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1Mumbai Marooned: An Enquiry into Mumbai Floods 2005

GlossaryAAI Airports Authority of IndiaACS Additional Chief SecretaryAGNI Action for good Governance and

Networking in IndiaAIR All India RadioALM Advanced Locality ManagementANM Auxiliary Nurse/MidwifeBCS Bombay Catholic SabhaBEST Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply &

Transport Undertaking.BEAG Bombay Environmental Action GroupBJP Bharatiya Janata PartyBKC Bandra Kurla Complex.BMC Brihanmumbai Municipal CorporationBNHS Bombay Natural History SocietyBRIMSTOSWAD BrihanMumbai Storm

Water Drain ProjectBWSL Bandra Worli Sea LinkCAT Conservation Action TrustCBD Central Business District.CBO Community Based OrganizationsCCC Concerned Citizens’ CommissionCEHAT Centre for Enquiry into Health and

Allied ThemesCG Coast GuardCII Confederation of Indian IndustryCJP Citizens for Justice and PeaceCM Chief MinisterCR Central RailwaysCRZ Coastal Regulation ZoneCS Chief SecretaryCST Chatrapati Shivaji TerminusCWPRS Central Water and Power Research StationCZMP Coastal Zone Management PlanDCR Development Control RulesDGP Director General of PoliceDIG Deputy Inspector GeneralDMC Disaster Management CellDMP Disaster Management PlanDP Development PlanDWR Doppler Weather RadarEMU Electric Multiple UnitsEOC Emergency Operations CentreFEJI Forum of Environmental Journalists

of IndiaFSI Floor Space IndexGIS Geographic Information SystemGKSS Girni Kamgar Sangarsh SamitiHUDCO Housing and Urban Corporation LimitedIAS Indian Administrative Services

IFEJ International Federation ofEnvironmental Journalists

IITM Indian Institute of Tropical MeteorologyILS Instrument Landing SystemIMD Indian Meteorological DepartmentISRO Indian Space Research OrganisationKEM King Edward Memorial HospitalMCGM/B Municipal Council of Greater Mumbai/

BombayMCMT Mohalla Committee Movement Trust.MDMC Mumbai Disaster Management CommitteeMDMP Mumbai Disaster Management PlanMoEF Ministry of Environment and ForestsMHADA Maharashtra Housing and Area

Development AuthorityMLA Member of Legislative AssemblyMMR Mumbai Metropolitan RegionMMRDA Mumbai Metropolitan Region

Development AuthorityMbPT Mumbai Port TrustMTNL Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd.MSDP Mumbai Sewerage Disposal ProjectMSEB Maharashtra State Electricity BoardMSRDC Maharashtra State Road Development

Corporation Ltd.MUIP Mumbai Urban Infrastructure ProjectMUTP Mumbai Urban Transport ProjectNAPM National Alliance of People’s MovementNEERI National Environmental Engineering

Research InstituteNIO National Institute of OceanographyRAF Rapid Action ForceREL Reliance Energy LimitedRMC Regional Meteorological CentreR&R Relief and RehabilitationSBI State Bank Of IndiaSBTC State Blood Transfusion CouncilSGNP Sanjay Gandhi National ParkSPP Shivshahi Punarvasan PrakalpSRA Slum Rehabilitation AuthoritySRS Slum Rehabilitation SocietySSP Slum Sanitation ProjectSWD Storm Water Drainage DepartmentTDR Transfer Development RightsTISS Tata Institute of Social SciencesWR Western RailwaysUDD Urban Development DepartmentULCRA Urban Land Ceiling Regulation ActYASHDA Yashwantrao Chavan Academy for

Development Administration

Mumbai Marooned: An Enquiry into Mumbai Floods 20052

IndexSr. No Chapter Pg No

I Introduction 6I.a. Overview of events on July 26, 2005 6I.b. Rationale for the commission 8I.c. Composition of the panel 8I.d. Acknowledgements 9I.e. Terms of Reference 9I.f. Methodology used 10

II Findings 11II.a Relief and rehabilitationII.b. Administration’s response to the disaster

1) Disaster Management Cell of Maharashtra Government. and BMC2) Political machinery3) Police4) BMC5) MMRDA6) Fire Brigade7) Coast Guard8) IMD9) AAI10) Home Guards

II.c Drainage shortcomingsII.d Sanitation and Waste ManagementII.e Public Health SystemII.f Travel and Transportation

1) BEST2) Railways3) Private Transport

II.g HousingII.h Interference with Ecology

1) The Mithi river/Mahim Creeka) Worli-Bandra Sea Linkb) Bandra Kurla Complexc) Airport issue

2) Dahisar, Poisar and other rivers/nallahs3) Reclamation and filling of creeks, marshy land / open spaces4) Encroachment5) Quarrying

II.i Communications System 56II.j Electricity 57II.k Role of the Media 58II.l Loss of Life and Property 61

II.m Rani Jadhav Committee Report 63

III Recommendations 64III.A. Short term recommendationsIII.A.1 Disaster Management Plan and Disaster Management CellIII.A.2 Relief and rehabilitation.

CONCERNED CITIZENS’ COMMISSION AN ENQUIRY INTO THE MUMBAI FLOODS, 2005


IndexSr. No Chapter Pg No

III.A.3 Administrationa) Role of Fire Brigadeb) Role of Policec) Meteorology Departmentd) Role of Home Guards and Civil Defensee) Role of Coast Guard/Armed Forces

III.A.4 Infrastructurea) Storm Water Drainageb) Sewage and Sanitationc) Waste Managementd) Transport

III.A.5 HousingIII.A.6 CommunicationsIII.A.7 ElectricityIII.A.8 Public Health SystemIII.A.9 Natural Drainage

a) Mithi riverb) Dahisar, Poisar and other riversc) Open spaces, Salt pans, Mangroves, Creeksd) Quarrying 75

III.B Long term (Urban planning) recommendationsIII.B.1 Carrying CapacityIII.B.2 TransparencyIII.B.3 HealthIII.B.4 Public AmenitiesIII.B.5 Pending and proposed projects and their impacts

a) Slum Redevelopment Schemeb) Bandra-Worli Nariman Point Sea Linksc) Sewri-Nhava Sea Linkd) Mills Lands development 79

III.B.6 Halting in-migration through development of employmentopportunities in the hinterland.

III.B.7 Climate change and Mumbai city.

IV Conclusions 83

V Annexures 85-126

CONCERNED CITIZENS’ COMMISSION AN ENQUIRY INTO THE MUMBAI FLOODS, 2005


I. A) OVERVIEW OF EVENTS ON JULY 26, 2005

July 26, 2005 has gone down as a day noMumbaikar will forget. A record 994 mm (37.2inches) of rain within 24 hours (75% of thedownpour – 709 mm — fell in a five-hour periodbetween 2.30 pm and 7.30 pm), widespreadflooding and the loss of lives and property, thevirtual shutdown of the ‘city that never sleeps’ fortwo days (more in some areas) ensured that allresidents will forever remember the MumbaiFloods of July 2005. One of the most crucialissues is whether this is actually ‘once-in-a-hundred-years’ incident or whether it is the firsttime that this phenomenon has taken place overone of the few locations where it could bemeasured and recorded. This is important sincevery heavy spot rainfall has been recordedhistorically throughout the Konkan districts.

Starting at about 12.30 pm on the 26th till5:30 am on the 27th (earlier in the northernsuburbs), the torrential rain caught residentsunawares. A peculiar feature of the rain was thatthe southern island city received just 73.4 mm(2.89 inches) in the same period. Within a fewhours of the rain, areas like Kurla, Kalina, Andheri,Saki Naka, Chembur, Govandi, Malad werereported flooded.

At least one-third of the surface area of thecity is believed to have been flooded. Most phonelines were lost or severely disrupted, for periodsranging from a few hours to, in some cases,

weeks. Electricity supply was cut. The city’s cellphone network also faltered, leaving families withno way of verifying the whereabouts of their lovedones. Mumbai airport was closed, with waterflowing over the runway and even through theterminal buildings. Public transport came to agrinding halt, marooning lakhs of people atdifferent points in the city. All India Radio reportedthat 150,000 people were stranded acrossdifferent suburban railway stations, some foralmost 24 hours. It was only by the afternoon ofJuly 27, 2005 that some sectors of the suburbanrail system partly commenced operations. Neverbefore have all three of Mumbai’s suburban raillines been shut down. For 18 hours, Mumbai’slifeline, its suburban rail system, was completelyinoperable.

With the airport closed and flooding andlandslides affecting rail and road links, India’sfinancial capital was literally cut off from the restof the country for a day.

In some low-lying areas, the water was 10to 15 ft deep. Open gutters and nallahs turnedinto raging rivers. Thousands of homes in theMumbai’s sprawling slums were either washedaway or damaged beyond repair. The middle andupper class were not spared either, withfloodwaters entering and even completelysubmerging ground floor apartments in manyareas. As can be imagined, the loss to life andproperty was considerable. The fact that thefloodwaters did not recede for days in some areascompounded the situation and led to outbreaksof diseases such as leptospirosis, diarrhoea,malaria, dengue etc.

A reason given by most government andadministration officials for the breakdown ofsystems on July 26 was that this rainfall wasunprecedented. This is however misleading atbest.

There have been other instances of dailyrainfall that has approached these levels, forexample the Thane District Gazetteer mentions481 mm of rain in 1951. Similarly, the Nashik

I. Introduction

1 http://www.maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/nasik/004%20General/003%20Climate.htm2 http://www.imdmumbai.gov.in/erf_scz.htm

maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/


district Gazetteer mentions a record of 473.7 mmat Peint on July 2, 1941.1 On June 10, 1991,Santacruz recorded 400 mm of rain2 . While theserecorded only about half the rainfall at Santacruzon July 26, they indicate that such abnormallyheavy rainfall does occur and must be taken intoaccount. Further, it is very possible, even probable,that other such localized ‘cloudbursts’ or ‘super-cells’ have occurred over areas that have noobservatories. One sometimes hears of severe‘flash floods’ which rarely make the headlinesbecause they occur in interior areas. Without awidespread data gathering system, it ismisleading to say that the rainfall received on

July 26 was ‘the highest in a 100 years’. Moreover,this should definitely not be used to excuseshortcomings and incompetence on the part ofthe administration.

Despite the havoc that Mumbai faced on thatday, and indeed for the next few days, the spirit ofthe ordinary Mumbaikar must be praised. Storiesabound of strangers risking their lives andbelongings to help fellow citizens, people of differentcommunities forgetting their differences, even inareas historically prone to communal violence, wetand weary office goers trudging home being revivedwith tea and biscuits offered free of cost byresidents en route and much much more.

In the days that followed, thousands ofindividuals, rich and poor alike, pitched in, inwhatever way and to whatever extent they could,with the relief effort, donating clothes, food,utensils, household items and even arranging totransport these to the worst-affected areas.

Even from south Mumbai, people who werenot affected rushed to provide relief. AslamMerchant received a distress call at 4.30 pm onJuly 26 and called a rally in Dongri at 6pm. Withinthree hours, he and his fellow volunteers hadraised Rs 50,000 in cash and Rs 1.5 lakh worth

Introduction

Salute to Mumbaikars

Melvin Pereira lived in Amboli, Andheri (W) and went to Dominic Savio School, where he was in the 10th standard. Schoolclosed at 5.30 pm on July 26 and his mother, Blanche Pereira, told the Commission that he had called at 8.30 pm to informhis home that he had reached Andheri station. He took an autorickshaw and at one stage had to get off to cross floodedareas, which was an annual occurrence. There were five other boys from the same school with Melvin and all were neverseen again. The next day, she received a message that a body had been found with a rosary and scapula, which identifiedher 18-year-old son.

At the Commission’s hearing in Govandi, Asha Pardi, a rag picker, testified how she had seen her five-year-old son,Vishal, being swept away by the turbulent water. His body was never traced. So traumatized was she by the incident that shehad not even applied for compensation, or received any relief, when she appeared before the Commission.

Juman Ali, a hutment dweller in Azad chawl, Jari Mari, lost everything he and his family owned that day. “There wasnowhere to escape,” he recounted, “even the roads were filled with water. I saw two or three corpses: it was terrifying.”However, all chawl dwellers helped people who were stranded on their roofs from 3.30 pm on July 26 till 7 am the followingday. The water started rising again on July 27 and they all fled to a safer place. Juman Ali, a cart puller, lost belongings worthRs 15,000 – Rs 20,000 and remained in the same wet clothes for seven days. He hails from Fatehpur in UP and has lived inMumbai for 25 years.

George Abraham, a Congress corporator from Kalina who resigned in August due to his frustration with the lack of officialresponse to the flooding in his ward, told the Commission that he had seen 25 to 30 bodies on a single road. The family ofan 18-year-old engineering student came to claim his body but they were directed to Cooper hospital, where his body wasonly released some three days later.



of provisions. For the next ten days, he and his bandcarried out repeated rescue missions to Kalyan,Mumbra and Panvel. On one such foray into Kalyan,they had to wade through waist-deep water: “It wasmy duty to lend a hand,” he explained simply.Astonishingly, snakes clung to his legs for safety:all they wanted was something solid to cling to andwhen he reached land, they dropped off withoutharming him.

Perhaps the best testament to the way Mumbai’scitizens pulled together lies in the fact that there wasno widespread looting or robbery and not a singlerape reported. This is in sharp contrast to the situationin New Orleans when Hurricane Katrina submergedmost of that city. Despite decades of faultyadministration by the political class, the indomitablespirit of Mumbai clearly survives.

B) RATIONALE FOR THE COMMISSION

As the scale of the disaster becameapparent, the public was outraged at the completelack of administration and governance. News thatthe government was setting up an official enquiryinto the floods was greeted with almost universalcynicism. Reports of administrative apathy andincompetence, political interference in the reliefdistribution process, a lack of accountability andindications that the lessons that should have beenlearnt from the disaster were being ignored led tomuch soul-searching among NGOs. It was clearthat if any people and their belongings were saved,it was due to the intervention of common people;not because of the government but inspite of it.

In the following days, several NGOs workingin Mumbai came together with the idea of

launching a free, impartial, unbiased commissionof enquiry to look into all matters pertaining tothe floods. At a meeting at the Mahim NaturePark on August 4, 2005, the idea of forming theConcerned Citizens’ Commission was putforward. A wide variety of people’s initiativesendorsed this idea and many participated inthe hearings.

Starting on September 3, 2005, for a periodof three weeks, the Concerned Citizens’Commission held a series of public hearings anddepositions involving members of the public aswell as those at different levels of the governmentadministration, NGO sector, experts in variousfields etc.

The prime concern of the commission wasto inquire into the immediate and long standingcauses that led to the collapse of the city’sadministration, resulting in a much graver dangerto lives and property than might otherwise havebeen expected. Issues pertaining to disastermanagement and city governance, public health,the role and duties of public servants as alsothe damages suffered by individuals and groupswere explored.

C) COMPOSITION OF THE CONCERNED CITIZENS’COMMISSION PANEL

1. Justice P.B. Sawant – Chairman2. Ms. Teesta Setalvad3. Mr. Shyam Chainani4. Mr. Sharad Kale5. Prof. Pushpa Bhave6. Mr. Darryl D’Monte7. Mr. Chandrashekhar Prabhu8. Mr. Datta Iswalkar9. Mr. Suresh Bhosle

Justice P.B. Sawant: Former judge of theSupreme Court from 1989 to 1995, he has extensiveexperience in all branches of law and has servedas legal advisor to a number of trade unions andsocial and educational institutions. He has servedas Chairperson to several people’s enquiries on avariety of issues.

Ms. Teesta Setalvad: One of the founders ofCitizens for Justice and Peace, Ms. Setalvad hasbeen fighting communal forces in Gujarat andMaharashtra, and has also been actively involved

Introduction



in ground level relief and rehabilitation efforts inMumbai after the floods of July 26, 2005.

Mr. Shyam Chainani: Founder member of theBombay Environmental Action Group, Mr. Chainanihas been working on issues of urban heritage andplanning, coastal protection and developmentregulation in Mumbai for over three decades.

Mr. Sharad Kale: Former MunicipalCommissioner of Mumbai from 1991 to 1995,Mr. Kale has extensive experience of theworkings of the administration in the city. Heis currently General Secretary of the Y.B.Chavan Pratishthan.

Prof. Pushpa Bhave: A dedicated social activistand academic, Ms. Bhave retired as Head of theMarathi Department, Ruia College.

Mr. Darryl D’Monte: Currently chair of the Forumof Environmental Journalists of India, Mr. D’Montehas been the Resident Editor of the Indian Expressand Times of India. He is author of ‘Ripping theFabric: The Decline of Mumbai & its Mills’.

Mr. Chandrashekhar Prabhu: Former Presidentof the Maharashtra Housing and Area DevelopmentAuthority and former Chairman of the AdvisoryCommittee, Department of Housing, Governmentof Maharashtra, Mr. Prabhu hasbeen a member of the Mumbai Metropolitan RegionDevelopment Authority and the SlumRedevelopment Authority. He is presently the Editor

of Economic Digest and anchors the talk showprogramme “Ghatna Chakra” on Doordarshan.

Mr. Datta Iswalkar: President of the GirniKamgar Sangarsh Samiti (GKSS), Mr. Iswalkarhas been fighting for the rights of the mill workersof Mumbai, and for the socially-appropriate use ofmill lands.

Mr. Suresh Bhosale: General Secretary of Friendsof Society, and Activist with the Dalit Panthers, heworks on housing rights issues in Mumbai.

D) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The panelists would whole-heartedly like tothank the citizens of Mumbai for their activeinvolvement and participation at every stage of thejourney, the different citizens’ groups and expertswho came forward and shared their expertise withthe commission so as to portray an authentic pictureof the causes and consequences of 26/7. Thepanelists would also like to thank the CoreCommittee (Mr. Cyrus Guzder, Mr. Debi Goenka),the secretariat (Mr Ashish Fernandes, Mr VivekVaidyanathan) and the volunteers, particularly MrDolphy D’Souza, Mr Poonam Gidwani, Mr FerozIbrahim, Mr Sumit Rai and Mr Kushal Mor whosecontributions were really appreciated.

Conservation Action Trust (CAT) takes thisopportunity to thank each and every one of thepanelists for being part of this endeavor. We wouldparticularly like to thank the panelists who

Introduction



participated in the public hearings and site visits.CAT would also like to acknowledge the fact thatMr Shyam Chainani delayed his travel plans tospare time for the few meetings that he could attenddespite his very crowded schedule. CAT would alsoextend its sincere gratitude to the numerous differentorganizations and individuals who extended theirsupport in every possible way for the Commissionto function effectively. Special mention must bemade of those who allowed us to use their premisesas venues for the public hearings. The volunteers,including students from Government Law College,also deserve a special mention. We would also liketo thank our many donors, who very generouslysupported the initiative of the CCC. Many thanks toMr Cyrus Guzder who really did make all thedifference. Finally the true heroes of this entire effortare the Mumbaikars themselves, citizens who cameout in their thousands and participated in thisendeavour. We salute these heroes, who coped withthis crisis despite the absence of the Governmentand the Municipal authorities.

E) THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE CCC ARE:

1. To develop a reliable picture of the floods inGreater Mumbai and document what actuallytook place, the extent of damage to lives anddignity of persons, along with a detailedexamination of property loss and damage,linked critically to the issue of relief andcompensation.

2. To determine the causes and factors that ledto the flooding, including the role of the stateexecutive, government and administration inimplementing the Disaster Management Plan.

3. To understand the role of the MCGB and theState police – in pre-empting, containing andcontrolling damage to life and property.

4. To recommend a set of measures to betteranticipate natural calamities and to minimizetheir impact; as also to ensure that DisasterManagement Plans are implemented moreeffectively.

5. To identify in particular those responsible forinaction and hold them accountable.

6. To ensure effective citizen participation in theplanning of the city and in DisasterManagement.

7. Any other relevant matters that the Panel maydecide to include.

F) METHODOLOGY

In all, 12 public hearings were held, in some ofthe worst affected areas — Kurla, Kalina, Jari-Mari,Bandra East, Saki Naka, Govandi, Chembur,Kandivli, Malad and Bandra West. At each hearing,members of the public filled in deposition/surveyforms, either on their own or with the help ofvolunteers The forms covered a range of topics: theindividuals’ experience on July 26 and the daysfollowing; loss of life in the family, if any; estimatesof financial loss; response of state agencies andNGOs; illness; relief distribution etc. These formswere made available in Hindi, Marathi, Urdu andEnglish. A sample of the form is available inAnnexure 1.

In addition to filling in these forms, somemembers of the public, local leaders/activists etcwould interact with and depose orally before thepanel members present on the day. Thesedepositions were recorded on camera.

From September 20 to 24, at the BombayNatural History Society, members of the panelinteracted with a variety of government officials,NGOs, citizens’ groups and experts in differentfields. (Annexures 3 & 4) These depositions werealso recorded on camera.

This report is based on the information gainedfrom these depositions, as well as from researchundertaken by the panelists and members of theCCC Secretariat.


Introduction


maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/maharashtra.gov.i

Introduction


II. A. RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Relief and rehabilitation efforts were quiteinadequate. On the one hand, there were reports ofirregularities and aid being siphoned off and sold inthe black market. On the other hand were the laudableefforts of those in charge of aid distribution whosurprisingly did not insist on those affected by floodsto produce identity proofs, which is a norm, associatedwith government officials. This meant that thedistribution of aid reached a wider section of thepopulation. This is not to absolve the government ofits duties.

If one were to see the pattern of anomalies in aiddistribution, CCC’s investigations have revealed thataround up to a fifth of the aid was unaccounted for; inaddition, there were several areas where people notaffected by the floods received aid.

The general attitude of the government towardsrehabilitation is appalling. A couple of months afterthe floods when the state government announced arehabilitation package of Rs 230 crores, not a singlepaisa was earmarked for those slum pockets ofMumbai which suffered the worst damages during thedeluge, the government’s contention being that a rehabpackage for slum dwellers would be anacknowledgement of their illegality. Also the way ofcalculating losses seems arbitrary and ad-hoc to saythe least. Take for instance the case of MohammedAshrafali Ansari a resident on the banks of the MithiRiver who resides on the first floor and has let out theground floor of his house.3 During the deluge, the entirehouse was affected and he suffered losses of Rs45,000. When aid finally arrived, the residents of theground floor received Rs 5,000. When Mr. Ansari askedfor his due, he was told that he was not eligible sincehe lived on the first floor.

Or take the case of Kamubai Gaikwad, a residentof Valmikinagar (Bandra-East). Her house was madeof cardboard and was literally washed away in thedeluge. She did not receive any aid simply becauseshe did not possess a ration card, was not on thevoters’ list and her house was unregistered. She hasbeen so badly impacted by the deluge that the meremention of the floods is enough to get her hysterical.

It also seems that it is only the encroachmentsalong a narrow point along the Mithi River, which arebeing targeted as illegal and unlawful structures. Thegovernment aims to remove the encroachers anddevelop a park there (This is not to absolveencroachments along the Mithi of their guilt.) In starkcontrast, the authorities continue to look the otherway when similar encroachments like the ‘G’ blockof the Bandra-Kurla Complex (BKC) that has beenconstructed on the mouth of the Mithi, blocking theinter-tidal zone to the detriment of large parts ofMumbai. Similarly, the government and theauthorities are silent on the taxiway on the illegallyextended airport runway come up with the approvalof the government authorities. Clearly the messagebeing sent out is that only people who do not have avoice will continue to face the brunt of governmentaction. If the government is really serious abouttackling illegal encroachments, they can begin bydemolishing the ‘G’ block of the BKC and the airporttaxiway, both of which are the most glaring examplesof environmentally hazardous construction.

Immediately after the floods, the governmentconstituted a core group of NGOs and entrusted themwith distributing relief. As time went by, in subsequentmeetings, especially where the BMC authorities wereinvolved in aid relating to children studying in BMCschools, councillors began openly demanding thatNGOs should directly provide relief and brazenlystarted demanding that NGOs start contributingmoney to government coffers. The notion of whatconstitutes Relief and Rehabilitation in governmentparlance is extremely narrow and arbitrary. It doesnot take into account the damage caused to homes,household goods and even loss of daily livelihood.Whether it be natural or manmade disasters orconflicts, Relief and Rehabilitation packages is agovernment dole, not a basic human right.

II.B. ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE DISASTER

II. B. 1) MUMBAI DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN(MDMP)4 :

Mumbai’s disaster management plan is acomprehensive document that lists in detail thedifferent calamities (floods, fires, landslides, road

II. Findings

3 “After the Deluge”, Frontline, August 27- September 09, 2005 http://www.flonnet.com/fl2218/stories/20050909003304000.htm4 Mumbai Disaster Management Plan (MDMP) – The Plan http://mdmu.maharashtra.gov.in/pages/Mumbai/mumbaiplanShow.php


accidents, industrial and chemical accidents,cyclones and earthquakes) that can strike the city,together with those areas likely to be affected. Italso contains a three-fold strategy which to avert/reduce the impact of these disasters(infrastructure development, communication andpublic information systems and land use policiesand planning). The plan then moves on toinstitutional mechanisms to be followed when adisaster strikes.

The Mumbai Disaster ManagementCommittee is headed by the Additional ChiefSecretary (Home) and comprises the heads ofother departments.

The functions of this committee are to:

• Ensure effective inter-departmental co-ordination between all state departments

• Provide policy decisions when required

• Keep the government informed about disastersituation

• Review disaster related activity reportsreceived from BMC Control Room, PoliceControl Room and Army Control Room andprovide appropriate directions.

• Co-ordinate the activities of lateral, and CentralGovernment agencies

The responsibility of execution of disasterrelated activities is undertaken by the BMCDisaster Management Committee with theMunicipal Commissioner as its Chairman withheads of departments as members

The plan talks about the role to be played bydifferent agencies during a disaster. The plan alsosays that there are sub plans for each ward, whichbecome operational on the declaration of anydisaster with the Assistant municipal commissionerof the ward assuming overall responsibility for his/her area.

Mumbai Floods and MDMP: 1. On the ChiefMinister’s own admission, the disaster managementplan did not work: “We do believe that the disastermanagement plan did not work well and we haveconstituted a fact-finding committee.”5

However the extent to which the plan did notwork or rather failed miserably became clear whenCCC spoke to different departmental heads.

Top police officials informed the CCC that onthe 26th itself, there was a meeting of the disastermanagement group at the CM’s office at 4pm,convened to discuss the floods which had hit Raigadand Ratnagiri the previous day. The group wasunaware of the impending disaster looming overMumbai. It was only during the meeting at around4:30 pm that news regarding water-logging atdifferent locations began to come in. The Controlroom at Mantralaya which should be the nerve centreof activity during any disaster was completely non-functional. Moreover, the police were not even calledfor any meeting on the floods held by the CM. Policeofficials also informed the CCC that there has beenno representative from the MMRDA or the MSRDCat the joint meetings held to discus Mumbai’smonsoon preparedness. They were also absent fromthe Disaster Management meetings. Furthermore,despite the DMP being a costly exercise involvingseveral crores, the police have not been providedwith any resources as part of the disastermanagement plan.

A similar view was shared by Mr. M.Z.Ansari(GM-Western Railways) who says that there wasabsolutely no warning from the BMC or the IMDabout the impending floods. The absence of awarning from any quarter made things worse.

Former Corporator George Abraham, whoresigned on August 18th 2005, regrets that although

Findings

5 “Mithi river doesn’t flow everywhere, blame the rain”; The Indian Express, August 21, 2005http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=76675



the present Mumbai Municipal Commissioner JohnyJoseph served as a one-man committee to formulatea Disaster Management Plan for the state after theLatur earthquake in 1993, and though he had alsoheld orientation courses in such management forofficials at the administration’s YASHDA(Yashwantrao Chavan Academy for DevelopmentAdministration) academy in Pune, he did not puthis principles into practice in the city. “AlthoughJohny Joseph designed the DMP, not even 1% of itwas implemented,” he complained.

Even during and after the floods, the governmentmade no attempt to warn people against travellingback to the suburbs knowing full well that theseareas were flooded. The simple act of informingpeople through FM radio stations and pressing hamradio operators into service (as they were after theLatur quake) would have succeeded in persuadingchildren to stay in schools or nearby homes, andpeople to remain at their workplaces, rather thanventuring on to the roads and risking their lives.The opening up of the Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT)roads could have saved lives. When theadministration should have been out in full forceadministering relief work, a two-day holiday wasdeclared for all government staff includingconservancy staff (35,000) whose absence wassorely felt. In fact, the staff at Mantralaya shouldnot have been sent home at all on the 26th, sincethey could have been used to help tackle the disastersituation rather than become part of the problem.

In the public hearings held by CCC, there wereinnumerable stories of how citizens tried toapproach the BMC or their elected representativesfor help and were either turned away or found thatthe representatives were themselves missing. Thelocal plans which were to be put into action in eachward simply did not materialize.

2. The Disaster Management Plan emphasisesland use polices and planning to mitigate disasters.In consonance with the MMR Plan (1996-2011) theDMP talks about the need to rein in reclamation toprotect water bodies and storm water holding ponds.The Plan argues that Mumbai has reached itscapacity in terms of services and infrastructure andthat a policy of decongestion of the island city shouldbe pursued. The MMR plan 1996-2011 talks aboutdeveloping surrounding areas like BKC and theOshiwara District Centre. It also suggests the need

to develop employment in the countryside. Yetironically, an integral part of the MMR Plan is theconstruction of the BKC itself, which has beencreated on reclaimed land by destroying mangroves,severely narrowing the Mithi River. This was a majorcause of the flooding in Kurla-Kalina-Saki Nakaareas. Similarly Oshiwara too is marshy, mangroveland. The MMR ignores its own warning bydeveloping large commercial centres without payingheed to the need to maintain natural drainage, openspaces and absorption areas.

3.Composition of Mumbai DisasterManagement Committee: It is strange that theDeputy Director General, Indian MeteorologyDepartment is only an invitee and not a member ofthe MDMC. Considering the fact that the westerncoast of Maharashtra is occasionally hit by cyclonesand frequent periods of heavy rain, and that theIMD plays a vital role in predicting and monitoringthe occurrence of these disasters, this glaringomission needs to be rectified at the earliest.(MDMP – Institutional Arrangements Vol I- 43)

To sum up, the Disaster Management Cell ofboth the state government and the BMC wereconspicuous by their complete inactivity on July26. These might just as well have not been set up,and the DMP might just as well have not beenformulated, as there is no evidence that it was putinto effect on July 26.

II. B. 2) POLITICAL MACHINERY RESPONSE TO MUMBAIFLOODS

For the enquiry, CCC tried to reach the ChiefMinister, the Environment Minister, the HealthMinister, the Chief Secretary, the Additional ChiefSecretary (Home) and the different PrincipalSecretaries (Forests, Health, UDD, Environment,etc.) However despite our repeated attempts tocontact them, we were stonewalled. The ChiefSecretary (Mr. R.M. Prem Kumar) expressed hisinability to meet CCC as he was busy with hisofficial engagements and could not spare the time.The Principal Secretary (Forests) Mr. S.S. Hussaininformed the panel that he would be out of stationand therefore could not meet the commission. Hehowever informed the panel that he ‘would be veryhappy if the commission could send all theinformation which had been gathered along with thesuggestions’.

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In the almost total absence of officialinformation and cooperation from these sources,CCC is forced to base its findings on interactionswith other public figures, the depositions receivedat the public hearings held across Mumbai andmedia reports.

Presentation by Secretary, Relief andRehabilitation: However, Mr. Krishna Vatsa,Secretary Relief & Rehabilitation, did meet theCCC subsequently on November 27, 2005. Mr.Vatsa provided the following information: Mr Vatsabegan by saying that the administration had noadvance warning about the torrential rains thatwould hit Mumbai on July 26. The impact wasonly seen when water in the Badlapur barrage(constructed over the Ulhas River in Thane District)which was a good 60-70 feet below the maximumlevel on 25th July began to overflow by the 26th

evening. On the 27th morning the barrage wascompletely washed away.

Mr Vatsa added that till June many districtswere facing drought and that the state governmenthad submitted a Memorandum for drought relief inVidharbha & Marathwada to the central govt on July15. On July 21, heavy rains lashed areas likeNanded, Konkan etc. In Thane, many of thesuburban tracks were completely washed away orflooded. Although in the past there had been heavyrains accompanied by heavy flooding in Thanedistrict, none of these could be compared to therains that lashed Maharashtra from July 24 to 26.He said that this was a ‘once-in-a-100-year’ event

and that nothing indicates that this would everhappen again.

Around July 23, there was heavy rain inKonkan; there were reports of long distance trainsbeing stranded in the Konkan belt, especiallyMangaon and Chiplun. Mr. Vatsa received a callfrom the CM requesting him to arrange forairdropping food packets to stranded trainpassengers. However, helicopters could not reachthe flood affected areas due to incessant rain. Entirevillages in the Konkan area were marooned by July25 and villagers had to climb onto hilltops to savethemselves. By the 26th morning, it had stoppedraining in Konkan. On that day, Mr. Vatsa, the DGPand the Chief Secretary took off in a chopper tosurvey the flood-affected areas of Chiplun. They leftat 11:30 am and came back by 2:30 pm; Mr Vatsasays that at that time there were no rains in Mumbai– by which he meant South Mumbai. According toMr Vatsa, there was as yet no indication of the heavyrains, which were going to strike Mumbai.

At 4 pm, there was the meeting chaired by theCM to discuss the floods in Raigad and Ratnagiri.Mr Vatsa was asked why the Police Commissionerof Mumbai was not present considering the serioussituation in North Mumbai. He replied that as themeeting was to deal with the situation in Raigadand Ratnagiri the CP had not been called. Howeverwhen asked about the presence of Mr JohnnyJoseph (Mumbai Municipal Commissioner) and Mr.Swadin Kshatriya of the BEST, Mr Vatsa said thattowards evening, the situation in Mumbai had


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become critical and therefore Mr Joseph waspresent. Mr Vatsa said that the Dy. Director Generalof the IMD, Dr C.V.V. Bhadram was present at thismeeting but he did not give any indication of theimpending rains over Mumbai. When asked whenthe control room at Mantralaya received the firstdistress call about unprecedented rainfall in Mumbai,Mr Vatsa said that the first call was received ‘sometime in the afternoon’ of July 26. It was pointed toMr. Vatsa that according to certain reports, officialsfrom Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP) hadcalled up Mantralaya at around 1:30 pm to reportunprecedented rainfall and flooding, inspite of whichthere was no action taken. The CCC also pointedout that as soon as the Santacruz weather stationrecorded the expected daily rainfall within about 60minutes, an alarm should have been sounded. Mr.Vatsa said that the logs of the respectivedepartments would have to be checked in order toascertain the facts.

Mr Vatsa said that around 4:00 – 4:30 pm,there were reports of heavy rain and suburbanrailway tracks being submerged, and a decisionwas taken to deploy additional fleets of BESTbuses. This decision was taken on the assumptionthat the flooding would only be around 4-5 feet;however the flooding was so severe that many BESTbuses themselves got stranded. Mr Vatsa also feltthat in hindsight the order to declare leave for twodays and allow municipal and governmentemployees to leave office early was amiscalculation. But he added that given thecircumstances, the decision was taken in order forpeople to leave for their homes and be with theirfamilies.

About the role played by the Met. dept., Mr.Vatsa said that there was no warning from the Met.dept. to indicate that there would be so much rain;he mentioned that at the 4 pm meeting, the Dy.Director General of the IMD Dr. Bhadram, made nomention about the rains over Mumbai. Mr. Vatsaalso said that in the mid 1990s there was an offerby the World Bank to provide assistance to India toupgrade its weather forecasting systems. This offerwas apparently refused by the then head of the IMDDr. R.R. Kelkar on the grounds that the technologyused by IMD was good enough and there was noneed of assistance from the World Bank. Mr. Vatsaadded that the technology used by western

countries was far superior to that used by Indiaand Indian equipment needed urgent upgradation.

Mr. Vatsa said that the weather pattern thatwas responsible for the floods in Konkan was notthe same that hit Mumbai. The pattern which causedunprecedented rainfall in Mumbai developed overNorth Mumbai. He added that on the 26th, when theDGP, Chief Secretary and he travelled from SouthMumbai towards Konkan, which is further south,the skies were absolutely clear, indicating that therainfall on July 26 was independent of the patternthat caused heavy rainfall in the Konkan.

As Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation, Mr.Vatsa was in charge and had full authority tomobilize any services required. He said that he wasin constant touch with the army and navy. He alsoadded that it was the Chief Secretary who was inoverall charge of the situation. (Indicating thatalthough ACS- Home was in charge in times ofdisaster, in terms of authority it was the CS whonormally took overall responsibility)

About the Relief & Rehabilitation, Mr. Vatsasaid that every area which had been flooded hadbeen provided relief within 48 hours All over the state,over 5 lakh people had been rescued. In Mumbaialone around 1,000 people had been rescued bysearch and rescue teams. By the 26th evening, theNavy had been successful in deploying rescueboats in Ratnagiri and by the 27th rescue boats werepressed into operation in Raigad.

In all the Maharashtra Government spent Rs.476 crores on R&R (Rs. 200 crores in Mumbai,Rs. 100 crores in Thane & Rs. 176 crores in therest of Maharashtra). Mr Vatsa added that thesearch and rescue team of the BMC, whichconsists of 32 people, is well trained and equippedbut even this was simply not enough to meet thiskind of crisis. Mr Vatsa pointed out that had therebeen boats the situation would have beensignificantly different. He emphasized the need fora robust communication system. He also addedthat the state government would need to set upspecial battalions of police, which are highly mobileand could be deployed in an emergency such asthis.

When the irregularities in relief distributionwhich came to light during the CCC hearings were

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pointed out, Mr. Vatsa replied that there could havebeen individual cases of discrepancies, especiallywhere local representatives had handled thedistribution. He said that the distribution of monetaryrelief had been stopped only after considerable time.This was a government decision as it was felt thatclaims (false) would keep coming in.

In conclusion, Mr. Vatsa said that it was theobstruction of natural drainage systems, unbridledcommercialization compounded with lack of lowincome housing which compounded the tragedy.These are the problems that should be tackled onan urgent basis. However he also said that therainfall on that particular day was so unprecedentedthat even with the best drainage system andappropriate social housing, it would have been verydifficult to escape the floods altogether. He saidthat the government needed to urgently invest in adisaster management plan that is effective, can beimplemented and . is backed up by necessaryresources. He called for reducing Mumbai’svulnerability by removing people from unsafe areas,and parallel investments in low cost housing.

Mr. Vatsa was also very critical of the roleplayed by the media, who according to him wereonly concentrating on Mumbai while the situationwas as bad or even worse in the interior areas of

Maharashtra. He said that the moment the situationin Mumbai became better, the media searched forother news stories inspite of the situation in theinterior being far worse off. He added that no sectionof the media covered the relief work carried out bythe Government.

Presentation by State Government: According toa presentation prepared by the State Governmenton relief and rehabilitation and obtained by CCC,the Maharashtra Government claims to have takenimmediate steps to respond to the situation. Someof these steps include:

� Meeting of all state government functionariesof the state government at 4 pm on 26th July.

� Control Room on full alert: Secretary-levelofficers assigned to Control Rooms

� Chief Secretary convened meetings of all thesecretaries at 11am every day.

� Evacuation of over 5 lakh people to saferlocations

� Community kitchens started, free food grainsprovided for these kitchens

� Restoration of power and water supply

� Immediate monetary relief to the deceased andinjured.


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� Dispatching doctors to affected areas anddistribution of necessary medicines

� Deployment of Army, Navy and Air Force

Control Rooms: The state government claimsthat there was a meeting of all state governmentfunctionaries at 4 pm on the 26th and that from thenext day the chief secretary held meetings of allsecretaries every day to monitor the situation.

However, it is now well known that the meetingcalled on July 26 was to take stock of the floodsituation in Raigad and Ratnagiri districts. Thegovernment till this time was unaware that heavyrains had hit Mumbai. It was only at 4:30 pm thatnews about different suburbs being waterlogged andthe railways having suspended services began totrickle in. That day Mantralaya and BMC orderedtheir offices to close early and private offices in southMumbai followed suit. Since this decision wastaken at the highest level of Government, it showeda complete failure to anticipate the probability thatMumbai would also be hit by the same heavy rainsthat had flooded Raigad and Ratnagiri.

Apparently, no attempt was made to evenobtain the latest met data from the IMD officialswho were present at that meeting about the likelyimpact on Mumbai.

One would have expected the government toswing into action and deploy government personnel;however it did just the opposite; it declared a two-day holiday for all state government officialsincluding around 35,000 conservancy staff whoshould have been at the heart of rescue and reliefefforts. As a result, the common citizens had noone to turn to in their hour of need.

The government claims to have deputedsecretary level officers to the various control roomsand having daily meetings of different secretariesto review the situation.

However, according to police sources, therewas no functioning Control Room in Mantralayaduring the crisis. The police themselves were notcalled to meetings held by the CM to discuss thefloods.

Evacuation, restoration of power & water supply,supply of essential commodities, monetary assistanceand health camps: The government claims that over

5 lakh people were evacuated and housed atmunicipal schools, municipal structures etc.However in most of the areas where CCC held thepublic hearings, people told us a completely differentstory. In areas like Govandi (Tata Nagar), peoplewent to higher floors to seek refuge. In certain areasthere was nothing left, so people simply came onto the roads and waited there till the water subsided.Amina Shabbir, 45, recalled how her homecollapsed like a pack of cards. “No one from thegovernment came to help us,” she complainedbitterly. “Some neighbours fed us. It will take Re 1lakh to repair our house.” She still walked withdifficulty when she deposed.

In Orlem (Malad), people went to the municipaloffice only to be told to go back. Here relief wasprovided by the Orlem Church where people stayedfor two days at a stretch. Similar stories emergedfrom other places — the involvement of governmentdepartments in evacuating people or providing reliefwas rarely heard of. At the Central Railway Colonyin Kurla, Roger Pereira cited how “only people cameto help those in need; had information beenavailable, it would have helped.” The entire colonywas flooded, much higher than the ground floors,which were perennially vulnerable in the monsoons.“There was no light or water; the media didn’t knowwe existed – we were totally isolated.”

The government provided rations and monetaryhelp to victims, but this came much later. However,here too there were massive discrepancies in therelief distribution process, discussed in the sectionon Relief and Rehabilitation. Aid was not distributeduniformly. In many places, people were told thatrations had simply run out, in other places that themoney had run out. Juman Ali in Jari Mari allegedthat half the food grains had been pilfered. CCCencountered many cases where differenthouseholds in the same locality had got differentialaid. CCC encountered cases where pockets ofpeople who supported the sitting corporator or MLAgot preferential treatment. In places like Saki Nakathere were open clashes between supporters of thecorporator Ms. Lalita and the MLA Naseem Khan,both of whom wanted to claim credit for relief work.The fact that certain areas got more relief suppliesthan required while certain areas went without aidfor days together needs to be probed.

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Jawahar Prajapati from Bachidevi chawl inKhar East testified that he went to complain aboutthe haphazard distribution of relief to the office ofthe Collector (Suburban District). He was asked toidentify himself and was given the run-around bydifferent officials. He alleged that there were ‘agents’supervising the distribution of money. Similarcomplains were made by Salvador Swami of KharWest, who named Prakash Bobde, a corporator,and Baba Siddiqui, a cabinet Minister, disbursingrelief to those who had not been affected.

In Bandra East, many residents of governmentcolonies near the Kherwadi police station openlyconfessed that they had received food and keroseneas compensation even though they had not beenaffected. Those who told the distributing authoritiesthat they had not been affected were still asked totake the material as ‘it had to be distributed anyway.’

When the CCC visited Jari Mari on September8, it was greeted with news that showed the politicalforces in the area were worried that their failureswould be exposed. As word of the CCC’s visitspread, local corporators got into their face-savingact. Coupons for aid were distributed by localpolitician Anna Malai, whose wife Sau Lalita is acorporator. This was obviously aimed both atassuaging the residents’ anger and at attractingpeople away from the CCC hearing.

As if this were not enough, Anna Malai alsogot garbage from some of the worst-affectedlocalities cleared up. Ironically however, thisgarbage was then dumped in the Mithi river. Thisenraged local residents such as such as RamDulvai, Naguma and Baba Tanvi Sheikh, whoimmediately objected, knowing that such dumpingand blockage of nallahs and rivers was a key causeof the flood in the first place. In response thecontractors got abusive and threatened the women.A local activist of Citizens’ Option named Yasinthen took the threatened women to the police tolodge a complaint. Constables were immediatelysent to the site to bring the situation under control.

The government also claims that immediatelyafter the deluge, they dispatched medical teams

to distribute essential medical supplies, chlorinetables etc. However, from the information gatheredby the CCC, almost all medical camps conductedwere by NGOs and charities. Even when thenumber of leptospirosis (borne by rats) cases beganto shoot up, the government tried to hide the issuesaying that these were only stray cases. It wasonly after a sustained media campaign that thegovernment acknowledged that there was a problem.Many areas were totally cut off for days on endwithout access to power or safe drinking water. Inareas like Kurla, residents did not have power anddrinking water for an entire week. It was only whenthese residents resorted to protests and rasta rokosthat the authorities took note. In other areas likeKalina and Govandi, although there was no majorwater shortage, the water continued to be muddyfor an entire fortnight.

The Political Game: Almost immediately afterthe floods, the game of gaining political mileagebegan in right earnest. BJP leader and former MPKirit Somaiya filed a criminal complaint against chiefminister Vilasrao Deshmukh, chief secretary R MPremkumar and other officials, accusing them ofculpable homicide not amounting to murder for theirnegligence which resulted in the deaths of hundredsof people in the recent floods. However, Somaiyahas not included municipal commissioner JohnyJoseph in his list of “guilty’’ persons. Perhaps thisis because the BJP controls the BMC along withthe Shiv Sena and a plaint against Joseph wouldhave been embarrassing for the party.6

In Kherwadi (Bandra), those picking up theirapportioned relief also had a ‘token’ thrust into theirhands, with their name and address scrawled in.‘‘From Government of Maharashtra, arranged by ProfJ C Chandurkar (MLA)’’.

According to an article in The Indian Express,in the far western suburbs, four MLAs (two ShivSena, one BJP and one Congress), a former MLAand a couple of corporators showed up when therelief trucks made their way into Borivali Theyclaimed later that they had been protesting the shortsupply of the relief rations, but sources in Kandivlipolice station differed. First, the MLAs offered to

6 “Somaiya’s Criminal Plaint against CM”; The Times of India, August 4, 2005 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1191630.cms

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‘assist’ the rationing officers. But local corporatorsfrom other parties wanted their slice of the actiontoo, leading to long-winded arguments among thegroups at Kandivli police station.7

Multiplicity of agencies: Certain experts like (Mr.V. Ranganathan – former municipal commissioner)point out that the different agencies with differentagendas and different styles of functioning meanthat there is no one authority in charge of thecity8 . The existence of different agencies like theSlum Rehabilitation Authority- SRA, MHADA(Maharashtra Housing Area Development Authority,MMRDA (Mumbai Metropolitan Region DevelopmentAuthority) and MSRDC (Maharashtra State RoadDevelopment Corporation), all of which report todifferent departments, means that there really isno synergy and that these different agencies arealways upstaging each other and working at cross-purposes.

The basic question of why this multiplicity hasbeen created and whether it has been done withmalafide intentions on the part of successive stategovernments needs to be addressed. It is no secretthat each of these agencies come with their ownperks and benefits for office bearers (vehicles,housing allowance, payment of telephone bills etc.)

Moreover, it is also convenient for those inpower that organisations such as the MSRDC, forexample, by virtue of being corporations, do notneed approval for their projects from the FinanceDepartment. As a result we have ‘glamorous’ andhugely expensive projects such as the Trans-Harbour Sea Link and the Bandra-Worli-NarimanPoint Sea Links being proposed and undertakenby the MSRDC with no accountability.

Similarly, the (SRA) Slum RehabilitationAuthority by virtue of being a separate authority isable to bypass planning standards and BMCprocedures.

Another classic case is that of the BMC andthe MMRDA. While the BMC is the Municipal bodyfor Mumbai city and Suburbs, MMRDA is the

regional planning agency with special powers toexecute infrastructure work in the city. There is anongoing power struggle between these twoagencies. The BMC has gone on record provingthat it repeatedly advised the MMRDA to provideadequate storm water drains on the road corridorsthat the MMRDA has taken up for improvement. Inmany cases, MMRDA work has affected the stormwater drains. However this advice was ignored orimplemented partially The BMC is equally to blame,as it okayed the quality of the work completed injoint inspections of the MMRDA and the BMC staffin areas that needed urgent work before themonsoon.9

Many, if not all, of these corporations andauthorities appear to have been set up expresslyto avoid accountability and bypass planning normsand regulations. The presence of many differentagencies with conflicting or overlapping roles hinderstransparency in planning and decision-making,benefitting those who wish to take advantage forillegal gain.

Greed, greed and more greed: When questionedas to why there was such enormous flooding, theCM blamed the flooding on the unprecedented rainsand the high tides, which coincided with the heavyrains. However, the flooding in the city is more theresult of bad planning than unprecedented rains orhigh tides. For instance, Diogo Fernandes, an 80-year-old former Tata hockey player, who lived for17 years in the Air-India Colony in Kalina, told theCCC how floods were an annual visitation due tothe construction of runways on the course of theMithi River. The airport boundary was barely 100metres away from the colony. He alleged thatGolden Builders was currently constructing a seven-storey building on a nallah in nearby Sunder Nagar,where he now lived. During the floods, he could notget out of his house for three days. According toR.B. Morade, General Secretary of the IndianAirlines Colony & Ideal School Association, thecollapse of the extension wall of the airport caused25 deaths; one body was recovered after ten days.10

7 “Mumbai: Everyone loves a good flood”; The Indian Express, August 6, 2005 www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=522228 “It’s a clash of civil bodies”, The Times of India, August 4, 2005 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1191628.cms9 “Why 944 mm took two days to drain out”, Indian Express- News line, September 23, 2005http://cities.expressindia.com/archivefullstory.php?newsid=149838&creation_date=2005-09-2310 . “Why Mumbai Choked”, Frontline, Vol.22, Issue 17, Aug 13 - 26, 2005 http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2217/stories/20050826004601700.htm

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Over the years, the builder-politician nexus hasknowingly and intentionally strangulated the city’sopen spaces, wetlands, mangroves and salt-panlands for commercial purposes. This loss of andsubsequent commercialization and concretizationof open spaces has meant that water, whichpreviously could seep into the soil has practicallynowhere to go, leading to flooding. Reclamation,legal and illegal, by private parties and governmentdepartments, have wreaked havoc on the city’sdrainage.

These issues have been dealt with in greaterdetail elsewhere in this report, but what is crucialto note is that even after 26/7, the politicalmachinery has shown no inclination to accept itsmistakes, learn from them and avoid repeatingthem.

The best example of this is the proposal of Mr.Ganesh Naik, Minister for Environment, Governmentof Maharashtra, to sell off all open spaces in Mumbaito pay off the state’s accumulated debts of Rs1,10,000 crores. This would include the MahalaxmiRace Course, Aarey Milk Colony, gardens, parks,salt pan lands, mangroves etc. This was widelyreported in the papers barely three weeks after thefloods.

Similarly, the government has shown nowillingness to rethink projects such as the Bandra-Worli and Worli-Nariman Point Sea Links, or theTrans-Harbour Sewri-Nhava Sea Link, which willagain involve reclamation and loss of mangroves.Repeated requests to change the alignment of theSewri-Nhava link have been ignored. [See SectionIII.B.5, “Pending and proposed projects and theirimpacts – Sewri –Nhava Sea Link”]

Perhaps the only predictable response of thegovernment has been the setting up of a number ofcommittees to look into issues related to the floodingof Mumbai, the Mithi River, etc. The Mithi RiverCommittee is headed by irrigation and hydrologistexpert Mr. Madhav Chitale. It remains to be seenwhat recommendations the committee makes andif these are accepted and implemented by thegovernment.

In the course of its enquiries, the CCC hasfound that there were early warning signs reportedby different wings of the administration. The BEST

has reported receiving a message at 12.45 pm onJuly 26 that the Central Railways trains beyondThane had ceased running due to flooding. Mr. P.N.Munde, Field Director of the SGNP, informed hissuperiors at Mantralaya between 2.30 – 2.45 pmthat a flash flood in the park had flooded his officewith three feet of water. The police log for Northregion (Zone XI and XIII shows that the at 1.57 pm,a call went from the North Region Control Room toall police stations in zones XI and XII warning thatheavy rain had commenced, flooding was beingreported from some places, and there was alikelihood of tree falls and short circuits. At 3 and3.06 pm respectively, the BEST received messagesthat the Malad and Dahisar subways were flooded.At 3.50 pm, the police were informed that there hadbeen discharge of water from a dam near Titwalawhich had submerged the tracks. If water had to bereleased then the Irrigation Secretary should havebeen informed of it. If these reports had been passedon to, and collated by one central source, such asthe Disaster Management Cell, they would haveprovided an indication that abnormally heavy rainwas hitting the city. Precautions could have beentaken and lives could have been saved.

II. B. 3) POLICE RESPONSE TO MUMBAI FLOODS

Throughout its interactions with the public andmost experts and citizens, the lack of a visible policepresence in most of the flood-affected areas wasrepeatedly stressed. There were a few honourableexceptions where heroic police personnel activelyrescued people. Police Constable PradeepNimbalkar and Assistant Inspector (Special Branch)Tushar Kadam both rescued several people in the


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Kurla and Kalina area respectively, and Nimbalkardied while attempting another rescue. However,these seemed to be exceptions. At many of theCCC’s public hearings, allegations were madethat the police were either not seen or did not orcould not render any help at the height of thecrisis. Many police chowkies when approachedwere found locked and empty.

Many citizens felt that the mere sight of apolice uniform helps to bring a sense of order tochaotic situations, but this was lacking on the26th. To the extent that Kadam intentionallydonned his uniform in order to rally people aroundhim during rescue operations. Clearly, in adisaster it is not only important that those inpositions of authority do something; they mustalso be “seen to be doing something.”

The CCC was able to piece together a fairlycomprehensive and coherent picture of the eventsthat occurred on July 26 based upon informationreceived from reliable sources who desired toremain anonymous.

� On the charge of police being absent fromduty: The CCC was told that many police stationswere completely inundated. 33 police stationswaterlogged with between three to 11 feet of water.The Vakola and Saki Naka stations had ten toeleven feet of water. Jogeshwari and Nehru Nagarhad eight feet. As a result, the lockups in manystations had to be evacuated. The police forcewas almost completely immobilised by the floodwaters, with 60 odd police vehicles stranded. Asa result, police personnel were sent out on footinto the floodwaters to help people. He also addedthat in many places the police personnel wereeither in plainclothes or had to remove theiruniforms to swim through the floodwaters, as aresult people could not distinguish them fromothers The CCC was told of a police team thatresponded to distress calls and rescued 13people from the top of a bus at Air-India Colony,Kalina.

Reports were received of buses stuck in therising waters at Air-India Colony, Kalina and Kurla.A police vehicle attempted to reach the Air IndiaColony but got stuck. Finally 13 people wererescued from the top of a bus at around 11 pm.There was another bus further ahead but the

police team could not reach it as the water waseven higher at that point. The people on thesecond bus were finally rescued on the 27th earlymorning, with the help of a navy boat. At Kurla,the police obtained a boat and rescued 3 busloadsof people.

� On the charge that the police was caughtunawares and were totally unprepared for thiscalamity: The CCC was informed that in case ofimpending heavy rain, the IMD sends out warningsto the BMC, Police etc. However for the periodJuly 22 to July 29, the IMD had predicted ‘RatherHeavy’ to ‘Heavy Rain’, which translates intobetween 35 and 65 mm, whereas 944 mm wasactually received. There was no indication fromthe IMD that a calamity of this magnitude wasimpending.

Each day’s forecast is received around 1 pm,effective for the next 24 hours. The forecastreceived for the 26th at around 1.30 pm was for“Rather Heavy to Heavy” rain. The same forecastwas also made for every day till August 4, but onmany of these days there was no rain or verylittle rain. The police are also given a list of dateswhen heavy rains and high tides are expected tocoincide, but going on the basis of these onecannot close down the city and ask people toremain at home, as the forecasts are very oftennot accurate.

The Railways normally inform the police andBEST in advance if they are likely to suspendservices, but this time there was no warning asthe Railways themselves were caught unawares.

The police were of the view that while all othercivic authorities pleaded helplessness, the policeforce was the only agency that undertook rescueoperations round the clock, to whatever extentpossible given the circumstances. Most policestations were without electricity and telephoneconnections. Though they were equipped withwireless sets, these need recharging. Thewireless batteries are supposed to last for 12hours. However, because of the intensive use,many batteries got drained within a few hours. Inmany places, recharging was a problem as therewas no electricity. Thus while the police wirelesscommunication system did not break down, itwas patchy in some areas.

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� On the charge that the police should haveprevented traffic congestion on the city ’s arterialroads: Once Mantralaya was closed at about 5pm, other private offices followed suit. As thegravity of the situation in the northern suburbsbecame apparent, attempts were made to get thetraffic stopped from heading towards the suburbsfrom south Mumbai, by about 7 pm. However, mostvehicles had already passed Haji Ali heading north.Further, it was hard to convince motorists of thesituation in the northern suburbs and manyinsisted on trying to get home, arguing with policepersonnel and evading them by taking side roads.

Falling trees also disrupted traffic. Jt. CP,Traffic Control Branch Satish Mathur had warnedthe BMC of the danger this monsoon because ofthe road digging and construction work in manyareas, without any protection are being taken ofthe roots of trees. Ultimately, 54 trees fell in aspan of three to four hours on the 26th evening,adding to the chaos. Before the monsoon, thepolice had requested the BMC to depute an officerto sit in the traffic control room during themonsoons, but they had refused.

� On the role of the Police in the DisasterManagement Plan (DMP): According to Mumbai’sDisaster Management Plan, the police role islimited to:

1. Cordoning of area to restrict movement

2. Shifting affected to hospital

3. Providing easy access to rescue personnel

4. Corpse disposal

5. Law and order maintenance

6. Divert traffic from blocked routes

7. Coordination with BMC Control Room

In reality on 26th July the police were calledon to go far beyond their prescribed role. Thepolice are not equipped to save lives, but in anemergency this is a role they can and do play.Once the gravity of the situation became apparent,they sent instructions to the various stations andteams were sent along the main roads to locatestranded buses, vehicles etc. They reported backand rescue operations commenced.

However, despite all these efforts, seniorpolice officers felt that not enough was done bythe entire government machinery and even thepolice. 17 people died in stranded vehicles onthe roads and this should have been avoided. Thepolice did their best, but it wasn’t good enough.

The state’s Disaster Management Cell camein for strong criticism. The control room atMantralaya, which should have been the nervecentre during the crisis, was non-functional.Though the police have become both the first andlast recourse in such cases of public emergency,they have not been given any statutory role insuch situations. They need to be given a statutoryrole and equipped and trained accordingly. Seniorofficers said that despite the crores spent onMumbai’s DMP, no money has been given to thepolice to purchase equipment, train personnel etc.The Commissioner of Police had not been invitedto any of the meetings held by the Chief Ministerto discuss the floods.

Dr P.S. Pasricha (Former Mumbai PoliceCommissioner and presently Director General ofPolice, Maharashtra) in an interview to rediff.comhas said that the “In the disaster managementplan, the police is not there at all.” Though thepolice are represented on the Mumbai DMC andthe BMC DMC, as the first recourse of the public,the police need to be given a greater role withstatutory authority and increased resources tofunction effectively in times of disasters.11


11 http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/aug/24inter1.htm

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The police also criticized the MMRDA andMSRDC for their irresponsible attitude to the city,despite the significant role both these bodies playin the functioning of the city. Neither agencybothered to send a representative for the jointmeeting held to discuss monsoon preparedness,held. It would also appear that neither of thesetwo bodies are represented on the MumbaiDisaster Management Cell or the BMC- DMC.

� On the charge of the police being absentduring the Saki Naka landslide: On the specific

charge that police were not present to help duringthe Saki Naka landslide, senior police officersinformed the CCC that there had a been a minorlandslide on the 26th evening and that the policewarned people to leave the place. However it wason the 27th that a major landslide flattenedhutments at the base of the hillock killing over ahundred people. He claimed that the police sentpersonnel from other areas and they were theones removing the debris. Very few personnelwere available. A JCB was brought to the site.On the 28th morning one company of RAF (RapidAction Force) turned up and on the 28th afternoon,the Fire Officer arrived.

The CCC’s conclusions:

• The police’s claim that police personnel werepresent but in plainclothes might be true inmany cases, but the overall fact remains thatthe police presence was not what it shouldhave been. To a large extent this wasunavoidable, given the circumstances, as thepolice themselves were immobilized and notequipped to tackle an emergency of this sort.However, the police force needs to be trained

THE SAKI-NAKA LANDSLIDE

Regarding the Saki Naka landslide episode, there are significant discrepancies in the story put forward by the policeand that as told to the CCC by residents of the area concerned, which is as follows:

It was the first landslide on the 26th evening at around 4:30pm that claimed the large number of lives, flatteninghutments at the base of the hill. By the time the second landslide occurred early on the 27th morning, people had alreadymoved away from the area. Residents of this locality (Khadi No 3- Saki Naka) have informed

representatives of the CCC that they went to the nearest police Chowki (90 feet road police Chowki) attached to theSaki Naka police station which is 5 minutes from the accident site. The Police personnel on duty refused to/could nothelp. There were attempts to call the Saki Naka police station but the phone was not answered. On the 27th morning, a fewpolice personnel from the nearby chowki came to inspect the scene. Finally, on the 27th morning, more members of thepolice force turned up, as did the Fire Brigade, both of whom took part in the rescue operations. However, the localresidents insist that it was the fire brigade that undertook most of the work, not the police.

The Saki Naka landslide was a disaster waiting to happen. CCC’s investigations have revealed that local politicians(read slum lords) along with unscrupulous government officials turned a blind eye to unauthorised settlements and inmany cases actively abetted in the setting up of shanties atop unstable terrain which resulted in the death of countlessinnocent people. When CCC went to the area, local residents were extremely wary of talking to us fearing a backlash fromvested interests. However certain residents on condition on anonymity revealed how the slum atop the hill had developedover the past decade despite the full knowledge of the civic authorities and elected representative. When pressed fordetails, they revealed that it was the local MLA, Naseem Khan and his henchmen who in fact controlled land supply in theentire area and no shanty could have come up without their approval. They further revealed that in the past there had beeninstances of boulders falling from the hilltop, which had been brought to the notice of municipal authorities whose onlyanswer was to tell them to move away from that site without any talk of resettlement. Finally people also said that theofficial death toll in the landslide was far less than the people who had actually perished.


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and equipped to handle natural disasterssuch as floods, earthquakes, tsunamis,chemical disasters etc.

• The police have been assigned a very limitedrole to play in the DMP. Considering the factthat they are the wing that is directly in contactwith the people and spread throughout the city,the police needs to be given a greater role withcorrespondingly greater powers andinfrastructure as part of the DMP.

• Though the police may be faulted for beingunable to provide help in many areas on the26th, they appear to have played asignificantly better role, above and beyondthe call of duty, in the relief efforts over thenext few days. Just as their absence incertain areas must be pointed out, thepositive role played in the relief efforts mustbe lauded.

On the 27th evening, a message was sent toall police stations asking them to gathervolunteers, local NGOs, and donors andmake local arrangements for distributingrelief materials and provisions to thoseaffected. On the 28th morning, the policestarted holding health camps in some areasand from the 29th onwards, they starteddistributing provisions, clothes etc.According to the Police Department, in all

36 health camps were held and over 2 lakhpeople helped.

The State Bank of India (SBI) contacted thepolice and offered their help, giving aid worthabout Rs 20 lakhs. The Confederation ofIndian Industry (CII) also contacted the policedepartment and were assigned the Kurlaarea, where they distributed relief kits. TheSidhivinayak Trust also gave aid worth aboutRs 20 lakhs. Teen Challenge (NGO) sent fivevehicles with materials to police headquartersevery day starting on the 29th. By policeestimates, about Rs 60 lakh worth of materialmust have been distributed by TeenChallenge in the eastern suburbs ofGhatkopar, Vikhroli and the North region.

“NIMBALKAR DIED SAVING OUR LIVES”

He managed to save two people from being sucked to death but lost his own life in an attempt to answer a third cry for help.The body of Pradip Nimbalkar, a constable with the Local Arms Unit-I, was recovered five days later in Kurla where he drownedtrying to save a man whose body is yet to be found. A 28-year-old bachelor, on July 26, Nimbalkar was on his way home afterreceiving a phone call that his room at the Nehru Nagar Police Lines was under water. At Kurla he saw two men (lateridentified as Vijay Ambure and Hemant Satam) floundering in the water. Nimbalkar, a good swimmer, pulled Ambure out by hiscollar, and dived in again to rescue Satam. On hearing another cry for help, he swam out a third time but was pulled underalong with the man crying for help. Nimbalkar’s body was recovered on August 3.

Commissioner of police, Mumbai, AN Roy has announced compensation due to a policeman who dies on duty. Thechief added that rewards would also be given to those who saved people during the flood. According to the police, 440 people,including two policemen, have died as a result of the heavy rain. At least 66 people, including a constable, are still missing.

Ambure and Satam were called to police headquarters to relate their stories. Satam, who owns a flower shop nearKurla station, said he knew Nimbalkar since they were both from the same neighbourhood. “When I heard that a policeconstable was missing, I went to the Nehru Nagar police and they showed me a photograph,” said Satam. “It was Nimbalkar.He died saving our lives.”12 "

12 “ Hand in Hand”; Communalism Combat; August – September 2005


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II. B. 4) BMC

The CCC encountered universal condemnationof the BMC from all quarters post July 26. From thepolice hierarchy, the railways, and the commoncitizens, the BMC’s negligence leading up to the floodsand its compete absence during the crisis has beenseverely criticized. The BMC’s Disaster ManagementCommittee was conspicuous by its absence. This isall the more shocking as Municipal CommissionerJohny Joseph, Chairman of the BMC’s DMC, alsodrafted the Disaster Management Plan for the StateGovernment whilst he was Secretary (Relief &Rehabilitation) and was actively involved in the Laturearthquake rehabilitation a decade earlier. He oughtto have been best equipped to deal with the crisis.

The state government declared two-day holidayon the 27th and 28th meant that BMC staff andconservancy workers were absent when the cityneeded them most, and this badly hampered effortsto restore normalcy.

The BMC did not take a firm enough stancewith MMRDA when it found that MMRDA’s roadupgradation work under MUIP and MUTP wasaffecting drainage. While the MMRDA is mainly toblame, the BMC’s willingness to turn a blind eyealso cost the city dearly.

II. B. 5. MMRDA

MMRDA is the regional planning agency withspecial powers to execute infrastructure work in thecity. The role of the MMRDA has come under severescrutiny after the Mumbai floods. The MMRDA hasshown an alarming disrespect for sensible planningnorms and ecological spaces. Nothing typifies thisas much as the Banda-Kurla Complex and theextensive reclamation it has entailed, much of it takenup after the CRZ norms came into effect in 1991.This has been directly responsible for the flooding ofareas such as Kurla and Kalina. R.B. Morade,General Secretary of the Indian Airlines Colony, heldthe concreting of roads responsible for the extensiveflooding of the seven-acre colony.

With regard to Mumbai’s natural rivers, includingthe Mithi, the MMRDA has shown shocking

ignorance, apathy and neglect. Nothing exemplifiesthis as much as the fact that the Mithi river and theinter-tidal region in the estuary is not shown inMMRDA land use plan for 1996-2011.

The MMRDA is also undertaking the MumbaiUrban Transport Project (MUTP) and Mumbai UrbanInfrastructure Project (MUIP). The BMC has held theroad repair work taken up by MMRDA under theseprojects responsible for flooding many areas,according to an Indian Express report. According tothe BMC, the MMRDA and its consultants failed toprovide adequate storm water drainage systems onthe roads where the work for these two projects wasbeing undertaken. To list a few instances:13

• Along the western express highway (Kala NagarJunction to Jogeshwari- Vikhroli Link Road), theexisting open channel (5.5 metre x 1.2 metre)was disturbed. In its place, a new box drain(1.9 metre x 1.2 metre) was constructed. InJanuary, a letter was sent by the BMC (SWDDept) to the MMRDA about the discrepancy.

Suggestions were also made to the consultantto construct an additional drain along theservice road and a sewer along either side toserve roadside properties. Neither suggestionhas been implemented.

• On Link Road, for the stretch from SamantChowk in Bandra (West) to Juhu Tara Road,the SWD department had issued remarks tothe consultant in November 2004 to constructa 9-sq ft drain and construct or modify culvertsat every road-crossing to 15 sq ft. Work hasbeen done only on one stretch, while culvertsacross the road are not constructed/modifiedand some culverts along the road are not of thesize prescribed by the BMC. At least two pointson this stretch saw heavy flooding.

• For two other stretches along Link Road – fromOshiwara Bridge to Katchpada junction and fromAnnabhau Sathe Udyan to Shastri Nagar nullah– the BMC had given remarks to consultantsas far back as October 2003, suggesting boxculverts of reinforced cement concrete. Neitherbox culvert was constructed, and in both cases,

13 “Why 944 mm took two days to drain out”, Indian Express- Mumbai News line, September 23, 2005http://cities.expressindia.com/archivefullstory.php?newsid=149838&creation_date=2005-09-23

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the drains are only partly ready and connectivitywith larger drains is incomplete.

• In certain places such as Prem Nagar inJogeshwari (W), work on drains lies incompleteand elsewhere in an area opposite LandmarkHotel, a new drain doesn’t have connectivity.

It is significant that while all the road projectsthat are being implemented have gone through adetailed process of environmental impactassessment, no such attempt has been made inthe case of any of the road projects under MUIPeven though several of its projects are plannedthrough environmentally sensitive areas.

The Bandra–Kurla complex is yet anotherexample of how the MMRDA abused its powers.The MMRDA was fully aware that reclaiming swampsand constructing the Bandra-Kurla complex near themouth of the Mithi River would reduce its width andcould lead to flooding, especially in times of heavyrainfall, yet it went ahead. As a result, the mangroveswhere the Mithi River exits at Mahim are now one-third their original size. The MMRDA contends thatthe Bandra–Kurla complex reclamation has beenapproved of in a study conducted by CWRPS(Pune)14 .

However, Mr. Rakesh Kumar (Dy Director,National Environmental Engineering ResearchInstitute or NEERI) informed the CCC that it hadwarned Central Water and Power Research Station(CWPRS) and MMRDA of the negative impact ofthe Bandra-Kurla Complex on the Mithi. TheMMRDA’s contention that the complex was built onlyafter environmental approval is misleading, as thecomplex is a CRZ violation. As the agency in chargeof the development and planning for Mumbai,MMRDA should have altered its plans as soon asthe illegalities and the risk involved were pointed out.

The BMC has also criticized the MMRDA andthe SRA for creating blockages in the ‘Dani WooltaxNalla’, which joins the Mithi, leading to flooding inthe area along CST Road near Gujarat AmbujaCompany.15

During the crisis of 26/7, MMRDA wascompletely absent and played no role whatsoever.There is a state government directive that all agenciesconcerned with roads should have a control room.Police sources informed the CCC that the MMRDAdoes not yet have a functioning control room, or, inany event, did not at the time of the floods. MMRDAitself has earth moving and construction equipment(either directly or through its contractors) and thesecould have been invaluable in clearing the roads andat the site of the Saki Naka landslide. But sinceMMRDA itself was non-functional, these resourcescould not be tapped. The fact that the Head Office ofthe MMRDA was itself marooned is an apt commentaryon its working and indifferent approach to planning.

The final nail in the coffin for the MMRDA comesfrom the N. V. Merani Committee set up by theMaharashtra Government to study the flooding andmake suggestions. This committee recommendedthat widening the 17 arterial roads could wait; whatwas more important was to conduct a review of draindesigns for the 17 roads which the MMRDA isimproving. The message being sent out is to first fixthe drains and only after that is done, to continuewith widening roads. The report goes on to say that‘the MMRDA’s consultants were casual in theirapproach. Drain designs were very sketchy andprepared without taking into account the sites’geographical configuration’.16

It would also be pertinent to point out here thatthe MMRDA, supposedly the city’s apex planningbody, was completely bypassed by the BJP-ShivSena government during its rule in the late 1990s.This government entrusted the planning andexecution of a slew of road projects to theMaharashtra State Road Development Corporation(MSRDC). MSRDC is purely an engineering andconstruction agency and has absolutely no expertiseto take an overall view on the merits of such schemesand their desirability for the city as a whole. Indeed,the anomaly of such an agency taking all the majordecisions regarding fly-overs, sea links and othermajor road schemes has long been adverselycommented upon.

14 “Flooding caused by Maharashtra Government’s greed, not God”, Hindustan Times, July 31, 2005http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1448058,000600010004.htm15 Presentation by MCGM H/East Ward to Maharashtra Government Fact Finding Committee16 “Roads can wait, fix drains first”; The Indian Express, Mumbai News Line. November 30th, 2005http://cities.expressindia.com/archivefullstory.php?newsid=159465&creation_date=2005-12-01

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II. B. 6. FIRE BRIGADE

The Chief Fire Officer did not respond to CCC’srequest for a meeting, so we have been forced torely on press reports and information fromeyewitnesses and third party sources.

With reference to the Saki Naka landslide,where the Fire Brigade was the one agency bestequipped to rescue survivors, it took 15 hours forthe Brigade to arrive at the scene. Clearly, theMumbai Fire Brigade, like all other governmentagencies, was not prepared to cope with thisemergency. Added to the Fire Brigade’s woes isthe inaccessibility of most of the worst affectedareas due to narrow congested roads at the best oftime. This is another consequence of the poorplanning and enforcement of regulations in the city.

II. B. 7. COAST GUARD

Deputy Inspector General A. Rajshekhar,Commandant, Mumbai region informed the CCC thatthe Coast Guard has no mandatory role in the caseof a terrestrial disaster such as the floods of 26/7.Rivers and lakes do not come within their jurisdiction,which is restricted to the offshore waters. However,in case of emergencies they can and do provideassistance, as far as possible given their capacitiesand other duties.

Commandant Rajshekhar’s view was that theBMC needs to be given the training to respond todisasters such as floods. Given the Coast Guard’songoing responsibilities of patrolling, search andrescue etc, it will not be able to fulfill a permanentrole in this area.

The Coast Guard (CG), being a wing of theDefence Forces, has systems in place to ensure 24-hour readiness to tackle emergencies, and lessonscan be learnt from this. Despite Mumbai having cometo virtual standstill on the 27th, the CG was able torespond to the ONGC Bombay High oil well fire withadmirable speed. One of the main reasons for this isthat at any given time, 1/3rd of the crew or personnelare always on call. As a result, despite Mumbai’stransportation problems on the 27th evening, a CGship was ready to sail for Bombay High within threehours of the distress call coming in.

DIG Rajshekhar opined that the high tide hadlittle or no role to play in the floods, as the tide wasnot particularly high, and had receded by 6 pm,though the floods continued till the next morning.The CG also had no warning about the heavy rainthat would hit Mumbai. The CG’s communicationsare not affected in such situations, as they areequipped with satellite phones at the Headquartersand on their ships.

Regarding the possibility of using CG helicoptersto survey affected areas and/or for rescue operations,the DIG believed that the CG’s single-engined aircraftthat the CG has are not suited for operations overland. In any event, he was not approached for helpby the government and by the 27th evening the CGwas busy with the Bombay High platform fire.

At no point in the Mumbai floods, or those thathit the Konkan, did the state government make anyattempt to approach the CG for help. A team of CGdivers was sent to Raigad, but this was only afterthe Navy approached them.

maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/ maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/

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II) B. 8. METEOROLOGICAL DEPARTMENT

The head of the Meteorological Department,Mumbai, expressed his inability to meet with theCCC on the grounds that ‘the matter is sub-judice’.In this situation, the CCC has no option but tobase its findings on opinions received from othersand press reports.

There is overwhelming agreement that the IMDfailed miserably to provide any warning of theintensity of rain that struck Mumbai from the 26th

afternoon onwards. Other departments such as theBMC, Police, Airport Authority etc were all unanimousin this regard. The forecast received from the IMDfrom July 22 to July 29 was similar for each day,predicting ‘Rather Heavy to Heavy’. According to theIMD standards, this means between 35 to 125 mmof rain. (Rather Heavy rain is between 35 to 64 mm,Heavy rain is 65 to 125 mm and Very Heavy rain isanything above 125 mm.)

In actual fact, 482 mm of rain fell in just fourhours from 14.30 hours to 18.30 hours on July26, and a total of 944 mm in 24 hours, far in

excess of the IMD’s forecast. Going by pressreports, the IMD has said it could not do any betterwith the equipment it has, and it would needsophisticated Doppler radars, which would havegiven a 3 hour prior warning as they are able togive indications of cloud direction and speed ofmovement.

The CCC was informed that the Santa Cruzoffice informed the Colaba HQ at 1700 hours aboutthe very high rainfall.

It is also not clear why the IMD failed toissue a priority alert when the hourly rainfallat Santa Cruz far exceeded its daily forecast.

According to Frontline the first indigenousDoppler Weather Radar (DWR), fabricated by BELwith the support of the Indian Space ResearchOrganisation (ISRO), was installed at theSriharikota launch complex in 2002. This projectcost a total of Rs 9 crores. Two DWRs, importedfrom a German firm at Rs 13 crores each havealso been installed at the Regional MeteorologicalCentres in Chennai and Kolkata. 17

17 “For Reliable Cyclone Detection”; Frontline; Volume 19 - Issue 16, August 3 - 16, 2002 http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1916/19160880.htm


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II. B. 9. AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA

The CCC’s main concern with reference to theAAI pertains to the diversion of the Mithi River andthis has been discussed in Section (II H 1 c)

With reference to the performance of the AAIduring the floods, the Director of the Mumbai Airport,Mr. Sudhir Kumar, deposed before the CCC. Thesalient points from his testimony are:

The last flight landed on the 26th at 14.15. Dueto poor visibility landing and take off was not permittedafter this. Heavy rain then led to water logging of theoperations area. Water even started flowing throughthe international terminal building. The power supplywas cut and the standby generators could not beswitched on because of safety concerns. How badlythe airport was affected could be gauged from the factthat the airport was non functional for a period of closeto 48 hours and over 1100 flights were cancelled.

The intersection area of the runways had as muchas six feet of water at one point. Around 1.1 km. ofthe 8-foot-high wall around the operations area wasbreached, allowing water and debris to cover therunway. As a result of submergence, the InstrumentLanding System (ILS) system was not working.

The debris on the runways were cleared by 5 pmon the 27th. Runway lights were restored and by theafternoon of the 28th the ILS was functional. Flightsresumed but only as long as visibility was 1,500 m.The airport was not operational from 2.15 pm on 26th

till 1 pm on 28th. It is not clear why the IMD officer atthe airport did not trigger off an alert so early on 26/7.

Mr. Kumar informed the CCC that learning fromthe experience of July 26, the AAI intends to constructsteps/ramps at the entrances to the powerhousesand generators, so that water cannot enter easily. Allentry and exits of underground areas will be redesignedto keep out water. Electrical connections will not beat ground level. There is also a need for an alternate,independent source of lighting. The ILS system canalso be put on hydraulic platforms that can be raisedin case of flooding.

Mr Kumar stated that he was not aware of anywork carried out by the AAI in the recent past thathad resulted in the diversion or narrowing of the MithiRiver. In fact, he stated that the encroachmentsdownstream of the airport had led to the flooding ofthe airport.

II. B. 10. HOME GUARDS, CIVIL DEFENSE AND OTHERAGENCIES

The Home Guards comprises of men andwomen from all walks of life who come forward toreceive training in various specialized subjects suchas Weapon Training, Arms Drill, Fire Fighting,Rescue, Communication, First-Aid, etc. They canbe called upon to assist the State and its citizens intimes of need. The Home Guards function as thenucleus of the Civil Defence Services. They are meantto assist in managing transport communication,water supply and other essential services in timesof crises and breakdown of such services.

Satish Sahney, former Police Commissioner,former Commandant General, Home Guards andDirector, Civil Defense Organisation, spoke to theCCC. He informed the panel that in his tenure, therewere 28,000 trained personnel in Bombay. However,Civil Defense volunteers can, by law, only be calledout in terms of declared war. This pool of trainedcivilians should be tapped in such emergencies.However, the Civil Defense training is in manyrespects outdated.

The Home Guards Act stipulates that HomeGuards must be volunteers and must have regularemployment. Each volunteer needs to bring a letterfrom his/her employer showing willingness to relievehim/her in times of emergency. It is up to the DistrictAuthority to requisition the Home Guards. However,the system has suffered because governments havebeen using it to provide employment, which is not thepurpose. There are approximately 5,000 Home Guardsin Bombay. The HG commandant posts have alsobecome politicized. As a result of this, the HomeGuards is no longer a potent force. If the structureand functioning is revitalized, they can play animportant role in times of emergency and naturaldisaster.

II C) STORM WATER DRAIN SHORTCOMINGS

Mumbai’s drainage system was designed in theearly 20th century for a maximum rainfall of 25 mmper hour, with a 0.5 runoff coefficient — that is,assuming that half the rain would be absorbed andonly half would flow into the drainage system.Moreover, according to the BrihanMumbai StormWater Drain Project (BRIMSTOWAD) report, thecapacity of many drains is even less than 25 mm/hr,

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particularly when downstream levels are considered.

With the onset of rampant and indiscriminateurbanization, most areas are now either paved orconcreted or asphalted, as a result, the runoffcoefficient is now virtually 1, with very little rainwaterbeing absorbed at all. Thus even at one inch perhour, the drainage system is having to cope withalmost twice its intended capacity.

The Development Control Rules require 15 to25% of a plot to be maintained as recreational openspace in both residential and commercial zones. Inpractice this open space is paved/concreted,increasing run off and preventing percolation. Wherebasements are permitted for parking, almost theentire plot is covered by a basement and hencepercolation of rainwater is prevented.

Large flat areas in the city were once the inter-tidal flats between the original islands. The drainagesystem developed following the flat land around theislands and consequently some drainage routes areup to 5 km long, even though no part of Mumbai ismore than 2 km from the coast. According totestimony received from architect and town plannerNandan P. Mungekar, the water from the Lalbaug/Parel area is discharged at Reay Road, instead ofat Worli/Love Grove, which is much closer. Similarly,storm water from Dadar TT and King’s Circle is takento Dharavi. Such flat areas together constitute 56%of the island city of Mumbai.

There are many obstructions and blockages inthe drains due to other services passing through thedrains, such as water and sewer pipes. Thesepipelines cause blockage and siltation. TheBRIMSTOWAD report found that 23% of all draindefects were associated with such obstructions.

Many of the city’s drains are in poor structuralcondition, because of age and poor workmanship,as well as interference by other services. Access formaintenance is also restricted, frequently byunauthorized development.

The drainage situation in the suburbs ischaracterized by illogical or unplanned development,without keeping drainage requirements in mind.

Firstly, the BMC has degraded all the natural riversand creeks in Mumbai by calling them all “nallahs”.The concept of maintaining the flood plains of thesenatural water systems has been completely forgotten,and in fact, all attempts have been made to narrowand “train” these natural water systems. The banksof ‘nallahs’ or erstwhile streams/rivulets/rivers/creekshave been developed on with no regard for the stormwater capacity required. Whilst in absolute termsmuch of the development is of a temporary andinformal nature, some large ‘pucca’ structures, bothgovernment and private, also restrict water flow.

The BRIMSTOWAD report put forward severalproposals to remove obstructions and deepen/widenexisting nallahs, or realign them to remove restrictivebends. ‘Training’ (concretisation of nallahs from thebottom and sides to ensure smooth flow of water) ofnallahs was also proposed, not only to improvecapacity and maintenance, but also to preventencroachment18 .

This problem is not recent but has beenidentified as far back as 1993 by the BRIMSTOWADreport. “Much of the drainage system, particularly inthe suburbs, is restricted by unauthorizeddevelopment contrary to the development plan or thedevelopment control rules. This restriction sometimesinfringes into the drain itself and sometimes onlyaffects access for maintenance. MCGB has adequatepowers in law to remove such encroachment andprevent new ones but has in practice been unable toenforce those powers. Many of the proposals rely onthe removal of unauthorised development and thismust happen if substantial reduction of flooding is tobe achieved.”

The MCGM’s constant flip-flops on theBRIMSTOWAD report (first saying that it is doingaway with the report and then later on saying that itwill spend Rs 250 crores in the current fiscal forimplementing the BRIMSTOWAD report doesn’t helpmatters).19 The project was estimated at around Rs600 crores at 1992 prices. Till date, the MCGM hasbeen unable to implement the major components ofthe plan despite claims that Rs 200 crore has beenspent over the years on a gradual implementation ofthe BRIMSTOWAD recommendations.

18 “Master planning for Greater Bombay Storm Drainage & Sewer Rehabilitation (BRIMSTOWAD Project – Executive Summary”; BrihanMumbaiMahanagarpalika, February 199319 “We won’t err again: Joseph”, Daily News & Analysis, January 26, 2006 http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1009690

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Interestingly, the 1993 BRIMSTOWAD reportExecutive Summary says: “We have assumed nodevelopment will take place on land which ispresently undeveloped and zoned to remain so. Mostof the substantial areas zoned for no developmentare sited in the suburban catchments either in theupper ends, in and around the National Park, or thelower ends close to the shore. If unplanneddevelopment takes place in the upper end, run-offwill increase and the downstream drainage systemmay be inadequate.”

Unfortunately, this is precisely what hashappened. The last decade, since theBRIMSTOWAD report was prepared, has seen therapid urbanization of the northern suburbs and thespread of illegal encroachments, especially in theregion from Bandra northwards and eastwards. Thesewere the areas worst affected by flooding, togetherwith places like Goregaon, Malad and Kandivli. Sincethe GoM and BMC have not only failed to checkhaphazard development, but in fact, have permittedthis, it is no surprise that they now claim theBRIMSTOWAD report to be outdated.

II D) SANITATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

It is widely acknowledged that Mumbai’snotoriously poor hygiene and sanitation played a rolein the large scale illnesses and diseases that followedthe floods. With large areas of the city inundated,the floodwaters mixed freely with garbage and humanwaste, which is normally scattered indiscriminately,in the absence of proper waste management andadequate sanitation facilities.

All health experts and professionals whointeracted with the CCC primarily blamed the lack ofsanitation and hygienic conditions (in normal times)as the reason for the spate of illnesses and diseasesthat followed 26/7. Higher levels of sanitation andwaste management and disposal would have reducedthe health impact that the floods had on Mumbaikars.

By some estimates, as much as 60 per cent ofMumbai resides in slums, which typically haveinadequate or no toilet facilities. The BMC’s WorldBank-aided Slum Sanitation Programme (SSP),launched in 2000, aimed at providing toilet facilitiesin Mumbai’s slum areas. By 2003, about 9,700 ofpublic toilet blocks (about 77,550 seats) had beenbuilt in various parts of the city. WB surveys showed

that about 80 per cent of these were not functioning.Even if they were, they could only meet half thedemand. The SSP, which entails constructingcommunity toilet blocks, run by Community BasedOrganisations, has had mixed results, with somepositive examples. This scheme aims at providing afacility that will be owned and managed by the localcommunity, and not open to the general public. Theuser will pay a minimum charge, which goes towardsmaintenance and water, electricity supply etc.According to the BMC, by December 2003, about300 toilet blocks were completed, and about halfhanded over to CBOs. Aside from improving hygiene,the system also results in lower recurring expenditureon the part of the BMC.

While the population of the city has beenincreasing steadily, and significant investments havebeen and are being made in increasing water supply,the parallel investments in sewage treatment anddisposal have not been made. This is illogical anddangerous for the health of the city.

Waste Management: According to official BMCfigures, Mumbai generates about 7,800 tonnes of solidwaste daily. However, this figure is probably significantlyinflated by the contractor lobby. NGOs working in thefield of solid waste management state that no oneseems to have an accurate figure of the amount ofsolid wastes generated in Mumbai. In any event,Mumbai does generate very large amounts of waste,posing a problem for collection, transport and disposal.In many areas, again particularly the slum andunauthorised housing areas, garbage is collected onlyoccasionally, and large mounds of refuse are common,causing unhygienic conditions. With such conditionsthe norm, flooding and such disasters provide theperfect opportunity for the outbreak of epidemics.

The BMC is also forced to spend large amountson cleaning choked drains and nallahs every yearbefore the monsoon, when the ideal option would beto prevent the waste from entering the drainagesystem in the first place. By their very nature, manydrains do not lend themselves to proper cleaningonce blocked. Hence an effective waste reduction,collection and disposal system is key to the optimumfunctioning of any drainage system, aside fromimproving the overall quality of life of all residents.

The CCC has found that large areas of the cityare improperly serviced by the official waste collection

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machinery. In the absence of proper wastecollection, residents invariably use the nearestdrain/nallah as a waste dump and this hasdevastating consequences during the monsoons.

Only a fifth of households in Mumbai are coveredby house to house garbage collection facilities. Thusa large proportion of the city’s waste is collectedfrom community collection bins, creating unhygienicconditions.

One of the significant allegations that emergedfrom the hearings was that the BMC deliberatelydoes not clean pockets that are being eyed bybuilders for their projects since it makes it easierfor the builders to “persuade” residents to sell andmove out.

Another significant finding is the fact that thoughthe average daily collection of waste is supposed tobe 7,800 tpd, from July 26 till August 21, almost amonth, the average daily collection shot up to 10,000tpd. This implies that the BMC’s waste collection innormal circumstances is not efficient enough.systemis key to the optimum functioning of any drainagesystem, aside from improving the overall quality oflife of all residents.

The CCC has found that large areas of the cityare improperly serviced by the official waste collectionmachinery. In the absence of proper waste collection,residents invariably use the nearest drain/nallah asa waste dump and this has devastatingconsequences during the monsoons.

Only a fifth of households in Mumbai are coveredby house to house garbage collection facilities. Thusa large proportion of the city’s waste is collectedfrom community collection bins, creating unhygienicconditions.

One of the significant allegations that emergedfrom the hearings was that the BMC deliberatelydoes not clean pockets that are being eyed bybuilders for their projects since it makes it easierfor the builders to “persuade” residents to sell andmove out.

Another significant finding is the fact that thoughthe average daily collection of waste is supposed tobe 7,800 tpd, from July 26 till August 21, almost amonth, the average daily collection shot up to 10,000tpd. This implies that the BMC’s waste collection innormal circumstances is not efficient enough.

Plastic bags: The CCC has received testimonyfrom officials in the BMC and Railways which makesit clear that plastic does play a major role in chokingdrainage and causing floods during high rainfall periods.This factor, combined with other issues to do with thetoxicity, non-biodegradability and problems associatedwith plastic recycling are reasons enough to curb andreduce their use to whatever extent possible,especially where alternatives exist.

In the CCC’s opinion, the decision of thegovernment to ban plastic bags is welcome and muchneeded. At the same time, it would be wrong to placethe entire blame for Mumbai’s flooding on plastic bags.There are many other issues, such as poor urbanplanning and unchecked growth that are also to blamebut more difficult for the political machinery to tackle.

Moreover, after announcing the plastics ban, thestate government now appears to have withdrawn itpending a report from an advisory committee set upto look into the issue. Thus in effect no action at allhas yet been taken.

The CCC received suggestions that it would makeeminent sense for the Government to ban not justplastic bags but all single use plastic and thermocolproducts, and to force manufacturers of such productsto buy these back on a mandatory basis.

II E) PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM

The aftermath of the Mumbai floods saw a muchhigher incidence of diseases such as leptospirosis(borne by rats), malaria, diarrhoea etc. Most citizenswho interacted with the CCC reported sickness ordisease within their family in the days following the


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floods. In very few instances were there reports ofgovernment interventions such as the organisationof health camps, distribution of essential medicinesor fumigation to prevent the outbreak of diseases.

Respondents in nearly all the flood affectedareas where public hearings were held vouched thatthe response that they received from the civic healthdepartment was negligible or non-existent. The fewmedical camps, which were held, were mostlyorganized by NGOs.

To what extent the outbreak of diseases andillnesses could have been prevented? Could liveshave been saved if the government’s healthauthorities had taken quicker action?

CCC’s interaction with health experts has led itto conclude that the magnitude of the outbreak couldmost certainly have been reduced, even if it couldnot have been prevented altogether, had theadministration taken appropriate steps. Immediatelyafter the floods, when people fell ill due to dirtydrinking water, it was expected that the healthadministration would provide chlorine tablets andother basic medicines. This did not happen in mostareas. Large sections of the population who had beenstranded had been exposed to dirty sewage waterfor a number of hours. The hazard of these peoplecontracting water borne diseases was very real andyet the administration did not issue directives to thehealth department to take preventive measures. Itwas only after the outbreak of leptospirosis and thesubsequent media attention that was generated thatthe health minister declared an epidemic. Thisdeclaration was also subsequently withdrawn a fewhours later. This will be elaborated on later in thissection.

A look at the annual budget of the BMC overthe years reveals that the spending on public healthhas taken a back seat. In the early 1990s,expenditure on public health was between 25 – 30%of the budget. In the post-liberalization, privatizationand globalization era, this figure has fallen to 17%.Of this 17%, only 2% of the money is actually spenton capital investment (purchase and upgradation ofmedical services and equipment). Private hospitalsare supposed to dedicate 20% of their services topoor and needy patients, but in practice thebeneficiaries of this provision are usually politicians,public figures and ‘connected’ individuals.

Mr Ravi Duggal, Centre for Enquiry into Healthand Allied Themes (CEHAT) informed the CCCdespite the introduction of user fees at publichospitals, the quality of service provided at publichospitals has fallen. As a result, people have movedto the private sector for treatment.

Specifically about 26/7, Mr. Duggal pointed outthat given the constraints that the public hospitalswere under, the personnel at these hospitalsperformed remarkably well as doctors were treatingpatients round the clock. It was only after a few daysthat the lack of resources began to show. Dr AlkaGogate [Former Head of Department –Microbiology– Sion Hospital and Public Health Expert] adds thatin the public health system, paraprofessionals likeANMs (auxiliary nurse/midwife) and communityhealth workers are supposed to refer patients withmild ailments to dispensaries; instead we find thatpatients are invariably referred to the hospitals,resulting in an overload of patients.

Mr. Duggal informed the CCC that the role ofANMs and community health workers hasunfortunately been reduced almost exclusively toimplementing family planning and immunizationprograms. There is absolutely no informationregarding diseases in a particular area communicatedto the higher authorities. Mr. Duggal also pointed outthat the private sector (both hospitals and generalpractitioners) for the most part made no effort to keepa record of diseases, or pass this information on tothe state health authorities. With increasing numbersbeing forced to seek private medical treatment, it ishard to get an idea of the spread of diseases orimpending epidemics.

Mr. Duggal also stressed that while there mightnot have been a lack of medicines needed in theaftermath of July 26, the problem lay with thecumbersome procedures required to obtain them.Hospitals have to indent drugs and this proceduretakes a lot of time, making responding to a crisisdifficult. The combination of frustration caused dueto red tape and poor salaries is forcing many doctorsto move to the more lucrative private sector with theresult that many posts are vacant.

The BMC also used to publish a Public HealthReport, but this has either been discontinued or isno longer public.

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However in the midst of this gloom, there are stories which touch the heart, one being that of Dr Jayshree Sharmaof KEM Hospital and Dr. Jadhav of State Blood Transfusion Council.

KEM HOSPITAL: DR. JAYSHREE SHARMA, BLOOD BANK CHIEF DR. JADHAV, STATE BLOOD TRANSFUSION COUNCIL

It was on August 11 that Dr. Jayshree Sharma, chief of the Blood Bank at KEM Hospital, saw the writing on the wall andalerted the State Blood Transfusion Council (SBTC) through its assistant director, Dr. Jadhav, who set the alarm bells ringing.As a result, 54 per cent of those struck by leptospirosis and dengue who were admitted to the city’s hospitals could be saved.

Call it intuition or foresight, but that is what disaster management is all about. The state government, which has been heldguilty on several counts, swung into motion to ensure a ready and adequate supply of platelets. Platelet units were airliftedfrom sources in Nashik, Aurangabad, Ahmedabad and Bangalore to meet the demand.

“In a situation where there was a frightening lack of communication and parts of Mumbai were blacked out for days, theauthorities response to the platelets demand was prompt,” says Vinod Shetty, a resident of Kalina who is a representative ofCitizen, an NGO that works for victims of thalassaemia and AIDS. “It was Dr. Jayshree Sharma from KEM who alerted Dr.Jadhav, SBTC, and decisions were immediate – platelet units were flown in and distributed free.”

Rauf Lala from the Kausa-Mumbra Relief Committee agrees. Dozens of persons affected by the flood came down withdengue and leptospirosis, their blood count started falling drastically. We alerted the minister for Medical Education whoresponded with a big heart. His entire team immediately diverted much-needed platelets to Mumbra. Still, we lost 11 of ouryoung boys who had bravely helped in relief, wading through water without a thought for the risk they were taking.”

Says Dr. Sharma, “It was on August 11, 2005 that the extent of the post-deluge crisis could be observed by us at KEM.Normally in the monsoon the demand for platelets at KEM’s Blood Bank, the largest and most efficient in the city, is for about100-140 units per day. But this year, it was as if the whole city’s patients were pouring into KEM. We needed 300 platelet unitsevery day. Patients were bleeding like taps. It was heartbreaking. It was the poor that were the worst sufferers. They would say,‘Paani mein sab chala gaya… bas ek jaan hi bachi hai, usko bacha deejiye…’ (‘We have lost everything in the flood… onlyour life is left, please save that at least…’). The rich can manage somehow… what do the poor do?”

“I immediately alerted Dr. Jadhav from the SBTC. He responded very promptly. Stocks were airlifted from Nashik,Aurangabad, Ahmedabad and Bangalore. Free of cost – the SBTC bore the entire cost – platelet units were provided to allhospitals, public and private. Wherever there was a crisis, Mumbai or Mumbra, supplies were reached.

“The process of acquiring platelets is expensive and complicated, a time-consuming one. Donors need to be bled andtested. The platelets are then separated from the plasma and red blood cells, which are then given back to the donor. Aplatelet donor can donate platelets twice a week. This needs machines, which were also in short supply. The kit used in thisprocess costs Rs 7,000 per patient. Two extra machines were also provided to the KEM Hospital, all at government cost. Weused these machines continuously from August 11 to August 30, 2005.”

Pressing the panic button in time saved hundreds of lives. As a result 54 per cent who came in could be saved. The restunfortunately were already critical when they came in.

Dr Sharma, remembered by many for her foresight, is dismissive, “It was my duty to do what I did. Anyone in my placewould have done it. It had to be done. God gave me the insight to press the panic buttons at the right moment.” 20

Was it an epidemic? Leptospirosis, the diseasespread through rat urine, shot into prominence afterthe floods. One is in danger of contracting thedisease when open wounds, bruises etc come incontact with the urine of rats. During the floodspeople had to wade through dirty water and notsurprisingly after the gestation period, people beganto exhibit symptoms of ‘lepto’. Initially thegovernment tried to dismiss reports of leptospirosisas stray cases, however with increasing numbers

being reported, the administration was forced to ‘beseen taking action.’ On August 12, the MC declaredthat there had been a ‘faecal outbreak. Later on inthe afternoon, the Health Minister Ms. VimalaMundada held a press conference where shedeclared that certain pockets of Mumbai were facinga lepto epidemic. Soon after this the Dr SubashSalunke, the DG of Health, added to the confusionby adding that only the BMC had the authority todeclare an epidemic. The CM had the second-last

20 “ Hand in Hand”; Communalism Combat; August – September 2005

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word in the matter when he said that the BMC hadinvoked an emergency clause that made itcompulsory for all private hospitals to report casesof fever to the BMC. The confusion was completedwhen the DG of Information and Public RelationsMr B. Gagrani declared that neither the state govtnor the BMC had declared any epidemic. All thisinspite of the fact that several people had alreadydied of water-borne diseases and over 600suspected cases were admitted in differenthospitals. Probably the authorities were not braveenough to admit that they had failed to prevent anepidemic in Mumbai, India’s commercial capital,as this would have entailed a further loss of face.21

In the CCC’s opinion, whether or not anepidemic was declared, the necessary steps shouldhave been taken to first control the outbreak ofdisease, and secondly to gauge the extent of thedisease and then treat victims.

The example of Surat is worth looking at inthis connection. After the plague-like epidemic inthe city, the administration took the opportunity tothoroughly cleanse the city, a cleanliness drive,which has now lasted years. Mumbai has clearlymissed a golden opportunity to clean up its act.

II F) TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION

Given Mumbai’s geography, its longitudinalnorth-south axis and the central business districtsin south and central Mumbai while commuters livein the northern suburbs, transport is a key area inMumbai’s capacity to tackle a natural disaster.

The July 26 deluge snapped the city’s lifeline— its suburban train system — used by millionsevery day. From the afternoon onwards, the trainservices on both Western and Central Railway wereinoperable. The millions of commuters who normallyrely on the trains were forced to either wait out therains in the overcrowded stations of CST, Churchgateand others in south and central Mumbai, or attemptto return home by road. Since there was no accurateor authoritative information available on the scale ofthe problem, many attempted the latter option andwere soon stuck in traffic snarls amidst rising

floodwaters. This led to further road congestion andthe complete blockage of the city’s arterial roads,the Eastern and Western Express Highways, S.V.Road and L.B.S. Marg.

This dangerous situation could have beenavoided to a large extent if there had been propercommunication to the public, warning them to stayindoors and at their places of work, as all travel andtransport was seriously disrupted due to the heavyrain. By taking no measures to prevent commutersfrom resorting to road travel, the government isindirectly responsible for the loss of lives, injuries,illnesses and the damage to vehicles that had to beabandoned to the floodwaters.

Decongestion of the city’s roads must be thetopmost priority for all agencies concerned withMumbai’s development and administration. The CCChas observed that there is no shortage of reportsand studies recommending various measures toachieve traffic decongestion, dating as far back asthe 1987 Paranjpe Committee, followed by the Atkinsstudy in 1994. However, these reports have beentotally ignored and in some cases, specific activitieswarned against have been undertaken by successivestate governments, leading to the current severelycongested nature of the city.

For instance: The recommendation: The Atkinsreport warns against the construction of the WestIsland and East Island Expressway, on the groundsthat they would only attract additional traffic to southMumbai, worsening traffic congestion in the Tardeo,Bombay Central, Opera House, Nana Chowk andKalbadevi areas. The new expressways would onlyshift bottlenecks around have little impact on overallsystem capacity. The report has stressed thatdemand management is the only solution toMumbai’s traffic congestion. It also emphasized railtransport as the most cost-effective way to solveMumbai’s transport problems, with the leastenvironmental costs and highest economic returns.22

Quotes from the Atkins report (ExecutiveSummary, Pg XII Para 11)

(Tests with the model showed that the effectof major roads in the Island city such as the West

21 “Lepto Mania”, Mid-Day, August 12th, 2005http://www.mid-day.com/news/city/2005/august/116037.htm22 “Comprehensive Transport Plan for Bombay Metropolitan Region- Final Report”, Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority, July 1994

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Island Expressway and East Island expresswaywould be to attract considerable additional trafficto south island destinations in the Tardeo, BombayCentral, Opera House, Nana Chowk and Kalbadeviareas to be worsened. Thus these newexpressways would tend to shift the bottlenecksaround and have little impact on overall systemcapacity)

(Executive Summary, Pg XII Para 13)

The study recommends that the Bombaydivisions of the two present zonal railways becombined into a new Bombay regional railwaycorporation as a subsidiary corporation of IR. Thisis the optimal feasible means of serving the bulk ofthe future passenger needs of BMR and cateringto the projected 47% increase in peak publictransport demand

What has happened: The state government hasgone ahead with building the prohibitively expensiveBandra-Worli Sea Link, as Phase I of the WestIsland Expressway, estimated to cost Rs 1,300crores, though this is likely to go up still further asthe project is delayed. Not only will this link have anegative impact on traffic congestion in Bandra,Worli and South Mumbai, unplanned reclamationfor the project by MSRDC has also played a role inblocking the Mahim Creek and causing flooding inparts of Bandra and upstream areas (see sectionon BWSL, Section II).

To compound matters, the government-contractor nexus is determined to go ahead withthe Trans Harbour (Sewri-Nhava) and the Worli-Nariman Point Sea Links, at a cost of Rs 4,000crores and Rs 2,545 crores respectively.(Incidentally, the international consulting groupMcKinsey which recommended the projectestimates that the Sewri-Nhava link, both road andrail combined, would cost Rs 8-10,000 crores).These amounts, if invested in public transportsystems can make cheap, economical andcomfortable travel for all Mumbaikars a reality,simultaneously avoiding the environmental problemsthat the sea links pose.

While such large amounts have been providedfor private transport, public transport – the rail and

bus system, have seen negligible increases ininvestment.

Recommendation: The Paranjpe committeealso stressed that restrictions on FSI andDevelopment Plan Proposals should be strictlyenforced and no new reclamation are allowed inBombay.23

(Quote from the Paranjpe Committee Report )

The Committee recommends the following preventivemeasures:

1. Overall integrated plan needs to be drawn fordecongestion of Bombay Island.

2. No additional jobs should be allowed to becreated in Bombay Island.

3. The restrictions on FSI and Development PlanProposals should be strictly enforced

4. All big markets and wholesale markets shouldbe shifted out of the Island city

5. No new reclamation should be allowed inBombay

6. Permission for conversion of residentialpremises into commercial premises should notbe granted.

What has happened: FSI has been increasedthrough schemes such as TDR and SRA. FSI ingaothan areas, which are traditionally prone tocongestion, has also been increased. Reclamationhas been carrying on in different parts of the cityand the state government is even contemplatingpermitting development on saltpan lands, which areCRZ I area and within a no-development zone.

One major step that could and should havebeen taken as the events of July 26 unfolded wasto open up the Bombay Port Trust Road, otherwiseclosed to public and private transport, along thecity’s eastern waterfront. This single measure wouldhave enabled thousands to reach their homes insafety. The failure to open this road is a lapse onthe part of the Traffic Department.

With respect to the transport situation inMumbai relevant to the events of 26/7, the CCCrecords the following findings:

23 “Report of the High level Committee for Prioritisation of road works in Greater Bombay “, Government of Maharashtra, May 1988

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1) BEST: 3380BEST buses carry45 lakh passengersdaily on 335 routes.Over 80% of thesepassengers travelshort distances ofup to 7 km.However, when thetrain systemm a l f u n c t i o n s ,people rely on

BEST for long distance travel as well. On July 26, ofthe BEST’s 3380-strong fleet, 768 buses were renderedinoperable due to flooding.

In all, the BEST operated over 500 extra buseson main routes, especially from CST and Churchgate,on the 26 and 27. On 26/7, 362 extra buses wereoperated and on 27/7, 147 extra buses were plied.

The BEST suffered extensive losses dueto the floods.

Damage to buses: Rs 3.34 croreDamage to property: Rs 0.22 croreDamage to equipment: Rs 1.22 crore

Total: Rs 4.78 crore.

It would appear that there was little that theBEST could do given the circumstances. However,the BEST has suffered due to inadequate resourcesprovided to it over the years, and this must beseriously addressed. Resources must be generated/diverted to enable the expansion of the BEST busfleet to discourage the use of private transport.

There is a school of thought both within andoutside the BEST that believes it is best not tooperate more buses in such a situation as they addto congestion. However, the solution is not to takebuses off the roads but rather to keep private vehiclesoff the roads while simultaneously deployingadditional buses, which take up less space perpassenger transported. The traffic jams on July 26were caused not by BEST buses but by the largenumber of private vehicles and taxis on the roads. Infuture, if in such emergency situations private carsare kept off the roads, the complications caused bycongested roads and traffic jams can be substantiallyreduced. Private vehicles could be allowed to plyonly when filled to capacity.

Why did buses break down on July 26? BESTofficials also commented very strongly about theadverse role of private vehicles in 26/7. They saidthat if public transport catered to 84% of thepopulation, it was obvious that it should be givenhigher priority. The tremendous increase in the growthof private vehicles had put a considerable strain onthe city’s infrastructure, reducing the average speedof vehicles to 12 km per hour. Asked if it would helpto keep private vehicles off the road duringemergencies, they said they were not sure aboutthe feasibility but asserted that during any emergencythere should be a dedicated lane for public transport.This time around (26/7), private vehicles veeredtowards the centre and the right of the road, pushingbuses to the left where the water levels wereconsiderably higher. Both buses and vehicles werestranded. CCC was told that that any move to controlmovement of private vehicles in an emergency wasalways welcome.

They (BEST) emphasized the need fordedicated lanes for public transport. They added thatBEST were in talks with the MMRDA, which hadpromised to dedicate lanes while expanding theEastern and Western Express Highways andcreating the east–west corridors. These would beon the left, though the BEST had tried to reasonwith the MMRDA that the lanes should be in thecentre where the height of the buses would be thehighest and had been successful in cities likeBogotá. The MMRDA had refused, citing thathistorically, bus shelters were always next tofootpaths which were on the side of the road andcreating new footpaths in the centre would not beviable. BEST officials cited the instance of Moscow,where traffic in lanes dedicated to public transportmoved much faster than traffic on the other roads.

What happened to BEST control room? The firstinformation trickled in between 14:55 and 15:06when it came to BEST’s notice that Malad subway,Dahisar subway and Mulund check naka wereflooded. Immediately, routes of several buses werealtered and in come cases terminated. The BEST’sGM sent out warnings to officers to expect heavyrains with strong winds and told them to be alert online. By 15:40 it became apparent that other areaslike Dadar workshop and the entire stretch of LBSroad in Kurla were flooded. The consensus tillaround 5 pm was that this was one of those heavy


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rain days but levels would subside with the ebb ofthe tide. At the 4 pm meeting with the CM on the26th, it was learnt learned that the railways hadstopped working and the BEST decided to runadditional buses.

Asked were any alarm bells ringing andwarnings shared between the BEST control roomand other control rooms when it became apparentin the early afternoon that several suburbs wereflooded, sources said that at that point the generalbelief was that the water level would go down withthe low tide. About reporting the matter to othercontrol rooms, it was pointed out by the BEST thatthe normal practice was to report any emergencyto the BMC control room, the police control roomand the Traffic control room. When asked whetherthis had been done on 26/7 afternoon, BEST officialssaid that they were confident that it had,

Asked whether there any communicationbreakdown at BEST depots, and what the BESTproposed to improve communication systems, CCCwas informed that that the BEST has an exclusiveDisaster Management Plan independent ofMumbai’s. This was put into action at 15:30. Inany disaster, each depot and each person knowswhat their role is. Therefore, even during 26/7, manydepots coped well. Each depot has wireless sets,which, if fully charged, can work for more than 24hours. Communication with three depots — Kurla,Bandra and Santa Cruz — was severed. In the KurlaDepot, water completely submerged the groundfloor. The CCC was also told that the entire Kurladepot was in the process of being remodelled.

Asked where the communication equipmentwas kept, CCC was told that most was kept on theground floor. Asked if after the floods, there wereany lessons learnt – eg moves to shift thesecommunication devices to higher ground and tomake sure that they functioned in emergencies – it

was stated that this had not been considered, butwas now a possibility.

CCC was told that the BEST was planning tointroduce FM radio stations in buses which arededicated to regular traffic bulletins – this is for oneway communication. BEST is at an advanced stagein installing these radio stations and has invited bids.

It is also installing wireless sets in all the 3,391buses so that the driver and conductor can keep intouch with the nearest depot or control room andvice–versa. In fact it was stated that this idea hadbeen already put forward to the government and wasawaiting sanction.

Sources also indicated that the need of the hourwas a dedicated traffic management centre whichneeds to be set up where it is possible to relay two-way information to different agencies so that theymight monitor and focus the traffic situation in differentareas and act promptly.

2) RAILWAYS: Mumbai’s suburban railways –Central & Western — carry about 6.4 millionpassengers every day, which must be one of thelargest networks in the world. It is also one of thecheapest urban mass transit systems, chargingabout 5 paise per kilometre for season ticketholders. Despite this, the suburban rail systemmanages to break even due mainly to the highvolumes of passenger traffic; trains carry four to fivetimes their capacity in the peak hours in what istermed “super crush” capacity.

Mumbaikars have come to expect that thecity’s train services will be thrown out of gear atleast once or twice every monsoon, for a few hourseach time. The normal reaction of commuters is towait until the water recedes, once the high tide ispast, after which time services resume. Accordingto the testimony of Mr. M.Z. Ansari, GM of WesternRailway - WR), he and his officers were satisfied

On the charge by the traffic police that BEST cranes did not help in clearing the stranded vehicles, CCC was told that theBEST had only two cranes which were busy in clearing their own vehicles. In fact the BEST themselves had to hire additionaltowing vans and cranes to clear their vehicles.

On the second charge levelled by the Traffic Police that once BEST vehicles broke down, it was only engineers from thehome depot who could repair it, BEST officials clarified that this was not the case. Engineers from the nearest depot wouldattempt to repair the bus and if it could not be repaired, it would then be towed to the nearest deport.

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with the BMC’s clearing of drains before themonsoon, which was ahead of schedule and betterthan normal this year. In addition, WR had itselfcleaned some of the drains along its right of way(area adjoining tracks on either side right up toboundary walls). In fact, it hoped to get through the2005 monsoon without any disruption of services.The GM of the Central Railway (CR) in fact hadgone on record that there would be no disruption ofthe CR services in the monsoons due to theprecautions that they had taken.

On July 26, rail traffic on the WR was stoppedat 3.30 pm. According to Mr. Ansari, there was noopportunity to warn the BEST, police and otheragencies, as is normally done, as water levels rosein a matter of minutes between Mahalaxmi andBandra. His suspicion is that the large volumes ofwater suddenly flowing down the Mithi from thenorth, coupled perhaps with a release of water fromthe Powai or Vihar dams, raised water levels.

WR was disrupted completely from 3.30 pm.on 26/7 to 8.05 am the next day. Services werepartially restored on the Churchgate-Mahalaxmi andBandra-Virar on the 27th morning. By 9.50 pm thatnight, services were completely restored.

Suburban and long distance services on theCentral Railway were suspended from 4.15 pm on26/7/. Suburban services on the main line andHarbour line were partially restored the followingday. Suburban services on the Kalyan-Karjat sectionwere restored from 4/8. Long- distance trains towardsPune were restored that day. Long distance trainstowards the Konkan Railway line were restored from9/8, and towards Nasik, from 17/8.

Overall, WR suffered a loss of approximatelyRs 33 crores. CR lost much more, Rs 160 croresapproximately. Half WR’s EMU [Electric MultipleUnits] fleet was damaged. In the 1990s after similarflooding, it took three months to restore the EMUs,but this time they were restored much faster. A targetdate of Aug 30 was set for the restoration of allrakes, but by August 22, most were operational.WR normally runs 1,007 trains every day.

Mr. Ansari, who was given additional charge ofCR on August 1, also informed the CCC that 49EMU rakes on the CR had been damaged, togetherwith 22 electric locomotives and 15 long-distancerakes. Approximately 11 km of track on CR waswashed away and 1,900 metres were affected bylandslides.

The longest breach in the tracks was in theKalyan-Igatpuri section. A bridge over the Ullas onthe Diva-Vasai section was severely damaged whenit was hit by a runaway barge swept downstreamby the raging river.

Mr. Ansari also stressed that there wasabsolutely no warning or indication of any kind fromthe IMD that such heavy rainfall could be expected.

The railway’s communication (telephone)system was slightly affected on the 26th eveningbut was fully restored by the next morning. WRand CR source their power from Tata Electric andMSEB; there is no dependence on Reliance, hencethey were unaffected by Reliance’s power blackout.

Mr. Ansari came out strongly in favour of theban on plastic bags, saying they were the singlebiggest cause of blocking the drains. The ubiquityof plastic makes cleaning drains an impossibletask, no matter how many are employed.

In some places, Mr. Ansari opined that theconstruction of buildings on what was formerly openor low lying ground, led to flood waters surging onto the tracks. He particularly mentioned a sectionof track after Kalyan station. When the track bedwas restored, the railways incorporated a culvertto ensure that this would not happen again.Interestingly, this culvert construction was objectedto by locals on the other side of the tracks. Mr.Ansari stressed that the raised railbed serves as aflood protection embankment in many places, butthis is not their primary duty and in fact threatensmaharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/

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the integrity of the tracks in times of heavy rain. Aspart of their repair work post July 26, the railwayshas built several culverts in different places.

Mr. Ansari stressed that enhancing and properlymaintaining the drainage capacity of the city’s stormwater drains was essential if the 26/7 tragedy isnot be repeated.

Mr. Ansari was of the view that the electronicmedia did not handle the situation effectively. Therewas a significant time lag between information beingpassed on from the railways and the telecasts.News that the trains had stopped was not carriedfast enough, leading to more people coming tostations. Once skeletal services were restored, themedia gave the impression that all trains wererunning, leading to huge crowds gathering at somestations, for example, Bandra. And after serviceswere restored, channels continued to say that thetrains were affected.

When asked what impact construction on lowlying or open lands adjoining rail tracks could have,Mr. Ansari first said he was not qualified to say.When the issue of salt pan lands was specificallyraised, he said this would make the adjoining railtracks more prone to flooding. He also said thatgiven Mumbai’s geography, the metropolitan regionwas not capable of holding 2 crore people. As longas people commuted from Thane district, Dahanu,Pune, Panvel etc to the city daily, transport wouldremain a problem.

There is not much scope to further increasethe capacity of the suburban rail system. Trainsnow run at a frequency of about three minutes onWR, so there is not much scope for increasing trainfrequency, according to Mr. Ansari. It has introduced12-coach rakes. The only other ongoing plan toincrease capacity is the quadrupling of tracks onthe Borivali-Virar stretch, which is being funded bythe World Bank under MUTP. This has been delayedbecause of rehabilitation problems and the latestscheduled date of completion was November 2005.

Regarding the possibility of running double-decker trains, he said that such trains would notcarry more passengers, as both floors would onlyprovide seating, as the overall height of the carriage

cannot be raised. Moreover, space would be lostfor staircases etc.

Mr. Ansari believed that the only option availablefor Mumbai’s rail transport was an undergroundmetro. But he cautioned that even this would nothelp in the long run if the current policy ofencouraging people to travel 2-3 hours betweenhome and office continued. As long as Mumbairemains the main job centre for people from thehinterland, the transport crisis would worsen.

3) PRIVATE TRANSPORT: The high vehicle densityon Mumbai’s roads is a major setback during naturaldisasters and crises. The W.S. Atkins report [in 1994]showed that Mumbai was unique in that 83 per centof the passenger trips in peak hours were by publictransport (train and bus), another eight per cent bytaxis and three-wheelers and only nine per cent byprivate transport (both cars and two-wheelers).

There are about 12 lakh vehicles in Mumbaitoday. The number of vehicles is growing at about 6per cent per year. Vehicle density is about 700vehicles per kilometre. Approximately 200 newvehicles (two and four wheelers combined) are addedto Mumbai’s roads daily. This does not includevehicles registered in Thane.

The congestion caused by the volume of privatetransport vehicles hinders free movement, especiallyin disasters. While the population has grown 1.8per cent annually from 1981, the car and two-wheelerpopulation has grown at the annual rate of 5.5 percent and 18 per cent respectively.24

None of the various traffic decongestionmeasures proposed in the Paranjpe report have everbeen implemented (cars with even number plateson even dates/separate bus lanes/one way trafficduring rush hours etc). What the city hasexperienced has been haphazard engineering andsupply-side solutions that have ignored the rootproblem, that is, the high number of private vehicles,lack of a comfortable mass transit system and thecontinuing concentration of employmentopportunities in the southern extremity of the city.

Several urban planners and architectsexpressed to the CCC their concern that the ongoing

24 ‘Pay for Road Use’; The Hindu- Business Line; Sept 09, 2005http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/life/2005/09/09/stories/005090900180400.htm

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construction boom in central Mumbai following thesale and development of mill lands, would worsentransport significantly. Neither roads nor rail werecapable of handling more passengers.

The role played by the MSRDC also came infor criticism. Primarily a construction agency forroads (as its name reveals), the MSRDC nowvirtually decides on road schemes, without evenconsulting the MMRDA, which is supposed to bethe supreme planning agency for the Mumbairegion. Their continuing insistence on ‘glamorous’projects such as the Bandra- Worli-Nariman PointSea Link and the Sewri-Nhava Sea Link atphenomenal costs (currently estimated at overRs 8,000 crores totally), while the stategovernment professes that it is unable to fundmuch-needed improvements in public transport,is strangulating the city and rendering itincreasingly prone to disasters. Both theseprojects will lead to increased congestion in southMumbai. This is the main reason why asuccession of reports and experts have warnedagainst wasting funds on these expensive non-solutions. The only lobby to benefit from theseprojects will be construction firms, corrupt officialsand car-owners, a vocal minority.

II. G) HOUSING

The housing crisis that plagues Mumbai is partlyresponsible for the destruction wrought by 26/7. Thehousing policy is now being determined by thegovernment and builders, with no consideration ofpeople’s own initiatives, according to testimony fromarchitect and activist P.K. Das from the Nivara HakkSuraksha Samiti. There was a conscious effort toundermine the entire planning process. With thecurrent emphasis on privatization, the main playersin the housing market – the builders – were callingthe shots. The public could not participate in anydecisions in this sector due to the lack of informationand accountability. This has led to the proliferationof slums that unofficially account for a majority ofthe population – 55 per cent.

A large proportion of the lives lost were of thoseliving in unauthorized, irregular, makeshiftstructures, in areas with little or no infrastructure,thus making them more prone to such disasters.According to the 2001 census, Greater Mumbaihas a slum population of 58,23,410 as comparedto a non-slum population of 60,90,888. Only2,88,967 slum dwellers are eligible for rehabilitationup to the January 1, 1995 official cut-off, accordingto government figures.

Certain facts with regard to Mumbai’s traffic situation were brought to the CCC’s notice:

� 42 lakh people come to south Mumbai every day, by train, bus and car.

� The total working strength of the Traffic Police is 2228, but on any given day, the available strength on any given day is1643, divided into two shifts.

� The number of vehicles has increased 34 times from 1951 to 2004. Private vehicles occupy 84 per cent of the road spacebut carry only 17 per cent of people.

� The number of traffic police works out to just one man per two kilometres.

� There are a total of 467 signals in Mumbai; another 130 are needed.

� The government spends Rs 13 crore as fines every year.

� Private vehicles should no longer be subsidized by tax benefits, like depreciation. This is encouraging the growth ofprivate vehicles in the city even though there is no space on the roads.

� Shopping complexes/residential high rises that are coming up do not require an NOC from the Traffic Police, even thoughthese complexes invariably lead to traffic jams.

� Parking charges and the fines imposed for traffic offences have not been increased for several years Mumbai is one of theonly mega-cities to have diminishing parking rates on a telescopic basis (i.e. parking charges are reduced for longerperiods).

� Unless these basic issues are addressed, the city will only lurch from one crisis to another, each worse than the previous.

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That millions in Mumbai are forced to live insuch locations and structures is a reflection ofserious failures in the city’s planning, administrationand implementation of development regulations. Themain reasons for Mumbai’s housing crisis aresummarized below:

1. Exemptions granted under the Urban LandCeiling Act: The Urban Land Ceiling Act wasintroduced to enable the government to acquire landat low rates in order to provide low cost housing tothe poor. Only a few hundred acres were acquiredin Mumbai. For any exemption granted under theULCA, the builder has to provide 5 per cent of thetenements built to the state, for allotment to theneedy. In practice however, this quota is either nevergiven to the government or is used by the politicalforces of the time to grant favours. This is in effecta loss to the city and one source of cheap housingfor the poor is lost.

2. Failure of the Slum Redevelopment Scheme:The Slum Redevelopment Scheme is little morethan a carefully crafted scheme to benefit buildersat the cost of the city. The scheme provides for 2.5FSI in situ in addition to TDR. In August 2001, thestate government-appointed S.S. Tinaikarcommittee on slum rehabilitation submitted itsreport, exposing the Shivshahi Punarvasan Prakalp(SPP), (as the slum rehabilitation scheme was thenknown) as a fraud designed to enrich Mumbai’sconstruction lobby at the expense of the poor andby sacrificing public assets. Despite such strongcondemnation, the scheme has been continued.

The bulk of the lands on which private builderswere allowed to start projects were public lands,handed over at a pittance of between Rs 1,000 toRs 4,000 per square metre. “The private builders,”the Tinaikar report records, “picked up premiumlands of public authorities, which had been grabbedby encroaching slums, and got a quick clearancefrom (the) SRA. Clearance from the land-owninggovernment departments - the Maharashtra Housingand Area Development Authority (MHADA) or theMunicipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM)— was not a precondition. It was to follow within 30days of the SRA approving the project ofredevelopment. Lease or similar authority in respectof land was not insisted (on) by (the) SRA from thedeveloper.

“The size of problem is of a magnitude withreference to which the achievement over the last tenyears of the slum rehabilitation scheme is sominuscule; the gains derived by some developersby grabbing premium plots of public authorities for asong, so high; and excessively liberal developmentcontrol rules to ‘facilitate’ the developers to makeunlimited profit at the cost of integrated developmentof (this) metro city so brazen; that the continuationof this policy... is bound to be disastrous.”

Buildings coming up under the slumrehabilitation scheme are being planned without anyrelevance to infrastructure, even though massiveamounts of FSI are available on these plots. Slumsinvariably come up on sites which were occupied bynatural drainage systems, and being “low-lying” sites,were misused for waste and refuse disposal. Thishas blocked the nallahs (eg. along Mithi, Dahisar,Poisar rivers and other natural creek and streams).In many cases, when these slums are handed overfor redevelopment under the SRS, buildings havecome up on or abutting these rivers and nallahs. Forexample, in Shivaji Nagar Santa Cruz (East), twobuildings built under the scheme have encroachedon the Mithi River. Shree Ganesh Society in Kandivlihas encroached on the Poisar river.

According to Mr Das, builders have even triedto exploit the concern regarding unauthorizedhutments along the Mithi after 26/7. They have beenoffering ‘parcelled’ projects, rehousing the existingdwellers in situ with 2.5 FSI, which exoneratesthe government from providing alternativeaccommodation. According to rough estimates froman official survey conducted by the Collector(Suburban District), around 90% of the 20,000 slumdwellers along the Mithi are eligible for rehabilitation.The housing rights organisations demand that suchsurveys be conducted jointly with the affectedcolonies so that the room for manoeuvre is restricted.

The Tinaikar report notes: “It is well established,after ten years’ experience, that utilising the agencyof private property developers for construction offormal houses for slum dwellers in replacement ofhutments has failed miserably.”

Hundreds of applications for ownership of landunder the Slum Act are still pending, but instead ofguiding people to become the owners of the land,the administrative and political machinery is only

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interested in introducing builders into the equation,and handing over the land to them, enabling themto make massive profits and in many instances noteven benefiting the slum dwellers.

In the mid-1970s, the Slum Act empoweredslum dwellers by handing over the property on whichthe slums were to residents to construct their ownhouses. However, this was realized andimplemented only in a few isolated cases in thelate 1970s. Wherever this model was followed (about65 instances), the slums did not proliferate, as thosewho now had proper homes had a vested interestin upgrading and improving their surroundings.

The builder-centric model being followed atpresent has met with very limited success, with asignificant percentage of rehabilitated slum dwellersselling their new dwellings. Allowing people todevelop the land themselves is the better option,as ownership will give them incentives to take careof the area, prevent further encroachments andconstruct better tenements for themselves, as longas the costs are met. Instead slum dwellers arebeing forced to choose between two bad options: abuilder or staying in slums.

While redeveloping slums, natural drainagemust be maintained but this has not happened. Inmany cases this will mean that buildings cannotbe built in areas presently occupied by slums. Thecurrent scheme however conveniently ignores theseecological imperatives.

3. Vote-bank politics: It is no secret that Mumbai’sslums survive because of their function as vote banks.It is in the interest of politicians and political parties

to keep people on the edge of survival so thatpromises for electricity connections, water supply,sanitation, pucca houses, regularization, ration cardsetc can be made each election, in return for votes.

In most areas, slum lords allied with politicalforces play an important role to prevent people fromgaining control over the land. Public funds under theSlum Improvement heading are diverted for roadsand pavements, water supply, drainage lines,electrification of roads, constructing toilet blocks etc.

There are large-scale irregularities in the fundallotment and use, especially in the construction,repairs and maintenance of toilet blocks. Many ofthe toilet blocks are intentionally made non-functionaland allowed to degrade, so that after a period of twoyears or so, a fresh contract could be awarded todemolish and construct a new block. However, sincethe basic structure is intact, superficial restorationis carried out and the building passed off as new,enabling contractors to make large profits.

4. High real estate prices and lack of low-costhousing: It is in the interest of the builder lobby tokeep real estate prices artificially high to maximizetheir profits. As a result, low and middle-incomegroups are forced to either encroach on publicspaces or seek housing further away from the maincity (Virar, Dahisar and beyond). Public spaces suchas the banks and beds of creeks and rivers,mangrove areas, low-lying ground, open spaces etcare encroached on. People who are forced to live indistant suburbs invariably have to travel three hoursin the day to and from their work places, exertingfurther strain on the city’s transport infrastructure.

The failure of successive governments overthe decades to provide for the housing needs ofthe middle and lower income groups is the singlebiggest cause of the problems of illegal, unauthorizedhousing structures in the city today. Withprivatization, MHADA has stopped building for theless-privileged. Worryingly, despite much debate overencroachments and their removal, the root causes,including the lack of affordable housing, are beingignored by the government and the media.

The availability of reasonably-priced housingis a fundamental right and the responsibility of thegovernment. It must be enforced for an improvementin the quality of life for all Mumbaikars.


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5. Grant of excess FSI:The proliferation of housingfor the middle and upper classes in congested areasis placing an immense load on the city’s transport,water supply and sanitation infrastructure. Thebuilder-politician nexus is constantly seeking waysto increase the buildable area and make big profits,at the cost of the city. Among the methods beingfollowed are:

a. Reconstruction of cessed buildings:

The irregularities in the reconstruction of cessedbuildings has been addressed by the BombayHigh Court’s recent judgment. The HC has observedthat most tenants shown on record in suchreconstructions were bogus and hence the existingscheme must be amended and replaced by onewhich is more transparent, judicious and capableof proper monitoring. In many cases, houses meantto accommodate the tenants of cessed buildingshave ended up becoming the servant’s quarters forthe rich house owners who moved into thereconstructed buildings. By showing bogus tenants,builders have been able to load huge amounts ofFSI in areas that are essentially congested andwhere the infrastructure is already struggling to copewith the population burden. As high as 35- and 40-storeyed buildings have come up in congested areassuch as Nana Chowk, Grant Road and Girgaum.Some buildings have had as much as 11.4 FSIconstructed. There are about 19,000-odd cessedproperties in the island city.

b. Usurpation of MHADA land by builders:

MHADA has joined the list of governmentagencies colluding with builders to take over openspaces and gardens on MHADA land. Since theopen spaces on MHADA’s lands have not beenshown as designated open spaces, MHADA is nowhanding these over to builders. Existing MHADAcolonies are also being targeted by slumlords/builders. By encouraging slums in there areas, theFSI can be increased and the existing buildingadded to or a new building constructed. The MHADAredevelopment policy needs to be looked at afresh.

c. Reconstruction of BMC acquired properties:

In the 1950s and 1960s, the BMC acquiredprivate properties that had chawls or legal or illegalslums, with the idea of constructing buildings tohouse the slum dwellers. Paucity of funds resulted

in the BMC being unable to develop the areas andso the slums remained and spread. Further, mostof these properties are only ground floor structuresand hence not dangerous. Now under DC Regulation33/7, builders have been given 2.5 FSI for thereconstruction of such properties. This should neverhave been permitted as they are not by naturedangerous and can easily be repaired withoutinvolving the builder lobby. Handing over the propertyto builders and permitting increased FSI hasresulted in a further load on the city’s infrastructure.

What is more, a further 1.5 FSI can be addedto the plot if the builder gives 40 per cent of this tothe BMC. This would bring the total usable FSI to4, on structures that are in the first instance notdilapidated. These BMC properties are capable ofearning thousands of crores for the builders, withno thought given to the city’s capacity to handlethe additional load, or the fact that slum dwellerswill not benefit.

d. Sale of Municipal markets, schools, offices etc:

The issue of excess FSI loading is prevalenthere too. These are again mostly ground storey orground plus one storey structures. Under thescheme to reconstruct these structures, existingstall holders get the same amount of space in thenew market free of cost. An additional 60 per centof this space is sold commercially by the builder.Further, an additional 2.5 FSI (over and above thatgiven to existing stall owners and the incentivecommercial area) is given to the builder. From this2.5 FSI, 60 per cent of the residential area built isgiven free to the BMC and the remaining sold bythe builder.

For example, in the case of the DadarMunicipal Market, the existing Floor Space is about30,000 sq. ft. The developer will get 20,000 sq. ft asincentive commercial area. The cost of constructionof the 50,000 sq. ft will not be more than Rs 4crores. The selling price will at a conservativeestimate be Rs 15,000 per sq. ft. as the market isadjoining one of the city’s busiest railway stations.The revenue fetched on this sale of commercial areaalone will be Rs 30 crores. In addition, 70,000 sq.ft. of residential area is constructed, of which 40,000is given to BMC and 30,000 sold at market rates.The cost of construction of 70,000 sq. ft will beapproximately Rs 6 crores and the sale proceeds

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from 30,000 sq. ft. at the rate of about Rs 8,000 persq. ft. is about 24 crores. The developer will thusgain about 45 crores from this one developmentproject alone.

This scheme will further exert additionalpressure on the city’s infrastructure. There are over300 such markets in the city.

e. Gaothans, koliwadas, agriwadas andbhandarwadas:

Gaothans have a separate set of rules governingdevelopment, which were approved only recently.These rules do not have much respect for organicgrowth of the gaothans and their heritage aspects.The new rules are fairly lopsided and heavily in favourof builders, resulting in the original residents of theseareas being put to a lot of inconvenience ultimatelyresulting in their forced eviction from the area.

Since gaothans are essentially villages thathave been engulfed by the city, these areas typicallyare congested and with limited infrastructure. Onthis basis they should have an FSI equal to or lowerthan the rest of the city, but the opposite has beenallowed, with gaothans being given a higher FSI of2, as opposed to 1.33 or 1 for most of the city.Koliawads, agriwadas and bhandarwadas havebeen the worst affected by the DC rules and mostof these original settlements have now beencategorized as slums.

For example, at the Sion Koliwada, theresidents live on a piece of land allotted to them bythe British, who took over almost 363 hectares ofland belonging to this community. The then Britishgovernment gave them smaller alternative lands andpaid for the construction of their houses. The slumauthority has now approved slum rehabilitationschemes on this land, making these originalresidents entitled to just 225 sq. ft carpet area whenthe actual area they are occupying is more than2,000 sq. ft. each.

A slum in the neighbourhood has been shownas amalgamated in this scheme and bogustenancies have been created to deprive all theresidents of this area from their legitimaterehabilitation package by showing them as non-consenters to the scheme. The figures have beenmanipulated in this case to show them as less than30 per cent of the total residents. The factual

position is that none of the original residents supportthis scheme.

FSI must be subject to infrastructure: Theargument advanced by the builder-politician lobbyin favour of schemes that allow extra FSI is thatthis is needed in a city where housing is in shortsupply. This argument does not hold good for thefollowing reasons:

a. The majority of the housing being providedthrough these schemes is aimed at upper orupper middle class buyers and is unaffordablefor the poor.

b. Expansion in terms of housing can only beallowed if the infrastructure (water supply,traffic, sewerage, green spaces etc) is capableof supporting that expansion.

Instances of other large cities such as Tokyoare often quoted to justify granting higher FSI forMumbai. However, there is a vast differencebetween the infrastructural capacities of cities suchas Tokyo and Manhattan in New York as comparedto Mumbai. The provision of public transport, parkingspace, sanitation and sewerage are able to handlethe larger population concentrations that aregenerated by higher FSIs in these cities, whereasthe same services are in serious danger of completecollapse in Mumbai. To increase FSI in such asituation would be disastrous, as these serviceswould be unable to cope with higher total populationsand higher population densities that increased FSIwill generate.

A pre-requisite to any increase in FSI wouldthus have to be the creation of socially beneficialinfrastructure: water supply, sanitation andsewerage, public transport.

II H) INTERFERENCE WITH ECOLOGY

1) The Mithi river/Mahim Creek

a) Worli-Bandra Sea Link

b) Bandra Kurla Complex

c) Airport

2) Dahisar, Poisar and other rivers/nallahs

3) Reclamation and filling of marshy land, creeks

4) Encroachment

5) Quarrying

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Drainage has emerged as the most crucial issuefacing Mumbai city post July 26, 2005. Thoughdrainage is traditionally taken to mean the provisionof pumping stations, storm water and sewage drainsand marine outfalls, this section will dwell on themuch larger, more important and almost completelyneglected role of natural drainage.

The 437 sq. km. of Greater Mumbai is drainedby several small and large rivers, from the now-famous Mithi to others such as the Poisar inKandivli, the Dahisar river and others. Creeks suchas the Malad Creek also play an important role instorm water drainage.

From the CCC’s visits to the affected areas, itbegan to emerge that a common thread was themanner in which the city’s natural drainage channels– its rivers, creeks and nallahs – have been abusedand systematically choked if not destroyed.

II H 1. THE MITHI RIVER/MAHIM CREEK:

The Mithi river was once a commercialchannel for areas that are now the central suburbsof Mumbai. With the rapid growth of the city in thelast two decades, the once extensive mangroveecosystems along the Mithi river and the Mahimcreek have been destroyed. Hundreds of acreshave been reclaimed for construction. Theseecosystems serve as a buffer between land andsea. It is estimated that Mumbai has lost about40% of its mangroves between 1995 and 2005,

some to builders and some to encroachment(slums). Sewage and garbage dumps have alsodestroyed mangroves. Much of the Bandra-Kurlacomplex was created by replacing such swampsand mangrove areas.

The Mithi river is a confluence of the dischargesof Powai and Vihar lakes. Originating at Powai,Mithi river flows through Saki Naka, Safed Pool,around Santacruz airstrip, passing through thicklypopulated residential and commercial areas likeJarimari, Bail Bazar, old airport road, Kalina (CSTroad), Vakola, Bandra-Kurla complex and Dharavi,before becoming the Mahim creek. The river bedis narrow in the initial stretch and is about 10meters wide. Its total course covers about 15 km.It serves as combined sewer for the area carryingsewage, industrial waste and garbage as well asstorm water to sea.

The mouth of the original Mithi river was onceseveral hundred metres wide. Today, due to anumber of interferences, the mouth is only about40 m. wide. The river’s catchment area covers aboutthree-quarters of Mumbai, from the Sanjay GandhiNational Park in the North to Dadar TT in the south.The unplanned growth of Mumbai and theconsequent sacrifice of the Mahim Creek holdslessons for all large cities of the world.

In 1930, the marshy land in this area coveredover 700 acres. The upgradation and broadeningof the Mahim Causeway and the construction of

the railway bridge to connectBandra and Mahim involvedfilling in parts of the creek,narrowing the mouth. Similarly,a bridge was built for the watersupply pipes from Tansa andVaitarna. Finally, a large patchof mangroves was reclaimedfor the Dharavi-Bandra linkbridge, once again blockingthe river’s exit to the sea.Another section of the creekwas fil led in for theconstruction of a drive-intheatre near what is now theBandra-Kurla Complex.

Further west, the areaimmediately adjoining themaharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/

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mouth of the river was blocked by the Bandrareclamation in the 1970s, as well as reclamationfor the Bandra Kurla complex and the Bandra-WorliSea Link (1990s) and for the Bombay SewerageDisposal Project. During High Tide, it is now moredifficult for seawater to enter the river for thesereasons, increasing water level at the mouth. Thisalso makes it more difficult for rainwater from landto drain out to the sea, further aggravating theproblem. This leads to inundation in Dharavi,Mahim, Bandra East, King’s Circle, Kurla, NehruNagar and Dadar TT, as well as Kurla, Ghatkopar,Kalina and Saki Naka.

Illegal activities such as washing oil andchemical drums, discharging hazardous waste anddumping garbage can also be observed along theriver. This constant abuse has reduced both thedepth and the width of the river in most places. Allsections of the river visited by the CCC (Bandra-Kurla complex, CST Road, Vakola, Jari-Mari)showed clear evidence of such illegal activities.

‘Channelisation’ of the Mithi river: The path ofthe Mithi river that flows into the Mahim creek hasbeen reduced by reclamation carried out by theMMRDA. The original course of the river has beenchanged and the river has been “trained” to followan artificial route by the creation of bunds on itssides. This ‘channelisation’ programme as it istermed by the MMRDA is contrary to the basicnature of an estuary: free mixing of river and sea.This has destroyed the mangroves in the area andhas also made the area less capable of absorbingflood surges.

NEERI had objected to the reclamation of BKCand also MMRDA’s channelisation programme,warning of heavy floods in surrounding areas. TheNational Institute of Oceanography’s former DeputyDirector Dr. AG Untawale had urged MMRDA tostop channelisation and to remove the bunds.

In the CCC’s opinion, there are three maininterventions that have interfered to varying degreeswith the Mithi’s free flow, causing the destructionwitnessed on July 26. Each of these interventionsare an indication of the faulty planning that hasbecome the norm in Mumbai, either because ofskewed priorities or vested interests.

II H 1 A) BANDRA-WORLI SEA LINK

The Worli-Bandra Sea Link exemplifies badplanning and in the CCC’s view played acontributory role in the serious flooding thatoccurred along the banks of the Mithi river, Kurla,Kalina and neighbouring areas.

Despite experts’ and authorities’ warningsagainst these projects (Paranjpe Committee reportin 1987 and the Atkins report in 1994 to name two),the state has stubbornly ploughed vast sums ofmoney into this ‘non-solution’ for the city’s traffic.

The Summary Initial Environment Examinationof the project was conducted by foreign consultantsin 1993. Though they were in favour of the project,they warned that “.. the Project can be a successfulpart of such a plan, which should includeconsideration of improved mass transit, parkingrestrictions, alternative travel modes, computerizedtraffic signal management and land use controls. Inthe event that these larger issues are not addressedappropriately… the project will most likely add tothe environmental problems of the city.”25

After visiting the area in question and hearingindividuals and NGOs involved with the project, theCCC finds that the BWSL and activities undertakenin its name have narrowed the mouth of the Mithiand contributed to the flooding.

The project currently under construction issubstantially different from that for whichenvironmental clearance was granted in 1999.Around 27 hectares of land have been reclaimedthough permission was granted for just 4.7 ha. Thisadditional reclamation has taken place at the verypoint where the river exits into the Bay, narrowingits mouth. The MSRDC subsequently attributed thisto an “an inadvertent error in correspondence withthe MoEF”. Shockingly, the MoEF subscribed tothis explanation and in a letter in 2000, amendedits original clearance to state that reclaimed landshould not exceed 27 ha. However, this changeshould have necessitated a fresh EnvironmentalImpact Assessment and fresh permission to besought, in keeping with the 1994 EIA notification.

Moreover, the 90-odd pillars that will beconstructed for the bridge will in effect obstruct 670

25 ‘Summary- Initial Environment Examination, Worli-Bandra Link Project’, prepared by Balloffet and Associates, Inc, August 31, 1993

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m. of the 1600 m. width of the mouth of the bay,more than one-third. With siltation already posinga serious problem, any additional blockage willworsen the situation. The next deluge could seean even higher toll of death and destruction in theareas drained by the Mithi river/Mahim creek. TheJuly 2001 Indian People’s Tribunal (IPT) report onthe BWSL specifically warned that the reclamationfor the BWSL could cause serious flooding in areasadjacent to the Mithi. This prediction, sadly, wentunheeded.26

Under the original plan, the proposed bridgewas not supposed to disturb the sea, yet on theBandra side, a road stretching more than onekilometre has been built by reclaiming land.According to the report of a public enquiry conductedby the Indian People’s Tribunal, this is contrary toone of the original recommendations made in a 1992MMRDA report on the project stated that no furtherreclamation should be allowed on the Bandra side,to prevent siltation in the Mahim Bay and creekarea.27

Health impact: An estimated 800 million litresof sewage enters Mahim Creek every day, inaddition to an unknown quantity of industrialeffluents released by small scale, unregulatedindustries located along the Mithi’s banks. Tidalaction and flushing with seawater is the naturalfiltration mechanism that is keeping the mangrovesin the creek alive. If this tidal action is blocked orreduced by the sea link and other forces, themangroves will slowly die and this natural filtrationwill no longer be possible. The sewage willstagnate and accumulate, posing a tremendoushealth risk to a large segment of Mumbai’spopulation.28

Aside from its role in the narrowing ofthe mouth of the Mithi river, the BWSL alsoattracted the CCC’s attention because of the roleit will play in increasing traffic congestion in southMumbai. The BWSL will do nothing to removebottlenecks in the city’s traffic system. Rather, itwill merely shift bottlenecks around and createnewer, worse congestion problems. In particular,

traffic congestion in Worli and South Mumbai willincrease. The W.S. Atkins report was specificallycommissioned by the MSRDC to study thefeasibility of the BWSL, and the report clearlyshowed that the effect of both the West IslandExpressway and the East Island Expresswaywould be to attract considerable additional trafficto South Mumbai, increasing congestion in Tardeo,Mumbai Central, Opera House, Nana Chowk andKalbadevi areas.

Irregularities with regard to BWSL:

1. It is ridiculous that the BWSL, construction ofwhich commenced only in 1999, is based onthe 1984 report by the Central Water and PowerResearch Institute, which itself used datacollected 20 years earlier. This report was apurely hydraulic study based on a model, anddid not take into account tidal variations,current patterns, impact on marine life, otherparts of Mumbai’s coastline, seasonal changesetc. Thus 40-year-old data was used to justifythis project and dismiss its environmentalimpacts as negligible.

2. No detailed Environment Impact Assessmentstudy has ever been conducted for the project.

3. No public hearing has been conducted.

4. Location of the proposed toll plaza changedby about 1.5 km. even though environmentalclearance was only given for the first location.

5. Excess land reclamation over and above thatfor which permission was granted.

II H 1 B) BANDRA KURLA COMPLEX (BKC)

Though the stated objective of the BKC, whichwas to decongest the south Mumbai businessdistrict, was laudable, the fatal flaw is the complex’slocation – on the banks and partly on the bed of theMithi. There is enough evidence to show that theMMRDA and planning authorities were aware thatthe reclamation that would be required for the BKCcould flood the Mithi river basin, but an attempt wasmade to tackle this by ‘channelising’ the river. Thatthis approach has failed is now clearly proven.

26 ‘Hydraulic Model Studies for the Proposed Bridge between Worli Point and Bandra Point Across Mahim Bay on West Island Freeway’, CWPRS, Pune.Specific Note no. 2168 dated 15-2-8427 ‘An Enquiry into the Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project’, Indian People’s Tribunal, July 200028 ‘Environmental Status Report of Brihanmumbai’; MCGM 1998-991

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The MMRDA’s “Environmental Review of Bandra-Kurla Complex” in 1996 Mumbai states: “In the earlydays, the low-lying marshy land on either side of theriver served as the flood absorption reservoir duringthe monsoon. The indiscriminate reclamation of low-lying land over the years and dumping of solid wasteby the BMC progressively reduced the floodabsorption capacity of the Mithi River basin, therebycausing flooding of the adjoining areas including majortransport arteries such as LBS Marg, part of WesternExpress Highway and the Central Railway tracks.”

Yet despite this accurate analysis of the reasonsfor upstream flooding, the BKC, which itself involvedlarge-scale reclamation, was proceeded with. End-of-pipe engineering solutions were sought to anecological problem, in order to permit developmentto go ahead. Hence the ‘channelisation’ programmeand proposals to construct dykes along the river’schannel. While the channelisation programme asspecified by the (CWPRS) was reportedly largelycompleted before 1991, the dykes and bunds alongthe river have not been built. Under no circumstancesmust this be done as it would effectively transformthe river into a drain. In times of high rainfall, suchdykes would also lead to severe flooding in upstreamareas. The ‘channelisation’ of the river itself probablyplayed a role in the flooding, by preventing waterfrom flowing into the main stream of the river.

The BKC proposal identified a core area of 430hectares, out of which 370 hectares was for ‘DirectAction’. According to the plan, 283 hectares of thisarea needed to be reclaimed from the intertidal zoneof Mahim Bay.

The National Stock Exchange and surroundingbuildings that form a part of the G Block of theBandra-Kurla Complex are built exactly on theoriginal course of the Mithi River, as does theMMRDA office in the adjoining E Block. This isironically the agency that is supposed to look atthe overall development of the city.

Between 1994-96, G Block was reclaimed onthe course of the Mithi. In 1995, the gap between thecoffer dam walls west of Mahim Causeway wasnarrowed for the Marine Outfall project by MCGM. In1996, there was heavy flooding in the Kurla-Kalina-Sion-Matunga area. After Kalina, the main river joinsthe Mahim Creek. Here the mouth of the river hasbeen reclaimed by the BKC. Of the total of 332hectares of wetland reclaimed for BKC, about 113hectares lie in G block .

These various reclamations at different pointsin time have gone against the advice of severalcommittees appointed by the Government. The onlysupport the reclamations have received is from areport by the CWPRS, Pune. Interestingly, this reporthas been criticized by several experts who deposedbefore the CCC, on the grounds that it is a purelymodel-based report, for which no actual studies havebeen conducted.

In 1993, a technical group of the state MangroveSteering Committee warned that ongoing reclamationfrom Band Stand (Bandra) to Mahim Causeway wouldaffect the mangroves in the creek and accumulatepollutants in the river, as their outward flow would beobstructed. The group also warned against dumping

excavated material in G zone block,cautioning that the creek area withits mangrove ecosystem shouldnot be used for ‘trial andexperiment’.

The CCC’s conclusion is thatthe extensive reclamation of over318 hectares carried out by theMMRDA for the BKC, particularlyin the G block, has played a majorrole in the flooding. The MMRDA,by its shortsighted, commercialand technocratic outlook is thusresponsible for the loss of lives andhardship and damage to propertythat could have been avoided.maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/

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II H 1 C) MUMBAI AIRPORT

To extend the taxiway at Sahar Airport, a bridgeis being built over the Mithi river. According toinformation gained from Sudhir Kumar, Director of theairport, the width of the bridge will be 45 m., with theriver flowing under it. However, on July 26, the bridgewas being constructed. To facilitate this work, theriver had been diverted by the construction of atemporary earthen wall, bending it 90 degrees. Thiswould have severely blocked the flow. It is the CCC’sview that this diversion was partly responsible for theflooding that occurred in adjoining and upstream areas.Mr George Abraham, the Corporator who resignedover 26/7 over his frustration that Mr Johny Josephhad done nothing to prevent floods – his last letterwas dated June 15, 2005

— alleged that due to the construction of theairport facilities, covering 181 hectares which earlierused to hold excess rain, four of the five drains inKalina were choked. Mustaq Khan from Rafiq Nagarslum near the airport, who lost his one-year-old sonMohammed Hanif in the floods, described the nearbystretch of Mithi as having been reduced to a ‘gutter’.He lost all his belongings and escaped with only theclothes that he wore, claiming that three-quarters ofhis fellow slum dwellers had lost their homes.

Mr. Kumar denied that the runway had divertedthe Mithi. The river, he said, flows under the mainrunway, beneath a 22-m.-wide bridge. The new bridge

over the river which is being constructed to extend thetaxiway is twice as wide.

With regard to the other apparent diversions, forthe secondary runway and near the airport building,Mr. Kumar said both these were constructed decadesago (the secondary runway 35 years ago and the airportbuilding near the first bend in the river in 1981) and hehad no information about them.

When specifically asked again whether the airportauthorities had diverted the river to extend the taxiway,Mr. Kumar said they had not. When shown picturesof the ongoing work and diversion, he conceded thatin the process of construction, the contractor mighthave temporarily diverted the river.

The CCC concludes that the Mumbai Airport hasplayed a crucial role in July 26. The very location ofthe airport on low lying reclaimed land around the Mithiriver is to blame and is in fact believed to be responsiblefor the annual submergence of parts of Kranti Nagarand Bail Bazaar in the Kurla-Kalina area.

The AAI has also extended the secondary runwayeastwards, near Kalpana Theatre. This is believed tohave been extended in the mid-90s. Thus from Kurla,the Mithi has been forced to turn four right angles in avery short length of its course. In 1990, the constructionof walls without adequate drainage flooded Kurla-BailBazaar in 1991. Walls built by the AAI between theAir-India and Indian Airlines Colonies obstruct waterflowing down the east slope of the Kalina hill.


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2) OTHER RIVERS

Poisar River: The Shamshan road, Kandivli East,runs along the course of the Poisar River. This roadwas recently (2004) broadened by approximately 8ft by dumping debris on the river, thus constrictingthe channel. Further, a large slum colony now existsin the river bed itself. This entire area wassubmerged by the rains of July 26, and the heavyrains on September 10 also saw additional flooding,though to a lesser extent. The building ShreeGanesh society, built as part of the SlumRehabilitation Scheme, also appears to haveencroached on the river bed itself.

From the Kandivli-Malad link road, it is clearthat a river bed that was formerly over 200 feetwide has now been reduced to just about 20 to30 feet, through encroachment for housing/household industries.

Similar stories exist in the case of mostnallahs, streams, rivers and creeks. In Kandivli East,Damunagar, Barkya Compound, Rajaram Guptaprovided information about the Himalayan StoneCrushing Company that has allegedly dumpeddebris across a 15-foot nallah to enable thecompany’s trucks to cross, leaving only a three- tofour-foot-diameter pipe for water to flow through. Asa result, July 26 forced the nallah to change courseand flow into the adjacent Barkya compound.

Dahisar River: The Dahisar River originates atthe Tulsi lake in the SGNP. The river flows forroughly 4 km outside the park. It crosses theWestern Express Highway and most of its courseis in Dahisar West, hence the name.

Though the Dahisar River is in no wayconnected to the Mithi, their stories are similar –encroachment, neglect and abuse. This came backto haunt locals on 26/7, as the areas near theDahisar river were severely flooded. The KrishnaNagar & Shantivan areas had 5 to 6 feet of water inthe ground floor houses. This is the point wherethe river exits the national park. A wall constructedall along the river bank from the point it leaves theNational Park till the Krishna Nagar gate hasnarrowed the river’s width.

From here the river crosses under the WesternExpress highway at Shantivan. The low archesthrough which the river flows are heavily silted and

blocked with accumulated garbage. Furtherdownstream, the pillars of the Borivli-Dahisar flyoveralso impede the flow of water in the Dahisar riverbed.

A retention wall further narrows the width ofthe river in the Prem Nagar (Borivli East stretch).Both sides of the river are lined with huts for overtwo kilometres, especially in the Dahisar Weststretch. Many of these structures are now pucca innature and have encroached on the river bed itself.According to local citizens’ groups, a building calledSarika near Rustomjee Residency has alsoencroached on the river.

3) RECLAMATION AND FILLING OF MARSHY LAND, CREEKS,MANGROVE AREAS, OPEN SPACES

The ‘reclamation’ of land by dumping either in thesea or on mangroves, mudflats and creeks invariablyresults in poor drainage on the landward side . Thiswas brought to the notice of the CCC by local residentsin Bandra and Malad. In Bandra, residents of the ChapelRoad area and the Bandra Reclamation are affectedwhenever it rains heavily for three or four hours.Mangroves in areas such as Seven Bungalows,Kanjurmarg, Link Road (Goregaon), Gorai and Malvanivillage have been massively destroyed alongsidecreeks. The case of the Usha Madhu Development Co-op Hsg. Society which has filled about 250 hectares ofmangroves for the construction of a golf course on landbelonging to the Byramjee Jeejeebhoy group is alsowell known. There are similar examples of other realestate deals proceeding after first ‘reclaiming’ mangroveor inter-tidal marshland.

A recent paper in the Indian Journal of MarineSciences by V. Vijay, R.S. Biradar and others has


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concluded, on the basis of remote sensing, thatfrom 1990 to 2001, a total of 37 sq. km. of mangroveshas been lost in the city. This amounts to a decreaseof almost 40% in the area under mangroves and anaverage loss of over 3 sq. km every year. Between1996 and 2001, mangroves decreased from almost67 sq. km. to 56 sq. km., a decline of over 15%. 29

Interestingly, the paper also quotes earlier studiesestimating the city’s mangroves at 249 sq. km. in1954 and 200 sq. km in 1975.

Mangroves and their mudflats act as a bufferbetween sea and land. During heavy rainfall, excesswater from the land naturally drains into such areas.When these locations are reclaimed, naturaldrainage is ignored, with foreseeable consequencesfor the areas that were in the hinterland.

In this context, the CCC welcomes the recentMumbai High Court judgment ordering the cessationof all dumping and construction on mangroves. Thisorder needs to be strictly enforced for the benefit ofthe city.

According to the Development Control Rulesof 1991, no land shall be used as a site forconstruction of building:

• If it is within 9 m. from the edge of thewatermark for a minor water course or 15 m.from the edge of the watermark of a major watercourse, unless arrangements to thesatisfaction of the Commissioner are made todrain the flow of water course.

• Provided that where a water course passesthrough low-lying land without well-definedbanks, the Commissioner may permit theowner of the property to restrict or divert thewater course to an alignment and cross sectiondetermined by him (commissioner)

Clearly, this regulation has either been floutedor there have been widespread exemptions granted.

De-reserving open spaces: The city’sdevelopment plan has earmarked lands for gardensand playgrounds within the city limits. These arehowever being de-reserved at phenomenal rates,by successive state governments from the timewhen Sharad Pawar was Chief Minister. During his

tenure, he de-reserved 285 plots; Manohar Joshiwent a little further, de-reserving 300 plots. In hiseight-month rule, Narayan Rane de-reserved about180 plots, (one of which covered (264 ha) inMankhurd, an area that was severely affected byflooding with water rising to 12 feet). SushilkumarShinde de-reserved 67 plots and VilasraoDeshmukh is continuing the trend.

According to some estimates, this wouldcumulatively amount to almost 50 per cent of thespace for amenities. On paper, the developmentplan’s amenity spaces ratio is 0.2 acres per 1,000population. Of this, 82 per cent is taken over byslums so that the actual ratio is 0.03 acres per1,000 population. This is the lowest in the world.The international norm is 12 to 14 acres per 1,000population, and by Indian standards it should be 4acres per 1,000 population.

Mumbai’s target was to have a ratio of at least0.4 acres per 1,000 population. But this is actuallydropping – the current figure is 0.03 acres per 1,000.

Pure greed that is driving the de-reservationspree. When a plot is reserved, it has no commercialvalue since nothing can be built on it. But when itis de-reserved, the price shoots up to the level ofland values in the area. This is thus a major sourceof illegal income for politicians. When more FSI isgiven on that plot its worth increases further. Thebuilders and the politicians are the only ones toprofit, while the city and its inhabitants lose out.

Given below are details of land dereservationsby successive governments.

Sr No Chief Minister & Party Number of Plots

de-reserved.

1. Mr. Manohar JoshiShiv Sena 300

2. Mr. Sharad PawarCongress(I) 285

3. Mr. Sushil Kumar ShindeCongress(I) 67

4. Mr. Narayan RaneShiv Sena 180

29 Vijay.V. et al, “Mangrove mapping and change detection around Mumbai (Bombay) using remotely sensed data”, Indian Journal of MarineSciences”, Vol. 34(3), September 2005, pp. 310 -315

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Chaos at Guzdar Bandh

Residents of the Guzdar Scheme, Santa Cruz (West) deposed before the CCC on Monday September 19 at Bandra-West.This is one of the better documented cases of encroachment and disruption of natural drainage patterns causing threat to lifeand destruction of property. Within the last 15 years, over 8,317 hutments have come up on the Guzdar Creek. Of these,according to documents received from the Guzdar Scheme Residents Trust (GSRT), 5,154 are pre-1995 and thus eligible forrehabilitation.

These dwellings have destroyed over 11 hectares of mangrove and are occupying an area that is notified as CRZ I and a NoDevelopment Zone, to the west of the Guzdar Bandh. This area was formerly a mangrove and mud flat stretch known as theGuzdar Bay/Creek. By dumping and constructing hutments, the level of land west of the Bandh, that is the seaward side, hasbeen raised above that of the land on the eastern or landward side causing a “Saucer Effect”. With the result that rainwater,instead of flowing westward to the sea, now flows back to the land. The encroachments have blocked the free flow of water tothe sea, resulting in serious flooding every monsoon. Ground floor residents now have flood water entering their homes everymonsoon as a matter of course. Overflowing toilets and polluted underground tanks, electrical short circuits in the meter roomsand flooding of lift wells are also common. This is the situation during normal monsoon rains, so of course the July 26 delugeled to a much worse scenario, with over 5 feet of water in some ground floor residences.

In June 2000, the BMC demolished the four sluice gates that have been fitted on the Guzdar bandh since the early 1900s, tokeep the seawater out at high tide. As a result of the removal of the sluice gates, there has been regular flooding of roads and

It comes as no surprise that Mumbaiexperiences annual f loods and with theaccelerated de-reservation of open spaces, whichare then built on and paved over, one can onlyexpect that the flooding will increase over theyears to come. These spaces act as spongesto absorb water. Their development andconcretization has meant that the surface run offincreases.

Reclamation under the guise of infrastructureprojects has become a deliberate strategy tomake more land available to builders. An exampleis the BWSL, for which reclamation could easilyhave been avoided. Finally, instead of thepermitted 4 hectares, over 20 hectares have beenillegally reclaimed. When this was objected to,instead of prosecuting MSRDC, the MoEFregularized this reclamation post facto.

4) Encroachment: Encroachment on publicspaces is a significant reason for the worseningcivic situation in Mumbai, and played a role inthe Mumbai floods. Encroachments are causeddirectly by Mumbai’s unplanned development, andfostered by vested political interests who seekto benefit from them. Along the entire length ofthe Mithi river, encroachments have come up, in

many places right up to the bank of the river. Thesame is true of other rivers such as the Dahisarand Poisar. Since the river banks are marshy andof soft soil, debris is usually dumped first andthen rough shelters constructed. This of coursenarrows the width of the river, interfering withnatural drainage.

Since these settlements have little or no civicinfrastructure, the river becomes the easiestwaste disposal site, further interfering with thewater flow and water quality.

The CCC is clear in the opinion that the BMC,successive state governments and the spectrumof political parties are responsible for thissituation, in many cases tacitly or overtlyencouraging those desperate for housing to settleon the banks of the river and in the floodplainareas. By encouraging or tacitly permitting suchillegal settlements, those responsible not onlycondemn mil l ions to substandard l ivingconditions, they are also responsible for the lossof lives and property that occurred in these areason July 26 and 27.

5) Quarrying: Several experts such as Mr.Vivek Kulkarni felt that the widespread andindiscriminate quarrying that has been taking

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residential compounds during the high tides. The only reason given by the BMC for removing the sluice gates was that they are ‘nolonger technically required’. The sluice gates kept the high tide waters out, and this led to floods in the hutments (formerly inter-tidal zone) on the west of the Guzdar bandh. It would seem probable that this was the reason for the removal of the sluice gates.

In 2001, the citizens of the area approached the High Court for relief vide Writ Petition no 743/2001. On October 31, 2001, theCourt directed the Government of Maharashtra to take corrective steps as “immediate relief”. However little has changed on theground. The BMC protests its inability to clean the nallahs and drains in the area until the encroachments are cleared. To date,696 hutments have been demolished and 356 hutments have been rehabilitated, at no cost to themselves, at Anik Nagar,Chembur. This is against the High Court Orders of 31st Oct 2001, 4th Oct 2002, and 24th Feb 2004.

About Rs 5.5 crores has been spent for the development of 2.7 hectares of land at Malwani, Malad and each of the 780 pre-1995 encroachers were to pay the government Rs 30,000 for a 10’ x 15’ plot of land. Political interference forced the GoM torehabilitate 356 hutments free of cost at Anik Nagar, Chembur.

The latest development is a proposal to develop and SRA scheme in the Guzdar Bandh Creek of about 2.8 million sq feet, thatis in CRZ I area and a No Development Zone. Proposals have been submitted to the SRA by M/s Gala Builders and M/s DeewanBuilders The Guzdar Bandh Residents Association has applied to the SRA for information in this respect under the Right ToInformation Act, but no reply has been forthcoming thus far. Legal action would appear to once again be the only option left.

The Guzdar Bandh example typifies the manner in which open spaces and natural topographical features have beeninterfered with or destroyed across Mumbai city, in this case by illegal encroachments.

THE BORIVLI NATIONAL PARK AND ITS VALUE TO

MUMBAI CITY

The existence of the 103 sq. km. SanjayGandhi National Park (SGNP) came as agodsend on July 26. This forested, hilly andlargely ecologically intact area served to ensurethat the high volumes of water that fell over itsexpanse were to a large extent absorbed. Largeamounts would have percolated into theground and into the Vihar and Tulsi lakes.Using the rainfall recorded at Santacruz, a totalof 94,400 million litres of water would havefallen on SGNP. A significant proportion of thiswould have been absorbed by the soil. If theSGNP did not exist and this area wasdeveloped, this huge amount of water wouldhave come rushing down from a height intothe low-lying areas of the city, making the flooda lot worse that it was.

This emphasizes the importance of havingecologically intact areas such as forests/mangroves in and around an urbanconglomeration, as these spaces act as buffersagainst nature ’s extremes and man ’smistakes.

place in and around the city for over two decadesis affecting the city adversely. QuarryingMumbai’s hills causes erosion and siltation indownstream areas. For example, the Thanecreek, the main channel of which was 50 feetdeep around 1950 is now just 10 to 15 feet. Oneof the main reasons is the quarrying on both sidesof the creek.

Quarrying and construction around Powailake has resulted in the silting up of the lake.The water surface of the lake has been reducedby over 60 hectares, and the siltation has alsoreduced the depth of the lake and has reducedits capacity to store rainwater. Obviously, thisaccentuated the flow into the Mithi on July 26.The deluge also triggered off a massive landslidewithin the Hiranandani Gardens complex, whichled to additional debris being washed into Powai.

The regular landslides during the monsoonare the other consequence of quarrying. Quarriedhills are traditionally unstable (due to blasting,drilling etc) and unfit for human habitation. Yetonce abandoned, these quarried hills are sooncovered by slums, often perched precariously onthe hill slopes or the foot of the hill. The landslidethat claimed over 100 lives at Saki Naka tookplace at one such abandoned site.

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II.I.) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

The almost complete breakdown ofcommunications in the city on July 26 wasunprecedented. As the gravity of the situation camehome to Mumbaikars, the cell networks began to beoverloaded with people frantically trying to get in touchwith their families and loved ones. With Reliance

Energy shutting down power to many areas, mostpeople could not rely on TV channels for news either,and before long, MTNL landlines began giving troublein many areas.

Eventually, with widespread electricity failures,most cellular networks were shut down completelyor in certain localities, either due to equipment failure,

COASTAL EROSION IN MUMBAI

Mumbai cannot escape its history as a reclaimed city. At the same time, the excesses of the past must not be repeated. The city haswitnessed and continues to witness large scale reclamation, from the Backbay and Nariman Point reclamations of the 1960s &1970s, to the Bandra reclamation in the 1970s and 1980s, Bandra-Kurla Complex in the 1980s and

1990s, Bandra-Worli Sea Link of the 90s and ongoing decimation of mangroves on both east and west coasts.

A succession of experts (Dr. M.D. Zingde of the National Institute of Oceanography, architect Nandan Mungekar, ecologist GirishRaut, mangrove expert Vivek Kulkarni among others) told the CCC that these historic and ongoing reclamations are having a directimpact on the city’s shoreline, causing mild to severe erosion in many parts.

Due to the reclamation in the Mahim creek by the MMRDA for BKC, combined with the Bandra Reclamation and the reclamationcarried out at the mouth of the river for the Sewerage Disposal Project and BWSL, the sea cannot enter the creek as easily as it oncecould. As a result, the force of waves at Dadar has increased. The Mahatma Gandhi Swimming Pool and the Hinduja hospital areunder serious threat from the sea. The Ambedkar Samadhi at Dadar is also being eroded by the sea. The historic Mahim fort is alsobeing destroyed by higher waves and their intensity.

The erosion faced at Marine Drive and Nariman Point are well documented. Since these are reclaimed areas themselves, this isperhaps to be expected. But over the past few years, coasts are being eroded at areas that hitherto did not face this problem, such asDadar and Versova. Versova is now severely threatened and the compounds and foundations of several buildings are now undersiege in the monsoon. There seems to be a prima facie connection between the BWSL reclamation and the increase in erosion atDadar and Versova, however much this might be denied by the MSRDC.30

In the wake of 26/7 and the tsunami that hit the southern and eastern coasts on December 26, 2004, there have been proposalsto construct a ‘sea wall’ around Mumbai. The CCC is strongly opposed to this proposal and feels that it is nothing more than a cleverploy by politicians, builders and contractors to rake in crores, at the city’s expense, from direct construction and by attempting to skirtthe CRZ rules. The only logical, sustainable and economical way to tackle the problem of erosion is to respect our coastline, stop allreclamation without exceptions, protect and regenerate mangroves and keep our creeks and estuaries healthy and free fromencroachments.

However, ever since its inception, the CRZ notification has been overtly targeted by the politician-builder lobby. The new developmentplans passed in 1992 (soon after the CRZ came into force) for Mumbai showed roads in certain areas almost touching the sea, forexample in Versova. No such road exists in reality, but it was inserted into the plan so that wherever exemptions for construction weredesired, a road would be built, on the justification that it was in the original plan. The development would then be permitted on thelandward side of the road.31

Rather than opposing the CRZ notification and asking that it be further relaxed or scrapped, it would be desirable if the stategovernments appreciate the importance of protecting the coastline. The basic approach should be to restrict new development withinthe CRZ to the bare minimum and allow only those activities that are essential.

30 “Reclamation leads to erosion along coastal Mumbai”, The Times of India, Mumbai, 18 October 2000. [C.E32b.181000TOI].http://doccentre.org/eldoc/urban_issues/uu1_M041.html31 “Why Mumbai Choked”, Frontline, Vol.22, Issue 17, Aug 13 - 26, 2005http://www.flonnet.com/fl2217/stories/20050826004601700.htm

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overloading or as they did not have sufficient backup batteries to run in the absence of electricity fromthe grid. A city used to uninterrupted electricity supplywas ill-prepared to cope with hours and in somecases days without electricity.

This communications failure affected almost allgovernment departments to one extent or another.Perhaps the least affected was the Police, whosewireless systems proved to be the most reliable.Eventually however, as their batteries died down andwith electricity a problem in many areas, even thissystem was affected.

A report by IAS official Rani Jadhav followingthe floods in Mumbai on July 11-12, 2000 hasrecommended that at least 44 electronic displayboards be set up from Cuffe Parade to Borivli andThane to enable dissemination of information duringdisasters. On July 26, however, there were only twoinformation boards, one at Chowpatty and the otherat Haji Ali; neither were working. Similarly, the useof SMS by the Disaster Management Authorities wasalso advocated as an instantaneous and foolproofcommunication in the event of natural disaster orcalamities. Obviously, neither the MaharashtraGovernment nor the BMC were aware of thenecessity to use this tool to tackle the 26th flooding.[See section (II.M.) Rani Jadhav Committee Report& Annexure 7 for further details]

The lack of accurate and timely informationplayed a crucial role in the unfolding disaster, leadingto a sense of panic and chaos in many areas. Thedissemination of accurate information of the gravityof the situation and the areas affected could havekept many people off the roads and safe in theirhomes/offices.

II J) ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

As soon as waterlogging began to occur inmany areas, Reliance Energy, which supplieselectricity to most of the suburbs (22.23 lakhconsumers, population of over 9 million) took thedecision to cut off power supply in order to avoidelectrical accidents and possible deaths. This movewas necessary and probably saved lives.32 However,the company has come in for severe criticism for itsexcessive tardiness in restoring power to large parts

of the city, even after the waters receded. There arealso several instances where the same localityreceived uninterrupted power supply from the TataPower Company where the Reliance Energy hadostensibly shut down its power to prevent shortcircuits and electrocutions.

Kurla was without power for almost five days,parts of Kalina were without electricity for a weekand certain areas in Ghatkopar did not have powerfor a week to 10 days. Other areas in Bandra, Andheri,Thane etc were without power for periods rangingfrom 24 to 30 hours. The upmarket Hiranandanicomplex at Powai was without power from RelianceEnergy from the 26th evening up to the 27th morning –thereafter, though power was restored for a few hours,most parts of the complex did not receive electricityfrom Reliance Energy during the day for 8 days.

The absence of electricity also affected watersupply, as water could not be pumped. While RELwas quick to laud its achievement in shutting downthe power to save lives, its silence in the days followingthe floods was deafening. The company did not evenset up a functional helpline to offer information aboutthe power situation. In stark contrast, the state runMSEB which services most of Maharashtra was ableto restore power within 24 hours in most areas andwere constantly imparting information to the press.In fact, there were also almost no complaints aboutthe performance of the other private power utility inthe city, Tata Electric, even granting that the islandcity was not much affected.

It was only with public opinion rapidly turningugly and after the Mumbai Suburban Collector issueda show cause notice to REL asking why no actionshould be taken against it that the company madesome public statements and began to take visibleaction. A helpline was set up and Anil Ambanipromised to set aside Rs 100 crores towards adisaster management plan, assuring the public thatREL was working overtime to restore power.

The issue however is what took REL so long torestore services? How was a state-run MSEB ableto restore power the next day while a supposedlyefficient, profit-making company like REL was unableto get its act together for days on end? It would appearthat in its quest to boost profits and cut back on

32 http://www.rel.co.in/aboutus/systemdata.asp

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expenditure, REL, which bought over BSES in 2003,cut back on resources such as manpower and back-up transformers. This meant that Reliance quitesimply did not have the resources to handle this crisis.

According to Minister for Energy Dilip Walse-Patil, REL declined the MSEB’s offer of assistance.But eventually, MSEB’s gangmen were roped in topull out cables and clean up transformers. The ChiefMinister himself publicly criticized REL and thisspurred them into action.

REL has about 4,050 transformers in the cityand almost all of them were affected. The equipmentcan be restarted only when it is clean and dry.Further, it would appear that REL had no back-upequipment, due to its practice of cutting down oninventory. When it took over BSES, REL got rid ofold transformers to cut costs.

REL’s personnel were also unable to cope.According to media reports, four years ago, BSEShad 4,600 employees, but today REL has barely3,000, again a result of economies. Disasterpreparedness implies the need to keep reserveresources — human and material – even if this isnot commercially viable.

In the CCC’s view, Reliance Energy’s actions,or lack of them, caused needless suffering tomillions, including the sick, aged and infants. Thereis prima facie evidence for the government to imposepunitive damages on REL, and for private citizens totake legal action against REL seeking punitivedamages.

Reliance Energy in fact should take a cue fromthe electricity wing of the BEST. BEST’s insistenceon regular quality checks and storage of adequateamount of spares including transformers meant thateven though certain areas were without electricityas electric supply had to cut off to preventelectrocution, when the supply was restarted therewere no problems and none of the transformers shortcircuited. That was what was lacking in ReliancePower, which did not keep enough back up ofequipment in the name of cost cutting. BEST in factlent more than a dozen transformers to RelianceEnergy to restart its operations. BEST officials addedthat the focus now would be on raising the height ofpillars where the electric equipments are placed toprotect them water logging.

II.K.) ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Of the lack of so many essentials on 26/7 andthe days following it, information figured among thetop of the list. While the media – TV in particular – isguilty of dumbing down these days and even nationalbroadsheets tend not to report as much on theenvironment as they used to, TV news channels andnewspapers made amends in the aftermath.

On Tuesday itself, the media was caughtunawares, like everybody else. For years,newspapers had reported the flooding of areas duringthe monsoon, particularly in the island city, assporadic events, rather than the culmination of yearsof neglect in draining these chronically affected spots.To compound the confusion, in many areas in thesuburbs, cable TV was disrupted because of theelectricity was switched off.

Because communications were down that day– land lines and cell phones – and roads werejammed, it was difficult for a section of the mediawhich has tended to become South -Mumbai centric,to get an idea of the calamity that had gripped therest of the city, where the majority of people live.

Due to the central government’s inexplicableban on FM radio stations – barring AIR — carryingnews, this vital potential source of information, whichwas functioning throughout the deluge, was not putinto operation. The simple expedient of telling peoplenot to leave their offices on July 26, or children tostay in school or go to their friends’ nearby homesrather than risk returning home, would have savedenormous anxiety, hardship and, in some cases,lives.

Ironically, Mumbai’s ham radio operators, whohave volunteered to provide information in the Laturearthquake in 1993 and several internationaldisasters, were not contacted. Nor were the morecontemporary tribe of bloggers: Dina Mehta, living inKhar, actually helped with tsunami victims throughoutAsia and, more recently, helped put victims ofHurricane Katrina in contact with those who wereproviding relief in Louisiana.

Had the media been more pro-active, it wouldhave taken more notice of the report of the IndianPeople’s Tribunal on BWSL which warned that thesewerage and road schemes that blocked the mouthof the Mithi in the Mahim Bay could one day prove

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disastrous, as was the case. The fact that in theSGNP, stretching over 104 sq km – almost a quarterof Greater Mumbai – nature had provided the cityone of the best sponges and regulators of water wascompletely ignored by the media.

Unfortunately even the media, which is usuallysupportive of projects for the benefit of commonMumbaikars, has not focused significantly on theundue emphasis in Mumbai on private motorizedtransport, which ground to a complete halt on 26/7.The fact that the state is spending upwards of Rs12,000 crore on such schemes, to the neglect ofpublic transport, has seldom been commented uponby a media so obsessed with celebrities day afterday

Indeed, the ‘north-south’ divide in the media wasaccentuated after 26/7, when many editors becameconscious of areas of darkness like Jari-Mari for thevery first time. It also showed how the slum populationwas most vulnerable to these events. The celebrityDelhi-based editor of The Hindustan Times wascaught in the deluge himself and did some soul-searching in a Sunday column with the observationthat there was nothing that cleared the mind moreeffectively than having to wade through waist-deepwater in the Mumbai floods, which caught rich andpoor alike for once.

However, the media recovered soon after andbecame the prime source of information in a confusingsituation. In the absence of anything apart fromplatitudes being disseminated by official authorities,it was the media which informed people of what thecity was going through. Star TV, in particular, beingthe only cable news channel to be based in Mumbai,dispatched its reporters to remote corners of thesuburbs, from where they conveyed what washappening. The business channels also highlightedthe economic losses faced by the city and country.

TV channels were also enterprising enough tocommandeer helicopters to present a bird’s eye viewof the tragedy on the ground. Star, for instance,showed how the water was flowing just a few feetbelow the railway bridge at the mouth of the Mithi atMahim; had the level risen a little more, it wouldhave severed north from south Mumbai on this cruciallifeline. Not that the media itself, like much of Mumbai,was aware even of the existence of Mithi, let aloneits role in flushing the city during a flood.

That week-end, TV channels conducted debatesabout the tragedy. Questioned regarding thejustification for declaring a two-day holiday forgovernment officials, Chief Minister VilasraoDeshmukh argued that government employees werealso affected and had to look after the well-being oftheir own families. This prompted a lady in theaudience to remark that it was like a jawanexonerating himself from going to the front in a waron the ground that his first duty was to protect hisfamily. Even the Chief Minister’s later excuse thatonly clerical staff was given the holiday while seniorofficials were on duty, did not wash: among otherthings, it implied that such junior staff had no role toplay in an emergency. They could surely haveprovided back-up support for relief operations thattumultuous week.

TV channels, by exposing the lethargy ofofficials, played a significant role. In suchemergencies, officials have to be seen in action, notconfined to their cabins. Perhaps the exception wasthe Police Commissioner, A.N. Roy, who was thefirst senior official to be actually witnessed surveyingareas in a boat. Other officials, from the Chief Ministerdownwards, were conspicuous by their absence. Themedia can help enforce such accountability on thepart of the state, even while it highlights the role ofordinary citizens who filled the breach.

After a couple of days, the newspapers alsoreported and analysed the situation in great detail.Indeed, as has happened in previous disasters –particularly after the Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984 —dailies and periodicals conducted the first on-the-spot analysis of the causes and consequences ofthe flooding, given the sphinx-like silence on the part


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of the government, which could only repeatedly seekrefuge in the fact that this was an unprecedenteddownpour.

Dailies interviewed experts and providedinfographics to explain to the public – and politiciansand bureaucrats as well – how the city had beencaught on the wrong foot in July. The role of the Mithi,and that it was part of a natural watercourse thatbegins in the SGNP, and flows through the threelakes, was highlighted in great detail, which hashelped the public to comprehend the ecological baseof this metropolis for the first time.

Some reporters went into greater detail. TheTimes of India reported, for instance, how the IndianInstitute of Tropical Meteorology in Pune describedthe event as a “supercell”, one of the rarest and worstkinds of thunderstorms:

“Scientists have found a name for what happenedon July 26 this year, when a record-breaking 94 cmof rain submerged Mumbai in a day. The delugewasn’t a cloudburst, as some thought, or divineretribution, as others feared, but something moreimprobable: a supercell.

“Supercells are the rarest, worst kind ofthunderstorms, invariably wreaking disaster in theform of hail, torrential rain, floods and even tornadoes.Hidden in the heart of the supercell — which lookslike a tall, dense cloud with a rim at the top - lies avertical column of air spinning at speeds of over 50miles per hour to keep the storm alive.

“It’s this hyper-efficient wind-and-rain machinethat was squatting over Mumbai’s suburbs for thebetter part of 26/7, claim scientists from Pune’sIndian Institute of Tropical Meteorology (IITM) in areport to be submitted shortly to the stategovernment. A supercell, say scientists at theinstitute, is the best explanation for why so muchwater poured down in such a short span of time oversuch a small area.”

The newspaper went on to report whether thiswas a freak occurrence or not:

“Is the city likely to see more disastrous dayslike 26/7? It’s hard to predict but a look at rainfallpatterns over the last century shows that the numberof heavy-rainfall days in Mumbai is certainlyincreasing.

“The total rainfall we receive during the monsoonis now due not so much to steady drizzle over themonths but to a few days of heavy downpour. Andmost of these days are likely to occur in July…

“The 26/7 downpour ranks ninth among India’sheaviest-rainfall days since 1876 and is the secondamong such days in the plains (as opposed to hillyregions). It also has the distinction of being thehighest one-day rainfall since 1882 in Maharashtra.”

Whether this was a supercell – a phenomenonwhich not even climate change experts are familiarwith – or not, the point is that such media exposureis extremely educative. (Not that this prevented otherdailies recapitulating the events of 2005 on NewYear’s eve from claiming that 26/7 had witnessedthe heaviest rain ever recorded in India.) Moreover,as extensive reporting in the US media afterHurricane Katrina has shown, even naturalphenomena can either intensify due to human-induced factors or, even more significantly, suchinformation can help both the authorities and thepublic at large take precautionary measures in future.

The media even carried articles by cityhistorians to trace how from the 19th century, thecity’s reclamation schemes had been bogged downby the failure to provide adequate drainage. Dailiesalso unearthed the Brimstowad report, which hadbeen gathering dust for 13 years. All such informationsubsequently enabled the public to learn that thewrath of nature had been compounded by the folly ofhumans in the country’s commercial capital.

II.L. LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY

By and large, the estimates of loss of life arefairly accurate in a city like Mumbai, even thoughthis would be lower than actual figures, given thatmany slum dwellers, who constitute more than halfthe population, may not have reported dead ormissing family members, as the CCC found duringits hearings. Since many children in particular wereswept away into drains, their deaths may not havebeen recorded.

There are no accurate estimates of the financiallosses incurred during 26/7 – by way of homesdestroyed or partly damaged, belongings, earnings,medical expenses and the like. The first responsefrom people who testified was that they could notcalculate the loss, since they were poor and often

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STATISTICS RELATED TO LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY

1. Loss to Life - Mumbai and Surroundings

Sr.No. District Deaths Injured Missing

1 Mumbai 447 16 -

2 Mumbai (Railway) 7 4 14

3 Navi Mumbai 66 22 1

4 Thane 180 19 3

5 Thane(Rural) 44 - 12

6 Raigad 166 4 3

Total 910 65 33

illiterate. In the weeks after the deluge, they werealso not in the state of mind to add up the figures.

The deluge affected not only slum dwellers butmiddle class families who lived on the ground floor.Sambhaji Bagul from Railway Colony in Kurla


complained that all 89 buildings in the complex wereflooded year after year; 26/7 was worse. He and hisfamily moved to the second floor for six days. Helost a TV and fridge and clothes were sodden; heestimated his loss at Rs 30,000. Amina Sabbir, whois 46, told the CCC in Govandi that her housecompletely collapsed; it would take Rs 1 lakh to repair.

In most such disasters, there are officialsources of financial loss, which are generally anunderestimate and estimates by trade and industrialinterests, which tend to be inflated. Insurers are agood source, though in disasters like 26/7, wheremost affected were slum dwellers, their homes andbelongings would obviously not be insured andtherefore such estimates are on the lower side.


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3. TOTAL LOSSES (MUMBAI)

Sr. No. Nature of Losses Extent of Loss(Rs crores)

1 Infrastructural Losses 1000

2 Livestock loss 100

3 Housing Loss 300

4 Loss of crops 600

5 Export loss 800

Total 2800

2. TOTAL FINANCIAL LOSSES IN MAHARASHTRA (SECTOR WISE) Figures in Rs lakhs

Sr. No. Sector Asset Losses Output Losses Fiscal Losses Cost of Total Lossestemporary

Restoration

1 Agriculture 410.6493 624.0906 0.0400 204.7880 1239.5679

2 Animal husbandry, 719.4670 227.0700 4.6150 24.9070 976.0590

Diary developmentand Fisheries

3 Co-operation, marketing 382.3780 1.3900 0.000 0.0000 383.7860

and textiles

4 Finance 0.0275 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0275

5 General Administration 0.2670 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2670

6 Home 147.9748 11.6203 0.0000 0.0048 159.5999

7 Public Health Dept 10.6600 0.0000 0.0000 43.6500 54.3100

8 Public Works Dept 617.1600 0.0000 0.0000 320.7900 937.9500

(Roads & Building)

9 Public Works 139.2900 0.0000 0.0000 24.3850 163.6750

(National Highway)

10 Rural development 718.8300 0.0000 0.3700 21.8800 741.0800

and Water Conservation

11 School Education Dept 17.1040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 17.1040

12 Urban development 580.7375 17.3681 513.7326 36.0989 1147.9371

13 Water resources 501.2320 0.0000 7.0650 2.8900 511.1870

14 Water Supply & Sanitation 47.7077 3.9155 4.5608 6.1026 62.2866

Total 4293.5648 885.4545 530.3834 685.5143 6394.9170

(Source: Chart 1 & Chart 2, Maharashtra Floods Status Report 2005, Department of Relief andRehabilitation, Government of Maharashtra)

4. EXTENT OF INSURANCE COVERAGE

Sr. No. Nature of Insurance Amount(Rs crores)

1 Insurance for cars 30

2 Insurance for Property 20

3 Insurance for shops 50-60

4 Insurance for Godowns 200

Total 310-20

(Source: Chart 3 &4 www.fnst.org whose statistics have been compiled from Financial Times andEconomic Times August 4, 2005.)

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II. M) RANI JADHAV COMMITTEE REPORT FINDINGS &RECOMMENDATIONS

It would be worthwhile looking at a similar reportwhich was published by the state government onthe floods which hit Mumbai on July 11-12, 2000.This committee was headed by an IAS officer MsRani Jadhav and the findings are revealing. It showsthat old habits die hard.

It becomes apparent that many of the problemswhich plagued Mumbai on 26/7 (communicationsystems, weather forecasts, administrativeresponses) were witnessed five years previouslyas well. That time too several recommendationswere made and yet it appears that none or very fewof these recommendations were actuallyimplemented.

SOME INSTANCES:

Communication systems: “The fax machines ofthe Traffic Police, City Police, Mumbai, WesternRailway Control Room, Central Control Room, andEOC Mantralaya were found to be out of order. TheDMP requires that the communication systembetween the line departments should be upgraded.The Plan does not mention the agency which wouldundertake these tasks of up-gradation. From thereports made available by the various linedepartments, it appears that there is no directcommunication system between these departments(except for the normal/telephone connection) andno program of any kind is underway.

Further the report states that of the 44 locationswhere Electronics display boards were supposedto be displayed, it appears that that no displayboards were set up or activated during theoccurrence of the disaster”.

26/7: Nothing seems to have changed. At the4:30 pm meeting when it emerged that Mumbaiwas also inundated, the traffic police team tried tostop traffic heading from Haji – Ali heading north.By that time it was too late. The lack of displayboards along major arterial roads to warn people ofthe flood situation is another glaring example ofthe how successive governments refuse to learnfrom mistakes.

Rescue Efforts: Another important fact whichcomes to light is the point that, consequent to the

overflowing of the Tulsi and Vihar lakes on July 12& 13, residents in the adjoining areas including thoseon the banks of the Mithi were alerted. Naval boatswere immediately requisitioned and people alongthe banks of the Mithi were immediately rescued.

26/7: One seriously wonders as to why duringthe floods of 26/7, the government pleaded itsinability to requisitioning naval boats and there wasno warning to people along the Mithi, leave alonerescuing them.

About the IMD: “No weather warnings arereported to have received by Home Guard & CivilDefence Control Rooms, Collector MumbaiSuburban District and Collector Mumbai. The BMC& western Railways have observed that the weatherintimation from the IMD did not indicate the intensityof rains which would have helped them to preparebetter for the heavy downpour”

Recommendation: It may be advisable to requirethe IMD to communicate weather warningmessages to all Control Rooms instead of just theEOC and BMC Control Rooms

26/7: Inspite of the above recommendations,nothing seems to have improved. There was no priorwarning from the MET dept about the impendingfloods, different arms like the railways and the policewere not informed about the intensity of themagnitude. The equipment used by the METdepartment for weather forecasting is woefullyinadequate and there seems to be no sign ofinstallation of state of the art Doppler Radars whichwould ensure better forecasting. The warning givenby the MET dept was ‘rather heavy to heavy’ rainwhich ranged from 64 to 125 mm of rain which wasnowhere close to the 944 mm of rain on 26/7.

Disaster Management: “The BMC havesuggested provision of punitive measures forensuring strict compliance with the DMPprocedures. BMC have also proposed proper trainingfor all concerned and authority to requisition privatevehicles lodging, engaging labour, hiring machineryon the same lines as those available to Collectors.These suggestions may be considered at theappropriate level in the BMC”.

26/7: Even today the power of requisitioningvehicles etc lies exclusively with the Collector. Therehas been no decentralization of authority and

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responsibility which would be extremely critical intimes of a disaster. Even the traffic police whoserole is absolutely crucial in any disaster does noteven find a mention in the DMP.

Disaster Preparedness Meetings: “From the BMCreport it is noticed that not all departmentsresponded to the preparedness meetings etc heldat the ward level. For example, the railways did notattend A, B, G/N and T ward meetings. TheTehsildar did not attend any of the ward meetingsexcept the T ward meeting. The fire brigade did notattend the P/S and R/S ward meetings”

26/7: The CCC’s investigations show that theMantralaya Control room was not functioning duringthe crisis and that the police was not called in forany of the meetings on floods held by the CM. Infact an agency like the MMRDA which is in chargeof mega projects does not even have a control roomto deal with disasters.

[A full account of the Committee’s findingsand recommendations is in the Annexures.]

III RECOMMENDATIONS

Before coming to the specific recommendationsthat the CCC wishes to make, it is pertinent to dealwith a serious, underlying issue, which is the rootof much of the city’s problems, which in turnexacerbated that consequences of July 26.

Corruption has become so much a part of ourlife that many of us no longer stop to question it, ordeal with it as a separate issue. Yet corruption isthe underlying reason behind the open flouting ofdevelopment norms, building violations, ecologicaldestruction in the name of development, an ill-equipped fire brigade/police/BMC, inadequate, badlyconstructed or maintained roads, sewerage andsanitation. The roots of almost any problem inMumbai can be traced back to the twin bedfellowsof corruption and politics. The common Mumbaikarhas been forced to endure this, with tragicconsequences, for too long.

The politicization of development issues hasalso led to Mumbai’s long term interests beingsacrificed at the altar of short term benefits, thattoo, for a few. An example is the rampant buildingof flyovers that the city experienced in the 1990s,to the neglect of the city’s mass transport systems.

This continues even today, with successivegovernments keen to take credit for the BWSL andeventually the Sewri-Nhava Trans-Harbour Sea Link.These are glamorous projects that will benefit atiny elite, but it is easy to put a political spin onthem, while more vital improvements in the bus andtrain networks are ignored.

Similarly, the grant of higher FSI, de-reservationof open spaces, reclamation of inter-tidal land etcare justified by successive political parties as being‘pro-poor’ and for ‘public housing’ despite the factthat such measures have increased Mumbai’svulnerability, lowered the quality of life for allsections and, to boot, have brought little or nobenefit to the poor.

Development issues need to be analysedclearly, objectively and in an unbiased manner. It isnecessary for the political class to take a long termview of problems and not be just concerned aboutshort term gains. They also need to understandthat the wealth producing status of Mumbai needsto be sustained and enhanced.

If we are to bring about lasting solutions toMumbai’s problems, these underlying core issuesof corruption and politicization have to be rootedout of our system of governance.

Citizens’ Commission to monitor implementationof recommendations: The CCC also suggest thatNGOs and civic-minded citizens come together toform a citizens’ commission to monitor theimplementation of the recommendations madein this report, as well as to oversee therecommendations made by the various committeesset up by the government, and their implementation.

III A. SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

III A 1) DISASTER MANAGEMENT CELLRECOMMENDATIONS

1. Stockpiling of essential items: The DMP clearlylists down items which must be kept ready at alltimes with the authorities. However, due to lack offunds or other reasons, many of these materialsare either missing or not usable. Periodic inventoriesand inspections of these essential items must beundertaken. A ready provision of inflatable boats,ham radio sets, tents, demolition equipment, toxicgas masks, diesel and electric pump sets must be

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kept ready, working and available at all times witherwith the municipal authorities/police/fire brigade atthe community level. It would also be necessary toadd batteries, hand and cycle operated batterychargers, etc. to this list.

2. Location of emergency centres: Schools,temples, churches, mosques, hospitals etc mustbe identified on ward wise basis as emergencycentres to cater to the surrounding population.These venues to be equipped to deal withemergencies, provided with essential supplies, andbasic life-saving and communication equipment.The surrounding population must be instructed, asa matter of course, that in case of an emergency,they should make their way to the nearest suchcentre. (Had such instruction been imparted to slumcolonies around Union Carbide in Bhopal in 1984,many lives would have been saved.)

3. Upgrade Communication systems: In theory,there also exist comprehensive communication andpublic information systems that are supposed to warncitizens of disasters and keep them updated duringone. Some of these information systems includewireless communication, display boards, the publicaddress systems in local trains, railway and busstations, FM radio, cable TV networks, ham radiooperators etc. Many of these systems have not beenset up and those that exist were not effectively usedduring the floods. The lack of information can bedirectly blamed for the many lives lost as peopletried to reach their homes or loved ones unaware ofthe severity of the situation. Ensuring and fast,effective and flexible information disseminationsystems will go a long way in mitigating disasters.

4. Incorporating GIS in DMP: GeographicInformation Systems (GIS) is a technology thatmanages, analyzes, and disseminates geographicknowledge. GIS software converts physical mapsinto digital maps and can links these maps with avariety of data fields (roads, hospitals, municipaloffices, electrical substations, topographicalfeatures etc). In the case of flood control, GIS canbe synchronized with topographical data andexpected rainfall to give a real time flood modellingforecast. With this, one can simulate flood-prone

areas for varying rainfalls, tidal levels etc. However,proprietary GIS software and technologies areexpensive The focus should be to develop apublic(domain) GIS based on open source codes,which can be integrated with regular infrastructureprojects so that it can be used during emergenciesand to guide planning decisions.33

5. Institutional mechanism: There are too manyagencies involved in disaster management, withno clear chain of command. This leads to confusionand duplicity. The Emergency operations centreheaded by the Additional Chief Secretary is overallin-charge, but the question of who kick-starts theentire process is not clear. The fact that the CMhimself was attempting to manage the 26/7disaster underlines the complete failure of the DMP.There should be a dedicated DisasterManagement authority headed by a professionalthat will be overall in charge of disaster relief. Thisauthority must include representatives from differentarms of the administration who are speciallyearmarked for this purpose. This authority mustalso include experts in the area of differentdisasters as well as NGOs and this committeemust be empowered to take decisions and action.The state government and BMC must not declareholidays as it did on July 27 and 28, or claim thatit could do without the services of the clerical staffin such emergencies. If the nature of the disasteris such that government employees can bepressed into undertaking relief measures orcontributing in any way at all, this has to be done.

6. Financial Independence: A significant findingwas that in many places relief efforts by stateagencies were hampered because the requiredmaterial to launch relief attempts was simplymissing. This is a serious flaw. The proposeddisaster management authority must be financiallyindependent. A disaster fund must be establishedwhich will be separate from the normal BMC budget.Money once allocated to this fund must not bediverted for other purposes. The disastermanagement authority must also be empowerednot only to requisition the resources that it requiresbut also demand co-operation from the agenciesthat control and operate these resources.

33 “Post-flood, Mumbai slowly turns to `GIS’ for disaster management”; The Hindu-Business Line, August 25, 2005www.blonnet.com/2005/08/26/stories/2005082602911900.htm

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7. Training Programmes: In developed countrieswhich are prone to disasters, there exists acomprehensive disaster management trainingprogramme for citizens. For instance in Japan,which is prone to disasters like typhoons andearthquakes, there are nine different kinds of sirenswhich warn citizens of different disasters. As aresult, people know what to expect based on whichsiren is sounded. Such training programs helpreduce casualties when a disaster does strike.

It is equally important is to train citizens torespond to disasters differently. A training manualwhich will act as an Standard Operating Procedurewill be of immense help in this regard. Voluntaryagencies and citizens groups can be entrusted withthe work of training citizens. Once training isimparted, there must be periodic mock drills fordifferent disasters. Mock drills for earthquakes areextremely common in Japan and such drills equippeople with practical knowledge of how to protectoneself and others in disaster situations.

8. Legislation: The Disaster ManagementCommittee and its members and their roles mustbe backed by statutory, legally mandated powers,with emphasis on disciplinary action in case ofabdication of duty. In fact, the disaster managementplan should be accorded the highest priority andshould form the basis of the development plan.

9. Decentralisation: It is essential that the DMPfor Mumbai should be reformulated in a manner thatit is possible for the bureaucrats, technocrats, andother decision makers to implement in adecentralised manner if there is a breakdown incommunications. There is a great need to provideserious hands on training to all levels of Governmentand Municipal agencies. Mock drills also need tobe conducted. The Government must alsoencourage the Corporate Sector, hospitals andeducational institutions to prepare their own DMPs.

10. Citizens’ helpline: A citizens’ helpline setup and run by NGOs’ must be set up to disseminateinformation such as telephone numbers of policestations, hospitals, ambulance services, firestations, government departments, the controlrooms of various departments etc, aside from givinginformation on basic first aid measures, steps tobe taken in case of different emergencies andeventualities etc. The telephone numbers of various

control rooms could also be simplified so that theyare easier for citizens to remember.

III A. 2) RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

1. The entire approach towards calculation of lossof property needs to be re-looked at extremelyseriously. Time-bound public hearings byauthorities in localities—in full view to ensuretransparency—should record from citizens thedetails of losses suffered, orally and in writing.Prompt and immediate payment of lossesshould happen also in full view with monitoringof local and citizens’ groups since deep-rootedcorruption is the reality of Mumbai’s cityadministration and government departments.Innovative and realistic schemes should beoutlined by government for people who have losttheir livelihood in order to ensure meaningfulrehabilitation.

2. The most urgent recommendation is that allpeople who suffered damages must becompensated to the fullest extent. The stategovernment’s actions not to rehabilitate peoplewhose houses were illegal is deplorable andneeds to be condemned. It is the violation ofthe most fundamental human right. Instead thegovernment must focus its efforts to break thepolitician- builder nexus in mega projects asalso the politician–builder-slum lord nexus whichleads to the creation both of granite and glassillegal buildings and unauthorised slums in thefirst place.

3. The government relies on public memory beingshort. It was only in the immediate aftermath ofthe deluge that meetings between authorities


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and civic groups were being held regularly; astime passed and people picked up the piecesand got back with their lives, these meetingsbecame a rarity. A mechanism to ensure thatregular meetings to take stock of disasterpreparedness at the local level must evolve andthis should become a norm rather than anexception. These must be public with criticismsand comments from the public being invited andpublicised. Moreover, the government and civicauthorities must issue open invitations to allgroups to join these hearings; not play favouriteswith convenient groups or those with closeaccess to the authorities.

4. R&R is seen as a dole rather than a right andthis is an issue which needs to be tackled on awar footing in the long run. An appropriatebeginning would be to base the entire issue ofR&R on rights. Any person living in the city hasa right to a decent living and the onus to providethese rights rests with the civic authorities. Anyattempt to curtail this right must be challenged.

5. What was also witnessed during and after thedeluge was a total lack of transparency duringR&R. Badly affected areas went without relieffor days on end and other pockets which werewell connected got more than their share. Whatis urgently required is a public audit of R&Rwith the active involvement of citizens’.

6. As a matter of principle, public audits must bewoven into the system to bring about a senseof transparency and give the citizens a chanceto actively participate in the democratic processof planning the city. This is not the sole preserveof the elected representative, cabinet ministeror chief minister, nor even the MunicipalCommissioner or Building Department. Thedeep and corrupt nexus that have come to rulethe city’s planning agencies need to be cleanedup in a gargantuan operation resembling anamputation. Only then can the sleaze and filthbe excised and new life and blood be breathedinto government departments and the city’sadministration.

7. Participation in city planning is also everycitizen’s right. It cannot be done within theshadowy corridors of the Mantralaya or theBMC’s headquarters. Plans and policy

decisions must be made available to thepublic of the localities where such planningchanges or buildings/constructions are planned.Time must be given for objections from localitiesand groups.

8. Planning must be decentralized. There must bea bottom-up approach which is transparent andinvolves all sections of the residentialcommunities and should not favour the builderlobby that has deep pockets.

III A. 3) ADMINISTRATION

a) Fire Brigade:

1. The Fire Brigade must have the resources andtraining to respond to a variety of crises, (floods,earthquakes, landslides etc) and not just fires.Mumbai’s fire brigade has considerablyexperience in dealing with collapsed buildingsand the periodic landslides, but has never beforehad to deal with a flood situation of suchmagnitude. Life jackets and boats should beincluded as part of the brigade’s standardequipment and kept at each fire station. Highclearance vehicles and earth moving equipmentshould be part of the regular equipment.

2. Fire stations should be equipped with their ownwireless network that is kept in working conditionas standby in case the phone lines fail. Eachunit/fire engine should also be fitted with a mobilewireless set.

3. More weightage should be given to safetyconcerns before granting permissions forapartments/ shopping complexes etc, as manyof these are coming up in congested areasthat are difficult for rescue teams and equipmentto access.

4. An incentive scheme to encourage a core teamof firemen at each fire station to be ham operatorsmust be explored.

b) Police

1. There are 14 State Reserve Police battalions allover Maharashtra, totally with 40,000 people.According to Dr. PS Pasricha, the police hastaken a decision that each battalion will have acompany of around 100 people who areequipped and trained for disaster management.

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This will be a very useful source of trainedmanpower and the state government needsto support this initiative in whatever waydeemed necessary.34

2. Manpower must urgently be increased in allbranches of the Mumbai Police.

3. Power suppliers should be made to inform thepolice if they are shutting off power to any area.

4. The CCTV and Area Traffic Control system mustbe implemented. The CCTV system will costRs 8 crores. Even though this project is beingfunded by the Centre, the file has beengathering dust in Mantralaya since March 2005.

The Area Traffic Control project originallyinvolved 53 signals in south Mumbai, has nowbeen increased to add 100 in the suburbs.

5. The Police should have at least one helicopter(to start with) that can be used for traffic/lawand order/rescue operations.

6. The Police should be equipped with high groundclearance vehicles.

7. Life jackets should be kept in each policestation.

8. The Variable Messaging System needs to beintroduced, wherein certain categories ofmessages will get priority.

9. Internal Communication systems need to beupgraded and made fail-safe. The option ofsatellite phones at certain police stationsshould be explored, in addition to modernwireless equipment.

10. The opinion of the Traffic Control Branch shouldbe sought before orders are given to deployadditional buses when the trains stop. It is notphysically possible to carry all train passengersby bus, and bringing more buses on to theroads might only add to congestion in somesituations. Certain situations might necessitatethat private vehicles be ordered off the roads.This decision would have to be taken by theTraffic Police.

11. The police should have the power to requisitionpremises, transportation vehicles, earth moving

34 http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/aug/24inter1.htm

vehicles (public and private) and capacities ofother agencies, private companies, bodies etc.For example, using schools, hotels, privategrounds, maidans, etc for emergency rescuecentres, to house people, parking lots, etc.

12. The Police must be given a statutory role aspart of the Disaster Management Plan, as theyare the first agency the public approaches andare also the only agency to be on the ground,throughout the city, as part of their normalduties.

13. The Police needs to be equipped to handledisasters such as floods, earthquakes,landslides, chemical disasters etc. All fieldlevel personnel should be given such training.

14. Each police station should have basic rescueequipment (lifejackets, ropes, ladders, shovels,small boats, oxygen cylinders etc). This willenable each station to function as adecentralized rescue and relief centre in timesof natural disasters.

c) Meteorology Department:

1. Regardless of cost, the Doppler Weather Radarsystem should be installed for Mumbai. Allmetropolitan cities, particularly those on thecoast, should have these systems. Theargument that cities cannot afford such systemsis demolished if one factors in the economiccosts of any disaster. One can well argue thatit is bad economics to avoid such expenditure.

2. There is a need to increase the number of rainwater monitoring stations within the city. Theseshould ideally be automated and connectedto a central control room so that any abnormalpatterns can be detected instantly.

d) Home Guards and Civil Defense Organisation:

1. The Home Guards and Civil DefenseOrganisation are (or should be) a valuable poolof trained manpower to help deal withemergencies and natural disasters. The lawmust be amended to enable Civil Defensevolunteers to be called out in times of naturaldisasters and other calamities, and not just intimes of declared war.

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2. The training imparted to Home Guards and CivilDefense volunteers needs to be updated andmade more contemporary and broader inscope to include dealing with natural disasterssuch as floods, earthquakes etc.

3. The institution of the Home Guards must berevitalized and given a statutory role to play intimes of emergencies and natural disasters.

e) Role of Coast Guard/Armed Forces:

1. The Coast Guard and Armed Forces must belooked on only as a last resort as far asproviding relief and rehabilitation in suchsituations. However, these trained andequipped forces are a valuable source ofmanpower and the state government shouldcall upon them in case of need.

2. The Coast Guard should have a twin-enginedhelicopter capable of carrying out inland rescueoperations in case of floods. On July 26, theCoast Guard helicopter could have been utilizedto survey the worst affected areas and helpcoordinate rescue operations.

3. Similarly, the Army and Navy posts at Colabaand Kalina must be used in such emergencies.

4. There should be regular meetings on a bi-annual or quarterly basis between the CoastGuard, Army and Naval forces, the civicadministration, so that each is aware of theothers’ capacities and shortcomings in caseof emergencies.

III A. 4) INFRASTRUCTURE

a. Storm Water Drainage:

1. The MCGM must stop doing its flip-flops onthe BRIMSTOWAD report and must implementit in right earnest. It should be analysed todetermine which sections can be implementedgiven the changed circumstances in 13 years.

2. The city’s storm water drainage capacity needsto be augmented, strengthened and renovated.

3. Other utilities and departments must under nocircumstance be allowed to pass their lines/pipes etc through the storm water drainagesystem, as this causes blockages by trappingdebris and waste, aside from affecting thestructural integrity of the drain.

4. DCR 23, which requires 15 to 25% of plot areato be maintained as recreational open space,should be amended to specify the maximumpercentage of this open space that can bepaved/concreted. This should be kept to aminimum. Open parking areas and drivewaysmust also use pervious paving that allowpercolation of water. Similarly, the maximumbasement area should be prescribed, asexistence of a basement necessitates thatpercolation cannot take place.

b. Sewage and Sanitation:

1. The provision of adequate toilet facilitiesand proper sewerage is one of the mainresponsibilities of the BMC and thegovernment. Its failure to provide largesections of society – mainly slum dwellers –with these facilities poses a threat to theentire city. However, the provision of suchfacilities should not be a reflection onthe legality of unauthorised dwellings.

2. The BMC’s Slum Sanitation Programme forthe construction of community toiletblocks managed by Community BasedOrganisations has shown some positiveresults but must be widened and strengthenedas there remain large areas where suchfacilities have not reached. Of course,unless the proliferation of slums andunregulated housing is checked, this will be alosing battle.

3. The filtering, reuse and recycling of domesticwaste water must become a priority. At thehousing society level, this water can be usedfor toilets, gardens etc. and only the excess, ifany, allowed to enter the sewage system. Thiswill help reduce the water demand as also theload on the sewerage system.

4. While the population of the city has beenincreasing steadily, and significant investmentshave been and are being made in increasingwater supply, the parallel investments insewage treatment and disposal have not beenmade. This disparity must be addressed andincreases in water supply must be matchedby a parallel increase in sewage treatment anddisposal capacity.

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c) Waste Management:

1. Reducing the quantum of waste generated mustbe the first priority. A high tax on products withexcessive packaging has been repeatedlyproposed and is now long overdue. The stategovernment should work out the modalities ofimposing such a tax. The revenue earnedshould be ploughed into the waste collectionand management system.

2. All plastic carry bags should be banned. Theban on other uses of plastic (milk pouches/packaged foods/meat products etc) can bedelayed for a period of six months during whichtime alternatives are put in place.

3. Producers must be made to take back and re-use/recycle their packaging such as PETbottles, tetrapaks etc. This has beensuccessfully implemented in European nationsand in some states such as Goa. Soft drinkmanufacturers in particular must be made totake back and re-use or recycle their‘disposable’ PET bottles so that these do notenter the waste stream.

4. The next stage is to dispose of as large aquantity of waste as possible at source,through composting of biodegradable wasteand segregation and reuse/recycling of non-biodegradable waste. Several ALMs in Mumbaihave established efficient systems ofcomposting and recycling and these effortsneed to strengthened and spread to other partsof the city.

5. All new housing societies must compulsorilyhave dedicated areas (equivalent to the numberof housing units) for composting of wet waste.A suitable time frame should be given toexisting housing societies/colonies to establishtheir own composting areas. Since the spacerequired is not large, most societies will beable to comply with the directive. In the caseof those that are not able to, their wet wasteshould be sent to composting sites establishedin each ALM. The manure generated from thesecomposting sites can be used locally/sold/usedin public gardens etc.

According to BMC figures, 54% of the city’swaste is wet waste, which can be composted.This would in effect reduce the landfill demandby 50 per cent, as well as the cost incurred bythe BMC on transportation of this waste tolandfills. Such a management system will resultin considerable savings for the BMC, eliminatingthe need to transport waste tothe dumping grounds, whose capacity is fastbeing exhausted.

6. Non-biodegradable waste can be diverted forrecycling/re-use at the community level itselfthrough rag pickers and small-scale recyclers.The BMC estimates that 18% of Mumbai’swaste is recyclable.

7. Construction debris, silt etc forms a substantialpart (2,000 tonnes per day according to theBMC) of waste. This debris is also used toillegally fill low-lying land and mangroves.Construction debris such as concrete, cementand brick rubble can be used as road base andcrushed and re-used to cast concrete blocksetc. These practices are legally mandated andin place in many developed countries. Therecycling of construction debris should belegally mandated in Mumbai, and if necessarythe required infrastructure (crushers etc) canbe set up by tapping funds from the constructionlobby. 35

8. Incineration of municipal waste either as adisposal option or to generate electricity mustnot be an option due to the well-documentedpollution and air quality impacts. ‘Clean’incineration plants are extremely expensive andthere are other cheaper, employment generatingoptions available, as discussed above.

9. There is a situation of diluted accountability onthe part of the BMC because of the separatehandling of SWD, Sewerage and ConservancyServices at ward level. Mechanisms to have asingle authority responsible for these threedepartments must be examined.

10. The building debris/construction debris shouldbe stored separately and recycled into bricksusing flyash.

35 www.mcgm.gov.in

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d) Transport

1. Given that over 85% of the travelling populationrelies on public (train/bus) transport, thesesystems must receive the bulk of futureinvestment and funds aimed at improvingMumbai’s transport system.

2. The job of constructing flyovers over theremaining level crossings on the Western andCentral lines must be expedited to enablesmoother train travel.

3. From its discussion and deliberations, it is clearto the CCC that the only hope for significantlyimproving the transport situation for Mumbai’smillions lies with Mass Rapid Transit Systems.Investments in increasing road infrastructuremust only be taken up where absolutelynecessary, the priority, especially in terms offunding must be for mass transit systems thatbenefit the majority of residents, and not onlythose who travel by car. The ComprehensiveTransport Strategy prepared by WS Atkins forthe MMRDA also reflects an overwhelmingemphasis on rail transport as the only viablesolution to Mumbai’s transport problems. Railtransport would also be the most cost-effectiveuse of money, with the highest economicreturns, aside from being more beneficial fromenvironmental and social perspectives. Toquote the report: “Economic analysis showsthat the aggregate economic return is highestfor a strategy with substantial investment inthe metropolitan railways system and a modestinvestment in the road system, along withdemand management.” The Atkins planallocated 69 per cent of expenditure onrailways, 9 per cent on buses and ferries andonly 22 per cent on highways, of which 2.7 percent was on road over and under bridges toreplace level crossings.

4. The BEST bus fleet should be increased,diversified and its capacity increased. The stategovernment needs to take measures to ensurethe financial strength of the BEST in view ofthe vital role that it plays in the city, both forelectricity provision and public transport.

5. It is unlikely that there will be any one solutionto the city’s transport problems; a variety ofapproaches is needed. The construction of the

Mumbai underground metro rail is one optionavailable. Phase One of the metro plan includesbuilding three lines: Colaba to Charkop, Versovato Ghatkopar and Bandra to Mankhurd. TheColaba-Charkop route, which is 38.24 km. long,will cost an estimated Rs 8,726 crore.

6. Priority must be given to removing bottleneckson the existing suburban railway routes (levelcrossings etc) so that the frequency of trainservices can be maximized.

7. The feasibility of additional East-west links suchas the Versova-Ghatkopar mass transit lightrail system must be seriously explored.

8. The monorail system could be another optionto improve the city’s mass transport systemsand coverage.

9. Konkan Railways’ ‘Sky bus’ system which iscurrently being tested must also be exploredfor certain routes. The Sky bus system willalso generate a clear walkway (on top of theSky bus rail), which will allow for easypedestrian movement. Especially in times offloods/electrical breakdown, this route wouldbe invaluable, enabling pedestrians to get backto their homes with minimum inconvenience.

10. The CCC strongly recommends that pendingmega road projects such as the Worli-NarimanPoint and Sewri-Nhava link projects, estimatedto cost close to Rs 7,000 crores, beabandoned, on the grounds that they will notserve the common man, will only increase trafficcongestion in south Mumbai, and will seriousenvironmental consequences. This moneywould best serve the interests of the city if itwere invested in mass transit systems suchas the metro, and to make existing train andbus travel more comfortable and reliable, asthis would benefit a much larger section of thepopulation, and with no environmental losses.

11. The BWSL, currently much delayed and stillunder-construction, should be abandonedbefore more public money is wasted on it, forthe same reasons as above. Since constructionon the Worli-Nariman Point link, now believedto entail tunnelling through Malabar Hill, hasnot begun, this would save a few hundredcrores.

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12. The Area Traffic Control System must beimplemented immediately. Sources haveinformed the CCC that the file has been lyingwith Mantralaya since April 2005, even thoughthe system does not place any burden on thestate exchequer.

13. All tax benefits on private cars must bewithdrawn.

14. Many elements of the Singapore model of trafficmanagement can be followed in Mumbai. Theseinclude:

a) A ceiling on the total number of private carsregistered in the city at any one time. Underthe Vehicle Quota System, anyone who wishesto register a new vehicle must first bid for aCertificate of Entitlement (COE) in monthlypublic tenders. The government pre-decidesthe number of new vehicles allowed forregistration based on the transport system’scurrent capacity

b) Incentives are given to scrap or export cars olderthan ten years, to ensure a young and lesspolluting vehicle fleet.

c) For any vehicle license to be issued, theprospective vehicle owner must show proof ofoff-road parking space, to ensure that valuableroad space is not consumed by parked vehicles.

d) A Park-and-Ride Scheme provides parking lotswhere drivers can leave their vehicles and boardbuses into the CBD.

e) The Off-peak Car Scheme grants discounts inregistration fee and road tax to owners whoagree to restrict the use of their cars to off-peakhours.

f) These measures are of course backed by anefficient and comfortable public transportsystem.

g) Many of the world’s major cities (London,Singapore) have imposed a fee on the entry ofprivate cars into the Central Business District.This could be imposed in Mumbai.

15. Parking charges are ridiculously low for a citywith Mumbai’s traffic congestion problems. TheCCC recommends that parking charges beincreased by 200 per cent. Additionally, parking

rates should be incremental and notdecremental as at present.

16. The option of sea transport along the east andwest coast of the city has been discussed formany years and tried out. Catamaran and hi-speed launches will always be high expenseand low volume services and in the CCC’sopinion, public money should not be diverted tothese schemes. However, if private operatorswant to attempt such services, they should beallowed to, as long as reclamation for thebuilding of jetties etc is not involved.

17. Office timings should be staggeredlocation-wise.

18. The system of separate bus lanes must beimplemented on all the arterial roads of the city.

19. The Change of Use from Residential toCommercial should not be permitted withoutthe Traffic Police’s approval as such changesoften result in significant increases in thevolume of traffic in the area.

20. During disasters that result in a stress on thetransport system, the plying of private vehicleswith less than 75 per cent occupancy shouldbe banned in order to reduce traffic congestion.

III A. 5) HOUSING

1. Suspend the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme andamend it so as to curtail the role of builders inthe scheme. The original idea of handing overthe area to slum dwellers under the Slum Actis the preferred option. However, slums that havecome up on ecologically important spaces (riverbeds and river banks, in nallahs or on the banksof nallahs, in mangrove areas, CRZ areas, saltpan lands etc) cannot be redeveloped in thesame area but will have to relocated elsewhere,for their own safety and that of the city.

2. Amend the DC regulations 33/6, 33/7. 33/8.33/9 and 33/10, as all of them result inincreased FSI irrespective of infrastructure andcarrying capacity constraints.

3. Put an end to the practice of loading TDR.

4. FSI in gaothan areas must be kept at 1.

5. Exceptions to the limits on FSI must not bemade within the municipal limits of Mumbai

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city. The recent High Court judgment on clause33/7 of the DC regulations has this to say withregard to FSI: “Allowable FSI must bear arational relationship to the availability of civicinfrastructure including water supply, sewerage,transport, electricity and open spaces. Anincrease in FSI is liable to result in an increasein the density of population. It has an importantbearing on the quality of urban life.” The courtnoted that the availability of ‘incentive’ FSI issurprisingly “irrespective of… availability of civicservices, the density of population, the abilityof the area to sustain a surge in residents, theimpact on the quality of life on traditionalneighbourhoods.”

6. Limits must be placed on the incentive FSIgiven to developers and this FSI must bebuildable only in areas that have scope foradditional development. These areas to bedecided by a panel that includes bureaucrats,town planners and NGOs.

7. In case of any proposal to grant higher thannormal FSI, a public hearing should be held inthe area, after giving sufficient publicized notice,to invite objections and suggestions fromexisting residents of the locality.

8. Ensure proper monitoring of the 33/7 clauseto prevent irregularities such as the creation ofbogus tenants.

9. Affordable housing for lower income classesmust be provided by the state government. Thisis one of the most important measures to betaken to achieve a permanent solution to theproblem of encroachment on public spaces.

10. To prevent the growth of new slums/expansionof existing ones, it is also essential thatmeasures are taken to check migrationinto Mumbai by investing in the countryside.Some suggestions are discussed underSection III B. 8.

III A. 6) COMMUNICATIONS

1. Wireless systems are perhaps the mostreliable of communication methods at such

times and each fire station and major railwaystation should have a working wireless set witha trained operator and battery backup.

2. The long overdue erection of electronicinformation display boards in the city andsuburbs must be expedited within threemonths.

3. Satellite phones: Satellite phones, usuallyused only by the armed forces, coast guardand in remote and inaccessible terrain, mustbe incorporated as an integral part of thedisaster communication systems. Major policestations, fire stations, ward offices, Mantralayacontrol room etc should be equipped withsatellite phones. Unlike cell phones,communication based on sat phones isindependent of local telephony infrastructureand so less prone to disruptions because ofpower failures or other events common indisaster areas. For instance during HurricaneKatrina, it was only sat phone services whichwere running. On account of their expense andthe likelihood that they will be required only onrare occasions, they should not form thebackbone of communication systems but beused as a back up to more conventionalnetworks. If technically possible, an integratednetwork can be set up in which calls areautomatically rerouted to satellite phones whenterrestrial networks are non-functional. 36

4. Ham Radio One of the oldest forms ofcommunication is the Ham Radio. Typicallyanyone with a radio receiver or a radio scannercan listen in on ham radio communications,but only a licensed operator can transmit thesignals. Typically, ham radio operators, orhams, do not use ham radio to broadcast inthe way radio stations broadcast to largeaudiences at once. Ham transmission isusually two-way or with groups of people usinga transceiver, meaning that two or more hamstalk to each other instead of everyone listeningto a single ham’s broadcast. This technologycan be useful in spreading information duringemergencies when other services such as

36 “Senate Looks at Benefits of Satellite Phones in Disaster Zones”, Space News, September 26, 2005http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/050926_business_monday.html

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telephones, television or the Internet fail. Thereexist several amateur radio operators and theirclubs in Mumbai and these should be given arole to play in times of disaster.

5. Private cell phone services must increase theircapacity to avoid problems associated withoverloading. They must also ensure they havea sufficient 12-24 hour battery backup at eachtower.

An officer of the rank of DCP should be giventhe power to direct local cable TV operatorsand channels to carry announcements andinformation in times of emergencies anddisasters.37

III A. 7) ELECTRIC SUPPLY

1. All power suppliers, state owned and private,must be required to follow norms of disasterpreparedness. Failure to do so must be legallypunishable. Equipment must be kept in goodcondition and back up equipment must bepresent or easily available at all times.

2. A system of localizing power failures especiallyduring emergencies must be evolved.

3. In the event that power companies for anyreason have to cut off the supply of electricity,the police and municipal authorities must beinformed in advance.

4. In case of a service breakdown, the publicmust be kept informed through a system ofinformation dissemination, help lines etc tillsuch time as power is restored.

III A. 8) PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM

a) Invocation of Notifiable Diseases Act: Under-reporting of diseases is a significant problemin Mumbai. The fact that private hospitals donot report diseases and illnesses is shocking,as it does not allow authorities to gauge themagnitude of the problem, if any. The invocationof the Notifiable Diseases Act would make itmandatory for all private hospitals and medicalpractitioners to report cases of illnesses for acertain time period. The invocation of this act

immediately after July 26 would have helpedauthorities to deal with the situation moreeffectively.

b) Accumulated garbage should be removed fromthe streets and drains so that water flows andprevents stagnation and mosquitos. Wherestagnated water cannot be drained, adequatemeasures should be taken to prevent mosquitobreeding.38

c) The government should provide a health workerfor every 2,000 people. Attempts should bemade to involve the community throughformation of health committees in the bastisfor monitoring basic health services andcreating awareness in the community aboutpreventive health and also link it with referralhealth posts. Local NGOs should be involved.

d) The shortage of staff in the Health Department,especially in health posts and dispensaries,should be tackled with utmost urgency andoutreach services should be given priority. Moreeffective functioning of the peripheral healthcentres ensuring the presence of staff anddoctors during the duty hours should be ensured.

e) Meaningful growth monitoring and care ofchildhood illness should be done and it shouldbe ensured that service reaches to each andevery child of the area. Ensuring food securityof women and children by strengthening thepublic distribution system and all different typesof Anganwadis/Balwadis under various projectsmust provide supplementary nutrition regularly.

f) No differences should be made in relief materialand services on basis of caste and religion.All types of services including health servicesshould reach to all types of slums irrespectiveof the fact that they are registered orunregistered.

III A. 9) NATURAL DRAINAGE

a) Mithi river: The restoration of the flow of theMithi river is essential if the tragedy of 26/7 isnot to be repeated. The CCC recommends thefollowing measures be taken without further

37 http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/ham_radio.html38 “ Report on Status of Health and Health Care Services In Flood Affected Slums of Mumbai “, CRY, August 2005

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delay and substantially completedbefore the monsoon of 2006.

1. Bandra-Kurla Complex: No furtherconstruction development on theremaining vacant and unsold lots. Theflow of the river/creek should bewidened as near to original state byremoving dumped debris and earthfrom the channel/river banks/mangrove areas. The costs shouldbe borne by MMRDA from the fundsit has gathered from BKC, sinceMMRDA’s lack of foresight andcontempt for the law brought thissituation about in the first place.Areas that have been reclaimed postCRZ without environmental clearance shouldbe restored to their original condition.

2. Bandra-Worli Sea Link: MSRDC must befinancially penalized for its excessive,unnecessary and illegal reclamation for theproject. The mouth of the river must be widenedby removing the dumped debris and earth. Thecost of this should be borne by the MSDRDC.Construction on the BWSL must be halted toprevent further blockage of the river’s exit tothe sea via the Mahim Bay, and the projectshould be redesigned accordingly.

3. Mumbai Airport: Since the diversion of the Mithiby the airport authorities is a fait accompli,there appears little that can be done to remedyit. The authorities must however ensure thatthe ongoing work on the taxiway extension,for which the river was temporarily blocked, befinished by April 2006. From the last week ofMay onwards, the airport authorities mustdeploy a team to ensure that the grates acrossthe river where it flows under the twin bridgesof the runways are kept clear of debris, so thatthe flow of the river is not interrupted. Thereshould also be mechanisms to clean the areaunder the bridge, usually inaccessible forsecurity reasons.

b) Other rivers: Similarly, efforts must be made torestore and preserve the free flow of Mumbai’sother rivers.

1. Dumping of waste (solid or effluent) in riversand nallahs must be punishable by a fine and/

or imprisonment. Within a year, the BMCshould provide adequate waste disposalfacilities to these areas or relocate those itcannot provide services to.

2. The BMC must compulsorily undertake de-silting and clean ups of all Mumbai’s rivers andnallahs at least twice a year.

3. Encroachments on the banks of the rivers mustbe removed and regular patrols must ensurethat they do no recur. The help of local citizens’groups and ALMs should be sought. Politicianswho seek to interfere with removal ofencroachments should be disenfranchised andbarred from contesting elections for at least10 years.

4. Detailed surveys must be carried out to identifyblockages and obstructions to the flow. Thesecan then be prioritized for removal and flowrestoration.

5. Enquiries should be launched into those SRAschemes that have encroached on riverbeds(Shree Ganesh Society on Poisar river andSarika building on Dahisar river, to cite a few).

6. The practice of building retention walls alongthe river course must not be allowed. Suchwalls invariably also lead to encroachments.Other options, such as wire-mesh fences, lowwalls flanked by gardens/trees can be explored.In times of excess rainfall, this will providedispersal area for floodwaters.


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7. When constructing bridges/flyovers etc overnallahs and rivers, pillars should as far aspossible not be sunk in the channel. If theymust be, they should be designed in such away as to cause minimum interference withthe water flow.

c) Open spaces, Salt pans, Mangroves, Creeks:

1. As discussed earlier, Mumbai has alreadysacrificed too many of its open spaces, evenignoring and flouting Development Planstipulations. This trend must be arrestedimmediately, for the survival of the city and thequality of life of its inhabitants.

2. Strict enforcement of a ban on all reclamationis necessary, along the coast, creeks, nallahs,mangroves and salt pan lands.

3. The discretionary powers given to theCommissioner in case of DCR 16 of 1991,restricting construction within 15 m. and 9 m.of major and minor watercourses must berevoked in the interests of transparency andenforceability.

4. There should be a blanket ban for a period oftwo years on the de-reservation of landsreserved for public use.

5. All construction on designated open spaces/gardens/parks/de-reserved public lands etc

must be halted immediately and no newconstructions allowed to get underway. Thereshould be a complete ban on de-reservation ofopen spaces, recreational grounds andplayground areas

6. The Slum Rehabilitation scheme must beamended to prevent the construction of buildingson open land and land reserved for parksgardens etc. Slum Rehabilitation schemesshould only be allowed on areas where thereare existing slums, provided these do not fallwithin CRZ or No Development Zones.

7. Salt pan lands, important rainfall absorptionareas, must remain free of development as theyare integrally part of the inter-tidal zone andare CRZ I areas. Abandoned salt pans will berestored to mangroves in due course of time,if they are not interfered with.

8. All Mumbai’s remaining mangroves should bestrictly protected, as per the recent High Courtorder.

9. The MMRDA, MSRDC and BMC shouldcontribute to the establishment of a mobilemangrove inspection squad, administered andstaffed by the Forest Department. This squadwill patrol mangrove areas and respond toreports of mangrove destruction, dumping,hacking etc.


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10. Mumbai’s network of rivers and erstwhilestreams, if restored to ecological health andwell-being, can restore a unique character tothe island city and lead to an overallimprovement in the quality of life for all citizens.Any restoration and protection programme, ifit is to be successful and widely accepted,must be designed such that it is open to allsections of society, irrespective of economicor social status. Private clubs or recreationalparks in these areas must not be permitted.The restoration of these ecosystems will alsobe a boon to the city’s struggling traditionalfishing population.

11. Most importantly, it is evident that the drainagesystem of the city cannot handle more than25 mm of rain per hour and that too during thelow tide periods. It is therefore imperative thatthe capacity of those natural features andsystems that exist that can absorb and retainrain water should be preserved and evenaugmented. The continued destruction of openspaces, reclamation of ponds, wetlands,mangroves, low-lying areas, etc. would amountto the greatest tragedy.

d) Quarrying

1. The state government should immediately endall quarrying within municipal limits.

2. Unsafe and unauthorised slums/hutments/otherstructures built on or near hills should be clearedand provisions made for rehabilitation.

3. All hills and abandoned quarries in Mumbai shouldbe kept clear of development and constructionsand instead utilized to provide much needed openspace/ gardens/tree cover/ etc.

4. The necessity and implications of dredging ofthe main channel of the Thane creek to therequired depth should be looked into and theopinion of ecologists and hydrologists sought.

III B. LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Carrying Capacity: All recommendations madeby this commission and other government andnon-government experts for improving thequality of life in Mumbai city will come to naughtunless the question of carrying capacity is firstaddressed.

The city is already facing a large shortfall interms of water demand, of 550 million litres aday. Traffic jams, mushrooming slums,pollution are worsening. Measures to boosturban infrastructure will at best buy us a fewyears grace time, if the population growth ofthe city is not first addressed. Indeed, anyimprovements in infrastructure couldsimultaneously be nullified if the populationgrowth increases rapidly (distinctly possibledue to increased employment opportunities).

The CCC is convinced that prima facie Mumbaihas passed its population carrying capacity atcurrent levels of infrastructure, both natural(green areas, water availability etc) and man-made. A comprehensive carrying capacitystudy for Mumbai city and the MMR region asa whole is long overdue. This should beundertaken by a reliable, qualified and impartialagency without further delay and also shouldconsider the costs (financial and ecological)of infrastructural increases. All majorinfrastructure projects (expansion of MumbaiPort Trust and JNPT, sea link projects etc)should be suspended pending the results ofthis study.

Such a study must look at issues pertainingto the project and possible growth rates inMumbai’s population, housing availability,existing capacity of transport infrastructure andpotential for addition to this capacity. Existenceof basic services such as water supply,sewerage, sanitation, waste management anddisposal, pollution levels etc.

Present conditions in Mumbai indicate that theinfrastructure is inadequate to support currentpopulation. In this case, the first priority is toprevent further growth of the city, at least untilthe gap between population needs andinfrastructure provision is bridged. This then isthe over-riding principle behind therecommendations made by the CCC, and mustbe the guiding principle for all decisions relatedto the city.

An exception must of course be made forsocially beneficial projects such as the genuineprovision of low-cost housing for the poor,expansion and streamlining of public transport

Findings


systems, increasing sewerage, sanitation andstorm water drainage facilities etc.

The focus of planners, administrators, industryand citizens must shift from a purely statisticalgrowth-based approach to an approach thatlooks at maintaining and enhancing the qualityof life of all citizens of the megapolis.

2. Transparency: July 26 has been the perfectexample of how planning decisions taken bygovernment bodies and people in power haveprofound implications for millions. It is essentialthat all information pertaining to public projects,proposed and ongoing be freely available in thepublic domain.

As soon as a project is proposed, thegovernment should ensure that local peopleare aware of its details, possible impacts,drawbacks and benefits.

In the case of private projects too, the localcommunity should be made aware through ahoarding or some such device, details suchas the name of the developer, nature of theproject, size etc.

3. Health:

a) Autonomy of Medical Personnel in case ofemergencies: One of the major problems withthe public health system is the red tape.Following the floods, medical professionals inthe public hospitals could not take crucialdecisions pertaining to the procurement anddistribution of life-saving drugs. They had tofollow the time-consuming indent process.During emergencies heads of medicalinstitutions (Deans or medical superintendents)should be empowered to take decisions thatcan save the lives of countless people.Decentralization of responsibility and authorityis the key to cutting the red tape.

b) Strengthening Information systems: Field medicalstaff (ANMs & community health workers)should be mobilised to gather information fromcommunities and inform the medical officersin case of any impending outbreak of diseasesso that appropriate action can be initiated.Outbreak of diseases can be minimized andprevented to a large extent if there is aneffective communication channel between the

field staff and the medical officers in the healthdepartment. Also these ground staffs aresupposed to refer patients with commonailments to dispensaries. However it is oftenfound that since dispensaries are lacking inmedicines, they refer the patients to largerhospitals creating a bottleneck at thesecondary hospitals. This situation needs tobe remedied.

c) Increasing Public Health Sector Spending: Overthe past decade, spending on health has fallenconsiderably both at state and national level.At the state level, around the early 1990s thegovernment was spending close to 30-35% ofthe budget on health; over the decade, thisspending has reduced and today the amountspent hovers around 15 –16% with non-capitalexpenditure cornering a large chunk.Expenditure on capital investment has reducedto just 2%. Nobel Laureates like Amartya Senhave long since argued that health is one focusarea, which should not be privatized in thename of efficiency. There should be increasedgovernment spending both in real terms andas a percentage of GDP, and a significantproportion should be on capital investment. Inall government hospitals all investigations andessential drugs should be provided free of cost.User fees should be removed at least for 3-6months in all these hospitals. Efforts must belaid on strengthening the functioning of publichealth posts. Laboratories which are equippedto detect the outbreak of health hazards mustbe established

4. PUBLIC AMENITIES AND OPEN SPACES:

Keeping in mind the severe shortage of openspaces/recreational grounds/wooded areas/parks in the city, as and when future BMC plots(school buildings, municipal markets etc) fulfilltheir valid life and need to be torn down, thesespaces should not be handed over for re-development, but instead used exclusively forpublic amenities (hospitals, schools,playgrounds, parks etc).

The one-third of mill lands that will be madeavailable to the city as open spaces will be aninvaluable asset to the congested central areasof the city.

Findings


5. Pending and Proposed projects and their impacts:

a) Slum Redevelopment Scheme: The slumredevelopment scheme in its current form isseverely worsening the problems faced by thecity, rendering it even more prone to andincapable of dealing with disasters andemergencies. The CCC came across severalinstances of slum rehabilitation projects eitherplanned or that have already come up inecological spaces such as watercourses,nallahs etc. Overall, the SRS in its current formis increasing congestion and the loss of openspaces, and in most cases has not benefitedactual slum dwellers. The only sector that isgaining is the developer-builder lobby.

The SRS must be re-evaluated and amendedto reduce to a minimum the role of buildersand developers. The emphasis should be onallowing people to become owners of the landand undertaking the construction effortsthemselves, with government assistance.Certain areas should be identified where slumredevelopment is not permissible in theinterests of the city (inter-tidal areas, erstwhilemangroves, in and near nallahs and riverbeds,areas that fall under CRZ regulations etc).Slums in these areas will have to be relocatedelsewhere.

b) Bandra -Worli- Nariman Point Sea Link: TheWorli-Bandra and Worli-Nariman Point SeaLinks exemplify bad planning. Despite a seriesof well-recognised experts and authoritieswarning against taking up these projects(Paranjpe Committee report in 1987 and theAtkins report in 1994 to name two), the statehas stubbornly plowed vast sums of moneyinto these non-solutions.

These projects will do nothing to removebottlenecks in the city’s traffic system, merelyshifting them around and creating newer, worsecongestion problems. In particular, they willfurther increase traffic congestion in Worli andSouth Mumbai. The W.S. Atkins report wasspecifically commissioned by the MSRDC tostudy the feasibility of the BWSL, and the reportclearly showed that the effect of both the WestIsland Expressway and the East IslandExpressway would be to attract considerable

additional traffic to South Mumbai, increasingcongestion in Tardeo, Mumbai Central, OperaHouse, Nana Chowk and Kalbadevi. Thecontinued construction of the BWSL will alsofurther block the mouth of the Mahim Bay. Arepeat of 26/7’s rainfall could lead to even higherdeath and destruction if the bridge is completed.

c) Sewri-Nhava Trans-Harbour Sea Link: As in thecase of the Bandra-Worli-Nariman Point sealink, the Sewri-Nhava link will also increasecongestion in south Mumbai, though the statedintention is exactly the opposite. If the largeamount of money being raised/diverted for theproject is instead invested in public transportor in projects in the hinterland, it will provide aviable, effective and lasting solution toMumbai’s transport problems.

The sea link will also involve some reclamationand mangrove destruction, at the starting pointof Sewri. Clearly, the state and centralgovernment are only paying lip service to theissue of mangrove protection, simultaneouslyapproving projects that harm them.

d) Mill Land development: The approximately272 hectares of mill lands lying idle in centralMumbai are a ray of hope for the island city.Recently, the Mumbai High Court reinstatedthe original 1/3rd land sharing formula (1/3rd ofthe land to go for open spaces, 1/3rd to MHADAfor low cost housing and the remaining 1/3rd tobe used by the owner to sell or develop theland to revitalize the mills, settle workers’claims etc). The court thus deemed the stategovernment’s alteration of the rule in 2001 toapply the formula only to vacant and not allland to suit the mill owners and developers asillegal. If the state government, mill owners andbuilders have their way, almost all of this landwould have been converted to commercial useor residential upper class high-rises, drasticallyincreasing congestion in central Mumbai andin no way helping address the shortage of lowcost housing. The order once again givesMumbai’s citizens and planners an opportunityto draw up a holistic plan for this area, ensuringa healthy proportion of open space and publicamenities, while also ensuring that the rightsand interests of mill workers are protected.

Findings


6) Checking inward migration: This is a politically-charged and tricky issue, but one that the CCCfeels must be addressed for the sake of thecity and the millions who call it home. Mumbaisimply cannot expand further unless and untilthe already existing yawning gaps betweeninfrastructure requirements (transport, watersupply, sewerage and waste treatment anddisposal, open spaces, housing etc) are firstbridged. To enable this, the growth of the city’sburgeoning population must first be stemmed.Mumbai’s growth in absolute terms – not therate — over the last two decades is a directresult of the neglect of rural areas by state andcentral governments, leading people to cometo Mumbai in search of employment and betteropportunities.

It is undemocratic, unconstitutional andimpractical to keep Indian citizens out ofMumbai by force and this is not what the CCCis suggesting. The solution lies in developingrural areas by revitalizing the agricultural sector,investing in small-scale irrigation, avoidingmega-projects which displace thousands andpromoting employment opportunities in ruralcentres and smaller cities etc, so that peopleare not forced by circumstances to movetowards the big cities. The inhumanedemolition of slum dwellers’ hutments before26/7 was compounded by the floods.

Exemptions under the Urban Land CeilingAct

The Urban Land Ceiling Act was introduced toenable the government to acquire land at lowrates in order to provide low cost housing tothe poor. The state government has introduceda scheme whereby builders putting upresidential or commercial projects, can applyfor exemption from the ULCA. In return, 15 percent of the tenements are to be given to thestate. These tenements are then allotted,ostensibly to the needy. However, this allotmentis controlled by the Chief Minister and is notused to provide housing to the needy. This isin effect a loss to the city. The practice ofgranting exemptions to builders under theULCA must be stopped.

7) Planning for climate change: The latest research

from the UN Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change projects an increase in meantemperature of up to 5.8°C from 1990 to 2100,greater than that experienced in the last10,000 years. The global mean sea level isprojected to rise by 0.09 to 0.88 m. over thesame period – the result of a combination offactors: thermal expansion of the oceans andmelting of glaciers and polar ice caps. Thiswill bring about an increase in the frequencyand intensity of “natural disasters”, such asthe cyclones that have hit Kandla and Orissain recent years, claiming thousands of lives.

According to current scientific projections,such freak weather events are likely to becomemore common. The area prone to flooding andtidal erosion will increase significantly. In sucha situation, the precautionary principledemands that development, infrastructure andhabitations be kept away from low-lying areasof Mumbai city: along the coast, creeks,mangroves, salt pans etc. The threat posedby climate change is the strongest argumentfor implementing the CRZ Rules restrictingdevelopment along the coast. This would alsoimply greater prudence in the investment ofpublic money.

Excerpt from Climate Change 2001: Impacts,Adaptation and Vulnerability, report by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.39

“The most widespread direct risk to humansettlements from climate change is floodingand landslides, driven by projected increasesin rainfall intensity and, in coastal areas, sea-level rise. Riverine and coastal settlements areparticularly at risk, but urban flooding couldbe a problem anywhere that storm drains,water supply, and waste management systemshave inadequate capacity. In such areas,squatter and other informal urban settlementswith high population density, poor shelter, littleor no access to resources such as safe waterand public health services, and low adaptivecapacity are highly vulnerable. Humansettlements currently experience othersignificant environmental problems which couldbe exacerbated under higher temperature/increased precipitation regimes, including

Findings


water and energy resources and infrastructure,waste treatment, and transportation.

Rapid urbanization in low-lying coastal areasof both the developing and developed world isgreatly increasing population densities and thevalue of human-made assets exposed tocoastal climatic extremes such as tropicalcyclones. Model-based projections of the meanannual number of people who would be floodedby coastal storm surges increase several fold(by 75 to 200 million people depending onadaptive responses) for mid-range scenariosof a 40-cm sea-level rise by the 2080s relativeto scenarios with no sea-level rise.”

CRZ I areas in particular, must be strictlyprotected. Any proposed fresh investmentsalong the coast must be critically examinedkeeping in mind the fact that significant

stretches of our coastline would probably besubmerged or badly affected by tidal erosionwithin the next 30-50 years as a consequenceof global warming. Damage from strong weatherevents such as storms and cyclones is alsolikely to escalate.

The NIO should be entrusted with the task ofpreparing a report for the Mumbai MetropolitanRegion, one of the world’s most populous, toascertain the impact of the projected sea levelrise (going by IPCC data) on Mumbai city andits surroundings. This will enable the city toplan ahead and minimize losses. Incidentally,this information is already required to becollected by the state governments asstipulated in the conditional approval of theCoastal Zone Management Plan (CZMPs) bythe MoEF in 1996.

Findings


July 26, 2005 marks – literally – a watershed inMumbai’s history, almost like 9/11 did to New York.Things may never be quite the same in the country’scommercial capital. It made Mumbaikars realize howvulnerable the city was to the wrath of nature. Butthis wrath was greatly compounded and complicatedby the folly of humans.

As this citizens’ report makes abundantly clear,the government was conspicuous by its absence onall fronts during and after the deluge. Mumbai alreadyhad a disaster management plan in place, and theMunicipal Commissioner, Mr. Johny Joseph, hadbeen involved in drafting such a plan for the entirestate as a former Secretary for Rehabilitation in Latur,after the earthquake in 1993. However, the entireadministration was inexplicably paralysed andimmobilized during the flooding of Mumbai.

To add insult to injury, the Chief Minister declareda two-day holiday that week for the entireadministration – precisely at a time when it wasurgently required to help Mumbaikars get back ontheir feet. This yet again underlines how the stategovernment and municipal corporation, along withthe police and other services were – with notableexceptions – missing when the city needed themdesperately. This is a stinging indictment of all officialagencies, whatever their protestations to the contrary.

People – the richest to the poorest – were putto endless trauma and tribulation as they were stuckat home or at their workplaces, children in schools.Due to the abysmal absence of that most vital elementin such emergencies – information – there was panicas people rushed to reach home, only to be strandedmidway. There was no way of knowing whether theirnear and dear ones were safe. Since the bulk of therain fell over suburban Mumbai, which also happens

III. Conclusionsto be where the majority reside, the dislocationcommuters faced can well be imagined.

Later, as this report underlines, there was noway of knowing who was entitled to relief, where itwas available and how much was due. Those whohad lost members of their family or suffered severeillness, including depression and fear of water, orhad their prized possessions simply swept away,were further harassed when they attempted to getmedical or other relief. As for rehabilitation, the lesssaid, the better.

As is clear from countless other examples fromaround the world, including 9/11, officials have to beseen to be doing something in such emergencies,in addition to actually doing something – as distinctfrom merely talking about taking measures. Inretrospect, there is even some criticism of formerNew York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani for being lionisedby the media after 9/11 when he spent most of thatfateful day only looking for a command centre inlower Manhattan. In Mumbai, there was not evenany visibility of anyone in authority taking charge ofthe situation, unlike in New York that fatefulSeptember.

As is clear from the 13,890 written and 200videotaped depositions that this commission tookin all the affected areas, ordinary people came toeach other’s help – inspite of the government. Indeed,it was the poorest of the poor who seemed the mostresilient, despite having lost lives in some instancesand in others, all their personal belongings, includingtheir homes.

This is the greatest tribute that can be paid tothe common citizen, who rose to the occasion. Manywho could scarcely afford to do so, even providedrelief to those stranded in their cars and on the roadsand trains, despite all odds. The contrast betweenthe situation in Mumbai and what happened in NewOrleans a little later cannot be forgotten: the poorcitizens in that US city were stranded, physicallyand psychologically, without any external or internalresources to cope with the situation.

The Commission also noted that given therecent decline in the strength of communal forces inthe city, the Mumbaikar’s natural instinct to cometo the aid of his fellow citizen, irrespective of casteor creed, came to the fore. We heard instance afterinstance of people accommodating others, giving


Conclusionsthem food and clothing, and generally beingsympathetic to their plight. This was a source oftremendous solace when the administration wasvirtually on a prolonged vacation, if not actually adereliction of duty.

The report also emphasises that there had beenwarnings that such a breakdown in the life of Mumbaicould well occur due to such schemes as the MumbaiMetropolitan Region Development Authority’sBandra-Kurla Complex, which has been built onmangroves. Or the ill-advised Bandra-Worli Sea Link,which narrowed the mouth of the Mithi river, as didextensions to the airport runways several yearsearlier. The Commission cannot but comment thatthe future of Mumbai is being strangulated by thepolitician-builder nexus, which has vitiated even theredevelopment of slums.

There will be the inevitable official self-justification after this report is released – that thiswas an unprecedented occurrence, that relief couldnot be delivered because the deluge had broughttransport to a halt, that the administration lackedearly warning devices as well as rudimentaryequipment like boats and vehicles that could bravethe floods, and so on. The administration will alsoargue that it did not have the financial resources toput a proper disaster management plan in place.

However, as the rough assessment of thefinancial loss suffered by millions of people in whatis one of the world’s populous cities shows, itactually cost the government and ordinary citizensa great amount in terms of losses of life, health,

belongings, workplaces and earnings. In other words,the city cannot afford not to spend on measures toprevent or mitigate natural disasters, because thisdeluge cost them dearly a far bigger amount. Whatis more, there are isolated instances of floodingvirtually every monsoon, which the city treats as‘normal’, but which also take a heavy toll in human,material and financial terms. Imagine theoverwhelming chaos if there is a major chemical ornuclear accident instead, on the lines of the Bhopalgas tragedy 22 years ago.

Given the recent boasts about making Mumbaia Shanghai and a ‘world class city’ – much of whichhype has been drowned out after 26/7 – theadministration should realize that no city which seeksto crown itself in this self-serving manner in the 21st

century can falter at the very first step, as it were. Itmust first provide every citizen with housing, healthfacilities, education and infrastructure, so thatMumbai can be modernized in the truest sense ofthe word, not just for the elite which deludes itselfthat it can rank with the best in Asia.

We in the Commission believe that the reportspeaks for itself in assigning blame for the causesand consequences of the events which enfolded onand after 26/7. We earnestly hope that all officialagencies take cognizance of the report and carryout corrective measures to ensure that Mumbai isnot caught on the wrong foot in this catastrophicmanner ever again. If there is one message that thisreport delivers, it is that there is no price which is toohigh to be paid for the safety and health of the citizens.


SURVEY FORM

Concerned Citizens’ CommissionC/O Citizens for Justice and Peace

Nirant, Juhu Tara Road,Juhu, Mumbai – 400049

An enquiry into Mumbai Floods 2005Deposition

Note from CCC:

This information is being sought to both record the real and painful impact of the recent deluge on allcitizens in an effort to determine whether, if, with more responsible management of the city, the impact ofthe flood could have been reduced. We request that you give all the details of what you experienced andsaw so that we could draw the most complete conclusions of what happened.

1. Full Name: Surname First Name Middle Name

2. Address:

2.1. Residential:

2.2. Workplace:

3. Details of Family:How many family members etc1. Relation 2. Relation3. Relation 4. Relation5. Relation 6. Relation

4. Residential Status: (in Mumbai since…):

5. Testimony regarding Floods/Deluge:

Where were you on 26th July 2005:

7. What you saw [full details]:

8. How you survived:

9. What was/were your detailed impressions of those suffering around you?

10. What was the condition of the roads, sanitation, homes etc around you?

Annexure 1


Annexure11. Did you try and approach the authorities? Yes No

12. If so, when and which authority? Please give full details (BMC, Police, Fire Brigade, Collector,

State Government, etc):

13. How many times?

14. What was the response?

15. Were you satisfied with the response?

16. If so, how?

17. If not, why not?

18. Did you or your family suffer any personal damage of loss of life or property? Yes No

19. Can you describe the details? (Loss of lives, injuries, damage to house/office, vehicles, furniture,

household goods, etc.):

20. What do you estimate the financial loss to yourself is?

21. What compensation do you expect from government?

22. What should be done to avert such disasters in future?

23. Did you receive any aid in terms of relief and rehabilitation? If any, in what form? Yes No

24. If yes, was it from an official or non-governmental source?

25. What was the source?

26. Has there been any outbreak of illness in your area of residence or work after the deluge?Yes No

27. If yes, please provide details.

28. Was there any medical camp in you area of residence or work? Yes No

29. Who held it?

30. How often do the civic authorities clean the garbage in your area of residence and work?


31. Are there any nullahs near your house/office? Yes No

32. How often are they cleaned?

33. When were they last cleaned?

34. What is the condition of your residential area and the roads around it?

35. Do you go to a public civic hospital for medical treatment or to a private one?

36. What school do the children in your family attend, BMC/private?

37. Please give details about electricity availability from July 26- August 10, 2005

38. Please give details about phone connections from July 26- August 10, 2005

39. Please give details about water availability from July 26 to August 10, 2005

40. Any Other Details that you may think are relevant

Place: Date: Volunteers Name: Signature:

Annexure


SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS

Date Area Venue

September 3 Kurla Social Welfare Centre Hall,Central Railway Colony,Opp. Bldg no. 99, Kurla (E), near Kurla Station.

September4 Kurla Social Welfare Centre Hall,Central Railway Colony,Opp. Bldg no. 99, Kurla (E), near Kurla Station.

September 6 Kalina Community Hall,Old Air India Colony,Kalina, Mumbai 400 029.

September 8 Jeri-Meri St Jude’s High School,M.V. Marg, Andheri-Kurla Road, Jeri-Meri,Mumbai 400 072

September 9 Bandra East New English High School,next to Kherwadi Police Stn.,New English High School Road,Mumbai.

September 10 Kalina St Mary’s Junior College Hall,Church Road, Kalina, Santa Cruz [E],Mumbai 400 029.

September 11 Sakinaka Sakinaka, St. Anthony’s School Hall,Kherani Rd., SakinakaMumbai 72.

September 13 Govandi Tata Nagar Social Welfare Centre,Tanaji Malusare Chowk, Govandi (W)near Govandi Station, Mumbai 43.

September 14 Chembur TISS, Sion-Trombay Rd,Deonar, Opp. Deonar Bus Depot,Mumbai 40 088

September 16 Kandivali 1st Floor, Shyam Bhavan, Devji Bhimji Lane,Mathuradas Road,Kandivli West, near Station.

September 18 Malad St. Anne’s High School,Marve Road, Malad West,Mumbai 64.

September 19 Bandra St. Joseph’s High School Hall,Hill Rd, Bandra West

September 20-24 South Bombay Bombay Natural History Society

Annexure 2


Annexure 3LIST OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INVITED TO DEPOSE & RESPONSES

Sr. No. Name & Designation Response

1 Mr. Vilasrao DeshmukhChief Minister (Maharashtra) No Response

2 Ms. Vimal Mundada,Minister of Health (Maharashtra) No Response

3 Mr. Ganesh NaikMinister of Environment (Maharashtra) No Response

4 Mr. Johnny JosephMunicipal Commissioner (MCGM) No Response

5 Mr. SanglikarDeputy Municipal Commissioner No Response(Environment and Waste Management)

6 Mr. A.L. PatankarAssistant Municipal Commissioner, MCGM No Response

7 Mr. R.M. Prem KumarChief Secretary (Maharashtra) No Response

(Cited official engagements asreason for not deposing)

8 Mr. A. P. SinhaAdditional Chief Secretary No Response(Maharashtra – Home Dept)

9 Mr. B.P.PandeyPrincipal Secretary (Maharashtra – Environment) No Response

10 Mr. S. S. HussainPrincipal Secretary (Maharashtra – Forests) No Response( Cited official

engagements as reason for notdeposing)

11 Mr. Krishna VatsaSecretary, (Relief and Rehabilitation) Deposed

12 Dr. C.V.V.Bhadram No Response (Said that matter wasDy. Director General of Meteorology sub judice and therefore could not(Regional Meteorological Centre, Mumbai) depose)

13 Mr. A.D. JhandwalChief Fire Officer (MCGM) No Response

14 Mr. Ramanath JhaManaging Director, MSRDC No Response

15 Mr. Sudhir JoshiMetropolitan Commissioner, MMRDA No Response

16 Mr. PathakDeputy Chief Engineer Deposed (Storm Water Drainage Dept - BMC)

17 Mr. S.Y. HankareChief Engineer No Response(Mumbai Sewerage Disposal Project)

18 Mr. PalavDy. Chief Engineer, (Mech & Elect.), No ResponseSewerage Project.


EXPERTS WHO DEPOSED BEFORE CCC PANEL

Sr. No Person and Organization

1 Dr. M.D. Zingde,National Institute of Oceanography

2 Mr. Ravi DuggalCEHAT

3 Mr. Rakesh KumarNEERI

4 Mr. Prakash ApteyEx-Head, HUDCO

5 Mr. Sudhir KumarDirector, Mumbai Airport

6 Mr. Girish RautSocial Activist

7 Mr. Nandan Mungekar,Architect and Town Planner

8 Mr. Satish SahneyFormer Police Commissioner & Mohalla Committee Movement Trust

9 Mr. Soli ArceivalaChairman Emeritus, AIC Watson Consultants Ltd.

10 Ms. Neera PunjCitispace

11 Mr. Rajkumar Sharma,AGNI & CLEENSWEEP

12 Mr. Vivek Kulkarni,Pirojsha Godrej Foundation

13 Mr. P.K. Das,Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti

14 Mr. P.A. SebastianHuman rights lawyer

15 Dr. H. Samant,Lecturer in Geology, St. Xavier’s College

16 Mr. Arun Ranade,G Block, Bandra-Kurla Complex

17 DIG A. Rajasekhar,Coast Guard, W. Region

18 Mr. Jekisan G. Bhatia,Citispace

19 Mr. M.Z. Ansari,GM, Western Railway

20 Ms. Medha Patkar and others,NAPM

Annexure 4


TOTAL NUMBER OF DEPOSITIONS

Sr No Date Venue Total Depositions

1. 03/09/2005 Kurla Central Railway Hall, Kurla(E) 600

2. 04/09/2005 Kurla Central Railway Hall, Kurla(E)

3. 06/09/2005 Air India Colony, Santa Cruz(E) 700

4. 08/09/2005 Jeri Meri, St Jude’s High School,Andheri-Kurla Road 1000

5. 09/09/2005 Bandra(E), New English High School,Next to Kherwadi Police Station 60

6. 10/10/2005 Kalina 8000

7. 11/10/2005 St Anthony’s School Hall, Kherani Road,Saki-Naka 1200

8. 13/10/2005 Govandi(W), Tata Nagar Social WelfareCentre, Mumbai - 43 800

9. 14/10/2005 Tata Institute of Social Sciences,Deonar(E), Mumbai - 88 600

10. 16/10/2005 Kandivili (W), 1st Floor Shyam BhavanMumbai 400

11. 18/10/2005 Malad(W), St Anne’s High SchoolMarve Road 400

12. 19/10/2005 Bandra(W), St Joseph’s High SchoolOpp St Peter’s Church, Mumbai 130

Total Depositions across 12 hearings 13,890

Annexure 5


TESTIMONIALS OF KEY EXPERTS

1. Ravi Duggal (CEHAT):

§ Role of private medical sector needs to belooked into especially in terms of reporting ofcases.

§ The public health sector with all the limitedresources coped pretty well. The response ofthe Public health sector was rather a problemcaused by the administration and red tape

§ There should be more autonomy to deans andmedical superintendents in case ofemergencies.

§ Invocation of “Notifiable Diseases Act” whichwill give an accurate estimate of diseasesreported over the last 2 months.

§ In the long term, increase spending on healthsector with special emphasis on capitalinvestment.

2. Hrishikesh Samant (Lecturer - Geology,St Xavier’s College)

§ Originally Mithi had 3 channels, Mahul Creek,Mahim Creek and Thane Creek; today only onechannel i.e. the Mahim Creek remains

§ The Mumbai Airport has altered the course ofthe Mithi River at a 90o turn and has reducedthe width of the river considerably due to whichthe river does floods different areas.

§ Existence of slums i.e. ‘tolerant structures’along the banks of the Mithi River and in manycases small scale industries depositingtremendous waste has also had its toll on theMithi River.

§ Outdated technology by the MET dept wasanother reason for the lack of warning. The Metdept should have conducted simulations ofmaximum possible rain to foresee the situation

§ Ultimately it is the lack of monitoring of floodsplains and existence of ‘tolerant structures’which has resulted in 26/7.

3. Satish Sahney (Former Municipal Commissionerand MCMT)

§ Although, the Mumbai Police force has a strong37000 force; at any given point of time not more

Annexure 6than 10,000- 11,000 cops can be mustered tofight a disaster since this operates on an 8hour shift. Normally the police presence issignificant at the rush hours around 9:00 am inthe morning to around 11:00 am and 4:00pmin the evening to 7: pm. The rains began topound the city in the afternoon and the policein a way were caught unawares.

§ The Home Guards could have been called out,however this system over the past few decadeshas been used by politicians to provideemployment and rendered it ineffective.

§ The Civil Defence volunteers by law can onlybe called when a state of war has beendeclared.

§ The structure and functioning of these 2 armsshould be revitalized in order to make it a potentforce.

§ The State Reserve Police must be pressed intoaction and must be immediately provided withtraining and equipment for flood situations.

4. Nandan Mungekar (Architect and Town Planner)

§ The AAI has extended the runway at SantaCruz Airport exactly at a perpendicular angleto the Mithi River course by blocking it by awall, as a result the water from the river floodedareas like Airport runway, Air India Colony, Kurlaetc.

§ The mouth of the Mithi River which wasoriginally 1.6 kms is today only around 40 mtrsand the flow of the river has been blocked dueto Bandra –Worli Sea Link reclamation,reducing the Mahim Bay. Further during high-tide water cannot enter the Mithi River Basin.There is no mangrove cover to safeguard theland and so it enters the roads of Mahim, Dadar.Also since the sea water level has increased,it does not allow to rain water from the land todrain out into the sea aggravating the problemfurther.

§ The reclamation of 331 hectares of swamp landand marshland for the Bandra –Kurla Complexmeant that an area which was a natural waterholding tank has been done away with and thiswater finds its way into Kurla, Ghatkopar,Dharavi and Bandra.


5. Rakesh Kumar (NEERI)

§ Commercial activities in & around the MithiRiver have reduced the carrying capacity of theriver.

§ The fact that BKC was a water holding areaand that destruction of mangroves here toconstruct a business district would result indisplacement of water was warned by NEERIto CWPRS; inspite of which CWPRS gave theenvironmental clearance to BKC. Also theconstruction of BKC is a clear CRZ violation.

§ The first step is to look at planning holisticallyand see if a particular project is in sync withthe city’s development plan.

§ The next step would be to segregate thesewerage and storm water drains which existsin the Island city.

§ Creation of holding ponds which could storerainwater during times of high tide and whichcould be released during times of low tideshould be taken up.

6. Prakash Apte (Ex HUDCO Chief)

§ The entire city of Mumbai has been concretized,there is no space for the water to percolate,added to this the course of the Mithi River hasbeen severely altered and narrowed down atmany places. Water cannot find its way intothe sea and these were the main reasons whythe Mumbai floods occurred.

§ The failure of the civic administration indischarging its mandatory duties has led tothe situation that exists today. For instancethere is no proper de silting of nullas, peopleuse nullas as dumpling grounds; as a resultthese drains are perennially choked.

§ The first step is to encourage the use ofperforated tiles along pavements so that watercan percolate into the ground. Also roads shouldbe asphalted instead of concretization. This isanother way of increasing percolation of water.

§ Dereservation of opens spaces be if forcommercial purposes or social housing shouldbe immediately halted.

7. Girish Raut (Social Activist)

Due to massive commercialization in Mumbai

and unabated construction activities, there arehardly any open spaces left for the water topercolate, in this situation the role played by riverswhich act as natural storm water drains becomeseven more important. However inspite of knowingthis, the Mithi River has been choked by variousvested interests over the decades.

The course of the Mithi River has beenobstructed at several places.

§ AAI walls obstruct the flow of the Mithi River.

§ G-Block of the BKC directly suppresses theMithi River. Buildings like NSE & IL&FS areon the course of the Mithi River.

§ Channelisation of the river by introduction ofbunds especially in the Mithi River – ArabianSea estuary by the MMRDA has severelyaffected marine biology.

§ The Worli-Bandra Sea Link (WBSL) is the lastnail in the coffin. Reclamation of Mahim Creekwhich prevents the tidal waves from followingtheir natural path will have a significant impacton North Mumbai. The sea water now finds itsway into North Mumbai. Areas like Dadar,Prabhadevi, and Mahim Fort are now regularlyinundated with sea water. Several buildings inthe area have suffered damages due tocorrosion. The Mahim fort which survived forover 600 years is now in a dilapidated stateand there is constant pounding of waves inthis area.

§ The 1997 report by BNHS commissioned byMoEF warned against the reclamation of landfor the WBSL; in spite of this the MoEF gavethe go ahead to the WBSL with massivereclamation.

8. Vivek Kulkarni (Phirojsha Godrej Foundation)

§ The BKC area was an estuary for the MithiRiver which acted as a natural flood controlarea. When water could not find any area itdestroyed anything which came in its path.

§ The MMRDA has undertaken a process oftraining the smaller creeks which essentiallymeans construction of cement bunds. Whatthe authorities do not realize is that these bundsdestroy the eco-system and do more harmthan good.

Annexure


§ How the BRIMSTOWAD report has beenimplemented is an aspect which needs to beprobed.

§ Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP) was oneof the reasons why Mumbai wasn’t inundatedcompletely. The SGNP absorbed tremendousamounts of water and this saved the city furthercatastrophe.

§ Wetlands should be treated as ecologicalindicators of the entire city and their conditionshould be monitored continuously.

§ The city faces a real threat of floods, Tsunamisetc; to protect the city from these disasters,natural protection mechanisms like mangrovelands & salt pan lands need to exist and benurtured.

9. Depositions of flood victims:

a. Asha Rai Naik (husband lost): Asha Rai Naika resident of Anna Sathe Nagar, Mankhurd (W) losther husband (name not mentioned) who went tosave their children who were caught in the deluge.Her husband used to do odd jobs. She says thathe was swept away and his body was neverrecovered. Her tragedy did not end here. When shesent to the Police Station, the police personnel didnot file an NC and sent her back saying that herhusband’s body was not amongst the bodies whichhad been recovered and that she would be intimatedas soon as her husband’s body was found. It wasonly after the intervention of Medha Patkar that thepolice registered an NC. She continued to go tothe police station in the hope of some news regardingher husband; when she was told not to come tothe police station again and again. She also saysthat while houses in the neighborhood who wereclose to the corporator got assistance, her familydid not receive any assistance from the government.Not a single government official has come till dateto listen to their grievances.

b. Blanche Alves Pereira (son lost): Blanche AlvesPereira a resident of Andheri lost her son MelvinPereira, a Xth student at Dominic Savio High Schoolwhen he was swept away from under a nullah whilereturning from school. She says that he had calledher up at around 8:30 p.m. on the 26th saying thathe was near Andheri station. That was her lastconversation with him. He did not arrive home in

the night and his body was found the next eveningin a nullah. The only way he was recognised wasbecause of his uniform and the holy cross acrosshis neck. The bodies of five others who went missingalong with him were not recovered. Ms Pereira wenton to say that this particular area where Melvin waslast seen is always flooded and the floods of 26th

July was just too much for the area. She said thatshe did receive Rs 50,000 from the collector’s office;small consolation for a mother who lost her youngestchild.

c. Testimonies of Malad – Marve residents:Residents of Malad Marve faced unprecedentedflooding for the first time in many decades. Aninvestigation carried out by CCC revealed exactlywhy this area was inundated. Originally this areahad several open spaces comprising of playgrounds,parks, mangrove patches etc. However theconstruction boom along the western suburbs hasensured that these open spaces has been steadilyencroached upon. The natural drainage flow, whichwould have otherwise found its way into the ManorCreek, does not have any outlet; added to this isthe indiscriminate dumping by builders on openspaces to increase the height; in such a situationthe water finds its way to those places which are atthe lowest height which happen to be the originalinhabitants of the area.

c.1. Case study of Evergreen Housing Society andOasis Housing Society: Evergreen Hsg Society hasbeen in existence since a long time adjoins theLink Road at Malad (W) and is an area, which hasnever witnessed flooding thanks to the vast openspaces, which surround it. Recently however all thischanged. During May 2005, around 50 to 60 trucksdumped garbage in an adjoining plot. This plot ofland was low-lying and had been acting as a naturalsponge . Over three days, around 200 trucks dumpeddebris and raised the height of this plot significantly.A builder called Hemant Parashuram Puria had beenincreasing the height of the plot with an in intentionof constructing a building. Another plot of land inthe vicinity that was covered with mangroves washacked to make way for an SRA scheme. For thistoo, the level of the plot was raised significantly. OnJuly 26, water from the adjoining plot whose heighthad been increased broke through the compoundwall and Evergreen Hsg society was completelyinundated with water levels reaching around 10 feet.

Annexure


When the residents complained to the builder, heinstead of helping them accused them of breakingthe wall. Till date the matter has been unresolvedand the residents live in the fear of being inundatedyet again during the next monsoons.

c.2. Case study of Guzdar Scheme (Alsoincorporated in the main report Section II H 4 -Encroachments): Residents of the Guzdar Scheme,Santa Cruz (West) deposed before the CCC onMonday September 19 at Bandra-West. This isprobably one of the better documented cases ofencroachment and disruption of natural drainagepatterns causing threat to life and destruction ofproperty. Within the last 15 years, over 8,317hutments have come up on the Guzdar Creek. Ofthese, according to documents received from theGuzdar Scheme Residents Trust (GSRT), 5,154 arepre-1995 and thus eligible for rehabilitation. Thesedwellings have destroyed over 11 hectares ofmangrove and are occupying an area that is notifiedas CRZ I and a No Development Zone, to the westof the Guzdar Bandh. This area was formerly amangrove and mud flat stretch known as the GuzdarBay/Creek. By dumping and constructing hutments,the level of land west of the Bund, which is theseaward side, has been raised above that of theland on the eastern or landward side causing a“Saucer Effect”. With the result that rainwater,instead of flowing westward to the sea, now flowsback to the land. The encroachments have blockedthe free flow of water to the sea, resulting in seriousflooding every monsoon. Ground floor residents nowhave flood water entering their homes everymonsoon as a matter of course. Overflowing toiletsand polluted underground tanks, electrical shortcircuits in the meter rooms and flooding of lift wellsare also common. This is the situation during normalmonsoon rains, so of course the July 26 deluge ledto a much worse scenario, with over 5 feet of waterin some ground floor residences.

In June 2000, the BMC demolished the foursluice gates that have been fitted on the Guzdarbandh since the early 1900s, to keep the seawaterout at high tide. As a result of the removal of thesluice gates, there has been regular flooding of roadsand residential compounds during the high tides.The only reason given by the BMC for removing thesluice gates was that they are ‘no longer technicallyrequired’. The sluice gates kept the high tide waters

out, and this led to floods in the hutments (formerlyinter-tidal zone) on the west of the Guzdar bandh.It would seem probable that this was the reason forthe removal of the sluice gates.

In 2001, the citizens of the area approachedthe High Court for relief vide Writ Petition no 743/2001. On October 31, 2001, the Court directed theGovernment of Maharashtra to take corrective stepsas “immediate relief”. However little has changedon the ground. The BMC protests its inability toclean the nallahs and drains in the area until theencroachments are cleared. To date, 696 hutmentshave been demolished and 356 hutments have beenrehabilitated, at no cost to themselves, at AnikNagar, Chembur. This is against the High CourtOrders of 31st Oct 2001, 4th Oct 2002, and 24thFeb 2004. About Rs 5.5 crores has been spent forthe development of 2.7 hectares of land at Malwani,Malad and each of the 780 pre-1995 encroacherswere to pay the government Rs 30,000/- for a 10’ x15’ plot of land. Political interference forced the GoMto rehabilitate 356 hutments free of cost at AnikNagar, Chembur.

The latest development is a proposal to developand SRA scheme in the Guzdar Bandh Creek ofabout 2.8 million sq feet, that is in CRZ I area anda No Development Zone! Proposals have beensubmitted to the SRA by M/s Gala Builders and M/s Deewan Builders. The Guzdar Bandh ResidentsAssociation has applied to the SRA for informationin this respect under the Right To Information Act,but no reply has been forthcoming thus far. Legalaction would appear to once again be the onlyoption left.

The Guzdar Bandh example typifies themanner in which open spaces and naturaltopographical features have been interfered with ordestroyed across Mumbai city, in this case byillegal encroachments.

Annexure


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RANIJADHAV COMMITTEE REPORT

Rani Jadhav Committee ReportPART IV

5. ACTION TAKEN REPORTS

5.1 In this part we examine the actual actiontaken by the various agencies in terms of theirfunctions as mentioned in Part III and the extent towhich these actions were taken either in line withthe DMP or at least in consonance with theresponsibilities laid down in the DMP. It may bementioned at this stage that Action taken Reports(ATRs) were called by the Committee from all theconcerned agencies not only through a detailedquestionnaire in the first instance but by a numberof follow up communications and discussions withthe concerned officers from time to time. A list ofthese communications may be seen at AnnexureVIII. The reports of all the agencies have also beenincluded verbatim and can be seen from AnnexureIX-A to Annexure IX- J. In the light of the above theCommittee feels justified in presuming that whereno action is reported this is because no action isactually taken. The ATRs are examined in the samesequence as the provisions of the DMP viz.

1. Institutional Arrangements

2. Risk Assessment And Vulnerability

3. Mitigation Strategy And Measures

4. Coordination Mechanism And Control RoomFunctions

5. NGOs and Voluntary Agencies

6. Reporting Systems

7. Plan Dissemination

8. Ward Level Response

5.2. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

5.2.1. INDIAN METEOROLOGICAL DEPARTMENT(IMD) (Annexure X):

9th July, 2000: Local forecast for Mumbai andsuburbs regarding heavy to very heavy rain withgusty winds was sent via fax / phone / both to theEOC and the BMC besides other Control Roomsbetween 1.00 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. The fax machinesof the Traffic Police, City Police, Mumbai, WesternRailway Control Room, Central Control Room, EOC

Annexure 7Mantralaya were found to be out of order. LandlineTelegrams conveying the message “Rainfall reaching15 cm (equal or more than your limit) at a few placeswith heavy fall exceeding 15cm at isolated placesis likely in your area till the morning of 11th July,2000" were also sent to above authorities.

10th July, 2000 : Local forecast indicating “lightto moderate rain! showers” and “heavy rainfallwarning was given in respect of isolated places inKonkan Goa for the next 48 hours” was transmittedto Principal Secretary to CM , Chief Secretary, Addl.Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary (Revenue), andthe Control Room.

11th July, 2000 : Moderate rain showers, attimes heavy, accompanied with gusty winds wasforecast for the districts of

Mumbai, Thane and Raigad in the morning of13th. All offices as per details for 9th July above wereintimated by fax/telephone. The fax machines of CityPolice and Mantralaya (Control Room - 2850919) werenot functioning. Further fax messages indicating“Heavy rainfall at few places with very heavy falls atisolated places over Konkan Goa during next 48hours” were transmitted to PS to CM, CS, RevenueSecy. and Mantralaya Control room.

5.2.2. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE (EOC)

The IMD sent the following messages to theEOC 9th July, 2000 (between 1 pm and 3.30 pm) :a) Local forecast for Mumbai and suburbs: “Heavyto very heavy rains with gusty winds”, b) “Heavyrainfall is likely at a few places with very heavy fallsat isolated places in the districts of Mumbai, Thaneand Raigad till morning of 11th July, 2000.” Thismessage was sent by Fax and phone between 1pm and 3.30 pm. The fax was found to be not workingThe message was received on phone by Mahandale.c) Heavy rainfall warning :- Heavy rainfall at a fewplaces with very heavy falls at isolated places islikely in Konkan Goa in the next 48 hours.

10th July, 2000 (between 12 noon and 1 pm):Fax and phone message: Heavy’ rainfall warning:“Heavy rainfall at isolated places is likely in Konkan-Goa in the next 48 hours”. 11th July, 2000 (between12 noon and 1 pm) : “Heavy rainfall warning: Heavyrainfall is likely at isolated places in the districts ofMumbai, Thane and Raigad till the morning of 13

th

July, 2000.” The message was sent by fax and


phone. Once again the fax was not working. Thephone message was received by Patil.

12th July, 2000: (between 12 noon and 1 pm)

“Heavy rainfall warning: Heavy to very heavy rainsin the form of more or less continuos showersaccompanied by strong gusty wind expected overcity of Mumbai, its suburbs and districts of Thanetill morning of 14

th July, 2000.” This was sent by fax

and phone. ‘the phone message was received byNarvekar.

Apart from the IMD the EOC received otherdisaster (downpour) related information. Details ofinformation received and action taken as gleanedfrom the register are as follows:

12.7.2000:

INCIDENT ACTION

1) Overflow of Tulsi lake No action. Details of wholeading to release of sent the report, people inwater. Warning to etc., not mentioned. surrounding areas

2) One Rajesh As AboveRaghunath Patilwas washed awayat Deonar

3) House collapse As Abovebehind Vikram Glasscompany ,some peopleInjured

4) 2 children drowned As Aboveat Vakola, Santa Cruz

- A time of 1600 hours is entered for all theseentries

5) At 1600 hours Deore, wireless operator informedthat there is a landslide on Bombay Ahmedabadhighway. “Asked to take necessary measures.”

6) 17 00: Normal

7) At 17.30 BMC control ‘room has informed thattrains are closed to Vashi, Bandra and Thane.

8) 18 00: Normal

9) 18 00: Information received from the MainControl Room that at 16.20 hours that thereare landslides at Ghatkopar, Narayan nagarand Azadnagar. 19 people were injured and

they have been admitted to the Rajwadi hospitalfor treatment.

10) 9 other messages were received.

In all cases the only action taken by theEOC was to send this information tovarious senior officers and otherdepartments concerned.

5.2.3. DISASTER MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (STATELEVEL ACTION)

(i) The DMP envisages the setting up of a DisasterManagement Committee (DMC) at the statelevel under the ACS (Home). The CoordinationCommittee set up vide GR dated 24.7.1998 ismore or less on the lines of the DMC. Twomeetings of the coordination committee werechaired by the ACS (Home) on 4

th May and 5

th

June and detailed instructions were issued tothe concerned agencies for preparation for suchcontingencies as flooding etc. due tomonsoons. (Minutes of these meetingsmaintained by R & R may be seen at AnnexureXI). All control rooms were asked to be fullyprepared with details of various activities andfunctions expected to be carried out by them.They were asked .to maintain and up to datelist of important telephone numbers. Pre-emptive actions by way of cleaning / desiltingof nallas / drains with special attention to criticalpoints was emphasized. The committeestressed the importance of checking andmaintaining all equipment includingcommunication equipment in proper workingorder. The Police control room was entrustedwith the function of keeping the public informedof various arrangements made in case of adisaster. The committee noted that the EOChas not yet been activated and since the EOCis to act as nodal point for all communicationswith the state level coordination committee theneed to post a competent full time DS in chargeof EOC was mentioned. Instructions given inthe meeting on 4

th May were reviewed on 5

th

June.

(ii) In the meanwhile on 16th

May, 2000 the ChiefSecretary (CS) also held a pre-monsoonmeeting which was attended by all concerneddepartments of the GOM, Commissioner Police,

Annexure


Director Regional Meteorological Centre,Director DD, Director AIR, Commander Navy etc.Their attention was drawn to the responsibilitiesof the concerned agencies in handling of thecrisis arising out of heavy monsoons andinstructions were given to remove short comingswherever noticed.

(iii) In so far as post-disaster actions at the statelevel are concerned information regardingweather forecasts was received from the metoffice through the EOC at 1.00 p.m. on 11th Julyand 11.45 a.m. on 12

th July.

(iv) According to the Home Department report asalso Principal Secretary R & R’s report, ACS(Home) was constantly in touch with allconcerned agencies including Commissioner ofPolice Mumbai, Jt. Commissioner of Police(Traffic), Municipal Commissioner (MMC),BEST, Railway authorities and even contactedWard Officers in charge of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Wardswho were asked to make arrangements inschool premises for stranded passengersthrough out the day and monitoringarrangements on the ground. The GhatkoparLandslide site in which many persons lost theirlives was visited thrice by ACS (Home)personally and rescue and relief operationssupervised through the Collector M.S.D.

(v) An emergency meeting of officers of R&R and otherSecretaries was called by the CS on 13

th July, 2000

and requisitions made to Army and Navy seekingtheir services for evacuating the affected personsfrom the Ghatkopar Landslide site and the banksof the Mithi River which was overflowing.

(vi) Instructions were issued for issue of hourlybulletins on DD and radio. Principal SecretaryR & R has confirmed that the absence of anactivated EOC was not felt at the state levelsince regular signals were received from themeteorological office regarding possibility ofheavy rains on 11

th, 12

th and 13

th July, 2000.

And this information was relayed to allconcerned officials including Secy. to CM, CS,and ACS (Home).

(vii) According to this report also, ACS (Home) aswell as Principal Secretary R & R were in touchwith BMC including BEST, Commissioner PoliceMumbai and the Central. & Western Railways

to be in readiness to handle any situation arisingout of the heavy downpour. Fax messages weresent to AIR & DD to relay bulletins regardingflooding in the city and their effect on rail androad transport.

(viii) In summation the reports of both ACS (Home)and Principal Secretary R & R state that allpossible actions as required at the state levelfor mitigating difficulties of the affected personswas taken.

(ix) The only lacuna seen is that adequate publicityparticularly on the 11

th and 12

th. July could not

be carried out and public could not be keptsuitably informed. Had the EOC been active andbeen performing its functions as per the EOCmanual this lacuna may not have occurred.

5.2.4. DMP (Mumbai)

(i) On receipt of the weather warning from the Metdepartment all the concerned control rooms wereinformed of this and the control rooms of thewards/line departments were asked to remain inreadiness. This was done through four pre-monsoon circulars were issued by the AdditionalCommissioner, BMC to all concerned linedepartments of the BMC with instructions for :

a) Setting up well equipped departmentalcontrol rooms with delineated functions.

b) Provision of shelter arrangements to be madein schools and other public buildings for slumdwellers incase of flooding.

c) special attention to low lying areas prone towater clogging.

d) Issued of notices to owners of unsafestructures to vacate.

e) Removal of encroachments from rivers andnallas.

f) Nature of care to be taken in the event offlooding and landslides.

g) Checking the wireless equipment in time.

h) holding meetings of the Crisis managementGroup and giving them requisite training; and

i) Drives were undertaken by various wards tocleanup the storm water drains and seweragepipes.

Annexure


(ii) The BMC report further states that theseinstructions were followed by all concerned andin this way they were fully prepared as per theDisaster management Plan

(iii) On 3.6.2000 the Commissioner held a meetingof all agencies concerned with disaster reliefand ensured that pre monsoon preparednessgot underway. All Ward Officers were given 15copies of the ward level DMPs for distributionto the concerned agencies / organisationsalong with names, addresses and telephonenumbers of important officers, informationrelating to high and low tides. Ward level DMPswere also handed over to the concernedcorporators.

It would thus appear that as far as institutionalarrangements are concerned the arrangementsenvisaged in the DMP at the BMCCommissioner level were operationalised.

5.3 RISK ASSESSMENT AND VULNERABILITY

5.3.1 The Mumbai DMP envisages undertakingcomprehensive risk assessment and vulnerabilitystudies with a view to taking mitigation actionsthat would reduce/prevent disasters. The MumbaiDMP itself contains a detailed account of the areaslikely to be affected by various types of disastersincluding floods and landslides. Action expectedhere is that detailed risk assessments andvulnerability studies be carried out in respect ofthe identified areas, settlements and spots with aview to taking mitigation actions that would reduce/ prevent disasters. From the sample ward plansprovided by the BMC it appears that riskassessment and vulnerability studies have beencarried out in each ward and details of the samehave been given in the ward plan document. Eg.areas prone to flooding/choking have been listedalong with other vulnerable sites in the case ofearthquakes, fires, etc. etc. These have beendescribed in detail including, in some cases, thenames of buildings likely to be effected.

5.4 MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND MEASURES

5.4.1 The BMC report details the pre-monsoonpreparations undertaken of which Nallah training,soling and cleaning are important ingredients.However, there is no mention of any specific program

of training, soling or cleaning of storm water drainsbeing undertaken by the BMC as a pre monsoonactivity. However, it is generally mentioned thatdrives were undertaken by various wards to cleanup the storm water drains and sewerage pipes.

5.4.2 The DMP also requires that a programshould be undertaken to increase the capacity ofstorm water drainage (para 4.6.1(i) above). In thisregard BMC does have a long term plan known asthe BRIMSTOWARD PROJECT which was preparedbetween 1989 - and 1993 by consultants fromEngland.

The objective was to tackle the constraintsfaced by BMC in the management, inter alia, ofwaste / storm water and to improve / upgrade thecivic infrastructure to tackle this problem on apermanent basis. The project envisages a totalexpenditure of Rs.616 crores (1992 prices) and atime span of 12 years. Though some action underthe project has been initiated this has been in apiecemeal manner and only about Rs.160 croreshave been spent in the last 6 years. Due to lack offunds it has not been possible to implement theproject in a systematic manner.

5.4.3 The DMP requires that thecommunication system between the linedepartments should be upgraded (Para 4.6.1(ii)above). The plan does not mention the agencywhich would undertake this task of up-gradation.From the reports made available by the various linedepartments it appears that “there is no directcommunication system between these departments(except the normal telephone/fax system) and noprogram of any kind of up gradation (duplex orotherwise) is underway. The BMC report states thatcommunications sent to various control rooms viawireless sets did not elicit any response. The reportreceived from the Railways shows that the VHFset installed in the Emergency Control Room ofthe Western Railway has not been used since thetime it was installed. No information was eitherreceived on the VHF set or sent to the Mantralaya/ BMC Control Room on 11

th, 12 & 13

th July.

Information regarding flooding of tracks wascommunicated to BMC via telephone. The railwayreport claims that constant liaison was maintainedby the PRO of Western Railway with the Press,Television and Radio. The traffic police have reported

Annexure


that one hotline has been installed at the TrafficControl room to communicate directly with the BMCcontrol room and the same is working properly.During the disaster this channel proved very usefulin that it enabled BMC officials to immediatelyremove fallen trees blocking road traffic and to openthe covers of gutters to let accumulated water drainoff The BEST report has generally stated that thecommunication and operation systems “set upunder DMP were working satisfactorily” and “wereused to communicate messages to other utilities”.Similarly, the Commissioner of Police has alsostated that the communication systems arid thecommunication equipment was operating perfectly.

5.4.4 The DMP identifies 44 locations whereElectronic display Boards should be put up for thegeneral information of the public. This obligation iscast on the BMC and the traffic police. From thereports received from the BMC as well as trafficpolice it appears that no electronic display boardswere set up or activated during the occurrence ofthe disaster. In fact the only 2 display Boardsalready set up at Charni road and Haji Ali to displaywireless messages were under repair.

5.4.5 Regarding the public address system inthe trains the report from the western railway statesthat information was relayed on the centralannouncing system installed on the suburbansection of the railways. This possibly refers to thepublic address system on railway stations and notto any public address system installed in rakes asstated in the DMP. The central Railway report alsorefers to activation of Public address systems atthe “affected station”. Further, neither of the tworailways make any reference to wireless contactbeing established and maintained betweenthe guard and the railway stations as required bythe DMP.

5.4.6 Regarding cable channels on a ward wisebasis, the report from the DG (I & PR) states thatefforts were made for hourly news bulletins on DDand AIR to keep people informed esp. about railwaymovements and about the low lying areas whichwere flooded. While the report specially appreciatesthe response received from Doordarshan and otherTV channels there is no mention of cable TVoperators being involved on a ward wise basis asrequired by the DMP. Among the other agencies

both the western and the central railway reportsstate that information was relayed/flashed on TVchannels but does not specify cable channelsthrough cable operators. The reference is most likelyto Doordarshan and other TV channels as in thecase of DG (I&PR). However, the traffic police reportdoes mention “in-cable” network as being used fordissemination of information along with the variousTV channels. The Police Commissioner’s report alsostates that on 13.7.2000 citizens were kept informedthrough press releases and cable TV ‘broadcasts.

5.5 COORDINATION MECHANISM & CONTROL ROOMFUNCTIONS

It is clear from the reports of the’ PrincipalSecretary R & R, ACS (Home) and the EarthquakeRehabilitation Cell that during the disaster whichstruck Bombay on 11

th, 12

th and 13

th July, 2000 the

Emergency Operations Centre at Mantralaya didnot play any role at all in terms the functions.envisaged for it in the DMP. The various reasonswhich led to this situation are dealt with in Part IVof this report. Suffice it to say here that thecoordination mechanism at the state level continuedto remain the same as in earlier years viz. theCoordination Committee of the ACS (Home). TheEOC did not perform either its normal time functionas mentioned in para 3.3.4 or its post occurrencefunctions mentioned in para 4.3 of the DMP. Thismatter has already been dealt with extensively inPara 5.2.2 to para 5.2.4dealing with institutionalmechanisms and it will be clear from the same thatthe main coordinating role in the actual managementof the disaster was played by the BMC through itsControl room which is charged with the task of notonly performing its own functions in terms ofmanaging disasters within the managerial capacityof the BMC but also with coordinating the BMC’sother control rooms (i.e. line departments), its wardlevel control rooms and other state and centraldepartments concerned with the disaster.

5.5.1. BMC CONTROL ROOM: (Annexure IX-A)

The BMC report states that after receiving theweather forecast on 11.7.2000 directly from the Metdepartment the same was conveyed to all controlrooms as well as the respective line departmentsinside and outside the BMC. It appears that BMCset up a “Crisis management Group” which took

Annexure


action in respect of certain specific instances asbelow:

The Ghatkopar Chiragnagar, AzadnagarLandslide: The Mantralaya Control Room and otherconcerned agencies including hospitals were alerted.Field officials reached the spot and carried outrescue operations. A make-shift access road hadto be constructed by demolishing 14 constructionsto reach the site. This enabled heavy vehiclesincluding fork-lifts, fire brigades, ambulances etcto reach the spot.

Disruption of rail and road traffic: BMC officialsactively assisted the rail and BEST officials inkeeping the public informed about alternativetransportation arrangements for strandedpassengers on 12

th of July at 7.00 p.m. about 3000

passengers were stranded at CST and about 2000at Churchgate and were transported to theirdestinations. Help was also rendered by the railwaypolice force.

Overflowing of the Vihar Lake: The water levelrose to 73.915 meters on 12

th July due to heavy

rains. Water levels in the Mithi river also rosesharply. When the Vihar Lake started overflowingexcess water was released in the Mithi river, thereby flooding many low lying slums along the Mithiriver. Four Naval boats were requisitioned from theState govt. to rescue the affected persons. Shelterarrangements were made for a total of 1965 familiesinvolving 2425 slums. 340 families were given shelteron account of the flooding of the Vakola River byshifting them to safer places; mainly schoolbuildings in the vicinity. A total of 2287 families weregiven shelter by BMC through their schools andother buildings Rajwadi and Sion hospital staff wasinvolved and a makeshift dispensary set up.Excavation work was done under floodlights andthe affected persons were sent to hospitals aftergiving them first aid treatment. The BMC report alsostates that the Indian navy was alerted and 80jawans of the Indian navy played an important rolein the rescue operations.

NGO’s: Each ward had prepared lists of NGO’swho’s assistance was to be requisition in case ofdisasters during monsoons and NGO’s had beenprovided with details of institutional arrangementsthat would be in place at such time. Joint meetingswere held with NGO’s to enlist their support and

the response from some NGO’s is reported to beencouraging viz. Young Stars Krida Mandal (YSKM)and the Dignity Foundation.

AIR & Doordarshan were contacted on 12th July

to relay messages to citizens not to leave theirhomes where ever road I rail services were affected.The press - were also contacted to inform the publicagainst use of plastic bags and the importance ofsafe drinking water and food.

In the end the BMC report states that theDisaster Management Plan was received only on11th July, 2000 and, therefore, could not beimplemented fully.

(ii) The BMC report further states that all 24 wardcontrol rooms had started working from1.6.2000. Orders had already been issued thatall line departments of the BMC at the wardlevel would work under the directions of theward officer during disaster situations.

(iv) From the BMC report it is noticed that not alldepartments responded to the preparednessmeetings, etc. held at the ward level. Forexample, the railways did not attend the A, B,G/N, and T ward meetings. The Tehsildar didnot attend any of the ward meetings exceptthe T ward meeting. The Fire brigade did notattend the PIS and R/S ward meetings.

5.5.2. THE POLICE CONTROL ROOM

(i) The Police Control Room activities are seenfrom the Report from the office of theCommissioner of Police, Mumbai (AnnexureIX-B):

§ As on 15th July 2000 84 persons had died, 44persons were injured and property worth Rs.lcrore approximately was damaged consequentto the heavy rains in Mumbai from 11th onwards.Communication was received from theMeteorological Department on 12th & 13th Julyat 0900 hrs.

§ Action under the Disaster Management Planwas initiated and all Mobile Police patrollingin Mumbai were put on alert. Specificinstructions were given from 1800 hrs. onwardsto render all possible help to the rain affectedpeople by making available a ) transport b)medical aid c) food and d) shelter.

Annexure


§ Wireless messages were sent to ensureproper bandobast at sensitive points throughthe traffic police.

§ Regular contact was maintained with the TrafficPolice, BMC Control Room, Fire brigade,Railway Control Room, BEST, Mantralaya andall police stations.

§ Consequent to the over flowing of the Tulsi andVihar Lakes on 12

th / 13

th July all residents in

the adjoining areas including those on thebanks of Mithi River were alerted.

§ The provisions of the Mumbai DisasterManagement Plan were put into operation.mainly in South in the Bombay Police stationswhere arrangements were made to transportoffice goers to their homes in the suburbs bymeans of private trucks and buses after thewater had receded. .

§ Assistance of the media and the privatepersons was taken to keep citizens informedthrough press releases and cable TV on 13/7/2000. Assistance of NGO’s and other privatepersons was taken in making arrangementsfor transporting the effected people, arrangingfor food packets and also for providingtemporary shelter to the affected persons.

(ii) The Police Report states that although suitableinstructions were given to the police stationson the mobiles, no feedback / information wasreceived by the Control Room regarding actualactions taken in the field.

(iii) The Police report does not contain anyreference to cordoning off of the affected areaand setting up of an information centre, whichthe Police Control room is, expected to dounder the DMP in a flood situation.

5.5.3 REPORT OF JOINT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE- TRAFFIC (Annexure- IX-C)

§ It is the normal practice of the Traffic ControlRoom to obtain weather forecasts three timesa day during the monsoons. Intimationregarding heavy rains was received both on 11

th

& 12th of July, 2000.

§ Anticipating water logging at previouslyidentified sites diversion plans wereimplemented. All concerned officers were

alerted for taking necessary actions to carryout diversion plans and to maintain smooth flowof traffic.

§ Information regarding the likely traffic situationwas released through TV, Press and AIR.

§ No major traffic diversion plans were necessaryon the 11

th. On 12

th however, almost all internal

and major roads and junctions were floodedincluding many of the diversion roads. Trafficmovement was consequently seriouslyaffected.

§ No failure in the communications / operationsystems was reported. The hotline with BMCinstalled in the traffic control room was usefulin coordinating the removal of fallen trees andlifting of covers of manholes during heavy rains.

5.5.4 THE FIRE BRIGADE CONTROL ROOM (AnnexureIX-D)

§ No warning was received from the IMD.

§ According to the report received from the FireBrigade, the guide lines prescribed under theDMP were not acted upon in any great detail.However, as per normal practice all fire stations!fire appliances were kept in readiness to dealwith flood related eventualities. Adequatemanpower was available to handle crisissituations.

§ The Fire Brigade Control Room has not beenprovided with a wireless system and the chiefmode of communication was telephones.

§ Non availability of portable boats, sufficient lifejackets and other appliances are stated to bethe main handicaps.

§ No help of NGOs was taken; however, TV,media, etc were kept informed of relief actionstaken.

5.5.5 THE RAILWAYS CONTROL ROOMS

(i) Reports of activities undertaken by theRailways have been received both from theWestern and Central Railways (Annexure IX-Eand IX-F). As will be seen from Part I largesections of both railways were under water andpassengers were stranded in thousands at anumber of important junctions on both routes.

Annexure


(ii) REPORT OF WESTERN RAILWAY

§ Regular reports are received from the IMDindicating “warnings for rains of more than 12cm at one or two places almost since the onsetof the monsoons”. No specific warning wasreceived for 11

th, 12

th & 13

th July, 2000.

§ During high tides the sluice gates of thedrainage system are closed by the BMCresulting in accumulation of water on tracksand low lying areas.

§ Owing to heavy rains there was flooding of thetracks at Mumbai Central, Matunga Road andbetween Virar and Vasai Road. Train serviceswere stopped between Churchgate and Bandrabetween 10.00 a.m and 2.00 p.m. on 12

th July.

Train services beyond Vasai Road weresuspended from 1.00 p.m on 12

th to 9.50 a.m.

on 13th July.

§ All possible arrangements were made to assistthe stranded passengers by evacuating themto safer places, providing them with food andclean drinking water and coordinatingalternative transportation arrangements with thehelp of BEST and other agencies.

§ No buses however could be arranged at VasaiRoad to evacuate passengers from Vasai Roadto Nalla Sopara, Virar and beyond due to heavywater logging.

§ The VHF set installed in the Emergency ControlRoom of the Western Railway has not beenused since the time it was installed. Noinformation was either received on the VHF setor sent to the Mantralaya Control Room on11

th, 12 & 13

th July. Information regarding

flooding of tracks was communicated to BMCvia telephone.

§ Constant liaison was maintained by the PROof Western Railway with the Press, Televisionand Radio. The public announcement systemof the railways installed on the suburbansection was also widely used to relaymessages to the public.

§ No help of NGO’s was taken / received forproviding assistance in the management of thecrisis.

(iii) REPORT OF THE CENTRAL RAILWAY

§ Timely warning was received from the IMD andtimely action was taken by way of deputationof officers and staff to various stations to helpcommuters and passengers (nature of help hasnot been mentioned).

§ Public address systems were activated at theaffected stations. Buses were requisitioned fortransporting the commuters.

§ News was flashed over Radio and TV channels.

§ No help was taken from NGOs

(iv) The reports of both Western and CentralRailways do not contain any reference to thefollowing activities which are envisaged in theDMP for the Railway Control Rooms

a) Coordinate with the BMC control rooms fordraining of flood waters from the railway tracks

b) Coordinate medical first aid with railwayhospitals; and

c) Communicate with BMC control room foradditional resources

5.5.6 THE DISTRICT COLLECTORS CONTROL ROOM(MUMBAI AND BSD)

(i) REPORT OF COLLECTOR, MUMBAI(ANNEXURE IX-G)

§ Ward Plans in respect of only 3 wards weresent to the Collector’s office by the BMC.

§ IMD warning regarding likely rainfall of 10 to12 cm was received on 9.07.2000. Necessaryarrangements were made on the ground fordealing with all eventualities.

§ The wireless system provided functioned welland was used to communicate with otherControl Rooms.

(ii) REPORT OF COLLECTOR, MUMBAISUBURBAN DISTRICT (ANNEXURE IX-H)

§ No warning was received from the IMD.

§ Information regarding Azadnagar, Ghatkoparlandslide was received at 0930 p.m. from thePolice Control Room i.e. 5 hrs after the actualincident.

§ The Control Room, manned by a clerk, driverand peon, was in position and necessary action

Annexure


under the DMP could be initiated. The Collectoralong with other officials reached the landslidespot where BMC officials were already in action.

§ Revenue Minister, Guardian Minister, ChiefSecretary and the Local MLA guided andsupervised the rescue and relief operations.

§ The wireless equipment could not be used asthis equipment was not shifted to the newlocation of the Control Room in AdministrativeBldg. Bandra (E). The wireless set in theTahsildar’s office was also not working. Neitherhad any training regarding the use of wirelesssystem been given by M/s. Global Tele-SystemsLtd. The fax machines provided in Tahsildars’offices were also not working. The main modeof communication was by telephones.

5.5.7 HOME GUARD AND CIVIL DEFENCE(ANNEXURE- IX-I)

(i) No information was received either from theBMC or the IMD regarding the weatherconditions. Anticipating disruption of normal lifein Mumbai owing to heavy rains both the HomeGuards and Civil Defence maintained a highlevel of alertness and preparedness on the 11th

& 12th and the concerned staff were rushed tothe affected places to undertake rescueoperations. Details of the work undertaken areas follows:

(ii) Attempts were made to reach an ambulanceto the Chiragnagar, Ghatkopar site on13.07.2000. However, due to heavy flooding onthe way the ambulance could not reach thesite.

(iii) 50 Home Guards were mobilised to evacuateand relocate the affected persons near the Viharlake area on the 13.07.2000. On 14.07.2000an ambulance was deputed to the Chiragnagar- Ghatkopar site for assisting in relief actions.Wireless equipment installed in the CivilDefence Control Room was not used duringthe period 11

th-14

th July.

(iv) The Dy. Commandant General, Home Guards& Dy. Director of Civil Defence, Maharashtrahas mentioned serious deficiencies both inthe, equipment and the enrolment of requisitenumbers of Civil Defence Volunteers andHome Guards.

5.5.8 THE BEST CONTROL ROOM (Annexure - IX-J):

The Mumbai DMP document does not list theBEST control room among the control room withwhom the BMC control is required to keep liaison(Section 7 of the Mumbai DMP) However, the flowchart in the EOC Manual as also in the DMPdocument mentions the BEST Control Room as animportant control point for flow of information andfor mitigation action for tackling transportbottlenecks caused due to flooding etc. The reportof the BEST shows that this was one of the moreactive control rooms in tackling the crisis of strandedpassengers. The report is summarised as follows:

a) A fax message was received from theMeteorological Department on 11th July at 1400hrs. indicating heavy rains in isolated areas ofMumbai, Thane and Raigad Districts till 13

th

July, 2000

b) On 12th July the Western and Central Railwaysinformed BEST around 0930 hrs. aboutdisruption of rail services. Concerned officersand supervisory staff were posted at strategicplaces for clearing stranded passengers andoperating extra buses from CST andChurchgate railway junctions. In all 426 extrabuses were operated all over the city to clearstranded passengers including 206 buseswhich were operated from CST and Churchgatestations. Buses could not be operated inCentral and Northern parts of the city owing towater logging. No bus service could be operatedon the Central Corridor, that is, B.E. Road.

c) Consequent to heavy rains and water loggingin Kurla and Santa Cruz depots on 12th JulyBEST could not operate normal services onthe 13th. 304 and 271 buses were held up online on 12

th and 13

th July respectively owing to

breakdowns due to Roods.

d) The DMP guidelines were-put in practice on 12th

and 13th July 2000. However due to water

logging in several parts of the City normalservices were affected and strandedpassengers could not be cleared.

e) There was no failure of communication andoperation systems set up under DMP. Thesesystems served BEST well in coordinating withthe suburban rails, Mantralaya Control Room,

Annexure


BMC and Police Control Rooms.

f) Public Announcements were made atChurchgate, CST, Andheri and Dadar stationsabout the operation of BEST services.

5.5.9 THE ARMY CONTROL ROOM

Since the EOC was not operational there is noinformation about the interaction between the ArmyControl Room and others. The BMC report statesthat Naval boats were requisitioned to evacuatesome of the marooned but there is no informationof the work done by these boats or whether theywere deployed at all. The BMC report states that80 naval jawans gave valuable help in the rescueand relief operations at the Ghatkopar landslide.The DMP envisages assistance from the army tothe BMC upon receiving requisition from the EOC.In this case direct interaction appears to have beenestablished between the ACS (Home)/BMC ControlRoom and the Defence services.

5.6 NGOS AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES:

The BMC report states that all the WardOfficers had invited all the listed NGOs and voluntaryagencies to the meetings of the Crisis ManagementGroup and Simulation drills held by them. However,only the following NGOs/ Agencies responded

1) Dignity Foundation (P/South ward);

2) Young Star Kreeda Mandal (R/South ward); and

3) Dignity Foundation (R/North ward).

The Police Commissioner’s report states thathelp from NGOs and other private persons wastaken in making arrangements for transporting theaffected persons, arranging for food packets andproviding temporary shelters. Details of the precisework done by the NGOs and the names of NGOsinvolved are not available.

The Western Railway report states that thehelp of NGOs was neither sough nor made available.

5.7 REPORTING FORMATS

As mentioned in para 4.8 above, 6 (six) Statusand Action taken Reports have to be submitted tothe EOC (by BMC, Police, Fire Brigade, BEST,Railways and Medical Assistance agencies) in theformats prescribed. From the information submitted

by the various agencies it is clear that they wereneither aware nor did they send any such formalreports. The MC, BMC has categorically stated thatthe DMP itself was given to the BMC only on 11

th

July afternoon and therefore, the question of sendingany such reports does not arise and that the reportscan only be sent in future.

5.8 PLAN DISSEMINATION

According to the DMP the Plan is to be widelydisseminated at all levels mentioned in Para 4.9above. This work is to be done by the BMC.However, the BMC Commissioner has stated thatthe DMP itself was received by him on 11th Julyand therefore, it can be concluded that the planhas not been disseminated to any of the agenciesidentified. The Earthquake Rehabilitation Cell fromwhom the Plan should have been sent to the BMCCommissioner is silent on this issue. The onlyplans that were available with the implementingagencies were the Ward Plans and these are dealtwith below.

5.9 WARD LEVEL RESPONSES

5.9.1 Ward wise details of responses in termsof action taken have not been made available bythe BMC. Similarly, the other departmental reportsalso do not contain any reference to responses atthe ward level. From the reports of the linedepartments it is not clear whether activities werecontrolled and monitored at HQ and responses atthe ward level recorded.

5.9.2 The BMC report states that anti-floodingactivities were managed with the help of anti-floodinggangs which were kept ready in all wards. Thesegangs worked along with the staff of the storm waterdepartment to clear the water accumulations atvarious places. The increases in water levels of MithiRiver and Vihar lake affected Wards L, HIE, K/Eand RIN wards.

5.9.3 The ward officers shifted 1967 familiesfrom 2425 affected huts to Municipal schools andprivate schools. Also, although preparations weremade to evacuate 340 families from the banks ofVakola River, they were not eventually shifted asthe water had started receding. In this operation 3boats with divers and officers of the Navy were keptready.

Annexure


PART V

6. EVALUATION OF ACTION TAKEN REPORTS - GAPS ANDACTION POINTS

This part contains an evaluation of the actionsof the implementing agencies on the basis of acomparison of the functions laid down in the DMPwith the activities of the various agencies/departments/ organizations indicating gaps inaction taken as compared to the functions.Suggestions and action points for plugging the gapsand making the DMP more effective are alsoincorporated. The parameters mentioned in Para3.2.3 of the EOC Manual are thus covered in relationto the DMP and in the context of the ATRs.

6.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

6.1.1 EOC and DMC

(i) According to the DMP on receipt ofinformation from the IMD the EOC should passon the warning to the BMC control room andthe Police control room. It should also passit on to the mass media, TV and radio. TheBMC is required to pass on these warningsto all the other agencies / control rooms. Infact the records show that when the weatherwarnings were received from 9

th July to 12

th

July) the information was sent by the EOConly to senior officers/ministers viz. CM, CS,ACS (Home), PS to CM, DG (I&PR) and someother departments of the government. Inrespect of none of the entries contained inpara 5.2.2 (Part IV) is there any mention inthe register of the action taken by the EOC interms of its functions mentioned in the. EOCmanual viz. passing on information receivedto the BMC Control Room, Police ControlRoom and media, etc. In one case there is anotation to the effect that an attempt wasmade to contact Secretary (PWD) whichfailed and in another case the information waspassed on to Principal Secretary (R&R). Itwas not passed on to either the Police Controlroom or the BMC Control Room.

(ii) The EOC is expected to function as the hub ofall communications received and for issuingnecessary guidelines to the District DMPauthorities. The report of Principal Secretary

(R & R) makes it clear the EOC has not yetbeen fully activated and action to postpermanent staff in the EOC is yet to be taken.No proper record has been maintained of theaction taken on the various messages receivedby the EOC. Prompt intimation of messagesto the concerned agencies is a pre-conditionfor ensuring timely action by them but themessages received by EOC were not only notpassed on in all cases but were being sentafter a gap of a few days in some instances. Amessage received from IMD centre at 1300 hrson 09.07.2000 was sent to Div. Commissionersonly on 11.07.2000 at 1300 hrs.

(iii) The DMP requires that EOC should haveobtained feedback from the Police control roomand the BMC control room on a regular basisthroughout the 4 day period but the EOCrecords show that this was not done. In factthe essential function of the EOC to expanditself and take control of all coordinationactivities (under the guidance of ACS , Home)was not performed and the EOC was not anywhere in the picture throughout the crisis.

(iv) It can be argued that the dimensions of thisparticular crisis did not warrant any state levelcoordination and the DMP provides for the BMCCommissioner as the District DisasterManager for Mumbai to tackle the crisis withinthe managerial capacities of the BMC. Althoughthis was to a large extent true, it is significantthat this was not a conscious decision withinthe framework of the DMP i.e. by the StateLevel Disaster Management Committee (DMC)under the chairmanship of the ACS (Home) asenvisaged in the Maharashtra DMP and madeoperational by GR No. EQR-I096/CR-I05/ER-I,dated 22 July, 1998.

(v) The GR specifically provides that ACS (Home)will coordinate disaster mitigation functions withthe help of the state level coordinationcommittee using the medium of the EOC. Sincethe EOC itself was non functional ACS (Home)on his own initiative held two pre monsooncoordination committee meetings where all theconcerned agencies were present. Similarly inthe post disaster occurrence phase also theEOC remained out of the picture. Most of thecommunication with the State level officials

Annexure


happened via direct telephonic messages tothem rather than through the EOC. As reportedby ACS (Home) he was constantly in touchwith the BMC and other Control Rooms formonitoring and guiding relief actions. Theabsence of the EOC was, therefore, not byitself of great significance because the BMCControl room did perform to a large extent thecoordination function required for a disaster ofthis magnitude.

(vi) There can, however, be importantconsequences of the failure of the EOC toperform its functions even in a disaster of thisrelatively small magnitude, for ego thenumbers and locations of disaster eventsmentioned in Part I of the report are culledfrom the reports of the BMC, Police, Pressreports and NGOs. None of these reports bythemselves cover all locations. Had the EOCbeen operational information in respect of allincidents could have been relayed to allagencies and the benefits of this coordinationwould have flown to all areas.

(vii) The reason for these acts of commission andomission on the part of the EOC lie in the R &F Department’s inability to coordinate thetransfer of the EOC from the EarthquakeRehabilitation Cell to Principal Secretary, Relief& Rehabilitation as provided for in the DMPdocument and the EOC Manual. The reportsof Principal Secretary R & R, PrincipalSecretary to Chief Minister and EarthquakeRehabilitation Department, and ACS (Home)at II, XIII, and XIV may be seen. The GR issuedby ERC (dated 24.4.2000) appears to havebeen cone on the basis of a decision in ameeting of the Central Implementation Groupunder the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary.However, the GR appears to have beenprocessed and issued without consulting eitherR & R or R &F Department’s (which is theadministrative wing for both the ERC and R&R) and possibly without the formal approvalof GAD. ACS (Home) has stated that the DMPitself was not formally adopted forimplementation by the state governmentthrough a Government Resolution (followingpresumably a cabinet decision) and thereforethe coordination meetings held by him were

not in the context of the DMP’s mechanismviz. the EOC.

(viii) Thus it would appear that at the point of timeof the downpour the EOC was in a state oflimbo in that the R &R department under whichit is to lie as per the DMP had not acceptedthe transfer. The result was that the EOC,despite the high tech equipment provided underthe World Bank Project, was in effectfunctioning exactly like the earlier MantralayaControl Room ( i.e. in normal times a purveyorof messages from the field to senior officersand concerned departments). It was only afterthe intervention of the CS that PrincipalSecretary (R&R) took charge of the EOC onthe afternoon of the 12

th July, 2000. Further,

as per the DMP the EOC is to be manned bya permanent well trained officer of the rank ofDeputy Secretary, an EDP manager, ComputerOperator, Communication Operators and Drivercum messenger. However, the Control Roomeven today is manned by Officers on rotationas per rosters prepared by GAD. This is inline with the decision taken in respect of theearlier Mantralaya Control Room in theaftermath of Latur. Even the equipment installedin the EOC was not in proper working condition.Principal Secretary R & R has reported thateven the expensive equipment purchased forthe EOC was found to be defective till as lateas 13

th July, 2000 when messages could not

go through the V’Sat system of the EOC. TheIMD report has reported that the fax machinesof the EOC were not functioning. The wirelessequipment installed through the EOC in variousControl Rooms was also not operated/operable in many Control Rooms. Thus, it maybe stated that the EOC does not perform noris it equipped to perform either .its normal timeactivities or its post disaster occurrenceactivities as envisaged in the DMP.

(ix) Steps to suitably man the EOC under theformal charge of Principal Secretary, R & Rshould be taken and an appropriate budgetprovision made to enable it to perform itsactivities, both normal time as well as postdisaster, on a continuing basis. It should beformally approved by the government as a partof the DMP which itself should be adopted

Annexure


under a Government Resolution. PrincipalSecretary R & R should look after the normaltime activities of the EOC as envisaged in theDMP and playa supporting role to ACS (Home)in times of Mumbai related crises. In the caseof Non-Mumbai crises the DMP designates theChief Secretary as the Chief of Operations.Thus a comprehensive GR on these lines willneed to be issued by 0 & M (GAD) withsuitable additions in the Rules of Business.

6.1.2 DMP (MUMBAI)

(i) The DMP sets up a BMC DisasterManagement Committee to ensure speedyresponse and effective implementation andmonitoring of disaster relief activities. It is notclear whether any meeting was held under theformal umbrella of the BMC DisasterManagement Committee mentioned in theDMP was held. It is reported that on receivinginformation about the possible rainfall theAdditional Commissioner, BMC sent a seriesof circulars to ward officers and linedepartments giving them detailed instructionsas mentioned in para 5.2.4 of part IV.

(ii) It is also not clear whether any meetings ofthe DMP Committee were held under theChairmanship of the BMC Commissioner tomonitor the relief/ rescue actions being takenon the ground at regular intervals as requiredunder the provisions of the Mumbai DMP.

(iii) As at the state level, the Mumbai DMP at thedistrict (BMC) level was also neverdisseminated. Although MC, BMC has reportedthat the provisions of the Mumbai DMP havebeen substantially implemented this is a derivedobservation since he has also reported that acopy of the DMP became available to the BMConly after the 11th July and the EOC Manualwas obtained only on the 19

th of July, 2000.

It has been stated that in view of this therequisite reports in the prescribed formats canbe sent to the EOC/ Government only in thefuture. In fact although the Mumbai DMP wasprepared in 1998 it was printed only in early2000 and copies of this document have notbeen formally circulated to the concerneddepartments /agencies.

(iv) Another lacuna noticed is that although it was

the responsibility of the ward officers to enlistthe active support/participation of NGOs/Community groups, etc. in relief and rescueoperations this aspect was not monitored atthe level of the BMC Commissioner/ControlRoom and ward officers were left to deal withthese organisations themselves. Once thedistrict level DMC becomes operational this itemshould be a permanent item on the agenda forreview and fresh inter action on a proactivebasis.

6.2 RISK ASSESSMENT AND VULNERABILITY STUDIES

(i) From the information made available by theBMC it is noted that:

a. Out of 15 railway stations which were actuallyflooded during downpour five stations have notbeen identified as vulnerable in the respectiveward plans;

b. Seven slums affected by landslide during thedownpour between 2

nd July, 2000 and 13

th July,

2000 have all been identified in the ward plans.

c. Drain choking incidents were reported at 14places. Of these 6 have not been mentioned inthe ward plans.

(ii) The BMC report lists 61 separate incidents oflandslides, house/wall collapses However, theBMC has not been able to providecomprehensive information on whether all theareas actually affected by flooding (includingtransportation bottlenecks) and landslides inthe downpour of July 11th & 12

th have been

identified in the concerned ward plans.

(iii) On the basis of above it may be concludedthat the risk and vulnerability analysis carriedout in the Mumbai DMP and Ward DMPs wasnot accurate in all respects and there were afew trouble spots that had not been identifiedin the DMP/Ward plans. This work will need tobe undertaken afresh by R & R Departmentwhich should make an exhaustive list on thebasis of experience gathered during the recentdownpour.

6.3 MITIGATION STRATEGY AND MEASURES

(i) The Mumbai DMP which carries an exhaustivelist of various types and the details thereof of

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the mitigation measures required to be takento reduce/ eliminate risks had not been madeavailable to the BMC till 12.7 .2000.

(ii) The ward level plans which were prepared atthe BMC level do not contain any chapter onmitigation strategy. These should includespecific measure proposed to be taken up bythem to remove bottlenecks and improve /upgrade civic infra structure which will give itthe capacity to cope with storm wateraccumulation/flooding.

(iii) The BMC has however has reported thatpreemptive actions were taken to clean, soleand de-silt Nallas and drains and removeencroachments etc. to ensure free flow of rainwaters. Three reasons identified for choking ofdrains are:

§ Un-authorised construction on open Nallas andalongside Nallas and drains that has narrowedthe width of the drains thus reducing theirclearing capacity;

§ Location of cattle sheds in these areas hasalso resulted in the disposal of animal and otherwaste into the open nallas; and

§ The widespread use and disposal of plasticbags is an important factor choking the freeflow of water in the drains, etc.

Further, it has been mentioned that specificworks under the Brimstowad Plan had beenstarted to increase the storm water draincapacity. However, no indication has been givenabout when these works under the plan will becompleted. In effect this means that themitigation measures required to be taken toensure adequate carrying capacity of thedrainage system would remain pending andthe danger of flooding which causes avoidabledisruption of normal life once or twice everyseason will continue. One of the constraintsmentioned in this regard is the lack ofadequate outlays. The main point here is thatthe storm water drainage system is 70 yearsold and is designed to take not more than 25mm of rain during high tide. All Nallas and otherdrains discharge waste water into the sea andtherefore start overflowing whenever rain inexcess of 25mm per hour takes place as

happened on 12th July, 2000. A medium term

solution would, therefore, appear to lie inreprioritizing activities under Brimstowad planand raising requisite funds to undertake theseactivities.

(iv) Regarding communications, as per thereport of the IMD the fax machines of theTraffic Police, City Police, Mumbai, WesternRailway Control Room, Central ControlRoom, and EOC Mantralaya were found tobe out of order on 9

th July, 2000. Again on

11th July, 2000, the fax machines of CityPolice and Mantralaya (Control Room -2850919 i.e. EOC) were not functioning.Thus an action point would be for thesecontrol rooms to enquire into why theirequipment was allowed to remain in a stateof disrepair even after the ACS (Home) hadasked them to ensure that communicationlines should be kept open in his pre monsoonmeeting.

(v) Further, no weather warnings are reportedto have been received by Home Guard & CivilDefence Control Rooms, Collector MumbaiSuburban District and Collector Mumbai. TheBMC and Western Railways have observedthat the weather intimation from the IMD didnot indicate the intensity of the rains whichwould have helped them to prepare betterfor the heavy downpour. It may be advisableto require the IMD to communicate weatherwarning messages to all Control Roomsinstead of just the EOC and BMC ControlRooms.

6.4 COORDINATION MECHANISM AND CONTROL ROOMFUNCTIONS

6.4.1 THE BMC CONTROL ROOM:

(i) At the outset, the BMC have made it clearthat the Mumbai DMP was made available tothem only on 12

th July, 2000. Various pre-

monsoon coordination functions normallycarried out by BMC through the CrisisManagement Group and as contained in theward plans were however carried by the BMCcontrol Room. Pre-monsoon guidelines/instructions were issued to all control roomsto carry out preparatory actions such as

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cleanliness drives and simulation exercises.Post disaster actions were also coordinatedat the BMC level. The following shortcomingsare however noticed:

a) The railways’ representatives did not attend theA, B, G/N & T premonsoon ward meetings,the tahsildars did not attend any of the wardmeetings except the T ward meeting and thefire brigade did not attend the P /S and R/Sward meetings.

b) The coordination between the railways andBMC needs to be strengthened and deepened.Neither the BMC nor the railways have reportedon the important joint responsibility of cleaningareas adjoining the tracks before monsoonsto ensure that there is no flooding. The railwayshave also commented about the adverse effectof closing sluice gates at bandhs during hightides which lead to flooding of the tracks.

c) Efforts to coordinate with NGOs, etc. to enlisttheir active participation in flood related reliefand rescue actions met with very little success.

d) Detailed feedback required to be given toEOC in the prescribed format was alsonot forthcoming owing to the fact that theMumbai DMP document prescribing the samewas not made available to BMC before the12

th of July, 2000.

(ii) The BMC have suggested provision of punitivemeasures for ensuring strict compliance withthe DMP procedures. BMC have also proposedproper training for all concerned and authorityto requisition private vehicles lodging, boarding,engaging labour, hiring machinery etc. on thesame lines as those available to Collectors’.These suggestions may be considered at theappropriate level in the BMC.

(iii) It may be expected that with the availability ofthe Mumbai DMP and appropriate follow up actionas prescribed there under can be undertaken.

6.4.2 POLICE CONTROL ROOM

(i) It is clear that relief actions under the DMPcould be taken only in South Police Stationareas. Although detailed instructions appearedto have been issued to the concerned policestations the same were issued as late as 1800

hrs onward on the 12.07.2000. No details ofthe actual relief actions taken on the groundhave been furnished mainly because, as statedabove, no reporting system seems to be inplace. Since the report received is of a verygeneral nature it is difficult to state whether allactions prescribed under the Mumbai DMP inrespect of the Police Control Room especiallyin respect of shifting of the affected people,corpse disposal, setting up an informationcentre for sharing information with the media/public etc. could be carried out effectively.

(ii) It is not clear whether public informationcentres required to be set up as per provisionsof DMP and as directed by ACS (Home) in thepre monsoon meetings were actually set up.Both the media and the public have criticisedgovernment’s inability to keep the publicsuitably informed.

(iii) The department of R & R may like to carry outa separate study by more intensively interacting with the police machinery once EOCsupervision gets going.

6.4.3 TRAFFIC POLICE

(i) To the question as to whether the provisions ofthe Mumbai DMP had been put into practice,the reply given by the traffic police is “notapplicable”. This is because the responsestructure on occurrence of disaster in theMumbai DMP does not mention the TrafficPolice C ontrol Room. The DMP may need tobe amended to include the same.

(ii) In the DMP the functions relating to TrafficManagement is reflected under the PoliceControl Room. No details of the informationmade available to the public have beenfurnished. However, the traffic police have statedthat their main task of diversion of traffic couldnot be carried out successfully in areas of heavyflooding where the diversion routes themselvescould not be accessed.

(iii) Thus the DMP is still to be internalized by thetraffic police and this will be an important taskof the EOC for the future. Some technical helpto the traffic police may be needed to anticipateproblems and look for solutions within theavailable infrastructure in the city.

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(iv) Learning from the experience of the recentdownpour or a detailed / comprehensive reviewneeds to be undertaken and plans revised toensure that all affected areas can be reachedin times of flooding and evacuation of strandedpassengers carried out smoothly.

6.4.4 THE MUMBAI FIRE BRIGADE.

(i) The guidelines prescribed under the DMP werenot acted upon in any detail. However, as pernormal practice all fire stations/ fire applianceswere kept in readiness to deal with alleventualities adequate manpower was availableto handle the crisis situations. Actions werecarried out under the supervision of the BMCcontrol room.

(ii) The Fire Brigade has not been provided with awireless set and the chief mode ofcommunication was telephone. Non availabilityof portable boats, sufficient life jackets andother appliances were stated to be the mainhandicaps. The Fire Brigade control room didnot communicate its requirement of additionalresources to the BMC as per provisions of DMP.

(iii) The Fire Brigade should ensure a proper lineof communication between itself and the IMD,BMC and other Control Rooms in the city toensure timely actions on its part.

(iv) The wireless system provided under the DMPshould be got installed and people in the ControlRoom trained in its use.

(v) The Fire Brigade Control Room shouldcommunicate to BMC it’s requirement ofadditional resources for performing rescueevacuation and salvage operations. .

6.4.5 RAILWAYS:

(i) As a preparedness measure the railways arerequired by the DMP to clear all obstructionand garbage around the railway tracksespecially in drains and nallas in the low lyingareas to ensure free flow of rain water. No actionon this has been reported.

(ii) No details have been given of the releases tothe media informing the public of the position ofrail services or about any advise to the public tostay at home wherever services affected. It isnot clear whether the public address systems

were used at stations such as Dadar, BombayCentral and stations on the Harbour Lines,where the people were stranded Inability to keepthe public suitably informed at all places -received adverse comment in the media andalso among the citizens at large.

(iii) The Wireless sets installed to enablecommunication with the EOC and other lateralControl Rooms were never used. In the Centralrailway the wireless set provided under theMumbai DMP has not been installed in theControl Room but in the room of stenographerto the Chief Freight Manager and is thereforenot available for use by the Control Room staff.

(iv) No information has been provided regardingthe steps taken to monitor the floodwater andto evacuate stranded passenger to saferplaces, which is one of the major mitigationaction proposed in the DMP to be undertakenby the railways.

(v) The railways did not attend many importantco-ordination meetings held at the ward level.Clearly, the involvement of the railways in theDMP is. minimal and a mechanism will needto be set up to establish inter action on aregular basis within the coordination frameworkenvisaged by the DMP.

(vi) Communication equipment should bemaintained in proper working condition. Faxmachines of the both railways were reportedto be out of order on the crucial days by theIMD. The wireless sets installed to ensurebetter communication should be commonlyused during disasters. The wireless set ofCentral Railways should be relocated in theControl Room. Concerned people should betrained in the use this equipment.

(vii) Better coordination should be ensured betweenthe Railways on the one hand and BMC onthe other in such areas as pre-monsoonactivities to clear the Railway property adjoiningthe tracks of obstructions etc. affectingdrainage of rain water as well as post downpour activities to drain flood waters.

(viii) Enlist assistance of NGOs and Voluntarygroups in carrying out rescue and salvageoperations.

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6.4.6 CIVIL DEFENCE AND HOME GUARDS:

(i) As per the report received the Civil DefenceControl Room lacks the basic equipment Imanpower I infrastructure necessary to enableit to participate effectively in relief measures.

(ii) The IMD did not keep the Civil Defence ControlRoom informed of the weather conditions.

(iii) No details of the rescue and evacuation actionstaken by the Civil Defence have been given norhave any details been furnished of the additionalresources sought from BMC Control Room tomeet any gaps. There appears to be nocoordination with the BMC Control Room.

(iv) The need to provide additional resources forachieving requisite levels of Home Guardenrollment and equipment should beexamined and adequate resources madeavailable to achieved requisite standardsnecessary for effectively discharging itsdisaster related activities.

6.4.7 THE BEST CONTROL ROOM:

(i) No services could be operated on the centraland northern routes of the city as even thediversion routes could not be accessed andstranded passengers could not be evacuatedfrom these areas. These people had to wait forthe waters to recede and many of them had tosleep on railway stations etc~ Lessons learntfrom the recent downpour should beincorporated in the traffic plans to includeadditional diversion routes as required tofacilitate smooth flow of traffic.

(ii) The feedback received from the members of thecommunity indicates that the overall efforts madeby BEST to transport stranded passengers fromflooded areas were commendable.

(iii) BEST also actively participated in efforts tokeep the public informed of bus services atimportant points especially in South Mumbai.

(iv) Mitigation measures should be reviewed/revised to ensure that proper access to allareas is possible to facilitate necessaryevacuation during flooding of roads.

(v) Even though the ward plans have elaboratedon the duties to be discharged by various

functionaries of the BEST it is noticed thatSection 7 of DMP which deals with functionsof various Control Rooms does not list thespecific functions of the BEST. Action to detailthe functions of BEST and to include the samein the Mumbai DMP may be taken by R & RDepartment.

6.4.8 DISTRICT CONTROL ROOMS (Collectors ofMumbai and Mumbai Suburban Districts):

(i) No intimation about heavy rain was receivedfrom IMD by the MSD Collectorate.

(ii) There was considerable delay in transmittinginformation about incidents by the BMC andPolice Control Rooms. Report about theGhatkopar incident was received 5 hrs late.Similarly, report of the fire at Suyog Industries,Vikhroli was received much after the event.

(iii) No efforts seem to have been made to keepthe public informed through the media etc. orby setting up public information centres asrequired by the DMP.

(iv) The wireless equipment could not be used asthis equipment was not shifted to the newlocation of the Control Room in AdministrativeBldg. Bandra (E).The wireless set in theTahsildars offices were also not working.Neither had any training regarding the use ofwireless system had been given by the M/s.Global Tele-Systems Ltd. Fax machinesprovided in Tahsildars’ offices were also notworking. The main mode of communicationwas by telephones.

(v) Channels of communication between theDistrict Collectors’ Control Rooms on the onehand and the BMC and the Police ControlRooms on the other hand need to bestrengthened to ensure that important disasterrelated messages are transmitted without anydelay.

(vi) The wireless equipment should be shifted andlocated in the Control Room of the MumbaiSuburban District.

(vii) Both Control Rooms should ensure that theyare in receipt of all ward plans pertaining totheir jurisdiction.

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(viii) Information centres for keeping the media /public informed should be set up without fail toeducate the public and to control panic.

6.4.9 NGO/ VOLUNTARY AGENCIES I COMMUNITYPARTICIPATION

(i) Although the BMC report states that effortswere made to enlist participation in pre-monsoon ward level meetings/drills it is clearthat the response elicited was very poor.Reasons for this will need to be identified anda proper dialogue started with NGOs to ensurethat NGOs directly involved in the type ofactivities where their assistance is envisagedi.e relief and rescue, information dissemination,first aid, disposal of dead and trafficmanagement are contacted. In fact each wardplan lists the names of the NGOs who are tobe contacted for assisting in relief since theresponse evoked from these NGOs was verypoor the level of contact may need to be re-examined. It is possible that if the ward levelfailure had been communicated to the BMC orEOC level then contact at that level may haveobtained more active responses from theconcerned NGOs. The lists themselves mayalso be taken up for review in the light of thecurrent experiences. However, before this iscontemplated it should be ensured that theNGOs have fully understood the role expectedto be played by them and have been involvedin joint simulation to clarify further the specificactions required of them.

(ii) To enable NGOs, voluntary agencies, etc toplaya meaningful role in disaster managementit has been prescribed that such organisationsshould receive due training either directlythrough Y ASHADA or through Resourcepersons trained by YASHADA under DMP.Details of training imparted, if any, are notavailable. Overall it appears that this aspecthas not received the attention it deserves.

(iii) It is significant that the Police have reportedthat they were. successful in obtaining thehelp of NGOs and other volunteers fortransporting stranded passengers, arrangingfood packets and providing necessary shelters.The method and point of contact and the NGOsconcerned need to be studied to determine

whether the lessons from the success of thepolice can be adopted by the Wards/BMC and,if necessary, the ward plans/DMP be amendedto that extent.

6.5 REPORTING SYSTEMS

6.5.1 Status and Action Taken Reports in theprescribed formats were not sent by any ofthe six agencies to ACS (Home) and the EOCas required by the DMP (see para 4.8.1) Themain reason is that the DMP itself has not yetbeen operationalised and the document hasnot been sent to the concerned agencies sothere is no awareness that these detailedreports have to be sent on a continuing basis.

6.5.2 The importance of these reports cannotbe undermined because they help the recipientto decide on the future course of action. Theflow of information also ensures proper recordof the actions taken and lapses if any.Information thus gathered can later also beused for review and evaluation. Besides, theefficacy of institutional arrangements andprocedures can be enhanced with properreporting.

6.5.3 Once the DMP is operationalised thesereports should become an important part ofthe training curriculum because their accuracywill determine the efficiency with which thedisaster is handled on a continuing basis.

6.5.4 As per the DMP all the reports are to besent to the ACS (Home) and EOC. However,in a 10caJised disaster like the downpour ofour concern the EOC has a much lesser roleto play in decision making than then BMCcontrol room. Therefore, the DMP shouldprovide for these reports to be sent to the BMCControl room in addition to or in place of theEOC in certain types of disaster.

6.6 PLAN DISSEMINATION

6.6.1 The Mumbai DMP lays the responsibilityof disseminating the plan on the MC, BMC,not only among various central/statedepartments / agencies but also to membersof the public / media etc. This has not beendone. In fact dissemination to each agency

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should be accompanied by proper trainingsessions / drills / conferences so that the dutiesand functions of each agency vis-a-vis itselfand vis-a-vis others become clear to all. Theimplications of a task wrongly done or not doneby one agency on the functioning of anotheragency have to be understood by all andmeaningful dissemination rather than meredistribution is needed to ensure this. Both theMumbai DMP and the Ward Plan documentsmay be disseminated as required.

6.6.2 The TV and other media, as suggested,may be used for spreading awareness aboutthe existence of the Plan and the need tounderstand it but dissemination proper has tobe an in depth affair if the concerned agenciesare going to be expected to perform theirfunctions in the detailed manner expected ofthem by the DMP.

6.7 WARD LEVEL PLANS AND RESPONSES

6.7.1 Ward level responses to disastersituations have been detailed in the DMP onthe basis of risk assessment and vulnerabilitystudies of each ward. The areas prone toflooding leading to road and rail transportationbottlenecks, the drains likely to get chokedexacerbating water accumulation, thesettlements likely to get affected by floods andlandslides have all been identified. The natureof work required to be done for meeting thissituation has been listed viz. anti floodingoperations, rescue operations, transportation/Medical care/ temporary shelter of people andsalvage operations. The agencies that shoulddo this work have been mentioned i.e. underthe overall coordination of the Ward officer theBMC line departments, the other state andcentral agencies and the NGOs and voluntaryagencies.

6.7.2 Despite detailed ward plans it is clear thatcoordinated ward level responses did nothappen. In most cases where action was takenthe individual Control Rooms acted on their owninitiative rather than in coordination with theBMC/Ward level control rooms.

6.7.3 The authority of the Ward Level ControlRooms to set priorities and direct and monitor

action should be defined in relation to theControl Rooms of the State and CentralAgencies so that a coordinated approach isadopted.

6.7.4 Responses, wherever recorded, do notshow that they were pre-planned as per theDMP i.e. on the basis of anticipated problemsand prepared solutions. They were reactiverather than pro-active.

6.7.5 At the site level the technical aspects ofhow to tackle crises of various types becomesmore important than merely who should dowhat. The ward level plans like the MumbaiDMP itself are heavily slanted towardsadministrative arrangements to the exclusionof advice to line departments on how to handlevarious types of likely disaster situations. Aseparate chapter should be included on theidentified crisis situations detailing thetechnical issues and advise as necessarywithout which the concerned persons willcontinue to depend on local level spontaneousingenuity which is not what a Plan should seekto do.

6.7.6 The Ward level DMPs appear asprescriptive top down documents. Forfamiliarization, involvement and internalizationof the Plan the responses of the ward levelagencies including NGOs etc should be invitedin the form of critical comments on thedocument itself. This will not only help to evolvea more relevant document but help to ensurethat those concerned with implementing it arewell versed with its contents and committed toits solutions so that an actions fan smoothlyin place when a disaster happens.

6.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS

6.8.1 The exercise to conduct a detailedevaluation of the implementation of the MumbaiDMP is handicapped by the fact that theMumbai DMP document itself has neither beenformally operationalised through issue ofrequisite government orders nor were copiesof the same available with the implementingagencies including the BMC and the ControlRooms whose actions the BMC is required tocoordinate. Ward Plans prepared at the DistrictLevel are reported to have been distributed at

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the Ward Level (15 copies each) but no mentionhas been made about whether copies of thesame were made available to all the ControlRooms. Collector Mumbai has mentioned thathe had been given copies of only 3 ward plans.By and large the response of various districtagencies to the disaster was on the same linesas during similar deluges in the past. Underthe circumstances an attempt has been madeto evaluate the efficacy of the actions taken byvarious agencies only on the basis of thereports submitted by them. Gaps noticed interms of the DMP have been separatelyindicated and actions have been suggestedkeeping in mind the provisions of the DMP andthe feed back received from the media / NGOs/public.

6.8.2 The relatively minor disaster caused bythe downpour on 12th July can be used as amicro model to learn lessons for the future ifand when a genuinely major disaster strikesthe city.

6.8.3 One factor which stands out clearly isthat precipitation beyond a certain point cannotbe absorbed by the city’s infrastructure. Thiskind of precipitation happens once or twice ineach monsoon season and a mega city likeMumbai which is the commercial, businessand financial hub of the country can ill affordthe nuisance that such deluges bring on.Clearly, the implementation of theBRIMSTOWAD PLAN is likely to take severalmore years. Those mitigation measures whichcan contribute directly to augmenting the stormwater drainage system in the city and suchpremonsoon actions as are necessary toensure a clean and unclogged system will needto be given top priority and funds will need tobe sourced.

6.8.4 In the short run the preventive measureshave to concentrate on

(i) Doing a more through job of clearing the stormwater drains as a normal pre monsoon activityand augmenting capacity at the places alreadyidentified as vulnerable. Although the BMCclaims that the necessary pre-monsoon drivesin this regard were carried out, the publicperception and feedback from the press does

not support the claim as will be amply clearfrom the observations of the public mediacontained in Part II.

(ii) Preventing encroachments on, in and aroundnallahs and drains so that the entire capacitycan become available for draining off the excesswater.

(iii) De-silting / soling of nallas and river beds suchas the Mithi and Vakola rivers.

(iv) pre monsoon drills for curative action asprescribed in the DMP at vulnerable places asidentified for the kinds of problems anticipatedin the DMP.

(v) As important as taking preventive / mitigativeactions is the need to keep the media and thepublic informed about “what to do?” and detailsof facilities offered on the ground. There hasbeen stringent comment both in the media andthe public about “the total break down ofcommunications”.

6.8.5 In the long run the DMP has to be madeactive by putting its management in place atthe state level in the first instance. Keeping italive will need to be a continuous exercise.This can only be done by giving the R & RDepartment the requisite resources in termsof material and manpower not only for itselfbut for all the concerned agencies at the state,district and site levels. It can then be made tointer act at all the lower and higher levels tosee that the DMP is a reality.

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REPORT ON KONKAN FLOODS – PRAYAS, PUNE.

‘Konkantil Arishtavar Upay SthanikanchaNazaretun’ – Prayas, Pune

This when translated into English means“Remedies on the disaster in Konkan area –especially from the eyes of the local residents” andthis report has been prepared on the disaster inKonkan area on the 24th and 25th July 2005 byPrayas Study Group, Pune.

The sixty-six-page report takes intoconsideration the various causes, manmade andotherwise which led to the disaster. Themethodology for preparing this report was to havedialogues with residents and civil groups workingin the area.

The first few chapters of the report deal with ageneral description of the ecosystem of the coastalarea, the floods of July and the government’sresponse.

The report points out that while normal rain inthe area is around 2000 to 5000 mm, on 24th and25th July 543 mm rainfall was registered and withina span of ten days the region experienced 1544mm of rain. The report makes a rather strong pointabout the fact that the deluge which hit Mumbai onthe 26th took away all the attention from the Konkanand it took some time before government aid couldactually reach Konkan

Mumbai is a metropolis and Konkan is acoastal region so the problems faced were different.But uncontrolled human activity in the name ofdevelopment wrecked the eco-systems of bothregions. If one looks at the Konkan region, onenotices the following happenings.

The mining of coal to Mumbai and neighbouringindustrial belts have severely denuded thick forestcover and led to large scale erosion

Chemical factories in the region led to waterand air pollution.

New employment opportunities dried awaysooner than expected and old ones like the mills inMumbai had already collapsed. The long awaitedKonkan Railway did little to create employment forlocals but brought commercial tourism, which furthereroded the delicate ecosystem of the region.

Annexure 8Fishing communities suffered a setback becauseof the huge trawlers.

The floods of the 24th and 25th July swept awayentire villages. Railway tracks were washed away.Government grain depots were submerged whichleft the grain unfit for human consumption.

The government helped in the form of cash,coal and food grains; however they was aconsiderable population especially from the deprivedsections who were denied this relief. Also theunlisted farmers (Bedakhalkul) who cultivated theland of the owners could not claim any help. Severalhectares of farmland have fallen uncultivable due tothe stony deposits form landslides. The governmentwill have to come up with something concrete forthe livelihood of these farmers.

The salient point of the report is that it is genderfriendly. It highlights the plight of women along withthe fact that they are the real disaster managers.

Finally the report also talks about the need forpeople’s participation in the rebuilding of the region.

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