REFORMING SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS Mario Guadamillas, World Bank

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THE WORLD BANK IN COLLABORATION WITH THE ARAB MONETARY FUND AND THE BAHRAIN MONETARY AGENCYREFORMING PAYMENT AND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS Manama, Bahrein, March 15-17, 2005

REFORMING SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS

Mario Guadamillas, World Bank

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ContentA. Importance of market infrastructure

B. International standards as a guide for the reform

B.1 Evolution of international (regional) standards

B.2 Main factors identified

C. Main challenges for SSSs

C.1 Special consideration of CCPs

D. Interrelations between payments and securities settlement systems

E. Conclusions

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A. IMPORTANCE OF MARKET INFRAESTRUCTURE

Transaction value chain:

Clearing and Settlement key element to determine the infraestructure quality of capital markets

• Trading systems, intermediaries, custodians and asset managers can be easily changed if the inverstor perceives an inadequate level of servce or risk

• Not the case of Clearing and Settlement

Investment Decision

Execution Confimation Clearing and Settlement

Banking and Finance

Asset Servicing

Value-added Services

Transparency Indication of Interest

Allocation Clearance Credit and Cash Management

Income Collection

Pricing Research Execution

and Affirmation Delivery Securities Lending

Corporate Actions

Accountingd

Buy-Sell Decision

Notification Instructions Payment Margin Finance

Tax Reclaim Performace Reporting

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Important changes in the supply and demand for capital,

•Demographics: evolution in the population ratio between prime savers (40-59) and dissavers, (60+) could imply a surplus/deficit in capital supply

•Economics: GDP per capita growth in emerging markets will increase capital demand

will drive to changes in investors’ behavior•Asset reallocation: the investors and their intermediaries

will reallocate assets in the search of increased predictability of returns

•Higher specialization: need to respond to a more differentiated demand


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In the cases of Italy and Japan the trend is even more severewith a ratio “prime savers” vs. “dissavers” of 2:1

In the cases of India and China the trend is an increase of “prime savers” as a percentage of the population


United States

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Others (0-39)

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Changes in the investment strategy•More attention to best execution and low fees

•Outperformance in emerging markets

Differentiated needs from investors•Increased speed and expandable capacity

•“Functional flexibility” in the securitized and structured products area

•Despite the specialized need, there is still a very large investor segment interested in “one size fits all” solution

•Market segments interested in enhanced market transparency and investor protection


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How to provide more efficient and secure Clearing and Settlement services?

•Lower cost

•Reduced operational risk

•Straight through Processing (STP)

•Fully interoperable markets

•Harmonized regulations

•Fair market access

•Adequate oversight of the systems

•Uniform, consistent supervision of market participants

•Etc.


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B.1 EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

The international standards provide a very helpful framework to systematize and address the main factors to be considered for a reform

Despite the process of consolidation and generalization of accepted standards worldwide, some focus on minimum standards while others seek best practices

There is closer attention by international standards to the interaction between payments and securities settlement systems

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Group of Thirty Recommendations Regarding Securities Clearance and Settlement, 1990Objective: “reducing risk, improving efficiency and promoting greater standardization in international settlement”

- Trade comparison,Trade confirmation/affirmation, CSDs, Netting Schemes, DvP, Same day funds, Rolling settlement cycle, Securities lending, Common message standard

Lamfalussy Minimum Standards, 1990 Objective: “cross-border and multi-currency

netting and settlement schemes”- Legal basis, Financial risks, Management of credit and liquidity risks, Admission criteria, Operational reliability of netting schemes

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Technical Committee of IOSCO, 1990 Objective: “contribute to the process of creating an efficient central securities depository from a national regulatory point of view and, at the international level, offering views on how to create links in accordance to the recommendations issued on the subject”

- Regulatory aspects (including SRO role)

- Liquidity risk

- Industry organizational arrangements

- Operational reliability

- Endorses G30 recommendations

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ISSA, 1995 Objective: “amendment of G30 recommendations”

- Trade comparison in T+0 instead of T+1

- Positive affirmation of trade details by indirect market participants by T+1

- Explicit reference to immobilization/dematerialization

- Rules when several CSDs operate in a country in

order to allow for use of funds and cross-collateral

- Choice between a RTGS or “Lamfalussy

Recommendations” compliant netting system for funds settlement

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Emerging Markets Committe of IOSCO, 1997 Objective: “study on the legal and regulatory framework for clearing and settlement in emerging markets”

- Legal and custody issues

IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 1998 Objectives: “The principles are based upon three main objectives of securities regulation: protection of investors; ensure that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; reduction of systemic risk”

- SSSs should be subject to regulatory oversight and designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that thay reduce systemic risk

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FIVB, Clearing and Settlement Best Practices Report, 1999 Objective: “to enable FIBV members and their respective clearing and settlement organizations to score their performance against benchmarks and best practices, and to identify areas in their processes where improvements should be considered”

- Trade confirmation, Settlement cycles, Securities lending, CSDs and risk controls, DvP, Operational reliability, Efficiency, Netting schemes, Systems integration

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ISSA, New Recommendations, 2000 Objective: “to tackle key risks in today’s world of settlement and clearance”

- Governance of infrastructure

- Technology: core processing

- Technology: messaging and standards

- Uniform market practice

- Reduction of settlement risk

- Market linkages

- Investor protection

- Securities lending

- Legal infrastructure

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CPSS, Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, 2001 Public Policy Objectives: “safety and efficiency”

Introduction of the SIPS concept

- Ten principles: legal foundation (CPI), understanding and management of risks (CP II and III), settlement (CPs IV-VI), security, operational reliability and contingency arrangements (CP VII), efficiency and practicality (CP VIII), criteria for participation (CP IX) and governance (CP X)

- Four central bank’s responsibilities: objectives and policy (A), observance of CPs (B and C), cooperation (D)

- Not specific for SSSs but relevant

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CPSS-IOSCO, Recommendations for SSSs, 2001 Objective: “to promote implementation by SSSs of measures that can enhance international financial stability, reduce risks, increase efficiency and provide safeguards for investors by developing recommendations for the design, operation and oversight of such systems”

19 Recommendations

- Legal risk- Pre-settlement risk (including CCPs)- Settlement risk- Operational risk- Custody risk- Other issues (governance, access, efficiency, communication procedures and standards, transparecy, regulation and oversight, risks in cross-border links)

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G30, New Recommendations, 2003Objective: “to establish a set of new recommendations focused on the cross-border and international context that go beyond minimum standards and try to identify best practices”

- Building a strengthened interoperable global network

- Strengthening network safety and stability

- Improving governanceCPSS-IOSCO Task Force, Risk Management

Standards for Central Counterparties, November 2004

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B.1 EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL STANDARDS

EMI, Standards for the use of EU Securities Settlement Systems in ESCB Credit Operations”, 1998Objective: “assessing the soundness of SSSs seeking to qualify for involvement in monetary policy and intraday credit operations”

- Legal soundness

- Settlement in central bank money

- No undue custody risks

- Regulation and/or control by competent authorities

- Transparency of risks and conditions for participation in a system

- Risk management procedures

- Intraday finality of settlement

- Operating hours and days

- Operational reliability of technical systems and availability of adequate back-up facilities

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Giovannini Group 1st Report, 15 Barriers to the EU C&S Integration, 2002

Giovannini Group 2nd Report, Action proposals for removing barriers, 2003

Objective: “conduct a comprehensive analysis of clearing and settlement arrangements for equities, fixed-income securities and derivatives”

15 Barriers to efficient cross-border settlement:

- Technical requirements/market practice

- Differences in tax procedures

- Issues related to legal certainty

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ESCB-CESR Standards for Securities Clearing and Settlement Systems in the European Union (consultative report), 2003

Objective: “to increase the safety, soundness and efficiency of securities clearing and settlement systems in the European Union”

- Based on CPSS-IOSCO recommendations

- Beyond recommendations (standards) to be used as a regulatory tool

- Identifying “systemically important institutions”

- Standards to major custodian banks

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B.1 EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (SUMMARY)

Standards/Best Practices

G30/1989 IOSCO/1990 G30/ISSA1995 IOSCO/1997 IOSCO/1998 FIBV/1999 ISSA/2000CPSS-

IOSCO/2001 NEWG30/2002 COSRA1996 ESCB1998

Legal FrameworkSec. 2, 4, 6 Sec. 13.8 Rec. 8 Rec. 1 Rec. 14; 15; 16 Stand. 1

Trade ConfirmationRec. 1, 2

Sec. 2.3.1; 2.3.2 Rec. 1, 2 Sec. 13.10 Rec. 2 Rec. 5 Rec. 2 Rec. 1; 5

Settlement Cycles Rec. 7 Sec. 2.3.7 Rec. 7 Rec. 3 Rec. 5 Rec. 3

Central CounterpartiesRec. 4

Rec. 6; 9; 15; 16

Securities LendingRec. 8 Sec. 2.3.8 Rec. 8 Sec. 5 Sec. 13.11.3 Sec. 8.3.5 Rec. 5 Rec. 5 Rec. 7

Central Securities Depositories Rec. 3 Sec. 2; 2.3.3 Rec. 3 Sec. 1 Sec. 8.3.6 Rec. 6 Rec. 1Delivery versus Payment Rec. 5 Sec. 2.3.5 Rec. 5 Sec. 5 Sec. 8.2.1 Rec. 5 Rec. 7 Rec. 13Timing of Settlement Finality Rec. 6 Sec. 2.3.6 Rec. 6 Sec. 5 Rec. 8 Rec. 8 Stand. 7CSD risk controls to address participant's failures to settle

Sec. 8.2.2; 8.2.3 Rec. 9 Rec. 9 Stand. 6

Cash Settlement Assets Rec. 10 Stand. 2

Operational Reliability Sec. 2.2.4 to 2.2.9 Rec. 1 Rec. 2 Rec .11 Rec. 11; 12 Prin. 2; 5 Stand. 9

Protection of customers' securities Sec. 1.1 Sec. 2, 3, 4 Rec. 12 Stand. 3

GovernanceSec. 1.5 Rec. 4 Rec. 13 Rec. 13; 17; 18

AccessSec. 1.4; 2.2.3 Rec. 14 Rec. 10; 19 Prin. 1; 4

Efficiency Rec. 1; 4 Rec. 1 Rec. 15 Rec. 1

Communication Procedures and Standards

Rec. 9 Sec. 2.3.9 Rec. 9 Rec. 3 Rec. 16 Rec. 2; 3Transparency Sec. 2.2.10 Rec. 17 Rec. 19 Stand. 5

Regulation and oversightSec. 2.2.1; 2.2.11

Sec. 13.8; 13.9 Rec. 7 Rec. 18 Rec. 18 Prin. 3 Stand. 4

Risks in cross-border links Rec. 6 Rec. 19 Rec. 4

Netting Schemes Rec. 4 Sec. 2.3.4 Sec. 13.11.2 Rec. 5 Rec. 5Systems integration Sec. 8.1.5Liquidity Risk Sec. 1.2 Prin. 2SRO Role Sec. 1.3 Prin. 3Code of Good Practice Rec. 6

Operating Hours and Days Stand. 8

GLOBAL REGIONAL

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B.2 MAIN FACTORS IDENTIFIED

Legal & custody C&S processes: trade confirmation, settlement cycles,

systems integration, securities lending, communication procedures standards and securities identification

Settlement risk: CSDs, DvP, timing of settlement finality, risk management mechanisms, cash settlement assets,netting versus gross schemes, liquidity risk

CCPs Operational reliability Regulatory&Oversight (including SRO role) Organizational arrangements: participation

requirements, governance, transparency Cross-border Cost-efficiency

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B.2 MAIN FACTORS IDENTIFIED

LEGAL&CUSTODY

C&S PROCESSES

SETTLEMENT RISK

CCP

OPERATIONAL

REG.&OVERSIGHT

ORG. ARRANGEMENTS

CROSS-BORDER

COST-EFFICIENCY

G30 IOSCO G30/ISSA IOSCO IOSCO FIBV ISSA CPSSIOSCO

NEWG301989 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000

2001

2002

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C. MAIN CHALLENGES FOR SSSs

Legal Framework and Custody Risk

- Trading takes place global while underlying legal systems continue to be domestic

* Absence of a unique framework for the treatment of security interests* Problems with legal certainty in collateralized transactions* Uneven application of national conflict of law rules

- Finality: importance to adapt financial institutions bankruptcy legislation to protect SSSs

- Enforceability of security interests provided under collateral arrangements, legal basis for netting,

electronic documents and signatures (for developing systems)

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Legal Framework and Custody Risk

- The Hague Securities Convention. Unique legal framework for:

* Transfer of the collateral to the pledgee* Power of disposal over collateral* The order in which creditors have rights to the collateral* The duties of the intermadiary actually holding the pledged securities in custody* The correct procedure for realizing the collateral* Rules regarding claims to dividends and the rights associated to securities while they are pledged.

- Not yet applicable. Incorporation to national legal frameworks expected by the end of 2006

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Clearing and settlement processes

- Standardization of messaging standards and communication protocols

- Synchronization of timing among systems

- National differences in settlement cycles

- Tax and other impediments to securities lending and borrowing

- Mix of securities and money markets settlement procedures creates problems for market

development (different settlement needs)

- Diversity of trading and settlement mechanims and procedures even for similar type of securities

- Eliminate paper processing (for developing systems)

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Settlement risk

- CCPs: risk reduction but higher risk concentration

- Increasing need to ensure financial integrity. Delicate balance between access and competition

- Reduction of the settlement cycle not always accompanied by reduction of settlement risk

- Systemically important systems must have adequate risk management mechanisms

- Settlement assurance procedures (for developing systems)

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Operational issues

Interoperability of global network (more than technical compability of systems)

- Global identification methodology to facilitate STP

- National differences in IT and interfaces

- Practical impediments to remote access

Need to accommodate increasing volume of traffic and volatility in markets

Adequate contingency procedures and back-up systems (for developing systems)

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Regulation & oversight

Increasing importance of settlement issues for securities regulators and role of SROs

- No role in operating systems

- More attention to regulation and oversight. Dual roles: public policy framework for competition and prudential oversight

- Increasing need to coordinate with other regulators/supervisors, specially central bank, both domestically and internationally

- Interaction with private sector through SROs. Importance of overlaps/gaps in regulation and supervision

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Organizational arrangements

Governance of infrastructure is a key issue for markets integration

- Transparency: full disclosure to system users

- Non discrimination: fair access to SSSs

- No single group or single interest group with majority control

- Effective attention to users interests

Access to liquidity can be an important obstacle (interaction with funds transfer system)

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Cross-border settlement

- Inconsistent legal and regulatory underpinnings

- Lack of globally recognized technical standards

- Differing business processes

- Differences in tax procedures

These problems lead to higher costs due to

- Direct costs from higher fees of the services provided

- Indirect costs from extra back-office facilities

- Opportunity costs from inefficient use of collateral and higher incidence of failed trades

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Cost-efficiency issues- Level of market competition on clearing and

settlement organizations is low (lack of direct competitors to use as a benchmark), thus, alternatively in-house unit costing techniques need to be developed.

- Composition on costs is changing rapidly with diminishing IT costs. Increasing use of outsourcing

- Small value transactions normally subsidized by imposing higher charges on large value transactions.

- Many systems may be under-recovering their operating costs

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C.1. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF CCPs

Benefits

Attributed to multilateral netting

- Reduction in the number of settlements

- Reduction in individual contractual obligations

- May help reduce the margins required to collateralize current and potential future credit exposures

- May help to reduce the capital required to support participant’s trading activity

- Helps to sustain anonymity where trade execution process itself is anonymous

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Benefits

Provides risk management services

- Replaces exposures to multiple counterparties with a single exposure to a single counterparty

- No worry about the creditworthiness to a single counterparty

- Does not eliminate counterparty credit risk, but redistribute it much more efficiently than market participants could do in isolation

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RisksLegal and technical risks (not specific to CCPs but higher potential systemic impact)Principal risk (reduction but concentration)Replacement cost risks (not specific to CCPs but higher potential systemic impact)

Risk management tools Financial and operational requirements (to minimize probability of failure of a market participant)Margins (to minimize the loss if a participants fails)Limit build-up of exposures by means of periodic settlement of positions (normally used in derivative markets)

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Main concerns

Concentration of risk

Moral hazard (too big to fail)

Information asymmetry is reduced but only if CCP is perceived to be solvent

Competition between CCPs could negatively affect risk management standards

A single CCP would maximize externalities and economies of scale but could produce potential inefficiencies (lack of innovation). Need of appropriate governance rules

Contagion effects (cross-process, cross-products, cross currencies)

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Main issues to be considered Legal Framework Participation Requirements Understanding Risks Novation Settlement Default Procedures Risk Controls

• Margins/Guarantee fund/Loss Sharing Governance Operational Risk Regulatory Reporting

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D. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN PAYMENTSAND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS

Timing of settlement finality – Careful analysis of design, procedures, operational timetables and funding cut-off times– SSSs settlement end-of-day, intra-day, real-time?

Cash settlement asset and settlement agent risks– Is central bank money used? – Credit, liquidity, and operational risks– Management of a settlement agent’s failure– Concentration of settlement flows– Who has access to the funds transfer system– Participants ability to choose a settlement agent– Range of services provided by agent– Participants’ views on agent’s competitive neutrality– Arrangements for funding/defunding accounts

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D. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN PAYMENTSAND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS

Higher potential contagion effects in the financial system from the use of CCPs

Impact of SSSs on the implementation of monetary policy

Impact of SSSs on the liquidity management of the system (increasingly important with the generalized use of RTGS systems)

Impact of SSSs on the fiscal policy (especially for development markets)

Need of coordination between central bank and securities regulator

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E. MAIN CONCLUSIONS

Integrated approach for SSSs

Integration of payments and securities settlement

SSSs recognized as incurring same inherent risks as those associated with SIPS

Consolidation of SSSs functions (efficiency gains, risk reduction, higher concentration of risk)

Cross-border settlement main obstacles: differences in legal & regulatory frameworks, lack of enough technical and processes standardization, differences in tax procedures

Domestic settlement main challenges: legal issues (finality, collateral), adequate risk management procedures (beyond DvP), adequate coordination with other regulators and cooperation with the private sector

SSSs reform an on-going process

REFORMING SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS Mario Guadamillas, World Bank

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