://www.independent.org/pdf/policy_reports/2007-06-12-nuclear.pdf> 390 See agreements for inspections by the IAEA, Euratom (France-UK-EU), and ABACC (Argentina-Brazil) p. 33-35, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 391 See IAEA’s Information Circular 153 which allows “special inspections” at suspect undeclared sites, p. 45, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 392 In response to Security Council sanctions, Iran’s is threatening to withdraw from “snap inspections” required by the NPT additional protocol, “Iran’s response to next resolution will worsen situation, Soltanieh warns” (Mehr News Agency, June 16, 2007) <http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=503327> 393 As part of the NPT, see “The 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol At a Glance” (Arms Control Association, July 2006) <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.asp> ; “Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols” (International Atomic Energy Agency, March 22, 2007) <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html> ; p. 45, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 394 p. 47, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 395 p. 9-11, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks” (International Institute for Strategic Studies) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm> 396 Paul Reynolds, “Nuclear weapons: Can they be stopped?” (British Broadcasting Corporation, September 22, 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3680418.stm> ; See “Inspections that work” p. 66-70, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 397 “Iraqi Nuclear Weapons” (Federation of American Scientists, November 03, 1998) <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm> ; p. 35, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2006,” <http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmreport06.pdf> 398 p. 7, Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy, “The Terrorism Index” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/pdf/terrorism_index.pdf> 399 NAZILA FATHI, “Iran's President Sees Progress in Nuclear Program” (New York Times, April 9, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/middleeast/09cnd-iran.html>; ALI AKBAR DAREINI “Iran expands uranium enrichment effort” (Associated Press, April 9, 2007) <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070409/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iran_nuclear;_ylt=Avw.vsw5CrixLQdImyCSnxes0NUE>


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400 Paul Kerr “News Analysis: Doubts Rise on North Korea 's Uranium-Enrichment Program” (Arms Control Today, April 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/NewsAnalysis.asp> 401 “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons” (Federation of American Scientists, December 11, 2002) <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html>; Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks” (Federal News Service, May 9, 2007) <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13308/nuclear_black_markets.html>; “Former Russian PM Worried by Pakistani Nukes” (Global Security Newswire, July 11, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_7_11.html#ED8516D9> 402 See “Nonproliferation Compliance” in Christopher A. Ford “A Work Plan for the 2010 Review Cycle: Coping with Challenges Facing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” (US Department of State, April 30, 2007) <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/84044.htm> 403 p. 27-30 and “Suspected Weapons Programs in the Middle East” on p. 184, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 404 p. 16-17, p. 27-30, Perkovich, et al, “UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A Strategy for Nuclear Security” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> 405 “To thwart nuclear terror, US directs trade partners to inspect 11 million cargo containers” (International Herald Tribune, August 23, 2007) <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/23/america/NA-GEN-US-Port-Security.php>; “Public Law 110–53: IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007” (Library of Congress, August 3, 2007) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00001:> 406 “U.S. Army 20th Support Command (CBRNE -- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives)” <http://www.cbrne.army.mil/> 407 p. 52, US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2006” <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> 408 See 5.4.4.5, 5.4.2, 6.1.2.3, 6.13 of “Defense Threat Reduction Agency” (Department of Defense, November 28, 2005) <http://www.dtra.mil/documents/about/AgencyCharter510562.pdf> 409 See slide 5, Anu Bowman, “Progress in Nuclear Detection” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, March 23, 2007) <http://sbir.dhs.gov/reference/APS-Brief-draft-20070319-DNDO.ppt>; “NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NSPD-43, HOMELAND SECURTY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE HSPD-14” (THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, April 15, 2005) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-43.html>; See slide 10, Vayl Oxford, “DNDO Overview” (American Association for the Advancement of Science, April 20, 2006) <http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/Forum_2006/oxford.pdf> 410 “NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NSPD-43, HOMELAND SECURTY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE HSPD-14” (THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, April 15, 2005) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-43.html>; Also see Spencer S. Hsu , “U.S. Weighs How Best to Defend Against Nuclear Threats: Proven Technology Vs. New Advances” (Washington Post, April 15, 2006, p. A03) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401369_pf.html> 411 “The centerpiece of our government’s strategy for dealing with a nuclear attack is the National Missile Defense system now being installed in Alaska. That system has been criticized for being technically deficient on the basis of its test firings. But that is almost beside the point. Even if it worked exactly according to its specifications, it is simply irrelevant to the threat of nuclear terrorism. Terrorists would not use a ballistic missile to deliver their bomb; they would use a truck or a freighter. The mode of operation could be like the delivery of the truck bomb in Oklahoma City, but with the truck carrying a nuclear bomb instead of a few tons of explosives.” in William J. Perry, “Testimony House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee” (US Congress, July 18, 2007) <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Strat071807/Perry_Testimony071807.pdf> 412 Kei Koizumi, “R&D in the FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget” (American Association for the Advancement of Science, April, 2006) <http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/07pch6.htm> 413 See Figure 11, “Past and Projected Resources for Defense Agency Investment, Including Missile Defenses” in Donald B. Marron, “Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary Update for


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Fiscal Year 2007” (Congressional Budget Office, October 2006) ; Jon Fox, “U.S. Missile Defense Spending to Peak in 2016 at $15 Billion” (Global Security Newswire, November 9, 2006) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_11_9.html#7A5EADD8> 414 John Kyl, “DETECTING SMUGGLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS” (SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY, AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 27 JULY 2006) <http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/072706Kyl.pdf> 415 “U.S. Military Needs to Consider Nuclear Terrorism Prevention, Former Pentagon Official Says” (Global Security Newswire, June 21, 2007) <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_6_21.html#C6D33B5E>; See “Proliferation and Terrorism” p. 19-23, Charles Pena, “Nuclear Nonproliferation in the Post-9/11 World” (The Independent Institute, 2007) <http://www.independent.org/pdf/policy_reports/2007-06-12-nuclear.pdf> 416 “Our Bottom Line” (US Department of Defense Website) <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/dod101.html#bottomline> 417 “The military services had shown little interest in tackling [nuclear, chemical, and biological] threats. The unified commands had their specific missions and regional responsibilities. But the new threats included proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, the possibility of biological or chemical attacks, and even attacks on the information systems of the U.S. military commands. According to both Hamre and Welch, these new threats fell into the ‘too hard’ to solve category for the U.S. military commands and existing DoD agencies.” See p. 6, Joseph P. Harahan and Robert J. Bennett “CREATING THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY” (US Department of Defense, January, 2002) <http://www.dtra.mil/about/media/historical_documents/books/DTRAHix.pdf> 418 “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks” (International Institute for Strategic Studies) <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm> 419 See equations 1 & 2 of Jonathan Katz, Karol Lang and Roy Schwitters, “Muon Tomography—The Future of Vehicle and Cargo Inspection” (Decision Sciences Corporation, June 4, 2007) or the other Los Alamos refercnes on muon detection. 420 Wolfram Mathworld, “ERF” (CRC Press LLC, January 23, 2006) <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Erf.html>

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