FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 1ISSN 2049-2650

a monthly forum for news and discussion on

refugee legal aid Editorial Team: Nora Danielson, Themba Lewis,

Yara Romariz Maasri, Sara Gonzalez Devant, Darshini Yoganathan

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FAHAMUR e f u g e e L e g a l A i d

N e w s l e t t e rI S S U E 2 1 ❖ D e c 2 0 1 1

TheBangkokPrinciplesontheStatusandTreatmentofRefugeesMerrillSmith,AdvisortotheFahamuRefugeeTrust,contributedthisar;clehighligh;ngtheusefulnessoftheBangkokPrinciples.

TheBangkokPrinciples.Never heardofthem?Don’t feel too bad.Manyseasoned refugeeadvocateshaven’t either but theyshouldsoon,sonowmightbeagoodNmetoreadup!

The1966BangkokPrinciplesontheStatusandTreatmentofRefugees,or‘BangkokPrinciples’,areaproductoftheAsian‐AfricanLegalConsultaNveOrganizaNon(AALCO), aninternaNonalgovernmentalbodybased inNewDelhi.ItwasoriginallyknownastheAsianLegal ConsultaNveCommiYeeandformed shortlyaZer the1955BandungConferenceinIndonesia,oneof theformaNvemeeNngs of the Non‐AlignedMovement of less developed States that sought to steer aneutral path during the Cold WarbetweentheUnited Statesand theSoviet Union.AALCOcurrentlyhas47Member States inAfrica,AsiaandtheMiddleEast,including—notablyfor our purposes— the following23 thatarenot partytothe1951 ConvenNon relaNngto theStatus ofRefugees:Bahrain,Bangladesh,Brunei,India, Indonesia,Jordan,Kuwait, Lebanon,Libya,Malaysia, Mongolia,Myanmar,Nepal,NorthKorea,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,SaudiArabia,Singapore, SriLanka,Syria,ThailandandtheUnitedArabEmirates,i.e.,abouthalftheStatesthathavenotraNfiedtheConvenNonoritsProtocol.

Many of these States refrained from raNfying theConvenNon out of percepNons that it is a Cold WarinstrumentprivilegingpoliNcalrefugeesoverothersinneedof protecNon, giving UN agencies excessive license tointerfere in their affairs, shiZing burdens to developingcountries, and apparently not consistently bindingdeveloped countries in any event (Abrar 2001). TheComprehensive Plan of AcNon for refugees in SoutheastAsia,on the other hand,foundered on the United States’poliNcallymoNvatedrefusaltocountenancetherepatriaNonofeveneconomicmigrants(BeYs2006).

AALCOonly adopted thefinal text of the Principles at its40th Session inNewDelhi,24June2001.But thePrincipleswere making waves even as early as 1981 when Pakistancited their expanded refugee definiNon (see below) inaccording Afghan refugees prima facie, group protecNon(Oberoi 1999) — did you know that? Me neither. ThePrinciplesproclaimthemselves tobe‘declaratoryand non‐bindingincharacterandaim inter aliaat inspiringMemberStates for enacNng naNonal legislaNon for the Status andTreatment of Refugees and as a guide to deal with therefugee problems’. Nevertheless, a look at all the notes,commentsandreservaNonsthatformanintegralpartofthedocument reveals States negoNaNng something theyseemedtotakemoreseriouslythanameredeclaraNon.Wecan’t call it law unNl some legislaNve, judicial and/orexecuNveauthorityintheregionsaysit isbut,asapoliNcalmaYer it would seem difficult for any Member State todistance themselves from the Principles if they failed toobject or to declare a reservaNon when they hadopportunityto doso (demonstratedbythosewhoactuallydidso).

Alsointhisissue:

AfricanrefugeeandmigrantrightsresoluNon 2

AsiaPacificmodelrefugeerightspledge 4

MIGREUROPexploresreadmissioninstruments 5

ThesituaNonofrefugeesinIsrael 6

Requests 6

QuesNon&answer:theCessaNonClauseexamined 7

TheCessaNonClause:aprimer 8

ExtradiNonofallegedgenocidaire 10

WomenseekasylumfromSaintVincentandGrenadines 10

WikiLeaksdiplomaNccables:arefugeelegalaidtool? 10

InlimboinLatvia 11

Countryoforigin&legalnews 12

PublicaNons 16

Announcements 17

OpportuniNes 18

AsiaPacificregionaldetenNonworkshop 19

Links 19

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 2Okay,that’sinteresNng,butwhatdotheyactuallysay?Quitealotactually.Foronething,theBangkokPrinciplesincludeabroadrefugeedefiniNonexpresslyincludingpersonsfleeingpersecuNonforreasonsofcolour,ethnicorigin,andgenderinaddiNontothefivetradiNonalgroundsofthe1951ConvenNon.Theyalsoincludepersonsfleeing‘externalaggression,occupaNon,foreigndominaNonoreventsseriouslydisturbingpublicorderineitherpartorthewholeof[their]countryoforigin’andtheirlawfuldependents.TheGovernmentsofSingaporeandIndiadeclaredreservaNonstothisdefiniNon.TheotherMemberStates,wemaythereforepresume,agreedtoit.ThePrinciplesmakegranNngasylumasovereignchoicebutalsoprohibitrefoulement.

ThePrinciples’minimumstandardsoftreatmentarenogreatshakes anddo notoffer anythinglikethe1951 ConvenNon’s‘anN‐warehousing’rightstofreedomofmovement,choiceofresidenceandvariouswaystoparNcipateintheeconomyandearn livelihoods.Nevertheless,ArNcle IVat least providesfor‘treatmentnolessfavourablethanthatgenerallyaccordedtoaliens in similar circumstances, with due regard to basichuman rights as recognised in generally acceptedinternaNonalinstruments’andaddshelpfullythat‘[a]refugeeshall notbedenied anyrightsonthegroundthat there isnoreciprocityinregard to thegrant of suchrightsbetween thereceivingStateandtheStateorCountryofnaNonality’.The Principles also include a number of rights to which the1951 ConvenNon does not even come close. ArNcle VI, forexample, provides a right of return. ArNcle IX actuallyestablishesarightofcompensaNon fromthesourceStateforbodily injury, deprivaNon of personal liberty, death of therefugee or of the person on whom the refugee wasdependent, and destrucNon of or damage to property andassets,causedbytheauthorityoftheStateorcountry,publicofficials, or mob violence! The Governments of Bahrain,Jordan,Kuwait,Pakistan,Sudan,Tanzania,TurkeyandUnitedArabEmiratestookadimviewofthisinnovaNveproposalandall declared reservaNons 'in view of the financial andeconomicimplicaNons’.

ArNcleXrecognisesanexplicitprinciple ofinternaNonalsolidarityandburdensharing…applyingtoallaspectsof therefugee situaNon,includingthe developmentand strengthening of the standards of treatment of refugees,support to States in protecNng and assisNng refugees, theprovision of durable soluNons and the support of internaNonalbodieswith responsibiliNes for the protecNon and assistance ofrefugees ... through effecNve concrete measures where majorshare be borne by developed countries in support of Statesrequiringassistance,whetherthroughfinancialormaterialaid(or)throughreseYlementopportuniNes.

So what should we make of the Bangkok Principles? At aminimum, its nonaligned pedigree takes away thedisingenuously naNonalisNc arguments you someNmes hearaboutrefugeeprotecNonintheglobalsouthnecessarilybeingsome kind of hegemonic imposiNon of the metropole,although frankly I have heard such things more oZen frommiddle class white academics than from actual third worldpoliNcalleaders.AndarNculaNngaprincipleofburdensharingaimedat‘developmentandstrengtheningofthestandardsof

treatment’ is a major advance. Can we get the developedcountries to step up to the plate? The US CommiYee forRefugees and Immigrants (USCRI) presented some ideasonhow thismight workin ‘Movingforward:IdenNfyingspecificmeasures to end refugee warehousing’ at UNHCR’s 2004ConsultaNons with NGOs but experience has not beenencouraging. Rich countries seem more interested insubsidisingtheirdomesNcconsNtuenciesinthehumanitarianaid industry than supporNng local service providers in thecommuniNes that actually host the bulk of the world’srefugees. That this may lead to long‐term refugeewarehousing rather than the freedom, dignity and humanautonomy the 1951 ConvenNon offers seems merelyincidental.

And it is not as if host countrycivil society in Asiahas notasked.Over1,000Thai organisaNons,leadersand individualssubmiYed an October 2009 open leYer to internaNonaldonors callingon them ‘to commit funding for more rights‐friendly,community‐basedalternaNves [for refugees] insteadof forced encampment’. They conNnued, ‘Thai communitygroupsarewillingto 'adopt' andhost refugee families‐muchas similar groups reseYle refugees in other countries. Withthe right policies, they can help refugees integrate andbecomeproducNve and self‐sufficient’. USCRI’s internaNonal‘Statement calling for soluNons to end the warehousing ofrefugees’ also gathered hundreds of endorsements frombusinesses, labor organisaNons, faith groups and notableindividuals throughout Asia and the Middle East, includingC.R. Abrar, Kabir Chowdhury, Mohammad Azam Chaudhry,theDalaiLama,OroubEl‐Abed, KamalElMesbahi,ThichNhatHanh, Ijaz Hussain, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Phra ANkarn IntaIntaveero, Medhi Lahlou, Kamol Kamoltrakul, Phra KivsakKivsophano, Surapong Kongchantuk, Dr Cynthia Maung,Clovis Maksoud, Mae She Sushil Pyakurel, Tek Nath Rizal,LoreYa Ann Rosales, Wilaiwan SaeNa, Ranabir Samaddar,Nasim Hasan Shah, Suvimon Suebsarakam, Phra KruTaworasarnkitjanurak, Phra Thammakivmethee, PornpimonTrichotandJonUngphakorn.

The developed world was expressly not a part of thedevelopmentof theBangkokPrinciples— then‐USSecretaryof State John Foster Dulles boycoYed the 1955 BandungConference, but Harlem Congressman AdamClayton Powellshowed up to wide acclaim. Could there be the seed of aGrandBargainhere?ThePrinciplescouldbenefitfromexplicitinclusion of freedom of movement and the right to work.Could those be bargaining chips leZ off the table for now?MaybeifthedonornaNonswouldanteupwecanfindout.●

BibliographyAsian‐AfricanLegalConsultaNveOrganizaNon,BangkokPrinciplesontheStatusandTreatmentofRefugees,31December1966.Chowdhury R. Abrar, ‘Legal protecNon of refugees in SouthAsia’,ForcedMigra;onReview,No.10,April2001,pp.21–23.Alexander BeYs, 'Comprehensive plans of acNon: Insights fromCIREFCA andthe Indochinese CPA,' UNHCR,New Issuesin RefugeeResearch,WorkingPaperNo.120,January2006.PiaOberoi, ‘RegionalIniNaNves onRefugeeProtecNoninSouthAsia’,Interna;onalJournalofRefugeeLaw,11(1),1999,pp.193–201.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 3

We, thecivilsocietyorganizaNons(CSOs)meeNnginBanjulon17October2011;No=ngkeenly thedizzyingincrease ofviolaNonsofmigrants’rights, in parNcular in African countries including: racialdiscriminaNon,xenophobia, gender baseddiscriminaNon andviolence, raids and physical aYacks, inhuman and degradingtreatment,torture,killings,sexualassault,trafficking,arbitraryarrest,inhumancondiNons indetenNon,forced andcollecNvedeportaNons,refoulement,violaNonofdueprocessrightsandtherighttofairtrial;Concerned by these flagrant violaNons of the rightsprotecNons in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights, including the principle of non‐discriminaNon (art.2),right to respect for life and the physical and emoNonalintegrity of the person (art. 4); prohibiNon of torture andinhumantreatment(art.5);prohibiNonofarbitraryarrestanddetenNon (art.6),righttofairtrialandappeal(art.7);righttofreedomofcirculaNon (art.12.1); right to asylum(art. 12.3);principleoflegalityinanexpulsionprocedure(art.12.4),andprohibiNonofmassexpulsions(art.12.5);Conscious of the central role of the African Commission,including as framed in the African Charter on Human andPeoples’ Rights, which states that the African Commissionshould cooperate with other naNonal and internaNonalinsNtuNonsandcivil societyorganizaNonsconcernedwith theprotecNonandpromoNonofhumanandpeoples’rights;Observing that the NGO Forum is the ideal framework forjointacNonofcivilsocietyorganizaNonsinthedefenseof therightsofpersonsinAfrica;Convinced of the importance of freedom ofmovement suchas that arNculated in the Universal DeclaraNon of HumanRights of 1948, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’Rights,andarNcle13 of the InternaNonal ConvenNonon theProtecNonofAllRightsofMigrantWorkersandtheir Families,adoptedbyUNresoluNon45/158of18December1990;Aware that the mandate of the Special Rapporteur onRefugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Displaced personsneeds the constant support of partners in parNcular thosefromcivilsociety;Concernedby:• The lack of an adequate strategy that responds to theneedsofAfricancountriesinthefaceoftheglobalapproachtomigraNon;• The externalizaNon of the protecNon of borders byEuropeancountriesinAfrica;• The increasingly recurrent signature of readmissionaccordsand thecondiNoningofaid for development to thedemandsofEuropeanmigraNonpolicy.ArNcle13oftheACPaccordof Coutonouof23 June2000sNpulatesfor examplethat ‘the parNes take account, in the framework ofdevelopment strategies and the naNonal and regionalprogramming, the structural constraints linked to themigraNonphenomenoninviewofsupporNngtheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentof theregionsoforiginofmigrantsandthereducNonofpoverty…’;

• The absence of an African legal instrument, such as aconvenNon, for the protecNon of African migrants at thesame level as thosewhich protect refugees and displacedpersons;• The high incidence of xenophobic violence endangeringlivelihoodsand violaNng thehuman rightsof refugees andforcedmigrants’• The concurrent problems facing refugees and migrantswhen they aYempt to seek recourse with governmentauthoriNesandaccesspublichealthandeducaNonsystems;• The increas ing vu lnerab i l i ty o f women andunaccompanied minors who are vulnerable to traffickingandexploitaNon;•ThesilenceofAfricanstatesonLGBTrefugeesandasylumseekers;• The worsening of migraNon policies in North Africafollowing the events of Ceuta and Melilla and theirpersistencedespitetheeventsofthe'ArabSpring;’• The lack of cooperaNon between different insNtuNonalactorsatthenaNonal,regionalandconNnentallevel;• Thepersistent impunity inAfrican and other States aZertheviolaNonoftherightsofAfricanmigrants;

We, parNcipants of the African NGO Forum, have put intoplace a Sub‐group on the Rights of Migrants within theWorking Group on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants andDisplacedPersons.

We, parNcipantsoftheAfricanNGOForumrequesttheACHPRtoadoptaresoluNoninviNngAfricanStatestoadopt: •Aconven=onon therightsofmigrantsatthe samelevelofthosefordisplacedpersonsandrefugeesinAfrica;

•Anadequatestrategyat thecon=nental level to respondto theneedsof Africancountries in the faceof theglobalapproachtomigraNon;

• An integrated approach byAfrican Stateswhich refusesEuropean migraNon policy including readmission clausesthat have becomemore andmore recurrent in economiccooperaNonaccordssuchastheEU/ACPaccord;

• A comprehensive review process before accepNng oriniNaNngcessaNonclausesonrefugeestatus.

Finally,weinvite: •TheHonorableMadamCommissioner,SpecialRapporteuron Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and DisplacedPersons, to conduct visits in stateparNesto invesNgate thesituaNononthegroundoftherightsofmigrants;

• All State members of the African Union to raNfy anddomesNcate the regional and internaNonal legalinstruments including those relaNve to the rights of allmigrantsworkersandmembersoftheirfamilies;

• State parNes and the African Commission to undertakereforms aimed to facilitate judicial recourse to improveaccess by vicNms and civil society actors to jusNce at thenaNonalandregionallevel;

•TheraNficaNonoftheKampalaConvenNon.●

Resolu=onontherightsofrefugees,asylumseekers,migrantsanddisplacedpersonsJus;cewithoutBordersforMigrantsbroughttoouraGen;onthisrightsadvocacyresolu;on,adoptedbytheForumofAfrican

NGOsatthe50thsessionoftheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples’RightsinOctoberthisyear.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 4

The 60th anniversary commemoraNon of the 1951 RefugeeConvenNonpresentsanopportunitytofocusstates’aYenNonon various problems that refugees,migrants, stateless anddisplaced personsare faced with.Thesemayincludeamongothers, xenophobia and hate crimes, discriminaNon, non‐entree, detenNon, refoulement and absence of socialprotecNon.

FromaninstrumentdesignedtoprotectmostlythoseciviliansfleeingtheworseexcessesofWorldWar II,the1951RefugeeConvenNonhasdevelopedinto asetofprinciples,customaryrules,andvaluesthatarenowfirmlyembeddedinthehumanrightsframework,andareapplicabletoafarbroader rangeofrefugees. In addiNon, internaNonal refugee law has beenaffectedbyinternaNonalhumanitarian law and internaNonalcriminal law (and vice versa). Thus, there is a reinforcingdynamic in the development of thesecomplementaryareasoflaw.AtthesameNme,inrecentdecadesstateshaveshowna renewed interest in managing migraNon, thereby raisingissues of how to reconcile such interests with refugeeprotecNonprinciples. In addiNon,theemergenceofconceptsof parNcipaNon and responsibility to protect promise hasanimpactoninternaNonalrefugeelaw.

We have observed the growth in the use of immigraNondetenNon throughout the region, and its impact on thetreatment and protecNon of refugees, asylum seekers andvulnerable groups, such as children. Many individuals aredetained for prolonged periods, in condiNons belowinternaNonal standards, and denied the right to asylumprocedures and to review their detenNon. The detenNonenvironmenthasbeenfoundtonegaNvelyimpactonphysicalandmentalhealthandincreasethelikelihoodofill‐treatment,human rightsabusesandrefoulement. To addressthis,manystateshavebegunexploringand implemenNngalternaNvestoimmigraNondetenNon,whichhavebeenfoundtobecheaperthan detenNon and effecNve in ensuring compliance in thecommunity.

We have experienced that legal and social assistance isessenNal inorder to help asylum seekerswin recogniNonasrefugees and help them restore their lives with dignity.Categorically speaking, the post 9/11 world has witnessedincreasingrestricNonsonasylum,narrowinganN‐immigraNonpoliciesandgrowingsenNmentsofxenophobiaandsuspicion,not to menNon the government measures enacted andimplementedtodayinthenameofenhancedsecuriNsaNonofmigraNon.

The governments of the Asia‐Pacific region are obliged torespectand safeguard the rightsofrefugeesbythevirtueofcommon humanity, internaNonal human rights obligaNonsandthetreaNesgoverningrefugees.ProtecNonofrefugeesisnotmerelyacharitybut an obligaNon.Thus,wewould take

this opportunity to urge the states in the Asia Pacific toembracethe followingpledges in the field of refugee rightsregime:

PledgesbythegovernmentsoftheAsiaPacificregion1.WeshallconsideraccessiontotheRefugeeConvenNonandProtocol, if it has not alreadydone so, and incorporate anexpandedrefugeedefiniNonintothenaNonallaws, alongwiththeaccession to internaNonal human rights treaNesrelevantto refugee protecNon and also shall consider framing aregionalarrangementspecificallyfor refugees.Also,we shallconsider enactmentofnaNonallegislaNon in conformitywithinternaNonalstandardswithoutunduedelay.

2.WeshallperiodicallyreviewthevalidityofreservaNonsandrestricNve interpretaNons of the ConvenNon and shall takeintoaccount theConclusionsadoptedbyUNHCR’s ExecuNveCommiYee and guidelines on a range of refugee‐relatedissues‐indevisingnaNonalsystemsofrefugeeprotecNon.

3.We shall respect, among others, the right to be able toescape, to be accepted, to be provided shelter, not to bepenalizedforseekingrefugeandnottobeexposedtotheriskofreturnandrecognisethebasichumandignityincludingtheright to preservaNon of a family unity, freedom of thought,religionandeducaNon.

4.Weshall adhereto the principle ofnon‐discriminaNononthe basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientaNon,gender,disabilityor other similar statuses and vow to fighttheproblemofxenophobiawhichhastakentheformofbias‐moNvated violence‐‐a pernicious form of discriminaNon inwhichindividualsaretargeted.

5.Weshallsupport formeaningful parNcipaNonofwomen inthe design, implementaNon, monitoring and evaluaNon ofpolicies, programmes, and acNviNes being implemented ontheir behalf; strengthenaccess to legal proceedings incasesof rape or sexual abuse (of women, children or othersurvivorsof violence) andprosecute all forms of sexual andgender‐based violence. We shall ensure police, doctors,teachers,humanitarianandNGOworkers,membersofcampcommiYees and staff in refugee recepNon centres receivetrainingonappropriateresponsestosexualandgender‐basedviolence.

6. We shall embrace the principle of non‐refoulement onaccount of race, religion, naNonality, membership of aparNcular social group or poliNcal opinion and ensure toreflect the difference between those seeking asylum andotherswhomaywant toenter acountryforotherreasonsinnaNonal legislaNonand theright toenter and remain in thecountryofasylumwithoutarbitrarydetenNon.

ModelpledgetowardsupholdingrefugeerightsworldwideAspartofitscommemora;onofthe60thAnniversaryofthe1951RefugeeConven;on,theAsiaPacificRefugeeRightsNetwork

(APRRN)hasaskedgovernmentsintheAsiaPacificregiontomakethesepledgestowardstheupholdingofrefugeerights.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 5

7. We shall insNtute a fair RefugeeStatus DeterminaNon process toidenNfy thosewho deserve protecNonwith specific aspects of refugeeproblems and ensure to comply withthestates'obligaNonstoofferafairandefficientlegalprocedureformeaningfulremedies.

8. We shall ensure that, in line withinternaNonal standards, there is apresumpNon against the use ofimmigraNon detenNon,which must bea last resort, reviewable, for theshortestpossibleperiod,independentlymon i to red and w i th adequatecondiNons. We shall ensure thatalternaNves to immigraNon detenNonbe explored and pursued in the firstinstance,parNcularlyforchildren.

9 . We sha l l prov ide gu idance,informaNonand servicesto theasylumseekersaboutdifferentaspectsoftheirsocial situaNon and ensure to thefullest extent possible the right tosurvival,accessto servicesandasocialsafety net through different stages ofasylumprocedures.

10. We express our commitment toprovide UNHCR with informaNon onthenumber and condiNon of refugeeson the naNona l te r r i to ry, theraNficaNon status and implementaNonof the Refugee ConvenNon, and thelaws, regulaNons and decrees in forcerelatedto refugeesand allowUNHCR'saccessacrossthenaNon'sterritory.●

MIGREUROP explores readmission instrumentsContributor Claudia Charles submiGedthis report exploring readmissionagreements,draWedbyMIGREUROP.

Readmission is a legal techniqueenabling the expulsion of foreignersthrough internaNonal agreementsinanefficient and expedient manner. Inprinciple, states can expel aliens whoentered the country illegally or whosestay became irregular according tonaNonal law. However, the said alienscannot be expelled anywhere. InparNcular, the state must ask the

country of origin for an entry pass,whichwillallowfor theexpulsion tobeprocessed. Yet this is where theprocedure oZen fails: most expulsiondecisionsarenotimplementedbecausethe sending state does not obtain aformal agreement from the receivingstate, being thereby forced to releasethe migrant. Readmission agreementswere des igned to so lve thosedeadlocks.

Readmissionagreementsor clausesaretreaNes by which both parNes'mutually' commit to readmit theirn aNona l s , a nd , unde r c e r ta i ncondiNons, foreigners as well asstateless persons coming from theircountry or having transited throught h e i r c o u n t r y a n d w h o a r eundocumented on the other party’sterritory.Undersuchcommitments, theexpulsion of foreigners to the countryo f o r i g in becomes systemaNc ,parNcularly since the condiNons forproving one’s naNonality have beenloosened, while the alloYed Nme foreachstepofthereadmissionprocessisveryshort.

When talking about generaNons ofreadmission instruments, one shouldbe careful of paradigm changes. Thefirst readmission agreements between'friendly' states presumed the respectof human rights and the right toasylum: they manage migraNon'between themselves' and agreementsonlyconcernnaNonalsofeachpartytobe readmiYed.Today,thelogic isquitedifferent:undesirablealiensaresentoffto countrieswherebothparNesdonotshare the same concepNon of humanrights.

Thirteen readmission agreementssignedbytheEuropeanUnionarenowin force plus a significant number ofbilateral readmission agreementss i gned by the Member S tatesthemselves with third countries, inaddiNon to other instruments such asreadmission clauses in partnership orassociaNon agreements, or evenframework agreements. The panel ofreadmission instruments is evenwiderwhen taking into account the new

generaNons of readmission‐relatedinstrumentsthrough joint declaraNons,i n t e n t s , mo re o r l e s s fo rma lagreements, pacts, police cooperaNonagreements including a readmissionclause such as Spain's Africa Plan orFrance's joint agreement onmigraNonand'co‐development'.

Atoolmorepoli;calthantechnicalThe evaluaNon report of the EuropeanC omm i s s i o n o n t h e U n i o n ' sreadmission agreements in February2011 showsthat those agreementsareseldom used (even though liYleinformaNonisavailableon themaYer),that third countries are increasinglyreluctant tosignorchooseto 'raisethebidding', and that few guarantees areprovided that fundamental rights arerespected during those procedures.This doesn’t seemto bea problem forthe EU as the issue is, indeed, deeplypoliNcal. The European Commissioneven recommends developing ac onvenNona l p o l i c y i n c l u d i n g'incenNves' (especially financial ones),asthoseagreementsarecostlyforthirdcountries,while askingMember Statesnot to block negoNaNons on purelytechnical maYers, calling for sancNonmechanisms against third countrieswh i ch do no t ab i de by t he i rcommitments.

Let other states endure theweight ofourmigra;onpolicies?A readmiss ion agreement i s amechanism compelling other states totake their naNonals back, and evenother ‘undesirables’ which we ‘do notwant, or no longer want, in Europe’.Thus, the weight of implemenNng ourmigraNonpolicy fallsontoother states:when a stay is rendered illegal, thereceiving state must readmit theindividual with a mandatory clauseregarding travel documents delivery,prooforresponseinaNmelymannertothereadmissionrequest.Therefore,theportrayal of receiving states beingmerelyresponsibleforborder controlissomewhat false. First, they are undernoobligaNontocontrolindividualswholeavethecountry.Besides,readmissionis not applicable only for migrantsenteringirregularlyarequesNngstate

continued on page 17

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 6

Thesitua=onofrefugeesinIsraelContributed by Maddalena Zaccaro,MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies,UniversityofLondon.SheisgratefultoAdv.TallyKritzman‐Amirforhercomments.

The smuggling of African refugees to Israel fromEgypt has been ongoing for the last decade, butthere has been a sharp increase since 2007. Forrefugees,Israelrepresentstheonly'safedemocracy'intheareaorapossibletransitzonetoEurope.Thispaper will first discuss the causes behind theincrease of the smuggling into Israel and then theIsraeliasylumsystemtowardsnon‐Jews,i.e.Africanrefugees who enter Israel through the Israeli‐EgypNanborder.

AccordingtothelatestUNHCRdata,inJanuary2011there were 31,055 individuals in a ‘refugee‐likesituaNon’ in Israel: 25,471 refugees and 5,575asylum seekers. But these figures need to beexplained:85%oftherefugeepopulaNon inIsraeliscomprised of Sudanese and Eritreans; these twonaNonaliNes are currentlyenNtled to a temporarygroupprotecNon but thisstatusdoesnot grant thesamerightsasrefugeestatus. Instead,these25,471individuals, described as refugees, have beengranted ‘temporary’ protecNon on prima faciegrounds;theonlyrights theyreceiveareprotecNonagainst refoulement and the educaNon of theirchildren – theyhaveno right towork.The5,575asylumseekersarefromChad, DemocraNcRepublicofCongo,Ethiopia,IvoryCoast,NigeriaandSomalia.

InSeptember2011, therewereanesNmated43,000refugees living in Israel. This data underlines theincreasing number of refugees crossing into Israelevery year: the Ministry of Interior reported thatapproximately 5,000 refugees entered in 2009;some14,000 in 2010;and11,000 refugeescrossedintoIsraelfromJanuarytoSeptember2011.

Indeed,sincethefoundingofIsraelin1948,,only170asylumseekershaveeverbeengrantedfull refugeestatus,andonlytwoofthesedecisionstookplacein2010(seehereforinformaNononthe2011granNngofrefugeestatustoaColombianciNzenandtoanalbinochildand herfamilyfromIvoryCoast).Onewouldexpect,giventhesefigures, that fewwoulddeliberatelychooseIsrael as their desNnaNon, yet the number of refugees arriving in Israel is steadily increasing. The deterrence policiesimplementedbytheIsraeli GovernmentareclearlyhavingliYleeffect. IsraeliauthoriNes jusNfytheirpoliciesbysayingthat allasylumseekerscrossingtheIsraeli‐EgypNanborderareeithereconomicmigrantsorshouldhaveaskedforasyluminEgypt.

CausesbehindthesmugglingintoIsraelOneofthereasonsthathaveledmanyrefugeestobesmuggledtoIsraelaZer2007istheirfrustraNonwiththeir condiNonsinEgypt.ThissituaNonculminatedwiththeendingofathree‐monthsit‐ininfrontofUNHCR'sofficesinCairoin2005,brokenupbytheEgypNanpoliceandresulNnginthedeathsofatleast28Sudaneserefugees.Asaconsequenceofthefailureofthissit‐in,smugglingto Israel dramaNcallyincreased.Another causeofpeople findingtheir wayto Israel, inaddiNon to themanywhocamedirectlythroughSudan totheSinai,wasthe closingoffof thepossibilityof reachingItalythrough Libya. ItalyandLibyaentered an agreement in 2008,the 'Friendship Pact', that providesfor USD5billion 'in compensaNon for abuses commiYedduringItaly's colonial ruleofLibya'.The Pact included anagreement that required Libyato intensifythefight to control themovementofpeopleleavingLibyabyboatacrosstheMediterraneanforLampedusa. Continued on page 13

R E Q U E S T S Urgentrequest:COIontheGambiaTheImmigrantRightsClinic(IRC)inNewYorkUniversitySchoolofLawispreparingapoliNcalasylumapplicaNonforaGambianclient.PleaseemailtheIRCifyoucanrecommendanexpertwhocanprovideCOIontheGambiaforthecase.

Request:thesitua=onofAfghansinIranIfanyonehasinformaNononthesituaNonofAfghansinIran,pleasesendanemail,especiallywithregardstothefollowingquesNons:1)whatistheiractuallegalstatuswhentheyregisterwithauthoriNes(whetherUNHCRorIraniangovernment)?2)cantheirchildrenaYendpublicschools?3)cantheyworklegally?

Request: your views on legal counsel during the reseKlementprocessTheIraqiRefugeeAssistanceProjectiscurrentlywriNngareportontherightof refugeesto have legal counselduringthe reseYlementprocess.Thereportwill includelegal andpolicyanalysis,aswellashighlight the opinions and experiences of refugee organisaNons,lawyers, scholars, and, of course, refugees themselves. They areinterestedinhearingyourviewsaboutwhathurdlesrefugeesfaceinthe reseYlement process and what role you see for counsel inaddressingtheseobstacles.Ifyou arewillingtohelp,theywill sendyouadozenquesNonsthatcouldbediscussedoverphoneoremail.Ideally,theyaskthat you allow them to usesomeofyour answersandcitethemintheir report (theycankeepcommentsanonymousifneeded). Theywould liketobeabletospeaktoasmanypeopleaspossible.Ifyouarewillingtospeakwiththem,pleasecontactCaitlinbyemail.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 7

Ques=on&answer:theCessa=onClauseexaminedContributorMerrill Smithrespondstoaques;onaboutgovernmentalandorganiza;onalcompliancewiththelegal frameworkoftheCessa;onClausethatwasemailedbyaRwandanrefugee.

Ques;onfromRwandanrefugee,en;tled‘Iamconfused’:TheExComConclusion No. 69,2nd paragraph,saysthat the applicaNon ofthecessaNonclausein the1951 ConvenNon  ‘restsexclusivelywiththeContrac;ngStates.’And the5thparagraph (a) says:'in takinganydecisiononapplicaNonofthe4C,Statesmust carefully assess the fundamental character of thechangesin thecountry ofna;onality or origin including the generalhumanrightssituaNon,aswellastheparNcularcauseoffearofpersecuNon,inordertomakesureinanobjecNveandverifiablewaythatthesituaNonwhichjusNfiedthegranNngofrefugeestatushasceasedtoexist.'

IntheUNHCRGuidelinesParagraph25(ii), itsays:'Countriesofasylumaretheonestobeartheburdentodemonstratetherehasbeenafundamental,stableanddurablechangeincountryoforiginand thattheinvoca;onofAr;cle1C(5)isappropriate.’YetthejointcommuniquéoftheUNHCRandtheRwandanPatrioNcFront(RPF)regimedated7October2011,lastparagraph,states:'UNHCRwillrecommendStatesthattheyinvokethe4Cby31December2011effec;veon30June2012.'

AddiNonally, in an e‐mail sent on 1 August 2011,Mr. Douglas Asiimwe, Senior ProtecNon Officer in the PrimeMinister’sDirectorateOfRefugeesandDisasterManagement,wrote:'cessa;onclauseandeventuallossofstatusisnotaUganda thing,it’sglobalandwewaittobeadvised.'

Giventheabove; 1.WhyistheUNHCRacNvelycallingfor andapplyingclause4Cwhenit isanexclusivejobofstates, whoseresponsibilityit istobeartheburden? 2.IftheapplicaNonoftheCessaNonClauserestsexclusivelywithContracNngStates, whyistheUNHCRrecommendingstatesinvokeclause4C? 3.As a ContracNngState,whyis UgandawaiNng to be advisedwhen it is the burden of the state to demonstrate thosefundamental,durableandstablechanges? 4.Have anyContracNngStatescarefullyassessed the situaNon in Rwanda,or is it theUNHCR that elaborated thepro‐RPFcondoningreports? 5.IfstatesaresupposedtodemonstratefundamentalchangesinRwanda,howwillthisbeexpressed? 6.Given that it is their responsibility,whyhas no onefromtheUgandanGovernment arNculated their assessment of thesituaNoninRwandatous?

Furthermore, in a leYer from Antonio Guterres of 23 December 2009 toMr.JamesMusoni,theRwandanMinister ofLocalGovernment,Guterressaid thathehasdesignated acoordinatorwithin theUNHCR tofacilitatetheprocessofinvokingclause4Candtoprovidetherequired leadershipandsupport.Who isthiscoordinator?Hasanyoneheardabouther/him?Abouther/hisaddress?

ThejointcommuniquéoftheRPFandtheUNHCRof7December2011saidthatthescopeandmodaliNesoftheimplementaNonofthecessaNondeclaraNonweretobecommunicatedinthefollowingweeks.Givenalmostonemonthhassinceelapsed[attheNmeofwriNng‐Ed.],hasanythingbeenheardofthem?

ResponsefromMerrillSmithYouarerighttobeconfused.NeithertheStatesnortheUNHCRappeartobefollowingtheConvenNon.

AccordingtoConclusion69,although'theapplicaNonofthecessaNonclause(s)inthe1951ConvenNonrestsexclusivelywiththeContracNngStates, ...theHighCommissionershouldbeappropriatelyinvolved,inkeepingwiththeroleoftheHighCommissionerinsupervisingtheapplicaNonoftheprovisions ofthe1951ConvenNonasprovidedfor inArNcle 35ofthatConvenNon. ... [A]nydeclaraNonby theHighCommissionerthatthe competenceaccordedtoherbythe Statute ofherOfficewithregardtocertainrefugeesshall cease toapply,maybe useful toStatesinconnecNonwiththe applicaNonofthecessaNonclausesaswellas the1951ConvenNon. ...[Statesshouldalsomake]useofappropriate informaNonavailableinthisrespect,interalia,fromrelevantspecializedbodies,includingparNcularlyUNHCR;'

AlthoughthisappearstogivetheUNHCR arole,itdoesnot relievestatesof theburdenof fulfillingthe legalcondiNonsof theConvenNon.ArNcle35 of theConvenNononlygivesthe UNHCR a supervisoryrolethat arguablylimits it to apassive role ofdeclaringwhether ornot stateshave fulfilledtheir obligaNons(whichtheUNHCR hardlyexercisesadequatelyanyway), notan

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 8

acNveroleofrecommendingthatstatestakesuchacNonsasinvokingcessaNon.ArNcle35appearstogivestatestheacNverole,e.g.,infacilitaNngitsexerciseofsupervisionandprovidingitwithinformaNon:Q&A: the Cessation Clause examined, continued from previous page

'ArNcle35.‐Co‐operaNonofthenaNonalauthoriNeswiththeUnitedNaNons1.TheContracNngStatesundertake toco‐operatewiththeOffice of theUnitedNaNonsHighCommissioner forRefugees, or anyotheragencyoftheUnitedNaNonswhichmaysucceedit, intheexercise ofitsfuncNons,andshallinparNcularfacilitate itsdutyofsupervisingtheapplicaNonoftheprovisionsofthisConvenNon.2. Inorder toenable theOffice ofthe HighCommissioneroranyother agencyofthe UnitedNaNonswhichmay succeed it, tomakereportstothe competentorgansoftheUnitedNaNons,the ContracNngStatesundertake toprovide them intheappropriate formwithinformaNonandstaNsNcaldatarequestedconcerning:

(a)ThecondiNonofrefugees,(b)TheimplementaNonofthisConvenNon,and(c)Laws,regulaNonsanddecreeswhichare,ormayhereaZerbe,inforcerelaNngtorefugees.'

Also,ArNcle6oftheUNHCR'sStatuteappearstolimit itsdeclaraNonsofincompetenceduetoceasedcircumstancestopre‐1951refugees(emphasisadded):

'6.ThecompetenceoftheHighCommissionershallextendto:

A. (i) Any person whohas been considereda refugee under the Arrangements of 12May 1926 and of30 June 1928or under theConvenNonsof 28October 1933and10February 1938, the Protocol of14September 1939or the ConsNtuNonof the InternaNonalRefugeeOrganizaNon.(ii)Anypersonwho,as aresultofeventsoccurringbefore1January1951andowingtowell‐foundedfearofbeingpersecutedforreasonsofrace,religion,naNonalityorpoliNcalopinion, isoutsidethecountryofhisnaNonalityandisunableor,owingtosuchfearorforreasonsotherthanpersonalconvenience,isunwillingtoavailhimselfoftheprotecNonofthatcountry;orwho,nothavinganaNonalityandbeingoutsidethecountryofhisformerhabitualresidence,is unable or, owingtosuchfearor forreasonsotherthanpersonalconvenience,isunwillingtoreturntoit....

ThecompetenceoftheHighCommissionershallceasetoapplytoanypersondefinedinsec;onAaboveif:...(e)Hecannolonger,becausethecircumstancesinconnexionwithwhichhehasbeenrecognizedas a refugee haveceasedtoexist,claimgrounds other than those ofpersonal convenience for conNnuing to refuse to avail himself of the protecNon of the country of hisnaNonality.Reasonsofapurelyeconomiccharactermaynotbeinvoked.'●

TheCessa=onClause:aprimerThis ar;cle examines mo;va;ons behind the implementa;on of the Cessa;on Clause and is contributed by M. AngelaBuenaventura,arecentvolunteerlegaladvocatewithAsylumAccessinQuito,Ecuador,wheresherepresentedrefugees’rightstorefugeestatus,employment, security,educa;onand socialservices.ShepreviouslyworkedwiththeNa;onalImmigrant Jus;ceCenterandtheMidwestImmigrantandHumanRightsCenter’sAn;‐TraffickingProject.

Whatmo;vatesUNHCRtoimplementtheCessa;onClause?Under internaNonal law,refugeestatuslastsonlyaslongasthereasonsfor fleeingpersecuNon inthe refugee’shomecountrypersist.ArNcle 1(C) (5) of the 1951 Refugee ConvenNon – the ceased circumstances cessaNon clause ('cessaNon clause') –providesthatoncethecircumstancescausingarefugeetofleehisorhercountryoforiginhaveended, arefugeemaybeforciblyrepatriated.

Becausecertain host countries in theglobal south oZen lacktheresources and experNse to repatriaterefugees,theUNHCRdesignsproceduresforimplemenNngrepatriaNoninsuchcountriesandprovidesadviceonwhenimprovementsincountriesoforigin jusNfyimplementaNonofthecessaNonclause.[1]TheUNHCRhasbeenheavilyinvolved incessaNonpracNces inAfrica,theconNnenthosNngthelargestpopulaNonofrefugeesintheworld.[2]

TheOctober issueoftheFahamuRefugeeLegalAidNewsleYercalled aYenNonto thefact thaton31December,theUNHighCommissioner forRefugees,alongwithseveralstateshosNngRwandanrefugees,willconsiderinvokingthecessaNonclause.TheFahamu Refugee Programme (FRP) is concerned that Rwanda remains a fragile state with an authoritarian regime andrepatriated individualsmaybeexposedtofurtherpersecuNon.However,astheFRPhasnoted,theUNHCR reportedlybelievesthatRwandaisnowapeacefulanddemocraNccountry,andthusapplicaNonofthecessaNonclauseisappropriate.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 9

This arNcle aims to idenNfy why the UNHCR has encouraged implementaNon of the cessaNon clause in Rwandaand othercountriesin recent years.Recent scholarshiprevealsthe followingpotenNal reasonsforUNHCR’s interest inimplemenNngthecessaNonclause:

BudgetconstraintsThecostsofimplemenNngprogramstointegraterefugeesintohostcommuniNesandprovidesocialservicestorefugeesinhostcountrieslikelyoutweighthecostsofimplemenNngforciblerepatriaNonprocedures.Accordingly, monetaryrestricNonsmaybeamainsourceof theUNHCR’srecent interest in implemenNngthecessaNonclause.Indeed,B.S.Chimninotedthat,'aUNHCRdeclaraNon toenditsmandatemaybe theresultofbudget constraints,theneedto cut long‐termcasemaintenancecostsorpressurefromstateparNes.'[3]

PressurefromhoststatesBoth northern states and southern states havebecome increasingly interested in repatriaNonof refugees livingwithin theirrespecNveborders. Intheearly1990s,theglobalnorthwasconfrontedwiththelargest influxofrefugeessinceWorldWar II,[4]andsomenorthernstateswereconcernedthatthiswaveofrefugeeswouldbecomeasignificantandpermanentdrainonpublicfunding.[5] In addiNon, therewasno economic reason to welcomerefugees because therewasnoshortageof labour.[6] Toalleviatesuchconcerns,statesinthenorthbegantoconsiderrepatriaNngrefugees.

Statesin theglobal southhave their own reasonsfor seekinginvoluntaryrepatriaNonof refugees.Countries thatrankamongthepoorest in theworld‐ includingTanzania,Guinea,Uganda,Sudan,Nepal, Bangladesh,andPakistan‐host thousandsuponthousands of refugees.[7] These countries lacktheresources to adequately address theneeds of their own ciNzens, to saynothingoftheir inability tocareforrefugees.InaddiNon,theglobalsouthhasbecomeincreasinglyfrustratedwiththenorth’sunwillingnesstosharetheburdenofprovidingahavenforrefugees.[8]AsB.SChimninotes,'ItisunrealisNctoexpectacountryin suchadesperate state tobegeneroustorefugees,inparNcular if richstateshavebehavednodifferentlyin therecent pastandrefusedtosharetheburdenofthepoorhoststate.'[9]PracNcallyspeaking,repatriaNonmaybethemostdurablesoluNoninthesouthbecauserefugeesarrivethereinnumberstoolargeforintegraNontobepossible.[10]

PressurefromhomecountriesTheUNHCRmayalsoreceivepressurefromrefugees’ homecountries.Forexample,theUNHCRreportsthattheGovernmentofRwanda has repeatedly requested that the cessaNon clause be invoked so that it can uNlize the skills that refugees haveobtainedinhostcountries.[11]LessopNmisNcally,governmentsofcertain countries,suchasRwanda,mayalsoseekthereturnofrefugeestocontroldissidentsandpreventopposiNongroupsfromformingoutsidetheirborders.

OtherpossiblefactorsA paper commissioned by the UNHCR set forth addiNonal reasons for implementaNon of the cessaNon clause, including:'democraNsaNon in someformerlyrepressive states; concern to prevent asylum from becoming abackdoor to immigraNon;experimentswithtemporaryprotecNon;[and]stressuponrepatriaNonastheopNmaldurablesoluNon.'[12]

Inlight of budget constraints andpressure fromhostcountriesand donors,theUNHCRwill likelyconNnueto implement thecessaNonclause.However,ifthecessaNonclauseisinvoked,proceduralsafeguardsshouldbeimplementedtoensurethatthereisanobjecNveandreliableassessmentofcountryoforigincondiNonsandtherisksoffurtherpersecuNon.AuthoriNesinchargeofimplemenNngcessaNonproceduresshouldmakecertainthatpersonswhopresentcompellingreasonsto remaininthehostcountry(e.g.familyNes)areabletopresenttheircasetoadecision‐makingbody.●

[1]YasmeenSiddiqui,ReviewingtheApplica;onofthe1951Conven;onRela;ngtotheStatusofRefugeesinAfrica,at6,15,26.[2]Ibid.[3]B.S.Chimni,FromSeGlementtoInvoluntaryRepatria;on:TowardsaCri;calHistoryofDurableSolu;onstoRefugeeProblems,at55.[4]Siddiquiat8‐9.[5]Ibid.[6]Chimniat58,73.[7]Ibid.[8]Ibid.[9]Ibid.[10]Siddiquiat38.[11]'TheCessaNonClauseforRwandanRefugees'[12]Fitzpatrick, JoanandJeffrey andSusanBrotman,Current Issues inCessa;onofProtec;onUnderAr;cle 1Cofthe 1951Conven;onandAr;cleI.4ofthe1969OAUConven;on,at1.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 10

ECtHRallowsextradi=ontoRwandaofallegedHutugenocidairewithrefugeestatusinDenmark;UNHCRdoesnotinterveneMar;n Jones, lecturer in Interna;onalHuman RightsLawat theUniversity ofYork, United Kingdom, sent thefollowing comments regarding theextradi;on from Sweden of an allegedHutugenocidairetoRwanda,inthecaseofAhorugezev.Sweden(Applica;onno.37075/09). The judgment by theEuropean Court of Human Rights(ECtHR)wasdated27October2011.

The European Court of Human Rightshasjusthandeddownadecisionfindingthat Sweden should be allowed toextraditeanallegedHutugenocidairetoRwanda, as the Rwandan criminaljusNce system would not violate hisright to fair trial (Art 6) or theprohibiNon on inhuman or degradingtreatment or punishment (Art 3).InteresNngly,thestandardofviolaNon itapplied totheformerwasnotwhetheror not there would be a fair trial butrather the more stringent test ofwhether there would be a 'flagrantdenial of jusNce' (a test daNng back tothe famous Soering case). The courta l s o m a d e r e f e r e n c e t o t h eInternaNonal Criminal Tribunal forRwanda's likeminded decision in themaYer of Uwinkindi (currently underappeal).TheindividualinquesNonhadbeengrantedrefugeestatusbyDenmark.Oddly,itwouldseemthattheDanishrefugeedecisionwasnotadducedintoevidenceathisextradiNonhearinginSwedenandthat,inanycase,itwasconsideredtobedatedandbaseduponincompleteinformaNon(itwouldappearthattheeasiermannerofdealingwiththe'refugeestatus'issuewouldhavebeentoinvokeArNcle1Fb).ThecourtsinSwedendecidednottoautomaNcallyadopttheDanishdeterminaNonandinsteaddeterminedhimnottobeatsufficientrisktobearefugee.

UNHCR did not intervene (though theDutch government did intervene,arguing in favour of extradiNon). The

decisioncitesthecontradictorycaselawof various European naNonal courts(with UK courts generally declining toextraditeongroundsofunfairtrial).Itisan interesNngquesNontoaskwhether,notwithstanding the difficult test of'flagrant denial of jusNce' in Art. 6claims, cessaNonshouldbebasedupona jusNce systemwhich has been foundimplicitly to contain 'irregulariNes orlack of safeguards in the tr ia lprocedures such as might result in abreach of ArNcle 6 if occurring withinthe ContracNng State itself.' In otherwords, in such maYers, includingcessaNon,shouldtherebeonestandardforEuropeandone(lower)standard foreverywhereelse?●

‘IsthisCaribbeanidylltheworstplaceintheworldtobeawoman?’Contributed by Jackie Cartwright, MAstudent at Oxford Brookes Universityand intern at Fahamu RefugeeProgramme.

This istheheadline toavideoarNcle intheTorontoStaron12November2011.Intheshort clip, Keturah Cupid,one ofmanywomenseekingasyluminCanada,speaks of violence and fear. Herhomeland, Saint Vincent and theGrenadines,aseriesof islands,isamixof high end tourism on one hand andproblems of high unemployment andhigh rates of domesNc abuse andsexuality‐basedviolenceagainstwomenon theother.Keturahwas unsuccessfulinherapplicaNontostayinCanadaand,back in Saint Vincent, sNll longs toreturn to its safety. The arNcle alsohighlightsFaith’sstory:subject toabusefor beinggay, she is now a refugee inCanada and keen to help others likeherself.

Canada recognizes gender‐basedpersecuNon as grounds for an asylumclaim (according to its Guidelines onWomen Refugee Claimants FearingGender‐Related Persecu;on). Howeverthe arNcle highlights debate about thelegiNmacy of the high rate of claimsfromSaintVincentand theGrenadines.Federal judges quoted in the arNcleargue that some decision makers have

'ignored evidence of the unavailabilityofstateprotecNon' inSaintVincent andmade 'unreasonable' decisions inrejecNngdomesNcviolenceclaims.

CommenNng on the situaNon andtreatment of LGBTI people in thecountry, UNHCR noted that ‘sourcesreport that homosexuals in SaintVincent and the Grenadines facediscriminaNon…[but] there are no lawsprohibiNng discriminaNon based onsexualorientaNon.’

CANYOUHELP?SRLAN (www.srlan.org) has no countryof origin specialist or informa;on onnon‐governmental organisa;ons thatworkinStVincent andtheGrenadines.An LGBTI claimant has contacted thewebsitedirectly. Ifyoucanhelp,pleaseemailBarbaraHarrell‐Bond..●

WikiLeaksdiploma=ccables:atoolforrefugeelegalaidworkers?The editors received a leYer fromMarina Nemat, a Canadian‐Iranianauthor of internaNonal best sellersPrisoner of Tehran and AWer Tehran,who fled Iran aZer having beenimprisonedfortwoyearsandsentencedtodeath.Shewrites:

I was at a meeNng a while ago and ajournalist from Iraq was there. I didn'tmenNonthatIknewJulianAssange,butthejournalist talked aboutWikiLeaks and saidthat Julianhadsavedthe livesof a coupleof his friends. He explained that thesepeople were seeking asylum from the USand had been denied unNl their namesshowed up in some cables released byWikiLeaks, men;oning that they hadhelped the Americans. They used this asproofthat theirliveswereindangerinIraqandwere finallygrantedasylum in theUS[emphasisadded]. I thought you find thisstory interesNng. Unlike what mainstreammedia hasbeentellingus,Wikileaksmightnotbeendangeringlivesbutsavingthem.

Ifyouhaveanyexperienceoftheleakedcables impacNng your work, pleasecontact the editors or submit a shortarNcletothenewsleYer.Thisonlinetoolallowsyou to search namesand wordsin all the251,000WikiLeaksDiplomaNcCables,whichcoverallcountries.●

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 11

InlimboinLatviaContributedbyJackieCartwright,MAstudentatOxfordBrookesUniversityandinternatFahamuRefugeeProgramme.

‘IhavenofriendshereandIdon`tunderstandthelanguage.Iamherewithoutfreedomtomoveinthecountry.’‐email,,May2011

AnarNcleinRefugeesInterna;onalcommentsthatLatvia‘hasbeenhistoricallyresistant toinboundmigraNon’andisacountry‘whereasylumseekers…faceseriousprotecNon challenges’(Latvia’sotherhumanrightsproblembyMaureenLynch,14April2011).It conNnueswithconcern thatthereisahighriskofrefoulement,that asylumseekersfacedifficulNesofdetenNonandaccesstolegalandotherservicessuchasinterpretaNonandthat‘[m]anyNmeslegalprofessionalsgainaccesstoo lateto reacteffecNvely.’ Ahuman rightsworkerwhois interviewed acknowledgesthat ‘[a]sacountrywe’refairlynewto this.OurasylumlawmeetsminimumstandardsoftheEU.Theproblemishowitisimplemented.’

UNHCR hasnoofficeinLatvia;LatviaandotherBalNc statesare in asubregionoverseen fromStockholm.In its2011RegionalOperaNonsProfile‐Northern,WesternandSouthernEurope,UNHCRstates:‘MigraNonandasylum,alongwithsecurity consideraNons, arekey issuesinthesubregion.PoliNcal changescanbringpolicyshiZs,whichhaveadirectimpactoninternaNonalprotecNon,includingaccesstoterritory…Bordercontrolmeasures,penalNesforillegalentryandtheincreaseduseofdetenNonaffectasylum‐seekers. Ensuring theconsistentapplicaNonofevolvingEUlegalnormsremainsachallenge.TheeconomicsituaNonmayalsohaveanegaNveimpactontheavtudes ofhostcommuniNestowardasylum‐seekersandrefugees.RacismandxenophobiaaffectpersonsofconcerntoUNHCR.’

TheseconcernsarereflectedinLynch’sarNcle,whichnotesthat:‘Currently,only the LatvianCenterforHumanRightsprovideslegaladvice for refugeesina systemaNcmanner.Due inpart tothe tougheconomicsituaNon,governmenteffortstointegratepersonswhoseclaimshavebeenadjudicatedhavebeenpoor.’

Anasylum‐seekingmanfromSierraLeone, 32, tellsofhisexperienceinLatvia,nowintoitsfiZhyear.HehadlivedinGuineaforalongNmebutfledwhenhisfatherdiedduringconflict.HearrivedinLatviabyshipinSeptember2007andwasdetained.Withtheassistanceofthe LatvianCentre forHumanRights(LCHR) hesubmiYed an applicaNonfor asylum:hewasinterviewed inNovemberbutrefusedasyluminDecember2007.ThepaperworkwasnotinEnglish, norwasanEnglishtranscriptprovided,sohewasunabletoverifythedocumentaNonsubmiYedtothecourt.

Hewasgrantedlegalaidtoappeal.However,thiswasalsounsuccessful.TheappealdecisionwasnoNfiedtohiminApril2008atthedetenNoncentrebyborderguards;therewasnoopportunitytoappearincourt. HewasdirectedtosignpapersinLatvian,thepurposeofwhichwasnot explained,and hewasfingerprinted.HereceiveddeportaNonorders.Hewastakento InterpolandtheNigerianConsulate,whereitwasconfirmedhewasnotNigerian.HisdetenNonlastedfromSeptember2007toOctober2009,whenhewasreleasedfollowingtheintervenNonofanLCHRlawyer;appealingthelengthofdetenNonisunlawful.

HeexpresseshisunhappinesswiththelackoffinancialandemoNonalsupportoraccesstoeducaNonorhealthservicesduringthislengthydetenNon.Thelackofsupportor officialdocumentaNonconNnuedaZerhisrelease.HecannotobtainaLatvian IDbecausehecannot provideabirthcerNficate;he lamentsthelackofunderstandingthatmanypoor peopledonothavebirthcerNficateswherehecomesfrom.Hefeelsfurther discriminatedagainstwhenheseesothersarrivingwithoutdocumentaNonandyetapparentlyobtainingdocumentsallowingthemfreemovementinthecountry.

In August 2010 he was again detained. The court refused to allow thisdetenNon to be extended to the twomonths requested bythe state borderauthoriNes. This was repeated in September 2010, when the court againblockedfurtherdetenNon.

Thismanbelieveshimself tobestatelesswithneither familynor stateto turnto. Hefeelsunsupported anddismayed thatanEU statehasnotobservedUNand internaNonal convenNons in his treatment. He wants his human rightsincluding status documentaNon. Language barriers conNnue to add to hisdifficulNes.

SincehisrepresentaNveappealedtothecourt in2009,hehasbeenrepeatedlyrequested to appear in court: in this year on 6 September, 27 September, 6October and 12 October. Most recently he received a leYer (in Latvian)requiring his aYendance on 29 November. He conNnues to hope for afavourabledecision.●

TheFahamuRefugeeLegalAidNewsleGerisdistributedinPambazuka News,theauthorita;vepan‐AfricanelectronicweeklynewsleGerandplapormforsocialjus;ceinAfrica.

Withover1000contributorsandmorethan500,000readers,Pambazuka

Newsprovidescuqngedgecommentaryandin‐depthanalysison

poli;csandcurrentaffairs,development,humanrights,refugees,genderissuesandcultureinAfrica.Visit

onlineorsubscribebyemail.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 12

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN & LEGAL NEWS

AFRICACAMEROON:ThreeLGBTIindividualsjailedfor‘indecentbehaviour’KENYA:LackofclarityandcapacityunderminenewKenyanurbanrefugeelegislaNon,providinggreateropportuniNesforabuseofrefugeerightsSOUTHAFRICA:RwandanrefugeesinSouthAfricareluctanttorepatriateinanNcipaNonofCessaNonClauseSUDAN:AFPreportsSudandeported300Eritreanasylumseekersto‘almostcertainabuse’SUDAN:SouthSudanUnityStateofficialsreportSudanbombingofrefugeecamp

AMERICASMEXICO:MexicohostsfirstregionalInternaNonalDetenNonCoaliNonmeeNngondetenNonofrefugeesandmigrantsUSA:USlawyerexploresasylumonthebasisof‘otherseriousharm’USA:ReseYlementdown25%infiscalyear2011duetonewsecuritychecks

ASIA‐PACIFICAUSTRALIA:AsylumseekersbeingreleasedfromdetenNonfollowingthecollapseoftheAustralia‐MalaysiadealJAPAN:JusNceonholdforGhanaiankilledbyexcessiveuseofforceduringdeportaNonfromJapanMALAYSIA:BurmeserefugeesdescribecaningandtortureinMalaysianimmigraNondetenNoncenters,someapprehendedwhiletryingtoapproachUNHCRoffice;GovernmentofMalaysiaworkswithUNHCRtoregisterrefugeesinasteptowardsgreaterprotecNonNEPAL:Nepalaffirmscommitmentto ‘one‐China’policy, endangeringTibetanrefugees,prompNngUnitedStatestothreatenaidcut

EUROPEEU:EuropeanCommissionreleasesGreenPapertoopenlegaldebateonfamilyreunificaNonBULGARIA:BulgarianasylumdetenNonpracNcesconNnueinviolaNonofEUlawCYPRUS:KISAreportsCypriotdetenNonpracNcesviolateEUlawandincludedetenNonoffamiliesofrecognisedrefugeesGREECE:FrontexreleasesreportonGreece/TurkeyborderSERBIA:IncreaseinasylumseekersinSerbiademonstratesneedforgreaterlegalaidSWEDEN:IranianasylumseekererroneouslydeportedfromSwedentoIraq

MIDDLEEASTEGYPT:CNNpostsonlinedocumentaryaboutabuseandkillingofrefugeesinEgypNanSinaiwherenolegalaidisavailable,resulNnginthereleaseofsomerefugeesfromdetenNonEGYPT:RefugeesfaceincreasedviolenceanddiscriminaNoninrevoluNonaryEgyptEGYPT:AmnestyInternaNonalreportsEritreansdeportedfromEgyptwerebarredaccesstoUNHCRanddeniedtheopportunitytoclaimasylum;HumanRightsWatchcriNcisesEgypNangovernmentacNonsregardingEritreansEGYPT:DoctorinSinaitownofalArishreports‘disemboweledbodies’ofrefugeespointtotraffickinginhumanorgansIRAQ:KurdishrefugeesneedciNzenshiptorealiserightsISRAEL:Israelannouncesplanstobuild‘world’slargestdetenNoncentre’ISRAEL:IsraelannouncesincreaseindetenNonof‘infiltrators’,asrightsorganisaNonscallbuildingofnewdetenNoncentre‘draconianandimmoral’ISRAEL:ProposedIsraelilawwouldallowforindefinitedetenNonofrefugeesLEBANON:HezbollahrefusestoassistSyrianrefugeesLEBANON:LebanesejudiciarydoesnotactonkidnappingofSyrianrefugeesSYRIA:UNalarmedattortureofchildreninSyria

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 13

The situation of refugees in Israel, continued from page 6

Explaining his five‐year‐long journey before entering Israel,oneEritreansaid:Like everybody in Eritrea, I couldn't standbeing in the army onemoreday,IhadenoughandIdecidedtoleavemycountrywithoneofmy brothers anda friend.We walked for two days aiming atcrossing the Ethiopian border, we thought we had got there,because we heardsomeone speaking andit soundedAmharic sowe approachedsomepoliceofficersbutwhenweunderstoodthatweweresNllinEritreaitwastoolate.Theycaughtus,andputusinamilitary camp.AZer onemonthwemanagedtoescapeandwestartedwalkingagain; throughsmugglerswemadeourwaytotheSudan.MybrotherstoppedinKhartoum,hewantedtoputmoney[aside], get a forgeddocument andfly somewhere else, I didn'thave thepaNence towait, Iwantedtogetsomewhereandhave adecentlife. IpaidsomesmugglersandgottoLibya.WetriedtogetaboattoSicily,itdidn'twork,wewere caughtandput ina LibyandetenNoncentre [thatthe]Italiansbuilt(...).ThenIescapedagainandpaidsomesmugglers toEgyptandthen[onto]Israel.IthinkIspentalmostUSD20,000forthiswholejourney.

Another Eritrean, expressing his frustraNon at theimpossibilityofIsrael’srefugeepolicies,said:I'marefugee,iftheydeportmebacktoEritrea Iwillgostraighttoprison, if I'm lucky. But sNll I'ma human being, I want tohave adecentlife,butit'slikeiftheyhadputa leashonmyneck,like youwoulddotoa dog,andtheyare slowlypullingme towardsthem,butwhenever I'mjustone stepclosertothem,theypulltheropeand tug at me and I have to stop or slow down. Now I havestoppedinIsrael.They shouldjustobligeustostay inEritreaandfightanddieforthefreedomofourcountry.

Their journeysaredependentonsmugglersandthepricesareexorbitant. As they move from one place to another, theyaccumulate debts. Even worse, the smugglers, normallyBedouins, have learned that they can hold refugeesaYempNng to crossthe Sinai for ransom.A 15‐year‐old boyfromDarfurwhowasnowworkingillegallyin TelAvivrelatedto me how he had been called on his mobile by someBedouinsin theSinai;theyputhisbrother on thephoneandmadehimaskfor USD7,000for hisransom.For theduraNonof the phone call, the boy could hear his brother beingbeaten.Thisboy, who had alsobeenkidnapped in the Sinaideserton theway to Israel, sNll has topayhisown ransombacktohisfamilywhoremainsinDarfur.

TheIsraeliasylumsystemIsraelwasoneofthestatesparNcipaNnginthedraZingofthe1951ConvenNonrelaNngtotheStatusofRefugeesandoneofthefirst states to raNfyit in 1954.Despite this, it hasnever‘domesNcated’ refugee law; instead it has created a set ofinternal procedures known as 'RegulaNons Regarding theTreatment of Asylum Seekers in Israel'. Policy and pracNcetowardsrefugeesinIsraelisdrivenbytheideologyofaJewishstate.

Deten;onandan;‐infiltra;onbillThe Israeli‐EgypNan border militarisaNon is ruled by therestricNonsof the 1979 Peace Treaty,when Israel withdrewfromSinai:Egyptcan onlydeploy750 forcesin SinaiZone C

(theclosest to the border).OnlyEgypNancivil police armedwithlightweaponsareallowedtobestaNoned inZoneC.Onthe other side, in Zone D, Israel can deploy four infantrybaYalions, consisNng of up to 180 armoured personnelvehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousandpersonnel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel‐EgyptPeace Treaty, 26 March 1979. See also ‘Israel may seekamendment of peace treaty with Egypt, says report’,DailyNews Egypt, 1 September 2011). Given these figures, theEgypNan side of the border does not seem to be highlymilitarised, thus indicaNng a possible reason for itsincapability of controlling the smuggling into Israel ofweapons,drugsand,morerecently,refugees.

However,thisdoesnotjusNfytheEgypNanborderpolice'suseof lethal force against refugees in the process of enteringEgypt, as denounced by several non‐governmentalorganisaNons (NGOs) (see IRIN News, ‘EGYPT–ISRAEL: Howmany migrants are dying at the border?’, 30 September2009). Refugees who managed to cross the border areconsidered 'unlawfullypresentpersons' anddeportaNon andarrest warrants will be issued against an asylum seekerpresent in thecountrywithout authorisaNon.However, 'theexecuNonofthedeportaNonorderwillbesuspendedpendingcompleNon of the procedures in his applicaNon for refugeestatus' (Refugees RightsForum,‘PolicyPaper:theDetenNonofAsylumSeekersandRefugees’,June2008.)

In fact, refugees apprehended at the border are iniNallyissued a deportaNon/detenNon order by the Israeli DefenceForces(IDF). TheyareheldbytheIDFfor afewdayswithnoreview,then theyaretransferred toaprisonwheretheycanstarttheapplicaNonforrefugeestatus.

The law does not set alimit tothelengthof Nme arefugeecan be held in administraNve detenNon. Since the solepurpose of detenNon is to execute the order of deportaNonfrom Israel, if the period of detenNon exceeds 60 days andthereisno possibilitytoexecute thedeportaNon,authoriNeshave the discreNon to release ‘cooperaNve’ detainees. InpracNce such discreNon is rarelyexercised,and refugeescanbe detained for an indefinite amount of Nme (GlobalDetenNon Project, ‘Israel DetenNon Profile’,February2011).Thosewho candemonstratethat theycome from EritreaorSudan,andwhoarenotdeemedto beasecuritythreat,arereleasedand issueda2(A)(5) 'condiNonalrelease'visa, whichonlyprotectsthemfromrefoulement.

In addiNon, the Israeli Government has enacted tworesponses in order to prevent entrance into Israel: the'immediate coordinated return' (Hot Return) policyand theInfiltraNonPrevenNonLaw.

'HotReturn' isatermused todescribeanimmediateforcedreturn of either migrants or asylum seekers to the countryfrom which they arrived. Under this policy refugees arereturned to Egypt by Israeli army soldiers or border police

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 14

officerswithin 72 hours of crossing. In July2011 the IsraeliHigh Court of JusNce, aZer four years of deliberaNons andpeNNonsfiledbydifferentNGOshasdecidedthatHotReturnsareillegal:Fromthebeginningwewere concernedthatevenifthere wasanunwriYen agreement with Egypt, it seemedtobe not sufficient.AZer the recent regime change, this concern became evenstronger.... But, due tothe fact that the coordinate return policyhasfornow beensuspended,there is noreason toexamine thelegalityofapracNce nolongerimplemented(‘HighCourtofJusNceRuling on PeNNon against 'Hot Return', SecNon 1(9)and secNon12(4),7July2011(inHebrew,translatedbytheauthor)).

A police invesNgaNon is currently taking place aZerconsiderablepubliccriNcismanddifferentIsraeliNGOsfiledacomplaint in August 2011, claiming the Hot Return policy‘neverstopped’(YediotAhronot,PhysiciansforHumanRightswebsite, ‘Soldiers: 'We could returning refugees to theirdeath' , 2 September 2011). In any case, the Hot Returnprocedurehas been reformulated throughthePrevenNon ofInfiltraNon Bill and a fence is being constructed along 140kilometresofIsrael’s250‐kilometreborderwith Egypt whichissupposedtofuncNonasadeterrentto'infiltrators'.

Theterm'infiltrator'(mistanen),which isbroadlyusedbytheIsraeliAuthoriNeswhen referring toasylumseekersenteringIsrael through Egypt,derivesfromthe InfiltraNon PrevenNonLaw. This Law, signed in 1954, was originally intended fordealing with a security threat posed by the PalesNnian'infiltrators' (fedayyin), whereby a person who is either anaNonalofanenemycountryorwhohaspassedthroughoneof thesecountriesmaylegallybedetainedfor atermoffiveyears.Since 2007,when the numbers of Sudaneseasylum seekersarriving in Israel began to increase dramaNcally, the AnN‐InfiltraNon Law was applied,even to cases which obviouslywere not related to security. However, in the eyes of theGovernment, securitywas involved because SudanesewereciNzens of an enemy naNon. AZer Hotline for MigrantWorkers and Refugee Rights Clinic challenged this ruling incourt, and perhapsbecause thecourt itselfhad torecognisethat refugees were currently beyond the originalcounterterrorism scope of the law, the AnN‐InfiltraNon Billwas tabled in 2008 to replace the InfiltraNon Law.The bill,which saw its draZed version dropped in 2010 aZersignificant public criNcism,went through asecond and thirdreading in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) in July 2011;iffinallyapproved,itwould leadto aneven harsher treatmentof refugees, criminalising asylum seeking (with up to threeyearsofdetenNon),andrenderingitillegaltoassistrefugees.It will make the possibility of Hot Returns at the bordernormaNve (MeeNng of the Knesset Internal Affairs andEnvironment, 25 July 2011, 'PrevenNon of InfiltraNon' Bill,PreparaNon for aSecond andThird Reading (inHebrew)).AtthemeeNng,AhazBenAri,legaladvisor totheIsraeliDefenseMinistry,explainedthebillasbeing,...atemporaryorderforaperiodofthreeyears,itis supposedto

be anexperiment. (...)We believe thatifanenoughdrasNctoolswillbe implemented, sothatpeoplewillunderstandthat thewaytoTelAviv isblocked,insteadofcoming fromAfrica,acrossEgypt,then the Sinai, and then aZer staying two or three weeks inSaharonim[themainMigrantDetenNonCenter],theyarereleasedand theymake their way into the Israeli Labour market, if theyunderstandthis[thatthewayisblocked], thephenomenoncanbecurbed.We are only looking for a break, not a punishment, wedon'twantanythingelse.

TheimplementaNonofthebilliscondiNonaltothebuildingofan 'open refugee camp' in the South Negev Region,with acapacityofonlyupto10,000people.VotedbytheKnesset inNovember2010,theconstrucNonofthisdetenNonfacilityhasnotstartedyet because ofa lackofagreementbetween theMinisterofInteriorandtheMinisterofFinance.

Theestablishment of the LodUnit and thedetermina;on ofrefugeestatusFormerly, the Israeli office of UN High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) assumed responsibilityfor refugee statusdeterminaNon (RSD) in cooperaNonwith the Israeli Ministerof Interior.In 2001UNHCRrelinquished thisresponsibilitytothe NaNonal Status GranNng Body (NSGB). The HebrewImmigrant Aid Society (HIAS) and UNHCR took theresponsibility for training the staff of NSGB.As HIASput it,‘the training was good, but the paNent was ill'. In 2008the'InfiltraNon IdenNficaNon and ClassificaNon Unit' at Lod(hereaZerLodUnit,now located in TelAviv)wasestablishedand,within it, the Refugee Status DeterminaNon (RSD)Unit(Hotline for Migrant Workers, ‘Treatment of Asylum SeekersinIsrael’,September2010).By2009theenNreprocedurewasinthehandsoftheMinistry ofInterior.Today,thefirststepinthe procedure requires all asylum seekers to first approachtheLodUnit.

The first step is determinaNon of naNonality; most of theasylum seekers carry no idenNficaNon papers, in order toavoid refoulement. Eritreans and Sudanese, who make up85% of the refugee populaNon, are automaNcally grantedTemporary Group ProtecNon. There are a large number ofcaseswherethenaNonalityofan asylumseeker iscontested;forexample,veryoZenEritreansaredeemedtobeEthiopiansby the Israeli officials (for more on the acNons of theEthiopian embassy in Israel, see this arNcle). OthernaNonaliNeswhohaveregisteredwiththeLodUnitaresentaleYer summoningthemto theRSDUnit,which is located insouthTelAviv.Fromtheresultsof theseinterviews,it wouldappear that the decision‐makingprocess is moreconcernedwithfindinga jusNficaNon for denyingaclaimthangranNngasylum, since it is hard to believe that only two asylum‐seekers among thousands of applicants were eligible forrefugeestatusin2010.

There is no official provision of legal aid to asylum seekers(except for unaccompaniedminors)buttherearethreeNGOsaYempNng to address the problem by providing someindividualswithassistanceinpreparingtheir casesand,moreimportantly,using the High Court to challenge policy (for a

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 15

detailedexplanaNonof therangeofNGOswhomakeup theIsraeli civil society, see the Southern Refugee Legal AidNetworkwebsite’sIsraelpage).It ishoped thateachposiNveresult achieved will finally lead to Israel conforming to thestandardsofthe1951RefugeeConvenNon.

The‘TemporaryProtec;on’ruseAsmenNoned,85%oftherefugeepopulaNonin IsraelcomesfromSudanandEritreaandboth naNonaliNesareenNtled toTemporary ProtecNon (TP). According to the Israeli asylumsystem logic and to Joan Fitzpatrick's definiNon, TP is theperfect 'magic giZ' because it provides a 'diluted subsNtuteprotecNon for ConvenNon refugees' ( ‘Temporary protecNonof refugees: Elements of a formalised regime’, AmericanJournal of Interna;onal Law 94(2),April 2000:279–306).TPperfectly suits the Israeli principles of temporariness andexclusiontogetherwithitsallegeddeterrencefuncNon.

The Israelis have different reasons for offering temporaryprotecNon to the Eritreans and the Sudanese. UNHCR hasadvised the state that there is a presumpNon that mostEritrean asylum seekers are likely to saNsfy the RefugeeConvenNon'scriteriaandso itwouldbeawasteofresourcestoadjudicatetheir casesindividually(ThegeneralacceptancerateofEritreanasylumclaimsisesNmated tobe98%.Foranoverview of the Eritrean regime see: Human RightsWatch,ServiceforLife:StateRepressionandIndefiniteConscrip;oninEritrea,2009). Sudanese, ontheotherhand,fallunderArNcle10of the2011Internal Procedures,which reservestherightfor the state of Israel not to absorb or grant permits tosubjectsofenemyorhosNlestates,thereforemakingciNzensof Sudan not eligible to submit asylum applicaNons. NGOworkers have repeatedly underlined how this provision isextremelydiscriminatoryandthus in violaNonoftheRefugeeConvenNon'sart.3whichprohibitsdiscriminaNon astorace,religion or country of origin; the Universal DeclaraNon ofHuman Rights,arts. 1 and 2and the InternaNonalCovenanton Civil andPoliNcal Right (CCPR),art. 2(1), also reaffirm thesame principles of equality and non‐discriminaNon (manyacademics, social acNvists and Israeli ciNzens have alsostressed the importanceof a 'kinship of genocide' betweenDarfurisandJews,butalthoughthislegacywasverymuchfeltwhenthephenomenonstarted,ithasslowlyfadedaway).

InaddiNon, thistemporaryprotecNon isinformal since ithasnever been declared. Formalising it would mean admivngthe Eritrean government’s guilt, thus compromising theircloserelaNonshipwith Israel.AsfarasSudanisconcerned,itis theoreNcallyimpossibletograntprotecNon tomembersofanenemystate.

Those enNtled to TemporaryProtecNon are issued a 2(A)(5)'CondiNonal Release Visa', which has to be renewed eithereverymonthoreverythreemonthsandwhichdoesnotallowits holders to access any social or economic benefits. Forexample,none of the 2(A)(5) visaholders has accessto thenaNonal health system except for 'emergency cases', and

even inthosecases, treatmentisnotfree.Thosewhoreceivemedical care but cannot paythe hospitalare indebt for theamount,butgiventhefactthattheyarenotciNzens,thestatecannotforcethemto repaythedebt.However,beingindebtto a hospital means that they are denied any subsequentmedical care.Furthermore, bygranNnggroupprotecNon andbydroppinganyfurther responsibility, noonetakesaccountof the individual storiesthat led themto enter Israel, and oftheir needs,such astracingfamilymembersand takingcareoftraumaoraddressinggenderbasedviolenceexperiences.

The 2(A)(5) visa’s exclusionary logic is also reflected in factthat itdoesnotgrant thepermission towork,butthisruleisnot enforced and employers cannot be prosecuted, thusleaving refugees dependent on the blackmarket economy,encounteringdifficulNesingevnganyemploymentandlikelytobeeasilyexploited.AccordingtotheIsraeli authoriNestheprohibiNontoworkwillbeenforcedwiththeconstrucNon ofthenewdetenNonfacilityintheNegev.

Like a legal limbo, 'Temporary ProtecNon Visas are psychicprisonsimposeduponthedetaineesontheirreleasefromtherazor wireprisonsofthedetenNon centres' (seePugliese,J.,‘The Incommensurability of Law to JusNce: Refugees andAustralia'sTemporaryProtecNon’,2005).Asa38‐year‐oldmanfromEritreacommented:I fledmycountry alone andmywife was supposed to follow mewhenIhadachievedastablesituaNon,IcrossedSudanandEgypt,theBedouinsintheSinaitorturedme foronemonthbeforeIcouldfind the money to pay my ransom. I was caught at the IsraeliborderandspentsevenmonthsinSaharonim [MigrantDetenNonCenter], andforwhat? For being inacage again! Israel forme islike a big prison, it's a trap! You have nowhere to go and youcannot go back. I didn'twant my wife to join me in this trap. Iworkedfortwoyearsalmost12hoursperday, Iputmoney[aside]andsentthem tomywife inEritrea telling her totry theway toLibya.Shemade it andshe gota refugeestatusin Italy andnow Ican ask for family reunificaNon, I only need some traveldocuments,whichHIASishelpingmetoget.

ThelackofproperevaluaNonofasylumclaimshascausedthenumberofindividuals ina‘refugee‐likesituaNon’to increaseand,bynot allowingthem to access the welfare state,theyarethenviewedasaburdentosociety.Furthermore,whereaseverynaNon‐state isenNtledtodecidewho toaccept into itsbordersandwhotoexcludebecauseofthesameprincipleofstate sovereignty, the asylum regime must be governed byinternaNonal legal obligaNonsand not bydemographic fearsinregardstotheJewishidenNtyofthestate.

Given how recent the phenomenon is, it is fair to say thatthere is sNll Nme to avoid the Sinai becoming a new massgrave like theMediterranean Sea or theUS–Mexico border,and there is sNll Nme to accept the challenge posed byrefugees in a less drasNc and exclusionary way. Indeed, tothosewhoarguethatIsraelhastoomanyproblems,and thatrefugees can only occupy the boYom level of the poliNcalagenda, we can simply reply: fair enough, treat refugeesdecentlyandyouwillhaveonelessproblem.●

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 16

P U B L I C A T I O N S'TheExternalisa;onofEurope’sMigra;onControlsreportis based on original research, and focuses on tworelaNvely unknown aspects of the outsourcing ofimmigraNoncontrolsat thegatesof Europeandbeyond':the Turkish border with Iran, and responses to'hitchhiking'onboatsandmerchantvessels.Auxbordsdel’Europe: l’externalisa;on des contrôles migratoires (TheExternalisaNon of Europe's MigraNon Controls),Migreurop,18November2011.

'Refugeesandasylum‐seekersreturnedtoEritreahavebeendetainedincommunicadoandtortured…TheactofseekingasylumitselfisconsideredasanactoftreasonbytheEritreanauthoriNes,renderingallreturnedasylumseekersatriskofdetenNononthisbasis.'AmnestyInternaNonal,Egypt:EritreansinEgyptatriskofforciblereturn,AmnestyInternaNonal,2November2011.

'OnOctober17,2011,Sudanhandedover300EritreanstotheEritrean military without screening them for refugeestatus ... The mass deportaNon follows dozens of otherunlawful deportaNons by Sudan since May of Eritreanasylum seekers and of Eritreans who had been deniedaccess to asylum.' ‐ Sudan: End Mass SummaryDeportaNons of Eritreans, Human Rights Watch, 25October2011.

'The IraqiauthoriNeshavepubliclyannouncedtheir planstocloseCampNew Iraq,formerlyknownasCampAshraf,60 kilometres north of Baghdad, on 31 December thisyear.The camp is home to some 3,250 Iranian asylum‐seekers who have lived in Iraq for some25 years.' Iraq:Iranian Asylum‐Seekers in Iraq at Risk, AmnestyInternaNonal, 2 November 2011. (For more on CampAshraf,seeourOctoberissue.)

'Governmentofficialsandtheiragents[haveconfined]thousandsofpeNNoners–ciNzensfromtheruralcountrysideseekinglegalredressinBeijingandotherciNes–inunlawfulsecretdetenNonfaciliNesknownas'blackjails.’'China:EnforcedDisappearancesaGrowingThreat,HumanRightsWatch,9November2011.

'TheUNHCRcanrecommendcessaNon,yetitisuptoindividualstatestoagreeandenforcethecessaNonclause.ExcepNonstotheclauseareyettobefinalised,andsomesuchexcepNonsincludethosewhoareinHutu‐Tutsilifepartnershipsormarriages.ButNshimyimanahasnofaithinsuchexcepNons.'Onpaper,theremaybeexcepNons.ButinpracNce,theimplementaNonisthis:thecessaNonclauseallowscountriestoremoveforeigners.Wewillbeforcedtogohome.’'Op‐Ed:RwandanRefugeesFearCessaNonClause.

'3% of those surveyed have a permit to live outsiderefugeecamps. TheremainingparNcipantsliveinconstantfear of deportaNon back to countries where they facepersecuNon. This protecNon gap means that refugeeshave liYle choice but to conceal their idenNNes andnaNonaliNes for a beYer chance at a reasonablelivelihood.' UrbanRefugees inTanzania‐NoPlaceCalledHome,AsylumAccess.

'TheFiZhEdiNonofTheRefugeeishere. TheRefugeeisabi‐monthly newspaper wriYen by refugee youth inDadaab for therefugee community. It istheonly locallyproducednewspaper and serves apopulaNon in Dadaabwhich is now more than 450,000.' The RefugeeNewspaper‐EdiNonFiveandOnline,FilmAidBlog.

'The research maps the number and profile of statelesspersons in the UK and puts a human face on theirsituaNon. It also examines the UK’s legal obligaNons tostatelesspersonsunderinternaNonallawandanalysestheimpact of current policy and pracNce. Based on thesefindings the report makes recommendaNons forimprovement.' Mapping Statelessness in the UnitedKingdom,UNHighCommissionerforRefugeesandAsylumAid,22November2011.

'Concern[ing] the government’s pracNce of detainingchildren and families for immigraNon purposes ... I haveexposed official mendacity used in defence of thishazardouspracNce,andthesurprisingcosinessenjoyedbysome commercial contractors in their relaNons withministers and civil servants.' How official lying threatensour democracy and what should be done about it,OurKingdom submission to the House of Lords SelectCommiYeeonCommunicaNons,21November2011.

'TheExecuNveOfficeforImmigraNonReview(EOIR)todayannounced new guidance on the EOIR asylum clock forimmigraNonjudges, courtadministratorsandimmigraNoncourt staff... [which will increase] efficiency by reducingtheNmethat immigraNonjudgesandcourtstaffspendonadministering the asylum clock'. OperaNng Policies andProcedures Memorandum 11‐02: The Asylum Clock,United StatesDepartment of JusNce ExecuNveOffice forImmigraNonReview,15November2011.

'ThisarNclehasexploredthechallengesfacedbySahrawiandPalesNnian refugeeswhowerestudyingandworkingin Libyaat thestartoftheconflict inFebruary2011,andthe nature and implicaNons of the internaNonalcommunity’s responses to these challenges.' InvisibleRefugees:ProtecNngSahrawis andPalesNnians Displacedby the 2011 Libyan Uprising, United NaNons HighCommissionerforRefugees,November2011.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 17

MIGREUROP explores readmission instruments, continued from page 5

but for all undocumented migrants, including those who became irregular as a consequence of the requesNng state’smigraNonpolicy. Financial incenNvesare evenawarded to completethistask,parNcularlythrough the fundingofdetenNoncenters,thepurchases ofborder controlequipment,or the trainingofpoliceand borderpatrolsinmigraNonmanagementandbordersurveillance.

Incen;vepoliciesTheunderlyingagendaof theseagreements, far frombeingmerely technical,should not be overlooked.Thewaytowardsthoseagreements ispavedthrough incenNvepoliciesto thebenefitofthirdparNes:visafacilitaNons, financial support,andpartnershipifnotintegraNonprospects;thisisapro‐acNvepolicy.

Indeed,theinterestofreceivingstatesisfragileandafewsuchincenNveswill oZensufficeto ensuretheircooperaNon.Thisexplainsthetendencytoembedreadmissionissuesinagreementsofalargerscopewhichwillenablereceivingstatestomeetasmany interests in themas the sendingstatesdo.Lately, thebargain readmission/visa isno longer a secret.The recentUnion'sagreementswiththirdcountriessystemaNcallycomewithvisafacilitaNonagreements,asexemplifiedbythefour‐yearlong negoNaNons between the EU and Turkey in this respect. Likewise, the European Commission evaluaNon report ofFebruary 2011 expressly states that the failure of certain negoNaNons is due to the lack of incenNves or of adequatecounterparts. The report then dwells on and details measures deemed efficient to implement those agreements andespeciallyvisafacilitaNonandfinancialassistance.

Withtheimpossibilityofdevelopingnewagreements,theCommissionthereforeoffersnew instruments, which wouldmixreadmissiontogetherwithotherissueswhileprovidingefficientsancNonmechanisms.

Anexternaliza;ontoolThe readmission procedure isanother tool in the EU externalizaNon policyiniNated afewyearsago,not least because themanagementofexpelledmigrantsispassedontothirdstates:theyaresentback,withoutbeingtakencareof.

Thirdcountriesarenowcontrollingourbordersanddealingwithourasylumseekers..Quitelogically, astheyarenotwillingtobeartheburden,theytendtomovetheissuethroughtheadopNon of similar legislaNon,i.e. readmissionagreementswith other states (this is the phenomenon of chain'readmissionagreements')andthroughthesystemaNcpolicyofdetainingforeignersincamps.

This phenomenon will probablyconNnueunNl a few stateswi l l accept, being provided with advantageouscompensaNon, to keep these populaNons or unNl newmigraNon cycles start again – migraNon thus becomesperpetual and migrants have no safeplacewhere to stop,not even their own country, for fear they might bepersecuted or legally condemned for their ‘clandesNneemigraNon’.

And the story is not over.As soon as the agreement withPakistan was approved, another agreement with Georgiawas signed, even though this country is at war, home topowerfulpersecutorsandcutofffromasizableporNonofitsterritory.

WiththiskindofpracNceinplacewemuststopspeakingofhigh levelsofprotecNoninEurope.First, thisisonlytrueforan increasingly small porNon of the populaNon aZermulNple screenings, ensured by the out‐sourcing of visadeliverance and joint operaNons, notably throughintercepNonsatseabytheEuropeanagency,Frontex.

A N N O U N C E M E N T SLGBTIissuesinrefugeelegalaid:anewresourceontheSouthernRefugeeLegalAidNetworkwebsite

ThewebsiteoftheFahamuRefugeeProgramme(FRP)nowhasaspecialpage,managedbyEddieBruce‐Jones,toprovidelegaladviserswithcredible,

country‐specificresourcesinrepresenNngLGBTIasylumclaims.AYachedtotheLGBTIpageonSRLANisalistofcountries.OneachcountrypageateamofinternswillbecompilingthelegalsituaNonforLGBTIsineach,caselaw,publicavtudesand/orcapacityofstatetoprotect,NGOswhowishtobeonthiswebsite

whoareworkinginLGBTIadvocacyandlegalrepresentaNoninorforthatcountry,countryoforiginspecialistspreparedtooffertheirservicestolegal

advisorswhoarerepresenNngLGBTIcasesforrefugeestatus,andotherrelevantmaterials.ThisisinlinewiththeFRP’sobjecNveforwww.srlan.orgtobealow‐bandwidthone‐stopshopforprovidersoflegalaidforrefugees.Weneedyourhelptoaccomplishthistask.PleasesendsuggesNonstoInternTeam

LeaderPeterKikomaga.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 18

Moreover, it can not be said of a legal system that it isprotecNvewhenoneof itsmainobjecNves isto sendbackindividuals to systems which do not protect. By sendingpeoplebackto tortureor death,weourselvesbecome thetorturer or criminal, which the Strasbourg Court stated intechnical termsin theSoering case. Andthis also goes foreveryhuman rightsviolaNon. We cannot boast about ourremedies, if, even before they can be used, we sendmigrantsbackto countriesthat have none.Putdifferently,through thispolicy,wecompromise,weareaccomplices;alegal system which delegates to another legal system tosome extent integrates the laYer and receives partsof itslogic.

ThemaGerofchainagreementsandindirectrefoulementHow long will the other states hold out? Due to theseagreements,statesarebecoming‘countriesof immigraNon’by default when previously they were countries ofemigraNon and transit. By prevenNng individuals fromleaving their territories, they automaNcally become the‘final’ or ulNmate desNnaNon for individuals, unlesspressureisplacedonsendingstatestopreventimmigraNonbyclosingtheborders.Withthislogic,therewillbeaNmewhenthiswillonlybepossibleifonecountryacceptsthosewho were rejected elsewhere.Migrantswill eventually be‘locked out’of everystate,that is tosay,have noplaceornowheretogo.

Chain readmission agreementsbetween our partners andother Statesplaythegameofchainexpulsion.Legally, thismeans that if we paid special aYenNon to safely expel analien to a desNnaNon country, no guarantee can beprovided that no expulsion will be carried out from thiscountry to another State offering no guarantees or evenopenlyviolaNngHumanRights.

ThreatsforhumanrightsGenerally,there isnoguaranteethatmigrantsin readmissionwill beprotectedagainsttheinfringementon theirfundamentalrightswhether ontheterritoryofaEuropeanstate,ofthecontracNngpartyorofanotherstate.Evenmore,somemechanismssuch as fast‐trackproceduresor naNonalitypresumpNoncanonlyleadto humanrightsviolaNons..TheEuropeanCommissionexpresslyadmitsthisfactin itsFebruary2011evaluaNonreport.It insistsonthenecessaryimprovementstobemadetoavoidsuchviolaNonsinanEUcountryandofferstoincludeasuspensionclauseonanyforthcomingagreementincasesof'conNnued'violaNons (sic) of human rights in the third‐partycountryconcerned,which implicitlymeansthat the current systemisnotsaNsfactory.Indeed,theCommissionstatesin itsreportthat:'theimplementaNonofreadmissionagreementswith theEUandissuesrelatedtoHumanRightscanobviouslybenefitfromimprovements,especiallythroughareinforcementoftheroleplayedbyjointcommiYeesregardingreadmission'.

Themostvulnerablemigrants(vicNmsof thesex trade,oftrafficking,unaccompaniedminors,women,asylumseekers)arenotprotectedbutdrownedintheflowofirregularmigrants.

Evenmore, somepartnercountriesarepersecuNngstatesorunderpersecuNonthemselves,ifnotatwar.TwoofthelatestareemblemaNcofanewstepfurther:Pakistan,wherepersecutorsabound,andwhichgraduallyseesthewarAfghanrefugeesarefleeingloomingahead;andGeorgia,inthemiddleofaparNNoncrisiswithSouthOsseNaandAbkhazia.●

O P P O R T U N I T I E S

Opening forLegal AssistanceCentreProgrammeManagerattheInterna=onalRescueCommiKee(IRC),ThailandThe IRC in Thailand is seeking a Legal Assistance CentreProgrammeManager to be based in Mae Sot, along theThai‐Burmaborder.TheposiNonwill involvemanagingandsupporNng the Legal Assistance Center staffon all aspectsoftheirwork,includinglegal counseling,casemanagementandcapacitybuilding.FormoreinformaNon,pleasevisittheapplicaNonwebsite.

Short courses on refugee issues, January and February2012inCairo,EgyptTheCenterforMigraNonandRefugeeStudies(CMRS)attheAmerican UniversityinCairowillhold fourshort courses inthe new year: Demographics Measures of Migra;on(January29‐February2,2012) taught byDr.AymanZohry;Migra;on andRefugeeMovements in theMiddleEast andNorth Africa (February 5‐9, 2012) taught byDr. ShadenKhallaf;Pales;nianRefugees(February12‐16,2012)taughtby Prof. Michael Kagan; Training Skills for Trainers ofPsychosocial and Mental Health Workers in CountriesAffected byEmergencies (February18‐25,2012) taughtbyDr. NancyBaron.Thecoursesareoffered forgraduatelevelstudents, researchers and pracNNoners in the field ofmigraNon and refugees. All courses are conducted inEnglish, without translaNon, so applicants should have asufficient command ofEnglish.To applyfor thecoursesorfor more informaNon, visit the CMRS Short Course webpage.Applicantsmayapplyandbe accepted tomore thanonecourse;theapplica=ondeadlineis10January2012.

FAHAMUREFUGEELEGALAIDNEWSLETTER 19

N E W S & I N F O R M A T I O N L I N K S

southern refugee legal aid network web, list-serv

statelessness in focus, alertnet

statelessness programme, tilburg law school, netherlands

european council on refugees and exiles weekly bulletin

kakuma refugee free press

pan african media portal

rsdwatch

international detention coalition news

shelter and legal aid for refugees in the US

forced migration current awareness blog

women’s asylum news monthly newsletter

this newsletter: past issues, facebook, blog, style guidelines

Fahamu RefugeeLegal Aid

NewsleYer ispublishedbyFahamu Trust and FahamuL t d . , 2 n d fl o o r , 5 1

Cornmarket Street,OxfordOX1 3HA, UK. Tel +44(0)1865 727006, fax +44(0)1865 727909, email

i n f o [ a t ] f a h amu . o r g .F a h a m u L t d w a sestablished in the UK in

1997. Fahamu Ltd wasr e g i s t e r e d a n dincorporated as a not‐for‐

profit company limited byguarantee in 2001 (no.4241054). Fahamu hasoffices in Oxford, UK;

Nairobi, Kenya; Dakar,Senegal; and Cape Town,SouthAfrica. FahamuLtdis

registered in Kenya asF 1 5 / 2 0 0 6 . B o a r d o fdirectors: Belinda Allan,

Pa d d y C o u l t e r OB E ,Shereen Karmali, HakimaAbbas. Fahamu Trust wasregistered as a charity in

the UK (no. 1100304) inJ u l y 2003 , w i t h t hefollowing objecNves: ‘the

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Rob Wel l s . ExecuNvedirector: Hakima Abbas.Fahamu ’s webs i te i swww.fahamu.org.

AsiaPacificRegionalImmigra=onDeten=onWorkingGroupWorkshopThismonthabout50peoplefrom18countriesparNcipatedintwodaymeeNngoftheAsiaPacificRegionalImmigraNonDetenNonWorkingGroup(IDWG)WorkshopinKualaLumpur.Though a lot to cover in 2 days, it was a good way to conNnue the momentum oncollaboraNon, undertake capacitybuildingonmonitoringand workingwith immigraNondetaineesandfurtherexploraNononimplemenNngacNonplans,parNcularlyonchildrenindetenNon,alternaNvestodetenNonandenhancingaccessandmonitoring.

Many States have begun exploring and implemenNng alternaNves to immigraNondetenNon,whichhavebeenfoundtobecheaper thandetenNonandeffecNveinensuringcompliancein thecommunity. AlternaNvesto detenNon aremorehumane,effecNveandfulfillhumanrightsandgovernmentsmust startusingthemforvulnerablegroupssuchaschildren,unaccompaniedminorsandfamilies.Inthisregion,ThailandandJapanhavebothreleased largenumber of refugee children fromdetenNonover the past year.NGOsarecalling on governments across Asia Pacific to use the 60th anniversaryof the RefugeeConvenNon to commit end the detenNon of children. The workshop occurs two weeksbeforeahighlevelministerialmeeNnginGenevatocommemoratethe60thanniversaryoftheRefugeeConvenNon.

Further details of the meeNng are available online here; the InternaNonal DetenNonCoaliNon will release a full report and revised regional detenNon acNon plans in thecomingmonth.●