Reforms and Opening

1860-1876

Choson politics

The equilibrium could shift from strong monarch to

bureaucratic-aristocratic domination, but there was

balance of forces; monarch and aristocracy

depended on each other

The balance was asset for maintaining stability, but

became hurdle when Korea faced the need to

strengthen central power to mobilize resources

The king controlled access to bureaucracy by the

examination system and appointment of officials

In the 14th and the 15th century a series of strong

kings, but in the next centuries the power of the

throne was checked by yangban bureaucracy

Yangban lineages dominated the throne: queens

were selected among yangban families; some kings

did not have male hairs and other kings were either

infants or youths

Normative restraints on royal despotism were

institutionalized in two ways: Censorate (to

exercise both surveillance and remonstrance

functions) modeled after Chinese system, and daily

royal lectures by which young kings were tutored

in Confucian learning

Korea in the Universal Order

Preeminence of man’s pursuit of moral perfection in Neo-Confucianism; the Great Learning (eight steps for sagehood) reaffirmed man as moral being and his role in the moral universe

Thus the importance of individual effort; man should strive for sagehood because he is fallible

To be moral is a matter of mind and attitude

The rectification of imperial mind was focal point, source of national well-being and harmony between the moral universe and the ethical and social order in the kingdom

Fan Tsu-yu, 11th c. scholar in Sung China:

“Order and disorder in the world all depend on the heart-and-mind of the ruler. If his heart-and-mind is correct, the myriad affairs of the court will be not incorrect.”

The authority of the Choson king was first and foremost based on the rhetoric of the ideal Confucian kingship

The vision of the founding group of Choson (Yi) dynasty was creation of a new Confucian moral order

The investiture (komyong) of the Korean king by

the Son of Heaven, the Chinese emperor –

mediator between Heaven and civilized world

Investiture symbolized the tributary status of

Choson Korea to China (Korean king was

“subject” to the emperor), peace and good will,

mutual protection

Most importantly investiture symbolized a definite

and secure place of Korean monarchy in the

hierarchy of the orderly universe

Choson statehood as cultural identity: in the Confucian world China was civilized, relegating other countries to various degrees of barbarism

Koreans regarded Confucian norms as universal standards by which society is judged as either civilized or barbarous

Choson Korea was to become member of civilized world, even better than China, by excelling by these standards

Confucianism was projected as rediscovery of native tradition initiated by sage Kija and which had been lost

The demise of Ming dynasty in 1644 and the replacement of the ruling house by the barbarian Manchus in the Central Kingdom disturbed the Choson dynasty's sense of the Confucian world order

Choson Koreans became the defenders of the authentic Confucian tradition, which resulted from the Korean commitment to Chu Hsi orthodoxy

Perception that now Korea was the only bastion of Confucian civilization; as a sole carrier and custodian of the civilized tradition, the Choson monarchy had to be guarded with greater zeal

Korea in the early 1860s

Powerful aristocratic lineages dominated political

and economic life

Threat of foreign invasion and peasant rebellion

Eastern Learning (Tonghak) challenged the

ideological orthodox unity

In 1864 an eleven year old boy (known for his

posthumous title Kojong) ascended the throne

Major effort in the next years under boy-king’s

father Yi Ha-ung, known as the Grand Prince or

the Taewongun

The heyday of the factions was the 17th and the

18th centuries; by 1864 factionalism was no longer

the most important basis of bureaucratic politics.

It was replaced by cleavages over issues of policy

Struggle between Taewongun and Min faction

(some scholars argue)

Yangban proved to be much more formidable

opponent of the throne in competition for

resources than the Chinese gentry

The Taewongun reforms, 1864-1873

Yi Hwa-ung: the Grand Prince or Taewongun

Reforms’ objectives

The Taewogun was pragmatist, not modernizer

Restoration the prestige and power of the throne to

earlier levels (early Choson)

Preserve the country and the dynasty by removing

some of the reasons for peasants discontent:

bureaucratic corruption, illicit taxation, and usury

Increase central government control over finances

Eliminate heterodox and subversive doctrines

Build military strength by traditional means

Reforms

Greatest fund-raising effort in the dynasty: imposed

land surtaxes; river, boat, commercial transit, and

gate taxes; “voluntary contributions” for special

purposes like palace construction

Reduced tax-exempt sector by curtailing autonomy

the palace estates and private academies; but did not

raise taxes on large landowners or reduce taxes on

small holdings

Authorized cloth tax on all households for military

defense; an act which was far easier in 1870 than

1750 because the tax-exempt yangban had

increased in size out of proportion to what was

tolerable in a fiscal sense

Precedent of relatively equal tax distribution at the

village level under the village cloth system (tongp’o);

by the middle of the 19th century yangban

households were already sharing in the payment of

military cloth taxes in many villages

Granary loan system: canceled debts and reduced

corruption; loan interest (10%) went to central

taxation agency; government could not refinance

grain loans except for overvalued currency

Minting of large cash (100 times the value of

normal copper coin) and importation of Qing cash

generated inflation

Prejudice against the use of cash (commercial activities), based on orthodox Confucian economics

Confucian doctrine emphasized social stability and frowned at social mobility (basic Confucian dogma) – especially via business activity

The Taewongun tried to control the market to offset the inflation

Problems of reforms: the predominance of landed aristocracy, Confucian dogma, and weakness of political leadership

King Kojong and his son Sunjong Queen Min

King Kojong

Surpluses in treasuries were held in depreciated Qing cash

King Kojong tried to follow Confucian principles when he came to the throne in 1873: reduced taxes on peasantry and liquidated most of the reserves

Confucian economics was concerned with people’s subsistence but not with their affluence; agriculture was virtually the only legitimate occupation for none-scholar class

Decision-making shifted to state council in 1875

The decade after 1876: the king, the queen, and the government in the centre of political spectrum between the Taewongun with his conservative supporters and radical progressives like Kim Ok-kyun

Encounters with foreign powers

Taewongun’s anti-Catholic persecution in the 1860s:

belief that the missionary movement was the

vanguard of foreign imperialism; 1866 persecution

In 1866: American ship arrived off Pyongyang;

French expedition to Kanghwa; the German

adventure (Ernst Oppert)

1871: American punitive expedition, Kanghwa

Koreans felt that they won victories over Western

barbarians, vindicating Taewongun’s policy of

resistance

Tokugawa Japan’s relations with Choson Korea

were conducted through Tsushima daimyo

Korea and Japan

Relations with China, serving a superior (sadae), with Japan, dealing with a neighbor (kyorin)

In 1868 Japanese envoy arrived in Korea to report the Meiji restoration; Koreans rejected the communication on the grounds of wording (title emperor)

From 1868 to 1873: Japanese attempts to gain Korean recognition of the Japanese government were unsuccessful

Seikan “Conquer Korea” debate in Japan, 1873:

retribution for Korean “insults” and safety valve for

discontent among former samurai class, Saigo

Takamori

Threat of force for diplomatic purposes; Japan did

not regard war as feasible policy alternative

Saigo Takamori

Japanese ship Unyokan, 1875: survey of Korean

coastal area; armed confrontation, city of Yongjiong

razed

To Koreans regarded Kanghwa island was a “door to

national capital”

Unyokan

Kojong’s regime devised a new solution: neutralize

the most dangerous military threat (Japan) in order

to preserve Korea’s defenses against the more

distant and more insidious Western menace

Western missionaries, Western merchandise, and

Western ideas were regarded as the real danger to

Korea, not the Japanese

Kanghwa Treaty 1876

Japanese navy in Pusan, 1876

Signing the Treaty

Korea presented herself as a country dependent

on China, and China described her tributary ties;

fruitless Sino-Japanese negotiations in 1876 and

seeds of conflict over Korea

Li Hung-chang: clause one of the 1871 treaty of

peace and amity between China and Japan

guarded against each other’s dependent countries

(mutual non-aggression)

Mori Arinori: It was incomprehensible that Korea

was called “dependent country” by the Tsungli

Yamen (Chinese foreign office) when Korea was in

full possession of the administration of her

internal and external affairs

Kuroda mission to Korea (with two warships) and

signing the Kanghwa Treaty in February 1876

The treaty recognized Korea as independent chaju

(article one); mutual exchange of envoys; trade at

Pusan and opening two additional ports;

extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Japanese

The supplementary treaty was even more unequal

than Japan’s treaties with Western powers:

purchase Korean goods with Japanese money at

face value, exemption of tariffs on Japanese

exports and imports

Mori: “Treaties would do only for ordinary

commercial relations. But great national decisions are

made according to comparative strength, not according

to treaties.”

Machtpolitik

Mori Arinori

Li Hung-chang

Korea’s seclusion ended, but Koreans considered the treaty a mere affirmation of tradition-sanctioned reality (“diplomacy” was right of China)

The Japanese intended to use the treaty as a means of isolating Korea from the Chinese tributary system

It would take years before exchanging envoys and opening additional ports (Wonsan 1880, Inch’on 1883)

Up to the early 1880s, Japan was contended herself

in seeking the fulfillment of the treaty terms

Reasons: little commercial prospects of Korea;

frustration over Korean intransigence; Satsuma

rebellion (1877)

ID Questions

3. Taewongun

4. Kanghwa Treaty

Sopyonje

Pansori