References - Home - Springer978-0-230-30… ·  · 2017-08-25References 223 Banco de México...

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References Aberbach, Joel (1990) Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution. Aberbach, Joel (2002) ‘What Has Happened to the Watchful Eye?’, Congress and the Presidency, 29: 3–23. Ackerman, John M. (2007) Organismo Autónomos y Democracia. El Caso de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM-Siglo XXI. Alba Vega, Carlos (1993) ‘La microindustria ante la liberalización económica y el Tratado del Libre Comercio’, Foro Internacional, 33: 453–483. Alesina, Alberto (1988) ‘Macroeconomics and Politics’ in Fischer, Stanley (ed.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research. Alesina, Alberto and Drazen, Allan (1991) ‘Why are Stabilizations Delayed?’, American Economic Review, 81(5): 1170–1188. Alesina, Alberto and Gatti, Roberta (1995) ‘Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?’, American Economic Review, 85: 196–200. Alesina, Alberto and Summers, Lawrence H. (1993) ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money and Banking, 25(May): 151–162. Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2004) ‘Bureaucrats or Politicians?’, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2009. Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2005) ‘Why Do Politicians Delegate?’, NBER Working Paper No. W11531. Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2007) ‘Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task’, American Economic Review, 97(1): 169–179. Alonso, Angelina and López, Roberto (1986) El sindicalismo de trabajadores petroleros y sus relaciones con PEMEX y el Estado: 1970–1985. México, El Colegio de México. Alvide, Gilberto (1998) ‘Diseño y operación de instituciones reguladoras. El caso de la CRE y la industria del gas natural después de 1995’, Mexico, FLACSO-Sede Mexico, Masters thesis in Government and Public Affairs, Gobierno y Asuntos Públicos. Amaya, María de Lourdes (1997) ‘Oportunidades y obstáculos para la autonomía administrativa en México: El caso de la Comisión Federal de Competencia’, Mexico, CIDE Documentos de Trabajo, División de Administración Pública No. 70. Angell, Alan, Lowden, Pamela and Thorp, Rosemary (2001) Decentralizing Develop- ment: The Political Economy of Institutional Change in Colombia and Chile, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Aoki, Masahiko (2000) Information, Corporate Governance and Institutional Diver- sity: Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, and the Transitional Economies, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 221

Transcript of References - Home - Springer978-0-230-30… ·  · 2017-08-25References 223 Banco de México...

References

Aberbach, Joel (1990) Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of CongressionalOversight, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution.

Aberbach, Joel (2002) ‘What Has Happened to the Watchful Eye?’, Congress andthe Presidency, 29: 3–23.

Ackerman, John M. (2007) Organismo Autónomos y Democracia. El Caso de México,Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM-Siglo XXI.

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Alesina, Alberto (1988) ‘Macroeconomics and Politics’ in Fischer, Stanley (ed.)NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge, National Bureau of EconomicResearch.

Alesina, Alberto and Drazen, Allan (1991) ‘Why are Stabilizations Delayed?’,American Economic Review, 81(5): 1170–1188.

Alesina, Alberto and Gatti, Roberta (1995) ‘Independent Central Banks: LowInflation at No Cost?’, American Economic Review, 85: 196–200.

Alesina, Alberto and Summers, Lawrence H. (1993) ‘Central Bank Independenceand Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal ofMoney and Banking, 25(May): 151–162.

Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2004) ‘Bureaucrats or Politicians?’, HarvardInstitute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2009.

Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2005) ‘Why Do Politicians Delegate?’,NBER Working Paper No. W11531.

Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2007) ‘Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I:A Single Policy Task’, American Economic Review, 97(1): 169–179.

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