Regional Integration Strategy Evaluationidev.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/Regional...

Independent Development Evaluation

From experience to knowledge... From knowledge to action... From action to impact

African Development Bank

March 2018

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nEvaluation of the Regional Integration

Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank, 2011-2016

Summary Report

Addressing Regional IntegrationChallenges in Central Africa:

IDEV conducts different types of evaluations to achieve its

strategic objectives

Thematic Evaluations Project Cluster Evaluations

Regional Integration Stra

tegy

Evaluation

Project Perfo

rmance Evaluations

(Public Secto

r)Impact Evaluations

Project Performance Evaluations

(Private Sector)

Coun

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Evaluation Syntheses

Corporate Evaluations

Sect

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Regional Integration Stra

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Evaluations

Independent Development Evaluation

From experience to knowledge... From knowledge to action... From action to impact

African Development Bank

March 2018

Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African

Development Bank, 2011-2016 Summary Report

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Addressing Regional IntegrationChallenges in Central Africa:

Acknowledgments

© 2018 African Development Bank Group All rights reserved – March 2018

Addressing Regional Integration Challenges in Central Africa: Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank, 2011-2016 - Summary Report An IDEV Regional Integration Strategy Evaluation, March 2018

Disclaimer

Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the various authors of the publication and are not necessarily those of the Management of the African Development Bank (the “Bank”) and the African Development Fund (the “Fund”), Boards of Directors, Boards of Governors or the countries they represent.

Use of this publication is at the reader’s sole risk. The content of this publication is provided without warranty of any kind, either express or implied, including without limitation warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non- infringement of third-party rights. The Bank specifically does not make any warranties or representations as to the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any information contained in the publication. Under no circumstances including, but not limited to, negligence, shall the Bank be liable for any loss, damage, liability or expense incurred or suffered which is claimed to result directly or indirectly from use of this publication or reliance on its content.

This publication may contain advice, opinions, and statements of various information and content providers. The Bank does not represent or endorse the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided by any information or content provider or other person or entity. Reliance upon any such opinion, advice, statement, or other information shall also be at the reader’s own risk.

About the AfDB

The overarching objective of the African Development Bank Group is to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction. The Bank Group achieves this objective by mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in RMCs and providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

About Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)

The mission of Independent Development Evaluation at the AfDB is to enhance the development effectiveness of the institution in its regional member countries through independent and instrumental evaluations and partnerships for sharing knowledge.

Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)African Development Bank GroupAvenue Joseph Anoma, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d’IvoirePhone: +225 20 26 20 41E-mail: [email protected]

Design & layout: A PARTE DESIGN

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Task manager Albert-Enéas Gakusi, Chief evaluation officer IDEV.1

Team member Mohamed Coulibaly, Consultant IDEV.1

Consultants Laura Delponte, Consultant, Frank Mattheis, Consultant

Internal peer reviewer Oswald M. Agbadome, Senior evaluation officer IDEV.2

External peer reviewers John Eriksson, Expert evaluator, Maximilien Tereraho, Expert evaluator

Internal Bank reference group Abdourahmane Diaw, Kalidou Diallo, Ali Cissé, Youssouf Kone, Francis D. Bougaire, Augustin Karanga, Issa Koussoube

Knowledge management officers Donmozoun Some, Consultant IDEV.3, Aminata Kouma, Junior Consultant IDEV.3

Other assistance/contributions provided by Karen Rot-Munstermann, Division manager IDEV.3; Stephanie Yoboué, Junior consultant IDEV.1, Najade Lindsay, Consultant IDEV.3, Henda Ayari, Team Assistant IDEV.1, Blandine A. Gomez, Secretary IDEV.2, Ruby E. Adzobu-Agyare, Secretary IDEV.0

Special thanks to Bank field offices of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, and Gabon

ECCAS Secretariat, LCBC Secretariat, ministries in charge of regional integration operations in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon

Executing agencies of Ketta-Djoum road, PARCI, PACEBCO, PRODEBALT and PRESIBALT operations

Beneficiaries, members of civil society and the private sector met.

El-Iza Mohamedou, OECD, Gauthier Bourlard, Chief Resource Mobilization Officer, FRMB.1

Division manager, OIC Rafika Amira, Foday Turay

Evaluator-General Rakesh Nangia

ContentsAcknowledgments iiAbbreviations and Acronyms vGlossary viExecutive Summary 1Management Response 5

Introduction 15Background 15Objectives and scope 15Methodology and limitations 16Organization of the report 17

Opportunities and Grand Challenges for Regional Integration in Central Africa 19

The Bank’s Strategic Response 20RISP’s strengths 20RISP’s weaknesses 20

Evolution and Structure of the Portfolio 23

The Development Performance of Central Africa MOs 29Relevance of the operations 29Effectiveness of the operations 33Efficiency of the operations 38Sustainability of the operations 40

Bank’s Performance 41

Regional Organizations’ and Countries’ Performance 43Countries’ performance 43Regional organizations’ performance 43

Main Findings 45

Recommendations 47

Annexes 51

Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Contents

List of tablesTable 1: Composition of ECCAS, CEMAC and CEPGL 15Table 2: Evaluation Rating Scale 17Table 3: Grand challenges and opportunities for regional integration in Central Africa 19Table 4: Approvals by sector and period in Central Africa 25Table 5: Sources of Bank’s assistance to Central Africa MOs 25Table 6: Indicative list of the operations in the strategy and the actual portfolio 26Table 7: Cofinancing of Bank’s MOs in Central Africa 27Table 8: Size of Bank financed Central Africa infrastructure operations 27Table 9: Status of the operations 28Table 10: Percentage of MOs of at least satisfactory design quality 30Table 11: Percentage of MOs of at least satisfactory design quality by pillars, 2008-2016 30Table 12: Achievement of project outcomes as compared to initial targets 34Table 13: Number of extensions of operations 39Table 14: Number of operations reported and rated in SAP 39Table 15: Implementation performance of the operations 39

List of figuresFigure 1: Evaluation Building Blocks 16Figure 2: Variation of the volume of approvals of MOs by region and by period (percent) 23

List of boxesBox 1: Approach to allocating resources to AfDB MOs 24Box 2: Non implemented operations 29Box 3: Binding constraints to free trade are not addressed by MOs 31Box 4: Good practices for monitoring project socio-economic outcomes in MOs 31Box 5: Examples of increased costs associated with security issues 32Box 6: Sustainability was highly unsatisfactory in all case studies 40

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vEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report Abbreviations and Acronyms

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB African Development Bank

ADF African Development Fund

AfDB African Development Bank Group

APOC African Program for Onchocerciasis

AU African Union

BDEAC Central African States’ Development Bank

CAPP Central African Power Pool

CAR Central African Republic

CBFF Congo Basin Forest Fund

CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa

CEPGL Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries

CEPI Centre for Investment Project Studies and Evaluation

CIC Community Integration Contribution

CODE Committee on Operations and Development Effectiveness

COMIFAC Central African Forest Commission

COPIL/REC Committee on the Rationalization of RECs in Central Africa

CSP Country Strategy Paper

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

DBDM Development and Business Delivery Model

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

FAPA Fund for African Private Sector Assistance

FRMB Resource Mobilization and External Finance Department

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus – Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IDEV Independent Development Evaluation

JBP Joint Border Post

LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission

MO Multinational Operation

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OHADA Organisation for Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa

OpsCom Operations Committee

ORCE Regional Department Centre (now RDGC)

PACEBCo Congo Basin Ecosystems Conservation Support Program

PAR Project Appraisal Report

PARCI-ECCAS Institutional Capacity Building Support Project of ECCAS

PCR Project Completion Report

PDCT-AC Consensual Transport Master Plan in Central Africa

PEAC Central African Power Pool

PICU Infrastructure, Cities and Urban DevelopmentDepartment

PRESIBALT Program to Rehabilitate and Strengthenthe Resilience of Lake Chad Basin Systems

PRODEBALT Lake Chad Rural Development Program

QAE Quality at Entry

RAPAC Central Africa Protected Areas Network

RDGC Regional Directorate General - Central Africa

RDTS Transition Support Department

REC Regional Economic Community

REP Regional Economic Program

RIS Regional Integration Strategy

RISP Regional Integration Strategy Paper

RMCs Regional Member Countries

SNV Netherlands Development Organization

TAF Technical Assistance Facility

TFP Technical and Financial Partner

TSF Transition Support Facility

UA Unit of Account

UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

WTO World Trade Organization

vi Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Multinational operation An operation taking place simultaneously in at least two countries which can be in a specific region or not, with regional impact or not. In some organizations, it is called multicountry operation.

Operation A set of activities to finance development.

Program A program is a portfolio comprising multiple projects that are managed and coordinated as one unit with the objective of achieving outcomes and benefits for the organization. In some organizations program is also used for a national coverage project or just a large project.

Project A temporary entity established to deliver specific outputs in line with predefined time, cost and quality constraints. A project should always be defined and exe-cuted and evaluated relative to an approved business case which balances the costs, benefits and risks of the project. Often projects form a clear and distinct portion of a larger, less precisely identified program.

Public good Goods or services whose benefits are shared by a group of countries in the same region in a non rival and non excludable way.Non rival: One country’s consumption does not subtract from the amount avai-lable to other countries. Non excludable: No country in the region can be excluded from benefiting, ex-cept at a prohibitive cost.

Region A territorial space located between the global and national scale. It is subject to different delineation by actors that aim to establish a definition of exclusion and inclusion. Such delineations can be based on language, religion or other social parameters.

Regional cooperation Cooperation between states in specific sectors for a limited period of time. Often occurs as a direct response to a regional crisis, such as a pandemic or a violent conflict.

Regional integration A political long-term process during which nation states synchronize their poli-cies and cede sovereignty to regional institutions. Outcomes of regional integra-tion can be common laws, free movement of people and goods or a regional tax.

Glossary

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viiEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report Glossary

Regional operation A project taking place in two countries or more with benefits superior to indi-vidual projects realized separately (integration operations), or a project taking place in a single country with regional impact where the benefits would be shared by the neighboring countries through positive cross border effects, in particular if they also include policy dimensions (single country operations with cross-border benefits).

Regionalism A strategy to cope with globalization by a political project. Includes non state actors and can take the form of networks, chains or other governance mecha-nisms.

viii Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

EQUATORIAL GUINEASAO TOME & PRINCIPE

DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO

CHAD

CONGO REPUBLIC

GABON RWANDA

BURUNDI

ANGOLA

CAMEROON

ECCASECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES

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ixEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report Classification of countries by funding window

Creditworthiness to Sustain ADB / IBRD* Financing

NO YES

Per capita income above the ADF / IDA** operational cut-off for more than 2 consecutive years

NO Category A: ADF-Only CountriesCountries below cut-off and not creditworthyOnly eligible for ADF resources

Category B: Blend CountriesCountries below cut-off and creditworthyEligible for ADB resources and for ADF resources subject to a cap and blend terms

YES Category A: Gap CountriesCountries above cut-off but not creditworthyOnly eligible for ADF resources on blend terms

Category C: ADB CountriesCountries above cut-off and creditworthyOnly eligible for ADB resources

Exceptionally, Graduating Countries are eligible for ADF resources on blend terms during a 2 to 5-year phasing-out period

Classification criteria: per capita income and creditworthiness

Blend of ADB and ADF

Cameroon

ADF-only

BurundiCentral African RepublicChadDemocratic Republic of CongoRwandaSao Tome and Principe

ADB -only

AngolaRepublic of CongoGabonEquatorial Guinea

*IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. World Bank window to provide loans and advice to middle-income and

creditworthy poor countries.

**IDA: International Development Association. World Bank window that helps the world’s poorest countries.

Source: Operational Guidelines of the ADF-14 Resource Allocation Framework, 5 December 2017.

Classification of countries by funding window

For FY 2017 (July 2016 to June 2017), the cut-off was a 2014 per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of US$1,185.

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1Executive SummaryEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

This evaluation assesses: (a) the relevance and consistency of the Bank’s strategy for fostering regional integration in Central Africa (“the strategy”); and (b) the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the Bank’s multinational operations (MOs) in that region. It discusses the key factors leading to MOs’ low performance with respect to the performance of the Bank and that of countries and regional organizations. It makes recommendations for improvements to the design and implementation of the new strategy and operations. The evaluation pertains to the period 2008-2016 to cover the period before the adoption of the strategy (2011) and the period thereafter.

This summary report is based on the following set of background papers: a scoping mission report, an inception report, a strategy review; a portfolio review; a quality at entry (QAE) review; and four case studies of MOs. The methodology includes statistical data and documentary analysis, site visits, individual interviews and focus groups. The main limitations include the fact that almost all operations were still ongoing and the information on outcomes and impacts is weak to nonexistent.

Main findings

The strategy was relevant but unrealistic and not well known by development partners.In addressing infrastructure and capacity building obstacles, the strategy was relevant. However it suffered from the following shortcomings:

ı The strategy was based on an unrealistic theory of change with respect to the causal relationships between limited and uncertain resources and

expected outcomes in terms of development and regional integration. In spite of an improved physical connectivity, poor enforcement of existing trade agreements as well as weak governance continue to hamper intraregional trade.

ı The strategy was not well known by Central African senior officials, development partners, the private sector, civil society, and other donors in the region. This is because it was not well disseminated and communicated, in particular through the media. Hence, there was a low ownership of the strategy and its operations.

There is no visible influence of the strategy on the design, the portfolio, the implementation and the effectiveness of MOs in Central Africa.This can be seen from the following:

ı Central Africa is the least integrated region of the continent, but it is the region that received the least resources for its integration and the only one where the Bank’s assistance to regional integration has declined during the implementation period of the strategy. The portfolio analysis shows that the share of approvals of MOs for Central Africa in the total approvals of MOs for all regions fell from 15.9 percent to 8.6 percent from the period when the strategy did not exist (2008-2011) to the implementation period of the strategy (2012-2016).

ı An assessment of the QAE of the portfolio did not find a visible difference between operations approved before adoption of the strategy and those approved afterward. Overall, the QAE was weak. Infrastructure operations fared much better than capacity building operations.

Executive Summary

2 Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

ı Sixty seven percent of operations have a value of less than UA ten million, meaning that the strategy did not generate a significant number of major regional integration operations.

ı There is no indication that the strategy was useful to increase the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency or sustainability of MO results.

The operations undertaken under the strategy were relevant but significantly differed from the strategy’s indicative program. Instead of 13 planned operations, the Bank approved 19 operations for only 56 percent of the indicative amount of the strategy, implying that almost half of the planned amount was dispersed over a larger number of operations than initially planned, resulting in much smaller operations on average. Some operations in agriculture and social sectors were not aligned with the strategy.

The effectiveness of the operations is unsatisfactory. Only one of the four case study operations was found to satisfactorily produce its outputs and outcomes:

ı Phase one of the construction of the Ketta-Djoum road between Brazzaville and Yaoundé was expected to be completed by the end of November 2017. Available evidence shows that overall, the project effectiveness of that phase is satisfactory both at output and outcome levels.

ı Although the Congo Basin Ecosystems Conservation Support Program (PACEBCo) and the Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Program (PRODEBALT) had two extensions, some of the outputs have not been produced at their completion at the end of June 2017 and the end of December 2017, respectively. PACECBCo produced buildings that remain without equipment and are therefore not usable. At the same time, the project has a remaining balance of UA five million.

ı While the Institutional Capacity Building Support Project of ECCAS (PARCI) is a relevant operation that addresses the institutional and operational shortcomings of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), it was only able to disburse 50 percent of the approved resources during the planned four year implementation period.

The efficiency of the operations is unsatisfactory.The implementation of the four case study operations took on average two years more than the planned time. The implementation performance of 13 operations reported and rated by the task managers in SAP were also unsatisfactory. This delay was due to difficulties meeting the conditions for the first disbursement, the non-availability of counterpart funds and various obstacles during implementation. In some cases, weak implementation performance was due to low Bank responsiveness to requests coming from the implementing agencies, which can be attributed to the task managers’ excessive workload. They were overloaded by managing up to three complex operations while also appraising new operations.

The sustainability of operations is highly unsatisfactory. This is due to lack of country level resources to finance development programs and maintain results, little country ownership of the results of operations, ineffective reform of road maintenance funds, and ECCAS’s experience of permanent financial uncertainty due to nonpayment of the Community Contribution by States and its dependence on donors.

The performance of the Bank is unsatisfactory. While the Bank is commended for its support to regional integration through infrastructure and capacity building, its performance was hampered by a series of gaps:

ı There is no evidence that the Bank carried out high level policy dialogue to help overcome weak commitment of policy makers in member states to work together for regional public goods.

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3Executive SummaryEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

ı In spite of the Bank being the primary financier of regional integration in the region, it did not take the lead to foster donor coordination to identify areas of collaboration, especially when it came to seeking complementarities with other donors for tackling other binding constraints to regional integration that are not related to physical connectivity or capacity building.

ı The QAE of the operations was not good enough to produce timely results and to sustain them. Often, operations were based on an overly complex institutional and organizational architecture without setting up effective implementation arrangements that would have measured up to the level of complexity.

ı Evaluation of operations, especially in relation to outcomes, was hampered by the lack of documentation and relevant data to be collected at project appraisal - especially for baselines - and during project implementation.

ı The support of the Bank to the private sector remained theoretical in spite of a comprehensive study carried out by the regional department in 2012 on the major role to be played by the private sector in regional integration.

The performance of the countries is unsatisfactory. There is a high demand for regional integration from the private sector and civil society. Some issues linked to infrastructure, biodiversity, health and education are better solved at regional level. However, there are political and institutional obstacles in the region, which need to be addressed to foster stronger and more diversified economic development. This will create the basis for increased exchanges in the region. Although countries have ratified key international conventions and have provided political backing to regional organizations, effective political commitment and financial contributions of countries to regional organizations have been sporadic. This undermines the leadership and operational capacity of regional organizations including for the oversight of regional programs.

The performance of the regional organizations is unsatisfactory. Regional organizations are mired with structural weakness, which undermines their internal capacity to effectively foster regional integration. The implementation of their vision and strategies relies heavily on consultants’ expertise which is not transferred to the staff of regional organizations when projects are completed. The overlap between the mandates of regional organizations, in particular the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and ECCAS, persists. This furthermore undermines their effectiveness and financial sustainability.

Recommendations

IDEV makes the following recommendations:

1. Address grand challenges of Central Africa with a commensurate tailored approach. The region has a multitude of development challenges that have to be met through a combination of efforts at the national and regional levels. MOs, by their nature, tend to be complex and require more financial and human resources as well as more time to design, implement and evaluate than national operations. Given that the region has a number of fragile states and landlocked countries, and it suffers from political instability and violence, with some countries severely hit in their public finances by the sharp decline of oil prices, the Bank should tailor its approach accordingly.

2. Move from a Regional Integration Strategy Paper (RISP) to an indicative operational program. Given that the Bank has defined strategies for its High Five Priorities1, it appears more appropriate that, instead of adopting a new RISP for Central Africa, it instead considers the preparation of an indicative operational program for regional integration. In this scenario, a tailored project pipeline which better reflects the specificities of the region would be developed.


3. Undertake a more active dissemination of the Central Africa regional integration program. Once the Bank has finalized the preparation of its new regional integration program for Central Africa, it should convene a regional conference and invite representatives of governments, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), development partners, the private sector, civil society, the media, and academia. This would promote a better understanding of what the Bank wants to achieve and foster an increased ownership of the regional actions to be undertaken.

4. Improve policy dialogue and leadership. It is essential to conduct policy dialogue at the highest level to increase the level of commitment and ownership by the policy and decision makers in countries and regions. The Bank should consider using its leadership position in terms of financing and knowledge of regional activities to foster the coordination of donor interventions at the regional level and to bring countries to work better together. Furthermore, the Bank should consider making its assistance for regional operations conditional on the payment of the community tax by the countries to the regional organizations. To satisfactorily play those roles, an increase of the research basis for strategies and programs is required.

5. Support the private sector. As the Bank has not financed any private sector operations in the region, it should study how to support the development of private sector operations that establish long-lasting linkages between markets across borders. The Bank should explore innovative ways of delivering regional operations by focusing on existing cross border interactions and directly involving the relevant actors - local administrations, informal traders, and transnational civil society organizations.

It should adopt appropriate measures at the national and regional levels to reduce obstacles to the movement of goods and people. This could also attract private funds to invest in regional integration operations.

6. Consider more realistic business planning than is currently the case. All the RISPs had an extension of two years. The four country case study operations included in this evaluation all had project implementation delays of at least two years. The Bank should examine to what extent these implementation delays were related to over-optimistic implementation schedules for MOs. In addition, the Bank should remove internal obstacles and inefficiencies that delay the execution of operations.

7. Continue supporting capacity building. The Bank should help clarify the division of labor between ECCAS and their specialized agencies –such as the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC), and the Central Africa Protected Areas Network (RAPAC) - and avoid conflict of competencies which creates implementation obstacles. Furthermore, it should help establish a monitoring and evaluation unit within ECCAS for collecting data on regional project outcomes and the continuous monitoring of the regional integration process. The Bank also needs to have realistic expectations towards RECs and revisit the role that ECCAS plays in implementing MOs. The Bank could assist ECCAS and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to establish a specialized project implementation unit that is staffed with experienced personnel to manage project implementation. The unit could be a focal point for all donors implementing regional operations through the RECs. The design of the unit should make sure that it maximizes its contribution to ECCAS's capacity.

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5Management ResponseEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Management noted the outcome of the evaluation conducted by Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV) of the Bank Group’s regional integration strategies and operations in Central Africa from 2011 to 2016. This evaluation offers a number of useful lessons, particularly in terms of effectiveness and sustainability of operations, and will enable the Bank to draw practical lessons to inform and guide the new Regional Integration Strategy (RISP) that is being designed. However, Management regrets the exceptional severity of the evaluation and considers that it is not justified by the analysis presented in the report. It makes it hard to adopt a constructive approach regarding both the Bank's weaknesses and successes in the region, such as the Ketta - Djoum and Bamenda - Enugu corridors. In addition, this analysis does not account for constraints arising from the political economy, insecurity and fragility of several countries in the region. Finally, Management believes that the recommendations of the evaluation are too general given the severity of observations. Management expected to receive concrete recommendations to amplify and consolidate the impact of our results on the ground.

Introduction

The independent evaluation focused on the Bank's intervention in Central Africa with the objective of: (i) assessing the relevance and consistency of the 2011-2015 RISP; and (ii) assessing the performance of multinational operations in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The evaluation methodology included an analysis of quantitative and qualitative data collected by various means, including field missions.

The evaluation was based on the Bank's active portfolio of multinational operations in Central Africa, including 39 operations approved between 2008 and 2016. A first group of 20 operations implemented from 2008 to 2011 was formed, followed by a second group comprising 19 projects implemented between 2011 and 2016. According to the evaluation, this approach allowed for a comparative portfolio performance analysis before and after the adoption of the strategy. Note that the portfolio description in the evaluation included all 39 operations, while the detailed input quality analysis, performance and effectiveness was limited to a sub-

group of 22 transactions (56.41% of the portfolio). The nine Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) operations and eight study projects were not taken into account.

The independent evaluation comes following the establishment of the Bank’s new Development and Business Delivery Model (DBDM), designed, among other things, to bring it closer to regional member countries and improve operational performance. However, Management regrets that the last year of the strategy - 2017 - was not evaluated. It was during this period that the Board approved three cumulative sub-regional operations worth over UA 240 million, accounting for about 36% of the current portfolio. This includes: (i) the railway line development study (UA 4 million), (ii) the Logone bridge project between the cities of Yagoua and Bongor (UA 26.9 million) and (iii) the electricity network interconnection project (UA 211.59 million). In 2017, Management also monitored MOs very closely, which will certainly help to improve portfolio performance in 2018. Moreover, the performance of the multinational operations portfolio in 2017 is satisfactory, with a rating of 3 on a scale of 1 to 4.

Management Response

Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report6 Evaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

ECCAS

CENTRAL AFRICA REGION COUNTRIES

PORTFOLIO OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IN CENTRAL AFRICA

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7Management ResponseEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary reportEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Regional Integration Strategy Paper (RISP) for Central Africa 2011-2015

Management welcomes IDEV's observation that the 2011-2015 RISP (extended to December 2017) in Central Africa was highly relevant. According to the evaluation, the RISP was based on a solid analysis of the region’s main challenges and opportunities. IDEV also recognizes that the strategy provides a practical response to two binding constraints based on the Bank's experience in Central Africa, namely the lack of quality infrastructure and the institutional and human capacity to conduct regional operations Management also notes that the two pillars of the RISP were relevant and, above all, well aligned with the priorities of community organizations in Central Africa. The RISP was based on the 2025 vision of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), whose overall objective is to promote and strengthen the economic and social development of member countries. The RISP was also based on the 2010-2015 Regional Economic Program (REP) of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), whose ambition was to build a competitive, diversified and high value-added regional economy. The strategy included the region’s sector priorities expressed in:

ı The Consensual Transport Master Plan in Central Africa (PDCT-AC) adopted in 2004, together with the 2010-2015 Action Plan for the Improvement of Air Transport, the Strategic Action Plan for the Improvement of Inland Navigation and regional water policy,

ı The master plan for the interconnection of electricity networks by 2030 and;

ı Regional policy for the development of new information and communication technologies (NICT) adopted in 2012.

Process and Methodology for Developing the RISP

Management notes the lack of in-depth analyses of Central Africa’s political economy during the RISP design process. It holds that such an analysis would have provided better information on the reasons for the region’s low level of integration. The report fails to mention that Management conducted two major analytical studies during the RISP implementation from 2011 to 2017. These studies focused, in particular, on regional potential, challenges and opportunities of private investment and sources of regional fragility and resilience in Central Africa. Management also issued a Concept Note to establish a hub to promote public-private partnerships. In addition, a study on the development and industrialization of the timber industry is under way and should be completed by the third quarter of 2018. As part of preparing the next Regional Integration Strategy for Central Africa, Management intends to draw on the recommendations made in these studies.

Management takes note of IDEV's observation that the link between regional integration, trade and poverty reduction is not clear in the RISP. Conscious of the fact that this link provides the basis for any regional integration strategy, the Bank will conduct more specific analyses of the link between regional integration, trade and poverty reduction and the poverty profiles within the framework of the next RISP.

Management takes note of IDEV's opinion that the strategy’s implementation depends on "ECCAS, which is already experiencing difficulties managing the funding available to it." For Management, this choice is determined by the fact that ECCAS is the regional economic community (REC) recognized by the African Union to promote regional integration in Central Africa. Therefore, for each Region, the Bank selected a regional organization responsible for implementing its operations which is ECCAS for Central Africa. However, Management was aware of ECCAS’s capacities. This is why the RISP indicated


that building ECCAS’ capacity was key to the successful implementation of regional projects. It is in this sense that the Bank has continued to provide support to the ECCAS General Secretariat, notably through the Institutional Capacity Building Support Project (PARCI). In addition, IDEV's evaluation recognizes that the size of capacity-building operations rose by 66% between 2012 and 2016. The technical assistance granted by the Bank must enable ECCAS to manage regional projects better and sustainably. Management would like to stress that besides the General Secretariat, ECCAS has specialized institutions including the Central African Power Pool (PEAC), the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC), etc. which participate actively in implementing certain regional projects. These institutions are supported by the Bank.

The Bank's portfolio for the Central region covers seven countries (CEMAC + DRC), while the RISP extends to the 11 ECCAS countries. Lastly, it should be recalled that since 2011, the Bank has supported the harmonization of programmes between CEMAC and ECCAS. To this end, with Bank support, ECCAS has developed ToRs for 12 areas of harmonization. A Steering Committee has also been set up with the Bank’s support to facilitate this harmonization.

Influence of the Strategy on Design, Portfolio Performance, and Operations Implementation

Management does not share IDEV’s observation that the RISP for Central Africa had no influence on portfolio design and performance, and the implementation and effectiveness of multinational operations in Central Africa. The systematization of studies, supervision missions and the strengthening of country offices were the factors that contributed to the improvement of the regional portfolio’s performance, as pointed out during the RISP mid-term review in 2014. However, at end 2014, the portfolio declined slightly due to the worsening political crisis in some countries in the region and the fall in oil prices which affected nearly half countries in the region.

Management wishes to note that when the RISP was initially programmed, it focused on greater selectivity and relevance of the operations in relation to the defined priorities and objectives. Management wished to strengthen selectivity in line with more realistic programming for multinational operations. In addition, the decline in resources allocated to regional integration noted by IDEV can also be explained by the non-implementation of major infrastructure projects (transport, energy and ICT) showing a particularly low absorptive capacity in those countries. Some operations, which had a regional dimension, were approved and implemented at national level, since the dialogue did not lead to an agreement with the countries concerned. These include the fibre-optic internet project (Backbone), which was originally designed as a sub-regional project, but was eventually approved in the form of national projects. This weakness in the absorptive capacity of resources by countries in the region can also be explained by several external factors, including the deterioration of the security climate, political instability and the economic crisis affecting the region.

However, it is important to note that in some countries, such as Cameroon, multinational operations account for about 25% of the portfolio.

Performance of the 2008-2016 Multinational Operations Portfolio

Management notes the observation made by IDEV that the financial and human resources initially planned were not mobilized. In fact, the initial financing programme for the 2011-2015 RISP included 13 operations, with ADB and ADF resources estimated at a total of UA 840 million.

Management acknowledges the difficulties encountered in the programming of the 2011-2015 RISP operations. While the initial strategy provided for 13 operations for a total of UA 840 million, 19 projects totalling UA 471 million, including CBFF projects, were financed. Management agrees with

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IDEV's observation that 56% of the indicative amount of the strategy was eventually divided among small operations.

According to IDEV, three operations, accounting for 14% of the multinational operations portfolio in Central Africa are not aligned with the pillars of the RISP. However, this statement should be tempered by the fact that these operations had a significant infrastructure and capacity-building component aimed at building resilience to food and nutrition insecurity and providing socio-economic support to enable the reintegration of young people and women.

Relevance

Management welcomes the conclusion of the evaluation that the relevance of the operations is deemed satisfactory. In most cases, the operations were well aligned with the regional strategy and other policy documents to meet the region’s pressing needs. With regard specifically to the quality-at-entry (QAE) criterion, Management notes that it shows mixed results, including the existence of a considerable design gap in some cases. Infrastructure operations (energy and transport) consistently featured a better design quality than capacity-building operations. This should also be correlated to the fragile situation in the region and its weak institutional capacity.

Management is aware of QAE problems with projects, especially with regard to multinational operations. In 2014, the mid-term review of the 2011-2015 RISP mentioned that the “quality at entry of regional operations, in particular, regional investment projects,” should be improved on four levels:

1. feasibility studies with a more stringent internal quality control system;

2. risk assessment of the capacity of national and regional structures to implement projects;

3. institutional set-up; and

4. the definition of terms and conditions attached to loans and grants that need to reflect regional context better.

Management will endeavour to meet quality-at-entry criteria.

Management would like to qualify the conclusion of the evaluation (Box 2) that argues that binding constraints to free trade are not addressed by Central African Multinational Operations (MOs). Management wishes to emphasize that PARCI is based on a thorough analysis of the obstacles to the free movement of goods and people in Central Africa. In addition to the corridors established with the Bank’s support, this project has made it possible to set up a Steering Committee to streamline the two Regional Economic Communities (RECs) namely ECCAS and CEMAC, and identified 12 priority areas to strengthen intra-regional trade. In addition, trade facilitation components are implemented as an integral part of road transport projects. However, Management believes that there is a need for further integration of soft infrastructure development and trade facilitation measures in MOs. A first step has been taken in this direction through the ECCAS institutional capacity-building support project to implement the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation.

Effectiveness

Management notes IDEV's finding that the effectiveness of operations is unsatisfactory. It is of the opinion that it is difficult to obtain reliable and up-to-date data on the implementation, results and impacts of operations. Of the 4 case studies reviewed in the evaluation, only the Ketta-Djoum road transport project appears to be meeting its stated objectives. Management acknowledges the difficulties in achieving the objectives set in the MOs, but wishes to mention that the Bamenda-Enugu project (which was not part of the evaluation) is a success and has increased both trade between Cameroon and Nigeria and the income of populations within the project area.


More generally, performance in the infrastructure sector is attributable to three (3) major road projects financed by the Bank: (i) the Cameroon-CAR-Chad corridor, (ii) the Ketta (Congo) -Djoum road (Cameroon) and (iii) the Bamenda (Cameroon) - Enugu (Nigeria) corridor. These operations have improved transport times and reduced travel costs in those countries. Completion of work under the Transport Facilitation Programme on the Douala – Bangui and Douala – N'djamena Corridors reduced the travel time between the exit from the port of Douala to the arrival in N'Djamena by approximately 13%.

In response to ECCAS’s capacity-building questions on the management/coordination of regional projects, the Bank will make two technical assistants available to these RECs to accelerate the preparation and implementation of PIDA projects, and prepare local experts for handover.

Efficiency

Management agrees with IDEV's finding that the efficiency of MOs remains problematic, especially given the general tendency towards extending the project execution time. This also stems from several constraints including:

1. long delays in meeting the conditions precedent to first disbursement;

2. delay in making counterpart funds available;

3. delays in the procurement process and in the execution of works and services;

4. delay in submission of audit reports and the poor quality of some reports;

5. the level of insecurity in some areas of the region;

6. the absence of key personnel at the start of projects; and

7. cumbersome internal procedures within ECCAS.

Management partially shares IDEV's view that the use of RECs and other sub-regional organizations to implement operations is a source of inefficiency. Considerable efforts have been made by the Bank and other partners to support the capacity of these organizations in conducting regional integration projects. Management believes that efforts at strengthening capacity building and institutional and political anchoring of RECs should be pursued so that they can take greater ownership of strategies and operations implemented with Bank support. This Bank support must complement the resources provided by member countries through their regular Community contributions.

Sustainability

Management notes IDEV’s observation that the sustainability of operations is the weakest aspect in the design quality of operations. However, it wishes to relativize this observation. The Bank is supporting several countries in the region to set up second-generation road maintenance funds to improve infrastructure sustainability. However, it agrees on the expected completion times. As a result, most of the operations approved under the RISP are still ongoing, as well as several other operations that started before the adoption of the strategy in 2011. This unfortunate situation is the result of overly optimistic programming that did not sufficiently account for the level of preparation of investment projects, the political climate and the weak capacity of beneficiary countries. Management also wishes to recall certain factors that negatively impacted the preparation of operations, namely:

1. the deterioration of the security situation and political instability in the region and the countries concerned;

2. divergences between the parties, from an institutional standpoint, on the structuring of a project;

3. The weakness of government commitment to execute certain operations.

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Management points out that three countries in the region are in a situation of fragility. This is the reason for which the Bank adopts a more flexible approach to project implementation conditions in these countries, in line with the recommendations of the Bank's Fragile States Strategy. Management also believes that the results and evaluation of our projects must be analyzed in light of the fragility of these countries.

The IDEV evaluation notes a weakness in conducting dialogue and in the visibility of the Bank's actions to promote regional integration in Central Africa. This conclusion is not shared by the Bank. Indeed, the Bank is the main institution that finances regional integration projects together with the European Union. It is recognized as the reference partner in the field of regional integration in Central Africa. Management also points out that action has been taken since 2014 to strengthen high-level dialogue between the Bank, RECs and other donors on regional integration issues. Several missions were organized by the Directorate General to the main RECs (CEMAC and ECCAS); and senior officials from these institutions also carried out work assignments at the Bank's headquarters. The Bank has also supported other regional structures such as the CAPP, OHADA, COMIFAC, etc.

However, Management acknowledges that the RISP does not propose formats for the different levels of political dialogue with the authorities or the coordination of donors. Therefore, it welcomes the introduction of the Bank's new Development and Business Delivery Model (DBDM), and intends to capitalize on this opportunity to strengthen the role and influence of the field offices to promote integration.

Conclusion

Management once more expresses its regret regarding the exceptional severity of IDEV's analysis. However, it shares some of the recommendations and goes one step further in the completion report of the Regional Integration Strategy Paper currently being finalized. The main lessons learned in this report are:

1. the need for greater ownership and proven leadership of RECs in implementing regional programmes;

2. better consideration of issues of fragility and resilience in implementing regional projects;

3. improvement of project preparation mechanisms and capacities at the REC level;

4. the establishment of specific criteria and indicators for monitoring regional integration;

5. the establishment of new regional frameworks for dialogue with other TFPs and RECs (notably CEMAC and ECCAS), the private sector and the civil society on regional integration issues for greater diversification;

6. continued strengthening of links between national CSPs and the RISP;

7. reforms to the intangible aspects affecting the quality of services and works;

8. the need for the continued building of the capacity of states and RECs to reduce barriers to investment at the regional level and;

9. ²the establishment of political, institutional and cultural frameworks to coordinate and control the interests of forest resources.

Finally, the Bank wishes to provide support for the tangible expression of the political will of ECCAS member states.

Management has prepared a matrix of actions to address the main recommendations made by IDEV.


RECOMMENDATION MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendation 1: Address key challenges in Central Africa through a measured and adapted response

The region faces a number of development challenges that need to be addressed by a combination of national and regional initiatives. MOs, by definition, tend to be complex and require more financial and human resources, and more time for design, implementation and evaluation than national operations. Given that the region comprises a number of fragile states and landlocked countries, is prone to political instability and violence, and public finances of some countries are hit hard by the drop in oil prices, the Bank should adapt its approach accordingly.

AGREED - Management intends to account for these concerns under the Bank’s DBDM

Measures:

ı Systematically account for the conclusions and recommendations of the regional study on the causes of fragility, and resilience factors in Central Africa in the formulation of the next RISP. (RDGC/RDTS - July 2018)

ı Strengthen efforts to mobilize co-financing for regional operations and set realistic deadlines to finalize the work. (RDGC - July 2018)

ı Under the next RISP, Management will strengthen harmonisation between the pillars of national CSPs and the RISP. (RDGC - July 2018)

ı Before the end of 2018, RDGC will finalize a new RISP (RDGC - July 2018)

ı Causes of fragility will be systematically and regularly analysed in the formulation of CSPs and the next RISP. (July 2022)

ı Support, motivate and justify the establishment of new and more flexible guidelines and mechanisms to implement operations in fragile countries; particularly through the application of flexibilities (RDGC - November 2018).

ı Build capacity of country office in fragile countries with the objective of ensuring efficiency in operations. (RDGC - July 2018)

Recommendation 2: Move from a RISP to an operational indicative programme

Since the Bank has defined strategies to attain its High 5s, this seems more appropriate, rather than adopting a new RISP for Central Africa. Instead, it should consider developing an indicative operational programme to ensure regional integration. In this scenario, a pool of adapted projects that better reflect the specificities of the region would be developed.

AGREED IN PART - Management considers that a RISP demonstrates vision and consistency. In addition, the problems noted in the execution of multinational operations do not call into question the relevance of the RISP for the region. Moreover, the evaluation of IDEV highlights the relevance of the strategic choices and pillars made in the RISP (2011-2015). As underscored in this strategy, the first of its kind in Central Africa, the strategy approach allows the Bank to better structure its assistance in regional integration through greater overall consistency and selectivity. This approach allows the Bank to play a leadership role in the interventions of other TFPs. However, it intends to develop, as recommended, a pipeline of regional projects/operations that are better aligned with the region’s needs.

Measures:

ı Finalize the preparation of a new RISP before end-2018 (RDGC/RDRI - July 2018)

ı Ensuring the consistency of the next RISP with the Bank’s regional integration strategy being finalized, while focusing on the priorities of the countries through the community organizations (CEMAC and ECCAS). (RDGC - July 2019)

ı Develop a current database of projects that are viable and better aligned with regional priorities. The selection process for eligible projects will be supported by appropriate diagnostic studies and analytical work. (RDGC - January 2019).

Recommendation 3: Disseminate the Central African Regional Integration Programme more actively.

When the Bank finalizes the preparation of its new regional integration programme, it is expected to organize a regional conference and invite government representatives, RECs, development partners, the private sector, civil society, the media and academics. This will promote a better understanding of Bank-projected goals and greater ownership of regional actions to be undertaken.

AGREED - Management agrees with the recommendation.

Measures:

ı Organize consultation mechanisms to share lessons from the RISP completion report (RDGC - June 2018)

ı Develop the next RISP 2018-2025 inclusively and organize feedback on outcomes with all the RECs concerned. (RDGC - June 2018)

ı Organize an annual forum on deepening regional integration in Central Africa. (RDGC - December 2018)

STATUS OF MANAGEMENT ACTIONS

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Recommendation 4: Improve political dialogue and leadership

Political dialogue at the highest level is essential to raise the level of commitment and ownership by policy- and decision-makers in countries and regions. The Bank should consider leveraging its leadership position in funding and knowledge of regional activities to promote coordination of donor interventions at the regional level and foster mutual cooperation among countries. In addition, the Bank should also consider making its aid for regional operations conditional upon countries paying the community tax to regional organizations. To play these roles satisfactorily, the Bank must strengthen the research base for strategies and programmes.

AGREED - Management agrees with the recommendation, which is an ongoing task. It is of the opinion that the Bank should boost advocacy on regional integration and consider support to RECs to establish a mechanism for ongoing dialogue.

Measures:

ı Strengthen high-level dialogue with regional organizations, with support from field offices. (RDGC - Ongoing action: 2025)

ı Continue support to harmonize policy in several areas between CEMAC and ECCAS; involve other TFPs, including ECA. For this purpose, the COPIL will be revitalized. (RDGC - Ongoing action: 2025)

ı Seek and initiate dialogue with other partners in the region to identify synergies and partnerships. (RDGC - Ongoing action)

ı At the operational level, strengthen dialogue with ECCAS countries to ensure the timely payment of the community tax. (RDGC - Ongoing action: 2025)

ı Strengthen support to develop statistics for the monitoring and evaluation of project outputs and impacts. (RDGC - Ongoing action: 2025)

Recommendation 5: Support the private sector.

Given that the Bank has not funded any private sector operations in the region, it should consider how to support the development of private sector operations that establish sustainable links between cross-border markets. The Bank should explore innovative ways to achieve regional operations by focusing on existing cross-border interactions and directly engaging relevant actors - local governments, informal traders and transnational civil society organizations. It should take appropriate measures at national and regional levels to diminish obstacles to the movement of goods and people. This could attract private funds to invest in regional integration operations.

AGREED - Management agrees with the recommendation. Management recalls that the Bank financed the private investment environment study, which paved the way for sustained dialogue between the private sector, governments and RECs. For this reason, a regional workshop bringing together the public and private sectors of the ten ECCAS member states and the two RECs was held in November 2012 in Libreville (Gabon) under the auspices of the Bank to deepen exchanges on developing the private sector in Central Africa and particularly investments geared towards of diversification sectors.

Measures:

ı Strengthen existing frameworks for consultation between public actors and the private sector in the countries concerned. Accordingly, establish a sub-regional hub to promote PPPs. (RDGC – Ongoing action: 2025) Management has already issued a Concept Note to establish a hub to promote public-private partnerships. It will support the establishment of this Hub.

ı Establish a loan programme for sub-regional operations using PPPs (Brazzaville/Kinshasa Rail Bridge) (RDGC/PICU - 2020)

ı Maintain a pipeline of trade facilitation programmes/projects covering the main corridors to be financed. (RDGC - December 2018)

Recommendation 6: Consider more realistic time lines for activities than currently in practice

All RISPs were extended by 2 years. The operations of the four case studies included in this evaluation all had implementation delays of at least 2 years. The Bank should determine to what extent these implementation delays were linked to overly optimistic implementation schedules for MOs. In addition, it should eliminate internal barriers and inefficiencies that delay the execution of operations.

AGREED - Management agrees with this proposal to adapt the duration of each regional strategy to the specific context of the region concerned.

Measure:

ı The implementation period of the next RISP will be reassessed during the preparation of the completion report. (RDGC - December 2018)



Recommendation 7: Continue to support capacity building of the regional economic communities.

The Bank should help to clarify the division of labour between ECCAS and its specialized agencies, such as COMIFAC and RAPAC, and avoid jurisdictional conflicts that create obstacles to implementation. It should help set up a monitoring and evaluation unit within ECCAS to collect data on the results of regional projects and to continuously monitor progress in regional integration. The Bank must also have realistic expectations regarding RECs and review the role ECCAS plays in implementing MOs. The Bank could help ECCAS and LCBC establish a specialized project implementation unit with experienced staff to manage project execution. This unit could be a focal point for all donors performing regional operations through the RECs. The cell should be designed to maximize its contribution to ECCAS’s capacity.

AGREED: Management agrees. It recognizes that appropriate implementation modalities and capacity assessment are critical to the success of regional projects.

Measures:

ı Include the recommendations of the REC capacity assessment report and pursue dialogue to that effect (RDGC - December 2018)

ı The Bank is already supporting ECCAS to set up a monitoring and evaluation mechanism under PARCI. Pursue this support also in the framework of the institutional support project to implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in Central Africa. (RDGC/ECSA - December 2020)

ı Predicate dialogue with the RECs on the question of quality human resources, because this is a prerequisite for the proper execution of the projects entrusted to them. (RDGC/ECGF - Ongoing action: 2025)

ı Set up a specialized unit with ECCAS and LCBC with the support of the Bank. (RDGC - December 2019)

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15IntroductionEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Background

Supporting regional integration is a founding principle of the African Development Bank (the Bank). Article 1 of the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank in 1963 states that: “The purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the sustainable economic development and social progress of its regional members individually and jointly.” Article 2 specifies that in order to do this, the Bank should finance investment projects and programs, giving special priority to:

ı Projects or programs which by their nature or scope concern several members; and

ı Projects or programs designed to make the economies of its members increasingly complementary and to bring about an orderly expansion of their foreign trade.

The agreement recommends paying special attention to the selection of suitable multinational projects defined as projects covering at least two countries.

In 2000, the Bank approved its Policy on Economic Cooperation and Regional Integration and in 2009 it approved its Africa wide Regional Integration Strategy 2009-2012 (RIS). The RIS was followed by four Regional Integration Strategy Papers (RISPs) for West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa respectively covering the period

2011-2015 (later extended to 2017). The strategy for North Africa was delayed by political challenges in the region. In 2016, the Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV) carried out an evaluation of the RISP (“the strategy” hereafter) for Eastern Africa. Likewise, this evaluation assesses the strategy for regional integration in Central Africa, including its operations (IDEV 2016) as part of IDEV 2017 work program.

The Central African region is composed of eleven countries including Rwanda2. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was set up in 1983 and is recognized by the African Union (AU). The region also comprises the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) established in 1994, which includes six countries using the CFA Franc. Finally, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) which, although it is not covered by the current strategy, has been reactivated (Table 1).

Objectives and scope

The evaluation aims to respond to the following questions: a) was the strategy relevant; and b) did it make a difference through its operations? It will also inform the preparation of the Bank’s new strategy for regional integration and the design and implementation of new operations for better development results.

Introduction

Table 1: Composition of ECCAS, CEMAC and CEPGL

ECCAS members CEMAC members CEPGL members

Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome-and -Principe

Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic and Chad

Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda


The evaluation examines the RISP for Central Africa and 39 MOs approved between 2008 and 2016 to compare the MO portfolio during 2008-2011, before the approval of the strategy, with the situation in 2011-2016, after the approval3. The total portfolio comprises 20 operations during the first period and 19 operations in the second. The description of the portfolio pertains to all the operations, while a more detailed analysis of the quality at entry (QAE), the implementation performance and their effectiveness is limited to a sub population of 22 operations. Those 22 operations exclude nine Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) operations whose design follows a particular format and which are part of a separate evaluation by IDEV in 2017, as well as eight studies and operations below one million Units of Account (UA). Finally, the evaluation assesses the performance of the Bank, the countries and the regional organizations. The evaluation uses interchangeably the terms “operation”, “project” or “program”, although the term “operation” covers all sorts of interventions including project and program.

Methodology and limitations

This summary report was prepared based on quantitative and qualitative evidence collected from different sources detailed in the inception report. They include: a) a desk review of the Bank’s

relevant documents and data, b) a questionnaire sent to task managers, c) interviews with task managers and Board members; and d) a field visit in Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to evaluate four MOs (see case studies summary reports in annex 2). Annex 1 presents a comprehensive methodology note and Figure 1 presents the steps taken to plan and prepare this summary report.

A four point rating scale was used to rate the operations and to summarize the judgment on their performance while applying the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (Table 2). The evaluation responds to the following questions:

ı Was the strategy relevant and designed to attain its objectives?

ı Did the operations address real issues standing in the way of regional integration in Central Africa?

ı Were the development objectives achieved?

ı Was the implementation timely and cost effective? and

ı Are the results achieved sustainable after the withdrawal of the Bank’s assistance?

SummaryReport

Building Blocks

Inception Report

Strategy Review

Portfolio Review

Quality at Entry Review

Four Case Studies

Preparation of an approach paper

Context

Objective and Scope

Theory of Change

Evaluation Questions

Methodology

Budget and Timeline

The starting Point

Quick review of Bank's relevant documents

Consultations with the evaluation stakeholders

Figure 1: Evaluation Building Blocks

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17IntroductionEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

The evaluation had to overcome different constraints including:

ı The context of the Bank’s restructuring and decentralization process which resulted in the redeployment of staff and change at managerial level of the region. This implied that the managers and the task managers who were initially involved in strategy or operation development were not available for discussing the evaluation questions. There was also a limited availability of task managers to respond to the survey questions sent to them.

ı Weak information available on the performance and effectiveness of MOs within the Bank. This weakness related to both regional organizations as well as at the country levels owing to a lack of internal and external resources dedicated to regional integration. For instance, out of 19 operations approved during 2011-2017, only six operations were reported in SAP and only one had performance criteria assessed by the task manager. Furthermore, only one CBFF operation was completed with a Project Completion Report (PCR).

Quality assurance of the evaluation reports. To ensure the consistency and relevance of the findings and recommendations, the results of the evaluation were reviewed by IDEV’s evaluation’s reference

group composed of experts from the Central Africa region and sectoral experts in the Bank’s decentralized offices in Central Africa, as well as by two external peer reviewers. A workshop attended by experts from the Bank’s operations departments was organized on November 14, 2017 at the Bank’s headquarters to present and discuss the emerging findings and recommendations.

Organization of the report

The report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a synthesis of grand challenges and opportunities for regional integration in Central Africa based on a relevant literature review. Chapter 3 presents the Bank’s strategic approach to regional integration from a critical assessment of the RISP. Chapter 4 contains the analysis of the evolution and the structure of the portfolio of MOs approved for the Central Africa region. Chapter 5 relates to the performance of the MOs from four case studies comprising infrastructure and capacity building operations. Chapters 6 and 7 review the performance of the Bank, the regional organizations and their country members. Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings, which are followed by the recommendations in chapters 9. References used for this evaluation are reported in Annex 10.

Score Rating Explanation

4 Highly satisfactory Good performance against all or nearly all aspects considered

3 Satisfactory Good performance against the majority of aspects

2 Unsatisfactory Good performance only on some aspects

1 Highly unsatisfactory Good performance against few or no aspects

Table 2: Evaluation Rating Scale

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19Opportunities and Grand Challenges for Regional Integration in Central AfricaEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Regional integration is a complex and challenging phenomenon. It transcends geographic, political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. The same dimensions tend to simultaneously pull towards integration and fragmentation. For instance, Central Africa has particular challenges standing

in the way of regional integration but it also offers opportunities to foster regional integration. However, these opportunities hinge on governance conditions and whether these can be improved. (Mattheis and Eriksson 2016). Table 3 provides an overview of the main regional integration determinants.

Opportunities and Grand Challenges for Regional Integration in Central Africa

Main factors of regional integration in Central Africa

Main challenges Main opportunities

Regional political order Tensions between colonial legacies and Pan-Africanism; authoritarian regimes with limited statehood.

Potential to deliver regional public goods to overcome constraints of fragile and weak states; potential convergence of regional policies with ECOWAS.

Regional economic structure National borders are an important source of revenue; economic nationalism, lack of diversification.

Informal cross border trade; natural resources; potential for regional industries; common currency.

Movements of goods and people Poor infrastructure; nationalist policies against free movement.

Common languages; potential for landlocked and island countries.

Peace and security Prevalence of armed groups; incapacity of states to provide regional peace and security.

Political will to resolve violent crises.

Regional organizations Unsustainable financial mechanism; lack of authority and leadership of regional institutions; overlap between ECCAS and CEMAC.

The proposed CIC (Community Integration Contribution) could provide more autonomy for regionalism; the merger of ECCAS and CEMAC presents an opportunity for more efficient regional organizations

Member states Lack of leadership; dominance of particular interests.

Potential for pragmatic coalitions of governing entities.

Civil society and private sector Persecution of civil society; low responsiveness of regional organizations.

Potential for regional thematic networks of civil society organizations and the private sector.

External supporters for regionalism High dependency on external donors; uncoordinated engagement of donors.

Existing important external support for regional initiatives; potential for donor coordination.

Table 3: Grand challenges and opportunities for regional integration in Central Africa


In 2011, the Bank decided to respond to the challenges and opportunities of regional integration in Central Africa through a Regional Integration Strategy Paper for Central Africa.Two strategic priorities were identified to position the Bank:

ı Financing regional infrastructure operations ; and

ı Supporting capacity building measures for the RECs, especially to manage regional infrastructure programs.

The strategy provides guidance for regional operations in Central Africa and highlights key outputs to be achieved: physical infrastructure (transport and energy), common tariffs and training of staff at the regional organizations. As outcomes the strategy foresees increases in economic indicators such as intraregional trade, economic growth and foreign direct investment, as well as a common external tariff and capable regional organizations. The overall impact of the strategy is defined as poverty reduction and capable regional organizations (see Theory of Change, Annex 3).

RISP’s strengths

The strategy is highly relevant. It is built on a sound analysis of the opportunities for regional integration in Central Africa and it adopts a practical response to address two binding constraints based on the Bank’s experience in both pillars of the strategy. Connecting Central Africa through infrastructure is a strategic priority for both ECCAS and CEMAC, as well as is the protection of fragile eco-systems, such as the Congo Forest or the Lake Chad. Alignment with country priorities is also strong, as, at least in principle, ECCAS member states are committed to increase biodiversity conservation, physical connectivity and intraregional trade. As an example, ECCAS member

countries attach high priority to the establishment of transport corridor in the region and in 2010 adopted a Consensual Transport Development Plan of Central Africa (PDCT-AC) to establishing inter-capital liaisons, transit corridors and interconnection liaisons. The Central Africa Power Pool (PEAC) was established to increase regional power generation and the number of interconnection projects.

The strategy identifies clear priorities that are able to guide the Bank’s regional operations: infrastructure, institutional capacity and biodiversity. The strategy also suggests concrete operations for the portfolio. Furthermore, the strategy identifies all donors that are active in supporting regional integration in Central Africa.

The strategy raises the awareness of important risks to the implementation of the strategy, namely state fragility, budget constraints and overlapping membership between ECCAS and CEMAC.

RISP’s weaknesses

The strategy is limited in its approach in terms of systemic analysis of the political economy of Central Africa. The strategy focuses on symptoms more than on root causes, so the causes for the current low level of regional integration are not identified. For instance, that the strategy proposed to harmonize ECCAS and CEMAC without explaining why there is an overlap. It emphasizes the gap between declarations and implementation without explaining the reasons for this lapse. While the strategy rightly identified conflicts between and within states as a constraint, there is no guidance on how MOs could contribute to relieving constraints to regional integration (for example, coordination with other donors or African Union and the Bank’s high-level dialogue with governments).

The Bank’s Strategic Response

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21The Bank’s Strategic ResponseEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

The strategy does not define key concepts such as regional integration. There are unrealistic expectations in the theory of change with respect to the outcomes and impacts of the strategy. The link between regional integration and poverty reduction is particularly complex and is not properly explained in the strategy. Regional integration can reduce or exacerbate poverty, depending on how it is designed. So far, it is unclear how far regional operations have effectively reduced poverty (Combaz 2013).

There is a lack of practical guidance for the Bank’s task managers and field offices on how to effectively implement the strategy. For instance, it is not clear what role the field offices should exactly play? Furthermore, the strategy does not propose concrete formats for different levels of policy dialogue and donor coordination.The strategy strongly depends on ECCAS for the implementation of operations although ECCAS already has major difficulties to manage existing development funds. Given the important

constraints in terms of budget, personnel, expertise and autonomy, ECCAS cannot be reasonably expected to carry out the programs foreseen by the strategy. On the contrary, these expectations are likely to further overburden the limited staff of ECCAS. The ECCAS could be more useful if its role was limited to what it can do best, for instance, in producing regional policies, strategies, rules and standards, rather than managing operations.

It is unclear how many financial and human resources the strategy will be able to effectively mobilize to be implemented. It depends upon the availability of resources from the African Development Fund (ADF), other development partners and countries, and the private sector, which are unknown.

Finally, the strategy is not well known in the region. It lacked an appropriate dissemination and communication plan tailored to different audiences in the region.

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23Evolution and Structure of the PortfolioEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Decrease in the volume of approvals for MOs in the region. Apart from North Africa, which borrows very little for MOs and did not have a strategy, Central Africa is the least integrated region of the continent. It is also the one that received the least resources for its integration. Furthermore, Central Africa is the only region where the Bank’s assistance to regional integration has declined during the implementation period of the strategy across all the variables considered: number of operations and total amount approved, share of amount approved in the region in total amount approved for MOs

for all regions, average size of MOs approved and approvals for MOs per capita (Figure 2 and Annex 4). Significantly, Central Africa’s share of approvals for MOs as a proportion of total approvals for MOs in all regions fell by almost a half from the first to the second period. It therefore appears that the adoption of the regional integration strategy failed to convince countries to allocate more resources to MOs compared to the period when the strategy did not exist. Box 1 explains how AfDB resources are allocated to MOs.

Evolution and Structure of the Portfolio

Source: Analysis of the portfolio.

-15%

+44%+392%

+98%

-12%

+15%

2008-2011

2012-2016

2008-2011

2012-2016

2008-2011

2012-2016

2008-2011

2012-2016

2008-2011

2012-2016

2008-2011

2012-2016

Center East West South North Multi-region

Figure 2: Variation of the volume of approvals of MOs by region and by period (percent)


While regional integration is a founding principle of the creation of the Bank, it is only since 2000 that the Bank’s dedicated financial support for regional integration operations has steadily increased. Under ADF VIII (1999-2001), the Bank established a regional operations (ROs) envelope to increase incentives for ADF countries to participate in multinational operations. In ADF-11 (2008-2010), a cost-sharing formula was introduced, whereby each participating country finances a 1/3 of the project costs from its Performance-Based Allocation (PBA), and the Regional Operations envelope covers the 2/3 remaining. ADF countries can thus use their national allocation to leverage additional resources from the RO envelope. This incentive has led to strong demand and competition for RO resources, which far exceeds the size of the envelope. Over time, the leverage ratio has been gradually reduced from 2:1 to 1:1, meaning that for every UA 1 contributed from its country allocation, an eligible ADF country can now receive UA 1 from the RO envelope (with an exception for countries classified as Transition States, who can leverage up to a ratio of 1.5 RO : 1 PBA).

Some other exceptions apply, such as for countries with a small ADF allocation, for regional public goods projects, for regional organizations (institutional support or coordinated policy-based operations), and for countries that participate in multiple operations. ADB-only countries involved in MOs finance 100% of the project costs attributed to them through the ADB window or with resources from other sources. Because they may not have the same incentive as ADF countries to participate in MOs, the Bank helps to identify sources of concessional financing, such as the Middle Income Countries Trust Fund, and engages in dialogue with the ADB countries about the benefits of regional integration to them.

Whereas until 2008, the selection of MOs was on a first come-first serve basis, the Bank has since then continuously refined its approach to select and prioritize MOs, to ensure that the available funding is allocated to the most deserving projects. Countries’ willingness to come together to jointly propose an MO and to show their commitment by investing resources from their national allocations is a crucial factor. After ascertaining that proposed MOs ensure alignment to regional integration priorities, country ownership and commitment to policy reforms, a Selection and Prioritization Scorecard is applied to examine criteria including quality at entry, expected development outcomes and impacts, the strength of participating countries’ policies and institutions, and their performance in ongoing and past regional operations. On this basis, the Operations Committee (OpsCom) discusses the ranked consolidated list and approves the list of projects for funding from the RO envelope for the year.

For more details, see Operational Guidelines of the ADF-14 Resource Allocation Framework, 5 December 2017.

Box 1: Approach to allocating resources to AfDB MOs

A pronounced decrease in the strategy priority areas. Table 4 shows that the strategy did not have any visible influence on the evolution and composition of resources allocated to its strategic pillars. This is especially true for physical connectivity initiatives

pursued by the Bank through cross border transport projects and interconnection energy projects. According to the Compendium of Statistics on Bank Operations, infrastructure includes transport, communication, energy, water and sanitation.

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Sectors 2008-2011 % 2012-2016 % Variation (UA million)

Transport 339.3 61.1 295.7 62.8 -43.6

Energy 109.3 19.7 90.6 19.2 -18.7

Environment 75.6 13.6 11.2 2.4 -64.4

Agriculture 0 0 9.8 2.1 9.8

Finance 0.6 0.1 0 0 -0.6

Water and sanitation 1.3 0.2 0 0 -1.3

Social 29 5.2 57 12 28

Multi-sector (technical assistance) 0 0 7 1.5 7

Total 555 100 471 100 -83.8

Table 4: Approvals by sector and period in Central Africa

A significant increase of African Development Bank (ADB) resources and decrease of ADF and of grants. Almost all Central Africa resources from the Bank came from the ADF during the pre-strategy period. This situation has dramatically changed as the ADB’s resources, absent during that period, represented nearly half of total resources for multinational operations during the RISP period (Table 5). This proportion is attributable to loans granted to three ADB countries: Congo, Cameroon and Gabon. Prior to the strategy, grants accounted for 55.3 percent of the approvals, the remaining being loans. Over the period of this strategy grants represented just 37.5 percent of total funding.

Mismatch between the indicative and actual portfolio. While the strategy planned 13 operations for UA 840 million, 19 operations (including two of the CBFF) were financed for only UA 471 million, equivalent to 56 percent of the indicative amount of the strategy. Consequently, nearly half of the indicated amount was dispersed over a larger number of projects than initially planned. Considering the size of the region, and its massive needs, this implies that resources were spread too thin. Furthermore, contrary to the intention of the strategy to limit its support to infrastructure and the capacity building of ECCAS, one operation in agriculture and two in the social sector were financed during the strategy period. They represented 14 percent of the total approvals of the period. Those operations include:


Table 5: Sources of Bank’s assistance to Central Africa MOs

Source 2008-2011 2012-2016

Approved Amount (UA million)

% of total approved amount

Approved Amount (UA million)

% of total approved amount

ADB 00 0.0 217.02 46.1

ADF 540.2 97.3 237.9 50.6

Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) 13.6 2.5 8.21 1.7

IPPF, FSF and Water Facility 1.3 0.2 7.35 1.6



ı Program to Rehabilitate and Strengthen the Resilience of Lake Chad Basin Systems (PRESIBALT) - approved in 2013 for UA 53.6 million and aiming to promote the implementation of social activities of the LCBC.

ı Support project for the socio-economic reintegration of young people and women (PARSEJF) approved in 2016 for UA 2.75 million, this provides socio-economic support to women and youth in Burundi, DRC, and CAR.

ı Chad program to build resilience to food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel (P2RS), approved in 2014 for UA 9.7 million to improve food and nutrition security of populations in the Sahel.

Table 6 shows that 8 of the 19 approved operations, totaling UA 124.9 million (28 percent of approvals), were not planned.

Absence of the private sector. Despite the fact that the strategy emphasizes the need to support a dynamic and competitive private sector, the portfolio has no multinational private sector operations. The fieldwork carried out as part of this evaluation found that there was an unmet demand from the private sector. This demand was reflected in the creation of the Union des chambres consulaires d’Afrique centrale located in Malabo and the Union patronale d’Afrique centrale based in Douala. In Brazzaville, Congo, a meeting with private sector representatives revealed that they were unaware that the Bank - unlike the World Bank - finances the private sector.

In Cameroon, economic operators expressed their keen need for the funding of rest areas along the Ketta-Djoum road, but they did not know what steps should be taken to achieve this goal. In CAR, the discussion with the private sector showed that there are opportunities to be exploited in the field of river transport between DRC and CAR. The only private small operation was the African Private Sector Assistance FAPA of UA 0.643 million, which was approved in 2010. This was part of a contribution to a multi donor operation of UA 8.8 million for capacity building of the Central African States’ Development Bank (BDEAC). The Bank’s lack of engagement with the private sector was underscored by the evaluation of the support given by the Bank to regional integration in East Africa (IDEV 2016).

Increase in cofinancing. Out of the 39 operations approved between 2008 and 2016, 11 were co-financed with at least one other donor (Table 7). The UA 471 million approved by the Bank for MOs during the strategy period represents 41.5 percent of the total cost of operations. Prior to the adoption of the strategy, the Bank's share of the total cost was 63.3 percent, implying that the Bank managed to mobilize more contributions from other donors during the strategy period. However, in most operations, the Bank remains the largest contributor. For 29 operations, its financial support exceeded 70 percent, which implies the results can be reasonably attributed to the Bank. It is worth noting that cofinancing by RMCs has increased substantially in both absolute and relative terms during the strategy period.

Table 6: Indicative list of the operations in the strategy and the actual portfolio


Operations Number of operations Amount (UA million)

Indicative list of operations 13 840.0

Actual portfolio : 19 471.0

Of which unplanned 8 124.9

Of which CBFF 2 8.2

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Table 7: Cofinancing of Bank’s MOs in Central Africa

Source2008-2011 2012-2016

Variation (%)Approved Amount UA million

% Approved Amount UA million

%

African Development Bank 555.2 63.3 470.8 41.5 -21.8

RMCs 134.2 15.3 257.3 22.7 7.4

Others (BID, BADEA, JBIC, BDEAC, etc.) 133.3 15.2 273.3 24.1 8.9

World Bank 44.9 5.1 54.7 4.8 -0.3

European Union 3.5 0.4 3 0.3 -0.1

RECs 6 0.7 3.9 0.3 -0.4

JICA 0 0.0 71.1 6.3 6.3

Total 877.1 100 1134.1 100 0


Table 8: Size of Bank financed Central Africa infrastructure operations

The portfolio of MOs of Central Africa is dominated by very small operations. These operations are unlikely to make an appreciable dent in the many regional integration challenges of the region. Out of 39 MOs, one-third is comprised of operations of less than UA three million, representing only 2.6 percent of total approvals. These are CBFF studies and operations. In contrast, five road and power infrastructure projects of UA 100 million or

more account for 65.6 percent of total approvals (Table 8). Following the adoption of the strategy the average size decreased from UA 27.8 million to UA 24.8 million. The size of infrastructure operations has dramatically decreased while that of capacity building operations has increased. The decrease was 42 percent for the former and the increase for the latter was 37.5 percent – a rise of nearly two-thirds.

Approved amount (UA million)

2008-2011 2012-2016

Number % of total approvals Number % of total approvals

< 3 9 1.6 6 2.4

3 – 5 1 0.9 2 1.53

5.1 – 10 3 4.42 5 7.54

10.1 – 45 4 16.4 3 24.52

45.1 – 99 0 00 1 11.43

> = 100 3 76.7 2 52.6

Total 20 100 19 100



Table 9: Status of the operations


Status Total 2008-2011 2012-2016 Of which

CBFF Studies

Ongoing 23 7 16 3 4

Completed 10 9 1 3 3

Completed with PCR 5 4 1 3 -

Approved 1 - 1 - -

Total 39 20 19 9 7

Almost all operations approved between 2008 and 2016 are still ongoing. Only one operation – CBFF- approved during the strategy period – the Projet d'appui au programme élargi de formation en gestion des ressources naturelles dans le bassin du Congo – is completed with a project completion report (PCR). This limits the analysis of the results

achieved by operations in terms of development effects (Table 9). Fieldwork was carried out to evaluate four regional operations to overcome this limitation. Those operations are, however, also ongoing or have just been completed without noticeable outcomes to report. The details on the status of the operations are reported in Annex 5.

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29The Development Performance of Central Africa MOsEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Relevance of the operations

Relevance is deemed satisfactory. Relevance can be analyzed with respect to three dimensions: a) appropriate response to the needs of the region; b) alignment of the operations with the strategies of the countries, regional organizations, and the Bank; and c) the quality of the design of the operations. The text below emphasizes the quality of the design of the operations, which, to a large extent, determines the level of operational success or failure.

Needs

Given the enormous development gaps in the region, any development intervention tends to respond to the first dimension and most of the time, operations are aligned with policy documents. Through addressing the massive infrastructure and capacity building gaps in Central Africa, the Bank responded to compelling needs of the region as described in chapter two of this report.

Alignment

The operations are well aligned with country, regional organizations and Bank strategies.

Infrastructure and capacity building are two long-standing priorities of the Bank, which are reflected in the Bank’s 2000 policy on economic cooperation and integration, in the 2009 RIS and in the RISPs. The Bank aims to support physical connectivity through infrastructure projects in the transport and energy sectors along with regional public goods when they address regional challenges related to health, security and the environment. Nevertheless, as indicated in the chapter on the portfolio, there was a large mismatch between the planned indicative and actual portfolio. Instead of 13 planned operations, the Bank approved 19 operations for only 56 percent of the indicative amount of the strategy, implying that almost half of the planned amount was dispersed over a larger number of projects than initially planned. In addition, two planned operations were not implemented and three were still at a feasibility study level (Box 2). This implies that the implementation of the strategy was based on a high degree of uncertainty in terms of planning the activities.

The operations also correspond to national priorities as reflected in their country strategy papers. Finally, the operations were aligned with the strategic priorities of the regional organizations

The Development Performance of Central Africa MOs

Operations not implemented ı The Kribi-Campo (Cameroon) -Bata (Equatorial Guinea) road project; ı The multimodal project: Congo-Sangha river navigation project and road construction Ouesso (Congo) - Bangui (CAR) - N'Djamena (Chad) whose study had been approved in 2010 but it is still ongoing.

Feasibility study level ıRoad Rail Bridge Project between Kinshasa (DRC) and Brazzaville (Congo) ıChad-Cameroon electricity network interconnection project ıCameroon-Gabon-Equatorial Guinea electricity network interconnection project

Box 2: Non implemented operations


including ECCAS, Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), CEMAC and COMIFAC.

Design quality

As acknowledged by common sense “a good start is half the battle”. Experience shows that weak design is among the main sources of failure in operations implementation since problems in the upstream phase (design, planning and contracting) are difficult to adjust downstream. The analysis

of the QAE of MOs of Central Africa region shows that there is a significant design gap for most of the QAE dimensions (Table 10). Project design quality varies more across strategic pillars and sectors of intervention, than over time (Table 11). The scores vary significantly among operations, but infrastructure operations in the energy and transport sectors consistently feature higher design quality as compared to capacity building operations. Strategic relevance and project rationale is the quality dimension with the best performance.

Dimensions 2008-2011 (n=8) 2012-2016 (n=12)

Strategic relevance and project rationale 75 83

Logical framework analysis 50 50

Partnership 75 58

Financial and technical aspects 25 58

Poverty, gender, environmental and social issues

88 64

Institutional capacity and framework 25 58

Risk assessment 50 75

Sustainability 25 33

Dimensions Infrastructure Capacity building

Strategic relevance and project rationale 100 60

Logical framework analysis 80 60

Partnership 70 50

Financial and technical aspects 70 30

Poverty, gender, environmental and social issues

100 60

Institutional capacity and framework 60 20

Risk assessment 70 20

Sustainability 40 20

Table 10: Percentage of MOs of at least satisfactory design quality

Table 11: Percentage of MOs of at least satisfactory design quality by pillars, 2008-2016

Source: Analysis of the QAE

Source: Analysis of the QAE

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MOs are a challenge to design, especially if they involve more than two countries, and even more so for the whole region, comprising up to eleven countries. This has led in some cases to complex implementation arrangements with dispersed partners and the ensuing daunting problems of accountability, communication and responsiveness.

The envisaged impact of MOs tends to be unrealistic. Causal relationships are not always convincing in the theory of change. While increased intraregional trade flows is the ultimate objective of almost all MOs of Central Africa, appraisal reports did not provide empirical evidence that the proposed approach would bring about progress in this area. Projects do not integrate policy dialogue at country level that would help to address trade policy issues that limit regional integration in Central Africa, such as the lack of enforcement of the existing free trade treaties. Market failures, such as the lack of complementarities between countries’ trade and production patterns, are also rarely addressed and identified as potential limits to the achievements of the operations’ regional integration objectives (Box 3).

Attribution of the envisaged results is also problematic. This is illustrated by the project Air Transport Sectors of West and Central Africa, which aims to build the capacity of regional aerial safety and of the Civil Aviation authorities of West and Central Africa. It estimates that its impact on increasing trade volume in the two regions would range from 19 to 23 percent. Likewise, it would be inappropriate to attribute the success of the African Program for Onchocerciasis (APOC) to the Bank since its contribution was only 20 percent of the total cost of the operations and more than ten cofinanciers were involved.

Effects on poverty reduction and gender equality are not always evident in MOs since there are rarely monitoring systems in place for capturing such effects. Evidence from case studies and lessons learnt from past MO implementation show that regional organizations have not been capable of performing this activity in the past. Good practice examples (Box 4) illustrate that data collection on project outcomes works better when contracted out to more experienced organizations.

Ketta-Djoum Road project. Congo and Cameroon are part of the CEMAC custom unions and should apply a common external tariff. However, each country uses its own standards and a bilateral trade agreement has not been signed yet. Presently, there are as many as seven internal checkpoints from the Congolese border to Brazzaville. A truck coming from Cameroon is subject to the payment of numerous fees to customs, police and immigration controls, which often include various illegal charges. These multiple controls discourage trade between the two countries and increase the price of imported goods from Cameroon to Congo three to four times.

Box 3: Binding constraints to free trade are not addressed by MOs

Means employed Operations

Delegating the analysis of project socio-economic outcomes to independent organizations in each participating country.

The Ketta-Djoum road project contracted out the assessment of the project socio- economic and environmental effects to two independent companies in Cameroon and Congo.

The Trans-Sahara highway project envisages delegating the collection of data to national statistical institutes.

Recruitment of external consultants The APOC project set up a multidisciplinary team to track outcomes in each participating country.

Box 4: Good practices for monitoring project socio-economic outcomes in MOs


MO financial and technical analysis is very often based on a one size fits all approach. The potential impacts of fragility and security in the region, which imply higher costs and longer project timelines, are not always accounted for when estimating projects’ implementation timeframe and projects’ costs (Box 5). A good practice is set by the Trans-Saharan highway project which allocated a specific budget for setting up security measures to protect workers in some of the project sites, and the Program to Rehabilitate and Strengthen the Resilience of Lake Chad Basin Systems – PRESIBALT - is based on a flexible approach to mitigate security issues.

Country specific costs and benefits are satisfactorily identified in only 45 percent of projects. Countries’ shares in project costs and benefits are not systematically presented and there is no common structure applied for presenting this key information. It is a low performance for such an important criterion, especially when MOs are financed using loans for some countries and grants for others since this can be perceived as inequitable. A relevant example is the difference in the financial architecture between PRODEBALT and PRESIBALT. PRODEBALT was financed as a public good through a grant to all participating countries. PRESIBALT was financed by the ADF RO envelope through a combination of grants and loans depending on the participating countries’ level of debt sustainability.

The design of project institutional architectures and implementation frameworks is also problematic. Only 35 percent of projects were approved when

countries had already in place a memorandum of understanding, implying that most of the operations had to negotiate part of their institutional framework after project commencement. The lack of such agreements is particularly critical for the implementation of cross-border components in transport projects where the positioning of a joint border post can be delayed by unresolved border issues. As an example, in the road project concerning the Douala Bangui and Douala Ndjamena corridor, the existing border dispute between Cameroon and the Central African Republic had delayed the construction of the joint border post and required considerable intermediation effort from CEMAC.

Consistent with the Bank approach to regional integration, MOs in Central Africa identify ECCAS as a key partner in project implementation. However, past experience showed that ECCAS has a weak operational capacity to ensure a satisfactory oversight of operations implementation. While entirely circumventing ECCAS, or other poorly performing regional organizations, bears the risk of undermining the legitimacy of Bank MOs, no convincing solution has so far been identified to address this issue.

Some MOs, especially those involving more than two countries in vast geographical areas, are based on overly complex implementation frameworks that are rarely supported by sound management systems. This was the case for instance with PRODEBALT and with PACEBCo. In both programs a complex and fragmented implementation architecture led to dispersed responsibilities, missing linkages between partners and problems of accountability.

ı In 2016, the project “Interconnection of the electric grids of Nile equatorial lakes countries”, which was approved in 2008, had to be extended with a supplementary grant for its Congo DRC component. The country component incurred severe delays and cost overruns due to a deterioration of security in the area of the project. The PAR approved in 2016 explains that “the average prices per kilometre of 220 kV line in the DRC are more than 25 percent higher than those charged by the same bidders in Rwanda for the same project”, because of the higher perceived country risk.

ı The mid-term review of the Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Program (PRODEBALT) was needed in order to revise cost estimates in view of considerable country differences and to shift activities from too fragile areas to more secure areas.

Box 5: Examples of increased costs associated with security issues

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Sustainability is the weakest dimension in the design quality of the operations. First, operations lack estimates of future costs and they do not plan future phases of the operations which, by their nature, respond to long run issues, especially with respect to the environment. Secondly, they adopt an ostrich- like policy consisting in handing over responsibilities to countries or organizations while ignoring the fact that they do not have the capacity to finance their own operations, which is hardly a credible strategy. Thirdly, most operations are implemented through consultants who are temporarily recruited in project implementation units that are subsequently dismantled when projects terminate, implying that there is not any significant transfer of capacities to regional or national executing agencies.

Effectiveness of the operations

Table 9 indicates 15 completed operations of which only five have a PCR. Out of the 15, three are studies and 6 are CBFF, which form part of another IDEV evaluation. Out of the 6 remaining operations only 2 have a PCR : the Projet de mise en œuvre de la politique régionale de l'eau de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale and Program africain de lutte contre l'onchocercose (APOC II). Both operations were not independently reviewed. Hence, the evaluation of effectiveness is mainly based on the four case studies, which were still being implemented or are near completion at the time of this evaluation.

Effectiveness of the operations is unsatisfactory overall. Evaluation of project effectiveness, especially in relation to outcomes, is hampered by the lack of documentation and statistics that should be collected during project implementation. While in most cases the achievement of the expected outputs seems satisfactory, it is still very early to have a clear idea about the outcomes of these operations.

PARCI: Institutional Capacity Building Support Project of ECCAS

Effectiveness was unsatisfactory. PARCI aimed to improve the implementation of projects by ECCAS and to support the harmonization of ECCAS and CEMAC. While PARCI is a relevant operation that addresses the institutional and operational shortcomings of ECCAS, it was only able to disburse 50 percent of the approved resources during the planned four year implementation period. The planned strategic plan of ECCAS was produced and the consultants were recruited and started work, however, other consultants are still to be recruited to work on the rationalization activities of the CEMAC and ECCAS. The planned harmonization between CEMAC and ECCAS could only be achieved to a level of 16 percent and the planned training activities have not yet taken place (Annex 6).

The two envisaged outcomes of PARCI have not been achieved but a cautiously positive trend can be observed. The first planned outcome was an increase in the disbursement rate of ECCAS projects to 30 percent in 2016. This was achieved by half of the projects. The second planned outcome was a rise in the share of intraregional trade to 2.5 percent in 2016. The latest available figures in the African Statistical Yearbook show a share of 1.7 percent in 2015, which is closer to the base rate of one percent than to the objective (Economic Commission for Africa, African Development Bank Group and African Union Commission 2017).

The main obstacles that contributed to not realizing most of the envisaged objectives relate to some of the risks mentioned in the appraisal report. The lack of political will to support PARCI has been a major source of delays. For instance, the establishment of the legal basis of the Committee on the Rationalization of RECs in Central Africa (COPIL) has been stalled for three years. In general, the reform process of ECCAS, which PARCI is supposed to support, has fallen short. The strategic plan for the period 2016-2020 was delayed by two years due to the missing go-ahead by national ministers and heads of state. It was eventually approved in 2017 but the indecision and absence of political leaders continues


to block the reform process. The budget reform to increase and stabilize funding has been proposed but has not been carried out. There has been a slight shift in the shares of contribution with the return of Rwanda to ECCAS in 2016 and a subsequent increased financial commitment but the total foreseen budget has remained the same.

The capacity of ECCAS was too low to manage and integrate all the PARCI components. Working on the harmonization of policies and laws has shown some signs of success through the studies carried out by the consultants at PARCI. However, major rationalization gains involving ECCAS and CEMAC precede PARCI, for instance, in the field of security with the convergence of the Multinational Force in Central Africa. Considering that the original timeline for PARCI to produce outputs has already elapsed and that the extension phase is unlikely to catch up with all the missing targets, the overall effectiveness of PARCI is unsatisfactory. Although there have been some results, they remain well below the envisaged ambitions.

Ketta-Djoum road and the Brazzaville-Yaoundé transport corridor facilitation project phase 1

The construction of the Ketta-Djoum road is not yet complete and its results are still to fully unfold. However, available evidence shows that, judged overall, the project effectiveness of Phase 1 is satisfactory both at output and outcome levels. The achievement of all physical outputs in Phase 1 is expected to be completed by the end of November 2017. The construction of the main road, including the related infrastructure has been completed. The preliminary handing over of infrastructures took place in December 2016 in Congo and in February 2017 in Cameroon. At the time the field mission of IDEV’s evaluation team took place, construction works were still ongoing for the Joint Border Post. In terms of outcomes, the road has brought about significant improvements in travel conditions (Table 12).

Targets at project appraisal Achievements at project completion

Mean overall travel speed on the Yaoundé – Brazzaville road axis goes from 30 Km/h to 80 km/h

Achieved, although not yet on the entire corridor. In Cameroon, the evaluation mission has calculated that the paved section of the road has an average travel speed that is three times higher than on the earth road sections.

Congo: transit time decreased by 60 percent on the paved section Ketta-Sembe and by 52 percent on the entire Ketta-Ntam road section.

Average Vehicle operating costs for heavy vehicles go from XAF 816/km to XAF 367/km

There is no data on average operating costs of heavy vehicles, but other indicators show a significant improvement of vehicles operating costs.

In Cameroon: for all vehicles monthly repairing costs reduced by 56 percent. Daily fuel consumption reduced by 44 percent.

Data are not available for Congo.

Mean walking distance to reach an all-season road goes from six km to two km

In Congo: data not available

In Cameroon: from 14.2 km to 13.3 km

Data from Cameroon shows that mean walking distance was initially far higher than six km. More importantly, the project has reduced the required time to access basic services, such as drinkable water, healthcare, education and markets.

Table 12: Achievement of project outcomes as compared to initial targets

Source: CEPI and Soreps.

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In both countries, the results of a survey conducted in 2016 among the population living within the project area shows that the project had a positive impact on their living conditions. Increased road traffic, improved access to healthcare centers, schools, markets and water points were the most commonly mentioned benefits. In Cameroon, the average time to reach a school was reduced by six percent and the average time to reach a healthcare center was reduced by 22 percent. In Congo, the average time to access to a healthcare center has decreased by 15 percent, while the distance to the nearest drinkable water point has been halved. However, it is important to note that the road also brought about some unintended negative effects, such as an increase in the number of accidents. In the districts of Sembé and Souanké in Cameroon there were 11 recorded accidents in 2012 and 35 in 2014 in spite of a sensitization campaign carried out.

The appraisal report set a target of 5,000 direct and indirect jobs to be created during road works in Cameroon and Congo and 2,000 jobs to be created for manual road maintenance works. Eventually, the project created 463 temporary jobs (299 in Cameroon and 164 in Congo), but there are no reliable statistics on long-term employment impacts. Local economic activities have benefited from the road. Catering activities have increased to serve the many workers engaged in the construction works. Survey data along the Djoum – Mintom road section shows the average revenue of households selling food increased by 20 percent. In Congo, access to the nearest market was reported to have improved from an average of 10.4 hours to 2.4 hours (Soreps, 2017). People interviewed also reported that the road contributed to turning Djoum from a large village into a town thanks to the expansion of economic activities, such as hotels and restaurants. It is likely that by building more infrastructures or services along the road, such as truck rest areas, small scale commercial activities will gradually develop. However, the road’s structuring impacts on the local economy, in terms of enabling new economic or industrial activities, are not visible yet and it is probably too early to observe such a structural change.

Project appraisal envisaged specific measures to reduce the negative impact on the forest’s flora and fauna. In Cameroon, the project had a significant impact on the flora that was not sufficiently offset by mitigation measures. In Congo, the project financed the construction of two forestry centers in Ketta and Kokoua to combat illegal logging and poaching. Environmental awareness campaigns were also conducted for the local population and the project workers. Local populations think that the road has increased forest exploitation4 and statistics provided by the logging company SEFYD5 confirmed an increase in their logging activities by 33 percent between 2012 and 2016. In the same period, timber export along the road has increased in volume by 20 percent (CEPI, 2016).

At present, trade potential between the two countries is limited by supply side constraints. These include insufficient diversification of their production systems, incomplete road infrastructure and several regulatory barriers. International freight traffic along the Yaoundé-Brazzaville corridor is currently low and is mostly made up of trucks loaded with timber coming from North East Congo (Sangha and Likouala) and heading to the Douala port. The Congolese government considers that the opening of the Brazzaville-Yaoundé corridor will open substantial development opportunities for the Sangha Department, which has thus far been limited to forestry and wood processing activities.

Improvements along the Yaoundé-Brazzaville corridor have made road transport profitable for some seasonal products, such as potatoes and onions, although some sections of the road still remain very difficult for commercial traffic. The lack of storage facilities along the corridor is also an obstacle to the transportation of perishable agricultural products. At present, the weaknesses of Congolese agricultural and industrial production, which is heavily dominated by oil, does not offer immediate prospects for observing a similar trade flow towards Cameroon, where trucks mostly return empty.


The long-term impact of the Ketta-Djoum road on subregional trade depends very much on the establishment of an appropriate institutional framework for regulating, implementing and monitoring the development of trade facilitation measures along the Yaoundé - Brazzaville axis. The commercial integration potential of the road remains hampered by a multitude of controls that hits the competitiveness of Cameroonian exports to Congo compared with products imported outside CEMAC. Only appropriate measures taken at the national level can effectively tackle these constraints.

PRODEBALT: Lake Chad Rural Development Program

PRODEBALT is a regional program centered on the provision of regional public goods and aims to promote concerted and sustainable management of the environment and natural resources in the Lake Chad basin. Its ultimate objective is to sustainably reduce poverty among the populations living on the basin’s resources by rehabilitating and conserving the productive capacities of Lake Chad ecosystems. The achievement of the expected outputs and outcomes of the program is unsatisfactory. The establishment of a sound project monitoring system, which was a specific objective of the program was not implemented and made the assessment of the programs’ outcomes very difficult. At the midterm program review in 2012, the program’s expected outputs had to be modified to redress mistakes in cost estimates that led to setting over optimistic targets. Furthermore, changes were added in the course of program implementation to adapt activities to the deterioration of the security conditions in certain program areas, but there is no well structured record of these modifications.

In 2009, the Boko Haram terrorist group launched military operations in the Nigerian section of Lake Chad to create an Islamic state. At the same time, CAR plunged into an interethnic and religious conflict. Planned program activities had to be suspended or cancelled as long as military operations in the area intensified. Initial targets could not be achieved and a new results framework

had to be established during the midterm review. The project’s financial architecture allowed for a redistribution of funds to other areas and activities. At the time the field work took place, some program activities were still far from their targets and will probably not be concluded by the program end in December 2018.

There is not enough documentary evidence to underpin robust conclusions about the ability of the program to achieve its expected outcomes and broader development goals. As an example, although the program’s results framework established specific gender targets (60 percent of microprojects had to benefit women associations), it is not possible to assess to what extent the program contributed to reducing gender disparities. The program implementation unit did not include a gender expert and the gender dimension of program activities was not monitored. The identified target indicators were too broad and ambitious and their achievement depended on many exogenous factors beyond the Bank’s control, such as changes in basin rainfall levels or intensification of the current armed conflict (Annex 7).

The extent to which the project helped to restore the Lake level cannot be assessed. This is linked to different external factors, including the fact that the Lake is known for being highly variable across seasons and years following varying rainfall levels in the upstream basin. Moreover, the project targeted a small area with the expectation that there would have been a significant impact on the overall water level.

Living conditions of the riverine populations. This objective is related to the implementation of microprojects. However, as compared to the program environmental activities, funds allocated to revenue generating activities were marginal and largely insufficient to cope with the many basic needs of the communities living on the Lake’s shore. Allocations from the Local Development Fund, which financed projects with a budget below ten million XAF, were spread too thinly on a vast area.

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There were two unplanned regional integration outcomes.The project has been mostly concerned with implementing activities at country level, but has also financed studies of regional relevance, such as the masterplan for the fight against silting and water erosion or the fisheries management plan for Lake Chad. Two unplanned regional integration outcomes were noticed. PRODEBALT financed two annexes of the Lake Chad Water Charter and participation in project bids was open to all enterprises and NGOs established in the LCBC member countries. Free movement of materials and equipment used for the project works was not easy to arrange because the project included two different economic zones, ECOWAS and CEMAC. However, in spite of some difficulties at the very beginning, which were due to a lack of sensitization campaign for the local police officers, national coordination units in Chad and Cameroon reported that cross-border transit of supplies worked smoothly during project implementation.

Increased capacity in regional and national organizations. The institutional capacity building component of the project was not implemented as planned. The LCBC technical staff in charge of following the implementation of PRODEBALT proved to be competent and knowledgeable about the program’s different activities, but the organization does not yet have the capacity to manage a large project portfolio and to coordinate donor interventions. Mutual learning of lessons from the implementation of microprojects in the different countries was not organized. This has been a missed opportunity for learning from good and bad practices that would have been useful to inform the design of microprojects in PRESIBALT, which was designed to continue and reinforce PRODEBALT achievements. At the same time, since PRESIBALT has recruited new experts, people that worked for PRODEBALT might not be retained by the new organization because of lack of funding. High staff turnover in national implementation units also established a very weak basis for transferring capacity.

PACEBCo: Congo Basin Ecosystems Conservation Support Program

The achievement of objectives of PACEBCo was significantly less than expected. Hence its effectiveness was unsatisfactory. The program was expected to achieve ecological conservation in six landscapes in the Congo Basin and to increase the income of local populations in those areas. To this end three components with respective sets of outputs were designed. While the program completed all outputs to strengthen the capacity of COMIFAC (component 1), only some outputs concerning biodiversity management (component 2) have been achieved. In terms of the welfare of local populations (component 3), few outputs have been achieved. Annex 8 provides a detailed breakdown.

The main enabling factor for realizing the outputs of the first component was the capacity of COMIFAC to absorb, steer and implement the activities. The main obstacles that contributed to not realizing most of the envisaged outputs in components 2 and 3 relate to some of the risks mentioned in the program logical framework. Issues of governance within the program, due to its complex structure but also within the partner organizations and at ECCAS, have been a major source of delays. Important partner organizations such as the Central Africa Protected Areas Network (RAPAC) did not have the capacity to perform the expected tasks in the complex program set-up. Others such as the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), who had a key role in the local development projects, abandoned the program over disagreement with the Bank about recruitment of their staff. The expectations for supervision and monitoring were too high for the number of staff and expertise. The lack of commitment by member states as evidenced in the lack of payment of counterparts has also affected the program.

The two program objectives of PACEBCo that were envisaged for 2014 have not been achieved. The first objective concerned the ecological conservation of the six landscapes. Although there are only limited data available, due to the capacity constraints in


protected areas, evidence suggests that poaching is still a major issue in the region and that populations of fauna and flora continue to decline. The majority of protected areas cite poaching as their main threat and report declines in mammal population, especially of elephant, gorilla, okapi and chimpanzee (de Wasseige et al. 2015, The Rainforest Foundation 2015). At the current annual loss rate of four percent, the forests in protected areas are expected to be entirely destroyed in the next two decades (Doumenge et al. 2015).

The second objective aimed at increased incomes for the populations affected by the program. Here too, data availability is limited due to the lack of current and comprehensive statistics in member states. However, available data from the World Bank suggest that household incomes have decreased in all countries except Rwanda. This assumption is supported by stagnating or declining GDP per capita figures. Local figures based on delineations of the landscapes were however not available. Observations and interviews during the fieldwork did not suggest an increase in economic activities but the lack of exact data does not enable a definitive judgement. The failure to fulfil objectives is due to outputs not having been achieved but it is also due to an unrealistic theory of change. The foreseen outputs are unlikely to significantly alter the state of biodiversity.

Efficiency of the operations

Efficiency of the operations is unsatisfactory. MOs tend to underperform in producing results in a timely manner. This relates to different issues such as poor design, lack of country ownership, weak human capacity within regional organizations and inadequate Bank responsiveness.

Contrary to time overruns, cost overruns are not much of an issue in the region. However, this is not an indicator of efficiency. Sometimes, it was not possible to spend the available resources in spite of extensions as the activities were abandoned. For example, this was true in the case of PACEBCo. Some activities of PRODEBALT were also abandoned because of security reasons.

Furthermore, resources could be saved because of an overestimation of the cost. This was exemplified by the Ketta-Djoum road project. Table 13 shows the number of extension for the four case studies. Details on delays and costs are shown in annex 9.

Over-optimistic planning. The fact that projects need an extension more than one time reflects the fact that implementation timeframes are too optimistic. More often than not, they do not account for the complexity of MOs and the challenges of working in the least developed of the African region marked by issues of governance, insecurity and weak implementation capacity. The IDEV’s Country Strategy and Program Evaluation 2004–2013 for Cameroon, found that the average duration of road projects in the country is 7.5 years. On the other hand, the duration for the Ketta-Djoum project was five years. On average the four operations selected for case studies had 30 months of delay, which is significantly higher than in East Africa region where the delay was found to vary between 15 and 23 months.

The use of RECs and other subregional organizations for operations implementation is a source of inefficiency. RECs and other subregional organizations proved to have a weak operational capacity to provide projects with sufficient follow up to coordinate and oversight implementation units in participating countries.

Operations that are delivered through a large number of small contracts, such as PRODEBALT or PACEBCo, do not work well. They generate an excessive administrative burden for the Bank, the executing agencies and the implementing organizations, which are generally small local NGOs or enterprises. The Bank’s procedures are not adequate to regulate such small contracts.

Almost absence of notified and rated operations during the strategy period. The available information shows high weakness in reporting and rating of the operations implemented during the strategy period by task managers (Table 14). Apart from one operation, the operations approved before 2011 were all reported and

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rated. During the strategy period, only six out of 17 operations were notified, but only one - the project Route Ndendé-Dolisie and facilitation of the transport on the corridor Libreville-Brazzaville - Phase 1- was rated by the task manager.

Unsatisfactory implementation performance in all dimensions. On a scale of 1 to 4, ranging from

highly unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, satisfactory, to highly satisfactory, task managers have rated the implementation performance dimensions as unsatisfactory (Table 15). Studies tend to perform lower than projects. It is worth noting that these ratings are given by the project task managers themselves, which reflects real obstacles to implementation.

Operations Number of extensions

Ketta-Djoum road project 2

PRODEBALT 2

PARCI 1 but a new extension is expected

PACEBCo 2

Table 13: Number of extensions of operations

Source: Supervision reports, field work.

Number of operations 2008-2011 2012-2016 Total

Total approved 20 19 39

Without CBFF operations 13 17 30

Operations notified in SAP 12 6 18

Operations rated in SAP 12 1 13

Table 14: Number of operations reported and rated in SAP

Table 15: Implementation performance of the operations

Dimensions Project rating Study rating

A. Compliance with conditions 2.3 2.2

B. Procurement performance 2.4 2.0

C. Financial performance 2.6 2.2

D. Activities and works 2.3 1.7

E. Expected impact on development 2.6 2.2


N= 13 operations reported and rated in SAP.


Sustainability of the operations

Sustainability is highly unsatisfactory. The explanatory factors of sustainability were discussed above under relevance. However, several other major obstacles include: a) the disconnect between the ambitions of regional organizations and the low commitment at national level, b) lack of a strong legal framework for regional integration and insufficient public financial means dedicated to regional integration, c) some donors are reducing support to RECs, and d) low visibility of ECCAS and low awareness by the population.

The countries of Central Africa have been hit hard by a series of severe shocks: a sharp decline in oil prices, civil conflicts and refugee flows. Economic

growth is at its lowest levels in 20 years and severe macroeconomic challenges have emerged, which undermine country capacity to finance infrastructure maintenance or continuation of project activities.

Another risk is that results from MOs are being appropriated by national entities that do not administer them for the region. For instance, for PACEBCo, the eco-center in Equatorial Guinea is supposed to fulfill a regional purpose but it was handed over to the national ministry without any plan to use it for the region, merely for their national forestry organization INDEFOR. To serve the region, the eco-center would have been better administered by the region and managed, for instance, by COMIFAC (Box 6).

Ketta Djoum road project. The governments of Congo and Cameroon are too focused on reaping the short-term benefits of the road without paying enough attention to the consequences of not enforcing axle load limits. Accidents are frequent and have already started damaging the road surface, while the existing weighing stations, provided by the project, are left unused. Both countries have underfunded maintenance, resulting in ineffective road funds that struggle to cope with the challenge of maintaining the existing road network in good condition. The funding mechanism for the functioning of the Joint Border Post has not been determined yet.

PRODEBALT. Both the LCBC regional coordination unit and the national coordination units depended entirely upon Bank financing, which provided staff salaries and equipment for implementing development projects. Member countries’ focus on the problems affecting the Lake Chad region has historically been very intermittent and is currently driven by security concerns rather than being supported by a long-term development vision.

PARCI. The probability that once the Bank has completed its assistance to ECCAS, the work done by the experts recruited under PARCI will be terminated is high. This organization does not have the means to ensure the continuity of the activities once the assistance of the Bank is completed.

PACEBCo. All stakeholders including the States expect a second phase of the program without which the consolidation of the achievements of the program would be called into question. Several infrastructures including the health centers, the multifunctional antenna in Gabon and the ecological research center in Equatorial Guinea are not equipped. Consequently, these infrastructures are not yet functional. In addition, the activities carried out at the local level are not likely to generate income for the management of the operation and maintenance of the sites which the Program Management Unit has handed over to the government structures.

Box 6: Sustainability was highly unsatisfactory in all case studies

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41Bank’s PerformanceEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

While the Bank is commended by its stakeholders in Central Africa including by regional organizations, countries, the private sector and the civil society for its assistance to the region both for infrastructure and capacity building, its performance has serious limitations for the following reasons.

ı First, at country level, Bank policy dialogue at country level for issues related to regional integration is not well integrated in project design. There is insufficient high level policy dialogue to solve challenges standing in the way of regional integration beyond financing infrastructures and capacity building. For instance, the Bank is not discussing issues related to the removal of trade regulatory barriers and internal checkpoints that limit intraregional trade.

ı Second, while partnerships with other donors are well identified in Bank’s operations at sector level, there is a lack of coordination and clear leadership on regional integration programs. Coordination with other donors remains focused on sector specific priorities. While regional integration operations highly depend on donors support, there is a striking lack of coordination of activities at regional level, especially for areas concerning trade facilitation measures.

ı Third, in some cases, the Bank tends to carry out its MOs without getting actively involved in donor coordination. The PRODEBALT and PRESIBALT

programs, which were presented as large multi donor initiatives, turned out to be solely a Bank project with very little coordination with regard to the many other donor initiatives addressing the environmental and social challenges of the Lake Chad region. Donor coordination is too often limited to pulling donor resources together for the financing of costly infrastructures, but it is not extended to regional integration facilitation measures.

ı Fourth, appraisal reports mention the importance of the role to be played by the private sector and civil society organizations but in reality those entities are absent for projects’ design and implementation. However, there is a strong demand for regional integration by civil society and the private sector, which is reflected in the creation of the Forum of Civil Society Organizations of Central Africa (FOSCAC) in 2015 and the private sector regional organizations mentioned above.

ı Fifth, task manager workload is excessive with respect to the complexity of MOs and the particular difficulties of the region. In three out of four case studies, people in executing agencies reported that the longtime taken by Bank task managers in providing their non objection statements delayed project activities. With one exception, task managers did not report and rate the implementation performance of the 19 operations during the strategy period.

Bank’s Performance

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43Regional Organizations’ and Countries’ PerformanceEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Countries’ performance

Countries' performance was unsatisfactory. At country level, the political commitment and financial contributions of countries to regional organizations have been sporadic. For instance, the financing gap of the ECCAS membership tax for the yearly budget amounts to 74 percent and the volume of arrears amounts to three full years of funding (figures as at 31 December 2016). This undermines the leadership and operational capacity of regional organizations including the oversight of regional programs. The LCBC was paralyzed, suspended and reorganized on a regular basis by late payments from its member countries. It has only been thanks to the funding from donors that the LCBC has been able to maintain a minimum level of activity and implement development projects.

In most countries there is no ministry dedicated to regional integration. This leads to either dispersing of responsibilities among various ministries or subordination within one single ministry. In both cases, visibility and coherence of regional integration policies are reduced. Only four countries have included an engagement in a Central African regional organization as an objective in their national strategies.

Many countries hold memberships in multiple regional organizations with a similar mandate. There is no political agreement about a merger of overlapping regional organizations. States have been slow to give COPIL a legal basis.

There is a high staff turnover in national executing agencies. This jeopardizes project implementation because the new staff has to learn about Bank procedures.

Contrasting behavior of countries. Countries have made important advances in the field of biodiversity conservation, such as signing the main international treaties and expanding the surface of protected areas. However, they do not make sufficient efforts to review the results of regional operations that are handed over to them, nor do they ensure their sustainability or their impact on regional integration.

Regional organizations’ performance

The performance of regional organizations is unsatisfactory. The overlap between regional organizations persists as they are reluctant to cede their mandate. This mainly concerns ECCAS and CEMAC but also the delineation of the division of labor between ECCAS and COMIFAC.

These organizations have mandates that exceed their human and financial resources. The LCBC is struggling to deliver on its broad mandate which encompasses the promotion of shared water and environmental resource management, the development of broader regional development policies and collective security functions.

Regional Organizations’ and Countries’ Performance


Because of a lack of internal capacity, regional organizations rely too much on consultants’ expertise which is not transferred to ECCAS staff when a project is completed. There are no adequate structures in place at the RECs to absorb new units that have been created through Bank projects, such as the COPIL.

LCBC and ECCAS are not coordinating donors. Some donors, such as the French Development Agency and the European Union, are circumventing regional organizations because of their weak operational capacity or due to a backlog of non justified expenses for the European Union.

ECCAS lacks the capacity to:

ı Mobilize and absorb private sector and development agency funding. The community depends too much on member states’ limited contributions and donor grants. As a result, it cannot coordinate and harmonize donor-driven capacity building initiatives, sustain donor-funded projects, or fully absorb funds made available6 .

ı Contribute the counterpart funding that was foreseen in the agreements between the Bank and ECCAS, which delayed the implementation of the operations.

ı Be financially autonomous. The RECs have limited autonomy, therefore they suffer from long decision-making chains that require the involvement of the member states and heads of state summits.

Key role of COMIFAC but uncertain resources. COMIFAC has become an internationally recognized organization with a regional mandate to coordinate, implement and supervise regional forest programs. This has been facilitated by substantial donor support. COMIFAC plays an important role in facilitating partnerships between local and international actors and providing technical advice. However, it is not financially sustainable. It depends mainly upon donors’ financial support for its operations and operating costs.

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45Main FindingsEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Central Africa presents particular challenges standing in the way of regional integration but at the same time, it offers opportunities to foster regional integration. However, this requires that governance conditions improve significantly so that these opportunities could be realized. Interviews carried out in the Central African region by the evaluation team with different stakeholders – civil servants, donors, RECs, private sector, and the civil society – indicate that the understanding of regional integration is confined to a pooling of efforts to achieve more integrated economies and a removal of obstacles to the movement of goods and people in the region. Rarely was a reference made to the need for States to transfer some powers to a regional, supranational organization acting on behalf of them.

Unrealistic theory of change of the strategy. While the strategy adequately describes the opportunities and the obstacles to regional integration and adopts a practical response in addressing infrastructures and capacity building obstacles, it was based on an unrealistic theory with respect to the causal relationships between limited and uncertain resources and expected outcomes in terms of development and regional integration. Investing in trade-related infrastructures is no guarantee that trade opportunities will materialize, unless other binding constraints are addressed. At the same time, trade cannot make a significant contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction unless it expands substantially7 . In spite of an improved physical connectivity, poor enforcement of good governance principles continues to hamper trade between countries. Appropriate measures taken at the national level could effectively tackle these constraints.

Low ownership of the strategy. It should be noted that while the strategy was relevant, it was unknown by development partners including senior country officials,

the private sector, civil society, and other donors in the region. This is mainly because it was not widely disseminated and communicated, in particular through the media. Hence, there was little ownership of the strategy.

Apart from North Africa, Central Africa is the least integrated region of the continent. It is also the one that received the least resources for its integration. Furthermore, Central Africa is the only region where the Bank’s assistance to regional integration has declined during the implementation period of the strategy. The adoption of the regional integration strategy did not have a visible positive influence compared to the period when the strategy did not exist. The share of approvals for MOs in Central Africa in the total approvals for all regions even fell by almost half from the first to the second period. The analysis of the portfolio shows that the strategy has not generated major regional integration projects. The only infrastructure projects of more than UA 50 million initiated are the Ndendé-Dolisie road and the facilitation of transport on the Libreville-Brazzaville corridor project, approved in 2013. There is also the Trans-Saharan route Niger-Chad-Algeria but this is a multiregional operation.

The operations of the strategy were relevant, but there was a mismatch between the indicative and the actual portfolio. Of the 19 operations actually implemented (instead of 13 planned by the strategy), eight operations were not initially foreseen. Some operations in agriculture and social sectors were not aligned with the strategy. As for the portfolio analysis, the analysis of the assessment of QAE did not find any significant difference between operations approved before the strategy and those approved thereafter. Infrastructure operations fared much better than those focused on capacity building.

Main Findings


Unsuccessful attainment of objectives. The case studies which provide an independent assessment based on a triangulation of different sources of evidence found that overall the effectiveness of the operations is unsatisfactory. Out of four cases, only one was found to satisfactorily meet its targeted outputs and outcomes.

The efficiency of operations is considered unsatisfactory by the evaluation team and also by task managers. The implementation of the operations takes on average at least 2.5 years more than the planned time. This time overrun derives mainly from the difficulties of meeting the conditions for the first disbursement, the non availability of counterpart funding and various obstacles during the implementation. Sometimes, weak implementation performance is due to low Bank’s responsiveness to requests from the implementing agencies, as was the case for NELSAP, PARCI, MDRTSP, and PRODEBALT. More often than not, this situation is due to the fact that task managers are overloaded by managing up to three complex operations while they also have to appraise new operations.

The sustainability of operations is highly unsatisfactory, which is explained by the fact that:

ı Most countries are fragile, lacking resources to finance development programs and maintain results;

ı The countries of the region are experiencing daunting financial difficulties due to decreases in the price of raw materials, which negatively affect their budgets;

ı There is little ownership of the results of operations, which is reflected in the non payment of counterpart funds by the States and by ECCAS;

ı The reforms of road maintenance funds that are supposed to finance road maintenance have not yet been effective, as in the case in Cameroon and Congo;

ı ECCAS experiences permanent financial uncertainty due to non payment of the Community Contribution by States and its dependence on donors.

Bank performance was unsatisfactory. While the Bank is commended for its support to regional integration through infrastructure and capacity building, its effectiveness is hampered by a series of gaps. These range from problems relating to policy dialogue to overcome institutional and political barriers to regional integration, leadership to foster donor coordination, and responsiveness to requests of implementing agencies. There were also problems centering on the role to be played by the private sector and civil society organizations, task managers’ excessive workload and the need to ensure higher QAE of operations as well as in producing relevant information to evaluate results beyond outputs.

The performance of the countries was unsatisfactory. There is strong demand for regional integration from the private sector and civil society. Certainly, some issues linked to infrastructure, biodiversity, health and education are better solved at regional level. However, there are political and institutional obstacles throughout the region which need to be addressed to foster higher and diversified economic development, the basis of increased exchanges in the region. Although countries have ratified key international conventions and have provided political backing to regional organizations, effective political commitment and financial contributions of countries to regional organizations have been sporadic. This undermines the leadership and operational capacity of regional organizations, including for the oversight of regional programs.

The performance of regional organizations was unsatisfactory. Regional organizations are mired with structural weakness, which undermines their internal capacity to foster effectively regional integration. The implementation of their programs relies heavily on consultants’ expertise which is not transferred to their staff when a project is completed. The overlap between CEMAC and ECCAS persists, which further undermines their effectiveness.

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47RecommendationsEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

IDEV makes the following recommendations:

1. Address Central Africa’s key challenges with a commensurate tailored approach. The region has a multitude of development challenges that have to be met through a combination of initiatives at the national and regional levels. MOs, by their nature, tend to be complex and require more financial and human resources as well as more time to design, implement and evaluate than national operations. Given that the region has a number of fragile states and landlocked countries, and it suffers from political instability and violence, with some countries severely hit in their public finances by the sharp decline of oil prices, the Bank should tailor its approach accordingly.

2. Move from a RISP to an indicative operational program. Given that the Bank has defined strategies for its High 5 priorities8, it appears more appropriate that, instead of adopting a new RISP for Central Africa, it instead considers the preparation of indicative operational program for regional integration in the region. In this scenario, a tailored project pipeline which better reflects the specificities of the region would be developed.

3. Undertake a more active dissemination of the Central Africa regional integration program. Once the Bank has finalized the preparation of its new regional integration program for Central Africa, it should convene a regional conference and invite representatives of governments, RECs, development partners, the private sector, civil society, the media, and academia. This would promote a better understanding of what the Bank wants to achieve and foster an increased ownership of the regional actions to be undertaken.

4. Improve policy dialogue and leadership. It is essential to conduct policy dialogue at the highest level to increase the level of commitment and ownership by the policy and decision makers in countries and regions. The Bank should consider using its leadership position in terms of financing and knowledge of regional activities to foster the coordination of donor interventions at the regional level and to promote countries’ mutual cooperation. Furthermore, the Bank should consider making its assistance for regional operations conditional on the payment of the community tax by the countries to the regional organizations. To satisfactorily play those roles, an increase of the research basis for strategies and programs is required.

5. Support the private sector. As the Bank has not financed any private sector operations in the region, it should study how to support the development of private sector operations that establish long-lasting linkages between markets across borders. The Bank should explore innovative ways of delivering regional operations by focusing on existing cross border interactions and directly involving the relevant actors - local administrations, informal traders, and transnational civil society organizations. It should take appropriate measures at the national and regional levels to reduce obstacles to the movement of goods and people. This could also attract private funds to invest in regional integration operations.

Recommendations


6. Consider more realistic business planning than is currently the case. All the RISPs had an extension of two years. The four country case study operations included in this evaluation all had project implementation delays of at least two years. The Bank should examine to what extent these implementation delays were related to over-optimistic implementation schedules for MOs. In addition to that, the Bank should remove internal obstacles and inefficiencies that delay the execution of operations.

7. Continue supporting capacity building. The Bank should help clarify the division of labor between ECCAS and their specialized agencies –such as COMIFAC, RAPAC - and avoid conflict

of competencies which creates implementation obstacles. It should help establish a monitoring and evaluation unit within ECCAS for collecting data on regional project outcomes and the continuous monitoring of regional integration progress. The Bank also needs to have realistic expectations towards RECs and revisit the role that ECCAS plays in implementing MOs. The Bank could assist ECCAS and LCBC establish a specialized project implementation unit that is staffed with experienced personnel to manage the implementation of projects. The unit could be a focal point for all donors implementing regional operations through the RECs. The design of the unit should make sure that it maximizes its contribution to ECCAS capacity.

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49RecommendationsEvaluation of the Regional Integration Strategy and Operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa, 2011-2016 – Summary report

Annexes


Annex 1: Methodology

This annex describes the methodology followed for the major components of the evaluation and indicates the main sources of information. The evaluation responded to the questions summarized as follows:

ı The extent to which the Bank's regional integration strategy has addressed the most binding constraints to regional integration and was designed so that the activities funded could help the economies of the countries to become more integrated, to foster economic growth and reduce poverty;

ı The design quality of the operations;

ı The effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of multinational operations;

ı The role of the Bank in policy dialogue, its capacity in terms of financial resources and staffing, as well as its processes for designing and implementing regional integration operations to produce sustainable results and to learn from experience;

ı The role of the participating countries in terms of political commitment and participation in the design and implementation of the regional integration strategy and operations, the level of ownership and co-financing of the operations;

ı The role of the RECs in the design and implementation of MOs;

ı The extent to which the RISP was aligned with Member States' priorities and RECs’ regional integration strategies to ensure effective ownership of regional operations and the mobilization of the resources required;

ı The level and quality of donor collaboration and coordination to support regional integration;

ı The extent to which good practices are transferable to other regions to share the experience;

ı The difference made by the strategy in comparison with the situation before the strategy was approved.

To respond to the above questions, the following steps were taken: scoping mission; desk review comprising a strategy evaluation, a portfolio analysis, and a quality at entry analysis; and 4 case studies. Two other background papers were prepared, one on challenges and opportunities of regional integration in Central Africa and the other on key concepts of regional integration. In addition, this annex indicates the key documents analyzed as well as the sources of statistical information.

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1. The inception report

A scoping mission was undertaken from 13 November to 4 December 2016 in Bangui, Libreville and Yaoundé. It aimed to meet Bank’s stakeholders to collect information on the challenges of regional integration in Central Africa and the responses provided by the Bank and development partners in terms of strategies and operations. The results of the mission were used to refine the theory of change of the regional integration strategy and for preparing the inception report. The mission team organized focus group discussions with senior civil servants, regional organisations, other donors, representatives of the private sector and the civil society. See the table below.

Stakeholders interviewed during the scoping mission

Stakeholders met in : Bangui, Yaoundé and Libreville Number of persons met

Bank’s staff in the 3 decentralized offices of Bangui, Yaoundé and Libreville 11

Senior civil servants 25

CEMAC and CEEAC 23

EU, WB, UNDP, ECA, JICA, AFD 16

Private sector 13

Civil society 12

Total 100

The interviews were carried out based on interview guides comprising generic questions to all stakeholders and more specific questions. The interview guides are annexed to the inception report (available on the IDEV website: idev.afdb.org).

2. The strategy review

The review examined the relevance and design quality of the strategy, and its capacity to effectively guide the Bank’s operations in the region. It specifically aimed to:

ı Analyze the relevance of the objectives and assumptions underlying the strategy;

ı Assess the relevance of the pillars of the strategy;

ı Assess the quality of the risk analysis and the mitigation measures;

ı Analyze whether the preparation of the strategy was participatory and whether this led to buy-in for the objectives of operations and ownership;

ı Assess whether the resources for implementation of the strategy and the capacity of the Bank, including the effectiveness of its financing mechanisms, were adequate for the challenges;

ı Examine the realism of the implementation duration;


ı Assess the capacity of governments and regional organisations to take ownership of operations and to implement them;

ı Assess the level and quality of coordination among donors;

ı Assess the effects of the strategy on organizational changes at the REC, countries and Bank levels.

ı Assess whether the objectives of the strategy will continue to be realized after the Bank’s and other external support is ended.

In addition to reviewing relevant documents, 15 task managers and managers conversant with the strategy were interviewed in Abidjan and decentralized offices.

3. The portfolio review

The portfolio review analyzed the trend, structure, implementation performance and results of operations. Specifically, it examined:

ı The evolution of resources approved and their distribution in terms of size, sectors, use of instruments, status, co-financing, etc.

ı The extent to which disbursement and implementation schedules were respected.

ı The implementation performance criteria to identify the sources of strength / weakness.

ı The results obtained from the implementation of the operations.

ı The difference made by the strategy while comparing different aspects of the portfolio after the strategy was approved (2012-2016) with the period before (2008-2011).

The portfolio review comprised a descriptive level covering all 39 operations to present the trends and the structure, and a second, more analytical level focused on the design and implementation performance of 22 selected operations, excluding CBFF, studies and operations of less than UA one million. The analysis was based on the appraisal reports, the last supervision reports and the results of a questionnaire sent to task managers on the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Fifteen of the 22 operations received responses from task managers. The questionnaire is in the annex of the portfolio analysis report.

4. The quality at entry assessment

The QAE assessment used a coding system to generate information from a detailed analysis of the appraisal reports of 22 out of 39 operations on the following dimensions: Strategic relevance & project rationale, Logical framework analysis, Partnership, Financial and technical aspects, Poverty, gender and environmental and social issues, Institutional capacity and framework, Risk assessment, and Sustainability. In addition, interviews were carried out with 18 staff in charge of the design of the operations and conversant with issues standing in the way of higher performance of the operations.

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5. Case studies

Given the complexity of MOs, time and cost constraints, 4 operations were analyzed in-depth between 23 July and 23 August 2017 in Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Two large environmental programs, a road infrastructure project and a capacity building operation were selected after having discussed with the staff of the regional department in charge of Central Africa. It is important to mention that the infrastructure operations included capacity building components too. The four operations represent more than 31.3% of the total amount approved for MOs in Central Africa in the period being studied. They are complex enough to help draw useful lessons. Each case study was based on a checklist of evaluation questions to systematically collect information on them.

StakeholdersNumber of persons met

Lake Chad Rural Development Program - PRODEBALT

Ketta-Djoum road

Bank’s staff in Ndjamena, Brazzaville, Yaoundé, Libreville, Malabo

5 8

Senior civil servants 22 25

CEMAC,CEEAC and LCBC 14 4

Other donors 1 3

Beneficiary populations and NGOs 11 7

Private sector - 6

Total 53 53

StakeholdersNumber of persons met

Institutional Capacity Building Support Project of ECCAS-PARCI

Congo Basin Ecosystems Conservation Support Program PACEBCo

Bank’s staff in Abidjan, Yaoundé, Libreville 8 8

Senior civil servants 15 18

CEMAC,CEEAC, COMIFAC, CIFOR and RAPAC

3 18

Other donors 3 4

Beneficiary populations, businesses and NGOs

- 17

Total 29 65

Stakeholders interviewed for case studies


6. Challenges and Opportunities PaperThe paper defines 8 main factors that contribute to the process of regionalism, namely:

ı Regional political order;

ı Regional economic structure;

ı Movement of goods and people;

ı Peace and security;

ı Regional organizations;

ı Regionalism and the member states;

ı Civil society and business;

ı External support for regionalism

7. Main Concepts of Regionalism PaperThe paper clarifies the definition of key concepts including:

ı Regional cooperation

ı Regional integration

ı Regionalism

ı Regionalization

ı Regional development

8. Key documents analyzed ı Bank’s regional integration policies and strategies; Country strategy papers

ı Appraisal reports

ı Regional economic program of CEMAC

ı ECCAS strategic plan and vision 2025

ı Regional indicative program of the European Union

ı Ex-ante evaluation reports of projects

ı Project completion reports

ı Previous assessments made by the Bank

ı Bank supervision mission reports

ı ECA reports on regional integration in Central Africa

ı Other relevant documents

9. Sources of statistical information ı Compendium of Statistics on Bank’s Operations

ı Statistics department database

ı Portfolio data of the department responsible for the Central Africa region and other regions

ı SAP

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Annex 2: Summaries of the four case studies The Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Program (PRODEBALT) is an environmental and rural development program covering the members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC): Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Central Africa Republic and Cameroon. The program was approved in 2008 and a second phase, Program to Rehabilitate and Strengthen the Resilience of Lake Chad Basin Systems –PRESIBALT, was launched in 2014. The second phase aims to further the implementation of activities supported under the first phase and help the LCBC member countries cope better with increasing environmental and socio-economic fragility in the Lake area. The program, originally designed as a large (nearly UA 60 million) multidonor initiative, was to operationalize the LCBC Vision 2025 for an equitable access to the Lake’s resources among the riparian countries to ultimately reduce poverty among the populations living on the Lake’s resources. To this end, the program was structured in three components: i) protection of Lake Chad and its basin, ii) adaptation of production systems to climate change, and iii) institutional support to the LCBC. Within component two, five Local Development Funds were established to support revenue generating projects in each participating country.

Findings

While relevant, the program resulted in a too complex and fragmented an implementation framework that was not supported by a sound program management system. Activities and funds were dispersed too thinly over a vast geographical area. Funds allocated to the five Local Development Funds were marginal and largely insufficient to cope with the many basic needs of the communities living on the Lake’s shore.

Data to measure results were not systematically collected during program implementation and there are no reliable socio-economic statistics covering this geographical area. The achievement of the program’s outputs and outcomes was also negatively affected by the armed conflict against the Boko Haram Jihadist group and civil war in the Central Africa Republic. However, the program financial architecture was flexible enough to allow a reallocation of funds in areas that were not concerned by these conflicts. The use of a flexible and adaptive approach avoided program disruption and allowed to mitigate drivers of latent conflicts for water and land use in other areas.

The program had many design shortfalls and was too hastily approved. Too much time had to be spent on preparatory activities after the program’s start, such as reviewing all cost estimates to account for country differences, identifying the specific location of projects’ sites or setting up coordination units at the regional and national level. As a result, the implementation of most activity was concentrated in two years from 2015 to 2016. Although PRESIBALT design has integrated some important lessons from the past program, such as the need to reduce the number of small-scale contracts or the need to better integrate gender issues, its approval was also too hurried. PRESIBALT created parallel new executing structures, thereby not capitalizing on the capacities developed under the previous program. Its implementation has also been delayed by institutional and organizational obstacles that were underestimated in project appraisal.

For small regional NGOs and enterprises, involved in program implementation, it was too difficult to follow the Bank’s standard procedures for procurement and disbursement. Activities were difficult to start and were sometimes suspended because of lack of continuous funding. Although the delivery of the Local Development Fund followed simplified procedures, these were still too cumbersome when compared with the tiny amount disbursed for each grant. The use of excessively complex procedures also reduced access to funding by more remote areas and less developed communities.


Program sustainability is unlikely. A second phase of the program has already been launched to complete activities initiated by PRODEBALT. Both the LCBC regional coordination unit and the national coordination units depended entirely upon Bank financing that provided staff salaries and equipment. LCBC Member Countries’ focus on the problems affecting the Lake Chad area is very intermittent and is currently driven by security concerns rather than being supported by a long-term development vision.

Bank performance was unsatisfactory. The Bank failed to fulfil its role of lead donor for interventions targeting the Lake Chad area. A case of serious misconduct was reported in the Bank office in Ndjamena, which had a key role in following up the program implementation, and eventually led to the resignation of the Bank representative.

Recommendations

Complex ROs should be based on high design quality which sets realistic targets and is based upon a realistic program implementation work plan. In such complex program, appropriate reporting requirements should be established and followed to ensure that activities, outputs and outcomes are consistently reported in each participating country. The establishment of a central repository of data on outputs and outcomes achieved through the countries’ Local Development Fund should be set up within the LCBC, as this is of paramount importance for keeping a record of the beneficiary profiles and of projects’ outputs and outcomes.

The Bank could mobilize more resources for the oversight and guidance of ROs, especially when these have such a broad scope of intervention, as in the case of PRODEBALT/PRESIBALT. The task manager’s duties should be set in a more realistic way, by considering, for instance, the need to cover a vast area in a region having poor transport infrastructure and insecurity. The Bank should also be sure to recruit competent staff for effective project implementation at the regional and national levels and reduce reliance on consultants for core business activities.

Multiplication of small contracts should be avoided. Instead the Bank could contract an “umbrella” NGO that knows Bank procedures and policies that would, in turn, make small grants according to mutually accepted criteria. The capacity of local organizations to engage in program activity should be carefully verified at the time of project appraisal.

In line with the Bank’s regional integration strategy objective of reinforcing regional organizations, the Bank could assist the LCBC to focus its mandate on a limited number of priorities that can be effectively managed by the LCBC. It could integrate the regional dimension of the Lake Chad in its policy dialogue with the LCBC member countries to ensure that countries honor their commitments to the organization and refrain from implementing agricultural projects that are not sustainable. Finally, the Bank could ensure the coordination of donor interventions to avoid the existing fragmentation of projects and approaches.

The Ketta-Djoum road project constitutes a section of the Brazzaville-Yaoundé transport corridor. The project was approved in 2009 as a RO and had to be structured in two phases because of its high costs. The first phase is to be completed in December 2017. The works for the second phase are yet to start in both countries. The project aims to support regional trade development between the two countries and to unleash the economic potential of the landlocked regions served by the road, leading, ultimately, to poverty reduction and an improvement in the living conditions of the local populations.

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Findings

The project responds to the aspirations of the two countries and of ECCAS in terms of establishing transport corridors between the capital cities of the Central Africa region and expanding intraregional trade. It also responds to the needs of the private sector in both countries by establishing an all-season road connection between Yaoundé and Brazzaville and helps improve the connectivity of landlocked populations to cities and basic services, such as schools and healthcare.

To produce the desired results, the project combines the building of physical infrastructures with transport and trade facilitation measures. However, the expected trade targets are too ambitious when considering the characteristics of countries’ production patterns, which lack industrial diversification, and all the political and regulatory barriers that limit trade flows in the region. The project implementation framework followed a lean structure, where responsibilities were clearly allocated, and was supported by countries’ commitment to sign a Memorandum of Understanding for the construction and operation of a Joint Border Post.

Because of changes in the original activity plan and cost savings, the project was able to increase the length of paved road by 64 km. The project also successfully achieved its objective of improving travel conditions. This can be measured either in terms of reduced travel time, which is three times lower in the paved road section, or in terms of reduced vehicle repairs and running costs. Furthermore, women’s access to transport services has been improved by the road because of increased accessibility and security.

The project has reduced travel time to basic services, such as drinkable water, schools and markets. However, the effects of the road in generating new economic activities have so far been limited. The project impact on the environment raises some concerns because of increased logging activities due to the improved road condition. Available statistics indicate an increase of logging activities by 33 percent between 2012 and 2016. In the same period, timber exports along the road increased in volume by 20 percent (CEPI, 2016).

Beyond the increase of timber exports from Congo to Cameroon, there have been no noticeable increases in trade flows between the two countries. Policy related obstacles to intraregional trade limits the regional integration potential of the road. While Congo and Cameroon remain committed to facilitating trade flows between the two countries and adhere, in principle, to adopting the CEMAC common external tariff, an array of legal - and illegal - regulatory barriers remain along the Yaoundé-Brazzaville corridor. The two countries have yet to sign a bilateral trade agreement, which would reduce transport and trade red tape costs.

The project did not have cost overruns, but its implementation was severely delayed when compared to the original planning. Delays were due to the very long time taken by both with respect to fulfilling their loan and grant ex-ante conditions. The performance of the national project implementation units was satisfactory, whereas ECCAS had more problems in implementing its activities. The Bank’s performance is fully satisfactory, since the project received adequate support measures from the Bank in both countries.

The project’s sustainability is judged unlikely. The countries are overly focused on reaping the short-term-benefits of the road without paying sufficient attention to the consequences of allowing heavily charged log trucks to use the road without any limitations. Accidents are frequent and have already started damaging the road surface while the project’s existing weight stations, remain unused. In addition to this problem, both countries have underfunded the project so there is a real challenge associated with maintaining the existing road network. In this respect, it is important to note that the second phase of the project includes institutional support measures for the transport sector. Finally, the funding mechanisms for the functioning of the Joint Border Post have yet to be determined.


Recommendations

Project appraisal reports should provide a more accurate picture of the existing trade flows and trade barriers to establish a more solid commercial rationale. Targets, in terms of increased intraregional trade flows, should be realistic and based on existing production and trade patterns in the participating countries. Project implementation calendars should also be realistic and based on past experiences rather than on standard practice.

Data on project results including in terms of outcomes should be collected both at the national and regional levels to demonstrate the achievement of the expected socio-economic and regional integration effects. The same indicators should be used in both countries to underpin a comparative analysis of outcomes and of country-specific barriers. Without the implementation of appropriate complementary economic policies and measures at country level the full benefits of this project can hardly be realized. Trade flows between the two countries are unlikely to increase unless countries eliminate the existing custom duties and the many illegal checkpoints that make goods produced in the region uncompetitive with respect to non regional imports.

Road projects integrating the provision of socio-economic infrastructures, such as schools or healthcare centers, need to work closely with relevant ministers to ensure that these infrastructures are built where they are mostly needed (that is, based on accurate and realistic demand forecast for such services), and that they are properly staffed. Local chiefs should also be better consulted for identifying the priority needs of local populations in relation to road construction.

To ensure the sustainability of the project results, both Congo and Cameroon need to accelerate the reform of their road funds and implement more adequate road infrastructure management policies. At the same time, they should ensure that axle load limits are respected by making fully operational the existing weigh stations and imposing dissuasive sanctions. The Bank should condition the approval of new road projects upon a substantial improvement of road maintenance and effective enforcement of axle load limits.

The Congo Basin Ecosystems Conservation Support Program (PACEBCo) is a high priority for the Bank’s regional integration strategy for Central Africa. It addresses the regional dimension of the Congo Basin’s biodiversity. The program was approved in September 2009 and the completion was initially foreseen for December 2014. It received two extensions, first until June 2016 and then until June 2017, when the program was officially completed. PACEBCo’s goal is the well-being of the local populations and the ecological balance of the planet. To these ends, the program aimed to contribute to the management of forest resources and protected areas in the region. The main components of the program were:

ı Capacity building of the Commission of Central African Forests (COMIFAC),

ı Support for conservation activities, such as eco-guard training as well as climate change mitigation pilot projects to access the global carbon market, and

ı Sustainable promotion of the populations’ welfare through local development projects that promote activities generating alternative incomes to the exploitation of forests.

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Findings

PACEBCo deals with the threat to forest survival at the regional level and of the vital environment functions of the forests for climate at the global level. It addresses the aspiration of COMIFAC to become a strong organization in the field of conservation in Central Africa. It also responds to the needs for economic development in remote communities.

There is a convincing causal relationship between all components and the envisaged impact on deforestation, knowledge production and forest governance. Risks are aptly identified but the mitigation measures are not up to task. The institutional support component was not enough to alleviate the weak capacity of the many regional and national organizations involved; meanwhile, the monitoring system did not address the challenges related to the vastness of the Congo Basin. The project fares badly with respect to the complex architecture of the program, which produces dispersed responsibilities, missing linkages between partners, and problems of accountability.

PACEBCo fared very well in the first component and contributed to the growing capacity and knowledge at COMIFAC and its partners. Training was carried out, new strategies were designed and regular reports on the state of the forests were published. However, it underperformed with respect to biodiversity management. Training of eco-guards, new forest plantation and establishment of eco-centers have only occurred partially and the climate change pilot projects were not realized at all. The local development projects focused primarily on the construction of buildings without necessarily ensuring their furnishing or the creation of income generating activities. Evidence suggests that the ecological conservation of the Congo Basin and the increase in incomes for the populations affected by the program were not realized.

While the program was extended twice, it was only able to fulfil 72 percent of its budget. The financial counterpart by ECCAS was not provided. Many small organizations took part in PACEBCo and their capacity to deal with the financial procedures and reports for the Bank was weak in many cases, which led to expenses that could not be justified. The complex institutional set up has generated long decision chains and dispersed accountability. As a result, communication and supervision did not function properly and procedures, such as the approval of expenses were time-consuming. The foreseen time for the constructions was heavily exceeded, largely due to the difficulties of implementing a “one-size-fits-all” solution in sites that differ considerably in their local conditions (population size, climate, and so forth.). Nevertheless, a notable improvement in the implementation performance of the program has been recorded for the last three years, thanks to a change in the management of the program, which enabled an acceleration in implementation.

Although COMIFAC has received political traction among the member states, it has not been able to create a financial model that ensures its autonomy. The appropriation of PACEBCo results by national bodies has been insufficient and local constructions, including offices and wells, do not have adequate management systems in place. By contrast, knowledge production has been well documented, disseminated and continues to be openly accessible.

Although the Bank has become an important player for the Congo Basin forests, it has failed to use its position in terms of donor coordination. There have also been issues in realistically assessing the different local conditions in the various landscapes and in the continuity of communication with partners suffering from delayed payments, such as CIFOR.


Recommendations

The forests and the biodiversity of the Congo Basin are unique features that require more regional operations. PACEBCo has produced important new knowledge, both about the Congo Basin and about how to manage complex programs. The Bank should use this experience to build up more internal knowledge on biodiversity, on forest management, and on working in the Congo Basin.

There is a need to clarify the division of labor between ECCAS and COMIFAC in regional biodiversity operations. ECCAS has a role to play in terms of intersectorial cooperation and political legitimacy. COMIFAC has become a widely recognized regional organization for managing the Congo Basin and should be further supported by the Bank so that it can attain financial autonomy.

In a complex program, the number of intermediary actors needs to be kept to a minimum and direct accountability needs to be ensured for all partners. For a regional operation that operates in several sites to work well, horizontal linkages between these sites and their implementation partners need to be clearly established. Expectations on what CSOs that operate in Central Africa are able to contribute also need to be realistic and the regulatory procedures of the Bank in terms of accounting and reporting might need to be adapted to their capacity.

The Bank needs to play a proactive role among donors that deal with the Congo Basin and among member states. A regional body or consortium should overtake the results and products of a regional environmental program. COMIFAC could play a role in this process. National bodies that are now in charge of the regional eco-centers and other buildings do not have a regional mandate.

The Institutional Capacity Building Support to the Economic Community of Central African States project (PARCI) aimed to improve the implementation of projects by ECCAS and to support the harmonization of ECCAS and CEMAC. It is a high priority for the Bank’s regional strategy for Central Africa. The project was approved in 2012 and was to be completed by March 2017. It subsequently received an extension until March 2018. PARCI’s envisaged impact is the consolidation of economic growth in the region. Its first component is the improvement of the institutional framework, including the management of regional infrastructure projects. The expected outcome is an improved implementation of projects by the secretariat of the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS). The second component is the harmonization of ECCAS and the overlapping Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) with the aim of improving intraregional trade.

Findings

The project responded to the aspiration of ECCAS to become a stronger organization and to address the overlap with CEMAC. It also met the needs of the private sector by improving infrastructure implementation and providing regional statistics. However there is a weak causal relationship with the envisaged impact of economic growth and the outcome of trade. Risks such as low political ownership and weak national structures are aptly identified but the mitigation measures are considerably below what is required to address them. The causal links in relation to institutional capacity of ECCAS are well identified.

There has been an improvement in the outcome indicators of regional trade and ECCAS disbursement rates but the figures are still well below the target. The four outputs relating to capacity building at ECCAS have only been partly achieved. Important achievements such as a new financial mechanism, statistical databases and

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the implementation of infrastructure projects are still lacking.The five outputs concerning the harmonization of regional organizations have only been achieved in parts or not at all. There are particular deficits regarding the visibility of ECCAS, the ownership of member states and the harmonization of tariffs. The lack of performance of PARCI relates mainly to the lack of political traction and the lack of capacity of ECCAS to handle the project. ECCAS lacked financial counterpart, adequate access to data and enough expertise.

Within the foreseen project period of four years, PARCI was only able to execute 50 percent of its resources. The rate for the harmonization of ECCAS and CEMAC component was particularly slow (16%). Several activities of the project stalled during the first years and they suffered from a slow decision-making process involving ECCAS and the member states. The pace has however improved since 2016 when the unit to manage PARCI’s second component was installed. PARCI also suffered from difficulties in the recruitment process of experts.

The sustainability of the outcomes of the project are seriously at risk. There is not enough political traction among the member states to embolden ECCAS with a strong mandate or to implement a merger between ECCAS and CEMAC. Given the budgetary uncertainties of ECCAS, it is also unlikely that the organization will be able to absorb experts recruited by PARCI or the knowledge created by PARCI. Other donors than the Bank are also unlikely to continue the objectives of the project given the lack of donor coordination and the different priorities of other leading donors, such as the European Union, which focus more on peace and security as well as trade agreements.

During the implementation of the project, there have been delays in communication, in the treatment of non objection statements and in supervision by the Bank. Although the Bank is one of the main supporters of capacity building at ECCAS, it has failed to use its position to foster donor coordination for regional operations.

Recommendations

Projects dedicated to strengthening regional organizations need to rely on consistent political will and binding financial commitments. If member states are only superficially interested in reforms of their regional organizations and are not willing to increase their mandate and to pay the cost, capacity building projects risk being stalled or carried out in vain.

If a REC is the target of a regional project, its institutional set up needs to be studied carefully. ECCAS has an intergovernmental structure and its secretariat has very limited powers. Decisions are made at heads of state summits. For organizational reforms and the merger of regional organizations to be achieved, the Bank and its project requires a more prominent role at these events.

In an intergovernmental setting an intervention at the REC level also needs to be integrated at a national level. To this end, accompanying binding agreements with member states should be signed. In addition, the Bank should encourage the inclusion of regional integration objectives in national development plans and the creation of dedicated ministries for regional integration where they do not exist.

Expectations on what ECCAS is able to contribute need to be realistic during the design of projects. This concerns ECCAS’s capacity to pay financial counterparts, its knowledge management and the integration of the project’s results.

The Bank can take advantage of its regional integration expertise and play a leading role among donors that directly support ECCAS. Regional capacity-building projects need to be embedded by agreements with the other main donors in this field to avoid duplication or fragmentation.


Annex 3: Theory of Change of Bank’s Assistance to Regional Integration in Central Africa

Opportunities. The region contains abundant oil, mineral and mining resources of high value it has great agricultural potential; it houses the Congo Basin which is the second largest forest and hydraulic reserve in the world; there is interest in regional integration and a willingness to support regional integration initiatives by development partners.

Challenges. The region contains fragile states and some landlocked countries. It has weak infrastructure (roads, electricity, drinking water); there is overlapping of different regional economic agreements; low productive capacity; low intraregional and interregional trade; and low diversi�cation of economies.

Assumption - 1: Lack of infrastructure is the most binding constraint for stronger growth. The infrastructure development is crucial to unlocking the immense potential of Central Africa and fostering its integration. Infrastructure development is a major imperative to address the structural constraints that have caused the region's delayed development.

Assumption - 2: Capacity building of RECs is essential, in particular to facilitate the design and management of infrastructure to be carried out with the strategy, but also for managing the regional integration agenda. Strengthening the institutional capacity of the RECs will also improve ownership at regional and at State levels.

Build institutional capacity of RECs (ECCAS and CEMAC

Context

Financial resources - The Bank (ADF, ADB, regional envelope, private sector windows);- Funding from RMCs and from private sector ; - Other funders; - Studies

Facilitate environment management (especially the Congo Basin)

Facilitate the design and implementation of regional development policies, strategies and regional infrastructure plans

Harmonization of common external tariff of the ECCAS FTA and the CEMAC Customs Union

Expand the regional market; improve the business climate and governance

Strategic Objectives Inputs / instruments Outputs Intermediate Results Impacts

2 : Develop understanding and collaboration between countries, in the spirit of the African Union

3 : Sustainable development of the region

Develop Regional infrastructures

Human resources: AfDB, RMCs, RECs, private sector, civil society and other funders experts

Physical connectivityRegional infrastructures: roads, corridors; electric interconnections

Enhance intraregional trade; access of the populations to transport, energy and ICT ; promote the non oil private sector

1 : Reducing poverty in Central Africa

Source: Prepared by evaluation team from the RISP.

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Region West East South Center North Multi-region Total (UA million)

2008-2011

Number of operations 13 16 6 20 3 54 112

Amount (UA million) 290.8 915.7 307.1 555.2 37.2 1383.9 3489.9

Percent of total amount (all regions) 8.3 26.2 8.8 15.9 1.1 39.7 100.0

Per capita (UA) 1.0 2.9 2.8 5.2 0.2 N/A N/A

Average size (UA million) 22.4 57.2 51.2 27.8 12.4 25.6 N/A

2012-2016

Number of operations 33 30 11 19 2 58 153

Amount (UA million) 1431.9 1315.5 608.5 470.8 32.8 1622.4 5481.9

Percent of total amount (all regions) 26.1 24 11.1 8.6 0.6 29.6 100

Per capita (UA) 4.2 3.6 5.1 3.8 0.2 N/A N/A

Average size (UA million) 43.4 43.9 55.3 24.8 16.4 28 N/A

Variation of amount approved (percent) 392.4 43.7 98.1 -15.2 -11.9 17.2 57.8

Annex 4: Approvals of MOs by region and by period

Source: Analysis of the portfolio.N/A: Not applicable.


Annex 5: MOs Portfolio of the Central Africa Regional Department - ORCE - January 2008-December 2016

Nr Name of the operation Year Approvals UA Million

Contribution of the Bank (percent)

Status Sector Disbursement (percent)

Source

1 Interconnection of the electric grids of the Nile equatorial lakes countries - DRC component (supplementary grant)

2016 8 100 Approved Power 0 Grant

2 Support project for the socio-economic reintegration of young people and women (PARSEJF) – CAR, Burundi and RDC

2016 2.8 100 Ongoing Social For CAR component =

22.5

Grant

3 Ketta-Djoum road and the Brazzaville-Yaoundé transport corridor facilitation project phase 2 -Congo and Cameroon

2015 147 48.6 Ongoing Transport 0.2 Loan

4 Project for support to the air transport sectors of west and central Africa (pasta –co)

2015 2 52.6 Ongoing Transport 4.6 Grant

5 Program to rehabilitate and strengthen the resilience of Lake Chad basin systems (PRESIBALT)

2014 53.8 75.6 Ongoing Social 3.1 Grant and Loan

6 Chad_programme to build resilience to food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel (P2RS)

2014 9.8 5.3 Ongoing Agriculture 6 Grant

7 Gabon/Congo- the Ndende-Dolisie road and Libreville-Brazzaville corridor transport facilitation project – phase i

2013 100.5 78 Ongoing Transport 12.9 Loan

8 Trans-Sahara highway (TSH) project - Chad

2013 41.3 16.3 Ongoing Transport 15.6 Grant and Loan

9 Inga site development and electricity access support project (PASEL)

2013 44.4 39.6 Ongoing Power 42.2 Grant

10 Electrical interconnection study Cameroon-Chad

2013 2.5 81.6 Ongoing Power 45 Grant and Loan

11 Support for Inga - 3 development

2013 5.4 99.3 Ongoing Power 80 Grant

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12 Central Africa biodiversity conservation program - protecting Central Africa’s elephants (PCBAC)

2013 3 100 Ongoing Environment 59 Grant and Loan

13 ECCAS institutional capacity building support (PARCI-ECCAS)

2012 7 85.1 Ongoing Multi-Sector 44 Grant

14 CAR/DRC project to interconnect the power grids from the Boali hydro-power system - phase 1

2012 29.7 84.3 Ongoing Power 3.8 Grant

15 Brazzaville railroad and Kinshasa-Ilebo railway bridge study -supplementary grant

2012 0.7 100 Ongoing Transport 78 Grant

16 Program for facilitation of transport on the Douala-Bangui and Douala-Ndjamena corridors - supplementary grant car

2012 4.2 100 Completed Transport 97 Grant

17 Project to strengthen the contribution of non-timber forest products to food security in central Africa

2012 2.9 100 Ongoing Environment 83.4 Grant

18 Congo basin regional MRV project - phase 1

2012 5.3 100.3 Closed Environment 100 Grant

19 ECCAS cross-border electrification pilot project study - phase 2


20 Support for multi actor participation in the REDD process

2011 1.5 92.5 Ongoing Environment 93 Grant

21 Support project for the expanded natural resources management training program in the Congo basin (PEFOGRN-BC)

2011 7 100 Closed Environment 100 Grant

22 Multinational road Doussala-Dolisie study - (mic fund)

2011 0.3 100 Completed Transport 61 Grant

23 Study of the Ouesso-Bangui-N'djamena road and river navigation on Congo, Oubangui and Sangha

2010 8 93 Ongoing Transport 12.8 Grant

24 Support to BDEAC - FAPA 2010 0.6 100 Ongoing Finance 60 Grant

25 CBFF - promoting community land tenure in the Congo basin

2009 0.4 84.2 Closed Environment 100 Grant

26 CBFF - stabilizing carbon emissions in the sangha tri nation

2009 0.4 61.8 Completed Environment 100 Grant





Source

27 Ketta-Djoum road and the Brazzaville-Yaoundé transport corridor facilitation project phase 1 -Congo and Cameroon

2009 121.2 58.1 Completed Transport 83.3 Grant and Loan

28 (ECCAS) - project for the implementation of the regional water policy of the economic community of central African states

2009 1.3 46.8 Closed Water and sanitation

100 Grant

29 Congo basin ecosystems conservation support program (PACEBCO)

2009 32 85.8 Completed Environment 62 Grant

30 The multicountry demobilization and reintegration transitional support program (MDRTSP)

2009 14 85.8 Completed Social 100 Grant

31 Lake Chad basin sustainable development program (PRODEBALT)

2008 30 49.9 Ongoing Environment 93 Grant

32 Study of the Brazzaville rail road bridge and the Kinshasa-Ilebo railway

2008 5 91.9 Completed Transport 73.1 Grant

33 Interconnection of the electric grids of the Nile equatorial lakes countries (NELSAP)


34 Cameroon/Nigeria proposal for an million to finance the transport facilitation program for the Bamenda-Mamfe-Abakalikienugu corridor

2008 204.8 74 Ongoing Transport 75.3 Grant and Loan

35 The African program for onchocerciasis control and phasing out (APOC II)

2008 15 20.1 Closed Social 100 Grant

36 Inga study and related interconnections

2008 9.5 90 Completed Power 97.8 Grant

37 Reconciling the needs of the logging industry with those of forest dependent


38 Building the foundation for success, ensuring community participation is at heart of REED

2009 1.6 100 Ongoing Environment 68 Grant

39 Quantifying carbon stocks and emissions in the forest of the Congo basin


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Annex 6: Planned and actual outputs of PARCI

Planned outputs until 2016

Performance indicators Output situation in July 2017 Score

First component (capacity)

The legal and institutional framework of the General Secretariat is strengthened.

The fundamental texts (Treaty, Staff Regulations, Internal Rules, Financial Rules) of ECCAS are revised.

New legal texts for ECCAS have been drafted and proposed to the member states. They are in the process of negotiation or ratification. So far, the revision has not been effective.

Unsatisfactory

The operational and financial management mechanism of the General Secretariat is strengthened.

A strategic framework for the regional budget is adopted.

There have been proposals for new funding mechanisms but there has been no budget reform. The budget has not been increased and the mechanism of funding has not changed. Arrears remain a problem. However, the hiring of an expert to consult on these issues is in process.

Unsatisfactory

The infrastructure projects in the PIDA Priority Action Plan are in an advanced stage of preparation.

Feasibility studies for 12 projects of the PIDA Priority Action Plan have been done and four projects are implemented.

Experts have been employed to support project management but the infrastructure projects have not gone past the identification phase.

Unsatisfactory

The statistics unit of ECCAS is operational and the infrastructure and trade databases are available.

A regional statistical development strategy is available.

A regional infrastructure database is available.

An external trade database is available.

A strategy was adopted and a consultant has been employed. However, the two regional databases are lacking.

Unsatisfactory


Planned outputs until 2016

Performance indicators Output situation in July 2017 Score

Second component (harmonization)

Harmonizations of the CET of CEMAC/ECCAS and of the common customs code are at an advanced level of implementation.

The CET is harmonized between ECCAS and CEMAC.

The customs code is harmonized between ECCAS and CEMAC.

A permanent harmonized monitoring mechanism is established.

The CET and the customs code are not harmonized and given the slow pace of ECCAS reforms they are unlikely to be harmonized by the end of project. A permanent mechanism has not been established.

Highly unsatisfactory

The COPIL technical secretariat is operational.

The organizational framework of the COPIL technical secretariat is established and operational.

216 staff of the COPIL technical secretariat have been trained, of which at least four are women.

The COPIL technical secretariat has been set up but it has very limited capacity to operate. Staffing is incomplete and the recruitment of three required experts has not been concluded yet. COPIL has participated in several ECCAS meetings but the foreseen trainings have not taken place.

Unsatisfactory

ECCAS has greater visibility.

A communication plan with the member states is adopted.

One consultant has been employed for communication but no communication plan has been adopted. There is no evidence of actual improvement in visibility.


The focal points are sensitized to integration issues.

200 stakeholders receive training, of which 40 percent are women.

The training was partially carried out. 79 people were trained of which 35 percent were women.

Unsatisfactory

Greater ownership by member states.

A mechanism for the collection of financial contribution is established and arrears decline by 30 percent.

A mechanism has not been established. Arrears of members have not decreased and payments remain volatile.


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Annex 7: Program outputs of PRODEBALT

Components Activities Target at project appraisal

Target at mid-term review

Execution rate at December 2016

Protection of Lake Chad and its basin

Soil conservation and soil moisture conservation

Sand dune: 8,000 ha

Lake bank: 27,000 ha

Sand dune: 2,000 ha

Lake bank: 12,000 ha

2,064 ha (over 100 percent)

5,000 ha (41 percent)

Regeneration of grazing land

23,000 ha 10,000 ha 4,400 ha (44 percent)

Control of invasive aquatic plants in water bodies

8,000 ha 700 ha 172 ha (25 percent)

Conservation of the endangered Kouri cow species

150 unit 150 unit 150 unit (100 percent)

Clearing out of the Vrick channel

15 Km 15Km 22 km (over 100 percent)

Study and plan of optimal management of reservoirs and water supply points of the basin

One study One study One master plan delivered, one study on Lake Chad pollutant agents and two annexes of Lake Chad Water charter delivered (over 100 percent)

Adaptation of production systems to climate change

Integrated water resource management

Six piezometers

1,400 ha irrigated perimeters

Six piezometers

1,000 ha irrigated perimeters

Purchased, to be installed (80 percent)

1,367 ha (over 100 percent)

Management of pastoral resources

One study for planning pastoral works

1,500 km transhumance corridor

44 unit pastoral wells

One study for planning pastoral works

490 km transhumance corridor

31 unit pastoral wells

One study delivered (100 percent)

770 km (over 100 percent)

79 unit (over 100 percent)

Management of forestry resources

120 h grazing perimeters

Five master plans for wood supply

Community forest: 20,000 ha

Classified forest: 12,000 ha

Agroforestry plantation: 23,390 ha

100 ha grazing perimeters

Five master plans for wood supply

Community forest: 6,000 ha

Classified forest: 5,500 ha

Agroforestry plantation: 11,500 ha

90 ha (90 percent)

Four studies (80 percent)




40 unit (20 percent)

Not reported

Promotion of alternative resources

200 biogas unit

150,000 improved hearts

200 biogas unit

43,000 improved hearts

One master plans delivered in collaboration with FAO (30 percent)

Delivered (100 percent)


Components Activities Target at project appraisal

Target at mid-term review

Execution rate at December 2016


Sustainable management of fishery resources

Three master plans for fishery management

Fishery infrastructure plan

Fishery statistics

17 surveillance antennas

15 fish cooling machines

15 water points

15 latrines built

2,250 m2 of hangar

7,000 ml of drying rack 2,000 Chorkor furnaces

1,500 isothermal containers

Three master plans for fishery management

Fishery infrastructure plan

Fishery statistics

17 surveillance antennas

15 fish cooling machines

15 water points

15 latrines built

2,250 m2 of hangar

7,000 ml of drying rack 2,000 Chorkor furnaces

1,500 isothermal containers

Not reported

Six finalized, nine under construction (35 percent)

Three finalized, nine under construction (20 percent)

Not reported

Not reported

Not reported

2,415 (34 percent)

775 (38 percent)

515 (35 percent)

Local development 200 projects

60,000 mosquito nets

30 HIV/AIDS awareness campaign

200 projects

60,000 mosquito nets

Transferred to another project

507 (over 100 percent)

No data reported

Activity cancelled

Source: author’s reconstruction from PRODEBALT mid-term review report and PRODEBALT progress report of January 2017

Note that the following activities were financed under the Institutional Support component without having been planned:

ı The refurbishment of the regional and national coordination offices, which was realized in all countries but CAR

ı Support for the establishment of Lake Chad observatory (zero percent)

ı Support for research activities (cancer awareness in Chad) (75 percent).

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Components Progress by country Achieved

Protection of Lake Chad and its basin

Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria 100 percent

Chad: sand dune fixation to be completed 79 percent

Central Africa Republic (CAR) Progress report says that no activities were planned in CAR for this program component, while the Bank’s mission report says that activities were cancelled because of security reasons.


Cameroon 93 percent and 123 microprojects financed

Niger 97 percent and 101 microprojects financed

Nigeria 96 percent and 70 microprojects financed.

CAR 91 percent and 115 microprojects financed

Chad 95 percent and 98 microprojects financed

Institutional support LCBC: almost 100 percent

Source: PRODEBALT supervision report, March 2017

Achievements of project outputs of PRODEBALT


Planned PACEBCo outputs until 2015

Performance target indicators Output situation in June 2017 Comments

First component (COMIFAC capacity)

The institutional capacity of COMIFAC and its affiliated institutions is built to match its mandate.

ı 100 certificates are recorded.

ı 200 staff of COMIFAC and partner organization are trained.

ı The COMIFAC institutional diagnostic study is adopted.

ı 100 percent of the program budget is implemented in time by COMIFAC and its partner institutions.

ı The appropriate expertise mobilized in key areas increases to 120 p/m in 2012.

ı The number of people covered by the mass communication plan increases to 50 percent.

All foreseen targets have been reached (100 percent).

Highly satisfactory

The structuring tools for biodiversity conservation are effectively implemented.

ı MIS set up and operational.

ı 50 professional staff of countries are trained in biodiversity data processing.

ı 100 national staff are trained.

All foreseen targets have been reached (100 percent).

Highly satisfactory

Second component (biodiversity management)

Conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity in the Program’s target Landscapes.

ı The surface area of the demarcated protected areas and the number of guard posts set up and equipped increase to four million ha and 120.

ı The number of trained ecological monitoring and anti-poaching guards increases to 1 000.

ı The surface area of community forest plantations developed increases to 10000 ha.

ı 580000 beneficiaries are trained in biodiversity protection.

ı Six operational ecological centers established.

ı 79 percent of the demarcation was carried out. three guard posts have been constructed and equipped....................................xg.

ı In total, 686 guards were trained. ..........................................fgdtr.nnngfx

ı In total, 4200 hectares were planted. ..........................................fgdtr.nnngf

ı In total, 3582 persons have been trained.

ı Five ecological centers have been built. They are not all operational.

Unsatisfactory

Annex 8: Planned and actual outputs of PACEBCo

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Planned PACEBCo outputs until 2015

Performance target indicators Output situation in June 2017 Comments

Climate change adaptation plans are implemented through the conservation of the CB forests as a carbon sink/adaptation to climate change pilot projects are effectively implemented/enhanced resilience and impacts resulting from knowledge of the carbon market.

ı The number of REDD pilot projects implemented rises to ten..

ı The number of national staff trained in the cycle and evaluation of carbon stocks and reduced emissions increases to 50.

ı The number of Adaptation to Climate Change (ACC) projects implemented increases to ten.

ı A regional support strategy for countries in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol Designated National Authorities (DNA) is implemented.

ı Five REDD pilot projects have been started in 2014 but were not concluded. All other outputs were contingent on these projects and were therefore not realized.


Third component (welfare)

The living conditions of the populations are improved through the implementation of income-generating activities and the promotion of new practices in the use of natural resources.

ı 60 LDPs are prepared and implemented.

ı 300 LDMs are implemented per landscape per year.

ı The number of distributed technological packages increases to 35.

ı The rate of adoption of themes disseminated rises to 75 percent.

ı The number of Management Plans increases to six..

ı The number of women affected by the LDF is 50 percent

ı 90 local development plans were validated.

ı In total, 279 local development microprojects were implemented.

ı Technological packages were only distributed in the Rwandan landscape.

ı The rate of adoption of disseminated themes was not recorded.

ı There was one Management Plan for all landscapes.

ı The number of affected women has not been recorded systematically.9



Annex 9: Time and cost overruns for case studies

Planned Realized or projected

Difference Comments

Ketta Djoum road

Completion date March 2014 November 2017 3.7 years Delays mainly related to the conditionality of expropriation and the long delay to recruit the company in charge of the construction. It was required that all the people were compensated before the work began. The mission was able to note that some people have suffered damages and have not been compensated.

Approval (UA million) 121.17 Less than amount approved

64 km more paved : Congo (49) and Cameroon (15)

The financial offer of the enterprises in charge of the construction was less than the planned amount.

PARCI

Completion date March 2017 December 2017 nine months Late Bank response to non objection and delayed disbursement of the counterpart by ECCAS. States have been slow to give COPIL a legal basis.

Approval (million UA) 7 Ongoing No cost overrun foreseen

PRODEBALT

Completion date December 2015

December 2017 Two years Cumbersome administrative procedures related to the complexity of the organizational structure.

Approval (UA million) 30 Ongoing No gap a priori 93% disbursement to date

PACEBCo

Completion date March 2014 July 2017 3.33 years The complexity of the organizational structure have considerably slowed down the program.

Approval (UA million) 32 27 About a balance of UA 5 million

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Annex 10: References

ACBF (2016). A survey of the capacity needs of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities.

ACBF (2008). A survey of the capacity needs of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities.

AfDB (2013). African Development Bank Group Long term strategy, 2013-2022. Revised version. March.

AfDB (2012). Environnement de l’Investissement Privé dans les Pays de la Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale Contraintes et Perspectives. Résumé Analytique, Département Régional de l’Afrique Centrale.

AfDB (2011). Central Africa: Regional Integration Strategy Paper (RISP) 2011-2015.

AfDB (2009). Bank Group Regional Integration Strategy, 2009 -2012.

AfDB (2000). Economic Cooperation and Regional Integration Policy.

AU, AfDB and UNECA (2016). Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016.

Bach Daniel C. (2016). Regionalism in Africa. Genealogies, institutions and trans-state networks. Routledge.

CEEAC (2016). Plan stratégique à moyen terme de la CEEAC pour la période 2016-2020, rapport final, Septembre.

CEMAC (2012). Programme économique régional: plan opérationnel 2011-2015. Bangui: CEMAC.

CEMAC (2009). CEMAC 2025: Vers une économie régionale intégrée et émergente – programme économique régional 2009-2015: rapport d’étape. Bangui: CEMAC.

CEPI, (2017). Evaluation ex-post de l’impact économique et social. Tronçon Ketta – Ntam au Congo.

Combaz, E. (2013). Regional development programs and poverty reduction, GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1023. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

De Lombaerde Philippe et al (2011). The regional integration manual. Quantitative and qualitative Methods. Routledge.

De Wasseige C., Tadoum M., Eba’a Atyi R. et Doumenge C. (Eds.) (2015). Les forêts du Bassin du Congo - Forêts et changements climatiques. Neufchateau: Weyrich.

Delponte Laura (2017). Quality at entry review assessment of regional operations (2008-2016) in Central Africa. IDEV, African Development Bank.

Doumenge et al. (Eds, 2015). Aires protégées d’Afrique centrale – État 2015. OFAC, Kinshasa et Yaoundé.

ECCAS, (2008). Vision stratégique de la CEEAC à l’horizon 2025.

EU, ECCAS, CEMAC (2015). Union Européenne-Afrique Centrale : programme indicatif régional pour la période 2014-2020, Bruxelles.

Gakusi Albert-Eneas, Frank Mattheis and Mohamed Coulibaly (2017). Evaluation of the Institutional Capacity Building Support to the Economic Community of Central African States (PARCI-ECCAS). IDEV, African Development Bank.

Gakusi Albert-Eneas, Frank Mattheis and Mohamed Coulibaly (2017). Evaluation of the Congo Basin Ecosystems Conservation Support Programme (PACEBCo). IDEV, African Development Bank

Gakusi Albert-Eneas, Laura Delponte and Mohamed Coulibaly (2017). Evaluation of Ketta-Djoum Road project. IDEV, African Development Bank.

Gakusi Albert-Eneas, Laura Delponte and Mohamed Coulibaly (2017). Evaluation of the Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Program (PRODEBALT). IDEV, African Development Bank.

Gakusi Albert-Eneas and Mohamed Coulibaly (2017). Evaluation de la stratégie et des opérations d’intégration régionale de la Banque Africaine de Développement, 2011-2016, Analyse du portefeuille.

Gakusi Albert-Eneas et Mohamed Coulibaly (2016a). Evaluation de la stratégie et des opérations d’intégration régionale de la Banque Africaine de Développement, 2011-2016, Rapport de démarrage.

Gakusi Albert-Eneas et Mohamed Coulibaly (2016), Evaluation de la stratégie et des opérations d’intégration régionale de la Banque Africaine de Développement 2011-2015. Observations de la mission exploratoire menée à Bangui, Libreville, et Yaoundé du 12 novembre au 4 décembre 2016.

Hirschman Albert O. (1967). Development projects observed, Washington DC., November.

IDEV (forthcoming). Evaluation of the Congo Basin Forest Fund.

IDEV (2016). IDEV 2016-2018 Work Program, 2017 Update, December.


IDEV (2016). Integrating Eastern Africa: A Long Road Ahead… Independent Evaluation of Bank’s Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper – Evaluation report. African Development Bank, October.

IDEV (2014). Transport in Africa: The African Development Bank’s Intervention and Results for the Last Decade.

Linda G. Morra Imas and Ray C. Rist (2009). The road to results - Designing and Conducting Effective Development Evaluations. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank.

Mattheis Frank (2017). Review of the Regional Integration Strategy (RISP) document. IDEV, African Development Bank.

Mattheis Frank and Erikson John (2016). Challenges and opportunities for regional integration in Central Africa. IDEV, African Development Bank.

OCDE (2010). Summary of key norms and standards - second edition.

OPEV (2012). Fostering Regional Integration in Africa: An Evaluation of the Bank’s Multinational Operations, 2000-2010.

ORCE (2016). Afrique centrale – Extension au 31 décembre 2017 de la stratégie d’intégration régionale 2011-2015 et revue de performance de portefeuille régional, Banque Africaine de Développement.

PNUD (2016). L’Afrique centrale, une sous-région laissée pour compte ? Premier rapport d’évaluation stratégique sous-régionale. Version n°4, janvier.

Soreps, (2017). Evaluation de l’impact socio-économique du Projet d’aménagement de la route Djoum-Mintom-frontière Congo : Rapport Final.

Söderbaum Fredrik and Therese Brolin (2016). Supporting Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa – What Works and Why? Stockholm: Elanders Sverige AB.

Söderbaum Fredrik and Ian Taylor (2008). Afro-regions. The Dynamic of Cross-Border micro-regionalism in Africa. Printed in Sweden by Elanders Sverige AB, Stockholm

TMSA, 2011. Case Study Chirundu One Stop Border Post.

Verdier Thierry (2010). Regional Integration, Fragility and Institution Building: An Analytical Framework Applied to the African Context. EUI Working Papers.

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1. Light up and power Africa, Feed Africa, Industrialize Africa, Integrate Africa, and Improve the quality of life for Africans

2. Rwanda left the Economic Community of Central African States in 2007 and joined again on August 17, 2016.

3. So far, the Bank’s databases do not identify single country operations that contribute to regional integration, and thus this evaluation does not include these operations.

4. This is the opinion of 73.1 percent of the resident population.

5. Four logging companies operate in the Sangha department: Congolaise Industrielle des Bois (CIB), Industrie Forestière de Ouesso, Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo (SIFCO) and Société d’Exploitation Forestière Yuan Dong (SEFYD). SIFCO and SEFYD operate in the project target area and only SEFYD disclosed its production data.

6. The African Capacity Building Foundation (2016), A Survey of the capacity needs of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities.

7. OECD (2009), Binding Constraints to Trade Expansion. Aid for Trade Objectives and Diagnostics Tools.

8. Light up and power Africa, Feed Africa, Industrialize Africa, Integrate Africa, and Improve the quality of life for Africans

9. Where data are available, the numbers are lower than foreseen. For example, of 1520 villagers trained in 28 villages next to the Dzanga Shanga protected area in Central African Republic, 398 were women.

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About this Evaluation

This report presents the results of the evaluation of the regional integration strategy and operations of the African Development Bank in Central Africa. In its effort to foster regional integration in Africa, the Bank approved, in 2011, a regional integration strategy for Central Africa. This evaluation covers both the strategy and the multinational operations implemented during 2008-2016 in order to compare implementation performance during the period before and after the approval of the strategy.

The evaluation finds that the strategy was relevant because it responded to compelling needs in addressing infrastructure and institutional capacity building of regional economic communities. However, it finds no visible influence of the strategy on the design, the portfolio, the implementation and the effectiveness of multinational operations in Central Africa compared to the period when the strategy did not exist. The effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the operations were found unsatisfactory. The performance of the Bank as well as that of the regional economic communities and their member countries were also found to be unsatisfactory. The evaluation recommends to adopt a more realistic approach buttressed by a clear theory of change and which is adapted to the recognized important challenges of the region.

An IDEV Regional Integration Strategy Evaluation

African Development Bank GroupAvenue Joseph Anoma, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d’IvoirePhone: +225 20 26 20 41E-mail: [email protected]

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