Regions, Powers And Order: AStructural Approach To Regional Politics

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Authors Bodung, Sverre

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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1

REGIONS, POWERS AND ORDER:

A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO REGIONAL POLITICS

by

Sverre Bodung

____________________________

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2014

2

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation

prepared by Sverre Bodung, titled “Regions, Powers and Order: A Structural Approach to

Regional Politics” and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

__________________________________________________________(June 30, 2014)

Thomas J. Volgy

__________________________________________________________(June 30, 2014)

Albert Bergesen

__________________________________________________________(June 30, 2014)

William C. Dixon

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission

of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that

it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

________________________________________________ (June 30, 2014)

Dissertation Director: Thomas J. Volgy

3

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an

advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be

made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided

that an accurate acknowledgement of the source is made. Requests for permission for extended

quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head

of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgment the

proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however,

permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED: Sverre Bodung

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AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The foundations for this dissertation were laid in Tom Volgy’s research seminar on regions,

regional architecture and the new world order. I am deeply indebted to the other seminar

participants - Alexis Henshaw, Chansuk Kang, Alesia Sedziaka, Patrick Rhamey, Kirssa Cline,

Aakriti Tandon and Beau James – both for helping developing the concepts used here and for

inspiring me to focus on regions. In addition, I am especially grateful to Patrick Rhamey for sharing

his ARROW dataset with me, and for offering sage advice at some trying junctures.

The road to finishing this dissertation has been long and, at times, difficult. Without the

patience and guidance of Tom Volgy, I could never have completed it. I am also profoundly

thankful to Al Bergesen and Bill Dixon. Finally, Diane Horgan’s help made it possible to finish

the dissertation.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Erin Giles, for her unflagging support, our

daughter, Emma Katrine, for being a daily inspiration, and the Bodung and Giles families for

helping when needed. Without you, this project have been impossible.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my dad, Terje Bodung. He instilled a strong interest in

politics, history and international relations in me at an early age, and this passion has never

weakened. An eternal pessimist, he always feared the worst when he looked at international

affairs; happily, I can now report that my own research disconfirms many of his fears.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of maps, graphs, and tables p. 8

Abstract p. 12

Chapter 1: Introduction p. 13

Chapter 2: Why study regions? p. 18

Introduction p. 18

Regional war and peace p. 25

An overview of IR theories of regional stability p. 39

Local versus systemic explanations p. 40

Conditions of war and peace p. 42

A structural theory of regional stability p. 50

Chapter 3: A brief history of regions p. 57

The purpose of defining regions p. 57

Regional logics p. 68

Segmentation or differentiation? p. 69

The role of distance and power p. 81

Interaction: separating potential and actual regions p. 93

Chapter 4: Identifying regions and regional powers p. 98

Introduction p. 98

Defining regions p. 101

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Determining opportunity p. 103

Defining willingness p. 105

Identifying regions p. 106

Identifying regional powers p. 108

Opportunity and willingness p. 111

The attribution of status p. 113

Chapter 5: Testing theories of regional stability p. 149

Introduction p. 149

Hypothesis 1: Regional polarity affects the frequency of MIDs p. 152

Hypothesis 2: Polarity affects the severity of conflicts p. 156

Hypothesis 3: Polarity has an effect on MID casualties p. 161

Hypothesis 4: Polarity affects the ratio of inter- and intraregional MIDs p. 165

Hypothesis 5: Regional polarity shapes leading-state behaviors p. 177

Conclusions p. 191

Chapter 6: Conclusion p. 195

Introduction p. 195

Unipolar regions p. 196

Bipolar regions p. 197

Multipolar regions p. 198

Nopolar regions p. 199

The role of challengers p. 200

Implications for international policymakers p. 203

Implications for international relations theory p. 204

Future research p. 206

Chapter 7: Bibliography p. 209

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LIST OF MAPS, GRAPHS AND TABLES

Graph 2.1: MID frequency after World War II p. 28

Graph 2.2: Great power MID involvement p. 29

Graph 2.3: Superpower MID participation p. 29

Graph 2.4: MID distribution 1945-1990 and 1990-2010 p. 31

Graph 2.5: MIDs in East Asia and the Middle East after WW2 p. 35

Graph 2.6: MIDs in Europe after the Cold War p. 38

Graph 4.1: MIDs in North America p. 120

Graph 4.2: MIDs in South America p. 122

Graph 4.3: MIDs in Europe p. 125

Graph 4.4: MIDs in West Africa p. 128

Graph 4.5: MIDs in East Africa p. 131

Graph 4.6: MIDs in Southern Africa p. 134

Graph 4.7: MIDs in North Africa p. 136

Graph 4.8: MIDs in the Middle East p. 139

Graph 4.9: MIDs in South Asia p. 142

Graph 4.10: MIDs in East Asia p. 145

Graph 4.11: MIDs in Oceania p. 148

Graph 5.1: MID frequency after World War II p. 150

Graph 5.2: MID severities, 1945-2010 p. 150

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Graph 5.3: MID hostility levels p. 157

Graph 5.4: MID fatality levels p. 161

Graph 5.5: Global inter/intraregional MID ratio, 1990-2010 p. 165

Graph 5.6: Ratio of MIDs featuring leading states, 1990-2010 p. 166

Graph 5.7: MIDs featuring regional powers or challengers p. 167

Graph 5.8: MID participants in nopolar regions, 1990-2010 p. 171

Graph 5.9: MID involvement in unipolar regions with challengers, 1990-2010 p. 172

Graph 5.10: MID involvement in unipolar regions without challengers, 1990-2010 p. 173

Graph 5.11: MID participants in East Asia, 1990-2010 p. 174

Graph 5.12: MID participants in Europe, 1990-2010 p. 175

Graph 5.13: MIDs involving North American powers p. 181

Graph 5.14: MIDs involving South American powers p. 182

Graph 5.15: MIDs involving South Asian powers p. 183

Graph 5.16: India-Pakistan MIDs, 1948-2010 p. 184

Graph 5.17: MIDs involving West African powers p. 185

Graph 5.18: MID participation by unipolar powers without challengers p. 186

Graph. 5.19: MIDs involving Middle Eastern powers p. 187

Graph 5.20: MIDs involving nopolar powers p. 188

Graph 5.21: MIDs involving East Asian powers p. 189

Graph 5.22: MIDs involving European powers p. 190

Graph 6.1: Challengers in decline? p. 191

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Map 3.1: Three versions of the Middle East p. 60

Map 3.2: The Heartland and the Rimland p. 72

Map 3.3: Haushofer’s pan-regions p. 73

Map 3.4: Cohen’s regions and shatterbelts p. 76

Map 3.5: Cantori and Spiegel’s regions p. 78

Map 3.6: Katzenstein’s American Imperium p. 80

Map 3.7: Lemke’s regions of war and peace p. 85

Map 3.8: Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complexes p. 87

Map 3.9: Regions based on Myers’ threat perceptions p. 90

Map 3.10: Integrating core versus fragmented periphery p. 95

Map 4.1: The North American region p. 118

Map 4.2: The South American region p. 121

Map 4.3: The European region p. 123

Map 4.4: The West African region p. 126

Map 4.5: The East African region p. 129

Map 4.6: The South African region p. 132

Map 4.7: The North African region p. 135

Map 4.8: The Middle Eastern region p. 137

Map 4.9: The South Asian region p. 140

Map 4.10: The East Asian region p. 143

Map 4.11: The Oceania region p. 146

Map 6.1: Border states p. 207

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Table 2.1: Regional MID differentials after the Cold War p. 33

Table 2.2: Solingen’s regional conflicts p. 34

Table 2.3: Updated MID counts using Solingen’s regions p. 36

Table 2.4: A structural theory of regional stability p. 55

Table 3.1: Asian regional memberships p. 62

Table 4.1: Defining regional powers and challengers p. 110

Table 5.1: MID frequency by polarity, 1990-2010 p. 152

Table 5.2: Conflict frequency by polarity, 1990-2010 p. 154

Table 5.3: Regional conflict severity, 1990-2010 p. 158

Table 5.4: Polar conflict severity, 1990-2010 p. 159

Table 5.5: MID casualties by region, 1990-2010 p. 162

Table 5.6: MID casualties by polarity, 1990-2010 p. 163

Table 5.7: Inter/intraregional MID differentials p. 168

Table 5.8: Intra/interregional MID casualty differentials p. 169

Table 5.9: Intra/interregional MID distribution by polarity p. 169

Table 5.10: Conflict distribution sorted by challenger p. 178

Table 5.11: MID casualties sorted by challenger p. 178

Table 5.12: MIDs joined or started by challengers, 1990-2010 p. 180

Table 6.1: Unipolarity and regional stability p. 196

Table 6.2: Bipolarity and regional stability p. 197

Table 6.3: Multipolarity and regional stability p. 198

Table 6.4: Nopolarity and regional stability p. 199

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I develop a theory that seeks to account for the variation in stability

and conflict proneness we observe across regions. I propose that the observed variation in

regional order in the international system is fundamentally rooted in the polar arrangements of

the different regions. Specifically, I argue that regions that do not have clearly recognized

regional powers are more prone to conflict, that their conflicts are more severe, and that these

regions are more vulnerable to outside influence than those that do have such powers. Using an

opportunity and willingness framework, I define regions as stable geographic spaces of

interacting states behaving uniquely from the broader international system.

In order to test these propositions, I make use of novel data defining both regional

memberships and that identifies leading regional actors. The results show that not only do

regional polarity have a significant explanatory effect, but they also suggest that it is necessary to

take regional-level effects into account when analyzing international politics.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Following the end of the Cold War, the focus of international politics has shifted toward

examining localized conflicts, intrastate disputes, and the development of regional institutions.

Much of international relations theory-building in the post-World War II era overemphasized the

global superpower rivalry and thus did not see that most of the goings-on in international politics

was not the direct result of the international system, but was rather about groupings of states

within regions. The ubiquitous great-power involvement in these affairs (Regan 2000) masked

their essentially local nature. While this important observation is as true now as it was during the

Cold War, the politics of regions have increased in importance with an absence of a significant

challenger state to American dominance after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However,

while research is plentiful on the development of certain regional outcomes, especially

international institutions (see, for example, Volgy et al 2013), the study of regions as an

explanation of the cross-regional variations in order and outcomes is much less common. The

most significant explanation that exists seeking to account for this variance is a recent article by

Etel Solingen's (Solingen 2007). Unfortunately, her analysis fails to construct her regional

identifiers in a theoretically sound manner, leading to mislabeled regions and misleading results.

In this dissertation I draw up a structural theory that seeks to account for the variation in

stability present across regions. Following the argument of Thomas Volgy and Alison Bailin

(Volgy and Bailin 2003), I argue that the post-Cold War environment cannot accurately be

described as unipolar; though the United States is clearly the strongest state in the international

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system, it does not possess the kind of structural strength needed to shape the world to its liking.

A more correct description of the current international system is one of power preponderance. In

this environment, local concerns and powers become more important than ever before in

determining behaviors and outcomes. Rather than the two great power blocs of Cold War

bipolarity the world is now better seen as a number of regions that are more autonomous than

they were during the Cold War. My argument is thus that understanding and identifying local

power structures are of crucial importance to understand international relations – specifically, I

argue that regional polarities, and the way these are either contested or accepted are strong

predictors of regional war and peace.

This reconceptualization of the effects of polarity ties into longstanding debates in

political science. Different authors have argued about the efficacy of different pole

configurations, and these discussions have not resolved themselves into a generally accepted

conclusions. I maintain that poles are important in international affairs, and, importantly, that the

new, more loosely organized world order gives us an opportunity to theorize about their effects in

ways we have not seen before. Furthermore, by offering a fresh and rigorously consistent

approach to how the poles, defined through the presence or absence of regional powers, are

identified, I hope to move this debate further towards a resolution.

The study of regions has not been conducted in a unified way, and previous research does

not point to any single way to define regional memberships. As regional order, which includes

their polar alignments, is contingent upon the domestic characteristics and capabilities of the

15

states that comprise the regions, I instead make use of the ARROW dataset - a new and original

means of identifying regions for the proper measurement and identification of regional variables

of interest. Using an opportunity and willingness framework (Most and Starr 1984), I define

regions as stable geographic spaces of interacting states behaving in ways that both separate them

from the broader international system and that serve to unify the member states. The resulting

empirical analysis draws upon a dataset that provides not only a necessary means of case

selection for the regional level variables included in this dissertation, but also serves as a

uniquely useful resource on regions broadly applicable to further regionalist research (Rhamey

2013).

Once the regions themselves are defined, I then go on to identify the regions’ leading

powers – the poles. Despite the increasing importance of regional politics, there have been

relatively few attempts to systematically identify and compare the states that act as regional

powers. This thesis utilizes a method for such comparative regional power identification

developed by Cline et al that draws upon the conceptualization and operationalization of global

powers created earlier by Renato Corbetta and his co-authors (Cline et al 2011, Corbetta et al

2011). This method uses a three part framework of opportunity, willingness, and status

attribution, identifying regional powers as those states that possess an “unusual amount”—

relative to their region—of each of the various indicators that capture aspects of these three

concepts.

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The research on regions and regional politics has suffered from both troubles related to

conceptual clarity and from lack of any kind of unified goal or cross-disciplinary conversations.

In Chapter 2, I thus argue for why regions are an important object of study. I lay out statistical

and historical evidence for their relevance, and elaborate further on why the new world order

makes regional studies necessary.

In Chapter 3, I provide a history of regional definitions and thinking. I show how the

regional concept has historically often been either unclear (Thompson 1973) or outright

boosterism connected to national geopolitical aims (O’Loughlin and van der Wusten 1990), and

call for a more coordinated approach to regional theory-building.

In Chapter 4, I introduce the ARROW and DIPCON datasets, identifying regional

membership and regional powers in the post-Cold War period (Rhamey 2013, Cline et al 2011).

Regions are stable geographic spaces defined by the interactions between states, which can be

either cooperative or conflictual. This definition of regions ignores the varieties of regional order,

avoiding the tautological issue of studying regional stability predicated on regional order while

using regional order as a defining characteristic.

In Chapter 5, I generate and test hypotheses about regional stability. Here, I used

Militarized International Disputes as proxies of instability; these are obtained from the COW 4.01

dataset (Kenwick et al 2013).

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In Chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation by discussing the findings of the previous

chapter, as well as the future of regional orders and the impact of this study on both comparative

regionalism and the literature on polarity and stability.

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Chapter 2: Why study regions?

Introduction

While some patterns in international relations, such as the striving for power and security,

may have something of a timeless and constant quality to them, the contexts in which these take

place are not permanent. The geopolitical worldmaps are regularly redrawn as results of regime

changes, trade pacts and the cooling and heating up of friendships; sometimes these processes are

gradual and drawn out, while at other times they happen abruptly. Their impacts are similarly

diverse - sometimes the changes are of little importance and are only noticed belatedly, while on

other occasions they are recognized as momentous right away; the complexities of geopolitical

evolution and transnational affairs give birth to new theories of international relations and

weakens, sometimes fatally so, old notions of how the world operates. These complexities go a

long way in explaining why there have been relatively few attempts to create general theories

about regions and their influence, as these have tended to become single-area post-hoc

explanations of individual events.

In some ways, the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War are obvious, even

banal. With the implosion of the Soviet Union and disappearance of Communism as a viable,

state-backed social, economic and political alternative, the face of international politics went

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through tremendous changes in a very short time, giving birth to claims about ‘the end of history’

(Fukuyama 1992). The superpower competition and its attendant neuroses were gone; in their

place was a triumphant United States, dominant in a new unipolar world order that was supposed

to be benevolent and stably peaceful.

However, there is much more to the new world order1 than the lack of credible military

challengers to the United States. The most important factor to take into account is that, as

Thomas Volgy and Allison Bailin point out, there are different types of power (Volgy and Bailin

2003). One is relational strength, which is a measure of economic and military power relative to

other competitors. This kind of power is necessary in order to defeat or deter other states and to

maintain already established order. The other kind of power is structural strength, which refers to

a state’s capacity to create political arrangements that are to its liking and then to ensure

compliance to these. Where relational strength can be seen as one-on-one dyadic relationships,

structural strength is best thought of as a great power taking on a wide spectrum of actors and

issues on a systemic level. The amount of structural strength needed to establish order depends on

the complexity of the global system, and how autonomous the great power is in pursuing its goals

(Volgy and Bailin 2003, ch. 3).

However, globalization reduces the autonomy of the states inhabiting the system, while

the birth of new states and the diversification of international issue areas increase its complexity.

This means that the required amount of structural strength needed to establish a new international

1 The term new world order will be used uncapitalized throughout the dissertation to avoid association with

conspiracy theories about the New World Order. For more on the NOW, see Barkun 2006.

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order increases. When this is coupled with the fact that the structural strength of both the United

States and of all other major powers2 is steadily decreasing, it becomes clear that no state has

enough structural pull to actually reorganize the world.3 Instead, we see that the system’s

strongest states have the ability to militarily defeat their enemies, but at the same time lack the

ability to create favorable arrangements from the resulting rubble. The preeminent example is

Iraq – the United States was, along with its allies, able to easily defeat Saddam Hussein’s regime

twice in a decade, but has proven unable to change the regional order in the Middle East;

similarly, it is far from clear whether the easy military victory in Afghanistan has been

accompanied by any kind of change of order in its immediate environment.

Thus, the new world order looks a lot less “new” than early triumphalist accounts would

have it. By any standards, the United States is the most powerful state in the system, both in

relational and structural terms. If we go strictly by relational measurements, the world is

overwhelmingly unipolar (Wohlforth 1999); however, by the arguably more important structural

measurement, no states in the world have the power to drive through new forms of order. Thus,

the best way of describing the new world order is that it is characterized by power preponderance

– the United States is the system’s most powerful state and is capable of defeating any rival in a

confrontation, but is at the same time incapable of reordering the world the way it could after

2 The major powers are the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union/Russia, France, Germany, Japan

and China. 3 The change in structural strength over time is done by measuring the resources committed to international affairs,

which are then reduced by constraints on autonomy (measured by trade), which is then further reduced by systemic

complexity (measured by the number of states in the system). The resulting index makes it possible to compare states

to themselves over time. The US index shows that its structural strength is nearly halved since 1950, even when

accounting for the massive foreign policy mobilizations associated with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as

the so-called War on Terror. For more on methodology and results, see Volgy and Imwalle 2000 and Volgy and

Bailin 2003.

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World War II. This is consistent with David Lake’s observation that although the United States

has made a tremendous leap in relational power with the end of the Cold War, its authority has

not increased – it might even be seen to have diminished somewhat (Lake 2009, especially

chapter 3).

Still, this post-Cold War environment is a very different entity from the era that preceded

it, and requires a way to theorize about the intermediate level of international political

organization that lies between the state and the system. There are a number of reasons for this, the

most important being the historical uniqueness of the Cold War. While the United States and the

Soviet Union may never have been completely equal (the United States was clearly the more

powerful party for almost the entire Cold War), the Cold War was nevertheless characterized by

strong mutual hostility that manifested itself globally through balancing, competition and

occasional bouts of brinkmanship.4 It pitted the two most powerful actors of the international

system directly against each other, creating a system of two competing global hierarchies that

derived much of their legitimacy and purpose through their opposition to each other; both

demanded the allegiance of all other actors and that created opportunities and incentives to

reward those who joined and punish those that did not. Though the Cold War had periods of

détente and developed a dynamic political ecosystem of thaws and freezes, its essential nature

remained unchanged. As John Vasquez points out, this sort of international political arrangement

is unique in human history; the combination of ideological animosity, global reach and the

technology and resources to spread the bipolar struggle to all corners of the globe was not only

4 Volgy and Imwalle 1995 argue that the power disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union was great

enough that the Cold War should mostly be considered a unipolar affair. In contrast, Cohen 1973, 1982 argues that

the Cold War was for all intents and purposes a multipolar period.

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unprecedented, but also unlikely to repeat itself (Vasquez 1997). Clearly, as we move away from

a system characterized by bipolar competition into one defined by limited-scope single-power

preponderance, we will need new theories to explain international relations.

In many ways, the end of the Cold War has finally enabled other international

diversification processes of the latter half of the 20th century to finally come into their own. With

the establishment of the new world order and disappearance of superpower competition, these

states now see opportunities to engage in policies more in line with their own interests (Walt

2005, Bacevich 2008). Why this is happening is a matter of debate. As mentioned above, Volgy

and Bailin offer one take – the great powers may still be powerful, but they lack the kind of

strength necessary to create systemic order (Volgy and Bailin 2003). An alternative argument is

advanced by Paul Kennedy and Samuel Huntington, who have both argued that the United States’

relative power is in decline; in this interpretation, local autonomy comes from American inability

to either properly enforce its interests or adequately reward loyal behavior (Kennedy 1987;

Huntington 1988). Another competing explanation is offered by the hegemonic stability school of

thought (Gilpin 1987). Here, local autonomy is the direct consequence of great-power decisions

not to interfere with the affairs of smaller states; instead, it is best seen as an example of benign

neglect. Alternatively, the lack of attention paid to the remoter corners of the world is a result of

policy decision that have come about as a direct result of the change in the international political

environment (Van Evera 1990). Nonetheless, the new political opportunities now available are

more a result of change in the international political structure than it has come about due to

newfound capabilities amongst the weaker actors.

23

While these theories are both interesting and intuitively compelling, they are also

problematic. For instance, William Wohlforth argues that the United States is relatively speaking

stronger than ever and has no realistic rival (Wohlforth 1999). Though he is not explicit about it,

Wohlforth is referring to relational strength, and his argument thus ends up illustrating the

importance of the two types of power – even as overwhelmingly powerful as the United States is,

it can no longer command the kind of allegiance it once could. Thus, with the arrival of the post-

Cold War new world order, many states now see opportunities to engage in policies more in line

with their own interests. The earliest signs of this may have been the US – Japanese trade

conflicts in the late 1980, but today local autonomy from great power influence is the norm rather

than the exception.

In an increasingly fragmented world lacking the strictly enforced ideological guidelines

and consistent great-power policing of the Cold War (Finnemore 2003), regions and regionalism

should matter a great deal. Regions cut across every dimension of the study of world politics, and

a major recent reader asserts that “[t]he resurrection and redefinition of regionalism are among

the dominating trends in today’s international studies” (Shaw and Söderbaum 2003). The

importance of regions is reflected through policy and academic debate; for example, more than

fifty per cent of the total volume of world trade occurring within preferential regional trade

agreements (RTAs), emphasizing the importance of regionalism in economic policy (Mansfield

and Milner 1999). The economic factors are only one part of the impact and importance of

regions – their growing significance comes also from how they constitute global order. Regions

provide a “significant complementary layer of governance” important enough that “regionalism

might actually shape world order” (Hettne 2005). Far from negating regionalization, American

24

unilateralism since 9/11 can be seen to operate through regional order and even to encourage

more of it. Peter Katzenstein argues that, through arrangements and institutions he dubs the

American Imperium, regions are now fundamental to the structure of world politics. Thus,

American influence is actually bolstered by regional arrangements, rather than being dilluted by

them (Katzenstein 2005). At the same time, this only seems to be happening in Europe and East

Asia, two regions considered vital to US interests; it is thus possible to argue that the American

Imperium is not a regional dynamic at all, but rather an American attempt to retain influence in

an indirect way in areas that are considered important to US interests.

Depending on perspective, one form or another of regions has always been part of

international relations. Some scholars associate the term with major empires, while others

observe that a regionalized world has always featured in human history. However, the creation of

regions as distinct groupings of states determined by their behaviors is generally seen as a

phenomenon of the international system that emerged after World War I and then expanded

enormously after World War II. The experience of the former type of regionalism, being

constituted of closed trading blocs that were assumed to lead to global economic depression came

to be judged nearly universally as negative. However, the prospects for regionalism after World

War II were far greater, though the occurrences and success rates varied considerably. The

League of Arab States was the first institutionalized regional cooperation initiative in this period;

although the “shared identities and interests would surely place the Arab states system high on

most predictors of regional institutionization”, it met with little success (Zacher 1979). On the

other hand, Western Europe gave rise to a regionalism with both analytical and normative

dimensions in functionalist integration that identified the pacific benefits of linking socio-

25

economic interests across national boundaries (Haas 1958, 1964; also see Kant 1970). As

insightful and groundbreaking as they were, these works have subsequently been seen as

referring to the specific experience of initial West European integration, and as a case that was

too unique to provide wider lessons.

Two distinct waves of post- World War II regionalism have occurred, the first in the

1950-1970s period, and then the second starting in the mid-1980s, with the latter process now

being labelled as the “new regionalism”, though some contend that “regionalism has been a

consistent feature of the global security and economic architecture since World War II” (Acharya

and Johnson 2007). However, the rediscovery of regionalism required the end of the systemic

constraints of the Cold War. A previously isolationist China now engages itself in regional

activities, including in promotion of cooperation between itself, Russia and Central Asian states.

Japan, previously reluctant to partake in regionalism, has become more internationally active, and

even Iran, while remaining ideologically and politically relatively isolated, has initiated a

moderately successful Economic Cooperation Organization.

Regional war and peace

Thus, following the end of the Cold War, there was an expectation that regional security

would divest itself from global security, especially when it came to the actions and interests of

the great powers (Lake and Morgan 1997). The primary reason for this was the cessation of a

worldwide competition for security, power and prestige – it was assumed that with the West’s

26

victory in the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the logic of bipolarity would no

longer hold. However, several events – most starkly the attacks on September 11 2001 – have

shown that there is a strong relationship between regional factors and global outcomes. Indeed,

the 9/11 Commission concludes that “in the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world’s

great industrial heartlands. In the twenty-first, the focus is in the opposite direction, towards

remote regions and weak states.” (9/11 Commission 2004; it is also worth noting that Lake has

changed his earlier position. See Lake 2009)

One of the main reasons regional war and peace has gained in importance after the end of

the Cold War is that disappearance of great power rivalries have brought regional antagonisms

into the spotlight. The fact that these antagonisms are more local in nature that the great world-

spanning tensions of the Cold War does not make them unimportant; indeed, these conflicts have

the possibility to affect far more of the world than just their immediate geographical vicinity

(Miller and Kagan, 1997). Militarily, they can lead to the proliferation of nuclear, biological and

chemical weaponry and technology; economically, they can disrupt delivery of, and access to,

critical resources. They can create flows of refugees, which can lead to shortages and ecological

problems in the receiving countries (Homer-Dixon 1994) or, in extremis, civil conflicts and

terrorism (Adamson 2006, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). The stress these problems create may

challenge the political and social stability in many countries, even well-established democracies.

Keeping in mind that, historically, the vast majority of militarized international disputes

(hereafter referred to as MIDs) take place between neighbors (Vasquez 1993), and that as the

severity of the conflict increases, the chances of other, nearby states being dragged into the

27

conflict increases (Gochman 1990), it becomes even clearer that the study of the causes of

regional war and peace is an issue of the greatest importance.

However, the existing theories we have for understanding international relations may not

be adequate for this purpose. The current world order is unquestionably different from the one of

the Cold War, and anyone theorizing about international relations needs to take this into account.

When the new world order is discussed, it is usually in terms like “globalization” or “flattening”,

all implying that the effects of physical distance has diminished (see writers as different as

Giddens 1991 and Friedman 2005). States are more interconnected than before, through treaties,

commerce and all kinds of other interactions. However, though global polarity has changed, the

underlying dynamics of world politics remain constant. The three following graphs illustrate this

continuity:5

5 Graph calculated from the COW 4.01 dataset (Kenwick et al 2013).

28

As Graph 2.1 makes clear, despite spikes and valleys, the world seems to have a relatively

constant baseline of about 90 Militarized Interstate Disputes per year after World War 2. There is

a brief “peace dividend” after the fall of the Soviet Union and the attendant collapse of the

Warsaw Pact, and conflict spikes associated with Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in

Kuwait and Iraq and with the NATO bombing of Serbia bookend the 1990s; we are currently

seeing a noticeable decrease in the number of MIDs. Much of the initial increase in MIDs is

clearly a result of decolonization and the subsequent increase in the number of sovereign states.

Importantly, it does not appear that these new conflicts are initiated by global powers:6

6 Graphs calculated from the COW 4.01 dataset (Kenwick et al 2013).

05

01

00

150

200

New

MID

fre

qu

ency

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Graph 2.1: MID frequency after World War II

29

There is a slight divergence in superpower and great power MID participation.

Graphs 2.2 and 2.3 maps the frequency of new MID involvement by the great powers per

year. The trend of lessening superpower use of force has been constant since the end of World

.15

.2.2

5.3

.35

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

95% CI lpoly smooth: GPower

Great powers are USA, UK, USSR/Russia, France, Germany, Japan and China.

Graph 2.2: Great power MID involvement

.08

.1.1

2.1

4.1

6

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

95% CI lpoly smooth: SPower

Superpowers are the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia

Graph 2.3: Superpower MID participation

30

War II and this has not changed with the end of the Cold War. Though we see a modest increase

in great power MID involvement after 2000, Graph 2.3 makes it clear that this increase is not

driven by the superpowers. It is also worth noting that the 95% confidence interval widens in the

same time frame; this is, as Graph 2.1 shows, because the absolute number of MIDs is declining.

Taken together, this means that now, more than ever before, the factors that determine war and

peace should be seen as primarily local affairs. The shape of Graph 2.2 strengthens this

assertion, as non-superpower great powers are by definition states that are capable of only partial

global power projection. Thus, even these new MIDs are best seen as at least mostly local

conflicts. In order to better understand the forces that drive this we need regional theories of

international relations. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to this project.

In an increasingly fragmented world lacking consistent great-power involvement, we

should thus expect regions, regionalism and regionalization to matter a great deal. The data bears

this out:7

7 Graph calculated from the COW 4.01 dataset (Kenwick et al 2013). The ccode variable on the horizontal axis is

how COW sorts states geographically. Generally, single-digit numbers=North and Central America, 100=South

Americas, 200=Western Europe, 300=Eastern Europe, 400 and 500=Africa, 600=Middle East, 700 and 800=Asia,

900=Pacific states.

31

Graph 2.4 describes the change in new MID involvement before and after the end of the Cold

War, sorted by geographical location. It allows us to draw several conclusions about the

evolution of conflict patterns during and after the Cold War.

Great powers are less involved in MIDs than they used to be. The percentage of MIDs

that the United States is involved in has decreased, and the involvement of other great

powers has gone down as well. Keeping in mind the MID trends documented in Graph

1.1, this means that the great powers participate in fewer MIDs in both absolute and

relative numbers. The exceptions to this trend are Russia and China.

Certain states, such as USA, Russia, Great Britain and China are expected to stand out on

a list like this. A more interesting finding may actually be the non-emergence of other

dominant users of force.

Thus, the use of threats and force has become more democratic throughout the world.

There are still states that stand out as more likely to use force, but the data shows that

there are more states resorting to force than before.

USAUSSR

Israel

China

Egypt

UK

01

23

45

67

89

10

11

12

MID

dis

trib

ution 1

945-1

990 in p

erc

ent

0 200 400 600 800 1000ccode

USA

Russia

Yugoslavia

Israel

China

Ethiopia

UK

01

23

45

67

89

10

11

12

MID

dis

trib

ution 1

990-2

010 in p

erc

ent

0 200 400 600 800 1000ccode

Graph 2.4: MID distribution 1945-1990 and 1990-2010

32

While the absolute number of MIDs has decreased, this decrease has not been evenly

distributed, making the global distribution of conflicts more uneven than before. Certain

states and regions are virtually MID free, while others see conflict levels equal to or

greater than before.

There seems to be a regional distribution to the MIDs. Though this graph does not tell us

who is engaged in MIDs with whom, we see that the bars rise and fall in groups. In

particular, East Africa and the Middle East sees high levels of interstate conflicts. It thus

serves to confirm the need for a regions-based theory of international relations.

While challenging, crafting regional-level international relations theories offer important

benefits, the most important of which is that it creates a way to add granularity to IR models

without becoming hopelessly preoccupied with details – i.e. it lets us see both the forest and the

trees. If we are, to use the terminology of Henry Teune and Adam Przeworski, to replace proper

names with common terms and thus develop generalizable theories of social and political

behavior (Przeworski and Teune 1970), we need theories that transcend regional particularism.8

Instead, it is necessary for such theories to be sufficiently general to be useful across a spectrum

of cases, while at the same time being specific enough to offer useful predictions and

explanations in individual cases (Sartori 1970). While striking the right balance can be difficult, it

is not impossible, and the kind of nuanced models this produces advances our understanding of

international relations far better than more simplistic models.

8 The danger this poses is best illustrated by the ‘area studies’ debate between Valerie Bunce, Terry Karl and

Philippe Schmitter. See Bunce (1995a, 1995b), Schmitter and Karl (1994), Karl and Schmitter (1995).

33

A simple count of post-Cold War MIDs further emphasizes the need for regional theories9:

Table 2.1: Regional MID differentials after the Cold War:

Number

of

member

states

Total

number

of

new

MID

participants

MIDs

per

state

Yearly

minimum

number

of

MIDS

Yearly

maximum

number

of

MIDs

Periodic

MID

variation

North

America

28 168 6 2 37 35

South

America

6 9 1,5 0 6 6

Europe

48 423 8,81 6 83 77

Middle

East

12 209 17,42 2 41 39

Northern

Africa

3 11 3,67 0 10 10

Western

Africa

18 79 4,39 0 12 12

Eastern

Africa

6 94 15,67 2 20 18

Southern

Africa

21 106 5,05 2 19 17

East

Asia

16 280 17,5 6 34 28

South

Asia

8 88 11 0 26 26

Oceania

13 16 1,23 0 8 8

Averages

16,27 134,82 8,29 1,82 26,91 25,09

The total number of new MID participants variable refers to any state that is a part of a

MID dyad that belongs to the region. The MIDs counted are all that include at least one

9 Table calculated from the COW 4.01 dataset (Kenwick et al 2013). African regions have the –ern geographic suffix

to avoid confusion with the country of South Africa.

34

participant from the aforementioned region; the regions referred to in table are determined

through methodology further detailed in Chapter 4.

One thing Table 1.1 makes obvious is that different definitions create different results. In

a recent, influential publication, Etel Solingen argues that that East Asia has gone from being

highly conflict prone to far less than the Middle East, and that this is due to the regions’ different

regime types (Solingen 2007). Her numbers initially seem to bear this out:

Table 2.2: Solingen’s regional conflicts:

Number

of

member

states

Total

number

of conflicts

Conflicts

per

state

Yearly

minimum

number

of

conflicts

Yearly

maximum

number

of

conflicts

Periodic

conflict

variation

East Asia

(Cold

War)

19 8 0,42 0 3 6

Middle

East

(Cold

War)

19 38 2 0 5 5

East Asia

(post-

Cold

War)

19 2 0,1 0 1 1

Middle

East

(post-

Cold

War)

19 10 0,53 0 5 5

Averages 19 134,82 8,29 1,82 26,91 25,09

35

However, this initial impression is quite simply wrong. Initially, it is worth noting that

Solingen uses no count models, no per-year frequencies and no other forms of quantitative

analysis. Even a quick perusal of her own data shows that the tendency away from conflicts and

towards peace in the Middle East is much more significant after the Cold War than it is in East

Asia, which puts her causal model in doubt. However, that is just the start of the problem. If we

re-run her numbers using her own regional definitions10 and substituting her data for the

generally accepted data provided by the Correlates Of War project (Kenwick et al 2013), we see

that the picture changes.

It is clear that the Middle East sees a lot of conflict; the baseline seems to lie around 30,

with frequent spikes and infrequent valleys. However, it is equally clear that East Asia saw and

10 This dissertation uses COW data, but has a very different regional definition. See Chapters 3 and 4 for more

details.

020

40

60

80

100

MID

fre

quency in E

ast A

sia

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

020

40

60

80

100

MID

fre

quency in the M

iddle

East

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Graph 2.5: MIDs in East Asia and the Middle East after WW2

36

continues to see a lot of conflict, and that the differentials are far smaller than Solingen alludes to.

Another simple count model emphasizes this:

Table 2.3: Updated MID counts using Solingen’s regions:

Number

of

member

states

Total

number

of MIDs

MIDs

per

state

Yearly

minimum

number

of

MIDs

Yearly

maximum

number

of

MIDs

Periodic

MID

variation

East Asia

(Cold

War)

19 524 27,58 4 59 55

Middle

East

(Cold

War)

19 717 37,74 7 88 81

Average 19 620,5 32,66 5,5 73,5 68

East Asia

(post-

Cold

War)

19 259 13,63 16 61 45

Middle

East

(post-

Cold

War)

19 261 13,74 21 43 22

Average 19 260 13,68 18,5 52 33,5

Grand

Averages

19 440,25 23,17 12 62,75 50,75

As Table 1.3 shows, the difference between Middle Eastern and East Asian conflict levels

is significant during the Cold War, but falls to negligible levels after it ends. Currently, the

Middle East has a higher conflict baseline count, but a much lower count ceiling, indicating lower

conflict volatility. It is debatable which of the regions is more peaceful now, and neither region

can plausibly be described as peaceful during the Cold War. If Solingen’s thesis about the

37

importance of regime types was accurate, the initial numbers should have been more divergent,

and we should not be seeing the current trend. This fatally mars an otherwise ingenious and well-

plotted argument. However, without a regional IR theory and a rigorous, defensible way of

defining these regions, errors like these are unavoidable.

Secondly, these tables raise more questions than they can answer without a regional IR

theory. An initially striking finding is that all the regions have low minimum MID levels –

Europe and East Asia lead with 6, suggesting that though the world sees a fairly consistent

minimum MID level, these cycle through different areas, giving lie to the notion that certain

places are perpetually conflict-plagued. Additionally we also see that certain regions are much

less prone to conflict than others, with South America and North Africa standing out, together

with Oceania. These regions also have a relatively small number of member states, suggesting

that a familiarity-breeds-contempt dynamic could be in effect here. On the other hand, we see that

the African regions have low MID baselines and high levels of periodic variation, suggesting a

more volatile conflict pattern – here, conflicts are quick to erupt, and equally quick to end.11 An

alternative explanation is that these regions have conflicts that simmer at low levels before

periodically escalating.

Surprisingly, the greatest volatility is seen in Europe and North America. Initially, it

seems counterintuitive that the world’s most economically developed and interconnected regions

should also see the highest numbers of conflicts. However, there are good reasons why this

11 For more on the conflict patterns of African states and the challenges gathering data on these often pose, see

Lemke 2003.

38

makes sense, with the most important being that most of the states that have both the ability and

the willingness to engage in international conflicts – states like the United States, France, Russia

and the United Kingdom – are located there. Secondly, it is important to remember that MIDs are

not necessarily wars – they are tiered measurements that range from threats through military

mobilizations to outright war. Thus, the graph does not show Europe or North America plagued

by war – what it shows is that European and North American states get involved in a lot of tense

international situations and that these situations come and go. The table also clarifies potential

misunderstandings. For example, the European propensity for conflict initially appears to be

driven by the Serbian air campaign:12

If the year 2000 bar is removed as a distorting outlier, the max MIDs per year score drops

to 40; however, that still leaves a periodic MID variance of 34, which is still the highest in the

12 Graph calculated from the COW 4.01 dataset (Kenwick et al 2013). It describes new MIDs per year.

02

04

06

08

0

MID

fre

qu

en

cy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Graph 2.6: MIDs in Europe after the Cold War

39

world. Thus, the European security environment remains volatile even when we remove outliers

and control for extreme events. However, the MIDs per state in Europe is quite low, suggesting

that the conflicts are confined to just a few states. In contrast, the Middle East, East African and

East Asian regions have both a high MID per state level and a relatively high MID variance

score, suggesting a wider tendency to escalate conflicts, a lot of underlying tension and a high

likelihood of these escalating into hostile acts. Why this is, and many other questions raised by

the table, will be addressed in the following chapters.

Finally, region-based conflict theories offer a way to develop a more progressive theory

of international relations. Kenneth Waltz’ dictum that “a structural theory of international

relations is necessarily based on the great powers” (Waltz 1979, p. 79) is not necessarily wrong,

(for example, van Evera 1990 predicted that US-led unipolarity would be uneven in its

international application.), but it seems necessary to develop a regional theory of poles and power

to fully account for these variations. Doing this while keeping the insights of Waltz and other

structural IR theorists is what I will do over the next chapters.

An overview of IR theories of regional stability

The goal of this dissertation is to offer a theory explaining the variances of regional war

and peace after the Cold War. Though the political science literatures concerning regions and war

and peace are very large, comparatively little has been written about regional war and peace, and

40

much of this literature is specific to a single region. The following section offers a discussion of

the main discussions of the existing literature, as well as the competing explanations they offer.

Local versus systemic explanations

Scholars of international relations have long tended to privilege either a systemic or a

domestic level of analysis (Waltz 1954; for a similar regional differentiation, see Katzenstein

1996). Different logics are assumed to guide the behaviors of these levels – i.e. the global level is

‘anarchic’ and the domestic level is ‘hierarchic’ – and they are thus incompatible and

irreconcilable.

The systemic logic suggests that it is necessary to focus on the broader international

contexts in which the regions are embedded if one is to understand international behaviors. These

contexts create the pressures and incentives that regional actors respond to; furthermore, the

world is now so interconnected and mutually dependent that there can be no such thing as an

entirely self-contained region that is free from outside influences (Hurrell 1995). Having said

that, the degree to how interconnected these regions are clearly varies; this is clearly shown by

the interaction patterns developed by Patrick Rhamey in his ARROW dataset that is used as the

regional definitions for this thesis (Rhamey 2013; for more details, see Chapter 4 in this thesis).

41

The systemic approach thus argues that the global environment shapes the behavior of

actors within it by offering punishments and rewards. As the distribution of capabilities within

the system is unequal, the superior capabilities of the great powers and the dependence of the

lesser powers on these force the small states to adapt both to the environment created by the more

powerful states and to the dominant modes on interaction within it. The pithiest summary of this

situation remains Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue: “The strong do as they will, and the weak as

they must” (Thucydides 1998). Regional conflicts are the results of great power friction – in its

ultimate interpretation, regional conflicts are nothing more than proxy wars reflecting great

power interests and competition (Väyrynen 1984). According to this line of thinking, bipolarity

during the Cold War brought about numerous regional conflicts, just as the end of the Cold War

and American hegemony has determined the pattern of regional conflicts in the time since then.

In contrast to this, local approaches to regional politics privileges indigenous features,

claiming that these factors and developments are the most important determinants of regional

security. Here, immediate neighbors are more important than distant great powers, primarily

because the regional environment produces the most direct threats and the most actionable

opportunities (Wriggins 1992). A group of neighboring states form a “regional security system”;

such systems are characterized by high levels of security interdependence and often by high

conflict frequency (Buzan 1983, Wriggins 1992). The chance of conflict is especially high if the

system’s member stats are geographically contiguous (Vasquez 1993). Importantly, the regions

have a large degree of independence from the global context around it and the influence of global

structure is mediated through attributes that are unique to each region, such as conflict intensity

or geographical factors (Buzan 1983; Gibler 2007). As a result of these individual factors,

42

students of regional politics must look at their configurations if they want to make sense of the

outcomes, rather than focus on the machinations of great powers or international structures. Each

region has its own unique set of opportunities and constraints, and operate with its own set of

structure and dynamics (Holsti 1992).

Conditions of war and peace

A second major literature concerns itself with the substantive causes of war and the

conditions for peace. I will argue that it is critically important to establish what makes a region

more or less prone to conflict; without this knowledge, any attempt at conflict management

operates blindly and the outcomes of any peace strategies will be suboptimal at best.

Realist theories, whether classical (Morgenthau 1962), structural (Waltz 1979) or neoclassical

(Rose 1998), emphasize three major factors when determining the propensity for conflict:

International anarchy and the self-help system, which is the permissive factor for all

types of international conflict

The security dilemma and mutual distrust and fear, which produces conflict spirals and

unintended conflicts

Imbalances of power, which creates opportunities for gains at the expense of others and

thus provides incentives for conflict.

43

Historically, realists have shared the emphasis on anarchy; defensive realists (Walt 1987,

Taliaferro 2000) focus on the security dilemma and how it can be mitigated, as well as problems

associated with the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities and technologies (Van

Evera 1998, Glaser and Kaufmann 1998), while offensive realists (Mearsheimer 1995a, Labs

1997) highlight states’ quest for power maximization that create incentives for conflict.

However, there are variants of realism that rejects the notion of anarchy. The English

School13 of international relations theory maintains that there is an “international society”

characterized by shared norms and beliefs and that discerning the rules that governs behavior in

this society must be a main goal of social scientists; on the other hand, it also accepts that

material capabilities are the ultimate policy drivers (Butterfield et al 1966; Wight 1978; Linklater

and Suganami 2006) Power transition theory sees the world as explicitly hierarchical, with great

powers dominating local and global power pyramids; conflicts occur when the order within these

hierarchies approaches equality, thus distorting the hierarchy (Organski 1968; Tammen 2000;

Lemke 2002). Long cycle theory sees world history as cyclical, being dominated by leading

states for 70-100 year increments; these states become frontrunners through technological

leadership and policy innovation (Modelski 1987; Thompson and Modelski 1988; Thompson and

Rasler 1994).

In contrast to the ordered hierarchies of authority within states, anarchy means that there

is no generally accepted government that can compel sovereign states in the international arena

13 The English School has at one time or another been claimed by most schools of thought in IR theory. I group it

realism here mostly due to statements by its best known theorists. See Buzan, Jones and Little 1993.

44

(Bull 1977, Waltz 1979). Instead, states must rely on their own facilities, and the states that can

compel obedience does so through their overwhelming capacity for punishment and reward. As

all states thus have some form of military capacity14 and there is no central international authority

to act as arbiter or enforcer, any conflict can escalate into war under anarchy.

The security dilemma also operates through the international anarchy (Hertz 1951, Jervis

1978). As previously mentioned, states must provide for their own security under anarchy.

However, by spending resources on increasing their security, they may, perversely, actually make

themselves less safe. The security dilemma refers to how states that take steps to build up their

security are seen as increasingly threatening by other states, who will then increase their own

capacities. As this then reduces the security of the first state, it will feel compelled to further

increase its capacities, which again serves to decrease the security of the second state. In a self-

help system, this can quickly devolve into arms racing and adversarial alliance-building, as even

the most reluctant state will at some point feel compelled to join in, as the consequences of not

doing so can, in the worst case, be the loss of autonomy. The security dilemma is especially

problematic if the offense-defense balance favors the offense, or if offensive weapons are not

distinguishable from defensive ones.

As a result of the lack of an effective controlling authority, another factor that profoundly

influences the occurrence of conflicts is the balance of power and the distribution of capabilities

among states. In contrast to the inadvertent conflicts deriving from the security dilemma,

14 In John Mearsheimer’s memorable phrase, “For every neck, there are two hands to wring it.” See Mearsheimer

2001.

45

conflicts arising from power imbalances are usually intended. Some of these conflicts are staged

for profit (Liberman 1993, Schweller 1994), others for political gain (Bueno de Mesquita et al

2001); others again are waged for local or global dominance (Mearsheimer 2001). The precise

effect of the distribution of power is the subject of considerable debate within the realist

community. Classical realists maintain that multipolar political orders are the least likely to

produce wars, as the uncertainty and opportunities for alliances inherent in such systems forces

states to act cautiously (Morgenthau 1962). Neorealists argue that bipolar orders are more stable

for the exact opposite reason: through the evolution of such a distribution of power the two poles

have shown themselves to be equal, and the lack of uncertainty in such a system means that the

states know that one side cannot defeat the other without incurring unacceptable damages. This

certainty serves to discourage foreign policy adventurism (Waltz 1979).15 Finally, proponents of

hegemonic stability theory argue that political systems are the most stable if they are headed by a

single, overwhelmingly powerful great power. This hegemon metes out punishments and rewards

to keep the smaller stats in line and is too powerful for revisionist powers to consider

challenging; as a result, the system is stably peaceful (Gilpin 1981, Wohlforth 1999).

As mentioned above, not all realists accept the notion of anarchy. Deriving insights from

all these schools of thought, yet standing apart from them are the realists of the power transition

theory school (Tammen 2000, Lemke 2002). Here, the prime determinant of conflict propensity

is the dynamic relative distribution of between the system’s leading powers. As long as one is

15 For critiques of this view, see Vasquez 1997, who questions the generalizability of this argument from a historical

and philosophical perspective, and Volgy and Imwalle 1995, who question the notion that the Cold War was ever

between two equal parties, instead arguing that the United States’ capabilities were so far ahead of the USSR that the

idea of ‘bipolarity’ is misleading. Finally, Cohen 1973, 1982, 1992 saw the Cold War as most ly multipolar.

46

clearly stronger than the other, the system is stably peaceful – the weaker power is incapable of

mounting a challenge, and the stronger power can achieve favorable outcomes without resorting

to actual use of force.16 However, once the power differentials become dynamic, the system is no

longer stably peaceful. As the leading powers edge towards power equality, conflicts become

more likely; the rising power will seek to capitalize on its momentum, while the declining power

may try a desperate attempt to keep its dominant position. Thus, it is less the number of poles but

rather their respective relative capabilities and the changes in these that are the primary drivers of

peace and conflict.

It seems fair to say that realists focus on the causes of war at the expense of the factors

that lead to peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). The reverse is generally true of liberal theories of

international politics. Still, there are two major liberal theories that deal with conflict proneness –

international interdependence through institutions, and the theory of the democratic peace.

The theory of democratic peace holds that though democratic states are no less war-prone

than non-democratic states, they are unlikely to wage war on each other. Why this is a matter of

debate, and the theory has several important substrata. One school of thought emphasizes shared

norms and values: Dixon (1994) argues that democracies share internalized norms of bounded

competition, and that the lack of a winner-takes-all mentality greatly increases the chances of

peaceful settlement of conflicts, while Owen (1994) holds that it is the notion of shared identity

between liberal states that is the crucial matter. Thus, though both the United States and Imperial

16 In such a system, the bargaining model of foreign policy applies. See Fearon 1995 and Reiter 2003.

47

Germany were formally “democracies”, no American regarded Germany as a liberal democracy.

Other theorists highlight mutual economic interdependence and the adverse effects of disrupting

this will have on the voting public (Hegre 2000; Gartzke 2007).

Finally, a variant on this argument argues that democratic societies possess superior

modes of resource mobilization, particularly in their ability to mobilize private goods (Bueno de

Mequita et al 2003). Democracies know this and avoid conflicts with fellow democracies for this

reason – it is just too costly to engage in conflicts with them, and the outcomes are not certain.

Instead, they engage in conflicts with less efficient states, which they usually win (Stam and

Reiter 1998; Brown et al 2011). In either way, groups of democratic states tend to be more

peaceful than mixed groups or groups of nondemocracies.17

Liberal theorists also point out that the presence of high economic interdependence, a

liberal international economic order and international institutions help reduce any tendencies

towards armed conflict. Institutions serve multiple purposes towards this end; they create

stability, enabling expectations of future reciprocity and continuities. The longer time horizons

provided by them are crucial to the give-and-take of peaceful conflict resolution (Axelrod 1984,

Copeland 199618). Formal organizations also provide mutually acceptable mechanisms for

conflict solving, as well as good offices to conduct negotiations in. Finally, the prosperity of the

international liberal economic order creates powerful disincentives to conflict; the extraordinary

expenses wars incur makes all-out conflict near-impossible for most nations, and the disruption

17 For an unconvincing theory of the ‘dictatorial peace’, see Peceny et al 2002. 18 Copeland is a leading realist. However, his theory of conflict emphasizes long versus short time horizons.

48

of trade makes it unpalatable even for the states with the economic wherewithal to engage in

international conflicts. Thus, in the liberal world order, most states will choose peaceful and

prosperous interdependence rather than wasteful and disruptive conflicts.

Both theories contain valuable and important insights. However, they also have major

shortcomings. For example, international anarchy cannot explain why we see different patterns of

war and peace between regions; as a constant, it is general and underspecified (Wendt 1992).

Though anarchy is supposedly a permissive cause for conflict19, it cannot account for escalation,

diffusion or emergence of conflicts, nor can it explain lasting peace in one region and near-

constant conflict in another. Hierarchy, as conceptualized by Gilpin or, in particular, Lake, can

account for these differences – hierarchic influence leads to stability, and regional variations in

hierarchic influence can explain why some regions see more instability than others (Gilpin 1981;

Lake 2009; also see Kindleberger 1974).

In order to account for variations in conflict proneness, realism offers two other factors:

the distribution of power and the offense/defense balance. Both of these come with problems as

well. First of all, though the global distribution of power is a better variable than anarchy as it can

vary over time, it does not vary enough to count as anything other than a constant. The world is

currently unipolar; it has been so for a while and is likely to remain so for a lot longer20; while

19 Though anarchy is a permissive cause, it is neither a necessary (there are plenty of conflicts in hierarchical

structures and societies) nor a sufficient (if it was, the constancy of anarchy would mean constancy of conflict as

well) cause of conflict. For more on necessary and sufficient conditions see Goertz 2006. 20 Wohlforth 1999 sees the world as unipolar since 1991; Volgy and Imwalle 1995 argues that it was probably

unipolar as far back as the mid-1960s.

49

great-power polarity can serve as an explanatory variable in a study of, for example, regional

politics now and in the 1950s, it cannot tell us anything about regional variation now or then. A

smaller, but still significant, problem is that just looking at regional distribution of power only

tells us part of the story. For example, both Oceania and North America are unipolar regions, and

their conflict patterns are very different.21 Offense/defense balance is similarly plagued with

problems. Again, like the distribution of power, this concept varies across time, but not so much

that it can be seen as anything other than a constant. Its main usefulness is as an explainer for

decision-making failures; the classic argument is that military and civilian leaders thought that

offensive technologies were dominant in the First World War and that defense would continue to

be dominant in World War Two. These erroneous beliefs explain the misguided strategies

employed in the former and the steps taken to contain Nazi Germany in the latter (Van Evera

1984; Posen 1984). These technologies are relatively similar around the world, meaning that the

offense/defense balance is globally similar as well. Thus, while they can explain variations in

conflict patterns across time, they can’t do so across regions in the same time frame.

Liberalism, on the other hand, can account for conflictual differences between democratic

and non-democratic regions. However, it struggles to explain variation in conflict proneness

between different non-democratic regions. Why, for example, has the Middle East seen more

conflict than Latin America after the Second World War? A more promising path is offered by

international institutions. While realists have downplayed the effects of institutions due to either

states’ inability to satisfice when it comes to security (Mearsheimer 2001) or their preoccupation

with relative gains over absolute ones (Grieco 1988; Grieco et al 1993), liberals instead

21 Regional definitions are developed in Chapter 4.

50

emphasize that institutions can moderate states’ competitive behavior by providing longer time

horizons (Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Oye 1986). Unlike technology or, to a lesser extent,

regime type, institutions, both in type and in density, vary wildly from region to region, making

them ideal for hypothesis testing.

A structural theory of regional stability

As established earlier in this chapter, we now live in a world of power preponderance.

The United States is the system’s dominant power, but it lacks the power and interest to actually

reshape the world order according to its preferences. While the Cold War may or may not have

been truly bipolar22, it seems safe to argue that the system’s leading powers, the United States

and the Soviet Union, saw it as bipolar and acted to balance out each other’s influence and roll

back any gains the other may have made, no matter where these might be happening. Though

some areas of the world were unquestionably seen as more important than others, no part of the

world was inconsequential (Scott 1996). With the end of the Cold War and the cessation of

superpower rivalry, this need to contest every policy everywhere goes away. Thus, in a power

preponderance configuration the interests and capabilities of second-order powers become more

important; as the global leading powers are less globally active, leaving the world’s regions more

opportunities to pursue their own goals and try to order themselves as they see fit. Illustrating this

is the fact that an increasing number of intergovernmental organizations now are entirely free of

22 Volgy and Imwalle 1995 argue it was primarily unipolar, Waltz 1979 that it was stably bipolar, and Cohen 1982

that it was primarily multipolar.

51

major powers, a development that would have been unthinkable just two decades ago (Grant et al

2009).

This situation allows for increased efforts by second-order powers to determine the order

of their regions. All states have strongly held preferences about order and its construction, and,

historically, strong powers have taken the opportunity to try and reshape the world order after

major upheavals. Woodrow Wilson launched an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to have the

world adopt his set of principles after World War 1, and the victorious Allied Powers created a

constitutional order after World War 2 that lasted until 1989 (Ikenberry 2000). In the same vein,

then-president George H.W. Bush announced as the Cold War ended the American intention to

forge a world order radically different from what had come before (Bush 1991). Often, these

attempts at reordering the world takes the form of institution-building. As Volgy et al document,

the number of intergovernmental organizations expanded greatly after both World Wars (Volgy

et al 2008). However, a similar expansion has not occurred after the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, the mortality rates of IGOs are higher now than they used to be, and the conflict-

dampening function of the organizations appear to be less effective than before (Grant et al 2009,

p. 76).

All these factors indicate that regional polarity should be an important indicator of

regional order and stability. States are a factious lot, and this is especially true on the regional

level; here, all decisions made and policies adopted affect a state directly, creating an

environment that is inherently one of direct competition and high stakes. Thus, strength may be

52

needed to create and maintain order. This brings up a second important point, which is that while

the world is, by definition, anarchic, this may not be true on a regional level. The level and

effectiveness of order clearly varies from region to region, but much of this variance can be

explained by the polarities of the regions and the hierarchies these create. Two of the three

regions identified in Table 2.1 as having the highest conflict-per-capita levels, East Africa and the

Middle East, has no major powers.23 Is this a coincidence? I will argue that it is not; without a

state that can credibly adjudicate disagreements and deal out rewards and punishments where

appropriate, a system will be less stable than it will be if it has such an actor.

The effects of polarity and the level of stability it creates is an unsolved issue in

international relations. Arguments have been made for the superiority of unipolarity

(Kindleberger 1974; Gilpin 1981; Wohlforth 1999), bipolarity (Waltz 1979) and multipolarity

(Morgenthau 1962). As it is definitionally impossible for the world to be nopolar, little or no

scholarship has been done on such orders. This thesis offers a first step towards a discussion on

this topic. Furthermore, as the regions range across the full spectrum of different polar

configurations, the thesis offers more data on the different effects they create. This also leads us

to a second benefit, which is that by comparing regional stability across a multitude of different

polar alignments, we can better evaluate the relative merits of the logics behind structural realism

and power transition theory. As covered earlier, structural realism sees bipolarity as the most

peaceful and stable polar configuration, while power transition theory rejects this and instead

fears parity, as this is the power configuration that gives both antagonists a conceivable chance to

win. Thus, the expected effects of power preponderance is very different in the two theories – it

23 For details on how these are identified, see chapter 4.

53

leads to counterbalancing, eventually culminating in open conflict, under structural realism, while

it is stably peaceful in power transition theory. While both neorealism and power transition

theory profess that they primarily apply to “great powers” (Organski 1968; Waltz 1979; Organski

and Kugler 1980), I see no reason why the same logics should not apply to second-order powers

and regional politics, especially in the current, more loosely governed world.

I argue, drawing from both realist and liberal institutionalist insights, that polarities serve

as informational markers. As stated above, I expect regions with no poles to be highly unstable.

In contrast, unipolar orders occur when one actor is sufficiently more powerful than others in its

system that its position is beyond doubt. I expect situations like these to be the most stable, as it

offers little to no chance of mounting a credible challenge to the system’s hegemon. Next up, I

expect bipolar systems to be significantly less stable than unipolar ones. Kenneth Waltz bases his

theory of bipolar stability on the fact that it explicitly means that neither party can get an upper

hand on the other (Waltz 1979); conversely, power transition theorists see bipolarity as the most

dangerous power configuration of all, as it means that both parties are close in capabilities and

could thus conceivably best the other (Tammen et al 2000). In addition to this, it is, as John

Vasquez points out, dangerous to generalize from Cold War experiences, as its circumstances

were unique (Vasquez 1997); additionally, the bipolar stability depended at least in part on the

presence of nuclear weapons, a technology that most regional powers do not possess. Whether an

actual power transition has taken place is not particularly important – in The War Ledger, only

nine out of seventeen identified power transitions resulted in war, and a later study only saw five

of ten cases associated with war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Houweling and Siccama 1988).

54

Instead, we will simply note that states in bipolar systems can fight each other and hope to win. I

expect bipolar regional orders to be tense and significantly less stable than unipolar ones.

Finally, some regions are multipolar. Classical realists argued that multipolarity created

ambiguities that prudent states respected; as a result, it was the most peaceful system (Niebuhr

1932; Morgenthau 1962; Carr 1964). Critics of this view can point to the possibility of ganging

up on one state, and that World War 1 came about as the ambiguities of the system led Germany

to underestimate their opponents (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Tuchmann 2004). I will argue

that multipolar systems are information-deficit and thus are vulnerable to miscalculation and

misunderstanding; these systems are conflict-prone, more so than unipolar and bipolar systems.

Finally, this thesis adds another complicating factor: the presence of challengers.

Challengers are strong or activist states that are either insufficiently powerful to be considered

regional powers, or that are not considered to be a major power by other states. I argue that

challenger states force regional powers to take a more activist stance, either to demonstrate to

their allies that they are still the ones that provide the region’s order or in order to discourage the

challenging state. In addition to this, challenger states do, by attempting to increase their power

and standing, encroach on the portfolio of regional power, further creating tension and conflict. A

structural theory of regional stability thus looks like this:

55

Table 2.4: A structural theory of regional stability:

Number of poles: Level of stability:

No poles Highly unstable

Unipolar Highly stable

Bipolar Stable

Multipolar Unstable

Challengers Exacerbates conflictual tendencies. Multiple

challengers add to this.

A number of qualifiers need to be added to this set of expectations. I chose to concentrate

on structural factors primarily because I wanted to create a theory with wide applicability. I do

not in any way claim either that regional polarities are the only factors that matter in determining

regional stability or that other factors do not play important roles. Polarity is not a sufficient

factor for determining war and peace – if it was, we would see constant conflict in certain regions

and complete absence of it in others, which we clearly do not. Instead, I view polarity as a

necessary factor for understanding international relations, as it limits and shapes the choices

available to policymakers.24 For example, the institutional makeup of a region is most probably

important to its stability. However, when crafting a portable and parsimonious theory, it becomes

problematic to account for their effect. Assume that two regions each have a region-spanning

institution that are formally identical. How this institution actually works on a day-to-day basis

could vary greatly based on the actions and attitudes of the respective regions’ leading powers.

24 In this sense, polarity functions as structure-induced equilibria, limiting the timing and range of options open to

actors. See Shepsle and Weingast 1981.

56

Similarly, cultural perspectives on security and international relation can explain why certain

outcomes were reached, and how they came about (Katzenstein 1996b). However, such theories

are non-portable; knowledge of, for example, the style of rhetoric and negotiation strategies of

the People’s Liberation Army (Johnson 1996) will not tell us much about similar strategies

employed by the neighboring Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. Other factors that are clearly

important in determining regional stability includes rivalries (Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993),

geographic factors (Gibler 2007), the status of borders (Starr 2013), the regime composition of

the region (Russett and Oneal 2001; Peceney et al 2002) and the effects of institutionalization in

the region (Nye and Donahue 2000). At the moment, I am prepared to sacrifice all of this on the

altar of parsimony.

The reason I am prepared to do so is because this dissertation represents exploratory

research. Structural theories reduce international relations to its simplest, most basic components

in order to get at the most fundamental processes that guide and govern a system’s workings.

Once these rules have been established, further layers of complexity can be added as needed. For

example, I am genuinely interested in the effects of rivalries on regional stability; I suspect it is

significant, and I further think the dynamics of intraregional rivalries will be different than those

of interregional rivals. However, such projects must wait until the basic foundations of a theory

of regional stability has been laid. I will do this over the next chapters; in Chapter 6, I will return

to areas of further research.

57

Chapter 3: A brief history of regions

The purpose of defining regions

“Rational choice theory, with its claims to axiomatic reasoning, deduction as the fountainhead of truth,

and universal principles of politics, is challenging political science. […] The idea of having a political

science specialist for every piece of international real estate may soon seem as arcane as having a

specialist for every planet in an astronomy department.”25

“Pluralism without updating is not science. […] It would be warping of the scientific frame if we built into

the charter of any department of political science that there had to be an expert on “realism”, or on “South

Asia”, or in “democracy”, or in “qualitative methods”.26

As established in Chapter 2, the post–Cold War era has been described as a “world of

regions,” and the study of regional orders has been declared “vital to our understanding of how

the world works” (Acharya 2007, p. 630). Given this strong encouragement for a greater effort

aimed at a better understanding of regions and regional powers it is surprising how little work

actually addresses these issues in the literature. While a number of scholars have presented

different operational criteria for regions (Lemke 2002; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Lake 1997),

there has been virtually no attempt to systematically identify regional powers. Most of the

25 Laitin 1993. 26 Laitin 2003.

58

approaches used to identify regions and regional powers typically range from ignoring the

problem of identification to identification by “common knowledge” or by using a single indicator

such as military capabilities or economic growth (Lemke 2002, p. 41). Attention to regional

powers is often focused on the “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) due to

their substantial military, economic, and political capacity (Hurrell 2006; Tammen 2006). Yet

their relations to the regions in which they reside are not typically discussed in a systematic and

comparative context. This chapter traces these problems and argues for why it is necessary to

develop better, more unified regional definitions in international relations.

The scope and direction of any attempt to create a theory of regions ultimately comes

down to the aims and ambitions of the theorist. I want to be explicit about mine: I fully subscribe

to the concept of social science as advanced by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, where they

argue for replacing “given names” with “common names”, i.e. to create widely generalizable

theories out of more particularistic ones (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The aim of this thesis is

not to create a theory of South Asia or North America, but rather a theory of regions that is

globally applicable. However, this is easier said than done - as William Thompson points out in

his classic survey of literature on regions, the 23 publications he examined had no fewer than 22

different definitions of “region” (Thompson 1973). More distressingly, he was unable to find

much evidence of theory-building progress, as none of the 23 authors shared more than 50% of

the definitional components Thompson identifies, and there were no signs that there was any sort

of congruence over time; definitions are as diverse in 1972 as they were in 1957. As hard as he

59

tried, Thompson was unable to formally identify a single necessary or sufficient component for a

definition of “region” (though “geographical proximity” came close) from the surveyed literature.

Surprisingly, this situation has not improved noticeably since Thompson published his

article almost 40 years ago. As an example, Benjamin Miller’s States, Nations, and the Great

Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace, which was a nominee for ISA’s “Book of the

decade” award for the 2000-2010 time period, contains no definition whatsoever of regions

despite its focus (Miller 2007), and the literature reviews on the subject call regionalism an

“elusive concept” and note that “extensive scholarly interest in regionalism has yet to generate a

widely accepted definition of it” (Mansfield & Milner 1999, p. 621). In addition to regions

having different constituting characteristics, many countries belong to several regional

arrangements, some of which overlap but do not necessarily coincide.

The concept and understanding of region is also obscured by divergent usages of the term.

In international relations, “region” can be a group of states, but it may also refer to linkages

across the national boundaries of two or more states but involving units below the national level

of governance (Cottey 1999). Such sub-regions are increasingly a worldwide phenomenon, and

are particularly important in development questions in the global south, where they are important

for both policy-making and as another level of analysis (Söderbaum & Taylor 2003, Breslin &

Hook 2002). However, the multiple meanings and varying usage of the terms do little to clear up

the regional concept.

60

This definitional confusion creates two serious problems. Initially, the lack of a generally

accepted definition casts aspersions on any one definition. Consider the three concepts of the

Middle East depicted in Map 3.1.

Map 3.1: Three versions of the Middle East:

Binder (1958):

Miller (2007):

Solingen (2007):

61

Binder explores the Middle East as a geopolitical unit. He differentiates between an Arab,

Muslim, ex-Ottoman core that also includes Iran, and a Muslim periphery attached to the core. In

contrast, Miller and Solingen develop theories on regional variations in conflict levels. Their

theories are quite different, but both argue that the Middle East is uniquely conflictual; Solingen’s

theory argues that this is due to the evolutionary process behind the region’s regimes, while

Miller’s theory instead locates the conflictual impulse in the lack of balance between state and

nation. Neither author actually specify the definition of their region; however, Solingen’s theory

benefits from a wider geographical membership, while Miller concentrates on key examples. The

result is three very different-looking versions of what is portrayed as the same region. One

problem that Miller and Solingen face is that they are unable to persuasively defend themselves

from the charge of cherry-picking. There are clearly core states that must be included in any

definition of the Middle East – Egypt, Syria and the Gulf States come to mind. However, why has

Solingen included Sudan when even the expansive Binder definition does not? Is it because

Sudan is conflict-plagued and thus serves her argument well? And why is Algeria excluded from

Miller’s version of the Middle East? Is it because Algeria’s civil war was primarily driven by

religion rather than ethno-social factors and thus didn’t fit his thesis? A closer look at the MID

data (Kenwick et al. 2013) further serves to undermine Solingen’s argument, as it turns out that a

lot of her border states do not orient towards the Middle Eastern core, instead primarily

interacting with states outside Solingen’s supposed region. As we will see in Chapter 4, by using

the ARROW definition of regions (Rhamey 2013), we get a much better sense of the actual

regions. Problems like these mar their otherwise thoughtful, well-crafted theories of international

politics, and serves to further emphasize that the regional definition must be explicit and that it

must be able to withstand charges of tautology or cherry-picking.

62

The second problem of the wide variety of regional definitions is the problem of

advancing a better understanding of a key factor in understanding international relations.

Consider this list of Asian regions:

Table 3.1: Asian regional memberships:

Southeast

Asia

Modelski

(1961)

Southern

Asia Brecher

(1963)

East

Asia

Hellmann

(1969)

North

Asia

Ng-

Quinn

(1986)

East

Asia

Ross

(1995)

East Asia

Solingen

(2007)

Southeast

Asia

Kuhonta

et al

(2008)

Australia X Maybe27 X

Bangladesh X X

Bhutan X

Brunei X X X

Cambodia X X X X

China X X X X X

India X X

Indonesia X X X X X X

Japan X X X X X

Malaysia X X X X X X

Myanmar X X X X

Nepal X X

New

Zealand

X X

North

Korea

X X X X

Pakistan X X

Papua New

Guinea

X X

Philippines X X X X X X

Singapore X X X X X

South

Korea

X X X X

Sri Lanka X X

Taiwan X X X X

Thailand X X X X X X

Vietnam X X X X

27 Australia appears in a table of «East Asian powers», but is not mentioned anywhere else.

63

Table 3.1 lists the memberships of Asian regions derived from the readings in the

bibliography that concerns themselves exclusively with Asian politics. Even with a relatively

small publication sample and geographical scope, we see that there is no consensus on “who

belongs where”. Is Japan best thought of as a Southeastern Asian country? East Asian? North

Asian? It is also notable that multiple authors use the same term, but fill them with different

content – Modelski’s Southeast Asia bears little resemblance to the one described by Kuhonta

and his co-authors. This also shows the issue of whether and how larger geographical units can or

should be considered regions, particularly continents. The concept of continent-shaped “meta-

regions” is widely used, both in the vernacular and in academic settings. Historians and political

scientists are said to ‘know a region when they see one’, and economists identify them through

the existence of formal trading structures (Väyrynen 2003, p. 26). The term ‘region’ is left fairly

open with one definition listing “besides proximity […] cultural, economic, linguistic, or political

ties” (Mansfield & Milner 1999, p. 591). This is clearly an unfortunate situation if we want to

effectively analyze international relations.

Some regions are more tightly interconnected than others. These connections constitute

regionalism, and this coordination in itself can define the region more tightly. However,

regionalism is a wide-ranging set of activities by different actors, in different ways and at

different times. The term regionness, as advocated by Björn Hettne, stresses the capacity of a

self-defined region to articulate its identity and interests to other actors (Hettne 1999). Here, how

well a region expresses this regionness then serves as an indication of how ‘real’ and successful a

region has become. However, this approach to regional definition is profoundly problematic, as it

requires regional consensus about belonging. As mentioned earlier, East European states like

64

Poland and Hungary tried to define themselves westward, seeing the “Eastern” prefix as

pejorative and indicating backwardness; however, if West European states do not see Poland and

Hungary as members of their region, where does that leave them? What do we do with states that

do not cooperate much with their neighbors, such as Israel or North Korea?

As we see, the term is conceptually unclear. The common understanding of regions shared

by a number of theorists is based on the notion of territorial proximity (Kacowicz 1998).

However, some scholars define regions on the basis of cultural affinity or divergence

(Katzenstein 2005, Huntington 1997), while others use the distribution of power as the major

criterion (Lemke 2002). Finally, some see regions as defined by constantly evolving issues (Lake

& Morgan 1997; Goertz & Powers 2009), while others see them as largely unchanging entities

(Nye 1968). And even though the theorists are correct that cooperation can contribute to the

formation of regions, it is equally true that conflictual interactions can create regions as well. This

aspect of regionalization is greatly undertheorized and understudied; the closest thing we have to

a theory of conflictual regionalization is the work on enduring rivalries by Paul Diehl, Gary

Goertz and Paul Hensel (Diehl & Goertz 1988; Goertz & Diehl 1992, 1993; Hensel 1994, 1996,

2000). This lack of interest is especially puzzling considering the prevalence security studies

have had in international relation; instead, the paucity of studies on conflictual regionalism can be

seen as an indicator of the lack of cross-field pollination of ideas in IR. Similarly, further

complicating the study of regions is the fact that different analytical formulations of region, and

what actors are responsible for them, are closely associated to fundamental features of core

debates in IR. The “new” regionalism, which is closely tied to IR constructivism, tries to describe

and analyze a complex interplay of local, regional, and global forces that involves states as well

65

as non-state, market, and societal actors (Bhagwati 1993). Assessing how regions function and

interact is further complicated by acceptance that regions are perpetually unfinished projects, and

that they are also porous units interlinking, influencing and being influenced regularly by others

actors and regions (Katzenstein 2005, pp. 21-35). In both the economic and political realm,

policy patterns are now seen to involve globally diffused network regions rather than being tidy,

self-contained units, further distinguishing the “new” from the “old” regionalist bloc concepts

dominating the regionalist thinking until the 1990s. This lack of clear-cut units and expected

tasks performed by these makes analysis even more challenging.

An early example of this cross-cutting concept is Karl Deutsch’s theorizing of the

“pluralistic security community” as a quality of relations among states that possess “a real

assurance that the members of the community will not fight each other physically, but will settle

their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch 1957). Here, Deutsch argues that a region can’t just

be behavior or location, but must be understood as a combination of the two. Moreover, making

an exception for the few powers with capacity for global power projection, regions serve as the

principle forum for conflict and peace. The foundational idea of a regional security complex has

over time been expanded to include cooperative as well as confrontational relations (Buzan 1983,

Lake & Morgan 1997). Regions have also been characterized in broader security thinking as

generating different forms of security, stretching from political-power competition to integration.

In this vein, Patrick Morgan and David Lake argue that there are “rungs on a ladder up which

regional security complexes may climb as they pursue security management” (Lake & Morgan

1997). David Lake argues that, rather than cooperation emerging instinctively from anarchy,

66

peaceful regional orders arise because of a dominant state; thus, regions are local international

order (Lake 2009).

One common factor is geography. “[W]ithout some geographical limits the term

‘regionalism’ becomes diffuse and unmanageable” (Hurrell 1995). Though much of the current

debate about regions place great emphasis on social construction, the earlier studies of

regionalism considered geographical proximity the most important factor of regional definition

and economic regionalism still “hinge on the importance of geographic proximity” (Mansfield &

Milner 1999). Hettne and his co-authors define “regionness” as “the convergence of several

dimensions”, including “cultural affinity, political regimes, security arrangements and economic

policies”, that result in “regional coherence within a particular geographic area” (Hettne, Inotai

and Sunkel 1999, p. xviii, my italics). Geography is thus the necessary starting point for

identification of regions.

However, though necessary, geographic features in themselves are not sufficient in

defining regions (on necessary and sufficient conditions, see Goertz 2006). As the brief

discussion of RTAs indicates, trade is a major activity of regions. In addition, the absence of

trade, not least when trade is a declared intention, could be both an indicator and an explanatory

tool for the absence of deeper regional cooperation. As an example, the Middle East has, on the

basis of declarations, embraced regionalism since the days of Nasser’s pan-Arabism, but has

produced little policy content to match the rhetoric. This could lead us to suggest that the Middle

East is lacking in “real” regionness. However, creating overly strict benchmarks for trade and

67

cooperation creates another problem – if the term’s definition becomes too strict, it loses

portability and generalizability (Sartori 1970). If only the European Union can qualify as a “real”

region, the term does not help us develop a better understanding of international politics.

Furthermore, the existence of institutions can be misleading. Some bodies with formal

institutions, like the OAS, “historically sustained themselves through their inaction, rather than

through multilateral activism” (Job 1997, p. 182). Acharya and Johnston go as far as to conclude

that generally more formally institutionalized regional groups do not necessarily produce more

effective cooperation (Acharya and Johnston 2007). It is entirely possible that effective security

communities might exist not so much because of formal institutionalization but because shared

values and almost instinctive responses to group needs. Similarly, effective trade organizations

may not be particularly good at creating group identities; as successful as NAFTA might be on

the economic level of regionalization, its North American identity-creating dimensions seem

extraordinarily limited, and the same seems to be true for the European Union. Even after 50

years of the most ambitious and most comprehensive identity-creating project ever attempted,

most Europeans still think of themselves as citizens of their own state first, European citizens

second and EU citizens last.

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Regional logics

As we have seen, developing a concept of regions is extraordinarily complex, featuring a

blend of organizational patterns, social identities and geographical factors. Furthermore, most

regional theories are very specific in scope. The problems with earlier versions of regional

definitions can still be summed up in Michael Banks’ overview, where he suggests that “regions

are what politicians and people want them to be” (Banks 1969, p. 338). Relatively few

researchers provide data justifying the definition of their regions, and most tend to focus on just

one area of interest and then define their regions according to that interest. The security theorists

look almost exclusively at measurements of power, the economic scholars focus on trade

organizations and flows, and the identity-focused researchers deal with matters of regional

culture and perceptions. As a result, the study of regions consists of three groups that that do not

talk much with each other and whose definitions can become overly narrow – indeed, the study of

regions seem to be a prime example of Gabriel Almond’s much-deplored “separate tables”

situation (Almond 1990). The aim of this thesis is to develop a theory of regions seeks to unify

these strands and create definitions that are acceptable to all parties.

As we see, interaction and geographical proximity are clearly not sufficient factors, but

both are necessary. In addition, a general theory of regions need to account for the roles played

by a wide variety of other factors, such as power, trade and culture. Over the next pages I

summarize earlier approaches to this and show how I integrate some of them and reject others; in

the next chapter, I use insights derived from these models to arrive at my own regional model.

69

Segmentation or differentiation?

Many authors have theorized on regions and their effect on the post-war political

environment. Generally, they have emphasized a gradual waning of great power preponderance,

which is assumed to lead to an increased significance of sub-global variants of political cohesion.

These patterns are assumed to occur and vary on a regional basis. Thus, the international system

is expected to separate into smaller entities based on either segmentation (the global system

breaking down into smaller subsystems – i.e. ‘blocs’) or differentiation (sector-based breakdown

that end up creating multiple overlapping regions – i.e. ‘webs’ or ‘networks’). The regionalist

perspective was especially prevalent in the regional subsystems literature of the late 1960s

(Thompson 1973); however, it has endured after that, and, with the end of the Cold War and the

cessation of superpower competition, its logic has become even more relevant (Väyrynen1984,

Gilpin 1987, Väyrynen 2003).

Early theories of regions are theories of differentiation. The first classical theory of

regions, and one that served as the foundation for much of the geopolitical thinking for the next

century, was the “Heartland theory” proposed by Halford Mackinder (Mackinder 1904, 1919;

Kaplan 2012 notes how Mackinder’s insights are becoming fashionable again). Mackinder can be

seen as a very early long cycle theorist.28 He noted that historically, the tribes that had dominated

the Eurasian continent had come from Central Asia; this he dubbed the “Heartland”. As land

28 Interestingly, the conclusions and predictions he drew are the exact opposite of later long cycle theorists, who

stressed the importance of seapower. See Thompson and Modelski 1988, and Thompson and Rasler 1994.

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power dominated, this area served as the source of power for anyone who would want to rule

Asia or Europe. With the beginning of the Columbian Era of maritime exploration and the ascent

of sea power in the late 1400s, this balance swung away from the Heartland in favor of coastal

states, especially Great Britain. However, Mackinder considered sea power to be on the wane,

primarily because of the mass-transportation possibilities of railways. With the re-ascent of land

power, he was confident that the Heartland would rise back into prominence.

The Heartland had two components: an inner “pivot area” that was inaccessible to sea

power, surrounded by an “inner crescent” consisting of the Eurasian landmass, and an “outer

crescent” consisting of the rest of the world. When the original theory came out, it was

tremendously influential, and provided a framework for British foreign policy: stop the Germans

from controlling the Heartland and thus building an impregnable Fortress Europa. As his famous

dictum has it:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island

Who rules the World-Island commands the World29

29 Mackinder 1919, quoted in Taylor 1984, p. 39

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Though this theory was tremendously influential, it had obvious, crippling weaknesses. If

sea power was on the wane, why would the way to world domination be to establish a

geographical area impervious to naval attack? Similarly, how would the masters of the Heartland

exercise power over the “outer crescent”? Clearly, air power affects the sanctity of the “pivot

zone”, and the invention of nuclear weapons invalidated the whole concept.

However flawed Mackinder’s logic was, the notion of a hierarchy of more and less

important geographic zones remained attractive to policymakers. The American diplomat

Nicholas Spykman took Mackinder’s map, revised the priorities and, with that, created a new US

policy framework. Though the Heartland remained strategically important, he argued, its power

could be negated by controlling what Mackinder had called the “inner crescent”; Spykman called

this the Rimland (Spykman 1942, 1944). Though the Soviet Union controlled the Heartland,

Spykman called for the United States to take control of the Rimland; this, along with the

containment recommendations in George Kennan’s “X” article a few years later, did indeed

become the US policy of containment. The Heartland and Rimland are described below:30

30 Map taken from Cohen 1973, chapter 2, who bases it on Mackinder 1904, 1919.

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Map 3.2: The Heartland and the Rimland:

Mackinder’s strategically critical Heartland is marked in red; the Inner Crescent in black

and the Outer Crescent in green. Mackinder wrote off North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as

useless desert. By reversing the map, we get Spykman’s Rimland – the black-colored areas are

now the all-important Rimland, containing the red-colored Heartland while drawing support from

the outer lands. The only difference is the role played by the Middle East, especially by Iran.

Another early, well-known and infamous31 example is the concept of pan-regions

developed by the German geopoliticians in the interwar period. The Geopolitiker saw the world

31 Sloan 1988, O’Loughlin and van der Wusten 1990, Demko and Wood 1994, and Parker 1998 all emphasize that

the concept of geopolitics was so tainted by its association with Nazism that it essentially disappeared from academia

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as divided into three or four large political and economic blocs, each dominated by a single great

power – Germany, Japan and the United States; some also included the Soviet Union

(O’Loughlin and van der Wusten 1988, Parker 1998). The European region usually included the

African continent, as well as the Middle East, while the pan-Asiatic region normally included the

Indian subcontinent; the border between the two was drawn through Persia. Latin America would

serve as the hinterlands of the United States. A summary of their theories is provided in Map

3.3:32

Map 3.3: Haushofer’s pan-regions:

The pan-regions would be autarkic and would have minimal contact with one another.

The borders and divisions between the pan-regions were never particularly clear; the main reason

after World War 2; furthermore, when it returned, it was brought back by political scientists rather than by

geographers. 32 Map taken from O’Loughlin & van der Wusten 1990, who adapted it from Haushofer 1934, 1938.

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for this was the complete lack of interest the Geopolitiker had for areas distant from Europe. It is

important to keep in mind that German geopolitics was little more than an attempt to graft

academic respectability onto post-imperial German hunger for land and prestige (O’Loughlin and

van der Wusten 1990; Starr 2013). Karl Haushofer, who, being both an army general and a

professor was the most influential of their number, wrote off huge tracts of the Soviet Union and

Latin America, plus virtually all of Africa and Canada, as useless land not worth fighting over.

The Soviet pan-region does not appear in all Geopolitiker writings, and where it appears, it is

implied that it would only be allowed to exist after being militarily beaten by Germany; it is seen

more as an aggregation of empty land of no use that is not worth ruling directly from Berlin than

it is as a viable political and economic unit.

Similar tripartite divisions of the world can be found in more reputable works. Kenchi

Ohmae argued that Africa and the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia are the natural markets

of European, American, and Japanese multinational corporations, respectively, and Robert Gilpin

saw an emerging world order comprised of three economic pan-regions dominated by Europe,

Japan and the United States (Ohmae 1985, Gilpin 1987). It is also popular with Marxist writers

operating within a center-periphery paradigm, which divides the world into rich exploiters and

poor exploitees, and with North-South theorists (Hobson 1965, Galtung 1971, Lenin 1996).

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The most prominent contributor to a modern theory of regions is Saul Cohen. He has

refined a hierarchical world model that distinguishes between two types of international regions

(Cohen 1973, 1976, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1991, 1996). Up until the end of the Cold War, his world

is primarily divided into geostrategic realms, each dominated by one of the superpowers. These

are again divided into geopolitical regions, which are derived from geographical regions and

serve as frameworks for common political or economic action. These divisions remain constant

throughout Cohen’s scholarship, though he does entertain the notion of separating out Southeast

Asia as its own geostrategic realm.

In addition to separating the world into regions, Cohen also divides the regions into

regional types: geopolitical regions and shatterbelts. Regular geopolitical regions are entities

held together by common purposes and actions. Shatterbelts are regions marked by superpower

rivalry and lack of internal cohesion. The three shatterbelt regions are Sub-Saharan Africa (in

purple), the Middle East (in dark green) and Southeast Asia (in yellow). Map 3.4 sums up

Cohen’s worldview:33

33 Map taken from Cohen (1982).

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Map 3.4: Cohen’s regions and shatterbelts:

Cohen argues that regions first took on real significance in the 1960s, when Europe, Japan

and China finally had recovered enough after World War 2 to re-emerge as international actors,

thus moving the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity. As the bipolar monopoly

on economic and military policy progressively broke down over time, regional arrangements

became increasingly important; this dynamic increases with the emergence of new second-order

powers such as India, Brazil, Nigeria and Australia during the 1970s. These states “possess the

prerequisite size, resource base, technological capacity, skilled military forces, ideological

dynamic and sense of national identity” to exercise influence in their home regions (Cohen 1982,

p. 234). After the end of the Cold War, the geostrategic realms cease to be important. Instead, he

argues that we now inhabit a segmented world – a whole with a number of separate, yet

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integrated parts. The biggest difference between Cohen and the German Geopolitiker is thus that

Cohen’s regions are interconnected.

Cohen is a geographer. Alternative views of regions have been developed by political

scientists. Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel put forward the idea of the region as the missing link

between the state and the global system; in their view, emphasizing the role of regions struck the

right balance between the overly narrow focus of state-based scholars and the overbroad

perspective of those that focused on systemic factors (Cantori & Spiegel, p 1). With

decolonization and the waning of European power they argued that the region was absolutely

necessary if one wanted to understand international politics. Based on a number of factors,

including geographical factors, economic relationships and political affinities, they identified 15

regions. These regions were neither autarkic nor isolated, but was rather meant to be seen as

nested units within the global system.

Though the regions had significant autonomy, global politics were still mainly influenced

by the three leading powers – the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Their regional

division is summed up in Map 3.5:34

34 Map taken from Cantori & Spiegel 1970. Colors are used for contrasts only. It is worth noting that they considered

the Soviet Union to be its own subordinate system, in addition to its dominance over Eastern Europe.

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Map 3.5: Cantori and Spiegel’s regions:

Elsewhere, Raimo Väyrynen has emphasized the role regional powers play in organizing

the politics on the regional level (Väyrynen 1979, 1984, 2003). Here, second-tier powers,

primarily located in peripheral parts of the world, assume a novel role: they serve as

intermediaries between the great powers in the already-developed world and the mass of the

Third World. In the process, they establish themselves as local powers and carve out their own

spheres of interest and influence. Initially, Väyrynen was a segmentation-oriented theorist – he

considers all sectoral interests to pull in the same direction, and sees the regions as embedded

with a greater global context. He later expands on this, noting that regions are becoming

increasingly decoupled from great-power control, instead developing their own pattern of conflict

management, security complexes and integrative processes; this is a result of the great powers

losing control and the lesser powers being unable to fully take over their now-vacated roles.

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Thus, domestic policies within the individual countries become an important shaper of regional

politics.

Finally, Peter Katzenstein has proposed the ultimate in regional segmentation: the concept

of porous regions, as shown on Map 3.6.35 He argues that the main difference of regions now and

then is that regions are now porous (Katzenstein 2005). Old regions were designed as buffer

zones, keeping enemies apart from each other. Modern regions, in contrast, have open borders

and serve as filtering and distribution agents for ideas and institutions. His concept of the

American Imperium is similar to Geir Lundestad’s argument about “empire by invitation” –

though the regional hegemons (Germany and Japan) serve as privileged intermediaries for US

foreign policy interests, the regions benefit enough that everybody’s happy (Lundestad 1997,

1999).

35 Map taken from Katzenstein (2005).

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Map 3.6: Katzenstein’s American Imperium:

In sum, regional logics have moved from a differential logic, where regions were

primarily seen as units that had minimal contacts with each other and were radically different

from each other, to a segmentational logic, where regions are now understood as smaller

components of a greater international system. In these regions, universal theorizing is possible

while simultaneously recognizing that the factors that shape regional policies can be arranged

differently. This realization is the starting point for any theory of regions.

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The role of distance and power

The effects of distance are not in any way a settled topic. In our increasingly

interconnected world, where putatively local policies are more and more constrained, or even

dictated, by international factors, the concept of distance becomes increasingly important if we

want to tell domestic and international affairs apart (for more on interconnectedness and the new

world order, see Slaughter 2004; on external coercion, see Palast 2011, particularly chapter 12).

That distance separates the domestic and the foreign is nothing new – Thomas Hobbes, who

separated foreign and domestic affairs primarily in that logics of war and of peace respectively

characterized each, allowed in Leviathan that “foreign” lands could become “sovereign” through

colonization (Hobbes 1968, p. 301). Thus, the acknowledgement of the importance of distance in

politics came early.

The increasing complexity and obscurity created by greater distances is implicit in the

rational actor-based bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995; Reiter 2003), where lack of

information lead states to engage in costly, counterproductive conflicts, and becomes explicit in

the memoirs of diplomats like Dean Acheson and Henry Kissinger, where distance and the

communication problems it creates begets misunderstandings, which again lead to all sorts of

diplomatic mishaps (Acheson 1973; Kissinger 1979). In addition to the informational difficulties

created by this lack of proximity, our thinking of distance can fruitfully be broken down into

three main models, neither of which offers a full explanation in itself:

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The attributional model of distance, which emphasizes inherent qualities in the units

being discussed. It assumes that units that share these qualities feel closer to one another

than to those that do not. This approach is common in political science, with the arguably

most famous examples being Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” and

certain versions of the theory of the democratic peace (Dixon 1994; Russett and Oneal

2001; Anderson 2006)

The gravitational model of distance, which focuses on the effects of physical distances

between the discussed units. The shorter the distance is, the more possibilities for

interactions open up, which again lead to more interactions, be they good or bad. Again,

this is commonly accepted in political science, with the most famous example being

Kenneth Boulding’s maxim that power projection capability declines with distance

(Boulding 1962).

The topological model of distance, which emphasizes the obstacles that are located

between the units discussed. This could be terrain features, or it could be the sheer

number of other actors situated between the discussed ones – presumably the difficulties

created by having to traverse one big actor would be different than those created by

traversing many smaller ones occupying the same space. Apart from Douglas Gibler’s

recent work on geography and war, this approach seems to be understudied in political

science (Gibler 2007).

Putting these factors together crease a more nuanced concept of distance, as well as

allowing for the fact that the effects of distance changes over time and between actors. All

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modern states, no matter how big or small, have interests beyond their immediate neighborhoods.

However, the means they possess for influencing these are different, and this means that the must

adopt different strategies. The predictions of these strategies differ according to which model of

distance one chooses to emphasize. For example, in a gravitational model, the world is seen as a

conglomeration of expanding and contacting spheres, each corresponding to the various actors’

ever-changing sets of capabilities. When these spheres overlap, we expect conflict to ensue.

However, not all of these collisions cause the same kinds of conflicts, not to mention that some

spheres are allies; when these spheres collide, they create reinforcing clusters rather than harmful

interactions. Thus, the gravitational model is perhaps best suited to explaining great-power

behaviors; furthermore, it works best in a relatively uncluttered environment.

As an example, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis took place deep within what was generally

understood as the American sphere of influence. This well-established truism, stretching all the

way back to the 1823 formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, served both to embolden the Kennedy

Administration when they demanded that the USSR pull out their equipment and personnel; as

importantly, it made it more acceptable for the Soviet leadership to actually accede to the

American demands and remove the missiles. However, in spheres that were less well established,

like Ethiopia or Angola, outcomes were less predictable (Kissinger 197936).

36 These are Kissinger’s examples. Whether the outcome of Missile Crisis outcome was “easy” to get to, or whether

the policies pursued in Ethiopia or Angola are good examples of Soviet “tentativeness outside their sphere” is highly

debatable.

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However, the most potent implication of the gravitational model is that states will find it

extraordinarily difficult to remain truly neutral and avoid getting caught up in the gravitational

pulls of the system’s more powerful actors. Kissinger notes that while Tito’s non-alignment

posture allowed Yugoslavia greater freedom in international affairs than that enjoyed by, say,

Ulbricht or Honnecker in East Germany or Zhivkov in Bulgaria, there were still boundaries

beyond which the Soviet Union would not permit him to go. This mechanism worked in reverse

as well – in order to retain the credibility of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77

during the Cold War, countries like India or Brazil could not afford to be seen as too close to the

United States either. The result was that even though the bipolar system remained both stable and

relatively static on a global level, the regional policies were constantly fluctuating as the local

powers were continuously adjusting their positions in order to retain as much independence as

possible. However, their freedom to do so was always powerfully constrained by the gravitational

pull of the superpowers, as the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968

demonstrated. Thus, it took the implosion and then break-up of the Soviet “star” for the satellite

states of Central and Eastern Europe to finally break free and pursue their own agendas.

The other main insight we can derive from the gravitational model of distance is that the

pull exercised by the core weakens as the distance grows. In practical political terms, this means

that the costs of control rise as we move away from the center of power. Thus, the costs of empire

are at their highest at its margins, where the frontiers must be defended. This entails, in the very

least, that the controlling power must be able to exercise its power in such a way that it can

exclude potential competitors. Where it is incapable of doing this, its sphere of influence ends

and that of its competitor begins. Recognizing this, Douglas Lemke has developed an

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impressively detailed theory about local power hierarchies and how they create regional power

balances. Employing Bueno de Mesquita’s refinement of Boulding’s loss-of-power gradient,

Lemke maps out military reach, modifies this based on the quality and availability of

transportation and arrives at a world map described below (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Lemke

2002):37

Map 3.7: Lemke’s regions of war and peace:

Lemke’s theory deals with local power hierarchies, so great-power arenas like Europe and

North America are by definition not included in it. He requires each region to have a hegemon;

37 Map taken from Lemke (2002). Map colors are only used for contrasting purposes.

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coupled with the lack of good transportation in most of the world, this creates a large number of

small regions.

A different security-driven regional model is proposed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver

(Buzan and Wæver 2003). In their model, the regional structure of international security is

shaped by 1+4+X pyramidal distribution of power. At the top is the United States, followed by

the EU-Europe, Japan, China, and Russia, with the rest at the bottom. This structure is divided

into three types of regional spaces. The first is “overlay,” where a region is shaped by outside

forces (such as the colonialism and superpower rivalry during the cold war). Such regional spaces

have more or less disappeared since the end of the cold war. The second type is called

“unstructured regions.” Here regional interactions are not sufficient to generate a discernible

structure of interdependence. It may be the residual space left by all the other security complexes

(for example, the South Pacific). The third and most important (as well as the most common) are

called “regional security complexes” (RSC), which “refers to the level where states or other units

link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each

other”(Buzan and Wæver, p. 43).

The RSCs are divided into three main categories on the basis of the number of great

powers located in them. Three of them are called centered (North America, the CIS, and the EU-

Europe). These are created either by a global-level power or by some collective institution that

allows the RSC to act collectively at the global level. One is a great power complex (East Asia),

so called because of the presence of more than one global-level power. The remaining seven are

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standard (South America, South Asia, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, Central

Africa, and Southern Africa). These are characterized by the absence of any global-level power in

the complex, thereby allowing local polarity to be defined exclusively by regional powers. In

sum, power is a central variable in differentiating regions conceptualized as security complexes.

One great power makes a centered RSC, more than one make for a great power RSC, and having

no great power leads to a standard RSC, although the last category may have regional-level

powers. This regional definition produces this world map:38

Map 3.8: Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complexes:

38 Map taken from Buzan and Wæver 2003.

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Paying close attention to the attributional concept of distance yields similarly interesting

insights. The mental maps it creates can be extremely significant, even if they are constrained by

physical geography. Consider the foreign policy of the United States after the Second World

War, prototypically summed up in John F. Kennedy’s inaugural speech:

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go

forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a

new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a

hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit

the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed,

and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear

any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the

survival and the success of liberty. (Kennedy 1961)

Here, any state, anywhere, is assumed to have more of an affinity to the United States if

they share a governmental system than if they are share the same physical neighborhood. In other

words, mental maps trump physical geography. Similar sentiments have been expressed by all

subsequent US Presidents. Also, this mechanism works in reverse as well; Cuba and, more

recently, Venezuela and Bolivia are seen as not really ‘belonging’ in the Western Hemisphere

even though they are physically located there because of the political models adopted by their

leaders.

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These mental maps lead us to ‘locate’ countries like Australia and Japan in ‘the West’,

even though their physical location is elsewhere; it also put Czechoslovakia in Eastern Europe

while locating Greece and Germany in the West and now creates problem cases like Turkey

(democratic, NATO member and Muslim) and Israel (democratic, dissimilar and hostile to its

neighbors). Is Iran a Middle Eastern country, being Muslim but not Arab? Where does Russia fit,

with its quasi-democracy and long history of opposition to the countries that now comprise “the

West”? In many ways, where the world is steadily compressed by the forces of globalization, it is

the notion of attributional distance that creates or maintains what separates us. As long as the

concept of “likes play with likes” continues, attributional distances will play a vital role in

international politics (see Rummel 1972, particularly pages 412-414).

An alternative way mental maps work is through fear. David Myers has developed a

psychologically based regional model based on threat perceptions:39

39 Map taken from Myers (1991). The United States (in orange) is a member of both the North Atlantic region (noted

in red) and the Caribbean Basin region (in yellow). Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana and French Guyana (in

blue) are all members of both the South American region and the Caribbean Basin.

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Map 3.9: Regions based on Myers’ threat perceptions:

Myers begins with noting that regions are primarily social constructs – they exist because

we believe they do. Thus, he only includes regions that are “generally accepted” as such.

Secondly, much of a region’s identity derives from a sense of “us” versus “them”, and a large

part of this comes from the perception of threat. Thus, his North Atlantic region exists in large

part because it sees itself in opposition to the Soviet Union; the same mechanic applies to the

Eastern European region.

There is a second insight to be taken from the attributional concept of space as well;

keeping Boulding’s power gradient in mind, it is obvious that mental maps, no matter how

compelling, must yield to physical geography at some point. It is simply impossible to states less

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endowed with resources and capabilities than the United States and, arguably, the Soviet Union

to pay any price and bear any burden in order to defend the configurations of their mental maps;

no matter how much they want to, even second-order great powers are unable to enforce their

will too far away from their borders. Thus, what we can think of as ‘definitional power’, i.e. the

power to actually draw and edit these mental maps, becomes the province of first-order great

powers, while lesser actor will have to content themselves with policing their own immediate

neighborhoods.

Finally, we must consider the notion of topographical distance. Technically, topological

models deal with configuration where gravitational models deal with separation. Topology

concerns itself less with the actual spaces than with what actually fills them. Thus, where

gravitational distance would be a function of the kilometers between countries A and B,

topological distance would instead be created by the number of objects between them. In such a

model, distance is created by the number of jigsaw pieces between the actors, rather than the size

of them or the square acreage they fill. To take an example, to a topologist, Africa is colossally

big – not just because of its physical immensity (the African continent comfortably fits the United

States, China and Western Europe), but because it contains an equally imposing 54 countries.

The coordination problems created by this agglomeration of states create immense distances

between actors. Despite the existence of coordinating organizations, both broad-based ones like

the African Union and more local ones such as the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), the playing field African states face remains far more complex and divided than

those faced by most other states.

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Europe, while topologically complex, has at least some of the ensuing fragmentation

mitigated by far simpler gravitational and attributional factors. However, for most of history what

Martin Wight calls “the sandwich system of international politics” – the idea that amity and

hostility seems to occur in alternating ‘layers’ across continents – held even there (Wight 1966, p.

149). If your neighbors are rarely friends with you, and their neighbors again tend to be friendly

towards you because they worry about your foes, the webs of alliances and conflicts quickly

become too complex to follow easily, and this is clearly reflected in the concept of topological

distance.

Topological factors are not necessarily confined to the merely geographical or political.

Technology plays a vitally important role as well. Consider the Arctic. Though the physical

distance from Alaska across the Bering Strait to the Kamchatka Peninsula is quite short, it is

impossible to invade either the United States or Russia using that route. This is also true for the

frozen empty spaces of the Arctic. Thus, the United States and the USSR were, topologically

speaking, located very, very far from each other, as they faced each other in the actor-rich central

Europe. However, this changed with the invention of submarine-launched ICBMs. All of a

sudden, the Arctic region became strategically important and the two superpowers found

themselves as topological neighbors.

As shown, the effects of distance on power is a key for any regional definition. However,

it is also important to keep in mind that regions are heuristic devices – a regional model that gets

too fine-grained not only loses portability, but also runs the risk of failing to bring clarity to the

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study of international relations. For example, Lemke’s model divides the African continent into

10 regions and includes numerous regions across the world that only contains two countries; it is

not clear that this actually helps in understanding international affairs. More abstraction is

probably needed. However, Lemke has hit upon an important insight, and that is that distances

are best viewed in a gravitational manner if we want to create generalizable regional concepts;

this dissertation will do so, and it will use a more abstract version of Lemke’s methodology.

However, I add an important wrinkle that Lemke overlooks – the difference between potential

regions and actual ones. I also opt not to consider mental maps as a definitional feature, as these

are unique to each region, hard to generalize from, and quickly become obsolete.

Interaction: separating potential and actual regions

Lemke’s regional concept is relatively straightforward (Lemke 2002). First, he determines

the military reach modified by the access to and the quality of transportation. He then calculates

relative power within the resulting clusters to determine each cluster’s dominant power. The

results are his regions. This approach has two weaknesses. The first is that it discounts non-

military factors as regional binding agents; it is entirely possible that factors like trade, shared

cultures, or organizational features are more important than the potential use of force in creating

discernible international patterns. The second is that while Lemke is correct that his regional

hegemons can dominate their lesser states, he does not show that they actually do so. Lemke’s

regions are potential regions. It is possible to argue that there is no need to show actual

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interaction, as it is unnecessary to use force when the threat to use it is credible.40 However, I will

argue that if one is to sort units into groups, it is necessary to show that they have more in

common with each other than they do with units outside their group, and the possibility of using

military force is not sufficient for this, especially as this is becoming both increasingly infrequent

and more and more unacceptable (Finnemore 2003; Goldstein 2012). Instead, my argument is

that though the concept of potential regions is valuable, it is also necessary to take actual

interaction into account when developing the regional concept. Over the next pages we will

examine some ways this can be done.

One way of defining regions through interaction is through taking Lemke’s logic to its

logical conclusion and defining them through military deployment. A recent and extraordinarily

influential41 attempt to do this is Barnett (2004).42

40 This is the rationalist view of war. See Fearon (1995). For a very different causal mechanism that leads to a similar

outcome, see Lukes (1974). 41 Barnett developed his “integrating core versus fragmented periphery” theory while working as an analyst at the

Department of Defense, and his White Papers were widely read and highly influential among top DoD officials and

among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. See Barnett 2003, especially chapters

1 and 3. 42 Map taken from Barnett 2003. The integrating core is in red, the fragmented periphery in black.

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Map 3.10: Integrating core versus fragmented periphery:

Barnett differentiates between an “integrating core” and a “fragmented periphery”; the

former is characterized by shared norms and commitments, while the latter rejects these. While

he acknowledges that the core holds a wide variety of regimes types and social and economic

forms of organization, he argues that its members have foundational commitments to things like

relatively free trade, respect for basic human rights and liberal concepts like gender equality and

democracy. To him, the biggest difference-maker after the Cold War was the entry of China,

Russia and India into the integrating core, creating the world map shown above.

Importantly, Barnett came about his definition of core and periphery through interaction –

the fragmented periphery is simply comprised of the states where the United States’ military has

deployed after the end of the Cold War. He argues that these states are, for a number of reasons,

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unstable and will serve as breeding grounds for conflict, terrorism and other destabilizing

behaviors; thus, they are places that the United States will need to keep an eye on.

This particular approach has an obvious, fatal flaw – it is entirely defined from the

interests, perspective and actions of the American military. Barnett is a military policy analyst, so

this is not a problem for him, but his approach needs to be greatly diversified if it is to serve as

the basis of any kind of general regional definition.

Another approach is to look at international organizations. This is arguably Katzenstein’s

approach; his theory of the American Imperium is that the United States exerts its influence

through ASEAN and the European Union, plus some neighboring countries (Katzenstein 2005).

Another approach has been tried by Gary Goertz and Kathy Powers (Goertz and Powers 2009).

Their argument is that organizations are regions – the formalization of behaviors and

expectations that come with institutionalization is the same thing that create regional identities.

Similar arguments are proposed about Scandinavia and the Middle Nordic area by Iver Neumann

and Hans Kjetil Lysgård, respectively (Neumann 1994; Lysgård 1997) – here, the shared

experiences of the citizens of these areas, as well as the tight latticework of institutions that

enable and enhance these experiences, create transnational regions.

For the purposes of this dissertation, there are two problems with the regions-as-

interaction-patterns definitions. The first is that they create particularist and local analytical

categories – they are not theories as regions as much as they are arguments for why a set of

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specific interactions should be regarded as a specific region. Though a focus on local experiences

obviously does not preclude interesting scholarship, the results are non-portable and non-

generalizable (see, for example Ingebritsen 1992, Löfgren 1996 or Lysgård 2001; for an

argument on the value of singletons and the usefulness of standalone case studies in political

science, see Rogowski 2004), and is thus of limited value for the goal this dissertation aims for.

Secondly, it is important to keep in mind that “regions”, like all other social science

concepts, are heuristic devices that we use to create mental maps and shortcuts and thus make

thinking and acting easier. If, as Goertz and Powers claim, regions can be meaningfully equated

with organizations, we can draw two conclusions. The first is that we have no need for a regional

concept, as it is already covered by the international organizations concept. The second is that

this concept is useless as a heuristic. There are currently at a minimum hundreds and hundreds of

active international organizations43, and all countries are members of a multitude of these.44 This

approach contributes neither to our understanding of international affairs nor does it contribute to

the development of theory. However, there are ways of incorporating interaction into the

definition of the regional concept that does not have this problem. How we do this the topic of the

next chapter.

43 The 2013 Yearbook of International Organizations contains biographic data on 66.000 entities, but this includes

private organizations. The FIGO dataset contains 213 formal intergovernmental organizations (Volgy et al. 2008). 44 To take some random examples, Finland belongs to 74 IGOs, Lesotho belongs to 42, Cuba to 44 and Papua New

Guinea to 52. Data accessed on www.indexmundi.com on January 27, 2013.

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Chapter 4: Identifying regions and regional powers

Introduction

Previous international relations research has usually focused on the most powerful states

and the effects they have on the international system. However, with the collapse of the Soviet

Union and the end of the Cold War many scholars now contend that regional powers are critical,

if not central, to our understanding of world politics (Lake and Morgan 1997; Lemke 2002;

Acharya 2007). There are two main reasons for this. First, these states often shape and establish

order within their respective regions. As they seek to create order in accordance with their policy

preferences, regional powers compete with challengers within the region as well as states outside

of the region to establish mechanisms for governance. Among the regional powers identified in

this chapter, this behavior is common. South Africa, for example, has made a concerted effort to

shape its region by stressing the recovery of Africa as foreign policy priorities through the

promotion of regional means.

The group of regional powers plays a second important role, as it constitutes the pool of

potential challengers to existing global powers (Hurrell 2006). Though their freedom to do so

may still be circumscribed both by stronger powers and the inertia of the international system, the

stronger regional powers can use their geographic base to develop alternative systems of rules

and norms that may challenge salient aspects of the international status quo. As their capabilities

and activities increase, many within the regional powers club have received attention as global

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power aspirants (Tammen and Kugler 2006). A number of these regional powers “share a belief

in their entitlement to a more influential role in world affairs” (Hurrell 2006, p. 2), consistent

with self- attribution- based status noted by Renato Corbetta and his co-authors (Corbetta et al.

2011a). This increase in self- attribution as well as capabilities means that regional powers play

a more important role in determining the stability of the new world order; while regional powers

certainly played an important role in local politics during the Cold War, its end has freed them up

to pursue more independent policies. This dual role of regional powers—as global power

aspirants and as creators of regional governance—makes this club of states an important part of

the international landscape. Also, an equally important effect of this increased complexity is an

increased chance of interstate conflict – Robert Powell argues in In the Shadow of Power that

conflict propensity has less to do with actual polarity than it has with the set of expectations that a

given polar configuration creates (Powell 1999). Thus, an increase in regional independence,

which leads to different polar alignments and differing expectations, lead to an increased risk of

tension and, at worst, conflict.

Surprisingly, there have been relatively few attempts to systematically identify and

compare members of the regional powers club. A notable exception to this has been developed by

Patrick Rhamey and his co-authors called the Analytical Recognition of Regions by Opportunity

and Willingness (ARROW) dataset (Cline et al. 2011, Rhamey 2013). They utilize a three-part

framework of opportunity, willingness, and status attribution, identifying regional powers as

those states that possess an “unusual amount”, relative to their region, of each of the various

indicators that capture aspects of these three concepts. This results in a novel, theoretically

rigorous regional definition. As noted in chapters 2 and 3, having a solid foundational definition

is necessary to avoid later trouble; one added benefit of Rhamey’s ARROW dataset is that it is

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globally applicable, using accurate, publicly available data. By contrast, the data employed by

David Lake in his investigation of international hierarchy can only be used when examining the

United States as several important components of it is simply unavailable for other countries

(Lake 2009, p. 68).Opportunity, which includes both military and economic capabilities,

constitutes a well- known aspect of international relations. With greater resources to coerce or

entice, powerful states are better able to pursue their interests. The willingness of states to use

their capabilities provides a second necessary dimension, indicating a desire to interact with and

potentially structure their region. Finally, high status accounts for a state’s legitimacy as a

regional power, representing substantial independence from other regional or global powers, as

well as additional capacity to influence other states. A state that is viewed as a legitimate regional

power will have a greater ability to establish and build regional order, negotiate with powerful

states outside of its region, and will be better able to mount a challenge to global powers.

This chapter starts by first describing the approach to identifying regions. After

delineating the contours of regions, the set of potential regional powers and challengers are

identified through the application of this framework to data collected from 1990 to 2005. What

emerges is a distinct set of regional powers that meet the thresholds for opportunity, willingness,

and status. This group includes each of the countries identified as global powers earlier as well as

Australia, Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Africa. They also introduce the concept of regional

challengers to aid in the discussion of regional dynamics. This group of states meets some, but

not all, of the thresholds of our framework for regional powers. Therefore, these states are by

definition not regional powers as they fail to cross all the thresholds required of regional powers;

however, they demonstrate either the potential (unusual capabilities) or the interest (unusual

activity) to become regional powers, and are in some cases are attributed substantial status inside

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the region and/or globally. Their existence are important as they may pose one of the more

significant challenges to regional powers as they attempt to develop regional governance, and

thus act as important regional actors.

Defining Regions

Before any comparative discussion of regional powers can take place, the region itself

must be defined. Currently no consensus exists in the literature on the appropriate method for

defining regions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Thompson’s review of regional literature identified

over 22 distinct definitions, a number that has only grown since (Thompson 1973). At its

simplest, a region is a clustering of contiguous states in geographic space often following the

contours of continents (Katzenstein 2005). These “metaregions” are readily recognizable to a lay

audience, and the use of the metaregion is thus frequently deemed sufficient. The use of

metaregions can become problematic at times – for example, when Lemke measures power

hierarchies in South America, he does not even consider including Panama in the Colombia-

Venezuela grouping, even though Panama borders Colombia (Lemke 2002). Apparently his

regional hierarchies cannot bridge the metaregional border between South and Central America.45

A number of other conceptualizations have also been used including definitions focused on

global and regional architecture (Katzenstein 1998; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Goertz and Powers

2009), identity and culture (Huntington 1997; Hymans 2002), or issue externalities (Lake and

Morgan 1997; Väyrynen 2003; Kelly 2007). Rhamey et al. create a definition of regions that

45 I’m grateful to Patrick Rhamey for bringing up this example.

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integrates elements of these various approaches, with particular attention paid to avoiding

arbitrary and potentially tautological determinations (Cline et al. 2011, Rhamey 2013).

The definition begins with the following conceptualization: a region is a cluster of

geographically proximate states with similar patterns of political and economic interactions, as

well as cultural similarities. Thus, regions possess a geographic component. This insistence upon

contiguity prevents states with strong interests outside their geographic neighborhoods from

being included elsewhere, such as Saudi Arabia, and it prevents the inclusion of global major

powers into regional membership when they interject themselves into regional politics, such as

the United States in the Middle East. Crucially, as this definition includes no consideration of the

metaregion, no state is excluded arbitrarily by a continental border. Secondly, states that

comprise a region interact similarly with one another and the international system; however, the

presence of institutional architectures or a regional power is unnecessary for the existence of a

region. By focusing on similar patterns of interaction between states, the definition is consistent

with attempts at identifying regions by cultural considerations or issue externalities. States

manifest similar cultural preferences or issue concerns in their behaviors, but by expanding the

focus to all types of behaviors the definition is not restricted to a single issue-area.

To operationalize the definition, Rhamey et al employ an opportunity and willingness

framework to identify patterns of political and economic interaction (Most and Starr 1984).

Given the combined constraints of geography and capability, they first determine which states are

capable of reaching one another in either the military or economic realms. Of those that do, states

are then identified that also engage in political or economic interaction exhibiting a willingness to

interact. Finally, by combining a state’s opportunity and willingness, patterns of interactions

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across are parse out to define the various regions. This is where the model not only differs from,

but also improves upon that of previous theorists’ – the model requires not only the possibility of

interaction, but also actual trans-border activity. Thus, the model becomes able to offer tentative

answers to difficult definitional questions – for example, it shows that Egypt and Israel belongs to

the main Gulf State/Middle Eastern region, while Turkey does not. Similarly, it shows that the

Indian subcontinent is best thought of as its own separate region, which includes Pakistan and

Afghanistan, but that it does not extend into the former Soviet Central Asian republics.

Determining opportunity

As economic issues play an important role in molding state preferences and should

therefore be included independent of military capabilities, two distinct opportunity measures are

used - military and economic. States have the “opportunity” to interact with another if they clear

the threshold for either the military or the economic dimension. Military capabilities are

measured by the dollar amount of military expenditures, while economic capabilities are

measured by market capitalization of domestic firms. While not a perfect representation, market

capitalization of domestic firms provides a more conceptually valid measure of economic

capabilities than gross domestic product (GDP), and this is especially true at the regional level.

Market capitalization is an indicator by investors of an economy’s worth and is more sensitive to

an economy’s strength than the simple aggregation of gross domestic product.

Additionally, GDP is highly dependent upon population size and does not account for the

degree of output that is necessary to simply sustain the domestic population. Previously, the use

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of market capitalization as an indicator had been of limited value in the Cold War period due to

the economic policies of communist states. However, with the spread of market economies

following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the rapid expansion of market capitalization statistics

allows now for an alternative to GDP. In general, the two measures are very strongly correlated

throughout the time period (.93) and result in identical findings for major powers. However, the

aggregation problems of GDP create potentially serious concerns for the identification of

economic strength at the regional level. Several of most notable examples can be found in the

South African region, where desperately poor and war-ravaged states such as Angola, the

Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique are in the top half of regional GDP statistics

due to their relatively large populations. Market capitalization, however, corrects this

measurement problem, resulting in the more stable and economically viable states at the top,

despite their smaller population size. Population sizes play similar roles in East Asia, where

Singapore is an important economic presence, but is discounted by GDP to the realm of less

economically powerful states such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Market capitalization,

however, places it with more plausible peers: fellow Asian Tiger states Taiwan and South Korea.

While at the global level the differences between the two measures may not be particularly large,

those same differences can have a substantive affect with the potential to alter results among the

smaller state clusters that comprise regions.

After determining each state’s military expenditures and market capitalization, the

measures are converted into the proportion of a state’s capabilities out of the international total.

Since the ability of a state to act is constrained by geography, a reach variable is calculated using

Boulding’s loss of power gradient, as refined by Bueno de Mesquita, and applied to both the

military and economic dimensions of opportunity (Boulding 1962; Bueno de Mesquita 1981).

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The gradient equation results in a “bubble” of capabilities radiating outward from each state, with

capabilities decreasing at a greater rate the further the distance from the capital. Each directed

dyad is coded 1 if the projecting state is capable of reaching the target state through either

military or economic means, and 0 if it cannot.

Defining willingness

To determine if two states are willing to interact, Rhamey et al again distinguish between

the military/political and economic realms (Cline et al 2011, Rhamey 2013). Initially, a simple

dichotomous variable is generated coded 1 if a pair of states has any interaction as coded by the

Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) in a given year, and 0 otherwise (Bond et al. 2003).

For economic interactions, trade is used: if two countries exchange any trade in a given year, the

measure is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. By using this basic level of interaction, definitional

arbitrariness is avoided. Finally, to integrate the opportunity and willingness dimensions, they

generate a variable indicating whether a directed dyad has both opportunity and willingness by

multiplying the two dichotomous measures. This final dichotomous measure is 1 if two states

have both the opportunity and willingness to interact along either the military or economic

dimensions. By combining these various measures in a simple manner, the final variable

represents a pairing of states (constrained by geography) that interact with one another.

Evaluating all dyads in a given year, it is then possible to determine which states have similar

patterns of interaction with the international system as a whole and thereby comprise the set of

regions.

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Identifying regions

Rhamey et al identify similar patterns of interactions between states using clique analysis,

a networking algorithm that identifies “a collection of actors all of whom ‘choose’ each other”

(Cline et al. 2011, Rhamey 2013). Applying clique analysis to the initial measures results in

states with the opportunity to interact and willingness to do so clustering together. These

groupings of similar states represent the set of possible regions, illustrated by a cluster diagram.

The relevant regions are lifted from the diagram, with the prerequisite that they must cluster

together in a group of more than two and also be contiguous. This was done at five year intervals

beginning in 1990 and ending in 2005, creating four snapshots of the potential regions. A state is

considered to be a member of a given region if it clusters with a group of states in at least three of

the four intervals or two intervals if it is a member of the region in 2005 (the last year data was

available). These time-based criteria produce high-quality regional definition both as it requires

consistent memberships throughout the time period, thus excluding unusual circumstances of any

given year, and as using the thresholds provides only regions that are consistently present. A

Central Asian region is present in 1995, for example, but is not consistently present throughout

the post–Cold War period.

However, it is important to realize that not all states have the capabilities or willingness to

interact with their neighbors. Usually these are very small states or geographically isolated island

nations. These isolated states are placed within a relevant region if a clear region is obvious due

to a historical relationship with a non-isolated neighbor, such as Sri Lanka with India. Other

states fall between multiple regions, having relatively equivalent patterns of opportunity and

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willingness with several groups. These states are defined as “border states and are listed

separately from regional clusters. However, most groups of states separate from one another

clearly and cleanly, enabling the determination of regional membership using capabilities and

willingness measures alone.

The greatest challenge came in separating the massive cluster of states encompassing

Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. The further division of this cluster into regions was

accomplished using the cultural aspect of the regional definition. Determining the “effect” of

culture is difficult, as research in international relations has not been able to reach a general

consensus on the importance of culture or how to measure it (contrast Jackman and Miller 2004

with Inglehart and Weltzel 2005; for more on culture in international relations, see Finnemore

1996, 2003); furthermore, it is entirely possible that its effects can be “important” even if they are

“small” (see Gartzke 1999), and that the configuration of cultural factors may be more important

than their individual presences (Ragin 2000). Thus, instead of trying to determine cultural effects,

a linguistic similarity variable ranging from 0 to 3 was created, capturing the degree of similarity

in language and script between two states. While not intended to fully capture cultural

considerations, it is an effective minimal proxy for identity and it allowed for a separation of the

Middle East from the European region.

The result of this procedure is the identification of 11 distinct, enduring political clusters.

These regions have substantial face validity and, as their definition is a result of neutral, non-

tautological procedure, they can serve as a foundation for any research agenda that has any

interest in regions and their dynamics. Though the conceptual and empirical differences in the

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literature are based on differing theoretical approaches and differing substantive questions, the

Rhamey et al. approach could serve, in the very least, as an inspiration for further regional

research.

Identifying regional powers

As outlined in Chapter 2, the primary concern of this thesis is with regional polarity. With

the separation of stable, plausible regions, it becomes possible to move on to identifying the

regions’ main powers. While a number of different scholars have discussed the concept of

regional powers, little of the research has sought to identify systematically which states belong in

this club. One of the few to delineate regional powers in a systematic, empirical context is

Douglas Lemke (Lemke 2002, 2008). He begins with the meta- region, and defines his local

hierarchies as groupings of states that are able to interact with one another militarily. The

regional power is the state with the greatest capabilities within the local hierarchy, and while the

focus is on military power, GDP is used as the primary operational indicator. By comparison, the

framework for identifying regional powers developed by Kirssa Cline and her co-authors rests on

a foundation that identifies regional powers on the basis of their opportunity and willingness to

act in the region, as well as the status that is attributed to them as a consequence (Cline et al.

2011). Their conceptualization of regional powers is distinct in the literature, and the inclusion of

the status dimension also allows for the important distinction between status consistent (awarded

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recognition for their capabilities and willingness) and status inconsistent (where status is

incommensurate with capabilities or willingness) regional powers.

The framework for regional powers is also distinct from the framework used for global powers.

Although the global powers framework provides the foundation for their work, Cline et al.

diverge from it in a number of ways to account for the particulars of regional dynamics(Cline et

al. 2011; for global status frameworks, see Corbetta et al. 2011b; Wohlforth and Kang 2009;

Wohlforth 2009). While a global power can be any state in the system, a regional power must be

embedded geographically within its region. While a global power must have opportunity and

willingness above and beyond all other states in the system, regional powers must be strong and

active relative to their region. Additionally, working in the regional context facilitates the use of

certain measures that are problematic at the global level, but necessitates a reexamination of

others that function well at the system level. In the next section discusses these differences and

the results they produce.

After determining whether a state has unusual levels of opportunity or willingness to

become a major power, it becomes possible to identify both regional powers and regional

challengers. To be labeled a regional power, a state must consistently possess both opportunity

and willingness over time. In addition to this, it must also receive significant recognition as a

regional power, whether in the form of regional or global status. A state is considered to be

consistently capable if it is at least one standard deviation above the regional mean on any

opportunity measure for more than half the years under study; the same logic is applied to the

willingness measure. Interactions by states are recorded as either cooperative or conflictual,

allowing comparison of behaviors of regional powers across the different regions. If a state

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surpasses either the cooperation or conflict threshold for more than half the years under study, it

is considered a consistently willing state. Consistency in status attribution follows the same

criteria. Thus, if a state passes either the regional or global status measures for more than half the

years under study, it is labeled as being attributed status.

In addition to regional powers, they also identify another group of states that are labeled

regional challengers. These states do not meet the criteria for being a regional power, but have

unusual amounts of some combination of capabilities, willingness, or status with which to

influence relations within the region nonetheless. Some regions do not have any challengers,

others contain one or two in addition to a regional power; additionally, there is at least one region

with a substantial number of challengers but no regional power. This mix of challengers and

regional powers has important implications for both regional governance. Challengers are states

that are not regional powers but pass two of the three regional power attributes for more than half

of the years under study. Table 4.1 sums up the possibilities.

Table 4.1: Defining regional powers and challengers:

Opportunity Willingness Regional

attribution of

status

Global attribution

of status

State type

Y Y Y Y Status consistent

Regional Power

Y Y Y N Status inconsistent

Regional Power

Y Y N Y Status inconsistent

Regional Power

Y Y N N Challenger

Y N Y Y Challenger

Y N Y N Challenger

Y N N Y Challenger

N Y Y Y Challenger

N Y Y N Challenger

N Y N Y Challenger

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Note that Table 4.1 lists all possible configurations of opportunity and willingness. Two

important clarifications are necessary. Initially, the assumption is made that states primarily pay

attention to capabilities. Secondarily, I assume that preferences are not fixed, and that all states

can change them if they find it useful. Thus, powers that have the capacity to act like regional

powers and act out on this ability will be treated accordingly. Then there are powers that seek

great power status, but do not have the capabilities necessary to support such ambitions. Finally,

there are states that have the capacity, but lack interest in becoming a regional power for

whatever reason. However, such states can always change their minds about their acceptance of

the status quo. Thus, though it might sound absurd, it is entirely possible to be a challenger

without showing any interest in actually becoming one (Saudi Arabia is an example of such a

state). The reason for this is simply that as this otherwise powerful actor can change its mind

about its acceptance of its status attribution, other states are forced to treat it as a “real”

challenger.

Opportunity and willingness

In the regional context, opportunity refers to a state’s military and economic size relative

to its region. A state is considered to have an unusual amount of military capabilities if either its

military expenditures or military personnel are at least one standard deviation above the regional

mean. Unlike for global powers, whose capabilities are dependent upon extensive military reach,

the raw value of military personnel and military expenditures are used. Given the geographic

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proximity of states within a region, the inclusion of a military reach variable was deemed

unnecessary.

In defining economic opportunity at the regional level, market capitalization is used

again. The indicator measures the market-determined value of each state’s economy, independent

of population. In determining a state’s economic opportunity, the reach measure is left out again

due to geographical proximity: economic size should suffice as an indicator of a country’s

capabilities in the regional context.

In addition to consistently possessing opportunity, a regional power must be willing to use

its capabilities to achieve wide ranging policy goals within the region. Willingness is measured

using the level of interaction by a state with others in the region using the IDEA events data base.

This includes both cooperative interactions, such as bilateral treaties and positive endorsements,

and conflict events, ranging from negative rhetoric between states to military disputes in order to

identify the broad range of activities by major powers willing and able to both reward and punish

others to advance their own priorities. Cline et al. find that opportunity is highly consistent over

time across all regions, while willingness, though relatively stable, has a greater range of

variation (Cline et al. 2011). Of the states displaying consistently high levels of opportunity, they

find that Brazil, China, India, Israel, Nigeria, and South Africa all engage in unusual (i.e. at least

one standard deviation above the regional mean) levels of conflict and cooperative behavior

throughout the period. Japan, a very strong state, is largely a cooperative power. This unique

behavior from Japan may be the result of a number of different factors: constraints imposed by

Japan’s domestic politics, emphasis on economic growth and development, or efforts to mend its

global and regional image following World War II (Katzenstein 2005). Pakistan is the only state

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that does not have the opportunity to be a regional power, but it consistently passes the conflict

and cooperation thresholds on willingness. Likely, the India-Pakistan rivalry has provided a

number of opportunities for both highly conflictual interaction as well as cooperative

reconciliation, driving the high level of activity Pakistan displays.

There are also a handful of states that have consistently high levels of opportunity but fail

to engage in unusually high levels of foreign policy activity. This group of states includes a

number of Middle Eastern states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran) as well as Libya. The data

illustrate both the relative isolation of Libya in regional and global politics during the period, and

the lack of consistent leadership activity by Middle Eastern states, effectively leaving the Middle

East without a regional power (Israel receives little status and is thus not a regional power).

The attribution of status

The application of the opportunity and willingness measures to the regional setting

provides a great deal of variation - some states have unusually large amounts of both capabilities

and willingness, while others have high amounts of either one or the other. Given this variation,

which states are awarded status? Furthermore, is status attribution essentially automatic for

regional powers? Important to the discussion of status is the recognition that different groups of

states can attribute status. Status can be attributed by actors within the region, by states outside of

the region, and by the state itself.

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The attribution of status from within the region signifies recognition of the state as a

regional power and acceptance that the state will seek to establish governance and order within

region. Global status attribution, or recognition from the global community, reinforces legitimacy

as a regional power. The recognition of a regional power’s role allows the state to represent

regional issues at the global level. Finally, self- attribution signals motivation and interest—does

a state intend for itself the regional power role? Unfortunately, finding quantitative, systematic

measures for self- attribution has proven especially difficult; in addition it is arguable that self-

attributed status signals a very different type of status that that attributed by others. For these

reasons, Cline et al. restrict their discussion to regional and global status attribution (Cline et al.

2011).

Status is measured using two dimensions: state visits and diplomatic contacts. These are

compiled in the DIPCON dataset, which records the number of embassies sent to all countries

(Rhamey et al. 2013). State visits are a largely symbolic act reflecting the desire of a state to

consult with another country of presumed importance, while the presence of embassies signals

the perception of relevance by the sending state to the receiving state. The measurement of

regional and global status attribution is conducted separately since status attributed from the

region and international system broadly constitute two different types of community-based

sources of status for regional powers. A state is considered to have regional status if it exceeds

the regional mean by one standard deviation in hosting embassies or state visits from regional

actors, and regional status from the global community if it does likewise for embassies or state

visits from outside the region.

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A second aspect of status attribution relates to what can be termed status consistency. For

regional powers, Cline et al. conceptualize status inconsistency as occurring when a state is not

attributed status at both the regional and global level. It is possible for a state to pass the threshold

for both capabilities and willingness, for example, but be recognized and attributed regional

power status by only the global community or only its regional community. To determine status

consistency, we compare the level of status received with a state’s opportunity and willingness. A

state with opportunity, willingness, and status at either the regional or global level is labeled a

regional power. States are status consistent regional powers if they have opportunity and

willingness and are attributed status at both the regional and global levels.

The findings suggest that by and large, states with consistently high levels of both

opportunity and willingness are rewarded with proportional status at both the regional and global

levels and are thus status consistent. The one exception is Japan: it is both a global and a regional

power, yet it fails to generate an unusual amount of regional status. It is worth noting that status

inconsistency is not synonymous with being a regional challengers; all challenger states would be

status inconsistent as they definitionally lack at least one of the attributes in the regional powers

framework. However, challengers are not regional powers to begin with and thus cannot be status

inconsistent regional powers. However, status inconsistency is important, as it represent cases of

community-based status attribution that are out of sync with either capabilities or willingness to

exercise a leadership role in the region. Thus, the status accorded to regional challengers

represent an important phenomenon: recognition (or rejection) by either the regional or global

community of the potential importance of the challenger state to its region.

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The result of these procedures produce the 11 regions described below. Some

clarifications are necessary, the potentially most important being the role played by Japan. As

noted above, Japan is a global and regional power that is accorded less regional status than

expected, raising the question of whether a state can be a regional power without regional

recognition. I have still designated it as a regional power, making East Asia a bipolar region, the

logic being that the category of “great power” fully subsumes the category of “regional power”.

East Asia has no challenger, though South Korea is trying hard to become one; in a few more

iterations of the ARROW procedure I’m confident that it will have achieved such status. The

same is true of Poland; it lacks Italy’s strength, but is clearly chasing regional power status.46

Several regions have no regional power at all; for consistency’s sake I still designate their leading

states as challengers, even if “aspirant” might have been a more accurate term.

Finally, a note about the face validity of the regional memberships and the designation of,

in particular, the challengers. Some members of either category may seem misplaced at first. The

issue of face validity is the most serious issue, with the biggest problem being the designation of

Canada as a challenger in North America. Canada is a victim of both geography and comparative

power levels – while Mexico has great influence with its southern neighbors, Canada only shares

a border with the United States and is thus relatively isolated. Both states are eclipsed by the

power of the United State to such an extent that it cannot be seriously argued that either Canada

or Mexico can even entertain the notion of displacing the United States as the hegemonic power

in North America. Yet both states are still classed as challengers. I will defend this classification

simply as it is the product of a straightforward procedure that has produced consistent and

46 However, Italy is surprisingly active in world politics. See the next chapter.

117

plausible results in the other regions; the ambiguousness of the Canadian challenge to US

hegemony is a reflection of the unusual dynamics of the regions rather than an indictment of the

ARROW procedure.

The other potentially puzzling designation is placing Libya in the West African region.

Traditionally, Libya, as a Muslim and Arab state, has been grouped into the Middle Eastern

metaregion, and if the ARROW dataset had extended its regional memberships back to the mid-

1960s, Libya would certainly had been included in that region. However, with the end of the Cold

War, Libya shifted its focus away from the Middle East towards its southern African neighbors,

becoming an active member of the African Union. Thus, as the focus of this dissertation is on the

new world order that has arisen after the end of the Cold War, it makes sense to include Libya

with the West African countries. A similar dynamic created the North African region – these

states now orient themselves south and west, rather than towards the Middle East. That these

placements may cause some confusion speaks to the power of tradition and mental maps –

precisely the kind of traditional thinking the ARROW procedure tries to break away from.

118

North America

Map 4.1: The North American region

119

Member states (28):

Antigua and Barbuda

Bahamas

Barbados

Belize

Canada

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Peru

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Trinidad and Tobago

USA

Venezuela

Regional power:

USA

Challengers:

Canada

Mexico

120

Graph 4.1: MIDs in North America:

05

10

15

20

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in North America

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in North America

121

South America

Map 4.2: The South American region

122

Member states (6):

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Paraguay

Uruguay

Regional power:

Brazil

Challenger:

Argentina

Graph 4.2: MIDs in South America:

Notes:

All MIDs in South America are interregional MIDs.

01

23

45

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

123

Europe

Map 4.3: The European region

124

Member states (48):

Albania

Andorra

Armenia

Austria

Belarus

Belgium

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bulgaria

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Georgia

Germany

Great Britain

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macedonia

Malta

Moldova

Monaco

Montenegro

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Russia

San Marino

Serbia

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Turkey

Ukraine

United Kingdom

Regional powers:

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Challenger:

Italy

125

Graph 4.3: MIDs in Europe:

02

04

06

08

01

00

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in Europe

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in Europe

126

Western Africa

Map 4.4: The West African region

127

Member states (18):

Benin

Burkina Faso

Cape Verde Islands

Central African Republic

Chad

Côte d’Ivoire

The Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Libya

Mali

Mauritania

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Togo

Regional power:

Nigeria

Challenger:

Libya

128

Graph 4.4: MIDs in West Africa:

02

46

8

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in West Africa

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in West Africa

129

Eastern Africa

Map 4.5: The East African region

130

Member states (6):

Djibouti

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Somalia

Sudan

Yemen

Regional great powers:

None

Challenger:

Ethiopia

131

Graph 4.5: MIDs in East Africa:

05

10

15

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in East Africa

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in East Africa

132

Southern Africa

Map 4.6: The South African region

133

Member states (21):

Angola

Botswana

Burundi

Comoros Islands

Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa)

Kenya

Lesotho

Madagascar

Malawi

Mauritius

Mozambique

Namibia

Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)

Rwanda

Seychelles

South Africa

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Regional great power:

South Africa

Challenger:

None

134

Graph 4.6: MIDs in Southern Africa:

05

10

15

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in Southern Africa

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in Southern Africa

135

North Africa

Map 4.7: The North African region

136

Member states (3):

Algeria

Morocco

Tunisia

Regional great power:

None

Challenger:

Morocco

Graph 4.7: MIDs in North Africa:

Note:

Every MIDs in North Africa is an interregional MIDs.

01

23

45

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in North Africa

137

Middle East

Map 4.8: The Middle Eastern region

138

Member states (12):

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates

Regional great powers:

None

Challengers:

Egypt

Iran

Israel

Saudi Arabia

139

Graph 4.8: MIDs in the Middle East:

01

02

03

0

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in the Middle East

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in the Middle East

140

South Asia

Map 4.9: The South Asian region

141

Member states (8):

Afghanistan

Bhutan

Bangladesh

India

Maldives

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

Regional great power:

India

Challenger:

Pakistan

142

Graph 4.9: MIDs in South Asia:

05

10

15

20

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in South Asia

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in South Asia

143

East Asia

Map 4.10: The East Asian region

144

Member states (16):

Brunei Darussalam

Cambodia

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Indonesia

Japan

Malaysia

Myanmar

Palau

People’s Democratic Republic of Laos

People’s Republic of China

Philippines

Singapore

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

South Korea

Taiwan

Thailand

Regional powers:

Japan

People’s Republic of China

Challengers:

None

145

Graph 4.10: MIDs in East Asia:

01

02

03

0

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in East Asia

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in East Asia

146

Oceania

Map 4.11: The Oceania region

147

Member states (13):

Australia

Federated States of Micronesia

Fiji

Kiribati

Marshall Islands

Nauru

New Zealand

Papua New Guinea

Samoa

Solomon Islands

Tonga

Tuvalu

Vanuatu

Regional great powers:

Australia

Challengers:

None

148

Graph 4.11: MIDs in Oceania:

01

23

4

Fre

que

ncy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs in Oceania

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

action

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Intraregional MIDs above line

Inter/Intraregional MID ratio in Oceania

149

Chapter 5: Testing theories of regional stability

Introduction

As discussed in earlier chapters, the thesis of this dissertation is that polarity matters in

determining regional stability and that we should expect to see consistent patterns in

international political behavior across regions correlating with their polarities. Drawing upon

insights from structural realism and power transition theory, I expect the following patterns:

Regions without at least one recognized regional power will be highly prone to conflict

Unipolar regions will be highly stable, seeing fewer conflicts than other polar

arrangements

Bipolar regions will be more conflict prone than unipolar regions, but less so than

multipolar ones

Multipolar regions will be see more conflicts than bipolar or unipolar regions, but less

than nopolar regions

In determining regional stability, I use Militarized International Disputes as a proxy; a

region that has a low number of MIDs is more stable than one that has a high number (Kenwick

et al 2013).

150

As discussed in chapter 2, the question of which polar type is more or less prone to

conflict largely depends on whether preponderance or balance of power logics better explains

state behavior. When considering Graphs 5.1 and 5.2 jointly, it can be argued that US

preponderance has, at least on an aggregate scale, led to a less conflictual world.

050

10

015

020

0

New

MID

fre

qu

ency

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Graph 5.1: MID frequency after World War II

0.2

.4.6

.81

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Ratio of MIDs involving use of force

0.2

.4.6

.81

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Ratio of MIDs with more than 100 dead

Graph 5.2: MID severities, 1945-1990

151

As we see, the number of MIDs is down, though whether this is a permanent trend or not

is hard to say, as there are several similar dips after World War 2 that were followed by new

increases. However, as Graph 5.2 shows, the severity47 of MIDs has gone strongly down since

the end of the Cold War. That a majority of MIDs involve force should not come as a surprise;

however, the severity of this use of force has gone drastically down over the last 20 years. The

high-casualty MID ratio has remained constant on about 0.07 since 1945; the variation in any

one year is on the third decimal point. With the declining MID rate, this means that high-

intensity, high-casualty conflicts are rarer now than at almost any time after the Second World

War.

The global numbers are thus encouraging. However, does the preponderance logic

translate onto the regional level? Over the next pages, I will look at conflict frequency, conflict

severity and the casualties produced by these conflicts to see if these have regional variation.

After that, I examine the behavior of regional powers and challengers to try to deduce patterns in

their policies, and whether these can be traced back to regional polarity.

47 Graph 5.2 shows the ratio of MIDs that involve the “use of force” – i.e. MID levels 4 and 5, and the ratio of MIDS

that have at least 100 casualties. The severity and casualty categories were calculated separately. A MID was

included in either category if at least one of the participants qualified – thus, if a MID has six participating states and

one had a MID hostility level of 4 or 5, all were included in the “use of force category. Similarly, if one of the MID

participants suffered at least 100 casualties, all participants were coded as “at least 100 casualties”.

152

Hypothesis 1: Regional polarity affects the frequency of MIDs

As discussed earlier, I expect polarity to affect the number of conflicts a region

experiences. How this happens has been a topic of debate in international relations literature for

decades; here, I make the assumption that the distribution of power that is expressed through

number of poles is correlated with the ease of anticipating a region’s conflicts of interests and the

capabilities of its members to act on these. Thus, I expect unipolar systems to be more peaceful

than bipolar ones, which will be more peaceful than multipolar ones, which will be more

peaceful than regions with no dominant powers at all. At first glance, the numbers are

suggestive, but largely inconclusive:

Table 5.1: MID frequency by polarity, 1990-2010:

Number

of

member

states

Total

number

of

new

MID

participants

MIDs

per

state

Yearly

minimum

number

of

MIDS

Yearly

maximum

number

of

MIDs

Periodic

Min/max

MID

variation

Yearly

median

number

of

MIDs

Non-polar

regions

21 374 17,81 4 31 27 18

Unipolar

regions

94 455 4,84 8 44 42 21

Bipolar

regions

16 270 16,88 4 28 24 12

Multipolar

regions

48 382 7,96 2 101 99 13

Averages

44,75 370,25 11,87 4,5 51 46,5 16

153

Table 5.1 presents the data from Table 2.1 recoded to represent regional polarities rather

than individual regions48. Initially, we see that non-polar regions have the highest number of

MIDs per state, as well as a high median MID count. This is in line with the expectations of

non-polar regions being highly conflictual. However, they also have low minimum and

maximum MID count scores, and as a result a low MID variation. Some of this is the result of

North Africa, a particularly peaceful region, being in this category; however, having a mere three

members, it creates little ‘noise’ – the volume and variation of MIDs are created by the other

non-polar regions, East Africa and the Middle East. The presumed more stable bipolar regions

have only marginally lower scores in all these categories, casting some doubt on whether one of

these arrangements really are better than the other. The presumably most stable polar

configuration, unipolarity, has a very low MID per state score, but it also has the highest median

MID count as well as a high min/max variation score. Finally, multipolar configurations have a

low MID per state score, but an incredibly high min/max variation; however, when we consider

its low median MID count, it seems likely that this is driven by an outlier49.

One way to deal with this uncertainty is to approach the conflict frequencies from a

different angle. In Table 5.2 below, I have recoded the data to show the number of conflicts

instead of the raw MID count.

48 Nopolar regions are East Africa, North Africa and the Middle East. Unipolar regions are North America, South

America, West Africa, Southern Africa, South Asia and Oceania. The bipolar region is East Asia. Finally, the

multipolar region is Europe. 49 Graph 4.3 confirms this.

154

Table 5.2: Conflict frequency by polarity, 1990-2010:

Number

of

member

states

Total

number

of

MID

participants

Number

of

conflicts

Conflicts

per

state

Participants

per

conflict

Nopolar

regions

21 374 148 7,05 2,53

Unipolar

regions

94 455 204 2,17 2,23

Bipolar

regions

16 270 128 8 2,11

Multipolar

regions

48 382 126 2,625 3,03

Averages

44,75 370,25 151,50 4,96 2,475

Reformatting the data this way lets us get around the outlier-driven multipolar MID count

and instead focus on conflict counts. Immediately we see that the picture clears up. Obviously

any MID needs at least two participants (the COW data does not cover civil wars); however, the

participants per conflict variation is still interesting. That the variation is the lowest in the bipolar

setting is not surprising; similarly, it is as expected that multipolar systems have the highest

number of number of participants per conflict and that nopolar regions also have a high score in

this category, as both open up for multiple alliance partners.

Equally interesting is the huge gap in conflicts per state between polarities. Nopolar and

bipolar regions see far more conflicts per state than unipolar and multipolar regions. That

nopolar regions see a high number of conflicts is in line with my expectations, but the even

higher number of bipolar conflicts is not.

155

A chi square test of the contents of Table 5.2 with 3 degrees of freedom gives us a chi

square of 2,554 and a Yates’ chi square of 0,672 (the Yates correction is appropriate here with

the number of low values in the table).50 Neither value allows us to reach the critical point for

χ=0.100 with 3 degrees of freedom, which is 6.251. A similar test of just the conflicts per state

column produces better, but still insignificant results. We can thus not reject the null hypothesis

and cannot conclude that the differences across the conflicts per state and participants per

conflict categories are statistically significant.

50 Chi square calculation performed with tools provided by Preacher 2001.

156

Hypothesis 2: Polarity affects the severity of conflicts

As graph 5.2 showed, far from all MIDs involve war or even the use of force. This

variation can be plausibly connected to regional polarity – as argued by hegemonic stability

theory, the hegemon effectively buys the submission of the lesser powers in its orbit by trading

lessened freedom for stability, predictability and, through these factors, increased efficiency and

lessened chances of conflicts (Kindleberger 1974, Gilpin 1981, Wohlforth 1999). If this is true,

we should see less severe conflict levels in regions that have dominant powers than in regions

that lack these; while a hegemon cannot, and probably doesn’t care to, prevent all conflicts in its

orbit, it will not tolerate serious ones and will act to prevent conflicts from breaking out between

states that have the capacity to create serious conflicts, as well as dampen already existing ones.

Thus, I expect to see less severe conflicts in unipolar and bipolar regions than in

multipolar ones; furthermore, I expect nopolar regions to have more serious conflicts than any

other regional power configuration.

157

This graph shows the distribution of different hostility levels and sums up the numbers:

Initially, the graph seem to suggest that talk is less cheap in international relations than is

often assumed; the use of threats is only marginally more common than declarations of war.

Additionally, the passive no action/threats categories is greatly outnumbered by the active

display/use force/war categories. The following table sums up the regional conflict levels:

No militarized action Threat to use force

Display of force Use of force

War

417

39

436

564

25

0

20

040

060

0

Fre

qu

en

cy

No

actio

n

Threa

ts to

use

forc

e

Display

of f

orce

Use

of f

orce

War

All MIDS 1990-2010

Graph 5.3: MID hostility levels

158

Table 5.3: Regional conflict severity, 1990-2010:

#

incidents

No action Threats to

use force

Display of

force

Use of

force

War

Global

totals

1481 417

(28,16%)

39

(2,63%)

436

(29,44%)

564

(38,08%)

25

(1,69%)

North

America

123 30

(24,39%)

1

(0,81%)

47

(38,21%)

45

(36,59%)

0

South

America

6 3

(50%)

0 0 3

(50%)

0

Europe

382 141

(36,91%)

18

(4,71%)

111

(29,06%)

112

(29,32%)

0

West

Africa

78 24

(30,77%)

3

(3,85%)

15

(19,23%)

36

(46,15%)

0

East

Africa

99 21

(21,21%)

0 16

(16,16%)

60

(60,61%)

2

(2,02%)

South

Africa

112 31

(27,68%)

6

(5,36%)

29

(25,89%)

39

(34,82%)

7

(6,25%)

North

Africa

4 1

(25%)

0 2

(50%)

1

(25%)

0

Middle

East

271 59

(21,77)

8

(2,95%)

77

(28,41%)

113

(41,70%)

14

(5,17%)

South

Asia

116 19

(16,38%)

0 30

(25,86%)

65

(56,03%)

2

(1,72%)

East

Asia

270 81

(30%)

3

(1,11%)

108

(40%)

78

(29,89%)

0

Oceania

20 7

(35%)

0 1

(5%)

12

(60%)

0

The table makes it clear that we see significant regional variation in hostility levels.

When the data is recoded by polarity, we see that this translates to the polar level as well.

159

Table 5.4: Polar conflict severity, 1990-2010:

#

incidents

No action Threats to

use force

Display of

force

Use of

force

War

Global

totals

1481 417

(28,16%)

39

(2,63%)

436

(29,44%)

564

(38,08%)

25

(1,69%)

Non-polar

regions

374 81

(21,66%)

8

(2,14%)

95

(25,40%)

174

(46,52%)

16

(4,28%)

Unipolar

regions

455 114

(25,05%)

10

(2,20%)

122

(26,81%)

200

(43,93%)

9

(1,98%)

Bipolar

regions

270 81

(30%)

3

(1,11%)

108

(40%)

78

(29,89%)

0

Multipolar

regions

382 141

(36,91%)

18

(4,71%)

111

(29,06%)

112

(29,32%)

0

A chi square test with 12 degrees of freedom gives us a chi square of 91,503 and a Yates’

chi square of 84,212.51 The critical point for χ=0.005 with 12 degrees of freedom is 28,300.

While this enables us to reject the null hypothesis, this conclusion comes with significant

caveats, the most important being that the results do not conform to the expected pattern beyond

the propensity for serious conflicts in nopolar regions. This is further complicated by the fact that

wars are outliers, and could be caused by any number of non-structural factors. For example,

what are we to make of the fact that 36% of wars happen in unipolar regions? Do we focus on

the fact that 78% of unipolar wars happen in Southern Africa – and if we do, is that due to

specific factors inherent to that region, or can it be extrapolated to say something about unipolar

regions in general? Thus, though the chi square results are statistically significant, I am hesitant

to actually say that the hypothesis is supported. Instead, I will argue that the connection between

51 Chi square calculation performed with tools provided by Preacher 2001.

160

polarity and conflict severity remains unclear and that further research is needed. The hypothesis

is thus rejected.

Having said that, the tables do show us several interesting factors. Bipolar and multipolar

regions have no formally declared wars52. They also have much lower incidents of the use of

force than unipolar and nopolar regions, as well as higher than average rates of either doing

nothing or just engaging in displays of force. Finally, it is interesting to note that Europe, the

only multipolar region, accounts for almost half of all the “use of threats” incidents. However, as

interesting as these findings are, it cannot be said with scientific precision that they are due to

differences in regional polarity.

52 It is important to note that this does not preclude them from having bloody conflicts. More on this later in this

chapter.

161

Hypothesis 3: Polarity has an effect on MID casualties

As we’ve seen, it is somewhat questionable whether there is a consistent relationship

between regional polarity and the level of conflicts we see therein. However, is there a

relationship between the number of poles and how bloody the conflicts are? Such relationships

are far from far-fetched – regional powers possess the resources to both cause and absorb high

casualty rates; conversely, smaller, less powerful states may lack the power to either cause or

absorb a high number of casualties, thus avoiding long, bloody conflicts. The following graph

sums up the distributions of MID casualties.

None 1-25 deaths

26-100 deaths 101-250 deaths

251-500 deaths 501-999 deaths

> 999 deaths

1247

122

18 11 7 4 7

0

30

060

090

012

00

15

00

Fre

qu

en

cy

Non

e

1-25

dea

ths

26-1

00 d

eath

s

101-

250

deat

hs

251-

500

deat

hs

501-

999

deat

hs

> 99

9 de

aths

All MIDs 1990-2010

Graph 5.4: MID fatality levels

162

As the graph makes clear, though wars are very rare, high casualty counts are even rarer.

Table 5.5 lays out regional variations. Note that the COW dataset has 66 instances of missing

data for MID casualties; these were removed when calculating these results, leading to lower

total sums.

Table 5.5: MID casualties by region, 1990-2010:

#

MIDs

None 1-

25

deaths

26-

100

deaths

101-

250

deaths

251-500

deaths

500-999

deaths

>999

deaths

Global

totals

1416 1247

(88,9%)

122

(8,6%)

18

(1,3%)

11

(0,78%)

7

(0,5%)

4

(0,28%)

7

(0,49%)

North

America

123 121

(98,4%)

0 0 2

(1,6%)

0 0 0

South

America

6 6

(100%)

0 0 0 0 0 0

Europe

376 345

(91,8%)

14

(3,7%)

6

(1,6%)

4

(1,06%)

4

(1,06%)

1

(0,27%)

2

(0,53%)

West

Africa

72 60

(83,3%)

10

(13,9%)

2

(2,8%)

0 0 0 0

East

Africa

85 68

(80%)

15

(17,6%)

0 0 0 0 2

(2,4%)

South

Africa

93 81

(87,1%)

10

(10,8%)

0 1

(1,08%)

1

(1,08%)

0 0

North

Africa

4 4

(100%)

0 0 0 0 0 0

Middle

East

259 221

(85,3%)

27

(10,4%)

4

(1,5%)

4

(1,5%)

0 1

(0,39%)

2

(0,77%)

South

Asia

115 82

(71,3%)

25

(21,7%)

3

(2,6%)

0 2

(1,74%)

2

(1,74%)

1

(0,87%)

East

Asia

265 242

(91,3%)

20

(7,6%)

3

(1,1%)

0 0 0 0

Oceania

18 17

(94,4%)

1

(5,6%)

0 0 0 0 0

163

The table below reorganizes the same numbers by polarity.

Table 5.6: MID casualties by polarity, 1990-2010:

#

MIDs

None 1-

25

deaths

26-

100

deaths

101-

250

deaths

251-500

deaths

500-999

deaths

>999

deaths

Global

totals

1416 1247

(88,9%)

122

(8,6%)

18

(1,3%)

11

(0,78%)

7

(0,5%)

4

(0,28%)

7

(0,49%)

Nopolar

regions

348 293

(84,2%)

42

(12,1%)

4

(1,15%)

4

(1,15%)

0 1

(0,29%)

4

(1,15%)

Uni-

polar

regions

427 367

(85,95%)

46

(10,8%)

5

(1,17%)

3

(0,7%)

3

(0,7%)

2

(0,47%)

1

(0,23%)

Bipolar

regions

265 242

(91,3%)

20

(7,6%)

3

(1,1%)

0 0 0 0

Multi-

polar

regions

376 345

(91,8%)

14

(3,7%)

6

(1,6%)

4

(1,06%)

4

(1,06%)

1

(0,27%)

2

(0,53%)

The lack of high-casualty conflicts in the bipolar regions stand out, as does the

prominence of high-casualty conflicts in non-polar areas. However, the linearity of the global

MID casualty rates dampens any the expectation that there is a relationship between polarity and

MID casualties. Interestingly, a chi square test with 18 degrees of freedom gives us a chi square

of 37,54 and a Yates’ chi square of 28,315 (the Yates correction is appropriate with this many

low values).53 The critical point for χ=0.005 with 18 degrees of freedom is 37,156; the Yates

score allows for a χ=0.100. We are thus able to reject the null hypothesis and instead conclude

that the differences between the different categories are significant. However, what this actually

53 Chi square calculation performed with tools provided by Preacher 2001.

164

means is not entirely clear, as the variation of the values of 25 dead and above is minimal across

most polarities. The only conclusion I am comfortable in drawing from the data is that the lack of

MID casualties under bipolarity is unique to that particular distribution of power. Thus, I am

forced to reject the hypothesis, recognizing that while some interesting tendencies have been

demonstrated, they are insufficient to argue that polarity and casualty rates are connected.

The three first hypotheses have produced a mixed picture. I have shown that MID

severity can be connected to a region’s polarity. The notion that MID frequency was connected

with regional polarity produced suggestive data that ultimately turned out to be statistically

insignificant; in contrast, the data on polarity and MID casualties was statistically significant, but

showed little variation and was thus of limited interest. The most compelling insight we have

derived so far is that the bipolar East Asian region sees a lot of conflict, but that these conflicts

do not escalate beyond the “display of force” level of severity. While this lack of war is not

inconsistent with the claims advanced by structural realists about the stability of bipolar orders, I

have a hard time arguing that such a tense order is stably peaceful; instead, it seems like it could

fall apart during any of its plentiful clashes. Thus, none of the first three hypotheses are

supported.

165

Hypothesis 4: Polarity affects the ratio of inter- and intraregional MIDs

A large number of studies have shown that physical proximity is the single strongest predictor of

conflict (Richardson 1960; Gochman and Leng 1983; Diehl 1985; Vasquez 1987, 1993, 1995,

1996, 2001; Bremer 1992; Hensel 1996; Huth 1996; Senese 1996, 1997; Vasquez and Henehan

2001; Bennett and Stam 2003). However, not all MIDs are between close neighbors. The graph

below shows the ratio between interregional and intraregional MIDs.

As the graph shows, the aggregate inter/intra MID ratio has varied between .5 and .6 in the post-

Cold War period, recently inching up above .6. However, as graphs 4.1 through 4.11 showed, the

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Intr

are

gio

nal fr

actio

n

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Intraregional MIDs under line; Interregional MIDs above line

Graph 5.5: Global Inter/Intraregional MID ratio, 1990-2010

166

ratio varies wildly between regions; several regions have no intraregional MIDs whatsoever, and

the other regions vary between the extremes of the Middle East (intraregional MIDs make up no

more than 37% of the region’s conflicts in any given year) and North America (where the

intraregional MID fraction never dips below .85). What could account for this variation? It does

not seem to be changes in level of challenger or regional power involvement, as this has been

relatively constant since the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, while the MID involvement ratio of leading states has remained constant, the

absolute number of MID involvements has gone down:

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Reg

iona

l p

ow

ers

/Challe

ng

ers

fra

ctio

n

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs with regional powers or challengers under line; MIDs without above

Graph 5.6: Ratio of MIDs featuring leading states, 1990-2010

167

Why does this ratio matter? If we subscribe to Carl von Clausewitz’ old dictum that war

is politics by other means (von Clausewitz 1982), then regional conflicts should follow local

logics. MIDs involving outside powers introduces actors whose logics or goals may not

correspond with those of the rest of the region. The results can be unwanted and unplanned for

escalation of what was thought to be contained conflicts54; additionally, the coordination

problems this introduces makes conflicts harder to solve.

54 Similarly, Patrick Regan shows that outside involvement in civil wars prolongs the conflicts and increases

casualties. See Regan 2000, 2002.

020

40

60

80

10

0

Fre

qu

en

cy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs with high-level states

020

40

60

80

10

0

Fre

qu

en

cy

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MIDs without high-level states

Graph 5.7: MIDS featuring regional powers or challengers

168

Table 5.7: Inter/intraregional MID differentials:

No action Threats to

use force

Display of

force

Use of

force

War

Average

severity55

Global

totals

417

39

436

564

25

2,83

Nopolar

interregional

47 7 68 97 14 3,11

Nopolar

intraregional

34 1 27 77 2 3,08

Unipolar

interregional

37 3 41 69 8 3,05

Unipolar

intraregional

77 7 81 131 1 2,91

Bipolar

interregional

20 1 44 16 0 2,69

Bipolar

intraregional

61 2 66 62 0 2,68

Multipolar

interregional

84 16 44 59 0 2,39

Multipolar

intraregional

57 2 67 52 0 2,64

It is difficult to draw consistent conclusions across the different polarities from the data

presented in Table 5.7; however, we can note that formally declared wars are greatly

overrepresented in the interregional category. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, while

Graph 5.5 shows that intraregional MIDs are far more common than interregional MIDs, nopolar

regions have reversed this ratio; unipolar regions, on the other hand, seem especially resistant to

interregional incursions.

55 The MID severity refers to the COW dataset’s classification. Thus 1 = no action etc.

169

Table 5.8: Intra/interregional MID casualty differentials:

#

MIDs

None 1-

25

deaths

26-

100

deaths

101-

250

deaths

251-500

deaths

500-999

deaths

>999

deaths

Global

totals

1416 1247

122

18

11

7

4

7

Inter-

regional

MIDs

647 572 53 11 2 2 2 5

Intra-

regional

MIDs

769 675 69 7 9 5 2 2

The casualty data is similarly ambiguous, though it is notable that five of seven conflicts

with more than 999 dead are interregional MIDs. This is probably correlated with the increased

probability for interregional MIDs to be formally declared wars. Beyond that important factor,

there are few discernible differences in casualties between interregional and intraregional MIDs.

However, it is still unclear if there are other patterns in regional MID involvement. The

table below shows the distribution of inter- and intraregional MIDs by polarity.

Table 5.9: Intra/interregional MID distribution by polarity:

Total

MIDs

Intraregional

MIDs

Interregional

MIDs

Intraregional

ratio

Nopolar regions 374 141 233 0.38

Unipolar regions 455 297 158 0.65

Bipolar regions 272 191 81 0.70

Multipolar

regions

381 203 178 0.53

170

We note that unipolar, bipolar and multipolar regions all have a majority of their conflicts

be intraregional MIDs; considering both the inferences drawn from Boulding and Bueno de

Mesquita’s work on the diminishing strength gradient and that earlier data in this dissertation has

shown that intraregional MIDs are the most common ones, this is as expected (Boulding 1962;

Bueno de Mesquita 1981). What is surprising is how low the intraregional MID ratio is for

nopolar regions; the massive ratio difference we see between bi- and unipolar regions and

multipolar regions is also noteworthy.

A chi square test with 3 degrees of freedom gives us a chi square of 100,259 and a Yates’

chi square of 98,211.56 The critical point for χ=0.005 with 3 degrees of freedom is 12,838.As we

are well above the critical point, we can safely conclude that the differences across the categories

within Table 5.9 are statistically significant.

How does these differences work out? The following graphs identify the MID

participants in each of the 11 regions of the world.

56 Chi square calculation performed with tools provided by Preacher 2001.

171

Nopolar regions:

As graph 5.8 shows, all three regions see significant outside involvement, even if the bulk

of conflictual behavior is done by the regional members. East Africa sees much less outside

involvement than the other two; the Middle East sees both the most conflict and the most outside

involvement.

USA FranceRussia

KenyaSomalia

EthiopiaEritrea

Sudan

Yemen

EgyptSaudi Arabia

DjiboutiChad

05

10

15

20

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

East Africa

USA

UKFrance

Iran

Turkey

Iraq

IsraelSyria

Kuwait

010

20

30

40

50

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

Middle East

Spain MoroccoAlgeria

Mali

12

34

5

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

North Africa

Graph 5.8: MID participants in nopolar regions, 1990-2010

172

Unipolar regions:

An early expectation of this dissertation was that unipolar regions would be highly stable,

and that this would be because they had a hegemon that could and would set rules that were

palatable to the region’s members, and that it could dissuade the dissatisfied members from

acting out. The findings has been negative, neither conflict frequency, severity of casualty counts

could be safely attributed to regional polarity. However, as Table 5.8 shows, unipolar orders are

highly resistant to outside involvement, and Graph 5.9 illustrates this. While North America does

see more interregional conflict than South America or Western Africa, it is not particularly

serious (the big outside MID participants are Denmark, and Portugal, who have multiple

fisheries-related run-ins with Canada). Beyond that, all outside involvement is by great powers.

Denmark

USACanada

RussiaPortugal

UKFrance

NicaraguaColombia

Venezuela

Ecuador

Peru

05

10

15

20

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

North America

UKRussiaChile

ArgentinaBrazilPeru

01

23

45

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

South America

USA France Libya

Liberia Nigeria

02

46

810

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

West Africa

USARussia

Afghanistan

India

Pakistan

BangladeshChina

05

10

15

20

25

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

South Asia

All unipolar regions with one or more challengers

Graph 5.9: MID involvement in unipolar regions, 1990-2010

173

Even when including NATO’s protracted war in Afghanistan, we see that the overwhelming

amount of unipolar MIDs are intraregional.57

Graph 5.10 describes unipolar regions without challengers. Again, we see that these

regions see their MIDs being primarily intraregional, with the exception being Indonesian action

during Timor Leste’s independence process. Southern Africa sees almost no outside MID

involvement. While this does lend further support to the hypothesis that unipolar regions are

resistant to outside interference, it does cast some doubts on the expectation that the presence of

challengers leads to more conflicts as the challenger-free regions do not seem to be much

57 The unusual Pakistan-India dynamic is discussed later in this chapter.

Belgium

Uganda

Rwanda

DR Congo

Sudan

Angola

05

10

15

20

25

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

Southern Africa

Norway India

Indonesia

Papua New Guinea

AustraliaPalau

05

10

15

20

25

Fre

qu

en

cy

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

Oceania

All unipolar regions without challengers

Graph 5.10: MID involvement in unipolar regions

174

different from the ones with challengers. I‘ll return to the role played by challengers later in this

chapter.

Bipolar regions:

The data shows that East Asia, the only bipolar region, sees a high number of conflicts,

that these conflicts do not escalate into shooting wars, and that it has the highest intraregional

MID ratio of all. Additionally, it has the lowest number of participants per conflict of all the

polarities. As the graph shows, the only outside powers that get involved in East Asian MIDs are

Russia and the United States This suggests that East Asian MIDs involve few actors, and that

outside powers (specifically, the United States) gets involved in these through bilateral alliances

with one of the other MID participants. This is consistent with the expectations generated by East

USA

China

Russia

Myanmar

Thailand

North Korea

Taiwan

Japan

South Korea

Phillipines

010

20

30

40

50

Fre

quency

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

Graph 5.11: MID participants in East Asia, 1990-2010

175

Asia being a bipolar region – the finely tuned balance of power in the region requires that outside

involvement is conducted through its already-established channels, and rogue outside

interference is discouraged or ignored (the other outside power regularly involving itself in East

Asia is Russia, but the bulk of its IDs are fishing disputes with Japan). Furthermore, the

combination of high numbers of MIDS and lack of conflict contagion illustrates the lack of

alliances throughout the region – MIDs are generally confined to the two sides plus possible US

involvement.

Multipolar regions:

As Table 5.9 shows, multipolarity is only weakly negatively correlated with interregional

conflict. Closer examination of the case of Europe, the only multipolar region, shows that this

USA

Canada

Russia

Turkey

GreeceYugoslavia

UzbekistanUK

Azerbaijan

010

20

30

40

50

Fre

quency

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900ccode

Graph 5.12: MID participants in Europe, 1990-2010

176

tendency is not a result of extensive outside meddling – instead, we see few outside MID

participants, and multiple parties to most conflicts. A large number of interregional MIDs

involve the United States and/or Canada through NATO; the others involve either Azerbaijan

(not a member of Europe by the criteria established in Chapter 4) or the Central Asian ex-Soviet

republics.

In summary, we can after close analysis of the data conclude that it is safe to say that

regional polarity affects the ratio of inter- and intraregional conflicts a region experiences.

Furthermore, we have shown that it has discernible, uniform patterns – nopolar regions are

vulnerable to outside interference, while regions that have recognized regional powers are much

less so. Furthermore, bipolar and multipolar regions seem to have different MID and alliance

patterns than unipolar regions.

177

Hypothesis 5: Regional polarity shapes leading-state behaviors

At first glance, this statement is obviously, even trivially, true. After all, the whole notion

of structure is that it shapes how its actors operate within it. However, how does a region’s

polarity shape the behavior of its regional powers and challengers? Consider what both structural

realism and power transition theory predicts – conflict between unevenly matched actors is

unlikely. If the capability disparity between two states is too big, conflict simply becomes an

untenable proposition; instead, the stronger actor can make demands and the weaker has to

acquiesce (Fearon 1995; Thucydides 1998). This insight should translate to the regional level.

Two factors play a role here – the number of regional powers, and the number of challengers.

The safer a regional power feels in its position, the less it needs to involve itself in the conflicts

of its region; instead, it can leave the lower-level states to sort their differences out among

themselves and only intervene if an outcome it dislikes seems likely. The lower-level states

know this and will limit themselves accordingly. This serves as the foundation of hegemonic

stability theory – the presence of a hegemon leads to increased stability, as the hegemon defends

the status quo. This stability may not be peaceful, as the hegemon will tolerate conflicts –

however, it is stable, as these conflicts will not be allowed to become sufficiently serious to

destabilize the system (Gilpin 1981). Finally, the challenger knows this and acts accordingly – if

it feels it can achieve parity with the regional power, it will concentrate its efforts in-region; if it

does not, it may direct its efforts elsewhere. If this logic is correct, we should see distinct patterns

in regional international relations.

178

Table 5.10: Conflict distribution sorted by challenger:

Number

of

member

states

Total

number

of

MID

participants

Number

of

conflicts

MIDs

per

state

Conflicts

per

state

Participants

per

conflict

Regions

without

challengers

50 402 189 8,04 3,78 2,13

Regions

with

challengers

129 1079 417 8,36 3,23 2,59

Table 5.11: MID casualties sorted by challenger:

#

MIDs58

None 1-

25

deaths

26-

100

deaths

101-

250

deaths

251-500

deaths

500-999

deaths

>999

deaths

Regions

without

challengers

376 339 32 3 1 1 0 0

Regions

with

challengers

1040 908 90 15 10 6 4 7

A chi square test of the conflict frequencies in Table 5.10 with 2 degrees of freedom

gives us a chi square of 0,092 and a Yates’ chi square (appropriate here due to the large amount

of low values) of 0,113.59 The critical point for χ=0.005 with 2 degrees of freedom is 10,597. As

58 The MID totals are lower here than in Table 5.9 as the cases of missing data has been removed. 59 Chi square calculation performed with tools provided by Preacher 2001.

179

we are far below the critical point, we must reject any hypothesis that rests on these differences

being statistically significant.

The results of Table 5.11, on the other hand, are potentially suggestive, especially the

facts that conflicts with 26 or more casualties are overrepresented in regions with challengers,

and that these regions also have all conflicts with more than 999 dead. However, the results are

not statistically significant - a chi square test with 6 degrees of freedom gives us a chi square of

7,401 and a Yates’ chi square (appropriate here due to the large amount of low values) of

3,484.60 The critical point for χ=0.100 with 6 degrees of freedom is 10,645. As we are well

below this, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the presence of challengers is unrelated to

conflict frequency or to casualty rates.

However, there is another way of examining whether the presence of challengers leads to

more conflicts, and that is to look at MID initiation rates. The COW dataset has a MID initiator

variable; however, it is not always reliable, especially in Third World conflicts. Thus, it becomes

difficult to compare the rates across regions. Instead, I will take a more narrative approach.

60 Chi square calculation performed with tools provided by Preacher 2001.

180

Table 5.12: MIDs joined or started by challengers, 1990-2010:

Region Challenger Number of

MIDs

involved in

Number of

MIDs

initiated

Intraregional

MIDs

Times

targeting

leading

states61

East Africa Ethiopia 22 19 16 0

Middle East Egypt 13 9 4 2 (Israel,

Iran)

Iran 46 28 27 2 (Egypt,

Pakistan)

Israel 20 17 14 5 (Egypt

x3,

France,

Saudi

Arabia)

Saudi Arabia 10 5 3 0

North Africa Morocco 4 1 0 062

North

America

Canada 17 13 2 1 (USA)

Mexico 0 0 0 0

South

America

Argentina 5 1 0 1 (Russia)

Europe Italy 8 5 1 0

West Africa Libya 2 2 2 0

South Asia Pakistan 21 13 8 6 (India

x5, USA)

No real pattern emerges from examining the MIDs that challengers partake in. The one

thing that does stand out is the understandable reluctance challengers show in engaging with

states of equal or greater strength. The one exception to this is Pakistan, which is the only

challenger that has engaged in actual armed conflicts with another leading power since the end of

the Cold War (none of the other MIDs that targeted leading states produced more than 9

61 Leading states are defined here as either great powers or other challengers 62 However, the one MID Morocco has initiated was against Spain, which though not a regional challenger is a very

powerful state.

181

casualties). We will return to the case of Pakistan below. However, based on the data so far, I am

reluctant to state that the presence of challengers has any kind of systematic effect.

Finally I examine whether polarity and challengers shape the geographic focus of a

region’s leading states. The expectation is that states whose standing is secure in their region will

be feel less need to display their capabilities than states that feel less entrenched. I thus expect to

see unipolar powers being less active than bipolar ones, followed by multipolar powers and,

finally, nopolar ones. Engaging in conflictual behavior is not undertaken lightly; thus, if a state is

willing to do so, it is a strong indicator that it does not feel safe at home.

Unipolar regions

05

10

15

20

25

Fre

qu

en

cy

NAm

erica

SAm

erica

Eur

ope

WAfri

ca

EAfri

ca

SAfri

ca

NAfri

ca

MEas

t

SAsi

a

EAsi

a

Oce

ania

United States

05

10

15

20

25

Fre

qu

en

cy

NAm

erica

SAm

erica

Eur

ope

WAfri

ca

EAfri

ca

SAfri

ca

NAfri

ca

MEas

t

SAsi

a

EAsi

a

Oce

ania

Canada

Total MIDs 1990-2010

Graph 5.13: MIDs involving North American powers

182

North America is a unipolar region with two challengers, Canada and Mexico. The

United States is a unique case, being the world’s strongest state and the only one with truly

global reach. Graph 5.13 makes it very clear that the Americans are not worried about their

regional standing. Intra-regional MIDs comprise a small fraction of its MID involvement, and

these span a wide variety of cases and opponents rather than focusing on a single state. We can

further note that the region’s two challengers have no intention of parity with the United States -

Mexico is not involved in a single MID and Canada focuses its energies outwards (its North

American MIDs are primarily fishing disputes with European states).

South America is a similarly unipolar region; it has one challenger in Argentina. Along

with North Africa, it is the most stable of all the regions. Brazil clearly is not concerned about its

standing and thus has little need to engage in displays of strength with its neighbors. Argentina,

who at one point had an operational nuclear weapons program, has a history of seeking regional

01

23

45

Fre

qu

en

cy

NAm

erica

SAm

erica

Eur

ope

WAfri

ca

EAfri

ca

SAfri

ca

NAfri

ca

MEas

t

SAsi

a

EAsi

a

Oce

ania

Brazil

01

23

45

Fre

qu

en

cy

NAm

erica

SAm

erica

Eur

ope

WAfri

ca

EAfri

ca

SAfri

ca

NAfri

ca

MEas

t

SAsi

a

EAsi

a

Oce

ania

Argentina

Total MIDs 1990-2010

Graph 5.14: MIDs involving South American powers

183

power status; however, it is now incapable of challenging Brazil. Thus, it directs its efforts out of

its region, becoming the by far most internationally active state in its region.

South Asia is unipolar with one challenger. As Cline and her coauthors point out,

Pakistan is unique among challengers in that it is preponderantly conflictual inside its region and

seems to have ambitions of parity with the regional power (Cline et al 2010). This ambition

creates an entirely different interaction pattern than in the two other unipolar-with-challenger

regions. Pakistan’s ambitions of parity forces India to confine its international efforts to its

region, which again constrains Pakistan, resulting in a spiral model (Jervis 1978). However, if we

keep in mind that Pakistan seems to be growing weaker rather than stronger, South Asia becomes

a useful test case for power transition theory – if the longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry

represented a frenzied effort by Pakistan to effect a power transition, the dyad should see fewer

and fewer as Pakistani capabilities erode.

05

10

15

20

25

Fre

qu

en

cy

NAm

erica

SAm

erica

Eur

ope

WAfri

ca

EAfri

ca

SAfri

ca

NAfri

ca

MEas

t

SAsi

a

EAsi

a

Oce

ania

India

05

10

15

20

25

Fre

qu

en

cy

NAm

erica

SAm

erica

Eur

ope

WAfri

ca

EAfri

ca

SAfri

ca

NAfri

ca

MEas

t

SAsi

a

EAsi

a

Oce

ania

Pakistan

Total MIDs 1990-2010

Graph 5.15: MIDs involving South Asian powers

184

This graph charts the two states’ conflictual history, and it is entirely possible to see their

relationship as becoming gradually more normalized after a peak in hostilities in the 1960s.

The bars marking MIDs are becoming less frequent; also, though the graph does not

show this, the conflicts are becoming less severe as well. If this trend continues, it seems likely

that the two countries will have a “normal” unipolar relationship in a decade or so, replacing the

current, atypically conflictual one.

02

46

810

Freq

uenc

y

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Graph 5.16: India-Pakistan MIDs, 1948-2010

185

West Africa has a MID pattern not dissimilar to the East Asian one.

West Africa is a unipolar region with one challenger. Crucially, Nigeria was not seen as a

regional power until the late 1990s, and it has needed to build itself up to become one. This

accounts for its tight regional focus. Libya has been largely unable to engage in independent

foreign policy in the period after the end of the Cold War, as it has been under a number of

international sanctions and boycotts; as a result, it has had to maintain an in-regional political

focus. The Libyan challenge probably also accounts for some of Nigeria’s attention to local

politics as well. With the current collapse of the Libyan government, it is unable to mount any

kind of challenge to Nigeria, and a similar measurement taken in five years would probably

reflect this.

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Graph 5.17: MIDs involving West African powers

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As the previous graphs demonstrate, the unipolar regions demonstrate two distinct action

patterns if they have challengers. These patterns repeat themselves in regions that lack

challengers, as we see below.

Australia has no challenger and no need to display strength. As such, it can pick and

choose which MIDs to engage in. As a result, it can stay out of MIDs more or less altogether –

the East Asian and Oceanian MIDs are associated with the East Timorese independence, rather

than any threats towards Australian land or property. The South African MID involvement shows

a similar dynamic as the Australian one – as an unchallengeable power, South Africa sees little

conflict, and can opt to not engage in it (the Southern African region is far from peaceful or

stable, but South Africa itself suffers no threats).

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Graph 5.18: MID participation by unipolar powers

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Nopolar regions:

The Middle East has no recognized regional powers and four challengers. As the graph

makes clear, this polar arrangement does not allow for foreign adventures. Instead, all four

leading states are forced to keep their foreign policy focus sharply in-region. Iran’s European

MIDs are with Armenia, Saudi Arabia’s East African MIDS are with Yemen and Egypt’s East

African MIDs with Sudan.

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Graph 5.19: MIDs involving Middle Eastern powers

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East Africa and North Africa are both nopolar regions with a single challenger. Neither

Morocco nor Ethiopia are rich countries, so their focus on their immediate neighborhoods may

be affected by their lack of resources; however, we still see that neither state ventures much

away from their home regions (Morocco’s on the receiving end of both of its two European

MIDs).

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Graph 5.20: MIDs involving nopolar powers

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Bipolar regions:

East Asia has two regional powers and no challengers. In the previous section, we noted

that the bipolarity of East Asia has profound consequences for its inter- and intraregional MID

ratio. The same trend seems to hold here – the finely honed balance of power demands constant

attention, meaning that both China and Japan keep their focus on international affairs close to

home. The European MIDs for both countries are minor incidents with Russia.

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Graph 5.21: MIDS involving East Asian powers

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Multipolar regions:

Europe is a multipolar region with Italy as its single challenger. If the same power-

balancing dynamic we saw in the other nominally multipolar region, the Middle East, holds here,

we should expect to see a very tight focus on regional affairs. However, we see nearly the

opposite – even Germany, which has been understandably averse both to engage in conflict and

in looking far away from Europe after World War 2, engages in as many MIDs outside Europe as

it does inside it. Russia is the big exception, but it also spreads its MID involvement far and

wide. However, the most interesting pattern of all might be the Italian one; as previously noted,

challengers that see no chance of ever achieving parity with their regional power will do one of

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Graph 5.22: MIDs involving European powers

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two things – give up, or look outwards. We have seen Canada look outwards, and Italy follows

this trend – with MID engagement in 10 regions, it covers more regions than any other state.

Conclusions:

This chapter has tested a number of hypotheses about the effects of regional polarity. The

initial expectation, in line with insights from structural realism, hegemonic stability theory and

power transition theory, was that polar alignments are instrumental in determining regional

stability. Specifically, I expected the relationship between polarity and stability to be linear, with

unipolar regions being more stable than bipolar regions, which would be more stable than

multipolar regions, which would again be more stable than regions with no poles at all.

Furthermore, I expected regional polarity to have an effect on the severity and casualty levels of

MIDs. Finally, I argued that regional polarity and the presence of challengers should create

stable patterns in the way both great powers and challengers act.

The initial findings, presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 showed some support for the thesis

that polarity is connected to how conflict prone a region is. The data presented in Table 5.1 was

interesting, but ambiguous - for example, nopolar regions had the highest number of MIDs per

state, as well as a high median MID count. However, as they also had low minimum and

maximum MID count scores, and as a result a low MID variation, it was hard to say that the

thesis was fully supported. Recoding the data presented a clearer picture in Table 5.2, where it

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was demonstrated that nopolar and bipolar orders are vastly more conflict-prone than unipolar

and multipolar orders. However, this data was not statistically significant, thus stopping us from

making any definite claims about the relationship between polarity and conflict proneness.

Secondly, I tested to see if regional polarity was connected with conflict severity, defined

through COW’s measurement of how much force is used. I found that bipolar and multipolar

regions have no formally declared wars, as well as having much lower incidences of the use of

force than unipolar and nopolar regions. Additionally, bipolar and multipolar regions have much

higher than average rates of either doing nothing or just engaging in displays of force. Though a

statistical test showed these results to be non-random variation, I was uncomfortable with

assigning these variations to structural factors. Thus, I found the thesis that polarity is

systematically connected with conflict severity to be unsupported.

Thirdly, I tested to see if regional polarity is connected with conflict casualties. The

results here were more unidirectional - with bipolar regions again having no high-casualty

conflicts and nopolar areas having an unusually high number of them. Multipolar regions also

had a high incidence of bloody conflicts. As with the previous hypothesis, the results were

shown to be statistically significant. However, the variation between different conflict levels

were minimal. Thus, though I will argue that the hypothesis that polarity and casualties is

distinctly connected is supported, the only firm conclusion I was comfortable making is that the

avoidance of bloody conflicts under bipolarity is not random. Thus, this hypothesis is also

deemed to be unsupported.

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The fourth hypothesis was that polarity is distinctly connected with a region’s ratio of

interregional and intraregional conflicts. Here, my expectation was that unipolar regions resist

external influence more strongly than other polar orders, followed by bipolar, multipolar and

nopolar systems. This hypothesis was strongly supported, as I demonstrated that regional polarity

creates uniform patterns – nopolar regions are vulnerable to outside interference, while regions

that have recognized regional powers are much less so. Furthermore, bipolar and multipolar

regions seem to have different MID and alliance patterns than unipolar regions. However, I was

unable to demonstrate that there was a consistent difference in conflict severity or casualty rate

between interregional and intraregional MIDs.

Finally, I examined how regional polarity shaped the actions of the regional powers and

their challengers. The results here were a mixed bag. I expected regional powers in unipolar

regions to have great freedom in setting their policies, and bipolar and multipolar powers to have

less so. Finally, the challengers in nopolar regions would be the most constrained by their

regions’ polar alignments. As most states prefer not to fight unless they have to (Fearon 1995;

Reiter 2003), MID participation becomes a signaling device, demonstrating strength and resolve.

States that feel secure will opt out of this, and if they do feel the need to fight, they will do so

where their interests lie. Less secure states will be forced to demonstrate their power more often,

and they may have to do so closer to home to ward off rivals. Thus, I expected the presence of

challengers to create more conflict.

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These expectations were not met. Though some interesting numbers came up when

investigating the differences in severity of conflicts in regions that do or do not have challengers,

these were not statistically significant. Furthermore, it does not appear that challengers seek out

conflicts with their equals or that regions with challengers are more conflictual than those

without. Indeed, the presence of challengers appears to do very little. The only thing I did

conclusively demonstrate is that Pakistan is a completely atypical challenger, and that I expect it

to become more normal over the next decade or two. I did show in a narrative fashion that the

presence of active challengers can force the region’s hegemon to focus its attention on its home

region; however, much of this was driven by the clearly abnormal behavior of Pakistan, and

little, if any, of the shown variation could be traced back to structural factors. Also, as this was

not subjected to a rigorous statistical test, it is more food for thought than a definitive statement

about polarity and foreign policy.

That gives us these results:

Regional polarity and MID frequency is connected: Not supported.

Regional polarity and MID severity is connected: Not supported.

Regional polarity and MID casualties are connected: Not supported.

Regional polarity and the ratio of inter- and intraregional MIDs is connected:

Strongly supported.

Regional polarity and the presence of challengers shape leading-state policies:

Not supported.

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Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction:

This dissertation has tested a number of hypotheses about the effects of regional polarity.

The initial expectation, in line with insights from structural realism, hegemonic stability theory

and power transition theory, was that polar alignments are instrumental in determining regional

stability. Specifically, I expected the relationship between polarity and stability to be linear, with

unipolar regions being more stable than bipolar regions, which would be more stable than

multipolar regions, which would again be more stable than regions with no poles at all.

Furthermore, I expected regional polarity to have an effect on the severity and casualty

levels of MIDs. Finally, I argued that regional polarity and the presence of challengers should

create stable patterns in the way both great powers and challengers act. Testing these hypotheses

produced a mostly negative set of results, as I was unable to conclusively show that regional

polarity is connected to conflict frequency or that it determines the policies chosen by regional

powers and their challengers. However, I was able to show that certain polar alignments are

more likely to experience conflict escalation and that regional polarity has a strong effect on the

ratio of inter- and intraregional conflicts the region faces. The results and their implications for

the different polarities are summed up below.

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Unipolar regions:

Table 6.1: Unipolarity and regional stability:

Hypothesis Supported? Notes

Regional polarity and MID

frequency is connected

No Lowest conflict per state rate,

lowest number of MIDs per

state

Regional polarity and MID

severity is connected

No High percentage of severe

conflicts

Regional polarity and MID

casualties are connected

No Close to global averages

across all casualty categories

Regional polarity and the

ratio of inter- and

intraregional MIDs is

connected

Yes High ratio of intraregional

MIDs

Regional polarity and the

presence of challengers shape

leading-state policies

No Hostile challengers seem to

be able to constrain unipolar

regional powers’ policies.

The initial expectation was that unipolarity would provide the most stable regional

setting. This expectation is mostly borne out, as unipolar regions see relatively few conflicts and

are able to resist outside influence; this is true even of regions with relatively weak hegemons

such as Nigeria in West Africa or South Africa in Southern Africa. The conflicts in unipolar

regions generally do not involve the leading states (the exception being the India-Pakistan rivalry

in South Asia) – the unipolar conflict hotspots are in Central Africa, Afghanistan and in Central

America. These conflicts can get serious, but do not seem to spread beyond their immediate

neighborhood.

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Bipolar regions:

Table 6.2: Bipolarity and regional stability:

Hypothesis Supported? Notes

Regional polarity and MID

frequency is connected

No Very high number of MIDs

and conflicts per state, the

lowest number of participants

per conflict

Regional polarity and MID

severity is connected

No Low percentage of severe

conflicts, no formally

declared wars

Regional polarity and MID

casualties are connected

No No conflicts with more than

100 casualties

Regional polarity and the

ratio of inter- and

intraregional MIDs is

connected

Yes Highest ratio of intraregional

MIDs

Regional polarity and the

presence of challengers shape

leading-state policies

No System seems highly

constrained. No challengers.

The similarities and differences between bipolar and unipolar regions can be seen as a

test of the differences between the logics of balance of power theories and power transition

theory, respectively. Bipolar regions have much higher rates of conflicts and MIDs than unipolar

regions, but these conflicts do not escalate – while East Asia sees some “use of force” conflicts,

the casualties of these are negligible, and the region has not seen any formally declared wars.

Bipolarity is tense, but manages to contain its conflicts before they escalate beyond control, thus

exemplifying what Benjamin Miller dubs “cold peace” (Miller 2007).

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Multipolar regions:

Table 6.3: Multipolarity and regional stability:

Hypothesis Supported? Notes

Regional polarity and MID

frequency is connected

No Low conflict per state rate,

low number of MIDs per

state, highest number of

participants per conflict

Regional polarity and MID

severity is connected

No Lowest percentage of severe

conflicts, no formally

declared wars

Regional polarity and MID

casualties are connected

No Close to or above global

averages across all casualty

categories

Regional polarity and the

ratio of inter- and

intraregional MIDs is

connected

Yes 50/50 split between inter- and

intraregional MIDs

Regional polarity and the

presence of challengers shape

leading-state policies

No Regional powers seem

unconstrained. Challengers

have no effect on policies.

The logic of multipolarity is very different from those of unipolarity or bipolarity. Europe

has relatively few conflicts, but high rates of contagion; many of these involve outside

participants (usually the United States or Canada acting through NATO, but other outside states

show up as well). However, while the conflicts may spread, they do not seem to escalate often,

as multipolar regions have the lowest rate of severe conflicts of any polar arrangement. The

presence of challengers do not seem to affect these dynamics at all.

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Nopolar regions:

Table 6.4: Nopolarity and regional stability:

Hypothesis Supported? Notes

Regional polarity and MID

frequency is connected

No Highest conflict per state rate,

high number of MIDs per

state, relatively high number

of participants per conflict

Regional polarity and MID

severity is connected

No Highest percentage of severe

conflicts, large number of

formally declared wars

Regional polarity and MID

casualties are connected

No Above global averages across

casualty categories

Regional polarity and the

ratio of inter- and

intraregional MIDs is

connected

Yes Highly vulnerable to outside

influence, lowest ratio of

intraregional conflicts

Regional polarity and the

presence of challengers shape

leading-state policies

No No recognized regional

powers. Challengers are

forced to contain themselves

to their home regions.

Nopolar regions combine the worst of the other three regional dynamics. They are as

conflict-prone as bipolar regions, but lack their de-escalating mechanisms. They lack the bi- and

unipolar regions’ ability to keep outside actors away, and thus see very high levels of

interregional conflicts. They are a bit less prone to contagion than multipolar regions, but as they

are far more vulnerable to escalation, their conflicts are both widespread and severe. Finally, the

leading states are forced by the unsettled circumstances of their regions to stay close to home;

considering how conflict-prone many of them are, this might actually be a good thing.

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These results do lend support to the notion that power preponderance creates peace.

While the bipolar order appears adept at limiting the scope of its conflicts, I can’t help but

wonder about what it would take for the bipolar safeguards to break down and plunge the region

into conflict – this is not a concern I have with any of the unipolar regions. Furthermore, I can

easily see the emergence of a challenger in East Asia, and this might change its established

tense-but-safe dynamic. This brings up the role played by challengers.

The role of challengers

The role played by challengers turned out to be much more limited than I initially

expected. Hostile challengers in unipolar regions seem to be able to constrain the regional power;

however, this only applies to Libya and Pakistan, which are both atypical states with

idiosyncratic priorities. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the India-Pakistan relationship

can be seen as a failed attempt by Pakistan to engineer a power transition, and I expect Pakistan

to give up on its attempts at parity and instead build a more accommodating relationship with

India over the next decade. Similarly, Libya is currently in the throes of serious internal unrest

and will remain incapable of mounting any challenge in its region for a long time. This means

that none of the current crop of challengers will matter much in, say, ten year, and this brings up

the uncomfortable question of whether challengers actually matter at all. Can an apparently

meaningless category be a worthwhile one? I will argue that it can be – as I showed in the

previous chapter, challengers are uniformly careful not to mix it up with their equals (again, the

exception is Pakistan, and I expect that to change), but this can change. Also, a big contributing

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factor to this reluctance is the strength of the regional power, and this can change, too. It is not

inconceivable that, say, Libya coalesces around capable leaders while Nigeria experiences

decline and unrest, creating an entirely different regional dynamic than the one we see now.

Also, as challengers necessarily must be the talent pool from where new regional powers emerge,

it does make sense to identify and keep track of them.

On the other hand, it is entirely legitimate to wonder if the current set of challengers

might be in decline. Canada and Italy, in particular, struggle with face validity – neither actively

challenge their regional powers, and neither can be said to be a real alternative policy conduit

either in or outside of its region.

As Graph 6.1 shows, both Canada and Italy have become increasingly reluctant to project

force over time. If this trend continues, they will both become irrelevant to the international

security environment. Who, if any, will replace them?

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As its fifth-biggest economy, Italy is the European challenger largely by default. One

viable alternative could be Spain. However, Spain has shown little interest in becoming a

European regional power, and is struggling economically. A better alternative might be Poland.

The Poles have a large population, an improving economy and a large and increasing military

budget. As importantly, Poland’s participation in the “Coalition of the willing” in the Second

Iraq War signaled their interest in becoming an international actor (much as Spain’s withdrawal

from the same conflict after the terrorist attacks in 2004 signaled their lack of similar interest),

and it does not share the other NATO states’ attitude towards Russia. As of now, Poland is

neither strong enough to be a regional power, nor does it receive enough diplomatic recognition,

but its willingness to both spend significant resources on its power projection capacities and its

interest in involving itself in international affairs suggests that this will probably change over the

next decade or two.

Another plausible candidate for challenger status is New Zealand – it is, by far, the

second strongest state in the Oceanian region, and receives far more recognition than any state

there after Australia. However, they display no interest in becoming an active international actor,

and as they would almost certainly not challenge Australia, an emergence of New Zealand as a

challenger would not change any regional dynamics, in or outside of Oceania. Instead, the most

interesting candidate for the status of challenger is South Korea.

South Korea is the third strongest state in its region, it has a large population base, a

strong economy and a large military budget. It is also willing to assert itself internationally. Also,

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it has been able to build itself up while being protected by its American alliance. However, the

emergence of a South Korean challenger in East Asia may throw the region’s finely tuned

balance of power into disarray. If the region acquires a viable third power, it is entirely possible

that at least a few of the region’s plentiful conflicts might not be bottled up as efficiently as they

are now, or that they could expand beyond what they do now. If challengers haven’t mattered all

that much before, I suspect this could change with the emergence of South Korea as a regional

power.

Implications for international policymakers

One of the main conclusions we can draw from these results is the importance of having

some sort of regional anchor. Even if the main regional power is relatively passive within its

neighborhood, its presence alone seems to be enough to moderate the behaviors of other regional

members. Thus, even though South Africa only plays a small direct role in its region, the

conflicts in its region has been much better contained than the ones in, for example, East Africa.

Furthermore, it seems that it might be better for all parties to invest in a single strong regional

power than it is to try to craft a regional balance of power. Yes, East Asia is stably peaceful, but

that is because of its two evenly matched regional powers; it would be difficult to see how that

situation could evolve peacefully in a region today (the main candidates for bipolar parity being

Iran-Saudi Arabia in the Middle East).

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Another notable finding is the role played by challengers. Some challengers (Argentina,

Canada and Italy) seem to have abandoned any attempt at regional parity and have instead tried

to establish themselves as active international actors. Others (Libya, Pakistan) have instead tried

to challenge their regional hegemons; the results are discouraging for all parties, as they have

failed to catch up to the regional power and have created tense, conflictual regions. The

experiences of Ethiopia and the Middle Eastern challengers point the same way. The lesson thus

seems to be to not challenge the hegemon, but instead try to develop a more diversified

international policy portfolio.

Implications for international relations theory

The findings of this dissertation could serve as food for thought for IR theorists. I started

this dissertation fully expecting the results of it to be in line with a combination of hegemonic

stability theory and power transition theory. Some of that has been confirmed, such as the notion

that the effects anarchy are not a global constant, but rather vary across time and place. However,

the stability of East Asia seems to contradict the expectations of power transition theory, which

states that wars are most likely to occur when states are evenly matched. The way to make this

finding consistent with power transition theory is to go back to the idea of dissatisfaction and

argue that neither Japan nor China is dissatisfied with their current power position. This is

perfectly plausible, but it does poke at power transition theory’s greatest weakness – how to

define “dissatisfaction”. As its frequent MID participation shows, China is clearly much more

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than just a trading state that does not care about military capabilities as long as its mercantile

capacities grow (see Ross 2009, 2010).

If power transition theory is somewhat weakened by my findings, I find that hegemonic

stability theory, along with its cousin long cycle theory, is similarly strengthened. Unipolar

regions are stably peaceful (the exception is in the Southern Africa region, and South Africa has

very limited ability to affect what happens in the Democratic Republic of Congo), and we see no

signs of balancing against regional hegemons. This surprised me – while balancing against the

global preponderant power might be a daunting task, trying to achieve parity in one’s own

neighborhood seems both easier and more urgent. The lack of balancing deals a small blow to

structural realism (Walt 1987).

Finally, I will argue that the demonstrated variations across the different of regional

polarity shows that future regional research cannot construct their regions simply as groups of

states clustered around a dominant power (Lemke 2002). As well-argued as Lemke’s work is, he

misses out when he defines all his regions as necessarily unipolar.

206

Future research

The one unequivocal finding in this dissertation is that the lack of regional hegemons

leads to an increase in outside involvement in a region’s disputes. How this happens, however, is

not covered here and clearly deserves further study. Do strong outside states force themselves

upon the reluctant nopolar aspirant hegemons – and, if so, how do they do this? Or are they

invited in by states seeking an advantage over their rivals? If this is the case, is it due to

desperation (presumably measurable through declining relative capabilities), or is it a policy

implemented by states that can offer a stable alliance with the outside power? Do states try

internal balancing first and then resort to outside help? Are alliance patterns different between

intra- and interregional allies? The topics of inquiry that the initial finding that the intra/inter

ratio variance depends on polarity enables are large and varied.

Another topic that needs investigation is the role played by rivalries in determining

regional affairs – more specifically, do rivalries trump polarities? How do we best approach the

India-Pakistan situation – is it an atypical polar setup, or is it a rivalry exacerbated by the

region’s unipolarity? Are interregional rivals more or less likely to engage in conflictual

behavior than intraregional ones? The range of topics here seem almost limitless.

207

Thirdly, not all states belong to a region. Map 6.1 shows all the unaffiliated border states.

A future project should examine their dynamics, especially that of the Central Asian states63.

Map 6.1: Border states

Finally, the structural theory developed in this dissertation is, as any structural theory

must be, a bare-bones framework for further development and investigation. For example, I am

certain that the organizational ecology of any region can help or hinder it from avoiding

conflicts. However, it is difficult to determine this if we don’t have a set of baseline expectations

63 A Central Asian region does show up in part of the period after the Cold War. However, it is not consistently

present and did not make the cut in either Rhamey or Cline et al, as it was gone for too many years. See Chapter 4 in

this dissertation, plus Cline et al 1010 and Rhamey 2013.

208

to work from. Thus, it makes little sense to speculate in whether the institutions established in,

for example, Europe and the Middle East play an important role without first establishing what

we should expect to see. Hopefully this dissertation has contributed towards building such a

launching pad for further research into regional politics.

209

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